

PROFUSELY

ILLUSTRATED

HISTORY OF THE  
**TURKO-RUSSIAN**  
**WAR**





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
















READING WAR PLACARDS AT CONSTANTINOPLE



HISTORICAL NARRATIVE  
OF THE  
TURKO-RUSSIAN WAR.

A HISTORY OF THE WAR COMMENCED IN APRIL, 1877, BETWEEN RUSSIA AND TURKEY; PRECEDED BY A SUMMARY OF  
THE EVENTS WHICH LED UP TO THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES, INCLUDING THE

SERVIAN AND MONTENEGRIN CAMPAIGNS OF 1876.


WITH CHAPTERS UPON THE CONSTITUTION AND RESOURCES OF THE TWO EMPIRES, THEIR NATIONAL HABITS AND  
CUSTOMS, AND THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE REMAINING STATES OF EUROPE.

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# CONTENTS.

CHAP.	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	1
I. THE EMPIRE OF TURKEY	3
Sect. 1. Turkey in Europe	3
" 2. Turkey in Asia and Africa	5
" 3. The Races of European Turkey	5
" 4. Turkish Conquests	8
" 5. The Character of Turkish Conquests	23
II. RELIGION, GOVERNMENT, AND MANNERS OF THE TURKS	24
Sect. 1. Religion	24
" 2. Government	29
III. THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE	40
IV. FORMER TURKO-RUSSIAN WARS	55
V. THE CHRISTIAN INSURRECTIONS (1875-6)	70
VI. BULGARIA	77
VII. ENGLISH POLICY	88
VIII. THE SERBIAN WAR	94
IX. MONTENEGRO	103
X. THE OUTBREAK OF WAR	106
XI. ON THE DANUBE	113
XII. BRITISH INTERESTS	126
XIII. THE FIRST ADVANCE IN ARMENIA	134
XIV. THE CAUCASIAN REVOLT	140
XV. THE CROSSING OF THE DANUBE	144
XVI. THE WAR IN MONTENEGRO	158
XVII. MORE NEGOTIATIONS	161



CHAP.	PAGE
XVIII. THE ADVANCE INTO BULGARIA ...	173
XIX. RUSSIAN REVERSES IN ASIA ...	182
XX. GOURKO ACROSS THE BALKANS ...	189
XXI. OSMAN PACHA AT PLEVNA ...	202
XXII. THE DEFENCE OF THE SCHIPKA PASS ...	219
XXIII. MEHEMET ALI'S ADVANCE ...	230
XXIV. PUBLIC OPINION IN TURKEY ...	237
XXV. PUBLIC OPINION IN RUSSIA ...	248
XXVI. OPINION IN ENGLAND ...	266
XXVII. THE ROUMANIAN ADVANCE ...	275
XXVIII. THE THIRD ATTACK ON PLEVNA ...	283
XXIX. TURKEY AND GREECE ...	306
XXX. MONTENEGRIN SUCCESES ...	320
XXXI. THE SECOND SIEGE OF KARS ...	342
XXXII. THE LAST LULL IN BULGARIA ...	370
XXXIII. THE INVESTMENT OF PLEVNA ...	378
XXXIV. THE ARMY OF RELIEF ...	385
XXXV. THE FALL OF PLEVNA ...	403
XXXVI. THE HORRORS OF WAR ...	414
XXXVII. THE RESULTS OF PLEVNA ...	428
XXXVIII. THE ADVANCE ON THE BALKANS ...	441
XXXIX. END OF THE ASIAN CAMPAIGN ...	450



# HISTORY OF THE TURKO-RUSSIAN WAR.

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## INTRODUCTION.

A FEW words will be sufficient to show why this "History of the Turko-Russian War" is undertaken—what it will attempt to do, and on what grounds it has appeared that a popular account of the Eastern question would be welcome to English readers.

The interest aroused in this country by the struggle between Turkey and Russia is complex in its nature. It arises, in part, from the fact that the condition of the Turkish empire is supposed to have an important bearing upon the safety of our great Indian dependency; partly from the fact that Russia is believed by some to have aggressive designs upon British India; and partly, again, from the unalterable belief of many Englishmen that Russia will never rest until she secures the possession of Constantinople. Whatever force there may be in these arguments—and it is not the aim of the present work to enter into any controversy of a political character, or to advocate the special views of any political party—there can be no doubt that they have commended themselves to a vast number of persons, and that they have been maintained with great tenacity, not only by Conservatives, but also by a considerable body of Liberals. On the other hand, there are many who believe that the danger to England of Russian aggression has been greatly exaggerated; that Russia cannot contemplate anything so wild as an attack upon our Indian empire; that she does not even desire to possess Constantinople; that, at all events, the other great powers of

Europe are as much concerned as England in preventing her from establishing herself on the Bosphorus; that, in the present war, she has not been guided by aggressive motives; that, however unworthy by her past history to be considered as the champion of humanity and civilisation, she does, in fact, occupy that proud position; that, on this account, she deserves our sympathy up to a certain point, and all the more so because, in the opinion of many, our attack upon her in the Crimean war was an act of folly, if not of injustice. Add to this, that the crimes of Turkey against her Christian subjects in Europe, culminating in the terrible massacres in Bulgaria in the spring of 1876, aroused the indignation of Englishmen to fever-heat, and it will readily be admitted that the interest felt in the last phase of the Eastern question by those who sympathise with Russia must be as great as the interest of those who have steadily refused to give Russia credit for any but the most selfish designs.

The divergence of opinions amongst Englishmen in these respects has been as remarkable as anything of the kind recorded in the annals of our history. We have always prided ourselves on the manner in which we have stood together in the presence of any actual danger from the enemies of our country, and shown a firm and united front to any foreign nation from whom there might be reason to anticipate a hostile movement. In this case, however, from the moment when the Christian dependencies of Turkey were seen to be thoroughly aroused against their rulers, and more especially from



the moment when the irregular troops of the Porte had suppressed the insurrection in Bulgaria with such desperate cruelty, a strong feeling was manifested throughout the country, not only in condemnation of Turkish misgovernment, but also emphatically demanding that England should never take another step in the defence of Turkey against her enemies. The agitation of the public mind during the autumn of 1876, aggravated as it was by the fact of its proceeding chiefly from the Liberal party, naturally did much to embarrass the Conservative government. This government was too much attached to the long-recognised Eastern policy of England, which deemed the maintenance of Turkish integrity and independence necessary to the imperial interests of the country, to yield without reluctance to the abandonment of that policy. Lord Beaconsfield, and one or two of his colleagues, made the mistake of holding public opinion too lightly; whilst some of the Liberal leaders, on their part, made the opposite mistake of thinking that a policy could be thrown aside as easily as a bill in Parliament. The controversy became very bitter, and much was said and done on both sides which the sayers and doers have no doubt, in their calmer moments, regretted.

Nevertheless, the upshot of the agitation was that the former policy of England in Eastern Europe, in accordance with which we had spent so much blood and money during the Crimean war, was seen to be no longer tenable. The vast majority of Englishmen, and a considerable majority in the two houses of Parliament, recognised the fact that this country could never make itself the ally of the Porte for the mere purpose of propping up the corrupt Turkish empire. In so far as our interests abroad—that is to say, chiefly, in India—had been supposed to be identified with the interests of Turkey, it was acknowledged that we were precluded by the higher interests of civilisation and morality from defending them. The great question for England then became a question as to where our interest in Turkey must for the future be considered to begin and end. The steps which have been taken

towards the solution of this question—whether by the efforts of English statesmen, or by the force of circumstances—will be found recorded in the following pages.

Meanwhile, the controversy to which reference has been made did not cease to rage in England. It was maintained by the bulk of the Liberal party, in and out of Parliament, with Mr. Gladstone for their principal exponent; and they justified what their opponents declared to be a partisan or an unpatriotic course by declaring their belief that the government were still unduly inclined to encourage Turkey, both directly and by the display of suspicion and jealousy against Russia. They further asserted that the attempt of the great powers to bring Turkey to reason without a war had been frustrated in great measure by the fact that the English government had refused to enter heartily into any scheme proposed by Russia for the settlement of the difficulty. Turkey, they said, would not have resisted all Europe, and would not have ventured upon a war with Russia, if she had not been convinced that England would sooner or later come to her assistance; and the English government had made itself in part responsible for the war, by failing to make the Porte understand that our alliance with it was absolutely impossible.

It is, of course, not to be supposed that English opinion on the Eastern question is fully or accurately described as a heated controversy—a contest between opposing ideas, and a constant appeal to the judgment or passions of the masses. There is a higher view than this—a view which does more credit to our heads and hearts, and which is at the same time more thoroughly true. The wisest and most candid men of both political parties, as well as those who belong to no party, began to see distinctly—in 1876, if not years before—that the great problem connected with the rule of Turkey in Europe, which had been a source of trouble to every European power in almost every generation, was at length ripe for solution. They saw that the men of today had inherited the Eastern question from

their forefathers—that the difficulties so long shirked must be fairly faced at last, and that the evils so long borne could be endured no longer. They saw that the Ottoman power had been put to the test and found wanting; it had had every opportunity of conciliating its subjects and its neighbours, and of creating a moral right over the country which it had wrested by physical force, and it had failed. They saw, in short, that the time had come when the utter hopelessness of Turkish rule had been made apparent; and they consequently rose above the clamour and distractions of party, and waited with calmness for the issue of events.

Such, in outline, is the course of public opinion in England during the recent crisis, and the strength with which this opinion has been urged or entertained is sufficiently accounted for by the fact that England has at least as much concern in the Eastern question as any power in Europe. The interest naturally attaching to such a war as that between Russia and Turkey is magnified in no small degree by the heated controversy which has been carried on in this country; and there can be no doubt that a “History of the Turko-Russian War” will command a closer attention from Englishmen than the account of any struggle between foreign powers in which they have no direct concern.

The following narrative will deal not only with the war itself, of which it will be to some extent a contemporary record, but also with the Eastern question in its earlier and later phases. It will also treat, with a certain amount of detail, of the nations and races which play the leading parts in the momentary conflict. Of Russia and Turkey, their geographical features, their customs and governments, their subject populations, and the leading points of their history, so much may with advantage be said as will serve to throw a stronger light on their hereditary enmities and their constantly-renewed struggles. A mere account of battles and sieges, with more or less military detail, and more or less disquisition on the wisdom or folly of the generals, might possibly be of

greater value and interest to a few. The present work aims simply at being a comprehensive and popular sketch of the whole question. Its object will be achieved if it succeeds in being readable, entertaining, and at the same time accurate in the statement of facts.

The compiler desires to acknowledge at the outset the obligations which he must necessarily incur towards the authors of a number of recent books dealing with various sections of the subject. The titles of these books will be found quoted from time to time as the work proceeds.

## CHAPTER I.

### THE EMPIRE OF TURKEY.

THE Ottoman dynasty holds sway over a vast extent of territory, occupying adjacent portions of Europe, Asia and Africa, and having outlets upon the eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf. The whole population is estimated at over forty millions, which includes both the direct subjects of the Porte and the inhabitants of the countries only nominally dependent upon the Sultan. The total area of the empire is about thirty thousand geographical square miles.\*

#### *Sect. 1. Turkey in Europe.*

The Turks themselves give the name of Roumelia to their European possessions as a whole; the word being derived from the Greek-speaking Roumans (*Romaioi*) conquered by the Mahomedans on their first incursion from Asia. To this day the followers of the Prophet throughout Southern and Western Asia speak of the Sultan of Turkey as the Sultan of Roum. The country directly subject to the Porte is divided into ten vilayets, in addition to the separate metropolitan district of Constantinople. These vilayets comprise (1.) The vilayet of the Danube,

\* For the preliminary details concerning the Turkish empire, I am indebted in part to the Introduction of Mr Maccoll's “Eastern Question,”



or Bulgaria, bounded by the River Danube, the Black Sea, the Balkans, and Servia; (2.) Adrianople, south of the Balkans, stretching from the Black Sea and the district of Constantinople to Selanik; (3.) Selanik, or Salonica, corresponding partly to the ancient Macedonia; (4.) Monastir, west of Selanik, and extending to Scutari and Yanina; (5, 6.) Scutari and Yanina, corresponding with Albania and Epirus, sloping down to the Adriatic, and extending from Montenegro on the north to Greece on the south; (7.) Bosnia, including Turkish Croatia; (8.) Herzegovina, bounded by Bosnia, Dalmatia and Montenegro; (9.) The islands of the eastern Archipelago, excepting Samos; and (10.) The island of Crete.

The population of these several districts, with the respective proportions of Mussulman and non-Mussulman inhabitants, has been estimated as follows\* (though it is right to say that, according to other accounts, the proportion of Mussulmans to non-Mussulmans in Europe is reckoned as low as one in seven):—

Vilayets.	Mussulmans.	Non-Mussulmans.	Total.
Adrianople ...	603,110	991,076	1,594,186
Danube..	1,055,650	1,535,466	2,591,116
Bosnia and Herzegovina }	619,044	613,414	1,232,458
Salonica. ...	249,656	248,314	497,970
Yanina... ..	501,498	935,202	1,436,700
Monastir. ...	795,986	611,610	1,407,596
Scutari... ..	176,000	224,000	400,000
Constantinople	620,000	580,000	1,200,000
Crete ... ..	93,112	118,888	212,000
Islands... ..	114,360	305,640	420,000
	4,828,416	6,163,610	10,992,026

Taking this estimate as approximating to the truth, it appears that the subjects of Turkey in Europe professing the Mahomedan faith are considerably less numerous than those of other creeds—who, with the exception of about a quarter of a million Jews and gypsies, may be set

\* In "The Present State of the Ottoman Empire," by Ubicini and de Courteille; published in France.

down as Christians. The majority of the Christians belong to the Greek Church; whilst those who are described as Mahomedans include a large number of "converts" from Christianity, who have frequently adopted the creed of their conquerors in order to be left secure in the possession of their property.

Of the vassal states of Roumania and Servia, and of Montenegro, more will have to be said hereafter. They are included in the following estimate of the entire population of European Turkey, as given by Mr. Lewis Farley.\*

Ottomans ... ..	1,150,000
Slavs ... ..	7,200,000
Greeks ... ..	1,450,000
Albanians ... ..	1,500,000
Roumanians ... ..	4,000,000
Armenians ... ..	400,000
Jews ... ..	70,000
Tartars ... ..	16,000
Gypsies ... ..	214,000
	16,000,000

The religious creeds are distributed, according to the same authority, as under:—

Mussulmans ... ..	3,200,000
Greek Church and Armenians	11,600,000
Roman Catholics ... ..	890,000
Jews, &c. ... ..	240,000
	15,930,000

This is evidently an estimate in round numbers; and it may be said with respect to the population of Turkey in general, that nothing like certainty can be obtained. It is worth while, however, to observe, before we pass on, how large a stake the Slav race possesses in the countries under the direct rule or the suzerainty of the Sultan. This important race overlaps the frontiers of Austria; a fact, as we shall see further on, which forms one of the chief disturbing elements in the Eastern question.

\* "Turks and Christians."

*Sect. 2. Turkey in Asia and Africa.*

Asiatic Turkey consists of Asia Minor, Armenia, Kurdistan, Syria and Arabia. It is bounded on the north and west by the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea, and on the east by Transcaucasian Russia, Persia, and the Persian Gulf.

African Turkey consists of the viceroyalty of Egypt and the States of Tripoli and Tunis. The mode and degree of Turkish rule in its widely extended dominions is very various. The vilayets of Europe and the whole of the Asiatic provinces are reckoned as the direct possessions of the Porte; the three African States are independent in every respect except the payment of an annual tribute, and the supply of a contingent of troops in time of war; whilst Servia and Roumania are held liable for the tribute, but not for the contingent.

The Turkish government has estimated the entire population of its empire as follows:—

Europe ... ..	18,487,000
Asia ... ..	16,463,000
Africa ... ..	6,050,000
	<hr/>
	41,000,000

According to the French work already quoted, the distribution of races, excluding the tributary States, is as follows:—

1. The Turkish group (Ottomans, Turkomans and Tartars) ...	14,020,000
2. The Greek-Latin ... ..	3,520,000
3. The Slavs (Croats, Serbs, Bulgarians, Cossacks) ... ..	4,550,000
4. The Georgians (Circassians, &c.)	1,020,000
5. The Hindus, or Gypsies ... ..	212,000
6. The Persians (Armenians, Kurds, Druses, &c.) ... ..	3,620,000
7. The Semitic group (Jews, Arabs, Syrians, &c.) ... ..	1,611,000
	<hr/>
	28,553,000

Of these twenty-eight and a half millions, about

eighteen and a half are reckoned as Mussulmans, and nine and a half as Christians. The latter are thus divided:—Greek Church, 3,225,000; Bulgarian Christians, 2,920,000; Armenians, 2,450,000; Roman Catholics, 670; Protestant, 5,000; and the remainder belong to other Christian sects.

*Sect. 3. The Races of European Turkey.*

One principal reason for the weakness of the Turkish empire is the fact that its populations are, to a large extent, distinct from each other in race, language, religion, and manners. If the rule of Turkey had been a firm, judicious and benevolent rule, these various populations might have become welded together by common interests. If the government of Turkey had been well-defined, equal and just—if there had been any religious tolerance, any open career for the industry and talent of her subjects, any encouragement or security for trade, any sure guarantee for property and life—the whole people would have grown together into a united nation, as the people of other states, in Western Europe especially, have done. But, instead of a strong and just rule, these wretched populations on the south-east of Europe have been tormented and harassed for five centuries by the most oppressive and obscene tyranny which was ever exercised, during so long a period, in any country in the world. The Turkish conquerors have looked upon and employed their victims as so many beasts of burden. They have never made a serious attempt to govern them for any other purpose than to drain them of their property as fast as they could accumulate it. The Sultan and his ministers have perpetually exacted tributes and taxes, entirely indifferent as to whether the unhappy people were prosperous or the reverse; and the officials throughout the country have fully comprehended that the great, if not the only important object of their appointment was to force as much as possible from every one, and from the despised Christian rayahs in particular. But this is not by any means the worst form of oppression to which the Turks have subjected their victims. Neither



life nor liberty has been respected by the barbarous conquerors, from the date of their first successes in the fourteenth century down to the present day. For a long five hundred years the honour of no man, and the chastity of no woman, has been safe against the rage and lust of Mahomedan hordes. Further on, we shall have occasion to go more deeply into this subject; but for the present we have merely to consider what the people of South-eastern Europe originally were, before the Asiatic invaders imposed upon them their baneful tyranny.

To go back to the twelfth century, we find the map of Europe presenting a marked contrast to its present configuration. The later Greek empire, which was called the Byzantine empire, from the ancient name of Constantinople (*Byzantium*), included the whole promontory of modern Turkey and Greece, having for its northern boundary the line of the Balkan Mountains, continued to the Adriatic Sea at a point adjacent to Scodra, the present Scutari. This empire extended into Asia Minor, including the coast from Rhodes to Sinope, and stretching inland to the borders of the kingdom of Roum—or, as it was sometimes called from the name of its most numerous inhabitants, the Seljucian empire. On the north of the Byzantine empire in Europe, two kingdoms occupied the belt of territory between the Balkans and the Danube, from the Black Sea to the Adriatic. The kingdom of Bulgaria stretched from the mouths of the Danube westward about as far as the Timok; whilst Servia, in addition to its present limits, ran south as far as Sophia, and included the shores of the Adriatic between Ragusa and Scutari.

Centuries and centuries before this time we find the districts occupied by races whose names are familiar to us in the history of ancient Greece. The Thracians held the country south of the Balkans, as far west as the modern Kara Su River, and the Despot-Dagh Mountains, which formerly went by the name of Rhodope. The Macedonians dwelt west of the Thracians, extending south to Mount Olympus, and westward

nearly as far as Lake Ochrida; the twenty-first meridian separating them from the Illyrians, who held a long strip of territory on the coast of the Adriatic, corresponding approximately to the modern Dalmatia, Bosnia, Montenegro, and Albania. The modern Servia and Bulgaria roughly answer to what was known as upper and lower Moesia; whilst, north of these, the Dacians peopled the left banks of the Danube, extending far into modern Hungary.

Now, between the two periods to which these two configurations of South-eastern Europe refer, the Byzantine empire was founded. The later Roman emperors turned their attention to Byzantium more than once. Severus laid it in ruins in the year 196 A. C. Constantine rebuilt it between 324 and 330, and called it after his own name. Sixty-five years later, Theodosius divided his wide empire amongst his sons; from which time forward the Eastern Roman Empire was separated from the Western, preserving its independence until the year 1453, when the last emperor gave place to Sultan Mahomet II.

Of the Roman conquests in what is now the Turkish empire, Mr. E. A. Freeman gives us a concise account in his recently published work on the "Ottoman Power in Europe." "In Eastern Europe the Romans found a nation more civilised than themselves, a nation which they conquered politically, but to which in everything else they were as ready to look up as the nations of the west were ready to look up to them. This was the Greek nation. When the Romans conquered the south-eastern lands they found there three great races—the Greek, the Illyrian, and the Thracian. Those three races are all there still. The Greeks speak for themselves. The Illyrians are represented by the modern Albanians. The Thracians are represented, there seems to be every reason to believe, by the modern Roumans. Now, had the whole of the south-eastern lands been inhabited by Illyrians and Thracians, those lands would doubtless have become as thoroughly Roman as the western lands became. There would be in the East Romance and Slavonic nations, as there

are in the West Romance and Teutonic nations, with perhaps some fragments and survivals of Illyrian and Thracian lingering on, as Basque and Breton have lingered in the west. But the position of the Greek nation, its long history and high civilisation, hindered this. The Greeks could not become Romans in any but the most purely political sense. Like other subjects of the Roman empire, they gradually took the Roman name; but they kept their own language, literature, and civilisation. In short, we may say that the Roman empire in the East became Greek, and that the Greek nation became Roman. The Eastern empire and the Greek-speaking lands became nearly co-extensive. Greek became the one language of the Eastern Roman empire, while those that spoke it still called themselves Romans. Till quite lately—that is, till the modern ideas of nationality began to spread, the Greek-speaking subjects of the Turk called themselves by no name but that of Romans. This people, who might be called either Greek or Roman, but who have now again taken up the Greek name, has lived on as a distinct nation to our own time. It is a nation which has largely assimilated its neighbours, but which has not been assimilated by them.

“While the Greeks thus took the Roman name without adopting the Latin language, another people in the eastern peninsula adopted both name and language, exactly as the nations of the West did. If, as there is good reason to believe, the modern Roumans represent the old Thracians, that nation came under the general law, exactly like the Western nations. The Thracians became thoroughly Roman in speech, as they have ever since kept the Roman name. They form, in part, one of the Romance nations just as much as the people of Gaul or Spain. They are a Romance nation on the eastern side of the Hadriatic instead of on the western. The third nation—that of the Illyrians, Skipetar, or Albanians—have been largely assimilated by the Greeks. Though they may be truly said to exist as a nation, still their existence as a na-

tion has been mainly owing to their being a mild people, living in a mild country. They hold a position between that of a nation like the Greeks and that of a mere survival of a nation like the Basques. The Roumans too, though they learned the Roman language and have kept the Roman name, can never have so fully adopted the Roman civilisation as the Gauls and Spaniards did. In short, the existence of a highly civilised people like the Greeks hindered in every way the influence of Rome from being so thorough in the East as it was in the West. The Greek nation lived on, and, alongside of itself, it preserved the other two ancient nations of the peninsula. Thus all three have lived on to the present as distinct nations. Two of them, the Greeks and Illyrians, still keep their own languages, while the third, the old Thracians, speak a Romance language, and call themselves Romans.”

The Greek-Latin city of Constantinople, which held its own against every enemy for nearly a thousand years,\* became the centre of a high form of civilisation. It was there that Justinian collected and promulgated his “Institutes.” It was there that Theodosius II. encouraged education, and brought about a revival of learning. It was there that successive emperors, bishops, and councils, fostered religion, and strove, according to their lights, for the purity of worship. It was there that the Byzantine art flourished for many centuries, leaving its indelible traces on the human mind. But if the city of Constantinople itself enjoyed a comparative immunity from external enemies, it was continually disturbed by internal dissensions, religious and other. Justinian’s great general, Belisarius, who won so many glorious victories for his ungrateful master in Europe, Asia, and Africa, was called upon, in the year 420, to suppress the faction-fights which for more than twenty years had held Constantinople in terror. We may

\* Nevertheless the leaders of the Fourth Crusade took the city in 1203 and 1204, in the interest of the Emperor Isaac. Isaac had been deposed and blinded by his brother Alexis, who met with a punishment in kind.



form some idea of the extent of these circus faction fights between the "Blues" and the "Greens," when we read that their final suppression cost the death of thirty thousand of the latter party, and the burning of the city.

#### *Sect. 4. Turkish Conquests.*

The enemies of the empire were constantly closing in upon her. At the beginning of the fifth century the Goths, under Alaric, pressed northward and westward, ravaging and destroying as they went. They were destined for a great future in Western Europe; but even in the south-eastern plains they made a partial settlement. To this day a portion of a Mæso-Gothic Bible, translated by Bishop Ulphilas, bears witness to the extent of the Gothic occupation of what we now call by the name of Bulgaria. In the seventh century the Saracens won many of the Asian possessions of the Eastern empire, and came no less than seven times to the siege of Constantinople; but each time in vain. Shortly after, the Bulgarians—amongst them, no doubt, the descendants of the Goths above mentioned—laid waste the country, from the Balkans to Constantinople; but they also were checked by the strong ramparts and natural defences of the capital. In the next century, ninety thousand Arabs, probably the first Mahomedan invaders of the Byzantine empire,\* were defeated; and during the next few hundred years southern Italy and Bulgaria were added to the imperial dominions. But meanwhile Dalmatia had been lost, and at the beginning of the thirteenth century an independent kingdom was set up in Epirus. The establishment of the Turkish empire in Asia Minor dates from the year 1299, when Othman I. asserted his sway over a wide tract of country.

From henceforth the Ottoman armies began to turn their attention to Europe; and by the middle of the fourteenth century we find them establishing themselves on the shores of the

Bosphorus and the Black Sea. In 1362, a successor of Othman, Amurath I., took Adrianople, and made it his capital; within a dozen years he had imposed a treaty on the Greek emperor at Constantinople (John Palæologus I.), by which he established his claim to the territories which he had overrun. Before the end of the century, all the Greek possessions in Asia Minor had been lost; and meanwhile the Turks were making rapid advances in Europe. In 1396 the Sultan Bajazet had gained a decisive victory over Sigismund of Hungary, whom he defeated at Nicopolis.

From this time we may date an era of history which can hardly be regarded as anything else than a deep disgrace to Europe at large. The crusades had proved clearly enough that the soldiers of Europe, when inspired by enthusiasm and determination, were more than a match for the Mahomedans; and whatever we may think as to the justifiable character of these expeditions to the Holy Land, the paladins of Western Europe at least gave proof of their invincible valour. But these attacks upon the Saracens in Palestine and elsewhere must have greatly exasperated the followers of the Prophet; and a determination to be avenged upon Europe was very probably amongst the motives which induced these Asiatic hordes, bound together as they were by the ties of fanaticism, to extend their conquests over the Greek empire in Europe. If they had been met in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries with as much vigour as they or their co-religionists had been met on their own ground, two or three centuries before, Europe might have been saved from untold miseries, and we should not now have to be fighting the battle which our ancestors, for generation after generation, refused to fight. The Western Powers cannot be acquitted of selfish indifference, not to say cowardice, during the long course of years in which the Turkish hordes were making south-eastern Europe their hunting grounds. It was not for want of earnest solicitation on the part of the victims. In the year 1400, the Emperor Manuel vainly implored the Christian sovereigns to assist him. They not merely turned

\* The Flight (Hegira) of Mahomet from Mecca to Medina, which commences the Mahomedan era, took place in the year 622. The invasion referred to was in 739.

a deaf ear to his own prayers, but despised, or shut their eyes to the danger when it approached more nearly to their own borders.

The Turks were thus permitted to attack their enemies in detail. In the year 1401 they had established a colony at Athens; and their conquests were already pushed far inland. Constantinople, however, continued to hold out for another fifty years, partly owing to the quarrels of the invaders amongst themselves. Amurath II. besieged the capital in the year 1422; but, failing to take it, he was compelled to conclude a peace with the Greeks. The respite was very brief; and in the year 1437 John Palæologus II., foreseeing that he would be unable by himself to offer an effectual resistance to his enemies, personally visited Rome and other western cities, in order to urge a combined opposition to the Turks. All was in vain; Europe left the Byzantine empire to its fate. In 1448, the Greek emperor, the thirteenth Constantine, ascended the throne. Three years later, the second Mahomet became sultan of the Ottoman empire, and speedily renewed the siege of Constantinople. After a desperate struggle he reduced the proud city, which had long been the bulwark of Christianity in the East. On the 29th of May, 1453, the Turk set foot within the grandest and most valuable of all his conquests. It was exactly four centuries later that England spent her best blood, and a vast amount of treasure, for the purpose of maintaining him there.

Of the deeds of Amurath II., who largely extended the Turkish territories in Europe, we may let another speak:\*

"Amurath continued his father's work, and in 1432 took Salonica, and put the inhabitants, men, women and children, to the sword, with circumstances of such barbarity as cannot be repeated, but which have found their counterpart in the recent massacres of Bulgaria, etc. The same excesses characterised his campaigns in Albania, Wallachia, and Servia, which he conquered and

annexed to his dominions. He devastated Hungary and Transylvania, massacring men, women, and children, and burning their towns and villages.

"The contest in Albania was long and severe, for the inhabitants were trained and led by the famous patriot general, Scanderbeg. This remarkable character, whose real name was George Castriota, was the son of one of the Greek chiefs of Epirus, his mother being a Serbian princess. In his boyhood he had been handed over to the Turks as one of the hostages for the good behaviour of the Greeks, and had been brought up in the sultan's palace as a Moslem. He rapidly rose in Amurath's favour, having, during his Asiatic campaigns, done signal service, and was rewarded with the rank of pasha.

"It happened, however, that in the course of the succeeding campaign, Amurath seized upon the lands of several of the chiefs of Epirus, and among others upon those of Scanderbeg's father. Many of his Epirote friends begged him to come to the assistance of his native country, and so influenced his feelings that he deserted the Turkish army. He was received with open arms by the Epirotes, who raised a force of fifteen thousand men. With these troops Scanderbeg marched against the Turkish army, which he defeated with heavy loss. He captured many fortresses, and availed himself so well of the mountainous nature of the country that he gained for Albania a kind of quasi-independence for upwards of twenty years, during which period he bore the title of King of Epirus.

"Amurath, burning with rage at the successful opposition offered him by the man whom he had trusted and loaded with honours, determined to find other fields of conquest, and thus give renewed confidence to his dispirited troops. He now led them southwards to the classic home of western civilisation and culture, Greece; and in this quarter victory always crowned his arms. The whole country had been almost depopulated by the constant succession of merciless wars which had endured for a thou-

\* "The Rise and Decay of the Rule of Islam." By A. J. Dunn.



sand years, and the heroic race which had won immortal glory at Marathon and Thermopylae was nearly extinct, at least upon the mainland. Within the course of a single year, therefore, Amurath was able to subdue the whole of Greece and the Peloponnesus. Frightful atrocities and massacres ensued as usual upon his victories; and his barbarous followers defaced and destroyed some of the finest monuments which had been left by the previous invaders. After achieving these memorable conquests, and establishing at least the terror of his name throughout the peninsula, he died at Adrianople, A. D. 1450."

From the same source we may borrow a short account of the siege of Constantinople, which ought not to be passed over in this work, dealing as it does with the empire of which Constantinople has so long been the capital.

"This great city was now the sole remaining possession of the once mighty Byzantine empire. The population was exceedingly large, and sunk in luxury and vice, for they revelled in the accumulated wealth of both the East and West, the spoil of a long period of supremacy and foreign conquest. It therefore was a tempting bait for the avidity of the predatory Turks. After more than a year spent in preparations, during which the inhabitants made no effort for an active defence, Mahomet laid siege to the city with an army of two hundred and fifty-eight thousand men, and a fleet of three hundred and twenty vessels.

"The defence was obstinate and sanguinary, but the cannon which were now used by the besiegers did frightful damage, and effected large breaches in the walls. Through these, at length, the Moslem host poured in seemingly countless hordes, and the final bulwark of Christendom against the Saracens succumbed. The Emperor Constantine Palæologus, the last of the Cæsars, fell fighting bravely, with a courage not unworthy of his great predecessors, and with him ended the great, the world-famous empire of the East. Then ensued a massacre which has no parallel for its brutality and for its magnitude. The ferocious Moslems murdered men, women, and children, without distinction. For three days

the city was given up to the soldiery for massacre, pillage, and violation. Many of the affrighted inhabitants took refuge in the holy Basilica of St Sophia, hoping that its sacred character would protect at least their lives. But the Moslem troops took the Basilica by storm and put to death every living soul within its walls, amounting to many thousands, and turned the sacred shrine into a stable.

"After three days the few remaining inhabitants were driven into the fields, and the sultan and his court rode into the silent city wading through pools of blood. In order to celebrate his triumph, he condemned to death all the prisoners of note who had been taken, including the family of the late emperor, the whole of the Greek nobility, priests, and persons of note. He did not even spare the rich merchants and foreigners who were in the city, and many Venetian senators and Genoese nobles were amongst them. The Christian princes who had been appealed to for assistance were supine spectators of the fall of Byzantine. Upon three previous occasions its defenders had been able to roll back the tide of Tartarian invasion, and the nations of Europe hoped that now again, when the imperial city was so closely pressed, its defenders would throw off their inertness, and by a striking victory emulate the great deeds of their forefathers.

"But it was too late. The long record of famous victories was destined to be closed, and the glories of the Greek and Roman empires effaced at Constantinople.

"At length, however, when the fall of the great city, and the horrors accompanying its capture, came to be known, a sudden fear fell upon the whole of Christendom. This last bulwark removed, what was now to prevent these hordes of victorious barbarians from overrunning the whole of Europe, and effacing every vestige of its civilisation and its religion? The standard of the Prophet already waved in triumph from the confines of Chinese Tartary in the East to the Atlantic Ocean on the West; from the wilds of Scythia in Northern Asia, to

the Indian Ocean on the south. And now these enemies of the Cross had firmly established themselves in Europe, and it was evident that they still lusted for further conquests. Spain was already theirs, Greece was theirs. They had made themselves masters of the Holy Land of Christendom, notwithstanding the efforts of two millions of the bravest crusaders and noblest knights of Europe, who had spilt their blood to rescue it. The Holy City of Jerusalem was defiled by the presence of its unbelieving masters. Who could say that the holy city of Rome would not soon be theirs also?"

A still more interesting account of this famous siege is given by Colonel Baker, in his recent book upon "Turkey in Europe:"—

"Frequent were the consultations with his (Mahomet II.) grand vizier, his generals, and engineers; and plans of the city, and the positions for all his batteries, were laid out with most scrupulous care. Everything was submitted to the criticism of his own eye, and nothing was to be left to chance. The recent introduction of cannon was to be the chief element in the siege, and a foundry was created at Adrianople to cast cannons which would throw a stone ball of six hundred pounds weight.

"All the aids of both ancient and modern warfare were enlisted for the siege, and men might be seen dragging huge cannon into position, whilst near them great wooden towers, on rollers, crept slowly to the front to be finally filled with troops and placed against the ditch, there to discharge their living freight by means of ladders thrown from the tower top, across the ditch, to meet the wall.

"The smoke of modern cannon was to cloak the instruments of ancient warfare. Not only was gunpowder to propel the missiles, but great engines for hurling stones, and battering rams to beat down the walls, were all moving to their carefully appointed places. Various are the accounts which are given of the formidable army of Turks which, under their fierce sultan, was to aid this grim machinery in its work of death; but Gibbon arrives at two hundred and fifty-

eight thousand as the total Ottoman force, of which sixty thousand cavalry and twenty thousand infantry were regular troops, and the remainder auxiliaries.

"Added to these was a naval force of three hundred and twenty vessels, but, with the exception of eighteen ships of war, these were small craft used mostly for transport.

"Constantinople was defended on one side by the Golden Horn, on the other by the sea, and the third side of the triangle had, and has, a great wall six miles long, with high flanking towers at very short intervals. Opposite and parallel to this wall Mahomet cut a ditch to cover his attack. Fourteen batteries were distributed opposite the most feeble parts of the walls. The principal point of attack was to be the great central gate of St. Romanus. Archers were to shower their arrows wherever the besieged should show themselves, and miners were brought from Servia for subterranean works. Nothing was forgotten, and all the art and strength of the Ottoman monarch was concentrated upon the effort.

"On the Christian side preparations for defence were not wanting, but there was an absence of unity of action. An empire does not fall without a cause, and the intrigues, the dissensions, and the jealousies which had driven the Greeks out of Thrace, and hemmed them into their fortified triangle, now shone out in all their force, and like a will-o'-the-wisp lured the empire to its final destruction. Conscious of his weakness, occasioned by the intrigues of his subjects, Constantine, eager to gain the least aid of any reinforcement, professed at the last moment the spiritual obedience of the Greek to the Roman Church, but the false concession only produced bitterness and disappointment, and the rancour excited against the Genoese forces was almost equal to the hatred of the Turk.

"It was a forlorn hope of policy, which fell back shattered and defeated, for, instead of reinforcements from without, it only produced fresh dissensions within.

"The total number of inhabitants, including



men, women, and children, did not exceed one hundred thousand persons, and of these all that could be counted upon for the defence of the capital was five thousand men; but to them were added a brave but small force of Latin volunteers, under the able leadership of John Guistiniani, a Genoese.

"The imminence of the danger at last roused the population to a sense of their critical position, and the unremitting exertions and ardour of the Emperor Constantine transmitted itself to the troops. Constantine distributed his small forces along the forts, and himself took the command of the outer wall. He exhorted his men and officers to emulate each other in the defence of all they held dear, and encouraged the timid with hopes of success and promises of reward. Such were his exertions at the last, that he inspired an enthusiasm which he would fain have felt himself, for in his own heart he knew that he must fight and die.

"A strong chain was thrown across the Golden Horn, and all the ships which arrived at the port were detained for the service of the besieged. Of war-ships he could count but fourteen.

"The Turkish preparations were at last complete, the troops were in position, the batteries fixed, the soldiers were reminded of the glories of their ancestors, and prayers were offered to Heaven for success, and on the morning of the 6th of April, 1453, the signal was given, and the Ottoman cannon thundered at the gates of Christendom.

"At first the Greeks, in their ardour for the fight, rushed down the ditch to meet the foe in the open field, but soon fell back before the advancing hosts. The battle raged fiercely along the line, but night came and no impression was made on the gallant defenders.

"Day after day was the fight renewed, but morning came and showed the city was still confident and strong. At last food was getting scarce, and all the horrors of a siege were sorely felt; but soon the spirits of the Greeks were raised, as away on the Sea of Marmora they

espied five great ships well laden with supplies, and which, by their colours flying, told that they were friends in need. Onward they flew before the breeze, but what a sight now met them as they neared the port! Three hundred Turkish ships were drawn across the straits, each filled with troops, and eager for the fight. The famished Christians from the lofty towers watched eagerly the approaching succour, and the hungry wish was father to the thought, that the coming fight might win a kindly smile from fortune.

"The news flew quickly through the Turkish ranks that a naval combat was on foot, and soon the waters of the Bosphorus seemed to break upon a beach of turbaned heads—one bare spot there was, as it were a bay, and in it the waves beat as against a rock, upon the charger of the sultan, who, riding breast-high into the sea, came down to watch the unequal fight, not doubting but that these rash sailor Franks would soon be punished for their insolence.

"But there were brave hearts in those five gallant ships, full willing to meet the outnumbering enemy. Gaily they careered before the swelling breeze, their white sails glistening in the sun, and, steering straight upon the Turkish line, bore down upon the foe. Truly it was a gallant sight, as all must feel who, having witnessed the beauties of the Bosphorus, can picture the struggling ships, urged on by cries and yells from the armed contending hosts. Suddenly from the Christian ranks there burst a joyous shout, as the Turkish ships first wavered, and then fled. But above all shouts there rose the bitter taunt of the fierce sultan, as, mad with rage, he, with threatening gestures, called on his naval captains to make good the fight. But the rout was made, and like chips of straw before the rushing wind, the Turkish craft were swept aside, and amidst ten thousand Christian cheers, the succouring ships sailed in victorious to the Golden Horn. Then many a mother's heart was joyous as she closely clasped her half-famished child!

"The days wore on, and fight succeeded fight;

but still the Christian front was bold, and the Turkish hosts were baffled.

"Then the warlike genius of the sultan came to his aid, and pointed out the weak spot in the armour of his adversaries. Could he but place his ships within the Golden Horn, the enemy's weakest point lay open to attack. But how to reach it! The chain across the mouth could not be broken, and all else was land. No matter, it must be done, and done that very night. The small craft were beached, the strongest men told off for each, and under the shadow of the night for ten miles on a road of planks, over hill and over dale, fourscore heavy craft were dragged and launched upon the Golden Horn.

"The dawn brought a bitter surprise to the still gallant Greeks. And now Mahomet gathered his engineers, and the heavy cannon were seen moving to the water's edge, where rafts were ready to receive them and form a floating battery. Such was the size of these monster guns, that seven shots a-day were all they were able to fire. Fifty-three weary days and nights had now passed, and hunger had so told upon the courage of the Greeks, that, at the sight of these floating batteries and preparations of the Turks, they grew sick at heart, and they now clamoured to the emperor to deliver up the city. But sternly the Christian king refused, and bid them to their posts, to fight, and, if need be, to die.

"It was on the 29th of May that Mahomet saw his works complete; and all was ready for the final rush of Islamism on Christendom.

"The great Byzantine empire, once foremost in the powers of the world, had shrunk within the narrow space before him, and he was now ready to crush it in his grasp.

"*Yarin* (to-morrow) Inshallah, the Christian dog shall die!"

"Amidst the Turkish ranks the Sheiks and Imauns (ministers of religion) suggested hopes of Paradise to brave soldiers who might to-morrow meet a glorious death, and, to those who might survive, freely promised rewards and honours. Then, as the sun sunk slowly in the west, two hundred thousand Moslems bowed

down their heads to Mother Earth in one united prayer. All day the cannon thundered against the opposing walls, and near the great gate of St. Romanus a yawning breach was seen. Constantine knew that the storm was soon to burst, but mean jealousies were rife among the Christian ranks. The gallant Giustiniani, like a true soldier, did his duty, and placed the brave Latins here and there where points seemed weakest. The emperor was everywhere exhorting to brave deeds, and enthusiasm seemed to follow in his path. When all were placed, and orders given, then with some few chosen knights he retired to the great Church of St. Sophia. He knew that his hour was at hand. He slowly entered the grand and sacred edifice, and there, uncovered, the last Byzantine emperor, surrounded by his knights, stood before the cross. To-morrow the empire would pass away with him! His tears fell thickly at the thought, and he knelt before the cross and prayed that he might die as became a Christian knight; then, for the last time, he partook of the sacred emblems of his Saviour, and, turning to those around, he said, 'I pray forgiveness if I have injured any one in thought or deed.'

"Then striding to the portal of the church, where stood his impatient steed, he placed his helmet on his head, and, mounting into the saddle, the humble penitent rode off, a warrior Christian king, to battle and to die!

"The sun had set, the evening past, and night fell on the attendant hosts. Christian knights, as they lay under the starry canopy of heaven, cast off the sterner half of man, and let their softer nature free, and loving thoughts of mothers, sister, wife, went winging through the air to meet in last embrace. And now the solemn calm before the coming storm drew near, and all was hushed and still. Constantine did not sleep, but from a lofty tower watched in the stillness of the night over the Moslem host. At length, as dawn drew near, his quick soldier's ear caught the measured tread of Moslems marching bravely to their posts, and many to their graves, and he warned the Christians



to their battlements. Soon the stars grew pale, and the minutes of many a gallant life were ebbing fast away. Then suddenly, like a thunder-clap, burst out the stirring roar of war. The shouts of men, the clang of arms, the cannon's roar the horses' neigh, the loud commands, all mingled in one exciting din as the Moslems rushed into the breach; by sea, by land, along the whole line, the fierce attack was made. Wave after wave of troops went forward, to perish in the ditch, which was soon filled up and bridged by the bodies of the dead and dying. Wherever the Greeks grew faint there appeared the noble Christian king, and where the king was there the Greeks grew brave, for he was ever foremost in the fight.

"Two hours passed of bloodshed, and still the Greeks and Latins bravely held their ground; the Moslems paused, and victory seemed about to touch the hand of Christendom.

"Then, from behind the smoke and dust, and swelling above the din of war, there came the sound of martial music—drums, fifes, and attaballs—growing louder and louder, as it neared the great gate of St. Romanus.

"And from out the smoke there rode the Padishah, the fierce Seljukian Sultan, with royal iron mace in hand, and behind him, with calm and measured tread, there came ten thousand chosen Janissaries, who made straight for the great breach.

"Onward they came, and then, with one shout, 'Allahu Akbar,' they rushed into the breach. Amidst the dust and smoke might be seen the Christian king foremost in the fight; but no longer by his side stood Guistiniani, who, sorely wounded, had retired from the fight.

"Fierce was the struggle, and furiously raged the fight. Here Turk grappled Christian in the death-struggle, and shouts and groans and loud commands rose upon the air. But still the Christians held their ground. Presently there came a sound, at first in front, then swelling louder, like a rushing gale from right to left, from front to rear, 'Allahu Akbar! Allahu Akbar!' rent the air. Constantine heard, and

knew that all was lost; then turning to those around, 'Can no man here be found to take away my life?' he mournfully exclaimed, but none stepped forth to fell the noble tree. 'It is enough, O Lord, now take away my life,' and he plunged into the fight, and fought until some unknown hand struck him to the heart; and as he sank amongst the heap of slain, another name was added to the obituary of heroes, and the Crescent rose over the waters of the Bosphorus and cast a shadow over the fairest land in Europe. Thus fell the Byzantine empire, and well might the emperor and his knights have said—

'Go, stranger, and in Lacedæmon tell  
That here, obedient to her laws, we fell.'

"I pass over the miserable scenes of the sacking and pillage of the city, which now became the seat of the Ottoman empire. The sultan proceeded straight to the church of St. Sophia, and alighting, entered, surrounded by his viziers, his pachas, and his guards, and ordered one of the Imauns who accompanied him to summon the faithful and all true believers to prayer; and he then himself mounted the high altar, and the Moslem prayer went up to heaven from the same temple that had but yesterday heard the Christian prayer for victory. The body of the emperor was sought, and the head cut off and exhibited for a time between the feet of the bronze horse of the equestrian statue of Justinian, in the place called the Augustan. It was subsequently embalmed and sent round the chief cities of Asia.

"I think that all Christians may feel proud of the hero who represented their faith at the fall of the Byzantine empire."

The year 1453, then, may be taken as the date of the definite establishment of the empire of Turkey in Europe. The character of the city of Constantine was changed in a single week from being, what it had been, the refuge and bulwark of Christianity, to the head-quarters of Mahomedan fanaticism. Of the eight hundred thousand inhabitants, who were formerly collected within its walls, it is asserted that hardly more than a hundred thousand remained to en-

ture the yoke of the Turks. Of the seven-eighths who had disappeared, many, perhaps the majority, were massacred by the relentless hordes who came in with Mahomet; others had fled before the approaching storm. The power of the Byzantine empire, the glory of Byzantine art, were crushed by the terrible blow, never to recover. It is true that the conqueror showed, before many days, a hesitation which may be looked upon as remorse, but which was more probably the mere prompting of a selfish policy. He remembered that the city he had captured and destroyed had for many centuries been the home of commerce as well as of civilisation; and no doubt he knew that the treasury of the empire had more than once accumulated upwards of two hundred thousand pounds' weight of gold. The Black Sea trade alone had been as valuable—by comparison, much more valuable than it has ever since been made. Mahomet seems to have thought that what had been under the Greeks might continue to be under the Turks. He was vastly mistaken. The instincts of commerce were as foreign to the character of these Asiatic hordes as the instincts of civilisation or true religion.

Nevertheless the sultan set himself to work to restore what he had ruined. He sent for Gennadius, the Greek Patriarch, and publicly invested him with the insignia of his office. He assigned to the Christians one-half of their own desecrated churches, turning the other half into mosques, for the purposes of Moslem worship; but he retained for himself the property of all. He granted to his victims the free exercise of their religion, and did all he could think of (within the few days that he devoted to the thought) to conciliate and bring back all who had escaped from the fury of his troops.

Then he turned his attention to wider conquests. He reduced Trebizond, on the southern shore of the Black Sea, and subsequently made himself master of the Crimea, of Negropont and Lemnos, of Istria, and of Otranto. But at Belgrade he met his match. Attempting to invade Hungary, he besieged the city, sending a large

fleet up the Danube, and marching across Servia with one hundred thousand men. In Belgrade, however, he found the valiant John Hunyady, who ten years before had forced him to sign a peace. The Hungarian was accompanied by considerable forces from the neighbouring Christian states; and he succeeded in destroying the Turkish fleet, overthrowing Mahomet in a pitched battle, and capturing the formidable siege guns which had breached the walls of Constantinople.

Thus the invasion of Hungary failed; as also did five successive attacks upon Epirus, where the brave Scanderbeg still held sway. On Scanderbeg's death, however, Epirus reverted to its former masters. At last, in 1481, Mahomet was poisoned, as he was hastening back to Egypt to the relief of his son Bajazet.

It was this Bajazet, the second sultan of the name, who strengthened and fostered the famous Janissaries, the body-guard of the sultans. They were originally recruited from the children of Christians, trained as Mahomedans, and attached to their masters by the conferment of various privileges and marks of favour. Subsequently, the Janissaries became rather an army in themselves than a simple body-guard. The wealthiest and most valiant Turks were enrolled in the ranks, until they numbered many thousands. Bajazet appointed his younger son, Selim, as commander of the force; and the last-named, after acquiring a complete ascendancy over his myrmidons, employed them to raise a revolt, to put to death his brothers and nephews, and—it would seem—to poison his father.

Selim had the spirit of his grandfather strong within him. After defeating the Persians, he led his Janissaries and other troops, in all a quarter of a million, to Egypt.\* Here he conquered

\* Egypt was invaded by the Saracens as early as the year 638, when Amrou, a general of Caliph Omar (father to one of Mahomet's wives) took Memphis and Alexandria, and laid them under tribute. The earlier followers of the Prophet do not seem to have been so blood-thirsty as the northern race who subsequently embraced the faith of Islam. There seems to have been comparatively little massacre after the capture of Alexandria; and it is doubtful whether the conquerors



the Mameluke sultan, and added the country to his empire. The last descendant of the Abbasside Caliph was at the time residing in Egypt, and Selim persuaded him to confide to him the sacred standard of the Prophet, which was in his keeping, and to confer upon him the title of Imaun. In consequence of this the Ottoman sultan became the chief of Islam, as the representative of Mahomet; and the sacred cities of Mecca and Medina, together with the chief Arabian tribes, as a matter of course, acknowledged his supremacy.\*

The standard in question, the raising of which is held by the Turks to inaugurate a war of special sacredness and importance to the whole of Islam, was, according to one account, not the standard of the Prophet himself, but of his immediate followers. It is said to have been the curtain hung before the door of the tent of Ayesha, Mahomet's favourite wife. When the Prophet lay on his deathbed, his generals—for Mahomet himself had conceived vast schemes of conquest—came to receive their master's final orders. As they were leaving, Ayesha tore down the curtain, and presented it to them, bidding them use it to rally the faithful in battle. The standard has frequently been carried through the Ottoman camp, and unfurled in sight of the army.

Suleiman, the son of Selim, succeeded in doing what Sultan Mahomet had failed in; he took Belgrade from the Hungarians, and subsequently captured Buda and Pesth, in the year 1526. Having set a creature of his own, John Zapolya, on the throne, he had occasion, a little later,

to go to his assistance against Ferdinand of Austria. Not content with relieving Zapolya, he pursued the Austrians to Vienna, to which city he laid siege. The nut was too hard for him to crack, as it was also for his successors. He lost eighty thousand men; but, from the time of his setting out to his return, he must have slain and massacred at least as many. It was this Suleiman, also, who drove the Knights of St. John from Rhodes, and carried off an immense number of slaves of both sexes from that island, from Corfu, and from Malta.

His son, Selim II., having seized Cyprus from the Venetians, was attacked off Lepanto by the fleets of Spain, Venice, and Austria, combined. There were two hundred and fifty vessels on each side; and the Turks, being defeated, lost three-fifths of their galleys. From that time forward they seem to have neglected their navy; and, until the present century, they have attempted little in the way of naval warfare.

The next two sultans, Amurath and Mahomet, the third of those names, continued the aggressive policy of their predecessors. Amurath attacked both Russia\* and Poland, committing many cruelties, but reaping little other result than to exasperate his enemies, and lay up for his posterity an inheritance of revenge and disaster.

Hitherto, it will have been perceived, the opposition of Europe to the Turkish hordes had been fitful, and, for the most part, unsustained. We have met with no Christian hero, unless it be Scanderbeg or John Hunyady, who made it his one end and aim to hurl back the advancing power of the Turks in Europe. The records of the seventeenth century present the picture of such a hero in John Sobieski, the elective king of Poland. It is cheering, in the course of such a history as that of the Turks in Europe, to encounter such a noble instance of patriotism as that which is afforded by this illustrious Pole; and the reader will need no apology if we dwell

were guilty of the act of vandalism of which they have frequently been accused, in the burning of the famous library. The story goes that Amrou sent to Caliph Omar, to ask what he should do with the vast store of books. The caliph replied: "The contents of the books are either in conformity with the Koran, or they are not. If they are, the Koran is sufficient without them; if they are not, they are pernicious. Let them therefore be destroyed." For six months, it has been asserted, the baths and furnaces were heated by the burning of these invaluable treasures.—The Mameluke dynasty was established in Egypt in the thirteenth century.

\* "The Rise and Decay of Islam."

\* A future chapter will deal specially with the wars between Russia and Turkey.

at some length upon the narrative of his victories.\*

The perpetual restlessness and unruliness of the Janissaries gave the sultan sufficient inducement to employ them as frequently as possible in foreign wars. In fact, this powerful and dangerous body had caused many serious disturbances in Constantinople, had revolted more than once, had put several sultans to death, and seized on the principal offices of the state. Mustapha I. they buried in a prison; Othman II. they strangled; Amurath IV. died suddenly, after massacring many of the Janissaries, as well as his relatives and large numbers of his subjects; Ibrahim met with the fate of Othman; and Mahomet IV., a boy of seven, probably escaped on account of his age. Meanwhile the pashas of outlying provinces began to rebel; and the populace of Constantinople became so disorganised that, after a serious defeat of the Turkish army by the Venetians, a revolt broke out in the city, which was at the mercy of the mob for several days.

But Mahomet grew up to man's estate, and displayed unusual ability. With the assistance of Kiuprili, a Greek, whom he made his grand vizier, he restored order in the capital, reorganised his forces, and gained a number of victories. In a series of conflicts which he had with the Poles, it is estimated that over a quarter of a million of the latter perished. In 1669, the sultan captured Crete, after it had been besieged, on and off, for four and twenty years. Pope Clement IX. is said to have died with grief at the news.

"Flushed by success, Mahomet IV., and his grand vizier, Achmet Kiuprili, who was of Greek origin, now entertained the most magnificent projects of conquest. The empire touched the Caspian Sea, the Adriatic, the Indian Ocean, and stretched south towards the upper waters of the Nile; it was now advancing on the Baltic, and would soon, they trusted, possess fleets

on the North Seas and the Indian Ocean alike, while the Archipelago and the Red Sea would have counted only as inland lakes in his dominion. 'He hoped to reign over the Christian world.' The present preparations were directed against Poland, which had always been the chief barrier to the subjugation of the North by the Turks. With the exception of a small subsidy from the Pope, she was left to bear the brunt of the attack alone. The preparations of the Porte were enormous. Tartars were arriving in hordes, Moldavia was full of battalions of strange men from the heart of Asia; the immense siege trains from Candia, consisting of between three and four hundred pieces of cannon, a number hitherto unheard of, were being carried up the Danube, and a numerous fleet was collecting in the Black Sea; seven hundred camels had arrived in Thrace, with corn from Egypt; soldiers from Attica and the Peloponnesus, from East and West, filled a vast camp near Adrianople, where Mahomet and his vizier held perpetual reviews. But their destination was still uncertain."

What a contrast between this activity and completeness of preparation, and the comparative helplessness of the Turks of the nineteenth century!

The Polish king refused to believe himself in danger, and even prevented Sobieski from collecting troops. Moreover, the latter was thwarted by the jealousy of Louis XIV. of France and the German emperor; but his popularity was already high amongst his own countrymen; so that, when the news came that the Turks were actually advancing upon Poland, a fairly numerous army flocked to his standard.

Mahomet began his attack by the siege of Kaminick, on the southern frontier—a fortress of which it had been said that "God alone could have built it, and He only could take it."

"Even then the only help which the Polish king thought fit to give in the struggle was to accuse his protector, the 'great Hetman,' of being 'an impostor and a traitor.' Sobieski, however, not heeding the insult, threw himself

\* For this period the compiler is largely indebted to a paper in the "Contemporary Review" for March, 1877: "Turkish Invasions of Europe," by Lady Verney.



with his scanty forces on the weak points of the Turkish lines, pursued the Tartars who had invaded the kingdom and were carrying off immense booty, overtook them in the Carpathian defiles, and almost exterminated them, liberating nearly thirty thousand captives who were being carried off into slavery. He turned next on the advanced guard of the sultan's army, which had advanced on the Vistula with forty thousand men. Mahomet had arranged a camp for himself at Boudchaz among the mountains, where, accompanied by his seraglio, he amused himself with hunting. Sobieski, by a *coup de main*, crossed the river, rushed on the camp 'intoxicated with pleasure and pillage,' penetrated even to the imperial tents and the women's quarters, and 'the young lord who ruled at Athens and Memphis, Jerusalem and Babylon,' on this his first campaign was obliged to fly to save his life.

"But the miserable Polish king suddenly gave up the struggle and threw himself on the mercy of the invaders, abandoning the Ukraine and Podolia to the Turk, and reducing his country to the condition of a vassal state by promising an annual tribute.

"Sobieski retired to his estates disgusted and nearly broken-hearted. He had not long been there, when the 'Terror of the Turks,' as he was surnamed, was accused in the Diet of having sold his country to the Infidel for a bribe of twelve million florins. Enraged at such an attack on his honour, he returned to Warsaw immediately, while his army, furious at such a libel on their beloved chief, swore to avenge the insult in blood. After calming them with much difficulty he proceeded to the Diet, where the very sight of him produced such an impression that when he claimed the punishment of his calumniator from the assembly, and excuses from all members who could for a moment have listened to such an accusation, his demands were accepted in a transport of enthusiasm. The Diet in a pressing message entreated his help against the Turks, and, in the strangely hyperbolical language so often used in Poland, termed him 'the

hero of whom it might be believed, according to the system of Pythagoras, that all the souls of the great captains and good citizens lived again, as not one of their virtues was wanting in him.'

"The miserable informer confessed that he had been bribed to make the accusation, and was condemned to death, but Sobieski would not allow the sentence to be carried out."

Of such a nature were the obstacles with which Sobieski had to contend; and it was owing to such miserable causes that the Turks had been able to establish themselves in Europe. Jealousy amongst nations, and meanness in individuals, have broken the hearts of heroes in more ages than one.

The Diet gave Sobieski sixty thousand men; but it was not until the end of some six months that the Turks, having thrown seven bridges across the Dniester, advanced, to the number of eighty thousand, under the Seraskier Hussein Pasha.

Sobieski did not give them time to cross. He hastened to attack them at Kotzim, on the other side of the river. "The weather was dreadful, and the snow was falling thickly, when he disposed his troops for the attack. All night long the preparations went on. 'Comrades!' cried he, passing along the ranks, his dress, his arms, his thick moustache, covered with hoar-frost, 'You have suffered, but the Turks are worn out; these men from Asia are half conquered already by the cold. The last twenty-four hours have fought for us. We shall save the republic from shame and vassalage. Soldiers of Poland, fight for your country, and remember that Jesus Christ fights for you!' Sobieski himself had heard three masses since daybreak, the army had been blessed by a priest, and now getting off his horse, sabre in hand, he led his infantry across the trenches. The Turks, who had believed an attack impossible in such weather, alarmed at the triumphant shouts of the Poles, defended themselves but ill; charge after charge of the young Polish cavalry, in full armour, cut to pieces their troops; they turned to fly, but the bridge of boats

had been broken down by Sobieski's orders; twenty thousand men were believed to have fallen in attempting to cross the rapid, half-frozen river; 'the water ran with blood and corpses for miles.'

"In the camp the carnage was frightful; under the axes, the lances, and scimitars of their assailants, lay thousands of dead bodies, half of them Janissaries and Spahis. The green standard of Hussein, given him by the sultan, was seized, sent to the Pope, and still hangs in St. Peter's. The victory was complete; all the Turkish garrisons of the neighbouring towns retired, leaving devastation and fire as monuments of their passage; and thanks were given in almost all the churches in Europe for the 'most memorable battle gained against the Infidel for three hundred years.'

"The Polish king died the night before the fight, and, by an act of tardy death-bed repentance, named John Sobieski as one of his executors."

A new King of Poland had to be elected; and a great gathering was held for the purpose on the plain of Vola. Representatives from all parts of Europe were present, and there were many candidates. At length these were reduced to two—one supported by the Grand Monarque and the other by the Emperor.

"For twenty-nine days the destinies of the nation only grew more and more perplexing, and the furious parties seemed on the point of a civil war, when, to avert such a frightful peril, the Bishop of Cracow gave the signal for the hymns and prayers to be begun, which showed that the debates were closed; and the palatinates separated for the vote.

"The President, Jablonowski, a man of great courage and capacity, began his discourse; he entered on the qualities of the two chief candidates and rejected both, as the nominees of France and Germany. He discussed the qualities of the Great Condé, and then declared that 'a Pole ought to reign in Poland.'

"There is a man among us who has saved the republic time after time by his counsels and his

victories, whose patriotism and genius would maintain our country in the rank she should hold in the universe. Nothing in such a choice would be left to chance; *he* will not make us a vassal of the Infidels. If we have a country at all, if men of illustrious dynasties care to rule over us, remember to whom we owe it, and take John Sobieski as your king!"

"The speech was received with furious acclamations by the assembly. 'The finger of God is here, it was on a Saturday as to-day that Kotzim was taken,' cried the Governor of Lemberg; 'I vote for Sobieski.' The tumult was tremendous; it was nine o'clock at night, but the long day of the north still gave sufficient light, and they would have proceeded immediately to the vote, but Sobieski would not suffer it. 'I will not accept the crown,' said he, 'when no one has had time to consider his vote, at the approach of night, when opposition might be stifled or constrained. I will raise my vote against it, if no one else will do so.'"

However, the people would have no other, and Sobieski was elected. He spent his whole time and energies in training his army for a renewal of the struggle with the Turks, which he knew could not long be delayed. And, in effect, Mahomet put himself at the head of his army in 1674, and sent forward his generals to open the campaign.

"The Turks, under Ibrahim the Seraskier, began the siege of Zbaras; a number of Russian peasants had taken refuge in the town, and treacherously gave it up to the enemy, when Ibrahim cut to pieces the whole population except the women, who were reserved for the seraglios. The old, the children, perished in the flames or by the sword, and the Turks moved on to other sieges, where the same horrible cruelties were exercised. Von Hammer, after repeated descriptions of barbarities on such occasions, which make one's blood run cold, and indeed are sometimes quite unreadable, at length seems to grow weary of such horrors, and merely writes, 'The town was taken; the usual cruelties ensued;' or, 'The



city was sacked, with the atrocities used by barbarian troops.' The love of pillage was so great among them that the army was delayed, so that their advantage in numbers was lost, and the fine season passed away, while Sobieski destroyed their communications, seized their plunder, and cut to pieces the troops whom he encountered."

At last the Seraskier advanced upon Lemberg. If this place was carried, there would be an end of the kingdom; and Sobieski nerved himself for a great effort.

"The terror of his name counted for a host in itself against the Turks, while among the Poles, if some of the peasants cried, 'All is lost,' the answer was, 'John Sobieski is there still; he will save us.' A few days after great fires in all directions announced the arrival of the Mussulman host. The king had arranged his little army with consummate skill among the defiles near the town, the artillery on the low hills, while the hussars with their lances defended the vineyards and rough ground. The nobles fought with sabres and pistols. A storm of hail and snow, though it was only August, troubled the Infidel. The king, the father of his country, having given his blessing to the army, rushed at the head of his troops with the cry, 'Jesus!' three times repeated, to which came the threefold answer of 'Allah!' The cavalry wavering for a moment, he brought them up himself again to the charge: 'Remember,' cried he, 'that we must conquer or you will leave me here;' and he reminded them that he had brought his wife and children into the midst of the danger. The Turks, in spite of their enormous numerical preponderance, were driven back terrified, their divisions were broken, their ranks were confused. Sobieski fell like a thunderbolt upon the parts of the field where he was least expected. The victory of Lemberg was considered to have been a miracle, even considering the reputation of the king. Five thousand Poles have beaten one hundred and fifty thousand Turks and Tartars!" cried the 'Gazette de France' of September, 1674, with pardonable

exaggeration. 'That the king should have conquered such powerful enemies by his astonishing courage, reducing the Infidels to make a precipitate retreat, . . . shows that Heaven itself has defended this bulwark of Christendom.'

"An interval of quiet ensued, and Sobieski employed his breathing-time in attempting to bring about a better state of things for Poland, and in re-organising the army; but the people would endure no fresh taxes, and he made little progress. Revolts, however, at Memphis, at Babylon and Damascus, the doubtful fidelity of the Tartars, and a superstitious dread in the Mussulman army at the thought of contending against 'King John,' had made the Porte desire an interval of quiet."

After one more attack, equally unsuccessful, Mahomet was compelled to conclude peace. But Sobieski knew that he could not trust his enemy. He therefore laboured hard to form an alliance against him. "Not to attempt to conquer or restrain the monster, should be our object," he wrote, "but to fling it back to the deserts from whence it came; to exterminate it, and raise once more on its ruins a Byzantine empire. This is the only Christian, worthy, wise, and decisive course." But his efforts failed. The Pope promised assistance; but the Czar shuffled; the emperor flatly refused to combine with Poland; the Venetians would not admit his envoy across their frontier, and Louis XIV. even ordered the return of the Frenchmen who had volunteered under the Polish king.

In 1683 the sultan sent an immense army into Austria, under the new grand vizier, Kara Mustapha. The Turks reached the walls of Vienna, almost without resistance, and laid siege to it. The pusillanimous emperor shut his ears against his danger, and even his army would not have saved the capital or the empire if Sobieski, uninvited, and all but forbidden to enter Austrian territory, had not resolved to meet his old enemy, in the interests of Europe and humanity. The Turkish army was seized with a panic when it heard that the King of Poland

was coming to attack them—which was only on the day before the battle took place.

“At eight in the morning the action began. Sobieski and his allies descended from the hills in five columns, like great torrents, and were met at first by the Spahis, who, being on horseback, became embarrassed in the broken ground, the narrow lanes, vineyards, and woods which surrounded Vienna, and gave way on all sides. The defenders of the city took courage, and fired from the walls, while Kara Mustapha, still not believing in the imminence of his danger, attempted to continue the battle with the town before him, at the same time that he marched himself to the rear, to meet King John, now at the head of seventy thousand men, the finest army he had ever commanded, eighteen thousand of whom were Poles.

“The heat was intense. The Christian army stopped for a moment to eat, without, however, putting down their muskets and lances; then in a great semicircle the allied force continued its march, Sobieski passing from column to column, encouraging the troops, and speaking to each in the language of their country.

“The Turks had profited by this halt to form a new line on the glacis of the camp. The vizier commanded here in person, with all the best troops; the king was in front. It was nearly five o’clock, and the work before them seemed too great an undertaking for tired men; he determined therefore to sleep on the field, and put off the battle to the next day. The grand vizier, in his contempt for the Christians, and his indomitable pride, treated the whole matter so lightly that at this moment he retired to his crimson tent, to drink coffee with his sons.

“At the sight, the king’s choler rose; although his infantry had not yet marched up, he pointed two or three cannon upon the tent; and the ammunition having not yet arrived, a French officer stuffed into one gun his gloves, his wig, and a packet of “*Gazettes de France*” which he had with him. Sobieski, as soon as his troops appeared, ordered them to take a neighbouring

height. Kara Mustapha, in defending himself left his flanks bare; the whole line was troubled. The king cried aloud that the enemy was lost, and, surrounded by his squadrons, distinguished afar by his brilliant aigrette, his bow, his golden quiver, and the magnificent buckler carried before him, he rushed straight on the crimson tent, crying, ‘*Non nobis, Domine exercituum, sed nomini tuo des gloriam.*’ The Tartars and Spahis recognised him and drew back. The name of the King of Poland ran through the ranks. ‘By Allah, the king is with them,’ repeated they. An eclipse of the moon made the ‘Crescent’ grow pale in the sky, and appeared to the excited armies as an omen from on high. ‘Heaven is against us,’ cried the Turks.

“The vizier, at last, after trying to rally his troops in vain, was obliged to take flight himself, weeping, it was said, bitterly.”

Sobieski’s letters to his wife—a Frenchwoman, who seems scarcely to have appreciated her husband—have been preserved; and they are so very interesting and characteristic that an extract from one written immediately after this great victory cannot fail to be acceptable to the reader. It has more than a personal interest, for it displays the ingratitude of the Austrians, and the unselfishness of the Poles, in a very strong light. The letter is dated “from the tents of the vizier, in the night.”\*

“God be praised! He has given our nation such a victory as has never been known in any former century.

“All the artillery, the camp of the Mussulmans, infinite riches, have fallen into our hands. The victory has been so sudden and extraordinary that in the town as in the camp there have been constant alarms that the enemy was returning upon us. They have left powder and munitions to the value of a million of florins, but half of this was set on fire, and the explosions were like the last judgment.

“The vizier abandoned everything except his coat and his horse. I have constituted myself

\* See the article in the “*Contemporary Review*,” already referred to.



his heir. The private tents alone cover as much space as Warsaw. I have sent the great standard to the Pope, but have hardly had time even to look at the multitude of rich tents, superb equipages, and a thousand beautiful and costly trifles, such as quivers mounted with rubies and sapphires, which are said to be worth thousands of ducats.

"Night put an end to the pursuit, for the Turks defended themselves desperately. They made the finest possible retreat. The Janisaries were forgotten in the trenches, and were all cut to pieces. Such was their pride and presumption that one part of the army was assaulting the town while the other gave us battle, and their forces were enough for both. Without the Tartars I believe they amounted to three hundred thousand men. One hundred thousand tents were counted. In flying they left a number of captives, particularly women, after having massacred as many as they could. Many were killed, but also many were only wounded, and may recover. I saw yesterday a charming little boy of three years old, whose head one of these cowards had split open from the mouth. It is impossible to describe the refinements of luxury which the vizier had collected in his tents—baths, little gardens with fountains, even a rabbit warren. . . . He had taken possession of a fine ostrich found in one of the emperor's country houses, but he cut off its head that it might not fall into the hands of the Christians. . . . I have been in to see the town; it could not have held out five more days. The imperial palace is honeycombed with bullets, the bastions in a terrible state, with great pieces of the wall about to fall over, like masses of rock. All the troops of the allies have done their duty well: they attributed the victory to God and to us. The greatest shock of the battle was just opposite where I was, in front of the vizier; and at the moment the enemy began to yield, the Elector of Bavaria, the Prince of Waldeck, and the other generals crowded round me, embracing me, the soldiers and officers on foot and horseback crying, 'Oh brave king' and kissing my feet.

In the town they called me their 'Saviour.' I went into two churches, where the people kissed my hands and feet and coat, crying, 'Let us touch your victorious hands.'

"But the day is just beginning to break, and I must finish this letter. God is indeed great. Let us render glory and honour to Him for it now and for ever. I cannot longer enjoy this pleasant *tête-à-tête* with you. We have lost a great number of men, but we shall march to-day to pursue the enemy into Hungary; the electors say they will accompany me. The heat is most oppressive.

"The Princes of Bavaria and Saxony will follow me to the end of the world, but we must get over the first two miles quickly, for the smell of infection from so large a number of corpses of men, horses, and camels, is insupportable.

"The emperor is a mile and a half away. I perceive that he has no great wish to see me, so I shall make room for him, and am very glad to escape all the ceremonies that are going to take place in Vienna.

"To-day we are pushing on, but I feel sure that the Germans will not budge. I have sent the Elector of Saxony, as a remembrance, two richly caparisoned horses, two Turkish standards, etc., etc. He is gone back with his army, after having expressed his resentment against the emperor very vehemently.

Sobieski saw the emperor, who barely thanked him. Kara Mustapha retreated in hot haste across the Danube; and a few days later he was strangled and beheaded, by order of the sultan.

This was the last of Turkish aggression in Europe. Never, from that day to this, has Turkey attempted to gain another foot of territory; and indeed the decline of the empire is dated from the day when John Sobieski hurled back the Turks from the walls of Vienna.

A sermon was preached on this occasion in Vienna, with the following text: "There was a man sent from God, and his name was John." Sobieski was indeed a deliverer, with a divine mission; and Poland had earned the perpetual

gratitude of Europe. What her reward was, and how she was ultimately partitioned by her three neighbours, is written in the chronicle of European history.

*Sect. 5. The Character of Turkish Conquests.*

It is most important to bear in mind the essential difference between the character and effects of the conquests made by the Turks, especially in Europe, and the character and effects of conquests made by more civilised nations. Other countries have subjected vast districts to their rule, by means hardly less justifiable than those which were employed by the Ottomans in the middle ages; and in less than four centuries the conquerors and the conquered have become so firmly amalgamated that it would be impossible to think that they could ever again be separated. The only justification which Europe could have for attempting to liberate the Christian subjects of the Porte—or at least for assisting them to throw off Turkish rule altogether—would consist in the absolute failure of Turkey to govern the races whom she has conquered.

No doubt this justification exists. Turkey's failure is as complete as it is possible to imagine it; so that we cannot conceive any circumstances in which the Porte, if left alone, could so much as learn the art of government, or deal, if it wished to deal, justly and liberally with its northern populations. The explanation of this remarkable fact—which is the fundamental fact of the whole Eastern Question—is given by Mr. Freeman in a passage which we may transfer to our own pages:\*

“Why has the conquest made by the Turks been of a nature so different, not only from other conquests made in Western Europe, but even from other conquests made in Eastern Europe? Why is the position of the Turks as a distinct people something quite unlike the position of any other people, even in lands where nations have a tendency to remain especially distinct? The reason

is because the Turk has no share in any of those things which, among all differences, are shared in common by the European nations. The Turk belongs to another branch of the human family than the nations of Europe. He has no share in the common history of these nations, in their common memories, their common feelings, their common civilisation. Lastly, what is more important than all the rest, he does not profess any of the forms of the Christian religion, but follows the religion of Mahomet.

“First, then, the Turk has no share in that original kindred of race and language which binds together all the European nations. The original Turks did not belong to the Aryan branch of mankind, and their original speech is not an Aryan speech. The Turks and their speech belong to altogether another class of nations and languages. They were wholly distinct alike from the Aryan inhabitants of Europe and from the inhabitants of Western Asia, who, wherever they were not Aryan, mainly belonged to the Semitic family. The Semitic nations must, in all those points which distinguished Eastern from Western life, be set down as belonging to the Eastern division. Yet in some points of language they come nearer to the Aryans than the other non-Aryan nations, and some of them have reached a higher stage of civilisation and civil polity than any of the nations which live beyond both the Aryan and Semitic range. It is not needful for our purpose to go deep into any scientific inquiry, as to the exact relations of those nations and languages of Asia and Northern Europe which are neither Aryan nor Semitic. For our purpose, it will be enough to class all those of them with which our subject has anything to do under a name which is sometimes given them, that of *Turanian*. The old Persians, who spoke an Aryan tongue, called their own land *Iran*, and the barbarous land to the north of it they call *Turan*. In their eyes Iran was the land of light, and Turan was the land of darkness. From this Turan, the land of Central Asia, came the many Turkish settlements which made their way, first into Western

\* ‘The Ottoman Power in Europe.’



Asia and then into Europe. The Turks are thus far more distant from any of the Aryan, or even from any of the Semitic nations of Europe and Asia, than any one of those nations can be from any other. From us Europeans they are more distant than the Persians and Hindoos, who are Aryan kinsfolk, though we and they have been so long parted. They are more distant—a fact which it is very important to notice—even than their Semitic forerunners and teachers in the Mahomedan religion, the Arabs and Saracens. It is true that the original Turkish blood must have been greatly modified, by their passage through Persia and Asia Minor. It must also have been greatly modified by their being joined by many European renegades, and by their custom of forcing the youth of the nations whom they conquered to serve in their armies and to embrace their religion. In this way we might say that the Turks in Europe are an artificial nation, and it is certain that many of them must be, in actual descent, of European blood. But the original stock was something altogether foreign to Europe; and, in a case like this, it is the original stock which gives the character to the whole. The Turks in Europe have neither assimilated the nations which they have conquered, nor have they been assimilated by them. They have simply adopted a great many renegades, one after another. And those renegades have, of course, been assimilated by the body which they have joined. They have practically become Turks."

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## CHAPTER II.

### RELIGION, GOVERNMENT, AND MANNERS OF THE TURKS.

#### *Sect. 1. Religion.*

MUCH of the modern history of Turkey is explained by its religion. In fact, it would be useless to expect that we could obtain a clear view of the motives and acts of any people without first inquiring into its character, as formed

and illustrated by its religion. A few pages devoted to this inquiry will, therefore, not be misplaced; whilst the subject is interesting enough in itself to reward the labour.

The religion of the original Turanian Turks, who moved southwards and westwards from the Altai mountains, was little more than an amalgam of wise saws, preserved in the memories of the old men, or of those who, incapable of fighting, undertook the duty of giving counsel to the warriors of their tribes. Amongst those wise saws there was no doubt an admixture of the doctrine and monitions of Zoroaster, one of the greatest sages of Eastern Asia. Their worship was, of course, more or less cruel in its character; but it would seem that, in addition to their reverence for the elements, and perhaps the heavenly bodies, they sacrificed to one Supreme Deity. Their religion was, before all things, a religion of warlike men. Colonel Baker quotes the advice of a counsellor to one of the Turanian chiefs, dissuading him from an invasion of China.

"The Turks," he said, "are not equal in number to one-hundredth part of the inhabitants of China. If we balance their power and elude their armies, it is because we wander without any fixed habitations in the exercise of war and hunting. Are we strong? We advance and conquer. Are we feeble? We retire, and are concealed. Should the Turks confine themselves within the walls of cities, the loss of a battle would be the destruction of their empire. The 'bonzes' preach only patience, humility, and the renunciation of the world. Such, O king is not the religion of heroes."

The religion of Mahomet thoroughly suited the Turks, as it suited the Orientals generally. Not many centuries after the commencement of the Hegira the majority of the Turanian tribes which had penetrated to the west of Asia had been converted to the faith of Islam. For an idea of the nature of this faith, which has made so many converts in the most densely populated regions of the world, we must turn to the Koran itself, to the holy scriptures of Mahomedanism,

in which the Prophet of Mecca set forth his ideas, and enunciated his precepts. Let us briefly examine the nature and peculiarities of this remarkable volume, which has been almost as much read and venerated as our own Bible.

Mr. George Sale, in the preliminary discourse to his translation of the Koran, says:—"The word Korân, derived from the verb *karau*, to read, signifies properly in Arabic, 'the reading,' or rather, 'that which ought to be read,' by which name the Mahomedans denote, not only the entire book or volume of the Korân, but also any particular chapter or section of it: just as the Jews call either the whole scripture or a part of it by the name of *Karâh*, or *Inikra*, words of the same origin and import, which observation seems to overthrow the opinion of some learned Arabians who would have the Korân so named, because it is a collection of the loose chapters or sheets which compose it—the verb *karau* signifying also to *gather* or *collect*.

"The Korân is divided into 114 larger portions of very unequal length, which we call chapters, but the Arabians *Sowar*, in the singular *Sâra*, a word rarely used on any other occasion, and properly signifying a row, order, or regular series; as a course of bricks in a building, or a rank of soldiers in the army; and is the same in use and import with the *Sâra* or *Tora* of the Jews, who also call the fifty-three sections of the Pentateuch *Sedârim*, a word of the same signification."

Mr. Sale goes on to say that the "Korân is universally allowed to be written with the utmost elegance and purity of language," that it is confessedly the standard of the Arabic tongue," and that "the style of the Korân is generally beautiful and fluent." We are not in a position to judge of the beauty of the original Korân, but in the translation it bears no comparison with the beautiful language of our own Bible, of which it appears to be little more than a feeble imitation. In order to give the reader a general idea of the Mahomedan religion, we cannot do better than quote from the same writer a few words in his chapter "on the doctrines and positive precepts of the Koran."

"The Mahomedans divide their religion into two parts: *Imân*, *i. e.*, faith or theory, and *Dîn*—*i. e.*, religion or practice; and teach that it is built on five fundamental points, one belonging to faith, and the other four to practice.

"The first is the confession of faith—"There is no God but the true God; and Mahomet is his Apostle"—under which they comprehend six distinct branches—viz., 1. Belief in God; 2. In his angels; 3. In his scriptures; 4. In his prophets; 5. In the resurrection and day of judgment; and, 6. In God's absolute decree and predetermination both of good and evil.

"The four points relating to practice are, 1. Prayer, under which are comprehended those washings or purifications which are necessary preparations required before prayer; 2. Alms; 3. Fasting; and, 4. The pilgrimage to Mecca."

Of the pilgrimage to Mecca, in chap. ii. of the Koran, it is said, "Perform the pilgrimage to Mecca and the visitation of God, and if ye be besieged, send that offering which shall be easiest" . . . . . The pilgrimage to Mecca must be performed during the known months. . . . . Make provision for your journey; but the best provision is piety, and fear ye me, ye of understanding. It shall be no crime in you, if ye seek an increase from your Lord, by trading during the pilgrimage."

This last passage is a specimen of the curious jumble of piety and worldly wisdom which one meets with constantly throughout the Koran. The descriptions of paradise are full of what the writer already quoted describes as "puerile imaginations." In this Mahomet "chose rather to imitate the indecency of the Magians than the modesty of the Christians; and lest his beatified Moslems should complain that anything was wanting, he bestows on them wives, as well as the other comforts of life; judging, it is to be presumed, from his own inclinations, that like Panurgus's ass, they would think all other enjoyments not worth their acceptance if they were to be debarred from this." "For those who are devout are prepared, with their Lord, gardens



through which rivers flow ; therein shall they continue for ever and they shall enjoy wives free from impurity, and the favour of God." "But as for the sincere servants of God, they shall have a certain provision in paradise—namely, delicious fruits ; and they shall be honoured : they shall be placed in gardens of pleasure leaning on couches, opposite to one another : a cup shall be carried round unto them, filled from a limpid fountain, for the delight of those who drink : it shall not oppress the understanding, neither shall they be inebriated therewith. And near them shall lie the virgins of paradise, refraining their looks from beholding any besides their spouses, having large black eyes, and resembling the eggs of an ostrich covered with feathers from the dust." (Koran, chap. xxxvii.)

And again : "The pious shall be lodged in a place of security among gardens and fountains : they shall be clothed in fine silk and in satin ; and they shall sit facing one another. Thus shall it be : and we will espouse them to fair damsels having large black eyes. In that place shall they call for all kind of fruits, in full security : they shall not taste death therein, after the first death ; and God shall deliver them from the pains of hell, through the gracious bounty of thy Lord. This will be great felicity." (Koran, chap. xlv.)

We might go on, quoting passages of this description *ad infinitum*. The fate which is to befall the Infidel is described in a very different—thought equally realistic—manner, as the following extracts will show :—

"Verily we have designed the same (*i. e.*, the tree Zakkum) for an occasion of dispute unto the unjust. It is a tree which issueth from the bottom of hell : the fruit thereof resembles the heads of devils ; and the damned shall eat of the same, and shall fill their bellies therewith ; there shall be given them thereon a mixture of filthy and boiling water to drink : afterwards they shall return into hell." (Chap. xxxvii.) "And the companions of the left hand (how miserable shall the companions of the left hand be !) shall dwell amidst burning winds and

scalding water, under the shade of a black smoke, neither cool nor agreeable."

In another passage we are told (chap. lvii.) that those who disbelieve shall be "broiled in hell fire, and so often as their skins shall be well burned we will give them other skins in exchange, that they may taste the sharper torment."

Again : "It shall be said to the tormentors, Take him and drag him into the midst of hell : and pour on his head the torture of boiling water, saying, Taste this ; for thou art that mighty and honourable person. Verily, this is the punishment of which ye doubted."

It is hardly to be wondered that such a religion as this should exercise a debasing rather than an ennobling influence on a race whose natural tendencies are sensual and cruel. Nothing strikes one more on reading the life of Mahomet, and in considering his character, as exhibited in his writings, than the differences between him and the Jewish prophets, and indeed holy men of all ages and nations, in this one point, that whereas these both practised and advocated the virtue of self-sacrifice and abstinence, the whole system of Mahomet's teaching turns upon self-indulgence, and the highest rewards of a noble existence on earth are described as the mere gratification of the lowest sensual appetites in heaven.

There are, however, many passages of great beauty in the Korân, some of which remind the reader strongly of many parts of our own Bible. The following is wont to be recited by Mahomedans in their prayers, and is frequently engraved on precious stones, and worn about their persons.

"God ! there is no God but he ; the living, the self-subsisting : neither slumber nor sleep seizeth him ; to him belongeth whatsoever is in heaven and on earth. Who is he that can intercede with him, but through his good pleasure ? He knoweth that which is past, and that which is to come unto them, and they shall not comprehend anything of his knowledge, but so far as he pleaseth. His throne is extended over

heaven and earth, and the preservation of both is no burden to him." (Chap. ii.)

And again, there is no fault to be found with such passages as these:—"We have enjoined a man to show kindness to his parents. With pain his mother beareth him." . . . "The Lord hath ordained that ye worship none but him; and kindness to your parents, whether one or both of them attain to old age with thee: and say not to them 'Fie!' neither reproach them; but speak to them both with respectful speech; and defer humbly to them out of tenderness and say, 'Lord, have compassion on them both, even as they reared me when I was little.'"

A warlike spirit breathes throughout the Koran; and such precepts as the following abound in it:—

"War is enjoined on you against the Infidels, but this is hateful unto you: yet perchance ye hate a thing which is better for you, and perchance ye love a thing which is worse for you: but God knoweth, and ye know not." (Chap. ii.)

"When ye encounter the unbelievers strike off their heads, until ye have made a great slaughter: and bind them in bonds." (Chap. xlviii.)

The following extract from chapter xxxv. of the Koran may be taken as a fair specimen of its style:—

"In the name of the most merciful God." (This form, called by the Mahomedans the Bismillah, is placed at the head of their books and writings in general, as a peculiar mark or distinguishing characteristic of their religion, it being counted a sort of impiety to omit it.)\*

"Praise be unto God, the Creator of heaven and earth; who maketh his angels his messengers, furnished with two and three and four pair of wings; God maketh what he pleaseth unto his creatures; for God is Almighty. The mercy which God shall freely bestow on mankind, there is none to withhold, and what he shall withhold there is none who can bestow, besides him: and he is the mighty, the wise. O men, remember

\* See Sale's preliminary discourse to translation of the Koran.

the favour of God towards you: is there any creator, besides God, who provideth food for you from heaven and earth? There is no God but he: how therefore are ye turned aside from acknowledging his unity? . . . . . For those who believe not there is prepared a severe torment; but for those who shall believe and do that which is right, is prepared mercy and a great reward. Shall he therefore for whom his evil work hath been prepared, and who imagineth it to be good, be as he who is rightly disposed and discerneth the truth? Verily, God will cause to err whom he pleaseth, and will direct whom he pleaseth. Let not thy soul therefore be spent in sighs for their sakes, on account of their obstinacy; for God well knoweth that which they do. It is God who sendeth the winds and raiseth a cloud; and we drive the same into a dead country and thereby quicken the earth after it hath been dead: so shall the resurrection be. . . . The two seas are not to be held in comparison. This is fresh and sweet, pleasant to drink; but that is salt and bitter: yet out of each of them ye eat fish and take ornaments for you to wear. Ye see the ships also ploughing the waves thereof, that ye may seek to enrich yourselves by commerce, of the abundance of God: peradventure ye will be thankful. He causeth the night to succeed the day and he causeth the day to succeed the night; and he obligeth the sun and moon to perform their services; each of them runneth an appointed course. This is God your Lord: his is the kingdom. But the idols which ye invoke beside him have not the power even over a date-stone: if ye invoke them they will not hear your calling; and although they should hear, yet they would not answer you . . . That which we have revealed unto thee of the book of the Koran is the truth, confirming the scriptures which were revealed before it; for God knoweth and regardeth his servants. And we have given the book of the Koran in heritage unto such of our servants as we have chosen: of them there is one who injureth his own soul; and there is another of them who keepeth the middle way; and there is an-



other of them who outstrippeth others in good works by permission of God. This is the great excellence. They shall be introduced into gardens of perpetual abode; they shall be adorned therein with bracelets of gold and pearls, and their clothing therein shall be of silk: and they shall say, Praise be unto God, who hath taken away sorrow from us! Verily our Lord is ready to forgive the sinners, and to reward the obedient, who hath caused us to take up our rest in a dwelling of eternal stability, through his bounty, wherein no labour shall touch us, neither shall any weariness affect us."

There can be no better test or illustration of the value of a religion than to consider the state in which the women of a nation live, and the manner in which they are treated, under its influence. The following picture of the life of Turkish ladies, as printed by a recent visitor to Constantinople, may therefore prove interesting to the reader. It is extracted from a paper on "The Grand Turk at Home," contributed by Mr. G. A. Sala to a recent number of the "Gentleman's Magazine."

"Nothing," writes Mr. Sala, "is more common than to hear Englishwomen, who have been sojourners for a lengthened period in Constantinople, speak in enthusiastic terms of the material *bien être* of the Turkish ladies, of their hospitality and amiability, and of the happiness in which, apparently, their lives are passed. According to these optimists, the Turkish *khanoums* have nothing whatever to grumble at here below; and if woman were indeed only a being 'qui s'habille, se déshabille, se réhabille, et babille;' if her sole vocations in this world were eating, drinking, smoking, sleeping, and scandal-monging, I should be at one with the optimists."

Further on the same writer quotes a description given by Mrs. Edward Hornby, a lady who, in 1858, in company with other English ladies, visited the harem of Kiza Pasha. "The visitors accepted an invitation to a banquet, at which warm rye-bread covered with caraway seeds, soups, smoking *pilafs*, and pancakes simmering in butter and honey, were among the chief dishes.

The *khanoums*, according to Mrs. Hornby, gave a loose and unseemly rein to their appetites, being stimulated by official female buffoons, who served the dishes with appropriate jokes to each *met*, the utterance of which '*funniments*' excited the most uproarious merriment, not only from the *khanoums*, but from the negro slaves in attendance. The quality of the fun seems to have been of the most indelicate and coarse description; and the English ladies congratulated themselves on their inability to understand witticisms at which a fair Circassian, the second wife of the pasha, 'between the intervals of licking her fingers and her spoon, and popping tit-bits on our plates, laughed so complacently.' It may be discreetly hinted that European ladies who do understand Turkish make no secret of the fact that the ordinary harem talk of Osmanli ladies is closely akin to the conversation of Dula and Aspasia, and the other ladies who wait upon Evadne in the 'Maid's Tragedy' of Beaumont and Fletcher—that is to say, ribaldry of the very grossest and most shameless kind."

As for the position of Mahomedan women in the religious system of the Koran, Mr. Sala says:—

"I believe it is a commonly accepted idea that the Mahomedans deny the possession of a soul to a woman. But this idea is erroneous. Women are believed by them to possess souls, although they are not supposed to associate with the men in paradise, but go into a separate place of happiness, where they will enjoy 'all manner of delights!' What these delights are to be the Prophet is not so careful to tell. There is no doubt, however, that the Turk thinks meanly of womenkind, and perhaps it is hardly to be wondered at, when we take into consideration the lives these women lead; indeed, it is harder to believe that creatures possessed of either soul or mind would be content to remain in such a state. As the Prophet says, they are 'brought up among ornaments, and are contentious without a cause.'"

*Sect. 2. Government.*

It must be admitted, in justice to the Ottoman Turks, that the task of government imposed upon them by the conquest of so many different races and nationalities in South-eastern Europe, to say nothing of South-western Asia and Africa, was one of immense difficulty, which would have sufficed for the highest ability and energy of the most civilised and powerful nation. The eighteen or twenty various peoples who have already been enumerated in this work, differing as they did in blood, in language, in religion and in habits, some more cultivated than their conquerors, others inferior to them, all had to be kept in subjection, to be ruled and taxed and conciliated; and we can hardly wonder if the Turanian warriors failed in everything but brute force.

They failed even in the employment of brute force; for, as we have seen, something like positive anarchy existed in Constantinople during the greater part of the fifteenth century, whilst the condition of affairs in the outlying provinces has in every generation been lamentable in the extreme.

Certain of the earlier historians of the Turks have given them a character which—setting aside their fierceness in time of war—enables them to compare favourably with the undeveloped phases of other nationalities. They were always brave, sober, honest, patient, fairly humane, and susceptible of discipline. Gibbon has praised their modesty; and to this day braggadocio has not been among the faults of the Turks. As to their sobriety, it must be borne in mind that the Turanians adopted the creed of Mahomet with enthusiasm, and Mahomet forbade the use of wine. Their honesty arose out of, or was indetical with, their simplicity of manners and taste, as their patience was due in part to their natural indolence, which made them content with little food, and with few of the luxuries of life. The same fact will account for their discipline, which is more the result of dogged endurance than of a reasoning self-restraint. As for their humanity, Colonel Baker (who is cer-

tainly inclined to be partial rather than the reverse) bears witness to what he has observed in the Turkish soldiers of our own days. "Look at the Turkish soldier," he says, "in private life, and you find him gentle and kind to children and women, and exceedingly fond of animals. His first thought, after a long and tiring day's march, is his horse. As soon as he has made the animal comfortable, then he thinks of the man. When he is exasperated by what he thinks are insults to his creed, he kills and slays, as his teaching tells him, and he appears a fanatical madman."

Such may be the character of the Turks as a nation; though we shall see by and by that they have grievous faults to be set against their virtues. But these good points are not what we look for in those whose lot it is to govern; and it is the governing Turks who are responsible for most of the misfortunes and crimes of the country.

Even in the capacity for governing, the earlier conquerors had more to be said in their favour than those who have succeeded them; and there is doubtless some truth in what is often urged in their excuse, that the deterioration is partly due to the corrupt influences of the subtle, intriguing, and corrupt Byzantine empire of which they had made themselves the heirs. "As soon as the head of the Turkish nation shall be purified," says Colonel Baker again, "we shall find the whole constitution in a healthy state—there is no disease of the body." This is, of course, a statement which needs considerable qualification; but the writer explains his meaning when he says that "the combination in Turkish government of despotism with the freedom of the most democratic of republics is unique. In Turkey there are no aristocracy. All men\* below the sultan are equal, not only in the eyes of the law, but by creed and custom. A shoeblack may be made grand vizier, and it is by no means uncommon to see some of the highest officials of the State who have been servants to predecessors in office."

\* "All Mahomedans," we must understand.



With respect to the traditional mode of government adopted by the Ottoman Turks who conquered Turkey in Europe, we cannot do better than quote the concise remarks of Colonel Baker, in his work upon "Turkey in Europe," which has made us acquainted with many details not elsewhere popularly related in English form.

When the conquering army entered a conquered country, we read, "it had to establish order, and this was done on the feudal system, by creating what were called Timars, Ziamets, and Beyliks—military grants of land carrying with them the obligation of providing a military force for the service of the State in case of need.

"A Timar was granted to a distinguished soldier, and contained from three to five hundred acres of land, and the owner or spahi (cavalier) was bound to supply a mounted cavalry soldier for every three thousand aspres of its revenue. A Ziamet comprised upwards of five hundred acres, and Beyliks were still larger grants. These fiefs were hereditary in the male line. A certain number of these grants were grouped into a district, and over the district was placed an officer, with the title of Sandjak Bey—Sandjak meaning a standard or flag—which generally carried a command of five thousand horse. Each Sandjak Bey was given a horse's tail as a distinctive mark of command.

"Here, then, was a feudal tenure, and a rough-and-ready form of government, applicable at a moment's notice, and backed by sufficient force to maintain order. Timars and Ziamets were eagerly sought by both soldiers and officers, and became prizes to incite to valour and gallant deeds. But although left in possession of their holdings, they did not represent the permanent organisation of government. The ancient and figurative idea of Turkish government was that of four pillars which supported the royal tent. The first of these was figurative of the Viziers; the second of the Cadiaskers, which would properly mean *military* judges; the third, Defterdars (treasurers); the fourth Nischandeges (Secretaries of State). Amongst Eastern nations a tent was not the simple covering which is sug-

gested by the word in England, but a far more elaborate dwelling. It had its passages and apartments, and grand and smaller entrances.

"To follow out the idea, we must picture the life of these nomad Eastern sovereigns, moving here and there at the head of their army, sometimes to make war on a foreign Power, sometimes to visit one part or another of their vast dominions. It was, in fact, a nomad government. It was customary for the great officials—the pillars of the royal tent—to meet at the great portal, within easy reach of the voice and ear of their royal master, there discuss the affairs of State, *sub limine portae*; hence the origin of the term 'Sublime Porte,' which now designates the Turkish Government.

"Tent court-life in the East is carried on very much in the same way in the present day—when sovereigns occupy their royal pavilions. I can remember being presented to the Shah of Persia, many years ago, when he was dwelling with his court on the banks of the river Euphrates, in a pavilion which exactly answers the description of the ancient court-life of the Turkish monarchs.

"In addition to the figurative four pillars of the royal tent, there were other officers of government, designated *agas* or rulers, which were of two kinds. The *outer agas* were military rulers, and their number was from the nature of the case very considerable; *inner agas* attended the court and serai. The serai is the palace, and the harem the women's apartments of the palace, so that the two should not be confounded, as is often the case. The *inner agas* comprised the eunuchs who attended on the harem. Besides these officers, there were expounders of the law, or *ulemas*.

"The first pillar of the royal shelter, the Viziers—which signifies 'the bearer of burdens'—the weight of government—were four in number, of which the grand vizier was the head.

"The second pillar, or Cadiaskers, were two in number, one for Europe and one for Asia, and watched over the legal affairs of the State. Under them were; 1. The Khodya, or tutor of the royal

princes; 2. The Muftis or expounders of the sacred law; and afterwards a third appointment was made—viz., the Judge of Constantinople.

"The assembly in council of the four pillars was called the Divan. It was attended by a chief secretary, a *Reis Effendi*, who from being able to visit and gain the ear of all the officials, was an officer of considerable importance, and he sometimes became practically the most powerful man in the State.

"The Grand Vizier sat at the head of the Divan in the absence of the sultan, and he could convoke a special Divan in his own tent when he considered it necessary. At the head of all sat the Padishah or Great King.

"We will suppose, then, that some of the Turkish generals have crossed the Dardanelles, pushed forward with their forces, and occupied a large part of Thrace, establishing their Sandjak Beys, Beyliks, Ziamets, and Timars as they go. The Great Sultan follows with his main army and 'royal tent,' thus carrying with him all the machinery of government. He groups his numerous Sandjak Beys under two heads—one for Europe and one for Asia, and to these he gives the title of Beyler Beys, Beyof Beys, or Mir Miran, Emir of Emirs; and to one he gives two, and to the other three horses' tails, to signify their power. Hence we have the common term, 'a Pasha of two tails.'

"The term Pasha, which means 'the shah's foot,' or one whom the sovereign employed (there were also the 'eyes' and 'hands' of the sovereign power), was not originally used in a military sense, but was given to literary as well as to any other Turkish subjects who might distinguish themselves in the eyes of the sultan.

"In possession of the land of Europe, it was necessary to appropriate it, according to ancient Turkish custom, for three purposes: 1. *Vacoufs*, or church lands; 2. Private property; and 3. Domain lands. The revenues of the *Vacoufs*, or ecclesiastical lands, were devoted to pious and charitable purposes—to the support of mosques and public schools, which received their education through the ecclesiastical authorities. The

pupils were, in fact, educated in the moral and sacred precepts of the Koran.

"The *private property* was subject to different liabilities, according to the religion of the owner. If he was a Mussulman, it was called *asckrie* or tithable, the owner paying as a tax a tithe of the produce in kind to the State, and there was no other burden upon it. If left in the hands of a Christian, its holder paid tribute or *kharadj* to the State, which consisted of a capitation tax, levied on the estate, which was sometimes a fixed sum, according to its extent, and was sometimes an impost on its proceeds, varying from an eighth to one-half.

"The *domain lands* included—1. The *Miri*, or those revenues which were appropriated to the State Treasury; 2. Unoccupied or waste lands, which afterwards became similar to our 'common' lands in England; 3. The private demesnes of the sultan, of which there are a large amount in both Turkey-in-Europe and Asia; 4. Escheated and forfeited lands (which are now usually sold by public auction); 5. The appanages of the Valideh Sultan (Sultan's mother), and other members of blood royal; 6. Lands assigned to the offices filled by viziers; 7. Lands assigned to the second rank; 8. Lands assigned to the ministers and officers of the palace; 9. The Beyliks, Ziamets, and Timars, already mentioned.

"It will be seen that the administrators of the Government were principally military men; and it must be remembered that we are following the wake of a conquering army, which was obliged to fill its ranks from a distance. Consequently, this abstraction of military governors and officers of State became such a strain on the resources, of the army, that it tended to weaken the force by which dominion was maintained.

"To meet this difficulty, which began to be one of alarming importance, Sultan Orchan, the son and successor of Othman, utilised the ancient Turkish custom of appropriating a fifth of the conquered subjects as slaves.

"He commenced by taking annually a thousand of the Christian children of from twelve to



fourteen years of age. The greatest care was bestowed upon their education, in order to fit them for either the military, civil or ecclesiastical professions, for whichever by nature and disposition they might prove to be most fitted. They had to pass through four successive schools before the final selection was made, and then were distributed as officers of the State.

"The abstraction of these Christian youths was not considered a hardship by their parents, although they were, of course, to be educated in the Mahomedan faith; but, on the contrary, it was rather looked forward to as a piece of good fortune, because it was likely to give the family greater influence with the ruling powers. It was out of this body of youths that the celebrated Janissaries—to whom I have previously alluded—were taken; and it is curious to mark that the greatest persecutors of the Christians—those, in fact, who in after times became the leaders of most of the atrocities which were too often committed—were not of Turkish, but of either Albanian, Greek, Slavonic, or Bulgarian blood.

"The treatment of Christians in the early times of the Ottoman conquest was not severe. It was only when the Porte became corrupt, and relaxed its vigorous and active administration for the luxuries and venality bequeathed to it by the Byzantine empire, that the disgraceful persecutions of Christians commenced.

"There is a maxim of the old Turkish law which says that 'the bended head shall not be stricken off,' and in former times this maxim was respected. The following question was once put to the Mufti: 'If eleven Mussulmans without just cause kill an Infidel (Christian) who is the subject of the Padishah and pays tribute, what is to be done? To this the Mufti replied—

"'Though the Mussulmans should be a thousand and one, let them all die.'

"The Christian subjects who paid tribute were called *rayahs*. They usually cultivated the land as tenants on the *metayer* system of their Mussulman landlords.

"Such was the commencement of the 'govern-

ment' of the Porte. At its head sat supreme the sultan, the depositary and representative of the law, which he can modify, but cannot change. His *ordonnances* are called *Hatt-i-cherifs*, or 'illustrious writings,' and *Hatt-i-humayouns*, or 'august writings.'"

It was by no means a bad system; and, under the most favourable circumstances, it worked fairly well. Other European nations at the same period were no better organised; and certainly Russia was not.

A further improvement in the local government of Turkey was made, some years later, under Murad (Amurath) the Third, who divided the whole empire into twenty-six *eyalets*, and a hundred and sixty-three *sandjaks*. The *sandjaks* were subdivided into small districts, each presided over by a *cadi*, or judge; and every village had its head, selected by the inhabitants, who was responsible to the *cadis* for the execution of the laws and regulations of the superior authorities. Such was the theoretical constitution of Turkey from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century—apparently with very few modifications. It reminds one of the division of the English counties into hundreds and tithings effected by Alfred some seven centuries before; and it speaks well for the sense and judgment of the Ottoman conquerors that they should have established such a system.

No doubt they availed themselves of the political machinery which they found to be in existence in the Byzantine empire, previous to their occupation of the country, as well as of the administrative capacity of the Greeks who accepted their new masters, and placed their knowledge at their disposal. It may safely be concluded that it was from these conquered Greeks, rather than from the conquering Turks, that the organisation of the Ottoman empire proceeded. It is probable that the subdivision of the country was already in existence before the invaders made their appearance, and that the latter adopted and gave their own names to an arrangement which they found ready to their hands.

But the great misfortune of the Turks, as we

have seen above, was the utter inability to rule wisely the heterogeneous elements of their subject empire. If all the Europeans over whom their sway was extended had been of the same race, it may be doubted whether they could have governed them successfully. As it was, not even a good system enabled them to rule with wisdom or justice.

From the day when Sobieski crushed them under the walls of Vienna, and put a final limit to their aggressions in Europe, the warlike qualities of the Turks began to disappear, and they grew more and more corrupt and effeminate. The history of the Ottoman government during the past two centuries has been a history of anarchy and corruption; and there is little indeed to relieve the monotony of selfish cruelty on the part of the rulers, and of hopeless degradation on the part of their victims.

The persecution of the Christian subjects of the Porte became greater year by year. There could be no surer sign of the absolute failure of the Turks to establish their right of possession in Europe, as many another conquering race has established its moral right over those whom it has subdued. If there had been any amalgamation of Turks and Christians, any approximation to a good and impartial government, either in Constantinople or in the provinces, Turkey might have grown into a solid Power, against which it would have been useless for the Russians to carry on their constant and almost invariably successful campaigns. But, instead of advancing towards homogeneity and nationality, Turkey has been perpetually sinking back into greater barbarism, and approaching nearer and nearer towards dissolution. Rulers and subjects have been falling further away from, instead of drawing closer to each other; and nothing but the force of external circumstances could have maintained the integrity of the empire up to the present time.

It is needless to remind Englishmen what these external circumstances have been. English policy before all things—a mistaken English policy, not to say a selfish English policy—has

alone sufficed to bolster up a nation which is no nation, and a tyranny which has had no hopeful elements to justify its continuance. From the seventeenth century downwards we have supported and protected the Ottoman Power in the interests of our own trade, and especially in the interests of our Indian empire, to which we have, rightly or wrongly, considered Turkey as a sort of half-way house.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, for a long time an ambassador at Constantinople, wrote in the year 1863 a remarkable paper on the then condition of Turkey; and we may quote therefrom a few passages, which concisely illustrated the general feeling in this country at that time, in respect of the connexion of English and Turkish interests.

“Long before we had any territorial footing in the Mediterranean,” writes his lordship,\* “that spirit of trade and navigation, which belongs so emphatically to the British Isles, had led us into commercial intercourse with the shores of Turkey. Those who embarked in the trade with that country required protection for their persons and properties against the violence of a despotic government, the cupidity of local authorities, and the prejudices of a fanatical population. We are indebted to the same great Princess for the Levant and East India Companies, which, in their day, though now consigned to the common resting-place of humanity, rendered service to the State on no common scale of magnitude. It was in connection with the former, and in support of its establishment, that our first ostensible engagements with the Porte were contracted under the name of ‘capitulations.’ These, and some additional treaties still in vigour, constitute our legal securities for justice and friendly treatment wherever the sultan’s power is practically maintained.”

After showing the rapid increase of the trade

\* The paper in question was reprinted in the “Nineteenth Century” for June, 1877. In a postscript appended to it, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe admits that his opinions have greatly changed as to the policy which he would consider it wise for England to maintain.



which our national policy encouraged, his lordship continues—

“Experience and conjecture, facts, and appearances, thus converge towards the same point, and warrant a steady belief that the interest we take in the welfare of Turkey is not imaginary, but well grounded, substantial, and progressive. Be it remembered at the same time that in giving our support to the maintenance of the Ottoman empire, to the improvement of its administration, and to the expansion of its resources, we promote the interests of a State whose commercial policy is singularly liberal, and from an earlier period, in advance of European legislation.

. . . . . Ascribe it, if you please, to ignorance, or to indifference—that ignorance, which steps instinctively before others into the right course, possesses a claim to our good-will, and that indifference, which opened a great empire to useful intercourse with all friendly countries, had at least the merit of not being repulsive in its character. But on either of these suppositions how are we to explain the positive encouragement given by the Porte to commercial adventurers from abroad, and carried even to the extreme of allowing the ambassador and consuls of their nation to exercise judicial authority within the Turkish dominions?”

This trade-policy we have constantly pursued for more than two hundred and fifty years. As early as 1621—before the date of John Sobieski—we interfered in a quarrel between Poland and the Turks, for the express purpose of preventing injury to the country from which our merchants were deriving so much profit; and from that time till now we have made ourselves a bulwark in Europe of one of the worst governments ever known.

It would lead us into too long a digression if we were to pursue this subject further in the present chapter. We shall return to it hereafter; but this much was necessary in order to suggest one principal explanation of the extraordinary fact, that a rule so corrupt as that of Turkey has been able to hold its place amongst the nations of Europe. It is impossible for an Englishman to make light of the importance of our na-

tional commercial interests, or to undervalue what has been done for this country by the shrewd policy of our forefathers; but at the same time we cannot, without a certain degree of shame, recall the memory of the times when England, for her own interests, prevented the operation of those natural and historical laws which would otherwise have driven the Turks out of Europe.

It has been said that little change was made in the form of Turkish government until the present century. The changes which now took place were due, in the main, to Sultan Mahmoud II., a man of discernment and of stern determination, who was almost the first amongst the sultans to attempt the modelling of Turkey after the fashion of the other European States. Let us see how he set about his work, and how far he succeeded. It was through the influence of Bairaktar, the Pasha of Rustchuk—a man of superior intellect and education to the generality of Turks in his time, and a great enemy of the Janissaries—that Mahmoud II. was placed upon the throne. With Bairaktar as Grand Vizier, Mahmoud carried out many reforms which had been commenced by Sultan Selim III., and rendered futile by the revolt of the Janissaries, and the compulsory abdication of that monarch. But Bairaktar was not suffered to remain long to assist his royal master; for, a reform of the army having been set on foot, the Janissaries again revolted, and assassinated Bairaktar in the royal palace. This put a stop to all reform for a time. The Janissaries were too powerful for the sultan to overcome easily, and, besides this, the country was engaged in war, both foreign and civil. However, after several years' submission to the arrogance and insubordination of this potent body, the sultan determined to put an end to them; and their suppression was effected in true Turkish style.

“Seeing that the sultan was still bent on carrying out the hated reforms,” says Mr. Dunn, in his narrative already quoted,\* “the Janis-

\* “Rise and Decay of the Rule of Islam.” A. J. Dunn.

saries again raised the standard of revolt, with the object of dethroning so un-Moslemlike a ruler, and replacing him by one more obedient to the precepts of the Koran. Mahmoud, hearing of these plans, resolved to forestall them, and, surrounding their barracks with all the available troops and several batteries of artillery, set it on fire. About fifteen thousand were shot down, eight thousand perished in the flames, and twenty thousand were banished. A proclamation was issued declaring the corps of Janissaries for ever dissolved. By this stern measure he strengthened the hands of the executive, and gained the necessary power to carry out without impediment the much-needed reforms."

Colonel Baker thus summarises the most beneficial measures that were passed by Sultan Mahmoud:—

"The closing of the Courts of Confiscation, by which the property of all persons banished or condemned to death had previously reverted to the Crown . . . had given rise to much government oppression, and its removal was a great boon to both the Christian and Mussulman population.

"The power of life and death was taken away from the governing pashas, and for the future capital punishment was not to be inflicted otherwise than by the sentence of an authorised court of law, with the right of appeal through the higher courts, until the appeal terminated with the sultan himself.

"The administration of the 'Vacoufs,' or Church lands, was revised, and the revenues therefrom placed under the control of the State, but the conscience of the government was not so sensitive on this point as to prevent the application of the revenue of the Church lands to the general purposes of the State.

"The Timars and Ziamets had formerly been instituted as military fiefs, for the purpose of furnishing an effective military force at the call of the State, but they had, from neglect and corruption, long ceased to act for any effective purpose; they were, therefore attached to the public domains, which added to the resources of the State, and put an end to a host of corruptions.

"A still more important reform was the suppression of the Dering Beys, or hereditary local chiefs, who had power to nominate their successors in default of male heirs. These beys had made themselves petty princes in most of the provinces of the empire, and their pride and exactions had become intolerable. Some of these independent chiefs could muster as many as forty thousand troops, but, by the steady and firm perseverance of Sultan Mahmoud, these insubordinate feudatories were, in a great measure, suppressed.

"By a firman in 1834 the vexatious charges usually made by public functionaries, when travelling, upon the inhabitants of the country, were forbidden, and all collections of money, except at the two half-yearly periods, were abolished. In this firman Sultan Mahmoud said—'No one is ignorant that I am bound to afford support to all my subjects against vexatious proceedings, to endeavour unceasingly to lighten instead of increasing their burdens, and to insure their peace and tranquillity; therefore those acts of oppression are at once contrary to the will of God and to my imperial orders.'

"The sultan set an example of attending the Divan, and personally superintending the government of the country.

"But it was not only the reforms which were passed and made law, which signalled his reign, but those which were studied, partially organised, and afterwards completed by his successor, Abdul Medjid, who was only sixteen years of age when he came to the throne. At the suggestion of the Divan he at once pushed forward the reforms commenced by his father, and the famous Tanzimat, for equality of rights between Christians and Mussulmans, was commenced.

"The Hatt-i-humayoun, read at Gulkhanèh, near Constantinople, in the presence of the sultan, announced the termination of arbitrary exactions in the collection of taxes, equality of taxation in proportion to fortune, and of liability to the military service, publicity of criminal justice, and the termination of the confiscation of heirs for the crimes of their predecessors.



"This Hatt-i-humayoun of the 3rd of November, 1839, was considered of such sacred importance that the text of it was deposited in the same hall as the sacred standard of the Prophet.

"A further ordinance was issued, declaring free the profession of a baker; and the monopoly of the purchase of bread by the Zahiré-Naziri, or surveyor-general of provisions, was also abolished; and from that moment all the abuses which had previously existed in that department disappeared. The bakers made their purchases wherever they chose, and the supply was abundant.

"Education was not neglected, and academies were established in Constantinople, Adrianople, Salonica, Smyrna, Broussa, Bagdad, and Trebizond, where literature and the sciences were to be taught on the European method, and military and naval schools were instituted."

The important services of Sultan Mahmoud and his son, Abdul Medjid, would have done much, if they had been fairly carried out, to redeem Turkey from her gradual decay. The Tanzimat, in particular, contained promises of the most liberal kind, which Abdul doubtless intended, for the moment, to keep. The provisions of the edict may be comprised under three heads:—

1. Guarantees insuring all subjects of the empire perfect security for their lives, their honour, and their property.

2. A regular method of imposing and collecting the taxes, and revision of the finances of the empire.

An equitable method of recruiting, levying the army, and fixing the duration of the service.

These concessions were extended to all subjects, to whatever religion or sect they belonged, and were sanctioned in the most solemn form by the Sheik-ul-Islam and the high dignitaries of State.

The reign of Abdul Medjid was marked by several events important to all the European Powers, not the least, of which was the Crimean

War, of which we shall have something further to say in a future chapter. We may here, however, quote a few observations as to certain of the results of this war from a writer to whom we are already indebted.

"By the Treaty of Peace, Russia had relinquished her pretensions to the protectorate, it was therefore incumbent on the Great Powers to make some provision other than a paper guarantee to secure the equal liberties of the Christian subjects of the Porte with their Moslem fellow-countrymen. In answer to their representations upon this subject, the sultan issued, on the 18th of February, 1856, a solemn decree of organic reform. By this decree he confirmed all the privileges and immunities which had been previously conferred upon the Christian communities throughout the empire. Freedom of worship and education were granted; law cases between members of different religious persuasions were to be heard before a mixed commission in open court, and the witnesses sworn according to their creed; a commercial and criminal code was to be drawn up and promulgated; the police force was to be remodelled, and corporal punishment or torture in any shape to be abolished. The electoral law was also to be arranged in such a manner as to secure an equal representation to each of the elements of the mixed population. It is certain that Abdul Medjid was fully alive to the necessity of carrying out these reforms, and was sincerely anxious to establish for his subjects a perfectly just and equitable system of government similar to those of Western nations."

But, as the writer proceeds to point out, all Abdul's reforms, all his new laws were virtually a dead letter, owing partly, no doubt, to the Oriental laziness and indifference of those whom they were framed to protect, but in a still greater degree to the fact which must strike even the most casual reader of their history, that the religion of the Moslem precludes any possibility of equality with "the Infidel," any desire

\* "The Rise and Decay of Islam." A. J. Dunn.

for progress, and consequently, any hope of an impartial and just government.

On the death of Abdul Medjid in 1861, his brother Abdul Aziz came to the throne, and "at the suggestion of the European Powers, and particularly Great Britain, introduced many reforms in the financial arrangements of the empire, and in the manner of adjusting and levying the taxation in the provinces. The expenses of the civil list were cut down, and a regular budget published. Treaties of commerce were signed with many of the European States, and for a few years everything went well, for peace reigned in Europe."

But, in 1866, came the insurrection of the Christians in Crete against their Moslem rulers; then came the Servian difficulty; then fresh disturbances in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and, lastly, the campaign of 1876.

In the midst of these disturbances Abdul Aziz, who, if not a man of powerful intellect, was at any rate intelligent and well meaning, was suddenly deposed (May 1876), and a few days after his deposition was found dead. It was said that he had committed suicide; but it is more probable that he met his death in some other way. Supposing the theory of suicide to be correct, it is no matter for surprise. One can hardly imagine a more pitiable case than that of the ex-sultan, who, after struggling for years to diminish the evils which he knew existed in his kingdom, found that all his efforts had been unavailing, and foresaw the impending ruin of his country.

We may fitly conclude this brief sketch of the constitution and government of Turkey by an extract from an essay of Mr. Cobden's, recently reprinted, which, though it was written more than forty years ago, still contains much that is worthy of consideration. Mr. Cobden, it must be observed, guarded himself most studiously against being supposed to advocate the cause of Russian aggression. He looked upon Turkey from the point of view of an English champion of free trade and political liberty, earnest in his desire for the triumph of the soundest prin-

ciples of freedom and commerce in every country of the world.

After describing the widely-extended dominions of the Turks, Mr. Cobden continues—

"The present lamentable condition of this fine territory, so renowned in former times, arises from no change in the seasons, or defalcation of nature. It still stretches from 34 to 48 degrees north, within the temperate zone, and upon the same parallels of latitude as Spain, France, and all the best portions of the United States. 'Mount Hæmus,' says Malte Brun, 'is still covered with verdant forests; the plains of Thrace, Macedonia and Thessaly, yield abundant and easy harvests to the husbandman—a thousand ports and a thousand gulfs are observed on the coasts, the peninsulas, and islands. The calm billows of these tranquil seas still bathe the base of mountains covered with vines and olive-trees. But the populous and numerous towns mentioned by ancient writers have been changed into deserts beneath a despotic government.' All the authorities upon this country assure us that the soil of many parts of Turkey is more fruitful than the richest plains of Sicily. When grazed by the rudest plough, it yields a more abundant harvest than the finest fields between the Eure and the Loire, the granary of France. Mines of silver, copper and iron are still existing, and salt abounds in the country. Cotton, tobacco, and silk, might be made the staple exports of this region, and their culture admits of almost unlimited extension throughout the Turkish territory; whilst some of the native wines are equal to those of Burgundy. Almost every species of tree flourishes in European Turkey. The heights of the Danube are clad with apple, pine, cherry, and apricot trees; whole forests of these may be seen in Wallachia; and they cover the hills of Thrace, Macedonia, and Epirus. The olive, orange, mastic, fig, pomegranate—the laurel, myrtle, and nearly all the beautiful and aromatic shrubs and plants—are natural to this soil. Nor are the animal productions less valuable than those of vegetable life. The finest horses have been drawn from



this quarter, to improve the breeds of Western Europe; and the rich pastures of European Turkey are, probably, the best in the world for rearing the largest growths of cattle and sheep.

“That in a region so very highly favoured the population should have retrograded, whilst surrounded by abundance; that its wealth and industry should have been annihilated; and that commerce should be banished from those rivers and harbours that first called it into existence—must be accounted for by remembering that the finest soil, the most genial climate, or the brightest intellectual and physical gifts of humanity, are as nothing when subjected to the benumbing influence of the government of Constantinople. It is necessary to refer to the religion and the maxims of its professors, which constitute all that serves as a substitute for law with this Mahomedan people, if we would ascertain the causes why ignorance, barbarism, and poverty, now overspread the fairest lands of Asia and Europe. The Turks profess, as is well known, the most bigoted and intolerant branch of the Mahomedan faith; they regard with equal detestation the Persian Shiite and the follower of Christ; nay, the more zealous amongst their doctors contend that it is as meritorious to slay one Shiite as twenty Christians. Their colleges, or madresses, teach nothing but the Mahomedan theology; many years being spent in mastering such knotty points as, *whether the feet should be washed at rising, or only rubbed with the dry hand.* As the orthodox Turk, of whatever rank, is taught to despise all other fields of learning but the Koran, under the belief that Mahomet has, in that sacred book, recorded all that comprises the education of a Frenchman, a German, or an Italian; he knows nothing of the countries beyond the bounds of the sultan’s dominions. The Turks (unlike the liberal Persians, who have made some advances in science) are unacquainted with the uses of the commonest scientific instruments, which are exhibited to them by travellers just as we do to amuse children. Notwithstanding that this people have been for nearly four centuries in absolute

possession of all the noblest remains of ancient art, they have evinced no taste for architecture or sculpture, whilst painting and music are equally unknown to them. Nor have they been less careless about the preservation of ancient, than the creation of modern works of labour and ingenuity. They found, at the conquest of the Eastern empire, splendid and substantial public and private edifices, which have been barbarously destroyed, or allowed to crumble beneath the hand of time; and huts of wood, compared by travellers to large boxes\* standing in rows, with their lids open upon hinges, compose the streets of modern Constantinople and other large cities. Bridges, aqueducts, and harbours, the precious and durable donations of remote, yet more enlightened generations, have all suffered a like fate; and the roads, even in the vicinity of the capital, which in former ages maintained an unrivalled celebrity, are described, by the last tourist,† to be now in so broken and neglected a state as to present a barrier against the progress of artillery as complete as though it had been designed by an engineer for that purpose.

“The cause of all the decay is ascribed to the genius of the Turkish government—a fierce, unmitigated military despotism—allied with the fanaticism of a brutalising religion, which teaches its followers to rely solely on the sword, and to disdain all improvement and labour. The sultan, who is the vicegerent of the Prophet, holds both temporal and spiritual authority over his followers; and this enables him to sway the lives and destinies of the people, with an absoluteness greater than was ever enjoyed by any tyrant of ancient times; unchecked, too, by the growth of cities, the increase of knowledge, or the accumulation of wealth—all which are alike incompatible with the present government of the country: the sultan is the vicegerent of the Prophet; every pasha is a representative of the sultan; and every soldier who carries an order, the representative of the pasha. The situ-

\* Willis—“Pencillings by the Way.”

† Quin—“Voyage down the Danube.”

ations of pasha and *cadi*, or judge, are all given to the highest bidders, who are removable at will, and of course, take care to indemnify themselves at the expense of the governed. 'It is a fact of public notoriety,' says Thornton,\* 'that governments of every description are openly sold at the Porte; they are held for the term of one year only, and, at the ensuing *bairam*, the leases must be renewed or transferred to a less parsimonious competitor. In the public registers, the precise value of every important post under government is recorded; and the regular remittance of the taxes and tribute is the only acknowledged criterion of upright administration.' It is a fundamental principle that all the property conquered by the Turks belongs to the sultan. Hence the Christians are accounted the slaves of the conqueror, and they are only allowed to live by paying a heavy tribute, the receipt for which bears that it is the ransom of their heads!

"Probably, in nothing has this people been more unduly represented than in the praises which have been bestowed on their unrestricted principles of trade. The Turk knows nothing, and cares as little, about freedom of commerce; he disdains trade himself, and despises it in others; and, if he has failed to imitate more civilised (though, certainly, in this point of view, not wiser) nations, by fortifying his coasts with custom-houses, it is certainly from no wise principle of taxation, but simply because such a circuitous method of fiscal exaction would be far too complicated and wearisome for the minds of Ottoman governors, who prefer the simpler mode of raising a revenue by the direct extortion of the pasha or the aga. Far from favouring the extension of commerce, one great cause of the present barbarism and the past unhappy condition of Turkey, is to be found in the aversion and contempt which its people bear for trade. 'The Jews,' says Hadji-Khalfa, the Turkish writer, in speaking of Salonica, 'employ many workmen in their different manufactories—support a number of schools, in which there

are not fewer than two hundred masters. The caravans that travel from Salonica to Semlin, Vienna, and Leipsig, are loaded with cotton, tobacco, carpets, and leather. It is a shame,' continues the orthodox Hadji-Khalfa, 'that so many Jews are allowed to remain in Salonica; the excitement thus given to trade is apt to blind true believers.' The fate of those vast and rich tracts bordering upon the Black Sea and its tributary rivers, affords ample proof that the genius of Mahomedanism is inimical to the interests of commerce and agriculture. The trade carried on by the ancients upon the shores of the Euxine was very considerable, and gave life and wealth to several populous cities mentioned in history. In more modern times the Genoese formed establishments upon the coasts of the Black Sea, and they took the lead in navigating those waters down to the fifteenth century. At the taking of Constantinople, the Turks closed the Black Sea against the ships of Europe, and from that time its navigation was lost to the commerce of the world for a period of more than three centuries.

"By the treaty of Kanardgi, in 1774, the ships of Russia were allowed to pass the Bosphorus; other countries soon afterwards obtained similar privileges; some restrictions, which it was still attempted to keep up, were removed by the treaty between the Russians and Turks in 1829; and the Black Sea is now, for commercial purposes, as open as the Mediterranean.\* The importance of this vast extension of commercial navigation cannot, at present, be fully appreciated, owing to the unfortunate condition of the population which inhabits those regions. Some idea may, however, be formed of the extent and probable importance of those great rivers which fall into the Black Sea, by the following estimate furnished by Malte Brun:—

If all the rivers in Europe be as	... 1.000
Those which flow into the Black Sea,	0.273
"	"
"	Mediterranean, 0.144

\* This was written in 1836. The Crimean War, as we shall see, made certain modifications in this arrangement.

\* "Present state of Turkey."



"Of all the features belonging to the Turkish national character, there is none less favourable than that which relates to the neglect and contempt with which that people has invariably treated affairs of trade. Whether it be owing to the dogma of their creed, which forbids the receiving interest for money, or to that other familiar text of the Koran, which says, 'There is but one law, and that forbids all communication with Infidels,' certain it is that such an example as a Turkish merchant transacting matters of commerce with a foreign trader was scarcely ever known in that country. This is an anomaly the more striking when we refer to other countries, less advantageously situated—as, for instance, China, where trade has acquired an importance, and is conducted on a system the growth of ages of good government, and of a like period of patient industry in the people. Nothing but a tyrannical despotism, at once sanguinary and lawless, could have had the effect of repelling commerce from the superb harbour of Constantinople; but, alas! the thousand ships which might find secure anchorage there would seek in vain for the rich freights of silk, cotton, and wool, which ought to await their coming: such is the character of its people and rulers, that no native capitalists have ever been emboldened to accumulate a store of merchandise to tempt the rapacity of the sultan; and vessels which trade to Constantinople have frequently occasion to go to Salonica, Smyrna, or some other port, for return cargoes.

"Before we turn away from this hasty, and assuredly not very pleasing glance at the Ottoman nation, it would be uncandid if we omitted to notice the imputed virtues of the Turks; foremost amongst which stands charity—a quality enjoined on all true believers by the words of Mahomet, and which includes within its operation the inferior animals. They are reputed to be honourable in their dealings, and faithful to their word—characteristics of the haughty masters, as lying and chicane are natural to the slave. The Turks are forbidden the use of wine; but, then, they console themselves by substituting the

eternal coffee, tobacco, and opium, and by other sensual indulgences."

### CHAPTER III.

#### THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE.

LET us now turn aside to consider the position, character, and government, of the other of the two rival empires of the East, whose continued struggles, constantly renewed through more than two centuries, seem at last to have culminated in a final and decisive conflict.

Russia owns nearly the half of Europe, and more than a third part of Asia, comprising upwards of sixty million inhabitants, who represent as many as eighty or a hundred different races and tribes of men. The vast extent of the Russian empire is apt to cause, in the minds of unreflecting persons, an exaggerated notion of its military strength and national importance. It is clear, however, that "vast deductions must be made from the written and statistical resources of a nation possessing no unison of religious or political feeling, when put in competition with other empires, identified in faith, language, and national characteristics."

So writes Mr. Cobden, in the tract from which we have previously quoted; and he continues to show reasons why we should refrain from any undue fear of Russian aggression. Although the forty years which have passed since these considerations were first printed, they are still—the necessary allowances being made—closely applicable to the present state of things.

We have been misled, Cobden considers, by writers on the Russian empire, "who have sought to impress their readers with the idea of the overwhelming size of its territory, and who have, at the same time, wilfully or negligently omitted to mention other facts, which, if taken in connection, serve to render that very magnitude of surface a source of weakness rather than power. We are furnished by Malte Brun with some

tables of the relative densities of the population of the European empires, which will help to illustrate our views upon the subject, and from which we give an extract:—

	Inhabitants.
Russia, for each square league ...	181
Prussia ... ..	792
France ... ..	1,063
England ... ..	1,457

“Now, the same law applies to communities as to physics—in proportion as you condense you strengthen, and as you draw out you weaken bodies; and, according to this rule, the above table, which makes Prussia more than four times as closely peopled as Russia, would, bearing in mind the advantages of her denser population, give to the former power an equality of might with her unwieldy neighbour, which, we have no doubt, is quite consistent with the truth; whilst the same tabular standard, if applied to Russia, France, and England, would assign much the greater share of power to the two latter nations; which experience has demonstrated to be the fact. Here, then, we have the means of exemplifying, by a very simple appeal to figures (even the best reasoning weapons), how the vastness of territory of the Russians is the cause of debility rather than of strength. It would be a common illustration of a self-evident truism if we were to adduce, as a proof of our argument, the practice in military tactics. What general ever dreamed of scattering his troops, by way of increasing their power? Bonaparte gained his terrible battles by manœuvring great masses of men in smaller limits than any preceding commanders.

“But the same geographer supplies us with a graduated scale of the relative taxation of these countries, which affords a yet more convincing proof of the disadvantageous position of Russia.

Russia, each inhabitant contri-	
butes to government ... ..	£0 11 8
Prussia ... ..	0 17 6
France ... ..	1 8 4
England ... ..	3 13 5

“Now, assuming as we may safely do, that these governments draw the utmost possible revenue from their subjects, what a disproportion here is between the wealth of the closely-peopled Britain and the poverty of the scantily populated Russia! We find too, that the gradation of wealth is in proportion to the density of the inhabitants of the four countries. Here, then, we have a double source of weakness for Russia, which would operate in a duplicate ratio to her disadvantage, in case that nation were plunged into a war with either of those other States, for, whilst her armies must necessarily be mustered from greater distances, at proportionate cost, and with less ability on her part to bear those charges, her rivals would possess troops more compactly positioned, and, at the same time, the greater means of transporting them—in a word, the one party would require the funds, and not possess them, whilst the other would, comparatively speaking, have the money, and not want it. A necessary evil attends the widespread character of the population of Russia, in the absence of those large towns which serve as centres of intelligence and nurses of civilisation in other countries. Thus, we have the large cities of

Petersburgh, with a population of	305,000
Moscow ... ..	190,000
Warsaw ... ..	117,000
Kasan ... ..	50,000
Kiow ... ..	40,000

whilst we find the remainder of the large places on the map of Russia to be only, in size, upon a par with the third-rate towns of England. That in a country of such vast extent, and comprising sixty millions of people, and where so few populous cities exist, the great mass of the inhabitants are living in poverty, ignorance, and barbarism, scarcely rising above a state of nature, must be apparent. Tribes of Cossacks and of Tartars, wandering over the low countries of Caucasia, own a formal allegiance to Russia. Other hordes, dignified by the alarmist writers



on the subject of Russian greatness, with the title of *nations*—such as the Circassians, the Georgians, the Mingrelians, with more than thirty other tribes, some Christian, others Mahomedan, or of a mixed creed, occupying the mountainous regions of the Caucasus—are wholly or partially subdued to the dominion of the czar. These fierce tribes are addicted to all the rude habits of savages; they live by the chase, or the cultivation of a little millet; they commit barbarous outrages, and buy and sell each other for slaves—often disposing of their own children, brothers, and sisters, to the Turks. Against these refractory and half-subdued neighbours, the Russians are compelled to keep fortresses along the frontier.

“If we pass to Northern Russia, we find the Samoides, a people enduring nearly six months of perpetual night, and enjoying, in requital, a day of two months; with them, corn is sown, ripened, and reaped, in sixty days. In the governments of Wologda, Archangel, and Olonetz (for even in this almost uninhabitable region man has established his ministerial arrangements and political divisions) the climate is of such a nature that human industry can hardly contend against the elements, and the scanty produce of his labour enables the husbandman scarcely to protract a painful and often a precarious existence. Trees disappear on the sterile plains—the plants are stunted—corn withers—the marshy meadows are covered with rushes and mosses—and the whole of vegetable nature proclaims the vicinity of the pole.

“Over these desolate wastes a traveller might journey five hundred miles, and not encounter one solitary human habitation. The government or province of Orenburg is larger than the entire kingdom of Prussia, and yet contains only a population of one million souls!

“There are, however, vast districts—as, for example, the whole of Little Russia, and the Ukraine—of fertile territory, equal in richness to any part of Europe; and it has been estimated that Russia contains more than seven hundred and fifty thousand square miles of land, of a

quality not inferior to the best portions of Germany, and upon which a population of two hundred millions of people might find subsistence. Here, then, is the field upon which the energies of the government and the industry of its subjects should be, for the next century, exclusively devoted, and if the best interests of Russia were understood—or if its government would attain to that actual power which ignorant writers proclaim for it in the possession of boundless wastes and impenetrable forests—she should cease the wars of the sword, and begin the battle with the wilderness, by constructing railroads, building bridges, deepening rivers; by fostering the accumulation of capital, the growth of cities, and the increase of civilisation and freedom. *These are the only sources of power and wealth in an age of improvement*; and until Russia, like America, draws from her plains, mountains, and rivers, those resources which can be developed only by patient labour—vain are her boasts of geographical extent. As well might the inhabitants of the United States vaunt their unexplored possessions west of the Rocky Mountains, or England plume herself upon the desert tracts of New Holland.”

Some considerable advance has been made by Russia since the date when Mr. Cobden's essay was written, but it may be questioned whether she has gained in strength during the past forty years. The circumstances of the war upon whose history we are presently to enter have not been such as to impress us with a sense of Russia's military power. It is true that when she entered upon her struggle with Turkey she was much crippled in her finances, and had the greatest difficulty in borrowing money in the European markets. But her resources, however much they may be below the point at which they ought to stand, are in themselves immense; and the government had been spending vast sums, for many years, on the army and navy. After such extensive preparations, the first results were certainly not surprising. They were not to be compared, for instance, with the circumstances of the German invasion of France, seven years before. In fact,

Russia has never displayed such military genius as to justify any of the great European Powers in regarding her as a very formidable enemy.

Before we pass on to consider the earlier relations between Russia and Turkey, and the wars in which the two countries have been successively engaged, we may glance at the general characteristics, the government and religion of the Russian people.

The dominions of the czar stretch from the Arctic Ocean to Turkey and Tartary on the south, and from Germany in Europe to the Pacific Ocean on the east of Asia. Within the past few years they have been extended in Asia to the south-east of the Sea of Aral, in the direction of Hindostan. The whole length of Russia, from east to west, is about eleven thousand miles; its area is over seven million square miles, the most fertile portions of this immense territory are the western provinces of European Russia, which grow large quantities of corn; but from many of the remaining districts come numerous commodities, more than ample for the trade of an industrious community. Vast supplies of timber, furs of twenty species, leather of the best quality, hides and tallow, wax, tar, oil, isinglass, hemp, caviar, and a dozen other articles of commerce, are produced in abundance from various parts of the country, and form the staples of an extensive commerce. The minerals of Russia are both plentiful and valuable, and might, if the mines were properly worked, increase the national revenues to an incalculable extent.

There were at one time three distinct Russias. Red Russia corresponded to the southern part of Poland; White Russia was the country which is now eastern Lithuania; and Black Russia included Moscow and the adjacent provinces.

The ancestors of the present monarch were called Grand Dukes. At the end of the fifteenth century Grand Duke Basil, conqueror of the Tartar invaders, assumed the title of Czar; and at the beginning of the eighteenth century Peter the Great became the first "Emperor and Autocrat of all the Russias."

The greatness and national importance of the Muscovite race unquestionably date from the time of Peter, and it is not without reason that the Russians in each succeeding age have been accustomed to boast of their mighty autocrat and lawgiver. Peter was the Russian Alfred, and the elements of existing administration of the empire may be traced in the institutions of this good and wise man. He found the country which he was called upon to govern in a chaotic condition, whether as regards its government, its commerce, its laws, or its social customs. He set himself to work to replace confusion by order, and, fortified by the experience gained in the various civilised nations which he had visited and studied, he bestowed at all events the outline of a systematic government upon his subjects. It was natural that many of his attempts should be doomed to comparative failure. "Imagine a man," says Mr. Mackenzie Wallace,\* "without technical knowledge, without skilled workmen, without good tools, and with no better material than soft crumbling sandstone, endeavouring to build a palace on a marsh! The undertaking would seem to reasonable minds utterly absurd, and yet it must be admitted that Peter's project was scarcely more feasible. He had neither technical knowledge, nor the requisite materials, nor a firm foundation to build on. With his usual Titanic energy he demolished the old structure, but his attempts to construct were little more than a series of failures. In his numerous ukases he has left us a graphic description of his efforts, and it is at once instructive and saddening to watch the great worker toiling indefatigably at his self-imposed task. His instruments are constantly breaking in his hands. The foundations of the building are continually giving way, and the lower tiers crumbling under the superincumbent weight. A whole section is found to be unsuitable, and is ruthlessly pulled down, or falls of its own accord. And yet the builder toils on, with a perseverance and energy of purpose that compel

\* "Russia," i. 299.



admiration, frankly confessing his mistakes and failures, and patiently seeking the means of remedying them, never allowing a word of despondency to escape him, and never despairing of ultimate success. And at length death comes, and the mighty builder is snatched away suddenly in the midst of his unfinished labours, bequeathing to his successors the task of carrying on the great work.

"None of these successors possessed Peter's genius and energy, but they were all compelled by the force of circumstances to adopt his plans. A return to the old rough and ready rule of the Voyevods was impossible. As the automatic power became more and more imbued with Western ideas, it felt more and more the need of a thoroughly good instrument for the realisation of its policy, and accordingly strove to systematise and centralise the administration.

"In this change we may perceive a certain analogy with the history of the French administration from the time of Philippe le Bel to that of Louis XIV. In both countries we see the central power bringing the local administrative organs more and more under its control, till at last it succeeds in creating a thoroughly centralised bureaucratic organisation. But under this superficial resemblance lie profound differences. The French kings had to struggle with provincial sovereignties and feudal rights, and when they had annihilated this opposition, they easily found materials with which to build up the bureaucratic structure. The Russian sovereigns, on the contrary, met with no such opposition, but they had great difficulty in finding bureaucratic material amongst their uneducated, undisciplined subjects. For many generations schools and colleges in Russia were founded and maintained simply for the purpose of preparing men for the public service. The administration was thus brought much nearer to the West-European ideal, but some people have grave doubts as to whether it became thereby better adapted to the practical wants of the people for whom it was created."

It will be interesting to the reader, and at

the same time valuable as affording an insight into the relations which exist at the present moment between the government of Russia and the masses of the empire, if we add, from the work just quoted, an outline of the bureaucratic system which has gradually been formed upon the foundations laid by Peter the Great. We may, in the course of the present work, have to speak more than once of the influence of Russian public opinion upon the czar and his government; and it will help us to understand the nature of this opinion if we set out with some kind of idea as to the relations between the various classes and orders in the body politic.

"In its present form," says Mr. Wallace, "the Russian administration might seem at first sight to be a very imposing edifice. At the top of the pyramid stands the emperor, 'the autocratic monarch,' as Peter the Great described him, 'who has to give an account of his acts to no one on earth, but has a power and authority to rule his states and lands as a Christian sovereign according to his own will and judgment.' Immediately below the emperor we see the Council of State, the Committee of Ministers, and the Senate, which represent respectively the legislature, the administrative, and the judicial power. An Englishman glancing over the first volume of the Code might imagine that the Council of State is a kind of Parliament, and the Committee of Ministers a Ministry in our sense of the term, but in reality both institutions are simply incarnations of the autocratic power. Though the Council is entrusted by law with many important functions—such as examining and criticising the annual budget, declaring war, concluding peace, and performing other important duties—it has merely a consultative character, and the emperor is not in any way bound by its decisions. The Committee is not at all a Ministry, as we understand the word. The Ministers are all directly and individually responsible to the emperor, and therefore the Committee has no common responsibility or other cohesive force. As to the Senate, it has descended from its high estate. It was originally entrusted with the su-

preme power during the absence or minority of the monarch, and was intended to exercise a controlling influence in all sections of the administration, but now its activity is restricted to judicial matters, and it is little more than a supreme court of appeal.

"Immediately below these three institutions stand the Ministries,\* ten in number. They are the central points, in which converge the various kinds of territorial administration, and from which radiates the Imperial will all over the empire.

"For the purposes of territorial administration Russia Proper—that is to say, European-Russia, exclusive of Poland, the Baltic Provinces, Finland, and the Caucasus, each of which has a peculiar administration of its own†—is divided into forty-six provinces, or "Governments" (*gubernii*), and each government is subdivided into districts (*uyezdi*). The average area of a province is about the size of Portugal, but some are as small as Belgium, while one at least is twenty-five times as big. The population, however, does not correspond to the amount of territory. In the largest province, that of Archangel, there are less than three hundred thousand inhabitants, while in some of the smaller ones there are over two millions. The districts likewise vary greatly in size. Some are smaller than Oxfordshire or Buckingham, and others are much bigger than the whole of the United Kingdom.

"Over each province is placed a Governor, who is assisted in his duties by a Vice-Governor, and a small Council. According to the legislature of Catherine II., which still appears in the Code, and has only been partially repealed, the Governor is termed 'the steward of the province,' and is entrusted with so many and such delicate duties, that in order to obtain men qualified for the post, it would be necessary to real-

ise the great empress's design of creating, by education, 'a new race of people.' Down to very recent times the Governors understood the term 'stewards' in a very literal sense, and ruled in a most arbitrary, high-handed style, often exercising an important influence on the civil and criminal tribunals. These extensive and regularly-defined powers have now been very much curtailed, partly by positive legislation, and partly by increased publicity and improved means of communication. All judicial matters have been placed completely beyond the Governor's control, and many of his former functions are now fulfilled by the Zemstvo—the new organ of local self-government, of which I shall have more to say presently. Besides this, all ordinary current affairs are regulated by an already big and ever-growing body of instructions, in the form of Imperial orders and Ministerial circulars; and as soon as anything not provided for by the instructions happens to occur, the minister is consulted through the post office or by telegraph. Even within the sphere of their lawful authority the Governors have now a certain respect for public opinion, and occasionally a very wholesome dread of casual newspaper correspondents. Thus the men who were formerly described by the satirists as 'little satraps,' have sunk to the level of subordinate officials. I can confidently say that many (I believe the majority) of them are honest, upright men, who are not perhaps endowed with any unusual administrative capacities, but who perform their duties faithfully according to their lights. Certainly M. Lerche, who was Governor of Novgorod during my sojourn there, was a most honourable, conscientious, and intelligent man, who had gained golden opinions from all classes of the people. If any representatives of the old 'satraps' still exist, they must be sought for in the outlying Asiatic provinces.

"Independent of the Governor, who is the local representative of the Ministry of the Interior, are a number of resident officials, who represent the other Ministries, and each of them has a bureau, with the requisite number of assistants, secretaries and scribes.

\* The ten sections of the administration are—1. The Interior; 2. Public Works; 3. State Demesnes; 4. Finance; 5. Justice; 6. Public Instruction; 7. War; 8. Navy; 9. Foreign Affairs; 10. The Imperial Court.

† The peculiarities of administration in Poland are being rapidly abolished.



"To keep this vast and complex bureaucratic machine in motion, it is necessary to have a large and well-drilled army of officials. These are drawn chiefly from the ranks of the noblesse and clergy, and from a peculiar social class called *Tchinorniks*, or men with '*Tchins*.' As the *Tchin* plays an important part in Russia, not only in the official world, but also in social life, it may be well to explain its significance.

"All offices civil and military are, according to a scheme invented by Peter the Great, arranged in fourteen classes or ranks, and to each class or rank a particular name is attached. As promotion is supposed to be given according to personal merit, a man who enters public service for the first time must, whatever be his social position, begin in the lower ranks, and work his way upwards. Educational certificates may exempt him from the necessity of passing the lowest classes, and the Imperial will may disregard the restrictions laid down by law, but, as a general rule, a man must begin at or near the bottom of the official ladder, and he must remain on each step a certain specified time. The step on which he is for the moment standing, or, in other words, the official rank or *Tchin* which he possesses, determines what offices he is competent to hold. Thus rank or *Tchin* is a necessary condition for receiving an appointment, but it does not designate any actual office, and the names of the different ranks are extremely apt to mislead a foreigner."

It may be said of this administration, as it may be said of every theoretically good government of the many by the few, that it would work admirably if we could always, and under all circumstances, be sure of the virtue, justice, and wisdom, of the ruling class. But we never can be so sure. Abuses are morally certain to arise in individual cases, even if they do not permeate whole classes, and establish themselves as national characteristics, and thus it is that in an advanced stage of civilisation we refuse to entrust the welfare and happiness of the community to the unchecked and irresponsible management of despotic governments.

The prevalence of administrative abuses amongst the entire ruling classes of a country is well illustrated in the case of Russia. Official corruption and dishonesty have distinguished the Russian system of government ever since the time of Peter the Great. That monarch set himself to eradicate the vice, and threatened to hang every man who should steal as much as would buy a rope. "Then," said his Procurator-general, "you will have no officials left. We all steal; the only difference is, that some of us steal larger sums, and more openly than others." Peter seems to have thought better of his intention, and winked at the corruption which he could not cure. His successors have done the same thing, down to the present day, so that the existing administrative system of Russia is honeycombed with bribery and official corruption. Various attempts have indeed been made to check this scourge of Russian society. An elaborate method of procedure is adopted in the smallest matters of routine, with the hope that a succession of checks on the part of a large number of clerks and committees might serve to ensure that all transactions in which the State has an interest should be carried out in a fair and honest manner. The result has generally been, that instead of a few officials being bribed a large number have been. The damage to the public, and the hardships of individuals, have thus been increased by the very means resorted to for the purpose of relieving them.

When such evils as these are present as a matter of course throughout the administration of the country, it is clear that the machine of State could never be set in motion without bringing to light some weakness or inefficiency. And it is least of all surprising that the outbreak of a great war should find out the imperfections of the services on which the army depends for its supplies, and that dishonest contractors, compelled to recoup themselves for the heavy bribes which secured them their contracts, should squeeze their exorbitant gains out of the food and clothing of the helpless troops. Russia suffered terribly from this dishonesty at the be-

ginning of the campaign of 1877. Mr. Archibald Forbes has some striking remarks on this subject in a paper\* which he published after his return from the seat of war. We quote them as the best illustration possible of the preceding observations.

After bearing testimony to the courage and humanity of the Russian soldier, Mr. Forbes continues:—"The main causes of the inability of the Russian armies to achieve successes proportionate to the undoubted intrinsic quality of their fighting material are, to my thinking, three: corruption, favouritism (with its inevitable concomitant and result, intrigue); and general deficiency of a sense of responsibility among the officers all down the roll. . . . I tremble to think how high corruption reaches in the Russian army; I shudder to think how low it descends. It permeates and vitiates the whole military system. To be venal, so far from not being recognised as a crime, is not so much as regarded as a thing to be ashamed of. Peculation faces the inquirer at every turn; indeed, it lies patently, glaringly, on the surface. An illustrious personage, high in the army and near the throne, has mines which produce iron. Desiring to sell this iron for military purposes, he, spite of his rank and position, had to accede to the universal usage, and bribe to gain his purpose—a perfectly honest and legitimate purpose. A Vienna contractor comes to intendance headquarters with intent to sell boots to the army. He learns that it is no use to forward his tender direct, in a straightforward business way: he must be introduced. He finds the right person to introduce him, and duly arranges with him the terms under which the favour of introduction is to be accorded. The introduction is made, and the contractor displays his samples, and states that he is prepared to supply boots of that quality at six roubles a pair. The answer given him is that his offer will be accepted, but that his invoice must be made out at the

rate of seven roubles per pair, although the payment will be at the rate of the tender. The Russian Government had an account with the Roumanian Railway, whereon the statement of the latter showed the former to be a debtor to the amount of ten million roubles. The Roumanian people pressed for payment, but obviously a preliminary duty was a searching audit. The Russian functionary concerned comes to the director of the railway with a proposition. This proposition is, that the audit shall be a merely formal operation, on condition that he, the Russian functionary, shall receive a *douceur* commission of half a rouble on every thousand roubles, for smoothing the track of an operation which if rigidly, far more if hostilely carried out, must be arduous and vexatious. Fifty copecks on each thousand roubles seems a bagatelle, but where ten millions of roubles are concerned, the *dustori* reaches the pretty penny of nearly a hundred pounds. Scarcely anywhere are the accumulated Russian stores at Bucharest, at Fatesti, at Simnitza, at Sistova, at Braila—protected by shedding from the destructive influences of weather. Why should they be, when it is in the interest of all concerned, except the State and the army, that the inevitable result should ensure the rotting and condemnation of a huge proportion of the accumulated stores? The contractors are paid by a commission on the quantity of material laid down by them in certain specified places; their commission is earned when that work has been accomplished; their commission swells in proportion to the quantities of fresh supplies rendered necessary by the unserviceability of what has already been laid down. Every intendant concerned has a pinch greater or smaller according to his position, of this commission; it is to the direct general and several interest of the gang that as much weather damage as may be shall occur among the supplies when once laid down. If any man wants proof of the universal system of plunder, he has only to visit Roumania and use his eyes. He will find the restaurants thronged with gentlemen of the twisted shoulder-knots.

\*"Russians, Turks and Bulgarians;" *Nineteenth Century*, Nov. 1877.



Their pay is a pittance, and it is in arrears: Jews, Greeks, and Bulgarians, the *debris* of the mercantile class, they have no private fortunes. But each gallant besworded non-combatant eats of the costliest dishes, and orders sweet Champagne in grating French; the *tout ensemble* of him would not be complete unless his companion were some French or Roumanian beauty, as venal as himself, who is serving him as he is serving Holy Russia. A French correspondent, with a disinclination for going to the front, and a desire to employ his spare time, has been employing himself in collecting and authenticating cases of peculation throughout the Russian army, the record to be published at a safe season, when the war is over. The exposure will astonish the world—at least that portion of the world which does not know Russia. In the meantime I venture to assert that every article of consumption or wear supplied to the Russian army costs, by the time it comes into use, more than double what it ought to do under a well-managed and decently honest system. Of other and yet baser corruption—of the little difficulty with which men of whom other things might be expected are to be found willing to be virtual traitors for a consideration, by offering to sell secrets and secret documents—I dare not trust myself to speak. The subject is too grievously melancholy.

“Favouritism brings it about that commands are bestowed on men within its ring-fence, with little or no reference to qualifications. The Russian officer does not need merit if he can only attain to ‘protection.’ With ‘protection’ a youngster may be a colonel in command of the grizzled veteran of hard campaigns and many decorations, who, destitute of ‘protection,’ is still but a first lieutenant. The aim in making appointments at the beginning of this war seems to have been to exclude from active service every man who has ever distinguished himself in a previous command. Todleben has been only sent for now as a last resource. Kauffmann, the conqueror of Khiva, was left behind to chew the cud of his experience. Bariatinsky was not withdrawn from the neglected retirement into which he had been

suffered to lapse. Kotzebue’s experience of command in active service remained unused. Tcherniaeff, who, with a mass of untrained militia kept the Turks four months at bay, was left for months to cool his heels in Russia, was at length insulted with the offer of the command of a brigade in Asia, and has now finally been ordered back into retirement at the instance of the Archduke Michael—jealous at the ovations with which a fine soldier and really capable chief was received on arriving at the former’s head quarters. Nepokoitchitzky’s claim to be chief of the staff lies simply, so far as I can gather, in his knowledge of the Danubian valley on the Roumanian side of the river, derived by having served in the force which in 1853-4 scarcely covered itself with glory in fighting against the Turks. At Ploesti he seemed to me to fulfil the rôle of a superior sort of staff-sergeant, always walking about with a handful of returns and states. He is a dumb man—and dumb seemingly from not having anything to say. Levitsky, his *sous chef*, is a young professor, utterly devoid of experience except in the handling in manœuvres of comparatively small bodies of men; pragmatic and arrogant, but with a strong will, which, in conjunction with his incapacity, has been one of the chief factors in the failure hitherto of the Russian army. But he is within the ring-fence of ‘protection,’ and holds his ground against the clamours and murmurs of the army. To be within that pale is to be safe, if not from contumely, at least from open disgrace. If there be one thing more certain than another in connection with this war, it is that Prince Schakoffskoy ought to have been tried and broke for insubordination and disobedience of orders at the battle of Plevna of the 30th of July. But he still commands his army corps, and, so far as I know, did not even receive a direct reprimand. In the old days Krüdener would have been sent to Siberia for the unmilitary and insubordinate act of assembling a batch of correspondents and essaying to vindicate his conduct through them to the world, by the publication of the essentially private orders under which he was forced per-

emptorily to act. But he holds his position in command of a corps, although his immunity may indeed be owing to the fact of his grimly and threateningly holding the telegrams which exonerate him at the expense of others. Schilder-Schuldner, the hero of the utterly 'unspeakable' first fiasco at Plevna, still retains the command of the fragment of that brigade which his gross blundering shattered there. General Kriloff, who, the other day, entrusted with a mass of Russian cavalry, and charged with the task of blocking the Sofia road, supinely failed to intercept reinforcements and supplies marching on Plevna, enjoys the equivocal credit of an exploit which the English military reader may be excused for regarding as well nigh impossible. He commanded for a year a cavalry division at Warsaw, during the whole of which time he possessed no charger, although he drew rations, or rather the money, equivalent for six.

"Favouritism as inevitably begets intrigue as rottenness engenders maggots. Under irresponsible absolutism the absolute must have an almost impossible thoroughness and strength of purpose if favours do not frequently go through caprice, and from other motives than the sheer claims of honest desert. So far as I can see, even the recognition of merit in the Russian Court and military circle is too often capricious. Young Skobeloff had fought as splendidly on the grey morning when he crossed the Danube and plashed through the mud on its further bank to come to close quarters with the enemy, as on the day when he gained the name 'hero of Lovca,' or on that other later day when he stood master of the three Turkish redoubts on the south-west of Plevna. But whereas on the news of Lovca he was toasted at the Imperial board, and whereas the Plevna fighting worthily earned him his Lieutenant-Generaley, after the first exploit, when the emperor embraced Dragimiroff and shook hands with Yolchine, he turned his back ostentatiously on Skobeloff, simply because he was out of favour, and had not yet got back into favour by dint of fighting. Every Russian circle I have had experience of—the camp, court, the

headquarter staff, the subsidiary staffs, the regiment, the battalion—each is a focus of unworthy intrigue. Men live in superficial amity one with another, while, to use an Americanism, they are 'going behind' each other by every underhand means in their power. Young Skobeloff was under a cloud, and Prince ——— was his enemy. Skobeloff, who is not a courtier, cleft the cloud with the edge of his good sword, and the cloud drifts on to settle above Prince ———. General Ignatieff is in high favour, seemingly fixed firmly in his place close to the emperor's right hand, a man of power, influence, and position. The bad fortune of the war goads certain people, on whom the odium lies of that bad fortune, to wrath against the man who had done so much to bring that war about. There is a period of swaying to and fro of the forces of intrigue, and then Ignatieff goes back to Russia to assist his wife in the nursing of her sick sister. The wheel will come full circle again, no doubt, and then that presently afflicted lady will recover. The mischief of this all-pervading intrigue is, that it is a distraction of the forces that ought to be concentrated on real and earnest duty. A man cannot concentrate all his energies in aiding or coping with the king's enemies without, when he has to spend—or waste—a share of them in plotting to get the better of the man in the next tent, or to foil the devices of that man to get the better of him. And, unfortunately, the man who is the greatest adept in intrigue, and benefits by it in the attainment of a high place, has not always—indeed, as intrigue is demoralising, it may be said seldom—the qualifications which the high place into which he may have intrigued himself demands.

"The deficiency in an adequate sense of responsibility is greatly caused by the evil treated of in the last paragraph. But, indeed, it seems to me that the lack of that thoroughness which a sense of responsibility inspires, is innate in the Russian military character, so far as preparation, organisation, and system, distinguished from mere fighting, are concerned. The Orientalism of the Russian extraction tends to *laissez faire*—hinders



them from the patient plodding, steady industry of the North German soldiering men. Nobody holds himself directly charged with the responsibility of the urgent mending of a bridge, and the bridge is not mended. Nobody has it borne in upon him that it is a bounden duty he owes to himself, to his comrades, and to the State, to see that reserves are ready at hand to be used in the nick of time, and an enterprise collapses for want of reserves. A general of division gets an order to send forward into the fight two of his regiments. His luncheon is spread under yonder tree. A German or an English general would disregard his food, and concentrate himself on the proper execution of the work; his staff-officers would compete with each other in orderly zeal for the successful fulfilment of the order, and crave, furthermore, for the good luck of being permitted to take a share in the 'fun.' It is as likely as not—I have witnessed the scene—that the Russian general endorses the order, and passes it on to the brigadier by the messenger who has brought it, while he and his *faineant* staff-officers, who have been sitting supinely about when they ought to have been in the saddle, seek the grateful shade of the tree and the contented enjoyment of the refectation. Coming down from the Shipka Pass while the fate of the fighting there hung in the scales, I was sent for by the commander-in-chief to give a narrative of what I had seen. The circumstance vividly impressed me, that, with the exception of Monseigneur himself, nobody appeared to feel that the general staff, and he himself, as a member of it, had intense, engrossing, overwhelming concern with the issue of that terrible combat. The subject was discussed with vivacious interest—indeed, with curiosity, with more or less of intelligence; but very much in the tone in which it might have been discussed by a coterie in the Army and Navy Club. With the exception indicated, there was no recognition or apparent realisation of responsibility. I left the *kibitka* with the curious sense that I, the stranger and the foreigner, was, save one, the man who felt the most concern in the episode and the result.

Except as regards the actual fighting, there is a strange, inappropriate dilettantism about the soldiering of the officerhood of the Russian army. There is a disregard of the grand military fact, that, if success is to be achieved, every man, each in his place, must put his hand to the work as if he were working for his own hand—ay, for his own honour, and his own life.

"One word as to the emperor. I would have it to be understood that no word I have written can apply to him. His position in proportion to the fulness with which his character is recognised, must move to the sincerest respect and the deepest sympathy. He is a true patriot, earnestly striving for the welfare of his country. But he toils amid obstacles; he struggles in the heart of gathered and incrustated impediments, the perception of which on his part must, it seems to me, kindle wrath which is unavailable, bring about misgivings which must awfully perturb, induce a despair which must strike to the very heart. He is not answerable for the growing up of the false system which strikes at the vitals of the Russian army, but he cannot but recognise the blighting curse of it. He is not the Hercules to cleanse the huge Augean stable; but he knows, and in this hour of terrible trial must revolt from the foulness of it with a disgust that is all the more loathsome because it is impotent. I sincerely believe that the emperor is the Russian who, in all unselfishness, suffers the direst pangs of anguish under a Russian disaster."

Before we quit the subject of Russian government, and pass on to the relations which have existed in earlier times between Russia and Turkey, a few paragraphs may be added in respect of the political conditions of the great empire of Eastern Europe. The brief outline will be found to be closely connected with the general object of the present work, inasmuch as the public of the Russian nation, its enthusiasms and discontent, its encouragement of, and its threats against the government, have more than once come to the front during the continuance of the war.

The principal subdivisions of the Russian

people are enumerated in the following official statement, quoted by Mr. Wallace from a volume published in St. Petersburg under the direction of the government :—

Hereditary nobles ... ..	652,887
Personal nobles ... ..	374,367
Clerical classes ... ..	695,905
Town classes ... ..	7,196,005
Rural classes ... ..	63,840,291
Military classes ... ..	4,767,703
Foreigners ... ..	153,135
Total population ... ..	77,680,293

There is, however, a broad distinction to be drawn between the classes here named and the social classes which exist in most other countries. "Between the nobles, the clergy, the burghers, and the peasants," says Mr. Wallace, "there are no distinctions of race and no impassable barriers. The peasant often becomes a merchant; and there are many cases on record of peasants, and sons of parish priests, becoming nobles." The social scale is thus, in some sense, open to the ambition of the whole population; a fact which has doubtless served as a very useful safety-valve for the restlessness of the masses. Such, at all events, is the practical state of things at the present time; but, on the other hand, more than one regulation has been established by various czars forbidding the passage of individuals from one class into another. The enlightened policy of the reigning czar in emancipating the serfs, shortly after his accession to the throne, has greatly assisted in weakening such class distinctions as previously existed; and, on the whole, it would seem that Russia is peculiarly free from the castes and class animosities which trouble the majority of civilised nations.

This partial homogeneity of the Russian people is quaintly accounted for in a popular legend, celebrated in 1862 by the erection at Novogorod of a remarkable monument, consisting of a vast globe of stone, resting upon a circular pedestal, surrounded by a group of allegorical

figures, which is intended to commemorate the origin of the Russian empire in 1862. We will quote the legend in question from an ancient chronicle, on the authority which we have last quoted.

"At that time, as the southern Slavonians paid tribute to the Kozars, so the Novogorodian Slavonians suffered from the attacks of the Variags. For some time the Variags exacted tribute from the Novogorodian Slavonians and the neighbouring Finns; then the conquered tribes, by uniting their forces, drove out the foreigners. But among the Slavonians arose strong internal dissensions; the clans rose against each other. Then, for the preservation of order and safety, they resolved to summon princes from a foreign land. During the year 1862, Slavonic legates went away beyond the Sea to the Variag tribe called Rūs,\* and said, 'Our land is great and fruitful, but there is no order in it; come and reign and rule over us.' Three brothers accepted this invitation, and appeared with their armed followers. The eldest of these, Rurik, settled in Novogorod; the second, Sineus, at Byelozero; and the third, Truvor, in Isborsk. From them our land is called Rūs. After two years the brothers of Rurik died. He alone began to rule over the Novogorod district, and confided to his men the administration of the principal towns."

Not much is known outside Russia—and therefore, in all probability, not much in Russia itself—about the alleged socialistic tendencies of the people. All that we have heard of plots and secret societies, aiming at the overthrow of the empire, and the establishment of a republic, seems to rest on a scanty foundation of fact. It is true that several State trials have recently taken place, in which large numbers of persons have been accused of taking part in a subversive propaganda; but the experience of other times

\* Probably, if we may regard the legend as based upon facts, a tribe of Scandinavians; so that Rurik and his brothers would be contemporaries and fellow countrymen of the Norsemen who were settling in France, and fighting Alfred in England.



and other countries leads us to suspect that the fears of the Russian government have been unduly exaggerated, and its severity unreasonable.

A few words as to the condition of the Russian peasantry, who constitute so vast a proportion of the whole population, may serve to give us a somewhat clearer idea of the people who are to play such an important part in the drama with which the following pages are occupied.

The Russian village commune, or *Mir*, is governed by the Village Assembly, formed of a certain number of heads of households, and having for president the Starosta, or Village Elder. Every commune has to pay annually into the Imperial Treasury a certain sum. The basis upon which this taxation is formed is contained in the census lists. "The lists are revised at regular intervals, and all males alive at the time of the 'revision,' from the new-born babe to the centenarian, are duly transcribed. Each commune has a list of this kind, and pays to the government an annual sum proportionate to the number of names which the list contains. . . . During the period intervening between the revisions the financial authorities take no notice of the births and deaths. A commune which has a hundred male members at the time of the revision may have, in a few years, considerably more or considerably less than the number, but it has to pay taxes for a hundred members all the same, until a new revision is made for the whole empire."\* Theoretically each male peasant has a portion of the communal land allotted to him, and from the proceeds of the cultivation of that portion his taxes have to be paid. Mr. Wallace points out, as one of the defects of the system, that "the revision list represents merely the numerical strength of the families, and the numerical strength is often not at all in proportion to the working power. Let us suppose, for example, two families," he goes on to say, "each containing at the time of the revision five male members. According to the census list these two families are equal, and ought to receive equal

shares of the land ; but, in reality, it may happen that the one contains a father in the prime of life and four able-bodied sons, whilst the other contains a widow and five little boys. The wants and working power of these two families of course are very different; and if the above system of distribution be applied, the man with four sons and a goodly supply of grandchildren will probably find that he has too little land, whilst the widow with her five little boys will find it difficult to cultivate the five shares allotted her, and utterly impossible to pay the corresponding amount of taxation."\* The occurrence of such cases as the foregoing has caused the *Mir* to take upon itself to distribute the land as it thinks fit, still of course paying the fixed yearly sum to the government according to the numbers of the revision list. The land is of three kinds; that on which the village is built, the arable land, and the meadows or hay-fields. "On the first of these each family possesses a house and garden, which are the hereditary property of the family, and are never affected by the periodical redistributions. The other two kinds are both subject to redistribution, but on somewhat different principles.

"The whole of the communal arable land is first of all divided into three fields, to suit the triennial rotation of crops already described, and each field is divided into a number of long narrow strips—corresponding to the number of male members in the commune—as nearly as possible equal to each other in area and quality. Sometimes it is necessary to divide the field into several portions, according to the quality of the soil, and then to subdivide each of these portions into the requisite number of strips. Thus, in all cases, every household possesses at least one strip in each field, and, in those cases where subdivision is necessary, every household possesses a strip in each of the portions into which the field is subdivided. . . . The meadow, which is reserved for the production of hay, is divided into the same number of shares as the arable land.

\* Wallace's "Russia."

\* Wallace's "Russia," chap. viii., p 207.

There, however, the division and distribution takes place, not at irregular intervals, but annually. Every year, on a day fixed by the Assembly, the villagers proceed in a body to this part of their property, and divide it into the requisite number of portions. Lots are then cast, and each family at once mows the portion allotted to it. In some communes the meadow is mown by all the peasants in common, and the day afterwards distributed by lot among the families, but this system is by no means so frequently used."

Before a peasant can leave his native village the 'Mir' must be consulted; and even if his absence is to be of short duration, he must obtain a written permission for it. During this absence the full amount of taxes must be sent home; otherwise the absentee will be suddenly recalled to his commune. Mr. Wallace says that, although the Russian peasant will set at defiance the police, the provincial governor, and even the central government, he has never heard of an instance where the will of the 'Mir' was openly opposed.

On the whole it would appear that, whilst the Russian peasant, in common with the trading classes in the towns, has many grievances, and is made to submit to many harassing restrictions, his lot will compare favourably enough, in ordinary times, with that of the peasantry in other lands, who are wont to consider themselves more highly placed in the scale of civilisation.

A few details of the religion of Russia will not be out of place in a work dealing with a struggle which has been represented by some writers as a new crusade, and which has at any rate assumed the characteristics of a religious war. The hatred and jealousy which has existed for centuries past between the Russians and the Turks have doubtless been aggravated by the distinct creeds of the two nations; and whilst, as we have seen, the injunctions of the Prophet required the Turks to exterminate those who do not believe in him, the Christianity of the Russians has not prevented them from nursing a bitter animosity against their Mahomedan neighbours.

The religion of Russia is the Greek or Eastern form of Christianity, differing in a few non-essential points from the Roman, Anglican, and Lutheran forms. It recognises, to borrow the words of a recent writer, "two sources of doctrine, the Bible and tradition, under which last it comprehends not only those doctrines which were orally delivered by the apostles, but also those which have been approved of by the fathers of the Greek Church, especially John of Damascus. . . . The Church does not allow the patriarchs or synods to introduce new doctrines. It treats its tenets as so entirely obligatory and necessary, that they cannot be denied without loss of salvation. It is the only Church which holds that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father only, thus differing from the Catholic and Protestant Churches, which agree in deriving the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son. Like the Catholic Church, it has seven sacraments—baptism, chrism, the eucharist preceded by confession, penance, ordination, marriage, and supreme unction; but it is peculiar, first, in holding that full purification from original sin in baptism requires an immersion three times of the whole body in water, whether infants or adults are to be baptised, and in joining chrism (confirmation) with it as the completion of baptism; and again, . . . in ordering the bread to be leavened, the wine to be mixed with water, and both elements to be distributed to every one, even to children, before they have a true idea of what sin is, the communicant receiving the bread broken in a spoon filled with the consecrated wine. All the clergy, with the exception of the monks, and of the higher clergy chosen from among them, down to the bishops inclusive, are allowed to marry a virgin, but not a widow; nor are they allowed to marry a second time; and therefore the widowed clergy are not permitted to retain their livings, but go into a cloister, where they are called *hieromonachi*. Rarely is a widowed clergyman allowed to keep his diocese; and from the rule that marriage is not suitable for the higher clergy in general, and a second marriage at least is improper for the



lower, there is no departure. The Greek Church does not regard marriage of the laity as indissoluble, and frequently grants divorces; but it is as strict as the Catholic Church with respect to the forbidden degrees of relationship, especially of the ecclesiastical relationship of Godparents; nor does it allow the laity a fourth marriage. It differs from the Catholic Church in anointing with the holy oil not only the dying, but the sick, for the restoration of their health, the forgiveness of their sins, and the sanctification of their souls. It rejects the doctrine of purgatory, has nothing to do with predestination, works of supererogation, indulgences and dispensations (to the living; but a printed form of the forgiveness of sin is sometimes given to the deceased, at the request and for the comfort of the survivors); and it recognises neither Pope nor any one else as the principal Vicar of Christ on earth. It, moreover, allows no carved, sculptured, or molten image of holy persons or subjects; but the representations of Christ, of the Virgin Mary, and the saints, which are objects of religious veneration in churches and private homes, must be merely painted, and, at most, inlaid with precious stones. In the Russian churches, however, works of sculpture are found on the altars. In the invocations of the saints, and especially of the Virgin, the Greeks are as jealous as the Catholics. They also hold relics, graves, and crosses, sacred; and crossing, in the name of Jesus, they consider as having a wonderful and blessed influence; fasts are particularly numerous with them, at which it is not lawful to eat anything but fruits, vegetables, bread, and fish. They fast on the Wednesday and Friday of every week, and, besides, observe four great annual fasts—viz., forty days before Easter, from Whitsuntide to the days of St. Peter and Paul; the fast of the Virgin Mary, from the 1st to the 15th of August; and the Apostle Philip's fast, from the 15th to the 26th of November; besides the day of the beheading of John the Baptist, and of the elevation of the cross.

"The public services of the Greek Church consist almost entirely in outward forms. Preach-

ing and catechising constitute the last part of it; and, in the seventeenth century, preaching was strictly forbidden in Russia, under the Czar Alexis, in order to prevent the diffusion of new doctrines. Instrumental music is excluded altogether from the Greek worship. Besides the mass, which is regarded as the chief thing, the liturgy consists of passages of Scripture, prayers, and legends of the saints, and in the recitation of the creed, or of sentences which the officiating priest begins, and the people continue in a body and finish."

Mr. Mackenzie Wallace, in his recent work on Russia, gives some interesting information, both as to the state of religion among the people of the country and the present condition of the clergy, and, more particularly, of the village priests. "Primitive mankind," he says, "is everywhere and always disposed to regard religion as simply a mass of mysterious rites, which have a secret magical power of averting evil in this world and securing felicity in the next. To this general rule the Russian peasantry are no exception, and the Russian Church has not done all it might have done to eradicate this conception, and to bring religion into closer association with ordinary morality. Hence such incidents as the following are still possible. A robber kills and rifles a traveller, but refrains from eating a piece of meat which he finds in the cart, because it happens to be a fast day! A peasant prepares to rob a young attaché of the Austrian Embassy in St. Petersburg, and ultimately kills his victim, but, before going to the house, he enters a church, and commends his undertaking to the protection of the saints!! A housebreaker, when in the act of robbing a church, finds it difficult to extract the jewels from an icon,\* and makes a vow that, if a certain saint assists him, he will place a rouble's worth of tapers before the saint's image!!

"All these are, of course, extreme cases, but they illustrate a tendency which, in its milder forms,

\* Icons are pictorial half-length representations of the Saviour, of the Madonna, or of a saint, adorned with gold and precious stones.

is only too general amongst the Russian people—the tendency to regard religion as a mass of ceremonies, which have a magical rather than a spiritual significance. It must be admitted that the Russian people are, in a certain sense, religious. They go regularly to church on Sundays and holy-days, cross themselves repeatedly when they pass a church or icon, take the holy communion at stated seasons, rigorously abstain from animal food, not only on Wednesdays and Fridays, but also during Lent and various other long fasts, make occasional pilgrimages to holy shrines, and, in a word, fulfil punctiliously all the ceremonial observances which they suppose necessary for salvation. But here their religiousness ends. They are generally profoundly ignorant of religious doctrine, and know little or nothing of Holy Writ. A peasant, it is said, was once asked by a priest if he could name the three Persons of the Trinity, and replied, without a moment's hesitation, 'How can one not know that, *Batushka*? Of course, it is the Saviour, the Mother of God, and Saint Nicholas, the miracle worker.' That answer represents fairly enough the theological attainments of a very large section of the peasantry. The anecdote is so well known, and so often repeated, that it is probably an invention, but it is not a calumny. Of theology, and of what Protestants term the 'minor religious life,' the Russian peasant has no conception. For him the ceremonial part of religion suffices; and he has the most unbounded, child-like confidence in the saving efficacy of the rites which he practises. If he has been baptised in infancy, has regularly observed the fasts, has annually partaken of the holy communion, and has just confessed and received extreme unction, he feels death approach with the most perfect tranquillity. He is tormented with no doubts as to the efficacy of faith or works, and has no fears that his past life may possibly have rendered him unfit for eternal felicity. Like a man in a sinking ship, who has buckled on his life-preserver, he feels perfectly secure. With no fear for the future, and little regret for the present or the past, he awaits calmly the dread summons,

and dies with a resignation which a Stoic philosopher might envy."

## CHAPTER IV.

### FORMER TURKO-RUSSIAN WARS.

WE have already sketched the earlier history of the Turks in Europe, down to the time when they were driven from the walls of Vienna by John Sobieski; from which time their active aggressions may be considered to have ceased. We will now briefly recapitulate the leading events of the struggles which have since that time taken place between Russia and the Porte. We shall find that our record is one of continual aggression on the part of the Northern Power; although there has rarely been wanting a provocation of some kind or another on the part of Mahomedans. It will perhaps assist us to take a correct view of history, as well as of the war which it is our special intention to consider, if we bear in mind that the Turks gained a footing on this side of the Bosphorus owing to the weakness and want of union amongst the nations of central and western Europe; and that Russia, almost alone amongst the European Powers, has never, from that time to the present day, desisted from her efforts to drive the barbarous hordes from the country which they had seized. Englishmen see in Russia, rightly or wrongly, an aggressive rival; but let us not forget that her hereditary enmity against the Turk is virtually the same which was felt by John Sobieski and his heroic Poles. There was a time when to fight the Turks was considered a noble instinct by the whole of Europe. The old hostility undoubtedly still exists in Russia, however much it may be mixed up with less worthy and unselfish motives.

The last general alliance of the European Powers against Turkey was formed in 1694. After a war of about five years' duration, a Treaty of Peace was concluded between the Sultan of Turkey and the Czar Peter the Great, and an ar-



mistice of thirty years was agreed upon. But notwithstanding these arrangements ten years had hardly passed before another war broke out. It resulted in the defeat of the Russians after a struggle of about two years, and no further hostilities took place until the year 1735, when the Empress Anne of Russia found some pretext for declaring war with the Porte, and induced Austria to join her. This war was a more lengthy and serious one than the last mentioned, as it was carried on with unabated vigour for between three and four years, with great loss to all the parties concerned. Turkey, however, succeeded in holding her own tolerably well; Austria, who, throughout the campaign, had not been so successful as Russia, concluded a separate peace; and although the Turks received a great defeat from the Russians at the battle of Choczim, which terminated the war, yet in the peace which was shortly afterwards concluded, the sultan succeeded in making favourable terms with his enemy.

The Treaty of Peace was signed in 1739, and remained in force until 1769, when the sultan, taking alarm at the partition of Poland, and thinking he had France as an ally, again declared war against his old enemy. The Turks, although successful in the beginning of this war, suffered repeated defeats as it progressed. The Russians achieved a great victory over the main body of the Turkish army on the banks of the Pruth, in August 1770. They succeeded in driving it across the Danube, and then proceeded to the Turkish fortress, Bender, on the Dniester, which they captured. The peninsula of the Crimea was now invaded and completely conquered (1771). In 1772 an armistice was concluded, but it was of very short duration; for, in June 1773, we hear of an encounter between the Russians and the Turks near Braila on the Danube, which resulted in the defeat of the latter. Shortly afterwards the fortress of Silistria was unsuccessfully besieged by the Russians. For a considerable time the Turks were again fortunate. But, in 1774, fortune once more smiled on the Russians, owing, in a great measure, to the want of organisation in the Turk-

ish army. At last, peace was again proclaimed, and the treaty of Kuckuk Kainardji, which conferred many solid advantages on Russia, was signed.

Catherine II., the sovereign of Russia at this period, was a woman of powerful mind and insatiable ambition; and although the powers conferred on Russia by the treaty were very great, her aspirations for the aggrandisement of her empire were far from being satisfied by its terms. Twelve years had barely elapsed before she began negotiating with Austria for the partition of Turkey, sent her armies under her favourite generals Potemkin and Suwarrow to occupy the lines of the Caucasus and the Danube, and seized the Crimea. The sultan, alarmed by these proceedings, endeavoured to make terms, by acknowledging the sovereignty of Russia in the Crimea; but, finding this of no avail, he once more prepared for war.

War was formally declared on February 10th, 1788. The first engagement of importance took place in the following August, and resulted in the defeat of the Austrians, with heavy loss; but the rest of the war was one long continued series of defeats for the Turks. The Emperor of Austria died in the midst of the struggle (February, 1790). A few months after his death the Court of Vienna thought fit to make peace with the Turks, and renounce their alliance with the Russians. The latter continued the fight single-handed, with more or less energy, until the summer of 1791, when two sanguinary battles, both resulting in the defeat of the Turks, completed the struggle, and obliged the sultan to sue for peace at any price. It has been asserted that this war, for carnage and cruelty, surpassed any other that has been recorded in history.

No further hostilities took place between Russia and Turkey until 1806, when, some slight differences having arisen between the governments of the two countries, the Emperor Alexander recommenced the seemingly interminable contest, by sending a large army to invade the provinces of the Danube. The Turks were driven across the river, but the Russians

were prevented from following up their victory by want of men. Napoleon was, at this period, alarming the whole of Europe by his victories, and Russia was naturally unwilling to leave her own borders unprotected, or to exhaust her resources, when there was every probability of being called upon to meet a more formidable antagonist.

At this moment, however, England came to the assistance of Russia; an expedition was sent to Egypt, and the fleet, under the command of Sir John Duckworth, was sent to threaten the immediate bombardment of Constantinople, unless compliance was made with the demands of the English government.

The events of this period in the relations between Turkey, Russia, and England, are of sufficient importance to merit a somewhat more detailed notice, and we may quote a passage from the interesting work by Major Frank Russell, on "Russian Wars with Turkey."

"Napoleon, seeing the importance of an alliance with Turkey, and thereby of neutralising a large portion of the Russian army, had sent one of his most skilful diplomatists, General Sebastiani, to Constantinople, with orders to get up a war by all the means in his power. Bonaparte's choice was a happy one, and his instructions were carried out with equal ability and success.

"It is unnecessary to recount the various stages of the negotiations which culminated in urging matters to such a crisis. Suffice it to say, the aid of England was so urgently required by Russia that Sir John Duckworth, then cruising off Ferrol, with four ships of the line, was ordered to unite with a squadron of three line of battle ships and four frigates, lying in Besika Bay, and to force the Divan, by threats of an immediate bombardment of Constantinople, to accept the Russo-English, and renounce the French alliance. Favoured by a fair wind the gallant admiral sailed through the Dardanelles, notwithstanding the cannonade which the formidable battery on its shores directed on him; but with trifling loss he reached the Sea of Marmora and delivered an imperative ultimatum to

the panic-stricken government of the sultan. Words can scarcely describe the terror and amazement of Constantinople; the capital was utterly defenceless; the sea batteries were unarmed; and the population rose in insurrection, loudly demanding the heads of Reis Effendi and the French Ambassador, whom they considered the causes of their misfortunes. Sebastiani was, however, equal to the occasion; disregarding alike his own personal danger and the threats of the English admiral, he counselled temporising and delay; a few days were all that was required to arm the batteries, and to render the capital safe. The brave but unwary English sailor fell into the snare; day after day was passed in the exchange of diplomatic notes and negotiations; meanwhile the Turks were making Constantinople safe, and cutting off the retreat of their enemies. At last, after the lapse of four days, the British Admiral perceived his danger, and to save his fleet had to retire. The passage of the Dardanelles was again forced, this time also successfully, but with considerable loss, and, except for the impression it made on Europe, this gallant expedition was, as to results, entirely fruitless.

"This war, on the whole disastrous to Turkey, was concluded by the Peace of Tilsit, when, thanks to the intervention of Napoleon, she escaped the loss of Moldavia and Wallachia, which were occupied by Russia temporarily, as it was termed, but which otherwise would have been ceded to her. It may be remarked, however, that secret clauses were added to the treaty signed at Tilsit, and that by these the partition of the Turkish empire was arranged between Alexander and Napoleon. Previous to the invasion of Russia by the grand army, in 1812, the czar deemed it politic to reveal these secret clauses to the Divan to ensure their neutrality in the approaching contest. In this he was perfectly successful, and subsequently, for many years to come, the influence of England replaced that of France in the council-chambers of Constantinople."

The peace of Tilsit lasted barely three years.



Early in the spring of 1810 a large army of Russians, under the charge of General Kamenskoi, attempted to cross the Danube, and, after one or two unsuccessful attempts, effected their purpose. The siege of Rustchuk, the first signal success of the Russians during the campaign, commenced early in August, and lasted until the end of September. It was attended by great losses both to Turks and Russians. Mukhtar Pasha, who had been sent with numerous forces to the relief of the besieged town, encountered the Russians at Battim, and received a severe defeat. No other engagement worthy of note occurred during the rest of the year. The Russian headquarters were established at Bucharest for the winter, and there was a cessation of hostilities.

Some prospect of difficulties in Poland arising, in the early part of the year 1811, a considerable portion of the army was drafted off to the Polish frontier. The Turks were successful in regaining Rustchuk, and the Russian garrison recrossed the Danube (July 5th), encamping on the left bank of the river, while the Turks soon followed their example. Nothing more than a few skirmishes, however, took place between the rival armies during the next three months. The Commander-in-chief of the Russian forces, General Kutusov, having discovered that the Turkish troops on the right bank of the river were comparatively few, and that Rustchuk itself was insufficiently garrisoned, determined once more to lay siege to the fortress. Accordingly, on the 10th of October, he sent general Markov with a considerable body of men, under cover of the night, to surprise the enemy encamped on the right bank. Owing to some mismanagement Markov did not succeed in getting all his men across until the 15th. The surprise was complete, nevertheless, and the Turks fled in confusion. In the meanwhile, general Kutusov advanced with the remainder of the army against the Turks on the left bank, and gained a signal victory. Rustchuk, however, had to be taken, and, though the Russians brought every effort to bear upon it, the besiegers held out until December 4th, when, an armistice having been concluded,

Oglon Pasha, the gallant commander, marched out of the fortress with the poor remnant of his army numbering some five thousand men, one hundred and twenty thousand having perished during the siege. The treaty of Bucharest was shortly afterwards concluded, by which the Russians extended their frontier to the Pruth, and obtained the navigation of the Danube and the destruction of the Turkish fortresses throughout Servia.

For the next fifteen or sixteen years, Russia and Turkey remained at peace with each other, Russia being apparently desirous of rest, whilst Turkey was fully occupied in other quarters. Servia was making a struggle for independence. The treaty of Bucharest contained certain provisions intended to give her a partial autonomy, although she was still to remain a tributary state. But these provisions were soon set aside by Turkey, and Servia was attacked and conquered, while Czerni George, her would-be deliverer from the hands of the oppressor, escaped into Austria. After a temporary submission the Servians again made a struggle for their liberty under another leader, Milosch Obrenovitch, and, in 1826, Sultan Mahmoud, by the treaty of Akerman, consented to give them what they had so long demanded. It was not, however, until three years later that the provisions for their independence were actually carried out, and not till 1867 that Turkish troops were withdrawn from the garrisons of their country; while a tribute was paid to Turkey up to the year 1876.

The struggle of Greece for independence was going on almost at the same time as that of Servia. Of the general uprising of the Greeks, which took place in 1821, Mr. E. A. Freeman, in his work on the "Ottoman Power in Europe," thus speaks: "The whole Greek nation rose in every part of the Turkish dominions, where they had numbers and strength to rise. They rose throughout Greece itself, both within the present kingdom and Epeiros, Thessaly, and Macedonia; in Crete too, and Cyprus, and other of the islands. In some parts they were too weak to rise at all; in some parts the rising was easily put down;

and in some parts, where there was no rising at all, the Turk did as he always had done, and as he always will do, whenever he has the power. Wherever the Turk was sufficiently strong he did then exactly as he did in 1876. Fifty years and more ago, men were shocked by the story of the massacres of Chios, Kassandra, and Cyprus, just as we have been shocked by the story of the massacres of Bulgaria."

The history of the great war of independence is too well known to need recapitulation here. We may, however, mention casually the winding up of the affair, in which our own country played no inconsiderable a part. After the innumerable atrocities and outrages perpetrated by the Turks on the brave little nation struggling for its liberty had sickened and aroused the indignation of every European nation, England, France, and Russia, banded together, and signed the treaty of London, by which they agreed to compel Turkey, either by persuasion or the force of arms, to acknowledge the freedom of Greece. Persuasion was of no avail, and, in November 1827, the battle of Navarino was fought by the United Powers, and resulted in the entire destruction of the Ottoman navy. No further assistance was rendered by England at this time. France, as Mr. Freeman says, "had the glory of clearing Peloponnêsos from the Egyptian troops, while Russia had the glory of bringing the Turk on his knees at Adrianople."

This short struggle of Russia with Turkey (1828-29) resulted in an immense loss of life on both sides. Part of the Russian army crossed the Pruth, on May 7th, without difficulty. The crossing of the Danube, a more serious undertaking, was accomplished by another portion on June 9th. The siege of Braiala was the first real event of the campaign. The Russians, although at first repulsed with heavy loss, succeeded in forcing the fortress to surrender, and this success was followed up by the capture of minor fortresses in the Dobrudscha. The siege of Varna and the battle of Widdin were amongst the other successes of the Russians during the year, while the Turks compelled the

enemy to retreat from before Shumla and Silistria, and fought throughout the campaign with a gallantry and vigour only equalled by that of their opponents. Of the generalship on either side little can be said. The Russians made repeated mistakes, while the Turks were remarkable for their supineness and incompetency.

At the end of October, 1828, the Russians settled down in their winter quarters, and hostilities were suspended until the spring of 1829. On the 17th of May the siege of Silistria was again commenced, and lasted until July 1st, when the fortress capitulated, after a gallant defence, with a loss to the Turks of some three thousand men. Several other encounters took place between the contending armies, in most of which the Russians were successful, though at an immense sacrifice of life. The crowning triumph of the campaign was the capture of Adrianople, by which the war was virtually ended. On this achievement Count Moltke remarks, that "the exertions of two campaigns, the expenditure of one hundred thousand millions of roubles, and the sacrifice of over fifty thousand men, had brought twenty thousand Russians to the gates of Adrianople."

After the fall of this town most exaggerated reports of the numbers of the invaders were circulated, and, yielding to the panic which prevailed everywhere, the sultan, on August 28, 1829, signed the Peace of Adrianople. By this treaty, the Turks relinquished their fortresses on the left bank of the Danube, and Servia and Montenegro were placed under the protection of Russia. The successes of the Russians in 1829 are all the more remarkable when we take into consideration the fearful amount of sickness which prevailed all through the war. They suffered, not only from the plague, but from intermittent and putrid fevers, and from inflammatory diseases of all kinds. Count Moltke calculates that the Russians lost at least eighty-two thousand men in the hospitals during the first campaign. In June, 1829, one thousand men a week were brought into the plague hospital at Varna, and one day as many as three hundred deaths took place.

After the Russians had entered Adrianople a



fearful state of things prevailed. We make a few quotations from Count Moltke's graphic description. "By the time the army had been in Adrianople a week one thousand six hundred and sixteen sick were taken there; by September 1st it contained three thousand six hundred and sixty-six, and by the middle of the month four thousand six hundred and forty-one, one-fourth of the whole remaining disposable force . . . . To these immense numbers of sick nothing but a bare shelter could be afforded. Adrianople did not contain a supply of stores sufficient to last any length of time; the most ordinary food was wanting; there was not even hay or straw to litter the sick upon the wooden pallets of the barracks; they were laid upon torn-up Turkish tents, with knapsacks as pillows, and no covering but their cloaks. The winter set in with fearful severity; most of the windows were unglazed, and the doors would not shut. In a short time the beautiful grove of plane trees had disappeared, for even the healthy troops wanted firewood, and the very bones of the dead out of the cemeteries were used as fuel. . . . Before the departure of the corps on October 29th, the first case of plague occurred in the hospital, and soon afterwards the disease spread with irresistible violence, until not one of the eighthundred wards was free from it. . . . Only two transports went to Burgas" (the winter quarters appointed for the Russian army by the terms of the Treaty of Peace) "one in December, with three hundred convalescents, and one in May, with one hundred and seventy sick. They were escorted by three hundred or four hundred men in good health; all the rest had perished. Of the six thousand who stayed behind in Adrianople five thousand two hundred died."

The successes of the Russians in Asia were on a par with their achievements in Europe. "Taking into consideration the success which everywhere attended his armies," as Major Russell writes, "the vast amount of territory, and the number of fortresses they subdued, more especially in Asia, the czar cannot be said to have made hard terms with his adversary. . . . He had, it is

true, loudly proclaimed to all Europe that in making war he desired not an increase of territory—no personal or national aggrandisement, but to improve the condition of the Christian subjects of the Porte; hence it was expected that he would be reasonable in his demands. But assurances and manifestoes before the commencement of a war are not always binding at its conclusion. 'Might is right' may too often be considered the motto of philanthropic monarchs. We must, therefore, certainly accord the praise of moderation to Nicholas and his government on this occasion." His acquisitions were these—Brailow, and a small amount of territory on the Danube, and the fortress and Pashalik of Akhaltsik in Asia. He also exacted a large indemnity, and occupied certain provinces until it was paid.

In 1831, war between Turkey and Egypt broke out, and such were the successes of the Egyptians under Ibrahim Pasha that the sultan, in dire distress, having appealed in vain to England and France to help him, actually turned to his ancient foe, who, without delay, sent an army and fleet to Constantinople. But Mehemet Ali, the Pasha of Egypt, finding that he would now have Russia to cope with as well as Turkey, soon agreed to a treaty of peace. England and France looked upon the occupation of the Bosphorus by the Russian army and fleet with extreme dissatisfaction, and were not slow in demanding their retirement from the scene. A treaty of alliance was then made between the czar and the sultan, which apparently conferred no particular advantages upon the former, and as soon as the Egyptians recrossed the Taurus, the Russians left the Bosphorus.

To this friendly little treaty of Unkiaz-Skelessi there was, however, a very important secret clause, by which Russian ships-of-war alone had the right of entry to the Dardanelles. This, of course, was unknown to the European Powers until long afterwards. In 1839, Mehemet Ali and Sultan Mahmoud were again at war with each other. The Egyptians were victorious both by land and sea, and in the midst of the contest the sultan died. He was succeeded by

Abdul Medjid. A total collapse of the Turkish power seemed at this moment imminent, for, in addition to the troubles with Egypt, serious disturbances were going on in Servia. At this juncture the other European Powers came to the rescue, and in July, 1840, succeeded in settling affairs between Turkey and Egypt.

The rights of the sultan and the five Powers under the treaty of 1841 are thus concisely stated in Kinglake's "*Invasion of the Crimea*:"—"By this treaty the five great Powers acknowledged the right of the sultan to exclude armed navies from both the straits; and, on the other hand, the sultan engaged that, in time of peace, he would always exercise this right of exclusion. Moreover, the five Powers promised that they would all respect this engagement by the sultan. The result, therefore, was, that, whether with or without the consent of the sultan, no foreign squadron, at a time when the sultan was at peace, could lawfully appear in either of the straits" (the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles).

No further disturbances took place in the East for some years after the signing of this treaty. In 1844 the Czar Nicholas came to England with the object of sounding the government on the subject of our future policy with regard to Turkey. He did not gain anything by his visit, England having wisely resolved to "let well alone," and refusing to make any statement as to what her conduct might be in the event of certain contingencies. The czar thereupon returned home, leaving in our Foreign Office a sort of memorandum recording his own views on the subject. After saying that Russia and England, in common with the other great Powers, should endeavour to check the well-known tendency of Turkey to evade treaties and ill-use its Christian subjects, rather by the "combined and friendly remonstrance than by the separate action of one," the memorandum proceeded—

"If all the great Powers frankly adopt this line of conduct, they will have a well-founded expectation of preserving the existence of Turkey. However, they must not conceal from themselves

how many elements of dissolution that empire contains within itself. Unforeseen circumstances may hasten its fall. . . . In the uncertainty which hovers over the future, a single fundamental idea seems to admit of a really practical application: it is, that the danger which may result from a catastrophe in Turkey will be much diminished if, in the event of its occurring, Russia and England have come to an understanding as to the course to be taken by them in common. That understanding will be the more beneficial, inasmuch as it will have the full assent of Austria. Between her and Russia there exists already an entire accord."\*

In 1848 a revolution in Wallachia having taken place, the czar thought fit to send a portion of his army to occupy the Principalities, but, in 1849, by the intervention of England, amicable relations were once more restored between Russia and Turkey, and the Russian troops were withdrawn.

We now come to the Crimean War, the exact date of the commencement of which has been a matter of dispute. According to the authority last referred to, "on the 23rd of October, 1853, the sultan was placed in a state of war with the Emperor of Russia."†

In order to understand the position of affairs between the two countries just before the outbreak of the war, we must go back to the month of June, 1850, when, acting upon the instructions of the President of the Republic, M. de Lavallette, the French Ambassador at Constantinople, demanded that the concessions to the Latin Christians, which were contained in the treaty of 1740, should be strictly executed. The Holy Land, it will be remembered, was in the possession of the Turks, while the Christians, both of the Greek and Latin Churches, paid toll to them for the privilege of worshipping at the various shrines. A concession had been made in the year 1740 by Turkey to France, by which the Latin Christians obtained many privileges. These privileges, how-

\* "*Kinglake's Invasion of the Crimea*," vol. i., ch. iv., p. 72.

† *Ibid.*, vol. i., ch. xvii., p. 378.



ever, had never been exacted; and during the course of the next hundred years, various concessions and grants had been made to the Greek Church, which virtually abrogated the terms of the treaty with France. By this demand on the part of M. de Lavalette, the sultan was placed in a very awkward position, it being impossible to comply with it without giving offence to Russia. After using a good deal of threatening language, and seeing, probably, that if he persisted in requiring the terms of the treaty of 1740, France would be called upon to execute her threats—which would be a different thing from uttering them—M. de Lavalette gradually toned down his demands to more modest proportions. The question finally became, whether, “for the purpose of passing through the building into their grotto, the Latin monks should have the key of the Church of Bethlehem, and also one of the keys of each of the two doors of the sacred Manger, and whether they should be at liberty to place in the sanctuary of the Nativity a silver star, adorned with the arms of France.”\*

After much pressing the sultan at last gave way, and signed a paper formally acknowledging the claims of the Latins. But in a few days the Russian Ambassador succeeded in making him issue a firman, ratifying the ancient privileges of the Greeks, thus nullifying his former one. The sultan was now in a dilemma; out of which he proceeded to extricate himself by secretly promising the French Ambassador that the firman favourable to the Greeks should not be publicly read at Jerusalem, while to the Russian Ambassador he promised—also in secret—to tell the Pasha of Jerusalem not to give up the key to the Latins, if he could by any means avoid it. Alif Bey was sent to Jerusalem to carry out these instructions. On his arrival, after meeting the three Patriarchs of Jerusalem, the Greek, Latin, and Armenian, and making an oration, in which he impressed upon them the sultan’s desire to please all his subjects, he proceeded to the Church of the Virgin, where he read the order of the sul-

tan, that the Latins should have the privilege of celebrating mass once in the year, but that the altar ornaments should not be touched. This did not at all fall in with the views of the Latins; a great discussion arose, and in the midst of it Alif Bey retired without having read the firman in favour of the Greeks. After this considerable pressure was brought to bear, both by the French and Russian governments, upon the Porte, in order to obtain the fulfilment of the promise made to them respectively on behalf of the Latins and Greeks. France finally triumphed; and on December the 22nd the Latins placed the silver star, adorned with the arms of France, in the sanctuary of the Nativity, and the keys they had demanded were given into their hands.

Great was the indignation of Russia on hearing these tidings, and the Czar Nicholas, without a moment’s hesitation, ordered an armed force to the frontiers of the Danubian provinces. Just at this time, the winter of 1852-53, the Turks were engaged in a conflict with their Christian subjects in Montenegro. The czar saw in this a favourable pretext for picking a quarrel with his ancient foe, and despatched an ambassador to Constantinople, demanding the instant withdrawal of the Turkish troops from Montenegro. Non-compliance with this demand was to be regarded as ground for a formal declaration of war with the Porte on the part of the czar. Prince Mentschikoff was the ambassador chosen for the conveyance of this message. At the same time Count Leiningen had been despatched from the Court of Vienna to call upon the sultan for the withdrawal of the troops. Austria, in fact, appears to have been foremost with the idea. Contrary to the czar’s expectations, the sultan very quietly acceded to his request, and a peaceful termination to affairs seemed probable when the anger of the czar was again aroused by hearing that the French government had despatched the Toulon fleet to Salamis. Immediately afterwards Prince Mentschikoff received fresh despatches, the tenor of which we may gather from the fact, that his next step was to demand for

\* Kinglake’s “Invasion of the Crimea,” vol. i., chap. iii. p. 49.

the czar the protectorate of the Greek Church in Turkey, which, as "many of the duties of prefects, of magistrates, of assessors, of collectors, and of police, were discharged by bishops, priests, and deacons—might be so used by a powerful foreign prince as to carry with it a virtual sovereignty over ten or fourteen millions of laymen."\* This demand was persistently repeated in one form or another throughout the whole of Prince Mentschikoff's negotiations with the Porte, and as persistently refused by it, acting upon the counsel given it by the English Ambassador, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, a man of great influence at the Turkish Court, and one for whom the czar had a peculiar aversion. The above quoted authority says of him—"People who knew the springs of action in the Russian capital used to say at that time, that the whole 'Eastern Question,' as it was called, lay enclosed in one name—lay enclosed in the name of Lord Stratford. They acknowledged that the Emperor Nicholas could not bear the stress of our ambassador's authority with the Porte." . . . "For Nicholas the Czar it was all but impossible to endure the ambassador's political ascendancy; but the bare thought of Lord Stratford's protecting Christianity in Turkey was more than could be borne by Nicholas the Pontiff."

Goaded on seemingly by the determination not to allow Lord Stratford to control Turkish affairs the czar sent fresh despatches to Prince Mentschikoff, urging him to insist on a compliance by the Porte with all his previous demands. Acting upon the advice of Lord Stratford, the Turks agreed to these demands in every particular, save that for the protectorate of the Greek Church, and embodied their concessions in a diplomatic note. Prince Mentschikoff refused to accept it, and a formal rupture of diplomatic relations between Russia and Turkey took place. Prince Mentschikoff, with the whole staff of the Imperial Legation, withdrew from Constantinople, and the Russian arms

were taken down from the palace of the embassy.

The part which Lord Stratford had taken in these negotiations between Russia and Turkey had naturally had the effect of giving to the latter a belief in the friendliness of England's intentions towards her. As Mr. Kinglake sapiently observes:—"The advice of a strong Power is highly valued, but it is valued for reasons which should make men chary of giving it. It is not commonly valued for the sake of its mere wisdom, but partly because it is more or less a disclosure of policy, and still more because it tends to draw the advising State into a line of action corresponding with its counsels. England, by the voice of her ambassador (approved from time to time by the Home Government), had been advising a weak Power to resist a strong one. Counsels of such a kind could not but have a grave import."

Prince Mentschikoff left Constantinople on the 24th of May, 1853. On the 31st, a letter was addressed to the Porte by Russia, urging the acceptance of her former demands, and announcing that, if the Porte failed to do this within eight days' time, the Russian army would shortly cross the frontier, and occupy the Danubian Principalities, "in order to obtain 'by force, but without war,' that which the Porte should decline to give up of its own accord." The Porte, assured by despatches from England of our support, once more refused Russia's demand. On the 2nd of July, the Russian forces passed the Pruth, and occupied the provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia.

We will pass on—without going into detail as to the negotiations on the part of the European Powers to bring matters to a pacific termination—to the time when the Emperor of the French took upon himself to impress on the English government the necessity for the advance of the English and French fleets—which had been lying at anchor in Besika Bay since the second week in June, ready for any emergency

\* Kinglake's "Invasion of the Crimea."

\* "Invasion of the Crimea."



—to Constantinople. Louis Napoleon found a pretext for this step in a report made to the French government by their ambassador at Constantinople, to the effect that affairs in Turkey bore a threatening aspect, and that a rising was dreaded, in which the Rayahs, or Europeans, would be the victims. England yielded to the French Emperor, and the fleet was ordered to enter the Dardanelles.

On hearing of this act of hostility the czar was much incensed, and determined to wreak his vengeance on the Turkish fleet. Orders were given to the fleet at Sebastopol for active operations. \* “In the middle of the month of November, and at a time when the Allied squadrons were anchored in the Bosphorus, the Sebastopol fleet came out, and was ranged in a kind of cordon stretching from north to south across the centre of the Black Sea.” But although it was known that Russian ships of the line were cruising in sight of Sinope, and “hovering over the Turkish squadron, which lay there at anchor,” no steps were taken by the Allied squadrons to protect the Turks. The Turkish commander at Sinope even appealed to the English for assistance, but without effect. The belief that the Russian attack on the Turkish fleet at Sinope was a stealthy surprise, was prevalent in England, but Mr. Kinglake takes pains to prove, that, so far from any concealment being made of their movements, the Russian ships hung about for days before the attack, and ostentatiously paraded themselves. Mr. Kinglake thus describes the engagement, if such it may be called :—

+ “On the 30th of November, Admiral Nachinoff, with six sail of the line, bore down upon the Turkish squadron, still lying at anchor in the port of Sinope. There was no ship of the line in the Turkish squadron. It consisted of seven frigates, a sloop, a steamer, and some transports. The Turks were the first to fire, and to bring upon their little squadron of frigates the broadsides of six sail of the line; and although

they fought without hope, they were steadfast. Either they refused to strike their colours, or else, if their colours went down, the Russian Admiral was blind to their signal, and continued to slaughter them. Except the steamer, every one of the Turkish vessels was destroyed. It was believed by men in authority that four thousand Turks were killed; that less than four hundred survived, and that all these were wounded. The feeble batteries of the place suffered under the enemy’s fire, and the town was much shattered. The Russian fleet did not move from Sinope until the following day.”

The indignation of England and France on hearing the news of this disaster was very great, and, as before mentioned, a strong feeling prevailed that Russia had acted in a treacherous manner in thus suddenly assuming the offensive. But the tide of popular feeling might not perhaps have set so strongly in this direction had the true state of affairs been known. We must bear in mind that the sultan had declared himself in a state of war with the czar more than a month previous to the date of the attack on Sinope. The 23rd of October is the date assigned to the sultan’s declaration by Mr. Kinglake; and in the beginning of November, the Russian government had been informed, “not only that active warfare was going on in the valley of the Lower Danube, but that the Turks had seized the Russian fort of St. Nicholas, on the eastern coast of the Euxine, and were attacking Russia upon her Armenian frontier.”\*

At this juncture the Emperor of the French sent a proposal to the English government that notice should be given to Russia, “that France and England were resolved to prevent the repetition of the affair of Sinope, and that every Russian ship thenceforward met in the Euxine would be requested, and, if necessary, constrained, to return to Sebastopol; and that any act of aggression afterwards attempted against the Ottoman territory or flag would be repelled by force.” This proposal reached the Cabinet on the 18th

\* Kinglake’s “Invasion of the Crimea,” vol. ii., chap. i.

+ Ibid.

\* Kinglake’s “Invasion of the Crimea,” vol. ii., chap. ii.

December, 1853; on the 22nd it was accepted. On the 12th of January, 1854, the czar received this notice. He speedily withdrew his ambassadors from Paris and London, and prepared for an invasion of Turkey. The Allied fleets had entered the Euxine on the 4th of January. We pass over the events of the war between the sultan and the czar in the early part of 1854, and the various negotiations of the European Powers favourable to a peaceful settlement, and come to the demand on the part of England, France, and Austria, for the evacuation of the Principalities by the Russians. The refusal to comply with this demand, which was embodied in a diplomatic note from each country, was to be regarded by the Western Powers as a declaration of war. On the 19th of March, Count Nesselrode, the Russian Minister, informed the English and French Consuls that his Imperial Master declined to make any answer to the notes of their respective governments, and, on the 27th, the queen announced to Parliament the result of the negotiations. On the 28th, the English Declaration of War was issued. Then came the despatch of the Allied armies to the East—the English under Lord Raglan, the French under Marshal St. Arnaud. Prince Paskievitch was the commander of the Russian forces. Paskievitch deemed it essential for the success of his operations on the Danube that the fortress of Silistria should be taken. On the 19th of May, he opened the siege; the place was but weakly garrisoned, but although the Allied armies were close at hand, neither of them were allowed to move forward to its relief.\* “At first few men harboured the thought that, without deliverance brought by a relieving force, a humble Turkish fortress would be able to hold out against the collected strength of Russia and the most renowned of her Guards. Soon it was known that, of their own free-will and humour, two young Englishmen—Captain Butler of the Ceylon Rifles, and Lieutenant Nasmyth of the East India Company’s Service

—had thrown themselves into the place, and were exercising a strange mastery over the garrison. On one of the hills overlooking the town there was a seam of earth, which, as though it were a kind of low fence, designed and thrown up by a peasant, passed along three sides of the slope in a doubtful meandering course. This was the earthwork which soon became famous in Europe. It was called the Arab Tabia. The work was one of a slight and rude sort; but the ground it stood on was judged to be needful to the besiegers, and, at any cost of life to his people, Prince Paskievitch resolved to seize it. By diligent fighting on the hill side—by sapping close up to the ditch—by springing mines which more than once blew in the counter-scarp and levelled the parapet—by storming it in the daytime—by storming it at night—the Russians strove hard to carry the work; but when they sprang a mine, they ever found that behind the ruins the Turks stood entrenched; and whether they stormed it by night or by day, their masses of columns were always driven back with cruel slaughter.” As time went on, however, the hopes of the garrison began to fail, and, had it not been for the timely aid of a brigade under the command of General Cannon, it is probable they would have surrendered. On the 22nd of June, the Russians raised the siege. This event was quickly followed by the battle of Giurgevo, in which the Turks won a decisive victory, and a short time afterwards the Principalities were relinquished. The invasion of Turkey was thus brought to an end, and there is no doubt that the czar would willingly have concluded a peace. But England and France were not content with what had been achieved in Turkey; they were bent on crushing Russia in a much more signal manner. No more effectual means could have suggested itself than an invasion of the Crimea. It was on the 16th of July, 1854, that despatches reached the English head-quarters on the Danube, intimating that the Commanders of the Allied armies should prepare to make a descent on the Crimea, and lay siege to Sebastopol. On the 18th of Sep-

\* Kinglake’s “Invasion of the Crimea,” vol. ii., chap. xiii.



tember, the whole of the land forces of the Allies were safely disembarked on the enemy's shores, the French and Turks numbering thirty-seven thousand men, and the English twenty-seven thousand. Before the embarkation of the troops from Varna, cholera had broken out; during the voyage its ravages continued, and, on the march from the landing place to Sebastopol, hundreds of men fell out of the ranks, writhing in its agonies. The battle of the Alma was the first great encounter with the enemy, and ended, as every one knows, in the discomfiture of the latter. The total losses of the English in the engagement in killed and wounded are computed at two thousand and two, of the French at five hundred and sixty, and of the Russians at five thousand seven hundred and nine. Mr. Kinglake thus describes the disorderly and disastrous retreat of the Russians on the night of the 20th of September :—

"The brave soldiery, who had stood superbly firm when shot were tearing their ranks, were scared by phantom thoughts; and their square built, hard, rigid battalions, which had chequered the hillsides on the Alma, now dissolved into shapeless masses. Even when, after accomplishing several miles of retreat, the troops reached the hillsides which looked down on the banks of the Kutchka, they had no belief that the Allies would suffer them to drink of its waters in peace; and the army of the czar, degenerating into a helpless throng—officers, men, horses, guns, tumbrils, carts laden with stores, carts laden with wounded—all pressed into a gorge leading down to the ford; and then the disorder was so complete, and the masses which choked the gorge were so dense and helpless, that it seemed as though a small force of cavalry and horse-artillery would have sufficed to make the whole army prisoners, or bring it to utter ruin. . . . Sometimes the combined masses were bent in their course by a voice shouting out, 'To the right!' and then again they would swerve the other way, under the impulse of a cry, 'To the

left!' All idea of bearings was so utterly lost, that, even in their flight, the fugitives could no longer be sure that they were retreating; for they did not know but that they might be marching all the while towards the enemy."

The Allies resumed their march on Sebastopol on the morning of the 23rd of September. Lord Raglan had been anxious to press on immediately after the battle of the Alma, but the French Commander, Marshal St. Arnaud, had refused, on the ground that his men were "too tired" for further action; and there was consequently a halt of two days on the heights of Alma. The incidents of the siege of Sebastopol, which lasted from October, 1854, to September, 1855, are so well known as to need only slight comment in these pages. The failure of the gallant attack of the Allied fleets, the capture of one after the other of the Russian strongholds, the heroic conduct of the Allies, the no less heroic conduct of the besieged, the perils not only of war itself, but of sickness in varied form, and the suffering from the severity of the climate endured by each and all of the vast armies, are familiar to most of us. The battle of Balaklava (October 25th, 1854), the battle of Inkerman (November 5th), the destruction of Kertch (June, 1855), the entry into Sebastopol (September, 1855), the capture of Kars by the Russians (November 26th, 1855)—these are the leading events of the war between Russia and the pro-Turkish Allies, which was closed by the Treaty of Paris on the 30th of March, 1856. It cost England a total of about twenty-four thousand men, and an addition to her national debt of over forty-one millions sterling.

With regard to the negotiations for peace, and the stipulations of the TREATY OF PARIS, which it is necessary to bear in mind for the due understanding of recent events, we cannot do better than place before the reader the following extract from Sir Edward Creasy's "History of the Ottoman Turks :"—

"Negotiations were opened on the interven-

\* Kinglake's "Invasion of the Crimea," vol. iii., chap. i.

\* Popular Edition, chap. xxv., p. 539.

tion of Austria, early in 1855, between Russia and the Powers in alliance against her, consisting of Turkey, England, France, and Sardinia. The Russian Court consented that the following five propositions should be taken as the basis of a pacification :—

“1. *Danubian Principalities*.—Complete abolition of the Russian protectorate. The Danubian Principalities shall receive an organisation conformable to their wishes, to their wants, to their interests; and this new organisation, respecting which the population itself will be consulted, shall be recognised by the Contracting Powers, and sanctioned by the sultan, as emanating from his sovereign initiative. No state shall be able, under any pretext whatever, under any form of protectorate, to interfere in the question of the internal administration of the Principalities; they shall adopt a definitive, permanent system, demanded by their geographical position; and no impediment shall be made to their fortifying, in the interest of their safety, in such manner as they may deem advisable, their territory against foreign aggression.

“In exchange for the strong places and territories occupied by the Allied armies, Russia consents to a rectification of her frontier with Turkey-in-Europe. It would commence in the vicinity of Choytm, follow the line of the mountains, which extend in a south-easterly direction, and terminate at Lake Sasik. The line (*trace*) shall be definitively regulated by the general treaty; and the conceded territory would return to the Principalities and to the suzerainty of the Porte.

“2. *The Danube*.—The freedom of the Danube and of its mouth shall be efficaciously assured by European institutions, in which the Contracting Powers shall be equally represented, except by the particular positions of the lords of the soil on the banks (*des riverains*), which shall be regulated upon the principles established by the Act of the Congress of Vienna, as regards the navigation of rivers. Each of the Contracting Powers shall have the right to keep one or two small vessels stationed at the mouths of the

river, destined to assure the execution of the regulations relative to the freedom of the Danube.

“3. *Neutralisation of the Black Sea*.—This sea shall be open to merchant vessels, closed to war navies (*marines militaires*); consequently no naval military arsenals shall be created or maintained there. The protection of the commercial and maritime interests of all nations shall be assured in the respective ports of the Black Sea by the establishment of institutions conformable to international law, and to the customs sanctioned in such matters. The two Powers which hold the coast engage themselves to maintain only the number of eight vessels, of a fixed force, necessary for their coast service. This convention, concluded separately between these two Powers, shall form part as an annex of the general treaty, after receiving the approval of the contracting parties. This separate convention cannot be annulled or modified without the consent of the signatories of the general treaty. The closing of the Straits will admit the exception applicable to the station any vessels mentioned in the preceding article.

“4. *Christian Subjects of the Porte*.—The immunities of the Rayah subjects of the Porte shall be religiously preserved, without infringement on the independence and dignity of the sultan's crown. As deliberations are taking place between Austria, France, Great Britain, and the Sublime Porte, to assure to the Christian subjects of the sultan their religious and political rights, Russia shall be invited, when peace is made, to associate herself thereto.

“5. The belligerent Powers reserve to themselves the right which appertains to them of producing, in a European interest, special conditions over and above the four guarantees.

“Paris was selected as the place for the Conference; and there accordingly assembled the Plenipotentiaries of France, England, Russia, Turkey, and Sardinia, which last-mentioned country had, during the latter part of the war, co-operated gallantly with the two Great Powers of the West in the common cause of justice and national independence. Austria, as the mediat-



ing Power, took part, by her diplomatic representatives, in the whole proceedings of the Congress. Prussia, which had at first stood aloof, was induced, at the end of the discussions, to become a party to the terms on which the others had debated and resolved. At last, on Sunday, the 30th of March, 1856, a Treaty framed in accordance with the propositions that have been cited, was signed by the Ministers of the Seven Powers, and peace was restored."

The terms of the Treaty of Paris are given at length in 'Hertslet's' second volume, p. 1250. The principal stipulations were as follow:—

"By Art. 7, the Sublime Porte was declared by the other Signatory Powers to be admitted to participate in the advantages of the Public Law and System (*concert*) of Europe. The Christian sovereigns engaged each on his part—

"To respect the Independence and the Integrity of the Ottoman Empire; guarantee in common the strict observance of that engagement; and will, in consequence, consider any act tending to its violation as a question of general interest.

*"Mediation in event of Misunderstanding between the Sublime Porte and one or more of the Contracting Powers.*

"ART. 8. If there should arise between the Sublime Porte and one or more of the other Signing Powers any misunderstanding, which might endanger the maintenance of their relations, the Sublime Porte and each of such Powers, before having recourse to the use of force, shall afford the other Contracting Parties the opportunity of preventing such an extremity by means of their mediation.

*"Amelioration of Condition of Christian Population of Ottoman Empire.*

"ART. 9. His Imperial Majesty, the Sultan, having, in his constant solicitude for the welfare of his subjects, issued a firman, which, while ameliorating their condition, without distinction of religion or of race, records his generous inten-

tions towards the Christian population of his empire, and wishing to give a further proof of his sentiments in that respect, has resolved to communicate to the Contracting Parties the said firman, emanating spontaneously from his sovereign will.

*"Non-interference of Allies in Internal Affairs of Ottoman Empire.*

"The Contracting Powers recognise the high value of this communication. It is clearly understood that it cannot, in any case, give to the said Powers the right to interfere, either collectively or separately, in the relations of his Majesty the Sultan with his subjects, nor in the internal administration of his empire.

*"Closing the Straits of Bosphorus and Dardanelles.*

"ART. 10. The Convention of 13th of July, 1841, which maintains the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire relative to the closing of the Straits of the Bosphorus and of the Dardanelles, has been revised by common consent.

"The Act concluded for that purpose, and in conformity with that principle, between the High Contracting Parties is and remains annexed to the present Treaty, and shall have the same force and validity as if it formed an integral part thereof.

*"Neutralisation of the Black Sea.*

"ART 11. The Black Sea is Neutralised; its Waters and its Ports thrown open to the Mercantile Marine of every nation, are formally and in perpetuity interdicted to the Flag of War, either of Powers possessing its coasts, or of any other Power, with the exceptions mentioned in Articles 14, and 19, of the present Treaty.

*"Commercial Regulations in the Black Sea.*

"ART 12. Free from any impediment, the Commerce in the Ports and Waters of the Black Sea shall be subject only to Regulations of Health, Customs, and Police, framed in a spirit

favourable to the development of commercial transactions.

*"Military Maritime Arsenals not to be established or maintained on Coasts of Black Sea.*

"ART 13. The Black Sea being Neutralised according to the terms of Article 11, the maintenance or establishment upon its coast of Military Maritime Arsenals become alike unnecessary and purposeless; in consequence, His Majesty, the Emperor of all the Russias, and His Imperial Majesty, the Sultan, engage not to establish or to maintain upon that coast any Military Maritime Arsenal.

*"Russian and Ottoman Naval Force in Black Sea.*

"ART 14. Their Majesties, the Emperor of all the Russias, and the Sultan, having concluded a Convention for the purpose of settling the Force and Number of Light Vessels, necessary for the service of their coasts, which they reserve to themselves to maintain in the Black Sea, that Convention is annexed to the present Treaty, and shall have the same force and validity as if it formed an integral part thereof. It cannot be either annulled or modified without the assent of the Powers signing the present Treaty."

By the Convention of the same date referred to in the Treaty and referred to in it, it was declared—

*"Prohibition to Foreign Ships of War to enter the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.*

"ART. 1. His Majesty the Sultan, on the one part, declares that he is firmly resolved to maintain for the future the principle invariably established as the ancient rule of his empire, and in virtue of which it has, at all times, been prohibited for the Ships of War of Foreign Powers to enter the Straits of the Dardanelles, and of the Bosphorus; and that, so long as the Porte is at Peace, His Majesty will admit no Foreign Ship of War in the said Straits.

*"Agreement of Six Powers to respect the Prohibition.*

"And their Majesties, the Queen of the United

Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, the Emperor of the French, the King of Prussia, the Emperor of all the Russias, and the King of Sardinia, on the other part, engage to respect this determination of the Sultan, and to conform themselves to the principle above declared.

*"Admission under Firman of Light Vessels in Service of Foreign Missions.*

"ART. 2. The Sultan reserves to himself, as in past times, to deliver Firmans of Passage for Light Vessels under Flag of War, which shall be employed, as is usual, in the service of the Missions of Foreign Powers."

Another convention of the same date between Russia and Turkey, fixed the number of light vessels to be maintained by each Power in the Black Sea.

By a treaty of the 15th of April, 1856, between Great Britain, Austria, and France, these three contracting parties bound themselves to maintain the integrity of the Turkish Empire, as follow :—

*"Guarantee of Independence and Integrity of the Ottoman Empire.*

"ART. 1. The High Contracting Parties guarantee, jointly, and severally, the Independence and the Integrity of the Ottoman Empire, recorded in the Treaty concluded at Paris on the 30th of March, 1856.

*"Any Infraction of the Treaty of 30th of March, 1856, to be considered as a casus belli.*

"ART. 2. Any infraction of the stipulations of the said Treaty will be considered by the Powers signing the present Treaty as a *casus belli*. They will come to an understanding with the Sublime Porte as to the measures which have become necessary, and will, without delay determine among themselves as to the employment of their Military and Naval Forces."

Sir Edward Creasy has pointed out that, while the regulations for peace were pending, the sultan put forth various state documents, by which he



bound himself to maintain the franchises and securities bestowed on his subjects by previous edicts, "without distinction of rank or religion," and gave many directions for the summoning of councils for local self-government, "for ensuring free exercise of religion, for providing mixed tribunals in matters where the litigants were of different religious persuasions, for raising contingents of Christian troops, and for numerous improvements in the administration of legal and commercial affairs."

Unfortunately, these promises of Turkish reform have never been fulfilled; and it is from this violation by the Porte of its most solemn engagements that the government of the czar derived its principal pretext for entering upon the campaign of 1877.

## CHAPTER V.

### THE CHRISTIAN INSURRECTIONS (1875-6).

HAVING thus rapidly passed in review the earlier history of Russia and Turkey, and the relations in which the two countries have stood to one another, from the establishment of the Ottoman Power in Europe down to the treaty which followed upon the Crimean War, we may naturally expect to be in a better position to understand the circumstances which led up to the last struggle between these two hereditary foes. One-half of the prejudices and mistaken views entertained in reference to this great and difficult question may safely be attributed to the lack of historical knowledge on the part of those who have spoken and written on the matter with more zeal than information. If the reader has been disposed to think the preceding chapters tedious, and has felt any impatience at the details of old wars and abrogated treaties, he will probably admit that the delay in arriving at the narrative of recent events is compensated by the clearer view which our retrospect enables us to take of them.

What have we seen to be the actual condition of affairs in Eastern Europe, antecedent to the outbreak of the last insurrection in Bosnia and Herzegovina? We saw, in the first place, a nation of fanatical men, with a creed in which fatalism is the guiding principle, able in every generation to make a fair stand on the battle-field, but *effete* in almost every other respect. We saw Turkey, established on the ruins of many ancient and civilised peoples, with all the materials of a great empire at her command, utterly unable to govern her European subjects, and never settling down into the family of European nations. Throughout the whole period of her sway at Constantinople she has never succeeded in establishing a definite official government, with heads of departments and staffs of secretaries and clerks. She has not taught her subjects to look to Constantinople for justice, law, and order, in the last resort, and far less has she attempted anything like an adoption of constitutional principles. The sultans have ruled through their favourites; or, in other words, the people have been misruled by cliques in the seraglio, or by the whims of successive grand viziers. Few and short have been the periods in which the Christian subjects of Turkey have been at peace with their Mussulman fellow-subjects, or with policemen and tax-gatherers who represented to them the imperial sway of the sultans. The empire, as a whole, has rarely been free from insurrections, in one or other of the phases of anticipation, actual bloodshed and suppression.

With constant anarchy at home, and perpetually recurrent war from abroad, it is not to be wondered at that Turkey should have made so little progress as a European nation; but it is impossible on this account to hold her excused, or to lay on others the blame of her misfortunes. Reason and history show that the fate of a nation is in its own hands, and that a capable government will always rise superior to domestic and foreign troubles. If Turkey had ruled herself well, she would have taken away all pretext for interference in her concerns; and the

sympathy and assistance which she has received from certain of the European Powers, England in chief, would have more than sufficed to maintain her against all her enemies. She has had a dozen chances of permanent confirmation in her conquests; but she has not had the grace to make use of them. The year 1877 found her even weaker than she had been when the Muscovites first attacked her; and it is to her own inherent and incurable weaknesses that she owes her recent misfortunes.

Since the termination of the Crimean War, the following insurrections and outbreaks—with others of minor importance—have disturbed the peace of Turkey. In the summer of 1858 there were several conflicts between the Montenegrins and the Turks, which led to the settlement of the boundaries by a European Commission. In June of the same year the Mahomedans of Jedda, the seaport of Mecca, in Arabia, massacred a number of Christians, including the English and French consuls. Turkey refusing, or delaying, the vindication of the sufferers, an English vessel, the “Cyclops,” bombarded the town; after which the ringleaders in the tumult were executed. In 1859 a formidable conspiracy against the sultan was discovered in Constantinople, and put down with difficulty.

In 1860 there were serious complaints of the ill-treatment of the Porte’s Christian subjects, in various parts of the empire. The Powers which had taken part in the Treaty of Paris threatened to intervene; and the Turkish government immediately promised to investigate and redress the grievances. Most of the Powers expressed themselves satisfied with the undertaking of the Porte; but Russia dissented, and foretold that the promises would be ineffectual. In the same month of June, when these promises were made, the Druses, a fanatical Mahomedan sect in Palestine, attacked their Christian neighbours and massacred them in large numbers, sparing neither age nor sex. Moved by the indignation of Europe, and in view of the fact that the French, with the sanction of the Powers, had actually sent an expedition to Syria, the

Porte ordered Fuad Pasha to punish the murderers. One hundred and sixty of the Druses were executed; whilst no fewer than eleven thousand of them were impressed into the Turkish army. The French continued to occupy Syria until June, 1861, when they withdrew.

Early in this year the Christians of Herzegovina revolted against the cruelties of the tax-collectors; and they were aided, as usual, by their neighbours, the Montenegrins. They continued the hostilities to the autumn of 1862. Meanwhile the Servians had begun to demand their independence. Belgrade, the capital, was still occupied by a Turkish garrison; and disputes arose in 1862, which led to the bombardment of the city in June. A conference of the representatives of the Powers considered the question in August, and their united representations induced the Porte to make certain concessions to the Principality.\* In 1866, Serbia demanded the withdrawal of the Turkish garrisons from their fortress, and to this demand the Sultan Abdul Aziz acceded in the spring of the following year.† In 1868 Prince Michael was assassinated. He was succeeded by his nephew, the present Prince Milan, and the hereditary rights of the Obrenovitch family were definitely confirmed.

In the meantime Abdul Aziz made sundry attempts at financial and other reforms, being continually urged thereto by the English ambassadors, Sir H. Bulwer (1858-1865), Lord Lyons, and Sir H. Elliot. He was opposed both by the incompetence and by the fanaticism of his Ministers, and little progress was made. In 1865, the Maronite Christians revolted, under Joseph Karam, and continued their efforts until the beginning of 1867. The year 1866 witnessed a serious outbreak in Crete (Candia), which had

\* The first Prince of Serbia recognised by Turkey was Milosch Obrenovitch (1829).

† This concession immediately preceded the sultan’s visit to Western Europe. May we conclude that his Majesty’s natural desire of a good reception had something to do with his conciliatory act?



already been subject to similar disturbances in 1841, 1858, and 1859. In June, 1859, the Cretan Christians, mostly Greek by nationality, rose *en masse*, and demanded the redress of their grievances. They published, at the same time, an appeal to the Powers which had guaranteed the independence of Greece, and, meeting in general assembly, proclaimed their freedom from the Turkish yoke, and their union with the historical fatherland. The Turks, commanded by Mustapha Pasha, were worsted in the earlier encounters; and great heroism was displayed by the insurgents, who were reinforced by volunteers from the mainland. On one occasion, a resolute defence having been made of the monastery of Arkadi, and the besieged being at last overcome, the improvised fortress was blown up by its gallant defenders, who perished, with a large number of their assailants, in the ruins.

Europe at length attempted to mediate; or rather the four Powers of Austria, Prussia, Italy, and Switzerland, endeavoured to persuade the sultan to enter into negotiations with a view to Cretan independence; but the Porte turned a deaf ear to their exhortations. The war was continued with great ferocity, and terrible stories began to reach the outer world of the butcheries of the Greeks by their enemies. Defenceless villages were burnt, and their inhabitants were slaughtered, with all the aggravations of cruelty with which the history of later times has made us so painfully familiar. In the middle of June the Powers, this time at the instance of Russia, addressed a collective note to the Turkish government, urging it to suspend hostilities, but to no effect. At the end of 1867 the insurrection had spent its force. The power of Turkey had proved too strong to admit of a complete success on the part of the Greeks, who were obliged to accept an amnesty, and to appoint delegates to confer with the grand vizier. The demands of the delegates were nominally granted; but the feeling of hostility was not allayed, and the following year witnessed a renewal of the contest. It was not until the spring of 1869 that the blockade of the island (which had been broken in scores of in-

stances) was brought to an end, and the sway of the Porte was restored.

A distinct rupture took place between Turkey and Greece at the end of 1868, on account of the active sympathy displayed by the latter towards the Cretans; but the intervention of the Powers sufficed to heal the breach. The Greek government maintained a strict neutrality during the Herzegovinian insurrection of 1875 and the Serbian war of 1876; but it was with the greatest difficulty that the king and his ministers were able to restrain the country from attacking Turkey in 1877, in the hope of securing the ancient Greek provinces of Thessaly and Albania.

The disputes of the Porte with Egypt have been due principally to the jealousy of the sultan at the ever-increasing power and influence of his vassal. The project of the Suez Canal (commenced in 1858, partially opened for traffic in 1865, and inaugurated in 1869), the commercial development of the country, the energy of the viceroy in the construction of public works and of the Egyptian navy, naturally aroused the suspicions of the sultan, who began to fear lest one of the most precious jewels in his crown should be lost to him. He did, indeed, recognise the hereditary succession to the viceroyalty in 1866, and acknowledged the khedive as a "sovereign" in the following year. But, in 1869, he reproached his vassal for assuming powers in rivalry with his own; and Ismail Pasha thought it prudent to submit to the terms of his suzerain. In the war of 1877 the khedive sent troops to the assistance of Turkey, in accordance with the stipulations of his vassalage, under the command of his eldest son.\*

In 1870, Russia took advantage of the Franco-German War, and the consequent disablement of France, one of the nations from whom she had suffered defeat in 1856, to re-open the question of the Treaty of Paris, which she repudiated in a diplomatic circular issued to the Powers. Lord Granville replied to this despatch, maintaining the force of the treaty; and as Austria

\* Prince Hassan, D.C.L. of Oxford.

and Prussia also protested in vigorous terms, the Russian government agreed to refer the matter to a conference. The sultan assented to this course, so far as the Black Sea clauses of the treaty were concerned. The conference met in London in the month of January, 1871, and the result was that the clauses above-named were abrogated by a new treaty, signed on March 13.\* From this time up to the year 1876, Russia em-

\* It would be useless to discuss, in the present work, the question as to how far Russia was morally justified in taking this opportunity to cast off a portion of the burden laid upon her in 1856. We are dealing with facts alone; and, as to the facts, we may cite a clear estimate of the effects of the repudiation, from a newspaper article published at the close of 1877:—

"The treaty signed on March 30th, 1856, as the result of the latter conferences between the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of the French, the Emperor of all the Russias, the Emperor of Austria, the King of Prussia, the King of Sardinia, and the Emperor of the Ottomans, secured solemnly, 'through effectual and reciprocal guarantees, the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire;' the same high contracting parties entering into the obligation 'each, on his own part, to respect the said independence and integrity,' guaranteeing, 'in common, the strict observance of that engagement,' and declaring that they 'will consider any act tending to its violation as a question of general interest.' Article 8 of the same diplomatic instrument, provided that, 'if there should arise between the Sublime Porte and one or more of the other Contracting Powers any misunderstanding which might endanger the maintenance of their relations, the Sublime Porte and each of such Powers, before having recourse to the use of force, shall afford the other contracting parties the opportunity of preventing such an extremity by means of their mediation.' Finally, the special convention annexed to the treaty constituted, in fact, the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus into a European property, held by the sultan, who entered into the obligation (by Art. 1) to 'admit in time of peace no foreign ship of war into the said Straits;' whilst by Art. 2 he 'reserved to himself, as in past times, to deliver firmans of passage for light vessels under flag of war which shall be employed in the service of the missions of the foreign Powers.' As to the Treaty of London, March 13th, 1871, between the same parties, while revising the stipulations relative to the Black Sea and Danube, it did not alter the main points of the Treaty of 1856, which, on the contrary, is formally 'renewed and confirmed.' Even the Conference of Constantinople, useless and abortive as it proved, was a new consecration of the right which the Powers undoubtedly retain in the settlement of any question involving a danger either to the independence and integrity of Turkey, or to the property of the Straits; and it was at the same time a consecration of the duties involved in such right."

ployed herself in organising her army, and cultivating good relations at Berlin, Vienna, and London. The understanding which was henceforth maintained between the three Emperors of Eastern Europe, has undoubtedly produced a great effect upon succeeding events. One of its earliest manifestations was the announcement made by the governments of Russia, Germany, and Austria, in October, 1874, that they held themselves perfectly at liberty to conclude separate treaties with the Principality of Roumania. The "Three Emperors' Alliance" has since become a potent fact, in the absence of which it would be impossible to make a fair approximation to the comprehension of the later phases of the Eastern question.

Our rapid retrospect now brings us to the year 1875, when, after a few years of comparative peace in Herzegovina, a new insurrection broke out, destined to be the spark which should light a vast conflagration. One of the first of the popular leaders was Lazaro Socica, who gained a few successes here and there against the Turks. The Great Powers, foreseeing how great troubles might arise out of these disturbances, induced the Porte to send a mission of conciliation; and Server Pasha was despatched to Herzegovina in August. He was unable to accomplish anything, and troops soon came from Constantinople in his place. The insurgents issued an appeal to Europe, in which they detailed the oppressions to which they were subject, and declared that they would never again submit to Turkish rule. The consuls attempted to mediate—or rather to induce the insurgents to lay down their arms; but it was too late to stem the tide. The country was fairly roused; and engagement succeeded engagement, with varied results.

The fighting which had thus broken out in the northern provinces of Turkey was a civil war of the worst possible kind. It began, in most instances, by the rising up of neighbour against neighbour, and by the massacre of peaceful individuals, as well as of armed men. The reason of this was to be found in the fact that



the Mussulman inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina are to a large extent renegade Christians, the original landowners, who adopted the Mahomedan faith in order to retain their property and privileges. An intense feeling of bitterness commonly exists between these renegades and the Christian population, or rayahs. The latter are in a great majority; but they were, in ordinary times, totally unarmed, the Turkish government not allowing its Christian subjects to carry weapons. They were consequently at the mercy of the renegade minority, and it was against the aggressive hostility of the latter, as well as against the cruelties of the tax-collectors and the zaptiehs, or Turkish gendarmes, that the rayahs had at length resolved upon a final and uncompromising struggle.

The first commander of the Turks in the disturbed districts was Dervish Pasha, who, though he would seem to be an honourable and fairly humane general, has not distinguished himself by great military vigour or ability. He made little head against the insurgents where the latter had assembled in force, and had secured arms and efficient leaders. It was, of course, by no means an easy thing for the rayahs to make a stand against their enemies, armed and trained to arms as these almost invariably were. A couple of extracts from the work of Miss Mackenzie and Miss Irby\* will illustrate the position in which the insurgents and their friends generally found themselves on the outbreak of hostilities.

The rising in North Bosnia (in sympathy with the Herzegovinian outbreak) began "on Sunday, 15th August, at Kosarac, in the district of Priedor, and in the neighbourhood of Gradishka. We first heard of it," writes Miss Irby, "on the Monday morning, when at an early hour the two girls of the family we had visited at Banjaluka appeared at the door of our room in the inn at Austrian Gradishka, telling us their mother had sent them away in the middle of the night, with all the children and those of a neigh-

bouring family, to join their relations in Austria. They reported that 'a Christian had killed a Turkish tax-gatherer,' and that 'Turks and Christians were now killing one another in the fields.' Vaso Videvic had been with us the afternoon of the preceding day, and he knew nothing then of what was taking place. He had told me a few days previously that the rayahs in North Bosnia could do nothing, that they were too weak to join the Herzegovinian example, and that they had no arms and no Montenegro to help them."

On the same day the two ladies met one Dr. Berlic, a Croatian lawyer. "He had come that morning from Sisseg, and he told us that, at a short distance from Gradishka, on the Turkish bank of the Save, he had seen from the deck of the steamer women and children hiding in the bushes at the water's edge, and peasants running to and fro with hoes and spades in their hands. Certainly the rising had commenced. Vaso Videvic, pale as death, called us down into the cabin, and implored us, with tears, not to go to Serajevo; persisting that it was highly dangerous to attempt the journey, and that the Austrian post-cart would very likely be fired at in the night. We told him encouragingly, it might prove a very good thing for their cause if two English ladies were killed. To which he replied, 'Yes; but not you.' He was quite right in expecting the disturbances would spread eastward towards Brod. Many women and children were killed a few days afterwards at Kotash, near which place three Christians were impaled two months later. A fierce Bey, named Osman Aga, from Dervend, on the post-road to Serajevo, sallied forth and effectively checked for a time the rising in that neighbourhood, by the massacre of many defenceless men, women, and children. Corpses were seen floating down the Save, and were cast on the sand of the island near Brod. The body of a man was brought on shore at Brod, and was found, on examination by the town-doctor, to be terribly burnt across the chest. This poor victim had suffered one of the well-known Turkish tortures, which

\* "Travels in the Slavonic Provinces of Turkey in Europe."

consists of heaping burning coals on the breast. These horrors took place a day or two after we reached Serajevo."

Unfortunately for Turkey, there was nothing new in such crimes as these. The persecution of Christians by the Mussulmans, whether under the sanction of the Turkish government itself, or as a result of local fanaticism, was a well-known fact in Eastern Europe, and amongst those who had a special acquaintance with the internal condition of the empire. Some have asserted that the grievance of the insurgents was not genuine, and that Russian emissaries had stirred up the animosity of the rayahs for their own purposes, and in order to re-open the whole Eastern question. The evidence of this is very meagre; and indeed there is scarcely any direct proof of the accusation. Many travellers in Turkey, who knew the country before and during 1875, have declared that they never heard of the presence of these foreign agitators. Mr. Barkley, in particular, who had employed a large number of labourers in Bosnia for several years before the outbreak, has borne this testimony in a volume which he published after his return to England. He is but one of a number who have witnessed to the same effect from personal experience; whilst hardly one has, of his own knowledge, spoken to the fact of a Russian propaganda. The "Times" newspaper, in its summary of the events of 1875, confirms what seems to be the common sense view of the case; and we may quote its remarks, both under this head and also in regard to the first effects produced by the insurrection on the neighbouring provinces.

The disturbances in Herzegovina and Bosnia, the writer observes, were "caused, not by foreign intrigue but by local grievances. In the early part of the year acts of violence committed against one another by Turks and Montenegrins, on the frontier, excited passing attention. Inquiry into the merits of the dispute, held at Podgoritzza, led to no satisfactory result; but the quarrel had apparently been settled. In the middle of the summer it was announced that an insurrection had commenced in the province

of Herzegovina, which adjoins Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, and, on the west, the Austrian territory of Dalmatia. The provocation to the enemy was given, not by Turkish officials, but by the Mahomedan landowners, who form an oligarchy of about one-third of the population.

. . . The insurgents themselves and their resolute leaders were encouraged by the sympathy of their neighbours on all sides, and by the hopes of foreign intervention in their favour; but after a few weeks it seemed probable that the revolt would end, like many previous enterprises of the kind, in the re-establishment of Turkish authority. Montenegro was restrained from open interference by the commands of Russia, and Prince Milan of Serbia publicly and successfully appealed to the Skuptchina against a Ministry which had attempted to involve the country in a dangerous quarrel. . . Russia has from the first consistently declined to support the cause of the insurgents, and the Russian ambassador at Constantinople has recommended to the Porte extensive concessions to the Christians, which have since been officially announced. The insurgents and their advocates contend that the new regulations will, like many previous reforms, be found inoperative; but Russia still professes confidence in the Porte. Austria has been engaged in incessant negotiations with Russia, with a view to the adoption of a common policy. Germany, which has but a remote interest in the matter, has repeatedly announced a resolution, by following the lead of Russia and Austria, to maintain unbroken the alliance of the three Imperial Courts."

Such was the situation as it appeared to exist at the close of 1875; and subsequent events have shown that the estimate was, on the whole, an accurate one. But, in the meanwhile, a fact of great importance had occurred. Turkey, already a borrower in the money-markets of Europe to a very large amount, found suddenly that its borrowing powers were almost exhausted, and that Europe would no longer furnish it with new loans to pay the interest of the old ones. The creditors of the empire were astounded at



the intimation, contained in a decree of October 6th, 1875, that during the next five years the interest on the national debt would be paid half in cash and half in five per cent. bonds. This decree was passed in consequence of a deficit of five millions sterling in the Turkish budget, coupled with the inability to borrow.

At this time Mahmoud Pasha was the grand vizier, and Midhat Pasha, an enterprising and liberal-minded man, was one of the guiding spirits of the government. Various attempts were made to introduce financial and other reforms; but the accomplishment of these was rendered hopeless from the beginning by the obstinate fanaticism of the Ottoman character. The reforming party were encountered by opposition from all quarters—from the cliques in the seraglio, from the "Old Turkey" party, and from different classes of officials and of the people at large. The nations of Europe began to realise more and more fully the desperate condition of the Turkish empire, which had now added bankruptcy to its other symptoms and causes of decay. Constant remonstrances were made to the Porte, by the English, Russian, and other ambassadors, both on behalf of its Christian subjects and in regard to its breach of financial faith. A great portion of the Turkish loans had been subscribed in England; so that the feeling of irritation and anxiety in this country was naturally very strong. The Turkish bondholders had for some time been receiving an exorbitant interest on their money—amounting, in some instances, to as much as eighteen per cent. They now found the investments woefully reduced in value; for, of course, no confidence could be felt in the payment of even the half of the interest promised, and still less in the redemption of the compulsory interest-bonds.

"Though the collapse had long been foreseen," the "Times" wrote on the last day of 1875, "by competent observers as inevitable, it nevertheless at the moment took capitalists and politicians by surprise. No other occurrence has done so much to create a belief in the early disruption of the Turkish empire, and one im-

mediate result has been the revival of the hopes of the insurgents in Herzegovina. . . . The peace of Europe would be in serious danger if all the Great Powers were not for the time sincerely desirous to avert a crisis of which it would be impossible to foresee the issue. While rumours of Russian projects and of further insurrections in Turkey were producing general disquietude, Englishmen heard with pleased surprise that their government had concluded the purchase, for £4,000,000, of about nine-twentieths of the shares of the Suez Canal. The khedive, who was the owner of the shares, had attempted to sell them to a French financial company, and, on the failure of his negotiation, his offer to transfer them to the English government was immediately accepted. . . . The chief merit of the government is that it has given notice to the world that free passage through Egypt must, at all hazards, be maintained."

The idea that England would sooner or later have to protect her own interests against Russian intrigues, and that Russia would take the weakness of Turkey as a pretext for aggression, soon gained ground in this country; and the Premier (Mr. Disraeli), together with a part, if not the whole of his Cabinet, held the view very strongly. The English government nevertheless agreed to the Andrassy Note, demanding certain internal reforms in Turkey; and this note, drawn up by the Austrian Minister, and backed by Germany and Russia, was nominally accepted in principle by the Turkish government, on the 10th of February, 1876.

In the spring and summer of this year, whilst all Europe was in a state of anxiety, a succession of startling events took place, which at once brought the situation to a climax. The first of these, although it was not generally known throughout Europe for a month or two, was the Bulgarian massacre, in April and May 1876. During the earlier months of this year, a conspiracy had been discovered amongst the Bulgarians, in sympathy with the insurrections of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and with the object of throwing off the Turkish yoke. The Porte



THE SULTAN OF TURKEY  
ABDUL HAMED II





determined to stamp out this rising before it could attain formidable proportions; and this it did, chiefly by means of the Bashi-Bazouks, so effectually and cruelly that the whole of Europe was horrified. It has been alleged that General Ignatieff, the Russian ambassador at the Porte, advised the use of the mercenary hordes of Bashi-Bazouks, well knowing that the result was likely to serve the purpose of his government. The accusation has never been proved; and, moreover, it is notorious that Turkey has employed these savage irregulars in all parts of the empire, and as a matter of course.

In the following chapter we will consider the events which led up to, and succeeded the Bulgarian massacre, up to the time when the outbreak of the Servian war made it evident that the whole question would have to be decided by the sword.

## CHAPTER VI.

### BULGARIA.

MR. E. A. FREEMAN, in his interesting volume on the "Ottoman Power in Europe," sketches for us the early history of the inhabitants of Bulgaria; and his remarks may enable us to take a more definite view of their present position and prospects in Europe.

"So much," he says, "has been lately heard of the Bulgarians, as being in our times the special victims of the Turk, that some people may find it strange to learn who the original Bulgarians were. They were a people more or less nearly akin to the Turks, and they came into Europe as barbarian conquerors, who were as much dreaded by the nations of South-eastern Europe as the Turks themselves were afterwards. The old Bulgarians were a Turanian people, who settled in a large part of the south-eastern peninsula, in lands which had been already occupied by slaves. They came in as barbarian conquer-

ors; but, exactly as happened to so many conquerors in Western Europe, they were presently assimilated by their Slavonic subjects and neighbours. They learned the Slavonic speech; they gradually lost all traces of their foreign origin. Those whom we now call Bulgarians are a Slavonic people speaking a Slavonic tongue, and they have nothing Turanian about them except the name, which they borrowed from their Turanian masters. Their case has been not unlike that of the settlements of the Franks in Gaul, or of the Normans in England. When we call their land Bulgaria, and its people Bulgarians, it is almost as if our own land were called Normandy, and ourselves Normans. It is in some points as when the land and people of Gaul came to be called France and French from their Frankish conquerors. The Bulgarians entered the empire in the seventh century, and embraced Christianity in the ninth. They rose to great power in the south-eastern lands, and played a great part in their history. But all their later history, from a comparatively short time after the first Bulgarian conquest, has been that of a Slavonic, and not that of a Turanian people. The history of the Bulgarians therefore shows that it is quite possible, if circumstances are favourable, for a Turanian people to settle among the Aryans of Europe, and to be thoroughly assimilated by the Aryan nation among whom they settled. . .

"The other case of earlier Turanian settlement, that of the Magyars or Hungarians, shows that Turanian settlers can, even when they are not assimilated, sit down in Europe and become a European nation. The Magyars, who, two hundred years ago, were among the subjects and victims of the Turks, have lately taken to profess great friendship for the Turks on the ground of common origin. This is certainly carrying the doctrine of race very far indeed. But there is just this much of truth in it, that the Turanian Magyars came into Europe, like the Bulgarians, as a race of Turanian conquerors. They came in the last years of the ninth century. For a while they were the terror of East and West. But in the West they simply ravaged;



in the East they sat down as a distinct nation. And to this day they still keep marked traces of their foreign origin, while the original Bulgarians lost all traces of theirs in about two hundred years. The Magyars still remain a distinct nation, speaking their own Turanian tongue. In the kingdom of Hungary, to which they have given their name, they still abide as in some sort a ruling race among its Slavonic inhabitants, though they certainly do not hold them in the same kind of bondage in which the Turks hold their subject nations. We therefore cannot say that the Magyars have been assimilated, like the old Bulgarians; but we may fairly say that they have been incorporated among the nations of Europe. For, not very long after their settlement, they adopted the religion and the general civilisation of Europe, and they have ever since been reckoned as a European nation. It has been a point of great importance in the history of Eastern Europe that the Magyars, though geographically they belong rather to Eastern than to Western Europe, got their Christianity and civilisation from the West, and not from the East. But our present point is, that though they kept their own tongue and remained a distinct nation, they did adopt the religion and civilisation of Europe in some shape. Thus, though their history has not been the same as the history of the Bulgarians, it has been very different from the history of the Turks. And it should always be remembered that both Bulgarians and Magyars have been among the nations whom the Turks have overcome and borne rule over. Their original kindred with the Turks has not enabled them, any more than any of the other nations whom the Turks overcame, either to assimilate the Turks to themselves, or to be assimilated by them.

"It is therefore most important constantly to bear in mind the history of the Bulgarians and Magyars, and the difference between their case and that of the Turks. Two of the Turanian nations which settled in Europe have become more or less thoroughly European. The third

has not become European at all. This shows that even difference of origin, though very important, is not of itself enough to account for the fact that the Turks, though they have been so long settled in Europe, have never become European. The cause of that fact must be sought in difference of origin, combined with certain other circumstances which have affected the settlement of the Turks, but which did not affect the settlement of the Bulgarians or the Magyars."

The Bulgarians of the present day seem to have lost most of the sterner elements of character which distinguished their ancestors, previous to their conquest by Sultan Amurath in the fourteenth century. They are, on the whole, a quiet and industrious people, devoted to agricultural pursuits—the only manufacture of importance being that of attar of roses, which is carried on in the valleys south of the Balkans. The heavy imposts laid upon them by the Turkish government, the persecutions to which they have been subjected, as Christians, from their armed Mahomedan neighbours, the general insecurity of their lives and property, which has induced many of their most industrious young men to emigrate to freer lands, have combined to render the Bulgarians a timid and spiritless—perhaps also a suspicious and revengeful people. It is probably true enough, as has frequently been stated, that there was, in certain parts of Bulgaria, a good deal of thrift and prosperity at the moment when the "insurrection" of 1876 broke out. Sad, indeed, would the condition of the province have been if it had not contained a few bright spots, in which the smile of fortune relieved the dense gloom which prevailed elsewhere. The reader must judge for himself, in this as in other cases, whether the Christian subjects of Turkey were justified in their attempt to throw off the yoke of their oppressors, and whether the justification of the many was removed by the prosperity of the few.

The massacre in Bulgaria, on which so large a proportion of recent events in the East has un-

questionably turned, came about in the following manner. The insurrections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the impending outbreak of hostilities in Servia and Montenegro, inspired the more energetic and ambitious of the Bulgarians with a desire of freedom from Turkey. The exiles who had left their native land for neighbouring countries, and who had in some instances gained positions of influence and wealth, were especially active in preparing a plan of revolt. At Bucharest there was an organisation formed for this express purpose; and it seems to be fully admitted that emissaries were sent into the province, particularly to the southern portion of it, to Adrianople, Philippopolis, and other large towns, during the winter of 1875 and the spring of 1876. Amongst these emissaries, it is alleged that there were a certain number of Russians; which is by no means improbable. A Panslavic Society, having its headquarters in Moscow, certainly provided men and money in order to promote the insurrection of the Christian subjects of the Porte. Its proceedings were winked at by the officers of the Russian government; but there is no proof whatever that the Russian government itself was directly concerned in sowing the seeds of rebellion.

When the plot was discovered by the Mahomedans of southern Bulgaria, they took alarm. It is scarcely possible to suppose that their terror was very great, or that their panic was very reasonable, when we remember that they were all accustomed to carry arms, whereas the Christians were an unarmed and spiritless mob. There was, perhaps, more of rage than of alarm amongst the Mussulman population; but, however this may be, they sent to Constantinople to demand a supply of troops. The government did not comply with this request, but it ordered the local authorities to take immediate steps to suppress the revolt. This they did by enrolling large bodies of volunteers from the surrounding neighbourhood, and leading them without any loss of time against their Christian fellow-subjects.

It must be observed that the contemplated insurrection in Bulgaria had not actually broken out. It was a movement, as Mr. Dunn impartially observes,\* "stamped with the mark of failure from its commencement. But still it was thought essential by the foreign committee that something should be done. Money was distributed, arms were smuggled into the country and concealed, and preparations were made for a rising which was to take place as soon as the signal should be given from Bucharest. But the young insurgents were rash, and took advantage of an act of oppression on the part of one of the Turkish officials to raise the standard of revolt, and call their fellow-Christians to arms."

This was on the 20th of April, 1876. Just three months later, a mixed Turkish Commission of Ottomans and Christians, sent from Constantinople to inquire into the origin and suppression of the revolt, presented a report on the subject, which Mr. Gladstone, referring to it in his famous pamphlet on "Bulgarian Horrors," describes as "a disgraceful document, confirmatory, in its moral effect, even of the worst part of the charges" against Turkey. "After all that has happened," Mr. Gladstone continues, "it would have been too much to expect a word of penitence or shame, but it does not contain a word of sorrow or compassion. The reporting Commission, which was armed with the powers of the State, wonders that the Bulgarians should have risen against their 'paternal' government; describes them as a peaceable, primitive, and docile people; and then charges them with murdering, burning, impaling, roasting men, women, and children indiscriminately, with the greatest cruelty. One of the most definite statements it contains is this; it cites, as a proof of the 'barbarous devastations' committed by the insurgents, the destruction of—a great bridge over the railway. It is full of laudations of the humanity and consideration of the troops, the commanders, and the Mussulman population. It de-

\* "Rise and Decay of the Rule of Islam."



nounces those who have opened the eyes of Europe to this Turkish *Inferno*, as the 'fantastic story-makers of dismal episodes.' It takes no notice of the attested fact that the bodies of slain women and children lie in multitudes, unburied and exposed; except, indeed, by alleging that at Prestenitza some of the insurgents slew their own women and children. Dated three months after the first outbreak, and full of horrible accusation, it contains, hardly in a single instance, such verifying particulars as would allow of the detection of falsehood by inquiry into the statement. And it winds up with a particular account of a Panslavic pamphlet, printed at Moscow in 1867! Then, by the way of appendix, comes one original document in proof, which contains, in the form of a sort of catechism, the plans and instructions of the great Bulgarian conspiracy. They are signed by twelve names of individuals, without profession or employment specified, who may, for all we know, have been the most insignificant men in the country. The report, however, states that the insurgents had instructions to massacre the Mussulman population. The sole document appended in proof of its charges contains, together with very severe provisions against such as should resist, the following passage: '*Quest. 13. What course is to be pursued with regard to those Turks who submit? Ans. They should be put in charge of our agents, who will convey them to the headquarters of the insurrection. From thence, they will be sent, with their families and with the aged, to the places occupied for refuge by our own families. They are to live there as our brethren. It is part of our duty to take care for their happiness, their life, and their religion; on the same ground as for the life and the honour of our own people.*'"

It cannot, then, be allowed that the Turks had a very strong justification for their fanatical outburst, or that the suppression of the revolt by wholesale slaughter was even palliated by the danger of a successful insurrection. And yet little would have been heard of the blood-thirsty repression if it had not been characterised by

circumstances of brutality which surpass anything of the kind in modern Turkish history. The horrible deeds of the Bashi-Bazouks\* and Circassians, which were continued throughout the month of May, were scarcely heard of in Western Europe until the earlier weeks of June; and then they leaked out through the letters of a "Daily News" correspondent. They were subsequently reported on by Mr. Schuyler, an American consul, and by Mr. Baring on behalf of the English government; and, though Mr. Schuyler's report was most strongly expressed, both concurred in the main points of the story.

We may here quote the salient points in the despatch sent home by Mr. Schuyler.

"The insurrection broke out prematurely in the villages of Clissura, Koprishtitsa, Panagurishta, Novo-Selo, Bellova, and perhaps one or two others. There was great alarm and even a panic at Tatar Bazardjik and Philippopolis; numerous telegrams were sent to the Porte for regular troops, which, after some delay, were refused. The Beys of Philippopolis and Adrianople practically seized on the government, and armed the Mussulman inhabitants of the town and of the country, arms being sent for that purpose from Adrianople and Constantinople. These armed Mussulmans, called irregular troops or Bashi-Bazouks, were then, together with the few regular troops at hand, sent against the Bulgarian villages for the purpose of putting down the insurrection and of disarming the Christian population. . . . It was a *levée en masse* of the Mussulman villages against their Christian neighbours. The insurgents made little or no resistance. In many cases they surrendered their arms upon the first demand. Nearly all the villages which were attacked by the Bashi-Bazouks were burned and pillaged, as were also all those which had been abandoned by the terrified inhabitants. The inhabitants of some villages were massacred after exhibitions of the most ferocious cruelty. . . . These crimes

\* The word means "light heads," and has come to be applied to Turkish irregular troops in general.

were committed by the regular troops as well as by the Bashi-Bazouks. The number of villages burnt in whole or in part, in the districts of Philippopolis, Roptchuk, and Tatar Bazardjik, is at least sixty-five. In these there were destroyed eight thousand one hundred and forty houses, forty churches, and forty-three schools. . . . Particular attention was given by the troops to the churches and schools, which, in some cases, were destroyed with petroleum and gunpowder. The altars were overturned, the pictures painted on the walls scratched and pierced, and the holy places defiled and desecrated. . . . It is very difficult to estimate the number of Bulgarians who were killed during the few days that the disturbances lasted, but I am inclined to put fifteen thousand as the lowest for the districts I have named . . . . These atrocities were clearly unnecessary for the suppression of the insurrection; for it was an insignificant rebellion at the best, and the villagers generally surrendered at the first summons. Nor can they be justified by the state of panic, which was over before the troops set out on the campaign.

"An attempt, however, has been made—and not by Turks alone—to defend and to palliate them on the ground of the previous atrocities which, it is alleged, were committed by the Bulgarians. I have carefully investigated this point, and am unable to find that the Bulgarians committed any outrages or atrocities, or any acts which deserve that name. I have vainly tried to obtain from the Turkish officials a list of such outrages, but have heard nothing but vague statements. I was told by Kiana Pacha that the insurgents killed the wife and daughter of the Mudir of Koprishtitsa; but this Mudir had recently gone there, and had left his wife at Eski Sagra, where she still resides, and he had no daughter. I was also told of the slaughter of the wife of the Mudir of Panagurishta, but at the time mentioned that village had no Mudir. I was referred for information to Hafiz Imri Effendi, a leading Turk of Philippopolis. In a very careful statement made by him, he

sets the number of Mussulmans (including gipsies) killed during the troubles at one hundred and fifty-five, of whom twelve are women and children—the word children being taken to mean any one under twenty years of age. I have been able to obtain proof of the death of only two of these women—at Panagurishta—who certainly were not intentionally killed. No Turkish women or children were killed in cold blood; no Mussulmans were tortured; no purely Turkish village was attacked or burned; no Mussulman house was pillaged; no mosque was desecrated or destroyed. The report of the Special Turkish Commissioner, Edib Effendi, contains statements on this point, as on every other, which are utterly unfounded in fact, and the whole report may be characterised as a tissue of falsehoods."

To this extract from Mr. Schuyler's summary we may add the bulk of the most striking and painful letter of the "Daily News" correspondence from Bulgaria. It will serve to epitomise the whole dreadful massacre; and though it is somewhat long, its importance demands that it should find a place in our pages.

The letter describes a visit to the town of Batak.

"As we approached, our attention was directed to some dogs on a slope overlooking the town. We turned aside from the road, and, passing over the *débris* of two or three walls, and through several gardens, urged our horses up the ascent towards the dogs. They barked at us in an angry manner, and then ran off into the adjoining fields. I observed nothing peculiar as we mounted, until my horse stumbled, when, looking down, I perceived he had stepped on a human skull, partly hidden among the grass. It was quite dry and hard, and might, to all appearance, have been there for two or three years, so well had the dogs done their work. A few steps further there was another, and beside it part of a skeleton, likewise white and dry. As we ascended, bones, skeletons, and skulls, became more frequent, but they had not been picked so clean, for there were fragments of half-dry, half-putrid



flesh still clinging to them. At last we came to a kind of little plateau, or shelf, on the hillside, where the ground was nearly level, with the exception of a little indentation, where the head of a hollow broke through. We rode towards this, with the intention of crossing it, but all suddenly drew rein with an exclamation of horror, for right before us, almost beneath our horses' feet, was a sight that made us shudder. It was a heap of skulls, intermingled with bones from all parts of the human body; skeletons, nearly entire, rotting; clothing, human hair, and putrid flesh, lying there in one foul heap, around which the grass was growing most luxuriantly. It emitted a sickening odour, like that of a dead horse, and it was here the dogs had been seeking a hasty repast when our untimely approach interrupted them.

"In the midst of this heap I could distinguish one slight skeleton form still enclosed in a chemise, the skull wrapped about with a coloured handkerchief, and the bony ankles encased in the embroidered footless stockings worn by the Bulgarian girls. We looked about us. The ground was strewed with bones in every direction, where the dogs had carried them off to gnaw them at their leisure. At the distance of a hundred yards beneath us lay the town.

"There was not a roof left, not a whole wall standing; all was a mass of ruins, from which arose, as we listened, a low plaintive wail, like the 'keening' of the Irish over their dead, that filled the little valley and gave it voice. We had the explanation of this curious sound when we afterwards descended into the village. We looked again at the heap of skulls and skeletons before us, and we observed that they were all small, and that the articles of clothing, intermingled with them and lying about, were all parts of women's apparel. These, then, were all women and girls. From my saddle I counted about a hundred skulls, not including those that were hidden beneath the others in the ghastly heap, nor those that were scattered far and wide through the fields. The skulls were nearly all separated from the rest of the bones; the skele-

tons were nearly all headless. These women had all been beheaded. We descended into the town. Within the shattered walls of the first house we came to was a woman sitting on a heap of rubbish, rocking herself to and fro, wailing a kind of monotonous chant, half sung, half sobbed, that was not without a wild, discordant melody. In her lap she held a babe, and another child sat beside her, patiently and silently, and looking at us as we passed with wondering eyes. She paid no attention to us; but we bent our ear to hear what she was saying, and our interpreter said it was as follows:—'My home, my home, my poor home, my sweet home; my husband, my husband, my poor husband, my dear husband; my home, my sweet home,' and so on, repeating the same words over and over again a thousand times. In the next house were two engaged in the same way; one old, the other young, repeating words nearly identical: 'I had a home, and now I have none; I had a husband, and now I am a widow; I had a son, and now I have none; I had five children, and now I have one,' while rocking themselves to and fro, beating their heads and wringing their hands. These were women who had escaped from the massacre, and had only just returned for the first time, having taken advantage of our visit, or that of Mr. Baring, to do so. They might have returned long ago, but their terror was so great that they had not dared, without the presence and protection of a foreigner, and now they would go on for hours in this way, 'keening' this kind of funeral dirge over their ruined homes. This was the explanation of the curious sounds we had heard when up on the hill. As we advanced there were more and more; some sitting on the heaps of stones that covered the floors of their houses; others walking up and down before their doors, wringing their hands and repeating the same despairing wail. There were few tears in this universal mourning. It was dry, hard, and despairing. The fountain of tears had been dried up weeks before, but the tide of sorrow and misery was as great as ever, and had to find vent without their

aid. As we proceeded, most of them fell into line behind us, and they finally formed a procession of four or five hundred people, mostly women and children, who followed us about wherever we went with their mournful cries. Such a sound as their united voices sent up to heaven I hope never to hear again.

"It may be well, before going further, to say something about Batak, so that the reader may form a better idea of what took place here. It was a place of nine hundred houses, and about eight thousand or nine thousand inhabitants. As there are no census statistics, nor, indeed, trustworthy statistics of any other kind in Turkey, it is impossible to tell exactly what the population of any place is or was. But the ordinary rule of calculating five persons to the house will not hold good in Bulgaria. The Bulgarians, like the Russian peasantry, adhere to the old patriarchal method, and fathers and married sons, with their children and children's children, live under the same roof until the grandfather dies. As each son in his turn gets married, a new room is added to the old building, until, with the new generation, there will often be twenty or thirty people living under the same roof, all paying obedience and respect to the head of the family. In estimating the population, therefore, by the number of houses, somewhere between eight and ten souls must be counted as the average. Edib Effendi, in his report, states that there were only about one thousand four hundred inhabitants in the village, all told. A more impudent falsehood was never uttered, even by a Turk. Mr. Schuyler has obtained their tax-list for this year, and finds that there were one thousand four hundred and twenty-one able-bodied men assessed to pay the military exemption tax. This number, in any European country, would indicate a population of about fifteen thousand, but here it would not give more than eight thousand to ten thousand souls, all told, and this is the figure at which the population of the place is estimated by the inhabitants, as well as by the people of Pestera.

"I think people in England and Europe generally have a very imperfect idea of what these Bulgarians are. I have always heard them spoken of as mere savages, who were in reality not much more civilised than the American Indians; and I confess that I myself was not far from entertaining the same opinion not very long ago. I was astonished, as I believe most of my readers will be, to learn that there is scarcely a Bulgarian village without its school; that these schools are, where they have not been burnt by the Turks, in a very flourishing condition; that they are supported by a voluntary tax levied by the Bulgarians on themselves, not only without being forced to do it by the government, but in spite of all sorts of obstacles thrown in their way by the perversity of the Turkish authorities; that the instruction given in these schools is gratuitous, and that all profit alike by it, poor as well as rich; that there is scarcely a Bulgarian child that cannot read and write; and, finally, that the per centage of people who can read and write is as great in Bulgaria as in England and France. Do the people who speak of the Bulgarians as savages happen to be aware of these facts? Again, I had thought that the burning of a Bulgarian village meant the burning of a few mud huts that were in reality of little value, and that could be easily rebuilt. I was very much astonished to find that the majority of these villages are in reality well-built towns, with solid stone houses, and that there are in all of them a comparatively large number of people who have attained to something like comfort, and that some of the villages might stand a not very unfavourable comparison with an English or French village. The truth is that these Bulgarians, instead of the savages we have taken them for, are in reality a hard-working, industrious, honest, civilised, and peaceful people. Now, as regards the insurrection, there was a weak attempt at an insurrection in three or four villages, but none whatever in Batak, and it does not appear that a single Turk was killed here.

"The Turkish authorities do not even pretend



that there was any Turk killed here, or that the inhabitants offered any resistance whatever. When Achmet-Agha, who commanded the massacre, came with the Bashi-Bazouks and demanded the surrender of their arms, they at first refused, but offered to deliver them to the regular troops, or to the Kaimakam at Tatar Bazardjik. This, however, Achmet-Agha refused to allow, and insisted upon their arms being delivered to him and his Bashi-Bazouks. After considerable hesitation and parleying, this was done. It must not be supposed that these were arms that the inhabitants had especially prepared for an insurrection. They were simply the arms that everybody, Christians and Turks alike, carried and wore openly, as is the custom here. What followed the delivery of the arms will best be understood by the continuation of the recital of what we saw yesterday. At the point where we descended into the principal street of the place, the people who had gathered around us pointed to a heap of ashes by the roadside, among which could be distinguished a great number of calcined bones. Here a heap of dead bodies had been burnt, and it would seem that the Turks had been making some futile and misdirected endeavours at cremation.

"A little further on we came to an object that filled us with pity and horror. It was the skeleton of a young girl not more than fifteen, lying by the roadside, and partly covered with the debris of a fallen wall. It was still clothed in a chemise; the ankles were enclosed in footless stockings; but the little feet, from which the shoes had been taken, were naked, and, owing to the fact that the flesh had dried instead of decomposing, were nearly perfect. There was a large gash in the skull, to which a mass of rich brown hair nearly a yard long still clung, trailing in the dust. It is to be remarked that all the skeletons of women found here were dressed in a chemise only, and this poor child had evidently been stripped to her chemise, partly in the search for money and jewels, partly out of mere brutality, then outraged, and afterwards killed. We have talked with many women who had passed

through all parts of the ordeal but the last, and the procedure seems to have been as follows:— They would seize a woman, strip her carefully to her chemise, laying aside articles of clothing that were valuable, with any ornaments and jewels she might have about her. Then as many of them as cared would violate her, and the last man would kill her or not as the humour took him.

"At the next house a man stopped us to show where a blind little brother had been burnt alive, and the spot where he had found his calcined bones, and the rough, hard-visaged man sat down and sobbed like a child. The foolish fellow did not seem to understand that the poor blind boy was better off now, and that he ought really to have thanked the Turks instead of crying about it.

"On the other side of the way were the skeletons of two children lying side by side, partly covered with stones, and with frightful sabre-cuts in their little skulls. The great number of children killed in these massacres, is something enormous. They were frequently spitted on bayonets, and we have several stories from eye-witnesses who saw little babes carried about the streets, both here and at Otluk-kui, on the point of the bayonets. The reason is simple. When a Mahomedan has killed a certain number of infidels he is sure of Paradise, no matter what his sins may be. Mahomet probably intended that only armed men should count; but the ordinary Mussulman takes the precept in broader acceptation, and counts women and children as well. Here in Batak the Bashi-Bazouks, in order to swell the count ripped open pregnant women, and killed the unborn infants. As we approached the centre of the town, bones, skeletons, and skulls, became more numerous. There was not a house beneath the ruins of which we did not perceive human remains, and the street besides was strewn with them. Before many of the doorways women were walking up and down wailing their funeral chant. One of them caught me by the arm and led me inside of the walls, and there in one corner, half covered with stones and mortar, were the remains

of another young girl, with her long hair flowing wildly about among the stones and dust. And the mother fairly shrieked with agony, and beat her head madly against the wall. I could only turn round and walk out sick at heart, leaving her alone with her skeleton. A few steps further on sat a woman on a door step, rocking herself to and fro, and uttering moans most heart-rending beyond anything I could have imagined. Her head was buried in her hands, while her fingers were unconsciously twisting and tearing her hair as she gazed into her lap, where lay three little skulls, with the hair still clinging to them. How did the mother come to be saved, while the children were slaughtered? Who knows? Perhaps she was away from the village when the massacre occurred. Perhaps she had escaped with a babe in her arms, leaving these to be saved by the father; or perhaps, most fearful, most pitiful of all, she had been so terror-stricken that she had adandoned the three poor little ones to their fate, and saved her own life by flight. If this be so, no wonder she is tearing her hair in that terribly unconscious way as she gazes at the three little heads lying in her lap.

"And now we begin to approach the church and the school-house. The ground is covered here with skeletons, to which are clinging articles of clothing and bits of putrid flesh; the air is heavy with a faint sickening odour that grows stronger as we advance. It is beginning to be horrible. The school is on one side of the road, the church on the other. The school-house, to judge by the walls, that are in part standing, was a fine large building, capable of accommodating from two to three hundred children. Beneath the stones and rubbish that cover the floor to the height of several feet, are the bones and ashes of two hundred women and children burnt alive between those four walls. Just beside the school-house is a broad shallow pit. Here were buried a hundred bodies two weeks after the massacre. But the dogs uncovered them in part. The water flowed in, and now it lies there a horrid cesspool, with human remains floating about or lying half exposed in the mud.

Near by, on the banks of the little stream that runs through the village, is a saw-mill. The wheel-pit beneath is full of dead bodies floating in the water. The banks of this stream were at one time literally covered with corpses of men and women, young girls and children, that lay there festering in the sun, and eaten by dogs. But the pitiful sky rained down a torrent upon them, and the little stream swelled and rose up and carried the bodies away, and strewed them far down its grassy banks, through its narrow gorges and dark defiles beneath the thick underbrush and the shady woods as far as Pestera, and even Tatar Bazardjik, forty miles distant. We entered the churchyard, but the odour here became so bad that it was almost impossible to proceed. We took a handful of tobacco, and held it to our noses while we continued our investigations.

"The church was not a very large one, and it was surrounded by a low stone wall, enclosing a small churchyard about fifty yards wide by seventy-five long. At first we perceive nothing in particular, and the stench is so great that we scarcely care to look about us, but we see that the place is heaped up with stones and rubbish to the height of five or six feet above the level of the street; and, upon inspection, we discover that what appeared to be a mass of stones and rubbish is, in reality, an immense heap of human bodies, covered over with a thin layer of stones. The whole of the little churchyard is heaped up with them to the depth of about three or four feet, and it is from here that the fearful odour comes. Some weeks after the massacre, orders were sent to bury the dead. But the stench at that time had become so deadly that it was impossible to execute the order, or even to continue in the neighbourhood of the village. The men sent to perform the work contented themselves with burying a few bodies, throwing a little earth over others; and here, in the little churchyard, they had tried to cover this immense heap of festering humanity by throwing in stones and rubbish over the walls, without daring to enter. They had only partially succeeded. The dogs had



been at work there since, and now could be seen projecting from this monster grave, heads, arms, legs, feet and hands, in horrid confusion. We were told that there were three thousand people lying in this little churchyard alone, and we could well believe it. It was a fearful sight—a spectacle to haunt one through life. There were little curly heads there in that festering mass, crushed down by heavy stones; little feet not as long as your finger on which the flesh was dried hard, by the ardent heat, before it had time to decompose; little baby hands stretched out as if for help; babes that had died wondering at the bright gleam of sabres and the red hands of the fierce-eyed men who wielded them; children who had died shrieking with fright and terror; young women who had died weeping and sobbing and begging for mercy; mothers who had died trying to shield their little ones with their own weak bodies, all lying there together, festering in one horrid mass. They are all silent enough now. There are no more tears nor cries, no weeping, no shrieks of terror, nor prayers for mercy. The harvests are rotting in the fields, and the reapers are rotting here in the churchyard.

“We looked into the church which had been blackened by the burning of the woodwork, but not destroyed, nor even much injured. It was a low building with a low roof, supported by heavy irregular arches, that, as we looked in, seemed scarcely high enough for a tall man to stand under. What we saw there was too frightful for more than a hasty glance. An immense number of bodies had been partly burnt there, and the charred and blackened remains, that seemed to fill it half way up to the low dark arches and make them lower and darker still, were lying in a state of putrefaction too frightful to look upon. I had never imagined anything so horrible. We all turned away sick and faint, and staggered out of the fearful pest-house glad to get into the street again. We walked about the place and saw the same things repeated over and over a hundred times. Skeletons of men, with the clothing and flesh still hanging to them, and rotting together; skulls of women, with the hair

dragging in the dust; bones of children and of infants everywhere. Here they show us a house where twenty people were burned alive; there another where a dozen girls had taken refuge, and been slaughtered to the last one, as their bones amply testified. Everywhere horrors upon horrors.

“There were no dogs in the place, as they had all been driven away when the inhabitants began to return, and only hung around the outskirts of the village; but I saw one or two cats, fat and sleek, that sat complacently upon the walls and watched us with sleepy eyes. It may be asked why the people who are in the village now do not bury these skeletons and these bones, instead of allowing them to be gnawed by the dogs and cats. Some of those who have been able to identify the bones of friends have made weak attempts at burying them. But they have no spades to dig graves with, and they are weak and starving. Besides, many of the survivors are women, who have made fruitless efforts to keep the bodies of loved ones covered with a little earth. We had ample proof that wherever bones could be identified, they were tenderly cared for. We saw many well-kept graves decorated with flowers. We saw others that had been uncovered by the rain or the dogs, leaving parts of the skeleton exposed, that were still decorated with flowers. We even saw skulls lying on the ground, within a doorway or a garden wall, with a bouquet of flowers lying upon them, as though some one was caring for them, and was yet loth to bury them away out of sight. I saw one half-buried, with the face upward, and its hollow eyes gazing reproachfully up at the sunny sky, with a bouquet carefully placed in its mouth; but most of these skeletons and bones have nobody to look after them. Of the eight or nine thousand people who made up the population of the place, there are only twelve or fifteen hundred left, and they have neither tools to dig graves with, nor strength to use spades if they had them. But why have the Turkish authorities not buried them out of sight? The Turkish authorities will tell you

that they have buried them, and that there were very few to bury.

"Of all the cruel, brutal, ferocious things the Turks ever did, the massacre of Batak is among the worst! Of all the mad, foolish things they ever did, leaving these bodies to lie here rotting for three months unburied is probably the maddest and most foolish! But this village was in an isolated, out-of-the-way place, difficult of access; and they never thought Europeans would go poking their noses here, so they cynically said, 'These Christians are not even worth burial; let the dogs eat them.'

"We talked to many of the people, but we had not the heart to listen to many of their stories in detail, and we restricted ourselves to simply asking them the number lost in each family. No other method would probably give a better idea of the fearful character of the massacre, and the way in which whole families were swept out of existence. 'How many were in your family?' we would ask. 'Ten,' the answer would be, perhaps. 'How many remain?' 'Two.' 'How many in yours?' 'Eight.' 'How many remain?' 'Three.' 'How many in yours?' 'Fifteen.' 'How many remain?' 'Five.' And so on in families numbering from five to twenty, in which only remained from one to five persons. One old woman came to us, wringing her hands, and crying in that hard, tearless manner of which I have already spoken, and when we could get her sufficiently calmed to tell us her story, she said she had three tall handsome sons, Ghiorghy, Ivantchu, and Stoyan, and they were all married to good and dutiful wives, Reika, Stoyanka, and Anka, and they had between them twelve beautiful children, Angel and Tragan, and Ghiorghy and Ivantchu, Letko, Assen, Boydan, Stoyan, Tonka, Gingka, Marika, and Reika, so that the family counted, all told, nineteen persons living under the same roof. Of all this large flourishing family, the tall handsome sons, the dutiful wives, and the twelve beautiful children, there remained only this poor old grandmother. They were all brutally slaughtered to the last one. Of this flourishing family-

tree there remained only this lifeless withered trunk, and the poor old woman sat down and beat her head, and fairly screamed out her despair. There was an old man who told us of his uncle, Blagoi Christostoff, a venerable patriarch of the grand old type. He had five sons married, who had among them twenty-seven children, thus making a family that, with the wives, counted up a sum total of thirty-nine persons living under the same roof. Of this enormous family there are only eight left. . . .

"The people who committed this wholesale slaughter were not Circassians, as has been supposed, but the Turks of the neighbouring villages, headed by the Achmet Agha already spoken of. The village of Batak was comparatively rich and prosperous; it had excited the envy and jealousy of its Turkish neighbours, and the opportunities of plunder offered a temptation to the Turks, which, combined with their religious fanaticism, and the pretext of an insurrection in another part of the country, was more than they could resist. The man, Achmet Agha, who commanded the slaughter, has not been punished, and will not be, but, on the contrary, he has been promoted to the rank of Yus-bashi, and decorated.

"We are told that any number of children and young girls had been carried off; and that it was known in what Turkish villages they were kept, and that the Turks simply refused to restore them to their parents. Mr. Schuyler afterwards obtained a list, with the names and ages of eighty-seven girls and boys that had been carried off, with the name of the village in which each was kept.

"As to the present condition of the people who are here, it is simply fearful to think of. The Turkish authorities have built a few wooden sheds in the outskirts of the village in which they sleep, but they have nothing to live upon but what they can beg or borrow from their neighbours. And in addition to this, the Turkish authorities, with that cool cynicism and utter disregard of European demands for which they are so distinguished, have ordered these people to pay their regular taxes and war contributions



just as though nothing had happened. Ask the Porte about this at Constantinople, and it will be denied, with the most plausible protestations and the most reassuring promises that everything that is possible will be done to help the sufferers. But everywhere the people of the burnt villages come to Mr. Schuyler with the same story—that unless they pay their taxes and war contributions, they are threatened with expulsion from the nooks and corners of the crumbling walls where they have found a temporary shelter. It is simply impossible for them to pay, and what will be the result of these demands it is not easy to foretell. But the government needs money badly, and must have it. Each village must make up its ordinary quota of taxes, and the living must pay for the dead.

“We asked about the skulls and bones we had seen up on the hill upon first arriving in the village where the dogs had barked at us. These, we were told, were the bones of about two hundred young girls, who had first been captured and particularly reserved for a worse fate than death. They had been kept to the last; they had been in the hands of their captors for several days—for the burning and the pillaging had not all been accomplished in a single day—and during this time they had suffered all it was possible that poor, weak, trembling girls could suffer at the hands of brutal savages. Then, when the town had been pillaged and burnt, when all their friends had been slaughtered, these poor young things, whose very wrongs should have ensured them safety, whose very outrages should have ensured them protection, were taken, in the broad light of day, beneath the smiling canopy of heaven, coolly beheaded, then thrown in a heap there, and left to rot.”

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## CHAPTER VII.

### ENGLISH POLICY.

THE effect produced by these horrors upon the

various countries of Europe was immense. In England especially a storm at once arose; but public opinion was divided in a very remarkable manner, as has already been partly indicated in the introduction to this work. There were many amongst us who considered that England, by the protection which she had frequently given to Turkey, and above all by the Crimean War, had made herself in some degree responsible for the conduct of the corrupt nation, condemned by all the rest of Europe. This would doubtless have been the opinion of the vast majority, and would have influenced our conduct far more than it has done, if it had not been counteracted by the strong feeling of jealousy and animosity entertained by many Englishmen against Russia, and by their conviction that Russia would turn this crime of Turkey to her own advantage.

For the moment, however, strong indignation was uppermost, and the autumn of 1876 witnessed an outbreak of popular feeling against the Turkish government which materially affected the policy of the Cabinet. Mr. Gladstone, the Liberal ex-Premier, made himself conspicuous in directing and emphasizing this agitation. In September he published a pamphlet under the title of “Bulgarian Horrors, and the Question of the East,” in which he sketches the rise and progress of the feeling excited by the occurrences in Turkey. We could not have from any authority a better account of what took place on the subject during the last weeks of the session.

Mr. Gladstone writes: “On the 26th of June the Duke of Argyll, in the House of Lords, and Mr. Forster, in the House of Commons, made anxious inquiries respecting the statements contained in a communication from the correspondent of the ‘Daily News,’ which had been published in the paper of the 23rd, following a more general statement on the 10th. In order not to load these pages too heavily, as well as on other grounds, I shall cite or describe, in referring to these proceedings, chiefly the replies of the head of the government. In answer, then, to Mr. Forster, Mr. Disraeli said, ‘We have no information in our possession which justifies the state-

ments to which the Right Hon. gentleman refers.' The disturbances appear to have been begun 'by strangers, burning the villages without reference to religion or race.' A war was carried on between 'Bashi-Bazouks and Circassians,' on one side, and 'the invaders' on the other, and no doubt 'with great atrocity,' much to be deplored. Since that time, measures had been adopted to stop these 'Bashi-Bazouks and Circassians.' 'I will merely repeat,' he concluded, 'that the information *which we have at various times received* does not justify the statements made in the journal named.' I must add Lord Derby's concluding sentence: '*As the noble Duke has thought the evidence in this matter sufficient to justify him in bringing the subject before the House, I will make further inquiry, and communicate the result to your Lordships.*' There were reasons enough why others, besides the Duke of Argyll, should have thought the evidence sufficient to require some notice. For, in the statement of the 'Daily News,' there were contained these ominous words (June 16th):—'Even now it is openly asserted by the Turks, that England has determined to help the government to put down the various insurrections. England,' says a Turkish journal, 'will defend us against Russia, while we look after our rebels.'

"So much for the first attempt to throw light into these dark places. On the 8th of July, the 'Daily News' inserted a second communication from its correspondent at Constantinople, confirming and extending the purport of the first. On the 10th, Mr. Forster renewed his inquiries. Mr. Disraeli stated, that there had not yet been time to receive any reply to the inquiries made. And this, though the telegraph passes in a few hours, and the statement in question had appeared on the 23rd of June. Even now the only efficient instrument was not put in action, nor did this happen until July 14th; and within five days after that date, a British agent was on his way to the bloody scene. It is absolutely necessary that her Majesty's government should explain why the telegraph had not at once been employed on the 26th or 27th of June. But

other parts of the First Minister's reply require notice. He hoped, 'for the sake of human nature itself,' that the statements were scarcely warranted. There had without doubt been atrocities in Bulgaria. This was a war, 'not carried on by regular troops, in this case not even by irregular troops, but by a sort of *posse comitatús* of an armed population.' 'I doubt whether torture. . . . has been practised on a great scale among an historical people, who seldom have, I believe, resorted to torture, but generally terminate their connection with culprits in a more expeditious manner (laughter).' Every effort had been made, and would continue to be made, 'to soften and mitigate as much as possible the terrible scenes that are now inevitably occurring.' Atrocities, he believed, were 'inevitable, when wars are carried on in certain countries *and between certain races.*'

"Down to this what we have to observe is—first, the deplorable inefficiency of the arrangements of the government for receiving information; secondly, the yet more deplorable tardiness of the means adopted, under Parliamentary pressure, for enlarging their store of knowledge; thirdly, the effect of the answers of the Prime Minister, from which it could not but be collected, by Parliament and the public, (a) that the responsibility lay in the first instance with certain 'invaders of Bulgaria;' (b) that the deplorable atrocities which had occurred were fairly divided, and were such as were incidental to wars 'between certain races.' What could and did this mean, but between Circassians on the one side, and Bulgarians on the other? It now appears that the Circassians had but a very small share in the matter; (c) while the Bulgarians were thus loaded with an even share of responsibility for the 'atrocities,' we were given to understand that the Turkish government, and its authorised agents, appeared to be no parties to them; (d) the 'scenes,' that is, as is now demonstrated, the wholesale murders, rapes, tortures, burnings, and the whole devilish enginery of crime, 'were to be mitigated and softened as much as possible.'



"I am concerned to subjoin the following declarations stated to have been made by Lord Derby to a deputation on the 14th of July:— 'He did not in the least doubt that there had been many acts of cruelty, and of wanton cruelty, committed by the irregular troops of both sides. . . . It was not a case of lambs and wolves, but of some savage races, fighting in a peculiarly savage manner.' This declaration is a gross wrong inadvertently done to the people of Bulgaria; and it ought to be withdrawn.

"Again, on the 17th of July, Mr. Baxter revived the interrogatories. By this time, as we have seen, the government had used the telegraph, and they had ordered, on the 15th, a real and special inquiry from Constantinople. The subject could no longer be entirely trifled with. The Prime Minister made a lengthened statement, which occupies two columns of the 'Times.' The main portion of it was extracted from official reports, which are now before the world; and which did not, in the smallest degree, sustain either the doctrine of a fair division of the blame of inevitable atrocities, or an acquittal of the Turkish government. But the Minister added matter of his own. What wonder was it, as to the Circassians, that 'when their villages were burned and their farms ravaged,' 'they should take matters into their own hands, and endeavour to defend themselves?' 'Scenes had occurred towards the end of May, and so on,' 'from which with our feelings'—what fine feelings we have!—'we naturally recoil.' 'We were constantly communicating,' 'I will not say remonstrating, with the Turkish Government,' for '*the Turkish Government was most anxious to be guided by the advice of the British Ambassador.*' And still, the guilt was to stand as a fairly divided guilt. 'There is no doubt that acts on both sides, as necessarily would be the case under such circumstances, were equally terrible and atrocious.' . . .

"When, on the 7th of August, the question of cruelties in Bulgaria was yet again raised, a member, and not a young member, 'deprecated party speeches against the Turkish government.' . . . Five attempts had thus been made to

penetrate what was still a mystery in the official mind. A sixth and seventh still followed, on the 9th and 11th of August. With true British determination, Mr. Ashley opened the question for discussion on the 11th. He was ably supported; and this time, it is pleasant to say, from both sides of the House there might be heard the language of humanity, of justice, and of wisdom. It was in the dying throes of the session. Mr. Ashley's action was especially judicious, because he had a right, which none could contest, to appear as a representative of Lord Palmerston. The powerful speech of Sir W. Harcourt was denounced by the Prime Minister in terms of great vivacity. He was assured that, 'from the very commencement of the transactions,' the government 'were constantly receiving' from the ambassador information on 'what was occurring in Bulgaria.' The Minister selected particular statements for contradiction of details, on which I am not yet sufficiently informed to pronounce; but what I complain of is, that he still, on the 12th of August, effectually disguised the main issue, which lay in the question, whether the Turkish government, which was receiving from us both moral and virtually material support, had or had not, by its agents, and by its approval and reward of its agents, been deeply guilty of excesses than which none more abominable have disgraced the history of the world. For the government, it was still merely a question of 'civil war,' 'carried on under conditions of brutality unfortunately not unprecedented in that country,' namely, Bulgaria. A repetition of language, which is either that of ignorance, or of brutal calumny upon a people whom Turkish authorities have themselves just described as industrious, primitive, and docile. Such then, are the steps taken by her Majesty's government during the session with respect to the Bulgarian atrocities."

We have quoted Mr. Gladstone's remarks principally in order to illustrate the depth of English feeling in the Autumn of 1876, and the warmth of the language commonly employed, especially amongst the Liberal party leaders,

and at public meetings in which Liberals were most conspicuous. It has been asserted that a party cry was made of the Bulgarian atrocities, and that the indignation of this country was fostered and intensified by a desire to cripple the Conservative administration. The acts of each generation must be judged by the generations which follow; and when the lapse of time has brought calmness to the assistance of our judgment, we shall be better able to decide as to the value and worthiness of the instincts which prompted the agitation.

The chief demand made by the public meetings, and by that portion of the press which regarded the matter from a point of view similar to that of Mr. Gladstone, was that England should never again enter into alliance with Turkey, and never take a single step for the purpose of perpetuating her power and that Turkey should be clearly given to understand this. It was impossible to doubt the strength and conclusiveness of the decision thus arrived at, which has gathered force from that time to the present. The majority of the country appears to have fully made up its mind not to do battle again for the integrity and the independence of Turkey. The expressions of public opinion in 1876, and again in January, 1878, may be interpreted to mean something of this kind: "We readily admit that our national interests are open to the attack of Russia, and that it may hereafter be necessary for us to resist her aggressions. But we will not do this again in the same fashion as we did it in 1854. If we must fight Russia we will not fight her on Turkish ground, nor accept the aid of Turkish troops."

There will, doubtless, be some who will consider this renunciation unreasonable. It may be Quixotic; but it is manifestly based on generous impulses.

The principal complaints urged against the Administration were these:—That the Premier and some of his colleagues made too light of the Bulgarian atrocities, omitting for a long time to inquire into them with sufficient zeal, and failing to speak boldly on the subject to the Porte;

that the Cabinet refused to agree to the Berlin Memorandum; that they despatched the fleet to Besika Bay, under circumstances pretty sure to be misunderstood; that they maintained Sir Henry Elliot as our ambassador at Constantinople, though he had displayed partiality for Turkey at the very moment when strict impartiality (to say the least) was necessary; and that they persisted in using suspicious, and even hostile language towards Russia, calculated to bring about the very end which the public opinion of the country had most emphatically protested against.

It is clear that these points cannot be fully discussed in our present narrative without entering more deeply into questions of party politics than would be desirable, in a work which professes to be no more than a bare record of facts. The conduct of Sir Henry Elliot, and the manner in which his embassy at the Porte ultimately terminated, hardly come within the scope of the present work.

The despatch of the fleet to Besika Bay was virtually the act of Sir Henry Elliot himself, who, "observing," as Mr. Gladstone has put it, "a great Mahomedan excitement, and an extensive purchase of arms in Constantinople, wisely telegraphed to the British Admiral in the Mediterranean, expressing a desire that he would bring his squadron to Besika Bay. The purpose was, for the protection of British subjects, and of the Christians in general.\* This judicious act, done by the ambassador in conjunction with the ambassadors of other Powers, who seem to have taken similar steps, was communicated by him to Lord Derby on the 9th of May, by letter and by telegraph."

A feeling had for some time been prevalent amongst the most patriotic, and at the same time

\* The summoning of the vessels took place on the 9th of May; and the fear of Mahomedan outbreaks was justified by a riot which had occurred, four days previously, at Salonica, in which the French and German consuls had been killed. Disturbances of a more or less alarming character were, moreover, constantly taking place in the Turkish capital.



most bigoted Mahomedans, that Russia exercised too much influence in the Turkish Cabinet, and that, while granting reforms to the Christians, home reforms were overlooked. This feeling of dissatisfaction culminated in an outbreak of the Softas, the legal students of the universities, on the 12th of May, which resulted in the deposition of the Grand Vizier Mahmoud Pasha, and the breaking up of the Cabinet. Mehemet Ruchdi was made Grand Vizier, and Midhat Pasha became the ruling spirit in the Cabinet. The Sultan Abdul Aziz, however, refused to agree to any of the reforms proposed by the new government; and before the end of May, a meeting of Ministers was held, at which his deposition was agreed upon. His nephew, Mehemet Murad Effendi, son of Abdul Medjid, was chosen to succeed him under the title of Murad V., his qualification for the post being weakness of body and of mind, amounting almost to imbecility, and an utter ignorance of public affairs.

On the 30th of May Abdul Aziz was informed of his deposition, and forced to quit his palace. Resistance would have been vain, for the conspirators had taken the precaution to surround the palace with troops. The ex-sultan was conveyed to the Old Palace, near the Seraglio Point, and from thence, by his own request, to the Palace of Cheragan, on the other side of the Golden Horn. Four days afterwards, Abdul Aziz was found lying dead in his apartment, the arteries of the arms being severed with a pair of scissors. Numerous physicians were at once called in, who unanimously expressed their opinion that the wounds were self-inflicted.

Before the excitement consequent upon these events had well subsided, Constantinople was aroused to a state of horror and indignation by the assassination, on the 15th of June, of four of the Ministers by a Circassian officer, who, in a state of mad excitement, rushed into the room in the palace of Midhat Pasha, where a Cabinet council had been held, and made a murderous attack upon them, one after the other. No one seems to have had either the courage or the power to master the assassin, the greater number of the

Ministers beating a precipitate retreat, and leaving the wounded ones to the mercy of the madman, for such undoubtedly he was. The police and soldiers having at length been summoned, the assassin, after a furious resistance, was captured. He was tried and sentenced to death on the next day, and executed on the day following.

In the meantime the Berlin Memorandum had been agreed upon by the Chancellors of Germany, Russia, and Austria; and on the 13th of May it was submitted to the representatives of England, France, and Italy, with a view of securing the assent of the three Western Powers.

The main points of this Memorandum were as follow :\*—"To insist on a suspension of arms for two months, and, when it was obtained, to make pressure both on the insurgents and on the Porte, in order to secure a durable pacification, based on the fulfilment of the obligations which the latter Power had contracted towards Europe. Certain points were suggested to form a basis for the negotiations between the insurgents and the Porte, which would be opened as soon as the armistice had been obtained—the principal one being, that materials to rebuild the destroyed houses and churches should be supplied to the returning refugees, together with sufficient food to support life until they were again in a position to maintain themselves. This and other proposals were not made definitively, but merely 'to serve as starting-points for a discussion.' The conclusion of the Memorandum is worth *verbatim* citation.

"If, with the friendly and cordial support of the Great Powers, and by the help of an armistice, an arrangement could be concluded on these bases, and be set in train immediately by the return of the refugees and the election of the Mixed Commission, a considerable step would be made towards pacification. If, however, the armistice were to expire without the efforts of

\*We quote from a tract of Mr. Sedley Taylor's: "The Conduct of Her Majesty's Ministers on the Eastern Question."

the Powers being successful in attaining the end they have in view, the three Imperial Courts are of opinion that it would become necessary to supplement their diplomatic action by the sanction of an agreement with a view to such efficacious measures as might be demanded in the interest of general peace, to check the evil and prevent its development.'

"By May 15th, the French and Italian governments had already notified, by telegraph, their adhesion to the proposals of the Northern Powers.

"On May 19th, Lord Derby wrote a despatch to our ambassador at Berlin, announcing the definitive refusal of the British Cabinet to co-operate in the policy recommended to them by the three Powers. In Lord Derby's view, it was by no means clear that a two months' armistice would tend to expedite a permanent pacification, nor that Turkey had it in its power to provide the funds requisite for rebuilding the destroyed houses and churches of the insurgents, and for temporarily supplying their necessities. Further, that the concluding intimation of the Memorandum would render any negotiations almost certainly abortive.

"It was plainly this last consideration which proved decisive with our government. The concluding words of the Memorandum showed that the Powers who had agreed to it actually contemplated, in the last resort, laying coercive hands on the sacred and inviolable Turk himself. Nothing, not even the request of the sultan's government—so Lord Derby himself wrote—should move the English Cabinet to commit itself to so compromising a document.

"The decision of our government called forth the most earnest remonstrances from the other Powers. The Foreign Minister of Italy 'regretted' it, as he 'considered that united action between all the Powers was the surest means of securing the maintenance of peace, and that, in associating themselves with the policy of the three Imperial Cabinets in the present instance, the Western Powers would be in a better position to exercise an influence over subsequent pro-

ceedings, should the measures now proposed fail to realise the hoped for pacification. These were the motives which had determined the Italian government to support the new proposals.'

"Prince Bismarck 'admitted that the several articles of the Memorandum were open to discussion, and might be modified according to circumstances, and that he, for one, would willingly entertain any improvement her Majesty's government might have to propose, but he greatly regretted that her Majesty's government had not felt able to give a general support to the principle of the plan submitted to them by the Northern Powers, and agreed to by France and Italy, and had felt obliged to withdraw from the cordial understanding so happily established between the six Great Powers in regard to the pacification of the Herzegovina. He hoped, however, that the attitude assumed by her Majesty's government would remain a benevolent one in regard to the action of the five Great Powers at Constantinople; and he felt convinced that her Majesty's government would do nothing that could encourage the resistance of the Turkish government to their combined efforts.'

"In this latter conviction, Prince Bismarck was unfortunately over sanguine; for Lord Derby had already, on May 16th (*i.e.*, three days *before* he notified to the German government his refusal to co-operate with them), 'given the Turkish ambassador to understand that it was unlikely that her Majesty's government would join in pressing the adoption of the (Berlin) proposals on the Porte.'

"The Foreign Minister of France expressed to our representative at Paris his 'surprise and regret' at the line taken by the English Cabinet. 'The Duc Decazes,' writes Mr. Adams, 'spoke to me at length, and in peculiarly earnest language, of the result which he dreaded if, by the non-consent of all the Powers, an armistice became impossible, and thus the present struggle were to be kept up . . . . He implored her Majesty's government to reconsider their decision; he trusted that they would at least con-



sent to recommend an armistice, however short, in order that an attempt might be made to find some ground for the establishment of a common concert between the six Powers; and he declared that, for his part, he could not but consider that, if England stood aloof at this momentous crisis, it would be a public calamity for Europe.'

"Prince Gortchakoff 'deeply regretted' the resolution taken by the London Cabinet of refusing its co-operation,' and wished to express the desire felt by the emperor, his master, 'to see a great Power like England occupy a place befitting it in the concert of the Great Powers.'

"Count Andrassy offered to delay the presentation to the Porte of the Berlin proposals, 'in the hope that her Majesty's government might still be induced' to give their co-operation.

"Thus, every one of the five Powers had urged England not to be the means of breaking up the European concert, but our Cabinet remained inaccessible to all remonstrances, and persisted in its policy of isolation. The Berlin proposal fell through, the Memorandum was never presented, and on the first of July the Prince of Servia, despairing of any amelioration through the action of the Great Powers, issued a proclamation of war against Turkey.

"The Berlin Memorandum was rejected by England towards the end of May. The result of that rejection was—not to mention the blood shed in the Servian campaign and in the latter portion of the Bulgarian massacre—that we found ourselves at this moment not one step further advanced than, had the Memorandum been accepted, we might perfectly well have been by the end of July. This was the result of sacrificing the European concert to the principle of non-intervention.

"The conduct of the government at this crisis would undoubtedly present itself in a much less unfavourable light if it appeared that, although unable to accept the Berlin proposals, they had themselves advanced an alternative scheme of their own, and submitted it to the other Powers. Now, this is exactly what the Prime Minister as-

serts that they did. In his speech at Aylesbury in September, after mentioning the view expressed by Mr. Gladstone and others that, as England had refused the propositions of the other Powers, the English government were bound to propose some on their own part, Lord Beaconsfield spoke thus—

"'Well, we did propose some on our own part. My noble friend, Lord Derby . . . . . lost no time in laying down the principles upon which he thought that the tranquillity of the east of Europe might be secured. That is to say, he laid down the principles upon which he thought that the relations between the Porte and its Christian subjects ought to be established. These communications were occurring constantly, I may say, between her Majesty's government and the five other Powers. . . . From the moment that we declined, and gave our reasons why we declined, entering into the Berlin Memorandum, there were on the whole, on the part of every one of the Great Powers, cordial attempts to act with us in every way which would bring about a satisfactory termination; but by no Power have we been met so cordially as by Russia. If you ask me to sum up in two sentences what was, of course, daily and hourly communication between the Powers or their representatives in England, I must tell you this, that, in the late spring of this year, peace, and peace on principles which would have been approved by every wise and good man, might have been accomplished. What happened? That happened which was not expected. Servia declared war upon Turkey.'"

In our next chapter we will briefly trace the outlines of the short, but very important, Servian war.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### THE SERVIAN WAR.

It was on the 1st of July, 1876, that Servia declared war against Turkey; and Montenegro did the same thing on the following day.

For some time previously Prince Milan and his Ministers—prominent amongst whom was M. Risties, the President of the Council—had been preparing the way for such action; and there can be no doubt that the political ambition of the Principality had as much to do with the step as any other consideration. To say that Risties followed, at a humble distance, the example set by Cavour in Sardinia—to say that, fired by the hope of independence, if not of expanding the Principality into a powerful kingdom of Serbia, the prince and his advisers endeavoured to make the most of the national sympathy with Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria—is only to say that they acted on the dictates of ordinary patriotism, and did what their sense of duty prompted them to do in the circumstances. The Servians are of the same blood with most of their neighbours, and it was impossible that they should not heartily sympathise with them in their struggle. It was barely fifteen years since Serbia had herself engaged in a conflict with the Ottoman Power, and her quarrel with Turkey was of the same kind, though not of such an aggravated character, as that which was now raging on her borders. She came forward at this juncture, not only, as she professed, in the light of a champion of the Slavs in general, but also in the hope of achieving the national independence for which she had often previously fought.

Undoubtedly the Principality received assistance from Russia in this campaign; not from the Russian government, but from the Panslavist associations in Russia, having their headquarters at Moscow. The army of Prince Milan itself was insignificant, numbering only eight or ten thousand, in addition to a number of raw recruits. It could not hope to offer any effective resistance to the large forces of the sultan, and if it had not been for the Russian volunteers, with Tcherniaeff and other Russian officers at their head, it would have made an insignificant display in the field, even if it had ventured to take the field at all.

Tcherniaeff was a retired general of the Rus-

sian army, forty-eight years of age, a Pole by birth, who, ten years before he took service under Prince Milan, had been recalled from Central Asia in consequence of a defeat in Khokand. He had, however, gained distinction in the Crimean War and in the Caucasus, and enjoyed a fair representation for courage and ability. He certainly made as much as there was to be made out of the rough materials at his command, and for a long time held a large army at bay with his handful of badly disciplined troops. The number of Russians with Tcherniaeff has been greatly exaggerated, different accounts bringing them up to a dozen, and even twenty thousand. The truth is, probably, as stated by M. Aksakoff, the Vice-President of the Slavonic Committee of Moscow, in an address delivered by him in that city towards the close of the year 1876, giving an account of the committee's operations in supplying men and money to Serbia.

M. Aksakoff, speaking of the exaggerations which had been circulated concerning the total sum of money entrusted to the Slavonic Committee, declares that "the rumours of these millions have as much truth as those concerning the numbers of volunteers, of whom it is said we sent twenty thousand, when in fact only a fifth part of that number—perhaps less—were sent. The truth is, at Moscow and St. Petersburg we received a little more than a million and a half of roubles. It must be borne in mind that we had to give help to Herzegovina, Montenegro, Bosnia, Bulgaria, and Serbia."

The encouragement of Serbia by the Russians led to various remonstrances with the czar by the other European Powers; in particular, by England and France. In reply the czar declared that the recent events in Bulgaria had so greatly excited the indignation of his people against the Turks that he was "unable to restrain them." Prince Milan had also received similar remonstrances, but although he had disclaimed all intention of attacking Turkey, his warlike preparations were continued, and fresh supplies of Russian volunteers were continually added to his army.



On the 3rd of July the Servian army, with Tcherniaeff at its head, commenced hostilities; and the battle of Zaitchar took place, in which the Turks were successful. It was in this battle that the first Russian volunteer, Colonel Kiréef, lost his life; and the news of this disaster instantly stimulated the enlistment of his countrymen in the cause of Servia. We take the following account of the gallant colonel's death from the narrative of Mr. Salusbury, a young and enthusiastic Englishman, who was an eye-witness to many of the occurrences of this short and one-sided campaign.\*

"Nicholas Kiréef was a man of noble birth, and in his youth had served as page of honour to the Empress of Russia. When the Servian war broke out, he was appointed, by one of the Slavonic societies, chief of an ambulance; but his heart yearned for more active service than that to be obtained with the doctors, and he accepted the command of a brigade, composed of five battalions of infantry, and a small force of cavalry and artillery. These men he led into battle against the Turks on the day that was to prove so fatal to him, and so unsuccessful to the Servian arms. But a short distance had been traversed by the brigade, when Kiréef received a slight wound from a ball in the left arm. He paid no attention to this, and directly afterwards received a second wound in the neck; this also he disregarded, and continued to advance and encourage his men to do likewise, when a third bullet shattered his right hand, and compelled him to drop his sabre; but 'Forward' was still his cry, until, at length, a fourth ball penetrated his lungs, and he fell from the saddle. With a terrible effort he cried in dying gasps, '*En avant, en avant!*' Two soldiers raised him from the ground, and, according to his wish, carried him at the head of the column. But no chance of escaping from the terrible carnage with life was to be given him, for a fifth bullet struck the glorious hero in the chest, and, passing through it, put an end to the beatings of the noblest heart

that ever throbbed. Their leader's death threw the soldiers into hopeless confusion; they paused a moment, then turned and fled; but, to the credit of the two militiamen who were carrying the lifeless clay of their commander, they did not relinquish their burden, but attempted to bear it away. This, however, the Turks were determined to prevent, and they poured a storm of bullets on these two poor men who were endeavouring so bravely to perform an act of mercy. Both fell pierced by bullets, and I regret exceedingly that I know not the names of those brave Servians. The Turks seized Kiréef's body and sent it to Widdin, where they mutilated and exhibited it; and to the application of the fallen hero's friends for leave to convey the remains to Russia, Osman Pasha, to his eternal disgrace, gave a flat refusal. . . . . Letters of condolence from Tcherniaeff, and from Prince Milan, were written to the Russian papers, and to the relatives of the deceased, and funeral services in his honour were celebrated in various parts of Russia. Some verses, commemorating his death, were printed, and, with his portrait, were largely circulated."

The Servians contested a battle with the Turks at Yavor, on the southern frontier, three days after the battle of Zaitchar, in which also they had the worst of it; and before the end of the month Prince Milan expressed to the consuls of the Powers in Belgrade his willingness to suspend hostilities, and to submit his quarrel to Europe. The suggestion came to nothing, and desultory fighting continued until the Turks entered Servian territory early in August, compelling the troops of the prince to fall back upon Gurgosovatz. The Turkish commander, Abdul Kerim Pasha, gradually drove his enemy up the valley of the Morava, towards Alexinatz, where Tcherniaeff made a stand. But it was in vain that the Russian volunteers performed prodigies of valour, and in vain that the general strove to elicit the fighting qualities of the raw Servian troops. The Ottoman army gained more than one victory on the Morava, and it became mani-

\* "Two Months with Tcherniaeff in Servia," p. 194.

fest that the Principality was utterly unable to withstand the invader.

We need not dwell at any great length upon the circumstances of the Servian campaign, the importance whereof has been so thoroughly eclipsed by the events of the following year. Towards the end of August Prince Milan's government again invited the mediation of the Powers; and England proposed to both sides an armistice of one month. This the Porte declined; but it offered Serbia the following humiliating terms of peace:—That Prince Milan should do homage to the sultan in Constantinople; that four Servian fortresses should be garrisoned with Turkish troops, and that others should be dismantled; that the Principality should pay an indemnity, or an increased tribute; and that the Porte should be at liberty to construct and work a railway through Servia. The Powers would not sanction these terms, and suggested a return to the *status quo ante bellum*.

Meanwhile, on the last day of August, Sultan Murad had been deposed, professedly on account of his "bad health," which some interpreted as signifying insanity, whilst others declared it to be the result of debauchery. He was succeeded by his brother, Abdul Hamid; and partly, perhaps, for this reason, the Turks agreed to a suspension of hostilities from the 17th to the 25th of September. During the interval, Tcherniaeff conceived the mad idea of proclaiming Prince Milan as King of Servia, at his head-quarters at Deligrad; notwithstanding which Turkey consented to renew the suspension till the 2nd of October.

The prince's army plucked up courage, and refused to suspend hostilities for a short period. The cost of supporting the army in the field, and the immense pressure of the war in other respects, made Servia anxious to conclude it as honourably as might be; and thus hostilities broke out again in the month of October. A week's hard fighting at tremendous odds, in which the Servian levies made but feeble show of prowess, although their artillery distinguished itself by its efficiency and intrepidity, sufficed to

prove once more that Tcherniaeff could not resist the Turkish battalions.

Mr. Salusbury, who has already been quoted, affords some spirited notes of these last efforts of the Servians. He was attached to the Staff of General Dochtouroff, under the command of Tcherniaeff, with whom he saw a good deal of fighting, although the general scope of the engagements appears, as a rule, to have escaped him.

The Turks held Zaitchar with a considerable force, and it was determined to attempt a movement against them at this point. Colonel Medvidovski, a young officer, was watching the town with a brigade of Servians, and Tcherniaeff, fearing lest his impetuosity should lead him into a hasty attack, sent Dochtouroff to assist him with his advice. Zaitchar was reached by a difficult and perilous mountain route. This was on the 17th of October. On the previous day Count Keller had "gained a decided victory over a superior force of the enemy, had captured the guns, and driven the Turks from their positions, which he had afterwards occupied. A more spirited, or, for the Servians, a more successful affair, had not taken place during the whole war; and it reflected the greatest possible credit and honour on the skill and gallantry of that young officer."

Of the engagement on the 18th Mr. Salusbury gives a brief description. The disposition of the troops was entrusted to a Prussian officer, chief of the Staff to Medvidovski; Zaitchar being the centre of operations. "Count Keller, marching south-east, was to descend from his mountainous position into the valley of the Black Timok, join our column, and with us operate in the direction of Zaitchar. If Keller clearly understood this plan, then his tactics in the early morning displayed great skill, as by attacking they must have been designed to divert the attention of the Turks from the real point of attack. . . Our column, under the direction of Colonel Medvidovski, who had the command, for the day, of all the troops, formed the left centre. Herzberg and his men were to work



up the Paracin (Zaitchar) road, and constituted the right centre. The right flank consisted of troops from Knijazevac; they were to advance from that place and attack Zaitchar on the south. On the north side of Zaitchar a brigade, under Ostoich, was to operate against the Turkish position, Velki Izvor; and on Ostoich's right was a contingent from Negotin, which nearly touched, with their right, Keller's left. Thus something more than a semicircle had been drawn round Zaitchar. . . The number of men on our side was under fifteen thousand; but of these not more than a half were engaged during the day. The enemy had, as it turned out afterwards, more than sixteen thousand engaged. The Turks had thrown up earthworks, and erected batteries at about three miles from Zaitchar, covering the front of the town in the shape of a bow. A great number of our men had nothing but muzzle-loading rifles and smooth-bores; our field-guns were not much better than our small-arms, and could not carry two-thirds the range of the Krupp gun of the enemy, who also possessed the deadly breech-loading Snider rifle."

The action was commenced by Hezberg's guns, which were quickly responded to by the Turks. The Servian artillery seems to have been excellently handled; but so also was that of the enemy; whilst the Turkish infantry undoubtedly behaved better than their opponents in the day's encounters. Ostoich's men fought with great bravery; but Keller does not seem to have come up when expected. As for Gen. Dochtoureff's reserves, Mr. Salusbury tells us that, when the general gave them the order to advance, "up they jumped, without waiting for any second order, and ran with great speed, firing off their guns and cheering loudly. There was only one fault to be found with them, and that was, that they unfortunately ran and fired in the wrong direction! In vain Dochtoureff shouted, in vain he swore, for they only ran the faster. I asked him to allow me to try and compel them, with the aid of my sword and revolver, to halt, front, and charge the enemy. 'No, no,' said he; 'they

are not worth wasting powder on. Nothing can stop them, and the day is lost.'"

It may have been want of discipline rather than cowardice; but at all events there was proof positive that the Servians could not face the Turks. There were many of them who had never been in action during the day, and who refused to advance when ordered. Mr. Salusbury is of opinion that, with a couple of thousand Russians, Zaitchar might have been recaptured.

On the 19th, 20th, and 21st, Tcherniaeff made his last gallant attempt at Djunis, in the neighbourhood of Deligrad. Once again the Turks were successful; and this decided the fate of the campaign. "Of the three thousand Russians who had joined the Servian army two months back, not more than seven hundred remained wholly untouched at the end of the fighting. How many the Turks lost, I am unable to say, but their losses in the three days' battle must have been terrible, as they were the attacking party, and had stormed positions in many cases almost impregnable. Krupp guns, Snider rifles, and better-trained troops, in far superior numbers, had done their work, and Servia was beaten. General Tcherniaeff has been blamed at home and abroad for his reckless tactics; but it would be impossible to find another man who could have done better under the circumstances. He was brave, kind-hearted, and a tactician far above the average. Of course, he made mistakes; but they were of such a nature that, if he had not made them, he would have laid himself open to charges of having made much greater ones by having left untried other plans which, in their turn, might have resulted in failures. In the case of extending his lines too far, of course, people blamed him; but it should be borne in mind that if he had not done so, the Turks could have outflanked him, and taken him in the rear, which would have been a far greater mistake than the one he is accused of—of having chanced too much. And then it must not be forgotten that he always expected reinforcements, which never came. And, again, it is to be noted, that he had to operate with eighty thousand of not the very best

troops in a country that required, to command success, two hundred thousand well trained and thoroughly-disciplined soldiers."

When it was perceived that Serbia was utterly unable to cope with the Turks, the Russian government, intervening on her behalf, demanded an armistice of six weeks. The Porte hastened to suggest a term of six months, which would have carried her over the winter; but Russia insisted upon the shorter term, and sent a virtual *ultimatum* to Constantinople, which secured her object.

Meanwhile the government of the czar had proposed to England and Austria that coercive measures should be taken to put an end to Turkish misrule, as well as to the wars which she was carrying on with her subjects. The form which the proposal took was this: That Russia should occupy Bulgaria; that Austria should send a force into Bosnia, and that the combined fleets should enter the Bosphorus; though the Russian government was prepared to be satisfied with the last stipulation only. To this scheme our government did not see its way to assent. It became evident to Europe at large that mutual confidence and harmony between England and Russia were impossible. The English government could not believe in the sincerity of Russia. It has suspected, at every stage of the crisis, that the czar and his ministers were intriguing to promote their own interests and to injure the interests of England; and experience had given us too much reason to doubt the disinterestedness of our old enemy.

On the 2nd of November, the czar, who was then staying at Livadia, held a conversation with Lord Augustus Loftus, in which "he pledged his sacred word and honour, in the most earnest and solemn manner, that he had no intention of acquiring Constantinople, and that, if necessity should oblige him to occupy a portion of Bulgaria, it would only be provisionally, and until the peace and safety of the Christian population could be secured." He requested our ambassador that his words might be repeated to the people of England, from whose minds he desired to remove

the prejudice which he knew existed against him. Lord A. Loftus telegraphed these assurances of the czar to Lord Derby, who replied that the Cabinet had received the assurances of the czar with much satisfaction. The conversation at Livadia was not, however, made public in England for three weeks after it had been held. On the 9th of November, at the usual inauguration banquet of the Lord Mayor, the Earl of Beaconsfield\* made a somewhat aggressive speech against Russia, not mentioning the czar's assurances, and hinting that, for certain objects, England would be prepared to fight more than one campaign.

The czar, speaking on the following day at Moscow, after expressing a hope that the Conference which had been suggested might result in a peaceable settlement of all disputes, added these significant words: "Should this, however, not be achieved, and should I see that we cannot obtain such guarantees as are necessary for carrying out what we have a right to demand of the Porte, I am firmly determined to act independently, and I am convinced that in this case the whole of Russia will respond to my summons should I consider it necessary, and should the honour of Russia require it."

It was England who had proposed that a Conference should assemble at Constantinople. The Great Powers were represented by their ambassadors at the Porte, and also by special commissioners, Lord Salisbury acting in the latter capacity for England. On his way to Constantinople his lordship visited Berlin, Vienna, Paris, and Rome, in order to elicit the opinions of the several Courts on the Eastern question in general. Amongst the instructions which were given

\* Mr. Disraeli received his coronet (assuming the title which had previously been bestowed upon his wife) in August, 1876, immediately before the prorogation of Parliament. During the session of that year, he had been instrumental in causing the queen to assume the title of Empress of India. There can be no doubt that, in India itself, this assumption had a good effect; and it was regarded by many as a timely assertion of the national determination to maintain our supremacy in Southern Asia at all costs, and against all comers. But public opinion in England showed that the imperial title was rather distasteful than otherwise in this country.



to our Commissioner before leaving England, he was enjoined to urge that the Porte should undertake, in a protocol to be signed at Constantinople with the representatives of the mediating Powers, to grant to Bosnia and Herzegovina a system of local or administrative autonomy; by which is to be understood a system of local institutions which shall give the population some control over their own local affairs, and guarantees against the exercise of arbitrary authority. There is to be no question of a tributary state. Guarantees of a similar kind to be also provided against maladministration in Bulgaria."

The Marquis of Salisbury found, on his diplomatic tour through Europe, that England could not expect any sympathy or moral support from the Continental Powers in any step calculated to bolster up the Turkish dominion. At Berlin he was assured by the Emperor, that "the course taken by the Emperor Alexander had been imposed upon him by circumstances," and that "the promises of the Porte could no longer be accepted." At Rome, the Italian Minister told him that "the action of the Powers ought not to be derived from, or limited by the Treaty of Paris, but that their functions were rather those of mediators, deriving their title solely from the events of the war, and the acceptance of the Conference by the Porte." Again, M. Melegari said—"The Powers should not be limited in seeking for solutions to the questions which will be submitted to the Conference by the obligations of the Treaty of Paris, and he cannot admit that the Porte is free to refuse the decisions which the Conference may adopt." The assurances of the Duke Decazes, and of Count Andrassy, were of a similar character; and it became apparent that England had not the slightest reason to expect an ally in the course which her government seemed disposed to adopt.

The Conference met in December, 1876, and proved to be entirely futile. The nine representatives of the six Great Powers\* held a series of

preliminary meetings in Constantinople before the full deliberations began, at which the proposals intended to be made to the Porte were discussed. The initial meeting of the plenary Conference was held on the 21st, amidst salvoes of artillery in the Turkish capital, which were fired, not in honour of the Powers, but to celebrate a new constitution, accorded by the Turkish government to the nation, and evidently intended to convey the meaning that the sultan and his ministers were capable of instituting their own reforms, without foreign advice or control. This constitution was the work of Midhat Pasha, who was made grand vizier at the same time. It soon became evident that the Turkish representatives had been directed not to submit to any foreign pressure whatever. The representatives of the six Powers began with moderation, and grew more and more moderate at each adjourned meeting; General Ignatieff especially astonishing his colleagues by the readiness with which he abated his demands. But the Turks displayed the most infatuated obstinacy, and refused even milder terms than those which had been accepted in the Andrassy Note. When this was pointed out to the delegates, Safvet Pasha actually asserted that he had never so much as read the Andrassy Note!

There seems to be little room for doubt that Turkey refused every kind of compromise because she perceived that the Powers were not at one, and that they would never unite to coerce her. The sultan and his ministers believed from the beginning that England would eventually fight for them against her old enemy, Russia; and to this belief they clung throughout the ensuing campaign. On the 18th of January the Conference broke up—Lord Salisbury having been one of the first to express his unwillingness to make any further concessions.

Meanwhile Russia had begun to assemble an army at Kischineff, on the frontier of Roumania. On the last day of January Prince Gortschakoff

\* Germany was represented by Baron Werther alone; France by Count de Bourgoing and Count de Chaudordy; Italy by Count Corti; Austria by Count Ziehy and Baron Calice; Rus-

sia by General Ignatieff, and England by Lord Salisbury and Sir. H. Elliot. The Porte deputed Edhem Pasha (afterwards grand vizier) and Safvet Pasha.

wrote a circular note to the Powers, asking them what they intended to do in view of the failure of the Conference. The replies to this note were long delayed—the various governments being plainly impressed by the danger of the situation, and hesitating to arrive at a final decision. On the 19th of February the Russian Ambassador in London, Count Schouvaloff, gave Lord Derby to understand that his government would not be satisfied to let the matter drop, and that Russia would act alone if she could not act in concert with the Powers. After another interval, Russia proposed that a Memorandum should be drawn up, and signed by all the Powers, reiterating their demands ; which was agreed to.

The London Protocol, as this declaration was called, announced the intention of the Powers to await the progress of the Turkish reforms ; and it ended by reserving to them the right, in the event of the promises of the Porte coming to nothing, “to consider in common as to the means best fitted to secure the well-being of the Christian population, and the interests of the general peace.” But, whilst agreeing to sign this document, the representatives of three of the Powers added separate declarations of their own, which naturally destroyed the force of the document itself. Lord Derby declared that the Protocol would be null and void for England if it did not result in the immediate disarmament of Russia and Turkey. Count Schouvaloff demanded that the Porte should send a special envoy to St. Petersburg to discuss the demobilisation, and threatened that any renewal of outrages on the Christians would prevent Russia from completing her disarmament ; and Count Menabrea, for Italy, made his adherence conditional upon the entire agreement of all the Powers.

Turkey flatly and instantly refused to concur in this Protocol ; and a fortnight later, on the 24th of April, Russia took the fatal step. A manifesto was issued by the czar to his subjects, which justified the action of the government. The document ran thus—

“Our faithful and beloved subjects know the strong interest which we have constantly felt in

the destinies of the oppressed Christian population of Turkey. Our desire to ameliorate and render their lot secure has been shared by the whole Russian nation, which now shows itself ready to bear fresh sacrifices to alleviate the position of the Christians of the Balkan Peninsula. The blood and the property of our faithful subjects have always been dear to us, and our whole reign attests our constant solicitude to preserve to Russia the benefits of peace. This solicitude never failed to actuate us during the deplorable events which occurred in Herzegovina, Bosnia, and Bulgaria. Our object, before all, was to effect an amelioration in the position of the Christians in the East by means of pacific negotiations, and in concert with the great European Powers, our allies and friends. . . Having exhausted our pacific efforts, we are compelled by the haughty obstinacy of the Porte to proceed to more decisive acts. A feeling of equity, and of our own dignity, enjoins it. By her refusal, Turkey places us under the necessity of having recourse to arms. Profoundly convinced of the justice of our cause, and humbly committing ourselves to the grace and help of the Most High, we make known to our faithful subjects that the moment foreseen, when we pronounced war, and to which all Russia responded with such complete unanimity, has now arrived. We expressed the intention to act independently when we should deem it necessary, and when Russia's honour should demand it.

“In now invoking the blessing of God upon our valiant armies, we give the order to cross the Turkish frontier.”

Prince Gortschakoff at the same time sent a circular to the Powers, announcing the determination of his government ; and to this circular Lord Derby replied, stating that her Majesty's government had received the information with great regret. He pointed out that the Treaty of Paris bound the signatory Powers to respect the independence and integrity of Turkey, and ended by saying that the action of the czar was one which could not meet with the concurrence of the English government.



The circular of the Russian Chancellor, issued during the third week of April to the representatives of the empire at London, Paris, Rome, Vienna, and Berlin, simultaneously with the manifesto of the czar, ran as follows :—

“The Imperial Cabinet has, since the commencement of the Eastern crisis, exhausted all the means in its power in order to bring about, with the co-operation of the Great Powers, a lasting pacification of Turkey. All proposals made successively to the Porte, in consequence of the understanding established between the Cabinets of the Powers, have, however, met with insurmountable resistance from the Porte. The Protocol signed in London on the 19th (31st) March, was the last expression of the united will of Europe. The Imperial Cabinet had, in signing it, offered its hand as its last attempt at conciliation. By a declaration attached to the Protocol, it had from that day marked out the conditions which, if loyally and sincerely accepted and carried out by the Turkish government, were calculated to bring about the re-establishment and strengthening of peace. The Porte has answered it by a fresh refusal. This eventuality was not provided for in the London Protocol. Europe, in framing its wishes and resolutions, had confined itself to stipulating that the Great Powers, if they should see themselves disappointed in their hopes of seeing the Porte carry out with energy the measure for the improvement of the position of the Christian population, and unanimously considered as indispensable for the peace of Europe, reserved to themselves the right to point out in common the means which they should think proper to secure the welfare of the population and the interests of the general peace. Thus the Cabinets had foreseen the contingency that the Porte would not fulfil the promises which it would make, but not that the Porte would reject the demands of Europe. At the same time it has been established by the declaration which Lord Derby made as an addition to the Protocol, that since the government of her Majesty, the Queen of England, had only consented to the signature of the Protocol in view

of the interests of general peace, it was to be understood from the outset that, in the event of this object, namely, the mutual disarmament and peace between Russia and Turkey not being obtained, the Protocol should be regarded as null and void. The rejection of the Protocol by the Porte, and the motives upon which it is based, leave no hope that the Porte will accede to the wishes and councils of Europe, and exclude also every guarantee for the execution of the projected reforms for the improvement of the lot of the Christian population. They also render peace with Montenegro and the execution of the conditions impossible, by which disarmament and pacification could be brought about. Under these circumstances, the success of any attempt at compromise is excluded, and there remains only the alternative, either to allow the state of things to continue, which the Powers have declared incompatible with their interests and those of Europe, or to try, by coercive measures, to obtain that which the unanimous efforts of the Powers did not succeed in obtaining from the Porte by means of an understanding. My exalted master has resolved to undertake that which his Majesty had invited the Great Powers to do in common with him. His Majesty has given his armies the order to cross the frontier of Turkey. You will bring this resolution to the cognisance of the government to which you are accredited. My exalted master, in taking this step, is fulfilling a duty which is imposed upon him by the interests of Russia, whose peaceable development is impeded by the constant troubles in the East. His Majesty has the conviction that he at the same time responds to the views of Europe.

(Signed) “GORTSCHAKOFF.”

The die was now cast. Russia stood in arms on the Turkish frontiers, on the Pruth, and beyond the Caucasus; whilst the Turkish armies awaited the onset. The day of negotiations had passed, and the two empires were at war.

## CHAPTER IX.

## MONTENEGRO.

As soon as the Conference had broken up, the Porte had set itself to the task of making peace with Servia and Montenegro. The Servian campaign of 1876 had ended greatly to the disadvantage of the Servians, though, as we have seen, Tcherniaeff, and the government of Prince Milan, had shown no extraordinary haste to sheathe the sword. They had themselves declined a suspension of hostilities in the beginning of October; and when they were defeated at Djunis, in a very significant manner, the armistice was forced upon them by Russian intervention.

In the spring of 1877 great pressure was brought to bear upon Servia to make her agree to a convention with the Porte. It was represented to her that a renewal of the war would be highly dangerous to the peace of Europe; and she understood that Montenegro would lay down her arms at the same time as herself. It seems probable that Prince Nikita had reasonable cause to complain of the independent action taken by Servia in her negotiations with the Porte; though, as the Montenegrins had gained several successes when the sister Principality had been defeated, it would have been more to the interest of the latter than of the former to make common cause at Constantinople. The Porte itself, however, refused to consider the claims of its vassals in conjunction; and the result was that Servia agreed to the conclusion of a peace.

The representatives of Prince Nikita, on the other hand, demanded a rectification of frontier as the price of peace; and the Turkish government consented to negotiate upon that basis. The claims of the mountaineers were larger than the Porte could bring itself to grant, and, after a few weeks of futile discussion, the Montenegrin delegates withdrew from the capital, and the prince prepared for another campaign. Hos-

tilities were in fact resumed, some time before the declaration of war by Russia.

At this point in our narrative, previously to entering upon the record of the invasion of Turkey by the armies of the czar, it will be well to describe the actual state of the relations between the sultan and the prince of Montenegro, which may be done in half-a-dozen pages.

The mountain district of Montenegro, or Tsernagora, was originally part of the flourishing principality of Zeta in the kingdom of Servia, which, until towards the close of the fifteenth century, comprised also a considerable territory, extending from Lake Scutari on the south to Herzegovina on the north. The Slavonic population of this principality have ever been distinguished as a brave and hardy race, and stand alone in their successful resistance to the encroachments of the Turks. In the year 1484 the situation of the principality became so desperate—the neighbouring districts of Albania and Herzegovina having submitted to the oppressor, and help from Venetia being refused—that the Montenegrins retreated to the mountain fortresses of Tsernagora, with their chief, Ivan Tchernoevitch, who seems to have been a man of extraordinary power and courage. Here, for nearly four hundred years, with almost incredible energy, has this brave little nation successfully maintained the struggle for its freedom. Ivan died in 1490, and was succeeded by his eldest son George, who, in 1492, at the instigation of his wife, took up his residence in Venice. During his absence, Stephen, a younger and still more unworthy son of the great Ivan, with several companions, paid a visit to Constantinople, and proposed to the Sultan Bajazet II. to betray their country to him. The offer was of course joyfully accepted by the Turks, who, however, insisted on the renunciation of their religion by the traitors, and, in a short time, these worthies set out with the Turkish army to accomplish their work. Prince George had, however, returned home by this time, and, calling together his countrymen, prepared for a resistance, and with such good effect that the Turks speedily



retired from the field in utter discomfiture. In 1516 this prince gave up the government of the country, and from that time until the year 1851 the sovereign power was in the hands of the Church, many of whose dignitaries combined in their persons the offices of priests, statesmen, and warriors, while its bishops, under the title of Vladikas, held the reins of government.

These Vladikas ruled, on the whole, wisely and well, and some of their number were really great and noble men. Under them war with the Turk, either aggressive or defensive, was incessantly kept up, and the ancient characteristics of the race sustained. While fighting with the foes without they were continually harassed by traitors and renegades at home, who, animated by the same ignoble spirit as that Stephen Tchernoiévitch, of whom we spoke above, were ever ready to betray their country into the hands of the oppressor, and were repeatedly discovered in acts of disloyalty. On Christmas Eve, 1792, a massacre of the renegades took place, which, for a time at least, very effectually purged the country of those servile spirits.

In 1712 the Montenegrins, under the heroic Vladika Danilo, in answer to the demand of the Turks for tribute money, marched upon the invading army, and surprised the encampment before daybreak on the 29th of July. A slaughter of the Turks ensued, in which their losses were computed at twenty thousand, while of the Montenegrins only three hundred and eighteen men were slain, though the whole number engaged was under twelve thousand.

In the following year a Turkish army, numbering one hundred and twenty thousand, invaded the country. Their commander having enticed some thirty or forty of the chief men of Montenegro into his camp, under pretence of making negotiations, treacherously seized them and put them to death, and then, knowing that the Montenegrins did not number more than ten thousand or twelve thousand, and were now almost without leaders, fell upon the mountaineers and defeated them. The monastery at Cettinge, which Ivan Tchernoiévitch had built, the Turks com-

pletely destroyed; they carried off thousands of women and children into slavery, and burned and sacked all the villages through which they passed. Again, in 1722, a Turkish invasion took place, but, although the Turks were twenty to one of the Montenegrins, they were completely defeated. In the years 1727, 1732, and 1768, they repeated their efforts to subdue this hardy race, but, in each case, they were repulsed with heavy losses. In 1782, the Vladika Peter the First came to the throne. During his reign of nearly fifty years, great changes and improvements took place in the country. He caused a code of excellent laws to be drawn up, appointed a number of judges, and, by the purity and uprightness of his own conduct, exercised a marked influence on the manners and morals of his people. To this day, he is regarded amongst them as a saint. He was succeeded by his nephew, Radatomovo, who was consecrated at St. Petersburg in 1833, being then only twenty years of age. He was a man of high education and talent, and proved himself, in every way, a worthy successor to St. Peter, whose reforms he effectually carried out and enlarged upon. Several remarkable victories were gained by him over the Turks, and some feats of almost incredible daring are recorded as having been performed under him. Of these, the following is mentioned by Mr. Gladstone, in his article on "Montenegro" in the "Nineteenth Century," for May 1877. "Ten men in 1835 seized, by a *coup de main*, the old castle of Zabliak, once the capital of Zeta, held it four days against three thousand Turks, and then only surrendered it by order of the Vladika, who was anxious to avoid a war."

Radatomovo was as remarkable in personal appearance as in mental qualities; he was in fact almost a giant, for his height was nearly six feet eight inches, and he is said to have been both handsome and well proportioned. He died at the early age of thirty-nine. He was the last of the Vladikas, for the young Danilo, who was intended for his successor, having fallen in love with a beautiful girl, and being anxious to avoid the episcopal consecration, with its enforcement

of celibacy, appealed to the Senate, who unanimously decided that he should be appointed to the throne as a prince, and not as a bishop. Danilo proved himself no unworthy successor of the great Vladikas; his reign was distinguished by the completion of the reforms commenced in the times of Peter the Saint and his nephew, and by many acts of wise and prudent statesmanship, while the military reputation of the country was maintained, and indeed increased, by many displays of daring and valour. On his death in August 1860—which was caused by the hand of an assassin, actuated, it is said, by a feeling of private revenge—he was deeply and truly mourned by his people, and is spoken of at the present time with reverence and affection.

From a paper on the early history of Montenegro, contributed by Mr. Gladstone to a monthly magazine,\* to which we are indebted for the foregoing particulars, we will quote the following summary of the achievements of Prince Nikita up to the close of 1876.

“Danilo was succeeded by his nephew Nikita, the present Prince of Montenegro. He had not, at his accession, completed his nineteenth year. It is characteristic of the Principality that his own father Mirko, the victor of Gratoro, contentedly gave way to him. Goptchevitch, the brother of his aunt, Princess Darinka, acquaints us that he set out with two fixed ideas—the first, to prosecute the civilising work among his people; the second, to liberate the sister Serbian lands still in servitude. This writer appears disposed, in regard to the present sovereign, rather to play the part of critic than of eulogist; but ascribes to him great merit in his political conduct, and in the prosecution of social reforms. Soon after his accession, Montenegro was worsted, after a long resistance, in a war with Turkey. She had been driven to her crags when diplomatic mediation brought about a settlement. It was then proved that an empire of thirty-five million *could* gain the advantage against a tribe under two hundred thousand. Only, however, when she could con-

centrate against it all, or nearly all her forces; when she had a general, not a Turk, of the ability of Omar Pasha; when she had reformed her whole armament by means of European loans; and when Montenegro had but her old muskets and her old ways. Since then a great change has taken place. The army has been organised in thirty battalions, eight hundred strong; and now, for the first time, we hear of an endeavour to establish a certain strength of cavalry. The fighting men are reckoned at thirty-five thousand; but the military age commences at twelve. The obligation for offensive service runs only from seventeen; but it appears that the zeal of patriotism carries the people, while yet boys, into the ranks. The force available for general operations, between seventeen and fifty, amounts to twenty-four thousand. The arms have been greatly improved; two-thirds having breech-loaders, all (it is stated) revolvers, and most of them carrying the *handschar*. During the war from July to October, 1876, we heard much of the Turkish victories over a Serbian army composed principally of peasants, put suddenly into the ranks, with a *salting* of real soldiers; but very little, in comparison, of their failures and defeats in the conflict with Montenegro. Goptchevitch has supplied a detailed account of the operations. I shall refer only to the most remarkable. On the 28th of July the men of Tsernagora encountered Muktar Pasha, and for once with superior force. Four thousand Turks were killed, but only seventy men of Montenegro. Osman Pasha was taken; Selim was among the slain. At Medun, on the 14th of August, twenty thousand Turks were defeated by five thousand of these heroic warriors; and four thousand seven hundred slain. On the 6th of September five battalions of Montenegro defeated Dervisch Pasha in his movement of Piperi, and slew three thousand of his men. On the 7th of October Muktar Pasha, with eighteen thousand men, drove three Montenegrin battalions back upon Mirotinsko Dolore. Here they were raised, by a junction with Vukotitch, to a strength of six thousand men. Thus reinforced, they swept down on

\*“The Nineteenth Century,” May, 1877.



Muktar, and after an action of sixteen hours, drove him back to Kloluk, leaving one thousand five hundred dead behind him. On the 10th of October, Dervisch Pasha effected an advance from the south, until he found himself attacked simultaneously at various points, and had to retreat, with a loss of two thousand men. On the 20th of October, Innedun was taken, and the Ottoman general fled to Scutari, leaving garrisons in Spuz and Podgoritza. The armistice arrested this course of disasters, when the southern army (Dervisch) had been reduced from forty-five thousand to twenty-two thousand, and the northern (Muktar) from thirty-five thousand to eighteen thousand."

It is clear that the Montenegrins were in a position to make better terms with the Turks than the Servians were; and, in fact, the Porte admitted in principle the necessity of granting to the mountaineers a certain rectification of frontier. But, when the negotiations began, it was evident that the Turkish idea of a rectification was little else than that they should give a strip of territory in one place and receive an equivalent for it in another. They would grant the mountaineers no definite advantage; and the consequence was, as we have already seen, that Prince Nikita's representatives quitted Constantinople, and the war broke out again.

It was doubtless unwise in the extreme for Turkey thus to keep open the sore, and to throw away what was at least a chance of a general pacification. The course of Russia might have been the same, even if the Porte had made terms with Montenegro; but it is beyond question that the general condemnation of Turkey by the European Powers was strengthened or kept alive by her refusal to satisfy Prince Nikita.

## CHAPTER X.

### THE OUTBREAK OF WAR.

AS soon as the czar's manifesto had been issued, it became evident that events were approaching

which would dwarf into insignificance the history of the petty wars between Turkey and her Christian subjects. Servia had done her best, and had, for the moment, succumbed. Bosnia and Herzegovina maintained their desultory guerilla warfare, and Montenegro had boldly defied the armies of the sultan, which soon began to press her hard. But, on the Roumanian and Transcaucasian frontiers of the Ottoman empire, another, and a more formidable enemy, was now gathering in tremendous force. Muscovite and Moslem were about to renew their ancient struggles; and all who bore in mind the character of the previous wars between these traditionally hostile powers, foresaw that the conflict would be one of the most terrible and stubborn character.

Vast preparations were made on both sides. The Russian army had been partly mobilised for some months past. Towards the end of April it was estimated that the Grand Duke Nicholas,\* Commander-in-Chief of the army of the Danube, had, under his command at Kischineff, on the Russian side of the Roumanian frontier, six army corps, with a reserve of two additional corps at Odessa. The total strength of the six corps was reckoned at two hundred and sixteen thousand men, with about fifty thousand horses and six hundred and forty-eight cannon. Three more corps were already mobilised; so that the Russians who were prepared for active operations, excluding the two corps at Odessa, numbered about three hundred and twenty-four thousand men.

The chief of the Grand Duke's staff was General Nepoikoitschitzky, and next in command was Major-General Levitzky. The commanders of the other corps who chiefly distinguished themselves during the campaign were General Radetzky, of the Eighth Corps, with his chief of the staff, Colonel Dimitrowsky; General Baras Krüdener, of the Ninth Corps; General Prince Schakoffsky, of the Eleventh Corps; and General Vanoffski, of the Twelfth Corps.

\* Brother of the czar. The Grand Duke Michael, another brother, held the chief command of the army of the Caucasus.

The Turkish force gathered together in Bulgaria, south of the Danube, to oppose this vast Russian army, was by no means imposing. A correspondent, writing from Constantinople on the 17th of April, made the following estimate of the Turkish preparations. "The whole force for the defence of the Danube cannot possibly exceed one hundred thousand men, in addition to a force of thirty-four thousand south of the Balkans, between Nisch and Sophia. These troops but a very short time ago were distributed between the various fortresses on the river, half the force stationed in about equal numbers at Silistria and Rustchuk; and the remainder, with the exception of a small reserve force at Shumla, concentrated at Widdin. The Turks have made the mistake, according to the best military authorities on the subject, of attempting too great a line of defence. They will be too weak to offer a successful resistance at any point where the Russians may attempt to cross. The bulk of the Turkish army will be shut up within fortresses which the Russians will only blockade, and not regularly besiege. There will thus be nothing to stop the march of the invaders to the plains south of the Balkans, and it may be to the gates of Constantinople. As far as one can judge, the Turks have an idea of commencing resistance before the Russians shall have reached the Danube, of fighting a battle on Roumanian soil, for it has been given out that the moment the advance guard of the Russians reach the Pruth the Turks will cross over in face of Silistria and intrench themselves at Kalarash; whilst the army at Widdin will also take the offensive. The fortresses on the Danube have been repaired lately, and a few new earthworks erected at Silistria, Widdin, and Rustchuk, as well as at one or two places in the Dobrudscha. Their armament has been changed within the last few months, and most of the batteries on the Danube now mount Krupp guns of considerable calibre. The best chance for the Turks, according to foreign military authorities, would be to let the Russians cross over, while they themselves concentrated

all efforts on the defence of the Balkans; but in their pride the Turks will not believe in the possibility of an enemy ever reaching the passes, and so there is reason to imagine that not so much attention has been given to the gates of the Roumelian plains as, from a Turkish point of view, ought to have been given." The result proved that this forecast was thoroughly justified.

Great things were expected of the Turkish fleet, which was known to be one of the most powerful in Europe; and the Russians certainly anticipated that a formidable attack would be made upon their Black Sea ports, even if no landing should be attempted. It was chiefly to provide against any such contingency that the army of Odessa was formed and maintained. The writer last quoted estimates the Odessa army at over two hundred thousand men in the middle of April; but the available number was probably less than this.

The position of Roumania, lying between the Russian frontier and the Danube, was one to which great importance was naturally attached. Little doubt could be entertained that Prince Charles\* would sanction the passage of the Russians through his territory. It would have been difficult for him to adopt any other course; but it was of course politic in him to display considerable deliberation in the matter.

On the 24th of April the Grand Duke issued from Jassy a proclamation to the inhabitants of Roumania, in which he said—"By order of the Emperor Alexander, the army under my command, which is destined to combat the Turks, enters your territory, which has before joyfully received the Russian armies. I declare to you that we come as friends, desirous only of furthering your welfare, and hoping to find among you the same noble sentiments as your ancestors displayed towards the Russian armies in former wars against the Turks. Acting in conformity with the order of the Emperor, I notify to you

\* He was a member of the German house of Hohenzollern; a fact which has been thought partly to account for the favourable attitude of Germany towards Russia, in connection with the invasion.



the passage of the Russian army through your territory, which will occupy but a short time, and ought not to inspire you with any apprehension, as the Roumanian government is regarded by us as a friend. I invite you to pursue your usual avocations, and to provide our army with the means necessary to satisfy their requirements. I have taken the necessary measures to enable the military treasury to pay without delay for all purchases made for the army. You know the discipline of the Imperial army, and I am sure that it will, when it is in your midst, preserve its honour unimpaired. The Russian army will nowhere disturb your tranquillity, and will respect your laws, customs, and property. Roumanians, our ancestors shed their blood for your liberty, and I believe that we have a right to require your support for the army which is traversing your territory for the sole purpose of helping the unhappy Christians of Turkey, whose distress has aroused the pity of Russia, and of all Europe."

Two days later the Grand Duke issued from Kischineff the following order of the day to the troops—"The Christians oppressed by the Turkish yoke rose against their oppressors, and their blood has been shed for the last two years. The efforts of Russia and the Powers to ameliorate their condition having been fruitless, the last word of the czar has been spoken, and war has been declared. The czar entrusts me with the mission of accomplishing his will. We do not march to make conquests, but to defend our brethren oppressed for Christ's sake. I am convinced that each of you will do his duty, and not dishonour the Russian name. All peaceable inhabitants, without distinction of religion or nationality, will be sacred in our eyes. You will take nothing without payment, and I require that extremely severe discipline be maintained. We pass through Roumania on our way, where I am sure we shall meet with the same hospitality as our ancestors; and I demand that, in return, you respect the established laws of the country, and if need be, afford the Roumanians disinterested aid against the Turks."

The sultan, on his side, addressed Prince Charles in the character of a suzerain writing to his vassal, appealing to him to render such assistance as his position nominally required him to render, for the defence of the Ottoman empire. On the 22nd of April the grand vizier telegraphed to the prince in the following terms:—

"The concentration of the Russian army on the Pruth, the ostensible preparations made by Russia in view of military action, and other indications no less significant, cannot leave your Highness, any more than the Imperial government, in any doubt as to the danger of a situation to which the Sublime Porte has already called the attention of your Highness, and which seems to threaten the territory of the Principality with an invasion by Russian troops. In this conjuncture, and in conformity with the provisions of Article 26 of the Treaty of Paris, and paragraph 3 of Article 8 of the Convention of the 19th August, 1858, I invite your Highness, in the name of his Imperial Majesty, to concert with the Sublime Porte, with the view of adopting in common the proper military measures, to ensure the defence of the territory of the Principality, by reason of the eventuality by which it might be threatened. I only await your Highness's reply to give the necessary instructions to that effect to the Serdar Ekrim Abdul Karim Pacha, who is at present on the Danube at the head of the Ottoman armies, and with whom, in the meantime, the military authorities of your Highness may concert in case of urgency."

Simultaneously with the grand duke's order of the day, the sultan addressed the commanders of his armies in a telegraphic dispatch, in which he said—

"Russia having declared war, we are compelled to have recourse to arms. We have always desired peace and tranquillity, and have listened to the counsels of the Powers to that end, but Russia wishes to destroy the rights and the independence of our country. Russia attacks us, and God, the protector of right and justice, will give us victory. Our soldiers will defend the

# THE SEAT OF WAR







territory acquired by our ancestors at the price of their blood, and by God's help will secure the honour and independence of the Osmanlis. The nation will take under its charge the wives and children of the soldiers. Should it be necessary the sultan, taking in hand the sacred banner of the Caliphate, will himself join the army. The sultan is ready to give his life for the honour and independence of the country."

The Turkish authorities had set to work, in their own fashion, to prepare for the defence of the country south of the Danube. The military description of Bulgaria may here be briefly given. The eastern half of the province is commanded by a Quadrilateral of four fortresses—namely, Rustchuk and Silistria, on the Danube, Varna on the Black Sea coast, and Shumla, south of Silistria, and near the northern slopes of the Balkans. The principal towns on the lower reaches of the river, below Silistria, are Rassova, Tchernavoda, Hirsova, Matchin, Isakchi, and Tultcha. The Danube falls into the sea by three mouths—the Kilia, the Sulina, and the St. George's mouth. The swampy Dobrudcha is enclosed by the winding course of the Danube from Tchernavoda to Kilia, by the Roman wall running from Tchernavoda, through Medjidie to Kustendje, and by the sea-coast from the last-named town to Kilia. The defence of the Dobrudcha has always been left by the Turks to the unhealthy nature of the district, which has generally been found quite as effective as fortifications and earth-works.

Higher up the Danube, above Rustchuk, are the towns of Sistova, Nikopol, Rahova, Lom Palanka, and Widdin, not many miles from the point where Bulgaria, Roumania, and Servia, meet, at the outfall of the Timok into the larger stream. The fortresses of Nisch and Sophia are on a line which, continued by road and rail, runs eastward and southward, through Tatar Bazardjik and Philippopolis, to Adrianople, and thence to Constantinople. Besides the towns above mentioned, there are no strongly fortified places in western Bulgaria, the most important centres being Lovatz, south of Nikopol, and

Tirnova (the ancient capital of the province) on the railway from Sistova, through Gabrova, to the Shipka Pass.

In the spring of the year 1877, the Turks devoted their attention to the task of strengthening a line of defence from Varna, through Rustchuk, to Widdin. They purchased vast quantities of cannon, ammunition, small arms of the very best description, and provisions of all kinds. The head-quarters of the Danubian army were at Shumla, and the direction of the defences was entrusted to Ruchdi Pasha, an Egyptian, who seems to have done his best to inspire the whole military and civil service with unflagging energy. But the indifferent system adopted in the Turkish army, the feeble power of organisation, and the want of steady persistence which is characteristic of the race, prevented them from making such efficient preparations as the imminence of the danger demanded; and subsequent events proved that many indispensable arrangements had been neglected.

On the 24th of April, the czar held a grand review of his army at Ungheni, near Kischineff, in the course of which he personally gave the troops the order to advance. A picturesque account of this memorable ceremony was communicated to the "Daily News," in a letter from an eye-witness:—

"KISCHENEFF, *April 23rd*.—The emperor reviewed the troops yesterday (Sunday) at Zinerin-gra and Birzala. After the review he addressed the troops in a speech, in which he said—'I have done everything in my power to avoid war and bloodshed. Nobody can say we have not been patient, or that the war has been of our seeking. We have practised patience to the last degree, but there comes a time when even patience must end. When that time comes I know that the young Russian army of to-day will not show itself unworthy of the fame which the old army won in days gone by.' The excitement and enthusiasm of the soldiers were very great.

"The emperor passed through here to-day without stopping, on his way to Ungheni, which is situated on the frontier where the railway



crosses the Pruth. He will review the troops there, and return here to-night. He is accompanied by the Grand Duke Nicholas and the staff, which went yesterday to meet him at Tiraspol, where he passed the night. He is, besides, accompanied by the Czarewitch, General Ignatieff, M. Milutin, the Minister of War, and many other dignitaries of the empire. There are great preparations here for the reception of his Majesty at the grand review, which will probably be held the day after to-morrow. There is no considerable movement of troops towards the frontier yet, except light cavalry and Cossacks. The weather is fine, and the roads are rapidly drying. According to all appearances, they will be in very good condition within a week. The enthusiasm here is immense. The feeling is real, deep, and universal, after a long period of suspense, which has been far more trying than an actual state of war.

*"April 25th.*—The emperor passed through Kischeneff on Monday morning, but without stopping, as he was on his way to Ungheni, on the Roumanian frontier, where the railway crosses the Pruth, and where a considerable portion of the army was quartered, impatiently awaiting the signal to advance. He reviewed the troops, addressed them in very nearly the same language as the manifesto, which was only read the next day, and then returned to Kischeneff, where he arrived at twelve o'clock at night, and where an enthusiastic reception awaited him. As the next day was the anniversary of the death of the late czarewitch, his eldest son, it was thought that, as he never receives visits on that day, nor transacts any business, the review would not be held, and the manifesto would not be read.

*"Tuesday, the 24th,* had, however, already been fixed upon, as I telegraphed you from St. Petersburg some time ago, and in the morning news soon spread that the review was to be held after all, and soon nearly the whole population of Kischeneff was pouring out of the narrow, filthy, muddy streets of the Jewish quarter, across the little valley of the Briskhova, to the slopes and the fields on the other side, where

part of the troops were camped, and where the review was to be held. The spot was well chosen, on a gentle undulating hillside, which enabled the spectators to see the whole army at once, as the lines rose behind each other higher and higher up the slope. It was a beautiful sunny morning, and the bright colours of the uniforms, the glitter of thousands of bayonets flashing in the sunshine, and the broad blaze of light reflected from a long line of polished field-pieces, and all set in a frame of brilliant green, that covered the surrounding hills, made a beautiful and striking picture. It was all the more impressive that this was no mere holiday review, arranged for show, but a review which everybody knew was the prelude to war. These uniforms, now so bright and fresh-looking, would soon be soiled with mud and dust, blackened and begrimed with the smoke of powder, and bespattered with blood. And those guns, with their brand-new look, whose voices had never yet been heard, would soon be speaking in tones of thunder, and their fiery throats vomiting destruction and death. A review under such circumstances is a solemn sight; and so the great crowds of people who had assembled to witness it seemed to feel. The troops were already under arms by nine o'clock, and they stood there in long lines and masses, never moving in the slightest, motionless as statues, and as silent too, for an hour and a half, until the arrival of the emperor. There was something strangely impressive and awful in this prolonged silence and immobility. The crowds looking upon the serried lines so silent and motionless, became themselves silent, and gazed with wonder and awe. Those masses of men, and horses, and cannon, with the power of causing such a hideous uproar as to make the very earth tremble, were now so still and silent that they seemed to be held petrified by some mighty spell, and they inspired in the crowd feelings of vague dread. There was none of the laughing, or joking, or chaff, of which one usually hears so much in a crowd assembled for a holiday sight. They spoke to each other in hushed voices, and every face wore a serious,

earnest look. Nor was the silence broken upon the arrival of the emperor. The crowd only swayed and opened a passage, taking off their hats as he passed, and not till he mounted his horse, and, accompanied by his brother, the Grand Duke Nicholas, and followed by an immense staff of more than a hundred officers, began to ride slowly along the lines, was the silence broken by the sound of music and cheers.

"The review proper lasted nearly an hour, and was over about half-past eleven. Then, when the music ceased, there was silence again; the soldiers took off their caps, and their example was followed by the crowd. The voice of one man was heard—it was that of the Bishop of Kischeneff, saying a grand military mass. This lasted about three-quarters of an hour, during which time everybody, spectators as well as soldiers, remained uncovered, with composed but expectant faces. Finally, this came to an end, and then an anxious murmur ran through the crowd. If the manifesto were to be launched, if war were to be declared, now was the moment when it would be done. In fact, the long-expected, long-hoped-for moment had come. There was a dead silence for an instant, during which I could hear the ticking of my watch; then a clear strong voice broke the stillness. It was not the voice of the emperor, but of the Bishop of Kischeneff, who was reading the manifesto; and, strange to say, he had not read more than half way through it, when sobs were heard, and people looking about to see whence they proceeded, perceived that they were from the Emperor Alexander, and that he was weeping like a child. It had been the pride and glory of his reign that it was one of peace; it had been his boast and his hope that he would finish it without a war; and now, in spite of everything he had done to avoid it, the step was at last taken, and a war was declared, the consequences of which no man can foresee. When they saw how much the emperor was affected by it, there was probably not a dry eye within the range of the reader's voice; but no sooner had the bishop finished than there went up a universal shout, such as I never heard before,

and scarcely expect to hear again. It was a shout of exultation, of triumph, and of relief, as though a great weight of suspense were lifted from the heart of the multitude. It spread through the army with the rapidity of sound itself, and was instantly taken up by the crowd outside, and repeated over and over again, until the very sky was full of it. The soldiers tossed their caps high in the air and caught them on their bayonets, and twirled them round and round, shouting and yelling as though they would burst their throats. This continued for several minutes, and, when silence was again restored, the Bishop of Kischeneff addressed the army. His discourse was very effective and telling, and was received very much in the same way as the manifesto itself, with shouts and cheers. Then the *ordre du jour* of the Grand Duke, Nicholas, Commander-in-Chief of this army, was read to every battalion, squadron, and battery. The emperor and his staff retired, and work for the day was over. A part of the army, I believe, started directly from the review to the frontier, without a moment's pause, and the rest began rapidly preparing for the march."

Not a moment was lost in acting upon the orders of the czar. According to some accounts, the frontiers of Turkey, both in Europe and in Asia, were violated even before the issue of the manifesto; but, at all events, the Russians were upon the Danube within a remarkably brief interval.

About a fortnight later, the official military organ in Russia, the "*Invalides*," published the following account of the operations in Asia and Europe:—

"Immediately after the Imperial manifesto of the 24th of April, our troops in Europe and Asia crossed the Turkish frontiers. The principal *échelons* of our European army crossed the frontier at Leovo, Beshtamach, and Kubea, and marched into the interior, a detachment of infantry on our left wing making seventy versts in twenty-four hours, while the accompanying cavalry performed one hundred versts in the same time. On the 25th of April they occupied



Reni, Galatz, Brail, and the bridge over the Sereth at Barbosch. Fresh *échelons* coming up, Ismail and Kilia, on the Lower Danube, were taken possession of. Our troops thus anticipated the Turks in garrisoning Galatz, the great railway centre of Roumania, a circumstance which will not a little facilitate the concentration of our army, and the transport of our baggage and train. During the last few days some difficulty has been experienced in crossing the Pruth, in consequence of the inundation at Leovo. The advance of the columns entering the Principality at other points, as well as in the Principality itself, has been uninterrupted. The Roumanian population has everywhere joyously welcomed our troops. The Turks have undertaken no offensive operations. It was not until the night of the 3rd of May that two Turkish ironclads exchanged a few shots with our field artillery at Braila.

"Simultaneously with these movements our Caucasian troops crossed the Asiatic frontier of Turkey in three columns. The main force, coming from Alexandropol, marched upon Kars; the Rion detachment marched upon Batoum; and the Erivan detachment upon Bayazid. The Alexandropol Corps, under the command of Adjutant General Loris Melikoff, entered Turkish territory in two columns, and, taking the Turkish outposts prisoners, on the same day reached Molla Musa and Bash Shuragel. On the 27th of April, the greater part of the corps crossed the River Kars Tchai, and passed the night at Kuruk Dara, Hadshi Vali, and Subotan. On the 29th the corps reached Zaim and Angi Keff, despatching twenty-seven squadrons and sotnias, with sixteen guns, to cut off the communication between Kars and Erzeroum. This cavalry, under the command of Major-General Tchavwehivadse, in their successful reconnoitring on the 28th, 29th, and 30th, destroyed the telegraph between Kars and Erzeroum, and pursued a Turkish detachment of eight battalions marching from Kars to Erzeroum, and commanded, as the prisoners told us, by Muktar Pasha himself. To support the cavalry, General Loris

Melikoff ordered twelve battalions of Grenadiers, without knapsacks, accompanied by forty guns and five sotnias, to turn the flank of the enemy at Kars, and proceed rapidly to Visinkeff. At the same time eight Turkish battalions sallied forth from Kars, and, with some artillery, took up a position under cover of the fortress guns. The artillery which accompanied our cavalry, opening fire, dismounted a Turkish cannon."

After this engagement, General Loris Melikoff, leaving the cavalry at Visinkeff, and, with his remaining forces, returned on the 1st of May to his former camp at Zaim. The population everywhere showed the most friendly disposition towards our troops. There was no resistance or opposition whatever. On the contrary, Russian rule was everywhere accepted as a benefit. On the 24th of April, a recently-levied squadron of Karapapachs, with their colours, begged permission to enter the Russian service. All the irregular cavalry of the district either joins our forces or disperses. The troops of the Rion detachment, under the command of Lieutenant General Oklobjio, marched upon Batoum in two columns. The left-hand column, under the command of Major-General Denebekoff, made for Muchastir, while the other, under General Scheremtief, proceeded along the Atchmarum road. On the 25th of April the left hand-column, after a serious engagement, took the camp of Muchastir, and on the 26th fortified this strong position. The other column marched along the Atchmarum-road, and likewise had an engagement with the enemy. Our loss on the 25th amounted to thirty wounded, among them Lieutenant Colonel Muscheloff, the commander of the 6th Battery of the 41st Artillery Brigade."

The Turko-Russian War had thus fairly begun; and all Europe began to realise in what terrible earnest it would have to be continued and fought out.

## CHAPTER XI.

## ON THE DANUBE.

THE spring of 1877 was a late one ; and the weather was at the same time abnormally wet. The elements fought against the Russians ; and they might well have complained that the hostility of the skies had given them as much to contend with as the hostility of the Turks, if the delay of winter had not subsequently redressed the balance.

At the moment when the grand duke was called upon to transport a quarter of a million men, with the artillery, horses, stores and equipments of so vast an army, across Roumania, the roads were converted into mud, and the whole country was made almost impassable. If the Turks had been more energetic and better advised, they would have crossed the Danube without delay, and either made a stand on the Pruth, or occupied certain points in Roumania, thus compelling the Principality to lend them at least a passive assistance. The Russians seem to have anticipated the possibility of these tactics, for, as we have seen, they crossed the frontier in hot haste, in spite of all difficulties, and sent forward flying columns to the Danube. It is all but incredible that the Turks made little or no effort to destroy the communications between Bulgaria and Roumania. Indeed, so feeble had their preparations been during the time when the Russians were assembling their forces in Bessarabia, and so poor was the result of the work which had actually been effected up to the end of April, that, if the armies of the czar could have got through Roumania in force with as much speed as they displayed at subsequent periods of the campaign, they would unquestionably have succeeded in crossing the river early in May, instead of at the end of June. If they had done this, the Turks might have been demoralised at once ; there might have been no investment of Plevna, the Balkans might have been passed be-

fore the winter, Adrianople itself might have been reached amidst the earliest snows, and with an incomparably smaller expenditure of blood and money !

It was not only the unfavourable weather which delayed the Russian advance. The czar's army was practically a new machine, which its possessors hardly knew how to use. A fresh system of tactics, fresh systems of transport and commissariat, had been adopted since the Crimean war ; and a hundred novel methods and arrangements were suddenly brought into use at one and the same moment. The natural consequence was, that the first attempt to work this complicated machinery was a failure. It was found that the supplies needed for the army could not be brought together at the time and in the places where they were needed, whilst, in only too many instances, the dishonesty or incompetence of contractors rendered futile the most carefully considered plans of the generals. We have already seen something of the corruptness and inefficiency of the Russian contractors. A long chapter might be filled with a narrative of the depredations and villainies of these men.

Though the Russians could not in the first instance send large forces to the Danube, for the reasons above stated, they were not long in occupying the towns and *têtes-des-ponts* on the lower stream, in sufficient strength to secure them against attack from the other side. One of the first places thus taken possession of was Galatz ; and a correspondent,\* writing on the 27th of April, and again a week later, gives us a graphic description of these earlier operations :—

"Mercantile Galatz had a rough and busy time of it to-day. It appears that when the Russians first came into the place it was intimated that, although all the merchant vessels here and at Braila would have to leave, a reasonable time would be allowed to enable them to load up and effect a clearance. But this morning there burst on the mercantile community a thunderclap in the shape of a peremptory edict,

\* "Daily News Correspondence," under date.



transmitted through the Russian Consul, that all ships must be clear of Galatz by six o'clock this evening, no matter whether loaded or not. The blow told perhaps most severely on our countrymen, for there are several British firms here, and a large portion of the trade from the Lower Danube is carried on in British bottoms. It was determined to request the consuls of the various nationalities interested to use their offices with the Russian general commanding here, from whom the order had emanated, to beg that he would reconsider it, and allow a reasonable extension of time. A number of merchants accompanied the consuls to an interview with Prince Schakofskoy, who received his visitors with great courtesy. But courtesy, as a merchant, plainatively remarked to me, will not freight ships. The prince stated that he had his orders from Kischeneff, and that he had no option in the matter. In reply to one remonstrant he pointed out that the shipping people had been in as good a position as any for reading the signs of the times, which had for some time indicated the imminence of such a step as that which his instructions had compelled him to take. He allowed that a hardship was involved, but, then, did not war always bring hardship and precariousness to mercantile interests? Finally, he said he himself could do nothing, but would telegraph to Kischeneff to ask whether an extension of time was permissible, warning, however, the deputation not to expect any consideration, and going so closely into detail as to compare the time on his watch to that shown by the watch of one of the deputation.

"One after another the steamers, ready or not, loosed their moorings, and steamed down the river. Nothing had actually been said on the subject, but it was felt that, in the intimation of the general, there was a latent flavour of torpedoes; and that torpedoes are not affairs to be trifled with. One stubborn Irish captain, whose ship lay at Braila, got his back up, refused to go till he had his cargo aboard—say in the course of a couple of days—and went so far in the *civis Romanus sum* direction; as to snap his fingers at

torpedoes. But he ultimately succumbed to persuasion, and his steamer passed down the Danube opposite Galatz within a few minutes of the hour specified in the notification. On the broad open space of the Galatz jetty, by the side of the Bourse, had congregated a large proportion of the mercantile people of Galatz to watch the departure of the shipping, which was felt as the stamping upon them of the seal of the coming war. Square-set, honest-faced Britons, swallow-faced Turks, Jews of all types of feature, from the aquiline Arabian to the thick-lipped sensual-faced Austrian Jew, here and there an Armenian, a group of Italians, voluble and gesticulatory, a little knot of Frenchmen disposed to cynical humour, even under what in the northern portion of our island would be termed a 'dispensation,' Germans in fair abundance, with the interstices of the gathering filled up by dark-eyed Roumanians, whom it was difficult to distinguish from the Italians—stood by the brown water as its wavelets washed the quay, and gossiped about cargoes, and charters, and torpedoes, and Turkish gunboats, as the 'Farnley Hall' and the 'Mary Coverdale' came swiftly gliding down stream with their figure-heads pointed for Sulina. Over the marsh land across the river was visible the spread sails of canvas of the sailing craft as they stood for the reach of the river that bends away south-east below Galatz. A few still remained clinging to the jetty, whether in a hope of the relenting of the Russians, or that their skippers for some reason or other did not care to go, I know not. The consuls at night handed into their Russian confrere a formal protest against the shortness of notice accorded, but this measure was felt to be a pure formality; so the shipbrokers and grain agents of Galatz may close their offices and take a holiday till the dogs of war are muzzled again.

"The bridging of the Danube below Galatz might not indeed, of itself, altogether arrest navigation, but it is necessary to cover the work both from above and below by flanking protection and outlying picquets in the shape of torpedoes, since the Turks have craft both higher up and lower down, which could impede, if not alto-

gether hinder the construction of the bridge, and which could destroy it, even if built without their interference. The Russians have made all their preparations for the construction and protection of the bridge which they design to throw across the Danube on this section of their advance. At Ismail a mass of timber and pontooning appliances has been collected. Two days ago there arrived by the train at Galatz, and have since been launched, two steam launches, with a full complement of torpedoes—the craft which were described in my colleague's letter from Constantinople, which you published on one of the early days of the present week. Three more of the same craft are, I understand, already in the Sereth at Barbosch, and yet two others, conveyed thither in carts, are inside the mouth of the Pruth. These vessels will doubtless be used for the double purpose of laying down torpedoes, to cover the bridge or bridges, and of attempting the destruction of the enemy's vessels in case of an effort on their part to interfere with the work. A hundred timber pontoons have been ordered to be made with all speed in Galatz, probably in view of the construction of a second bridge. Lighters have arrived in the Pruth, towed up stream by a Roumanian gunboat, laden—the lighters, I mean—with punts or row-boats, manifestly to be used in the construction of the bridge. That the commencement of this work will be immediate, is proved by the short and peremptory notice given to the shipping at Galatz and Braila. It remains to specify the point at which that work is to be undertaken. I cannot claim to have received any authoritative information on this head, but indications are not wanting to serve as guides to what I anticipate will prove an accurate speculation. The Russian military dispositions, so far as they are known, point, with what seems unmistakable precision, to the conclusion, that the force which will cross the Danube to the east of Braila will not be the main body, but only the left flank. With our huge modern armies, marching on a broad front is an imperious necessity, and this all the more so when the march will be through territories

where the roads are few and bad. The left flank then here, let us say, between Braila and Ismail, commences its operations earliest, because it has practically the furthest distance to go, and must go to work early to get up in line, or thereabout, with the rest of the invading army, which, wherever it crosses the river, will have the advantage and greater celerity of railway transport for a very considerable proportion of its journey through Roumania. The whole of the Dobrudscha, to the north of the little railway running athwart it from Tchernavoda on the Danube to Kustendjie on the Black Sea, is a promontory running northward, and the Russian left flank must tramp along this promontory, south at least as far as the railway I have named, to get on a front approximately in line with the rest of the army reaching the Danube further west. Then its route would lie on Bazardjik, and so south to the Pravadi Pass; or, in the alternative of a concentration on Shumla, it would turn to the right and follow the Varna-Shumla highway.

“With this extra work before it, the left flank must be across the Danube betimes, and ought not to delay an hour in crossing. But a man standing on the heights of Galatz, and looking southward over the Danube, may ask himself in vain the question—Where is it possible for the crossing to be effected? In the distance, on the Turkish side, no doubt, is high and dry country, a low, broken spur of the Balkans indeed; but how to reach it across that swamp of bulrushes struggling up through inundation, broken only by casual islets on which a few sheep are grazing, the whole expanse being intersected by deep lagoons of the nature of backwaters? That broad swamp, in which neither to east nor to west seems there any break, could be traversed neither by a Cossack pony nor the garron of a border moss-trooper—it is folly to think of it affording foothold for an army. A month's drought, apparently, could scarcely make *terra firma* of it. But if the reader has a good map, and will look at it, he will see marked on the Turkish side, about midway between Galatz and Braila, a place called Isatchia. At this point



the upland of the Dobrudscha comes very near to the river, and there is a hard strand and a sound road all the way from the water's edge. Nor is this all. From Isatchia there are two very tolerable roads leading southward through the whole length of this Dobrudscha promontory. One road bends away toward the west, and, without touching Matchin, presently gets on the shoulders of the Balkan spur, where they trend down into the Danube valley, and so goes on southward till the isthmus is reached, across which is drawn the Tchernavoda-Kustendjie railway. The other road from Isatchia bends away south-eastward on Babadagh, and then holds a course almost due south, somewhat inland of the coast marches. On the Roumanian side, opposite Isatchia, the conditions are as favourable as can be expected. There are two roads direct from Bolgrad, one on either side of the Lake Jalpuch, and there are also two roads from Ismail, only one of which, however, I believe, is out of the water at present. A crossing here would turn both Tulcha and Matchin, both of which have, at least nominally, batteries and guns, but that consideration—of so little account are the defences of these places—is of no moment. In fine, I venture to express the anticipation, that the first bridge at least made by the Russians on this section of the Danube will have its end on the Turkish side at Isatchia.

"In the construction of other bridges the Russians are working hard. They are widening and improving the new bridge near the mouth of the Pruth, which on Sunday last took the place of the old ramshackle structure by which the road crossed the river, and which was used by the first detachment of Cossacks who came over. Another bridge is in course of erection higher up. Two bridges are being made on the Sereth. No further troops in any numbers have come for the last two days over the Pruth through Galatz. Braila was occupied yesterday by a regiment of Cossacks with two field-gun batteries.

"I this afternoon visited the Pruth, which is distant twelve kilometres east of Galatz. In crossing the chaussée, which alone shows above

water between the Danube and Lake Brattich, one realises how easy it would have been for the Turkish turret ship which was cruising off it with ports open on Tuesday evening, when the Russian troops were crossing, to have arrested their progress by its fire. A few guns are in position on a knoll commanding the mouth of the Pruth. Cossacks are picqueted at the Galatz end of the bridge, and on the further slopes Russian infantry are encamped under canvas. The officer on duty on the bridge was very civil—civility is the *mot d'ordre* of the Russian officers in Roumania—and allowed our carriage to pass without hesitation. Time did not permit us to go further than just the other side of the bridge. The road toward Galatz from the bridge was lined by infantry sentries and Cossack vedettes. All the troops I saw seemed in excellent physical case, hard as nails, warmly clad; indeed, I wondered how in the heat they tramped along so sturdily in their long heavy boots and thick overcoats of duffle blanketing.

"Later in the afternoon I paid my respects to Prince Schakofskoy at his head-quarters in the town. His Excellency appears charged with administrative functions as well as with the chief command of the advance army. He is a rather thick-set man, with strong shrewd face and iron-grey hair and beard. He possesses no little humour of a dry, sententious character, has a very courteous and genial manner, and speaks English with singular fluency and precision. 'I come here,' said he, 'with the most pacific intentions.' 'Towards the Roumanians, of course, your Excellency,' I ventured to reply; 'but how about the Turks?' 'Oh, they are different, I admit,' was the rejoinder, with a quaint glance from under the grizzled eyebrows. I should have been glad to know where the general was to lay his bridge, but the subject was not touched upon. It was a pleasant coincidence to find on duty, as Prince Schakofskoy's officer of the day, Count Keller, a young officer of German birth, who had been one of the best men on General Tchernaiëff's staff in the Servian war, and who distinguished himself in the command

of a separate column in the operations against the Turks in the vicinity of Saitchar immediately before the final catastrophe of Djunis.

*"May 5th.*—Yesterday afternoon I went again out to where the road from Galatz to Reni crosses the Pruth and enters Bessarabia. There passed me on the chaussée, carried along between the waters of Lake Brattich and the Danube, a couple of battalions of Russian infantry, proceeding to Galatz in heavy marching order. The regiment was the 44th of the line, and belonged, as all the troops now hereabouts do, to the 11th Army Corps, commanded by Prince Schakofskoy."

By this time, the Russians held the whole left bank of the river, from Braila to the sea—that is to say, along the northern or Kilia mouth of the Danube; and they were quickly taking up their positions on the higher reaches of the broad stream which constituted the first line of the Turkish defence. It was expected by many persons that the attempt to cross would be made as soon as a sufficient force of the Russians could be massed upon the banks, at some selected place, or places; but when day followed day, and week followed week, without the occurrence of any important military operation, it began to be manifest that the invaders were playing a waiting game. It had been suspected from the first that the Russian preparations had not been so efficient as they ought to have been, in the case of a nation undertaking a war of extreme importance, which might at any moment assume proportions incalculably greater than those of a single combat between the Muscovite and Ottoman empires. There can be no doubt that the Russian government and the Russian generals were thrown out of their reckonings by the break-down of their transport, their commissariat, and almost every other branch of their army service. There was nothing for it but to check the advance, and set to work to remedy the failures which had been brought to light.

Lookers on were naturally puzzled by the apparent inactivity of the Russians, and there were many who thought that the Turks ought to have

taken advantage of the supineness of their enemies to cross into Roumania, and attempt to turn the tide of battle in Roumania itself. Even now it appears probable, or at least, very possible, that, if this had been done, the impetuosity of the Ottoman soldiers, coupled with the backwardness of the Russian preparations, might have enabled the former to reap some signal successes, if it had not altered the fate of the whole campaign.

The Russians, however, had lost no time in bringing up their artillery, in sinking torpedoes, and in placing gunboats, which had been brought from Russia in sections, on the Danube. They had thus made it quite as difficult, if not more difficult for the Turks to throw a large force across the stream than it would have been for themselves.

Meanwhile, it became necessary for the invaders to make their terms with Roumania; and the bases of a Convention had been agreed upon before the end of April. Special points were more clearly defined, or were modified or enlarged, on subsequent occasions; but the general outline of the arrangement was settled with no unnecessary delay.

The Austrian correspondent of the "Times," dating from Vienna, April 30th, gives us an epitome of these stipulations:—"We have at last the authentic text of the Russo-Roumanian Convention before us, which was communicated to the Chambers by the Roumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs. It is dated the 6th of April—that is, some days before the final refusal of the Porte to the Protocol, and insures free passage to the Russian troops, and friendly treatment. The czar undertakes to respect the rights and integrity of Roumania in conformity with treaties. The stipulations as to the passage of the Russian troops, and their relations with the local authorities, are regulated by a special Convention, which forms an appendix to the general one. The government explains that the object of the Convention is to secure the integrity of Roumania in conformity with the Treaty of Paris. It effects no change in the international relations



of Roumania, nor does it bind Roumania to co-operate with the Russian army, its only object being to keep for Roumania what she has already. No similar Convention has been concluded with Turkey, as the latter would then transfer the seat of war to Roumania, and as, besides, the Porte has systematically refused to recognise Roumania, and to settle the questions with it, which have been pending for years.

"The first additional Article of the Convention gives the Russians the right to use the railways, the rivers, roads, and the post and telegraph lines. The resources of the country, as regards provisions and other necessities, are placed at their disposal, and particulars are to be furnished to them about the capabilities of each district in this respect. The Roumanian Commissioners attached to the Russian army have the powers of the local authorities, and are to lend their assistance in the transport of baggage, war material, and ammunition. In all matters relating to the transport of ambulances, the Russian army is to enjoy the same railway privileges as the Roumanian army. In the second additional Article the Minister of Public Works lay down rules about the Russian military transport. After the Roumanian mail and military trains, the Russian military trains are to have precedence over all others. To further this arrangement, the number of passenger trains can be diminished, and goods trains altogether stopped. To prevent unloading, the gauge of the Russian and Roumanian lines will be assimilated. A special committee, consisting of delegates of the different railway companies, will be formed, under the care of the Minister of Public Works. The Russian military transports will be in the hands of a Russian superintendent, with power to depose railway officials, the Minister of Public Works consenting. The Russians have the right to complete whatever lines they may deem necessary, and the ground necessary for this will be granted them. The third additional Article contains a number of miscellaneous agreements. Russian telegraphic despatches are to have preference over private

ones. Apart from Bucharest, the Russians may march their forces anywhere and establish military stations. The Russian sick and wounded will be cared for in Russian hospitals, to be erected in the most populous towns, except in Bucharest. If need be, the Russian sick and wounded will be cared for, though not gratuitously, in Roumanian hospitals. Roumania is to procure for the Russians barges and other shipping material. The cost of the Russian passage will be paid in cash within two months. Articles for the Russian army will be admitted duty free. The Roumanian authorities are to assist in arresting Russian deserters. The document ends by saying that Russia was co-operating with the other Powers to improve the position of the Christians in Turkey; that the excitement of the Mahomedan population and the lethargy of the Turkish government allowed no hope of any reform; that, in consequence of this, intervention became necessary; and that as Russia was ready to guarantee the inviolability of Roumania, the Convention was concluded."

Roumania, it will be observed, was not yet prepared to place her army in the field. Her action was of course equivalent to war; and she soon took occasion, on the pretext of a Turkish violation of her territory, to declare herself formally what she had for some time been in reality. The position of Roumania between the two belligerents, to say nothing of her natural ambition, was quite sufficient to account for her resolution. But the Principality was destined to prove that it was capable of greater things than a merely nominal alliance with Russia, or than the passive defence of its own territory to which the army of Prince Charles originally confined itself.

The Prince of Roumania, as we have already seen, is a member of the German house of Hohenzollern; and he had been trained as a soldier under the best military system of modern Europe. He has displayed great personal courage on many occasions; and the distinction subsequently earned by his army showed how efficiently he had laboured to create a force capable of sustaining

the honour of the country. Before the end of May Roumania had placed in the field two army corps, numbering in all fifty-six thousand men; and behind these she had a trained militia of a hundred thousand, which could be mobilised at a brief notice. One army corps was despatched to the extreme west of Wallachia, and took up its position near the fortress of Kalafat, opposite to the Turkish fortified town of Widdin. The artillery duel between these two places constituted almost the first hostilities of the war in Europe.

The Russians did not confine themselves during the months of May and June to the massing of their troops and supplies in Roumania. They set themselves to the task of obtaining the command of the Danube, and soon succeeded in the effort, at all events at certain selected points. Their torpedoes and gunboats, aided by their artillery, sufficed to render the powerful Turkish flotilla comparatively harmless, although the latter appears to have been well officered. On May 11th a Turkish three-masted turret-ship was blown up by a shell from the Russian battery near Braila; whilst, on the 26th of the same month, a Turkish monitor was destroyed by torpedoes, between the place just mentioned and Matchin, lower down the stream.

A correspondent of the "Daily News" sent home a brief account of the first of these exploits from Galatz, May 13th:—"The branch of the Danube known as the Old Danube extends from Hirsova to opposite Braila. On this branch is situated the Turkish fortress of Matchin, and in it is penned by the Russian batteries at both ends a portion of the Turkish flotilla. On Friday afternoon the Turkish turret-ship, the same whose passage up the stream recently terrified Galatz, steamed out from Matchin, followed by two gunboats, and at half-past three was stationary under cover of the wooded end of the island, with its three masts visible above the trees. The Russian gunners from the batteries close to Braila, below the Roumanian barracks, opened fire from their light guns, the range being about four kilometres, but without effect. The general

officer present gave directions for two eight-inch guns of position, mounted in the battery, to come into action. The first shot had no effect. The second shot, fired at a high elevation with a low charge, dropped on the deck of the turret-ship and must have crushed down into the powder magazine. Immediately a tremendous flash and glare shot up from the interior of the doomed craft, followed by a heavy white smoke, which hung like a pall. Through this white cloud there shot up to a great height a spurt of black fragments of all shapes and sizes. When the smoke drifted away all that was visible of the turret-ship was her stern, with the mizen-mast standing, on which still fluttered the Turkish flag. The ship had gone down by the head in shallow water. The fore and main masts were blown out at once. Two Russian steam launches put off from Braila, boarded the wreck, gained the flag, gathered some of the *débris*, and picked up two men, the fireman and the engineer, both severely injured. One has since died. The other is still alive in the hospital. He reports the turret-ship to have had a crew of two hundred men, under the command of Kezim Bey. Fragments of the wreckage were picked up down the stream at Galatz. The Russian enthusiasm in the battery was intense, and the officers embraced each other. The Turkish gunboats hurried away abruptly on the explosion of the turret-ship, but returned an hour later, and fired on the Russian launches engaged in the work of humanity. The name of the turret-ship was the 'Lufti Djelil.' Its armament was five guns, of which two were nine-inch and two five-inch. The captain, a pacha, was on shore. Spies report that the intention was for the turret-ship to lie quiet till next morning, and then bombard Braila."

A letter which appeared in the "Times," of June 24th, from a correspondent at Bucharest, contains an account of the destruction of the second vessel, which, although not so full of detail as some which were given, is extremely interesting:—

"The days wore on slowly, and nothing interesting occurred at Ibraila. Batteries pro-



tected the bridge at Barboshi, and nothing was attempted against it. No Turkish vessel had come out, or dared to do so in the face of the batteries, which had increased in number and calibre of guns. The only feat performed by the Turks was a bombardment of Reni—a simple waste of powder and shot, for if Reni had been destroyed the way up the Danube was none the less closed. Every day or every night men from the Russian side crossed the main stream to a little village of about fifteen houses on the opposite shore, called Getchid by the Roumanians, and Pot Bashi by the Turks. The place is a mere custom-house of the Turks, with a sprinkling of houses. Sometimes the Russians were there, and sometimes the Turks, who maintained a rather amazing fire from their new toys, the Martini-Henry rifles. The Russians cleared the village with artillery fire, but only to find the enemy return, as they well could, seeing that the gunboats could always bring soldiers from Matchin. Getchid was therefore doomed to destruction. The few inhabitants had long fled; the ground was covered by the inundations. All that remained was to pull down the houses, so that they could no longer conceal the enemy's sharpshooters. But while every opportunity was seized for carrying out this work at intervals, the Seifi, the Feth ul Islam, and the Kilitch Ali, all armoured, with the unarmoured boats Midhat and Arcadi, remained in the Matchin branch of the river threatening the Roumanian towns now occupied by the Russians. The ships—the one force which the Turks have superior to the Russians—lay there idle, with pennants listlessly drooping from the motionless masts, while in sight of them flashed past day by day restless railway trains, carrying troops, horses, provisions, and guns, to other parts of the river. No doubt the Turkish commander thanked Allah that, for a time at least, he might smoke and dream in peace. In the breezy days the sailors could bask in the rays of their southern sun, and in the hot still nights they were lulled to sleep by the soothing lap of the yellow waters against the thick iron armour of their ships.

“But the Infidels slept not so quietly. With that incomprehensible energy which is so offensive to the true believer, they were prowling about at night in boats under cover of the willow trees on the sodden shores, half-hidden by the reeds and bushes, watching for opportunities. One dark windy night four little boats, moved by steam, crept slowly up the Matchin River. The Giaours on board knew not certainly what they would do, but in front of the boats were thrust forward, with characteristic Infidel cunning, long poles, which carried at their ends ill-looking lumps of metal containing explosive material, and attached to other cunning machines in the boats by small thin wires. As the boats crept on the crews saw suddenly, close by them, the masts of ships, seen rising against the sky. Reckless of the superior force before them, the boats moved on, always at low speed, so as not to wake the drowsy Osmanli. Still, though lacking in energy, the sailors of the ships had a routine, according to which a sentry was on deck. Above the noise of the breaking wavelets came his challenge, which was answered in the Turkish tongue by a Roumanian officer on board one of the boats. Something, however, was imperfect in the sound. The shibboleth rang false in the ears of the Turk, who fired his musket. From other ships broke out challenges, confused cries, and a dropping musketry fire at the foe. The time for slow creeping was over, full speed was given to the boats, which dashed at the nearest ship, the ill-fated Seifi. The first boat placed its torpedo, and drew backwards to fire it, but before the electric current was made to pass, a second boat followed its example. One of the terrible engines felt the strange thrill of the current, and replied to it by a fearful explosion, which dashed in the side of the monitor and threw up a tremendous column of water, almost filling the boats. The second followed. The boats slipped away in the darkness, men and officers baling out the water with caps and utensils of every description. They escaped; but for the big, black, heavily-armoured hull of the ship there was no hope, nor even time for more than

a cry from the men to Allah for aid. But they had not helped themselves. Almost immediately their home sank beneath their feet. With one sudden plunge, the Seifi sought at the bottom of the water that rest so dear to her masters, and one more vessel was lost to the sultan, another victim to passive defence. The boats returned safely, and the brave men who had done their work were decorated by their grateful countrymen. What did the Turk? Did he burn to avenge his defeat and make reprisals on his crafty foe? Not he. In a despatch to the sultan, published in a Constantinople journal, men may read how the admiral, who had lost an ironclad, the best hope of his country against the passage of the Danube by that country's traditional foe, was deeply grieved at the disaster, and, having determined that it should not be repeated, gave orders to his flotilla to leave the dangerous neighbourhood! Some days ago, the ships steamed quietly past Matchin and Hirsova, to a part where there are neither batteries nor torpedoes, there to dream again that Allah has sent back those turbulent and restless Infidels to their own broad steppes."

The time of waiting and preparation on the Danube, varied as its monotony was by such exploits as these, would have appeared uneventful enough if it had not been utilised by a series of artillery duels, both between fortresses on the opposite sides of the river, and between the banks and the islands in possession of Turks and Roumanians respectively. The Turks in Widdin, which was occupied by a force under Osman Pasha, fired on Kalafat early in the month of May, and thus commenced an artillery engagement between these two towns. They made at the same time an unsuccessful attempt to cross the river in boats, but were repulsed by the Roumanians. It seems to be unquestionable that the first shots were fired from the Turkish side upon the Roumanian village of Beket, whilst, in more than one place, Turkish irregulars crossed the Danube in small numbers, and committed depredations and outrages on the soil of the Principality, thus giving Prince Charles

one pretext the more for casting in his lot with Russia.

Giurgevo and Rustchuk,\* opposed to each

\* As we shall hear a good deal of the fortresses of Rustchuk and Widdin in the course of this narrative, it will not be uninteresting to quote, from a contemporary source, an account of the strength and the antecedents of these two places:—

Rustchuk, a town of thirty thousand inhabitants, situated at the influx of the Kara Lom into the Danube, is sixty-seven miles south-west of Silistria, and some twenty-five miles from Sistova, where the Grand Duke Nicholas effected his passage. The strategic importance of this fortress has been increased since the last war by the construction of a railroad from it to Varna, one hundred and forty miles distant. It was taken by the Russians under Generals Langeron and Markof in 1811, and again in 1828. The old fortification consists of eight bastioned fronts with demi-revetments, ditch, and counterscarp of masonry, but no ravelins or other subsidiary works on the land side. In the eastern part of the town there is a bastioned work, which serves as a citadel. Along the river bank there are eleven bastioned irregular fronts, each bastion armed with from four to six guns, one of which is a heavy Krupp. A double semi-circle of detached works, thirty in number, ending at both extremities at the river, and, with the exception of the Levant Tabia, constructed of earth, supplement the defence. Of these, however, only eight are closed works, the others being merely advanced earthworks, open at the gorge, to connect the larger forts. Nevertheless, their sites have been selected with considerable skill. Three of them lie between the Danube and the Tirnova road to the westward, of which the quarantine fort is the most formidable; and another closed work interposes between the Tirnova road and the Kara Lom. From the Lom to the Shumla road, on the ridges parallel to the Danube, there are seven tabias, of which the Levent and Grassna are the largest. Thirteen fill the space between the Silistria and Varna roads, the most considerable being the Tcheverli and Bagli Tabias; and between the Silistria road and the Danube, on the eastern side, there are six, the principal one being the Maratin Tabia. The total armament of the thirty outworks consists of one hundred and seventy cannon, including forty Krupps. Thirteen of the Krupps are thirteen-inch forty-six-ton guns. None of the forts mount less than four guns. Levent Tabia has seventeen—the greatest number—including seven Krupps, one of them an eighteen-inch. Giurgevo is on the opposite bank of the Danube, with a normal population of eighteen thousand. Sistova is connected by rail with Bucharest, of which it is the port, and which is forty-four miles distant. It was occupied and strongly fortified by the Russians in the last war. Omar Pasha crossed the Danube here with forty-five thousand men in pursuit of the retreating Muscovites in 1854.

Widdin, or Kikadova, as it is known also to the natives, is situated on a wide plain formed by the sweep of the Danube, twenty miles from the Timok, the boundary river between Servia and Turkey, one hundred and thirty from



other like Kalafat and Widdin, were not long in commencing a duel of artillery, which soon became extremely vigorous. A little lower down the river, the Russians threw up earthworks and planted batteries at Galatz, Braila, Reni, Ismail and Kilia; and one effect of their very elaborate preparations in this respect was to puzzle the most experienced military authorities, as well as their enemies, as to where they intended to cross into Bulgaria. The uncertainty continued up to the very day when the passage was actually made; and it doubtless contributed not a little to the ultimate success of the operation.

In the meantime, the czar, unable to bear the suspense of waiting for news of his army at a distance, determined to join the head-quarters of the Grand Duke Nicholas, and he accordingly proceeded to Roumania. Before leaving Russia he had been enthusiastically received in several of the large towns of his empire, and especially at the ancient Russian capital, Moscow, the inhabitants whereof had always been in favour of the Slavonic "crusade."

The following address was received by the czar in the great hall of the Kremlin, from the deputies of the provincial nobility:—"Most Gracious Czar—With prayers in her heart and on her lips, the Russian nation rises at your bidding, in the name of Christ, to accomplish a great and

just object. The time has come for the nobility to show themselves worthy of the station they occupy. True to the example of their ancestors, our sons and brothers are arrayed in the ranks of your gallant army. Not all of us can share the glorious distinction of fighting in the foremost ranks with the hereditary enemy of this country for the liberation of our enslaved brethren. But we have all to fulfil another important, though more pacific duty—to serve the sick and wounded in a spirit of brotherly love to the best of our ability. May God assist you, beloved czar, in this grand and holy struggle."

After this, the Moscow burgomaster, who likewise attended the reception, with the deputies of the Town Council, presented to his Majesty the address of the Municipal Corporation:—"Most Gracious Czar—Thou hast summoned us to the fight, and all Russia utters shouts of joy. Having marshalled thy troops to the battle, thou comest to us and showest thyself to the people in the walls of this ancient capital. The air resounds with acclamations of gratitude and blessing. Never has thy humble people greeted thee with such emotion and thankfulness as now, when listening to thy martial behest. This is an important and sacred hour. After thou hast spoken, O Czar, the honour and the conscience of Russia breathe freely. Thy people are aware

Belgrade, and one hundred and five from Nikopoli. From the steamer's deck it has, with its serried battlements and twenty glittering white minarets, a very imposing effect, which is, as is usual in most Oriental towns, rudely dispelled on landing. It is of great strategical value, as covering the road to Servia, and one of the great highways to Nissa, Sofia, and Adrianople. The inner town, exclusively inhabited by the Turks, is tolerably well built, as Turkish towns go; but the Christian suburbs are very indifferent quarters. The principal buildings are the Pasha's Konok, some mosques, and a good range of bazaars in the main street. The population, in peaceable times, is from twenty-five to thirty thousand. Taking the old *enceinte* of fortification, the river-front is composed of revetted lines *en cremaillere*—that is, zigzag outlines, with faces and flanks nearly perpendicular to each other—a plan easily applicable where the ground is irregular. On the land side there are seven bastioned fronts, with ravelins of tolerably regular construction, and the place is encircled by a deep and wide ditch, which can be made wet or dry at will. The revetment, or masonry support of the ditch

sides, is nearly forty feet high. On the west of the town is an ancient castle, which now serves as an arsenal. The suburbs extend along the river, and are defended by permanent lines flanked by bastions. Additional defences, consisting of detached works, in accordance with the requirements of modern war, have been erected, and the whole are mounted with nearly three hundred guns. Widdin was first taken by the Turks towards the end of the fourteenth century; retaken from them by John Hunyadi in 1454; captured by the Germans under Louis of Baden in 1689; and recovered by a grand vizier of the Kiuprili family in the following year. It was invested by the Germans again in 1737, who soon abandoned the siege, and it was also threatened fruitlessly by them in 1790. The celebrated Pasha, Paswan-Ogli, revolted there, and declared himself independent in 1792. Opposite to Widdin, in Little Wallachia, is Kalafat, which in former days formed the *tête de pont* to the greater fortress. In the last war Omar Pasha occupied it in October, 1853, and in January, 1854, defeated a Russian corps at Citate, a village in the neighbourhood.

that thou, O most pacific of Czars, dost not unsheathe the sword of Russia for the sake of vain glory, but in the name of Christ and for our much-suffering Slavonic brethren. Not to enslave and to destroy hurlest thou thy gallant regiments across the Danube, but to create liberty and prosperity, and to call to a new and promising existence tribes of the same race and faith with ourselves. There can be no more justifiable war than this. Praising God, who commands her to take up this noble and holy quarrel, Holy Russia prays that God may enable her to show herself worthy of her mission and to carry it out to the end, notwithstanding the intrigues of our enemies and the malicious whispers of self-sufficient wisdom. Pitying the victims of war, and wishing to spare the Russian blood, so dear to thy heart, thou, O Czar, hast postponed the day of battle. The loving words thou hast spoken are a guarantee of our coming success; Russian blood will not be shed in vain. The voice of Moscow is the voice of Russia. Faithful to thy Russia, O ruling Czar, rejoice in her sustained enthusiasm in the coming hours of trial. Cast about thee our love as an impenetrable coat of mail. The love of Russia is true and firm, and will work wonders."

During the same tour of the czar, previous to his entering Roumania, he attended a grand review at Odessa. The following description by an eye-witness will be interesting as affording an idea of the cavalry, and especially of the Cossack horse, of the Russian army:—

"The troops were massed in square on the vast plain of Koulikovo. Nothing could be more variegated, original, or amusing than the sight of the compact crowds which hustled and jostled about behind the lines of police on duty. The weather was splendid, and the elegant toilettes of the ladies, and the worn-out robes of the moujiks, contrasted most strangely under the rays of the sun. The infantry does not produce that deep impression on the mind of the spectator which all who have seen a Prussian battalion manœuvring on the review ground must remember. The flat, ungainly head-dress, which

is called the *kepi*, had also decreased the picturesque value of the Russian linesman. The cavalry and artillery were admirable. It would be impossible to see, even in Germany, finer or better kept horses, harness of superior quality, or uniforms more complete or neatly trimmed. The bronze breechloaders, drawn by six noble animals, dazzled in the sun. We saw pass hussars dressed like ours, with blue vests and white facings, and red trousers; and then the Cossacks, which surprised us. They are the corps most fitted to give one an idea of regular troops and a *corps d'élite* combined. I never saw cleaner faces or better shaven chins than those of these Cossacks. They are, in fact, the spoilt children of the Grand Duke Nicholas and the public. Their uniform is of a dark-blue, with a broad red band on the trousers. They carry a carbine in a case, and in another case, slung over their back, is their wrapper. Fearing rain, they had enveloped their bearskin caps in a waterproof covering. Their lances are like those of the German Uhlans. Their horses are small, but vigorous. Banish all ancient ideas of the Cossack from your mind, and eschew such literary expressions as 'the savage sons of Ukrania,' and the like. Ukrania has remained a steppe to a certain extent; but railways traverse her soil, and her sons learn under the flag to practise the virtue of cleanliness. One thing about the artillery struck me most singularly. The band on horseback, which marched in front, did not sound the trumpet, but sang. Some of them whistled in a manner resembling the fife, and kept time with the singers. The infantry also has choristers, who are trained. This is an excellent system, for nothing enlivens the soldier when marching like music, especially the music he makes himself."

The same correspondent thus describes some torpedo experiments which took place in presence of the Russian emperor:—

"Suddenly a fearful explosion was heard. All eyes were turned towards the middle of the bay, from whence a cloud of smoke arose from the waters. It was a torpedo which had just been



fired by the sailors of the circular ironclad, on board of which the czar stood. I confess I expected something more conclusive. It is true this torpedo is nothing but a submarine cannon, which may miss its mark like any other cannon. A barge, which ought to have been blown up by the torpedo, continued its course intact. But this was only the signal for a sham combat which the commander of Odessa was about to show his Imperial Majesty. The enemy advances to bombard Odessa. Immediately the upper batteries open fire; then the lower batteries follow; and in a few minutes fifty heavy marine guns are firing at the same time. Two monitors leave to attack the enemy, and the next second the whole bay disappears in a cloud of smoke. As soon as the mist dissolves, the enemy is seen running away, followed by the monitors, while on the surface of the waters are the remnants of the vessels blown up by the torpedoes."

Before we turn aside to consider, in a separate chapter, the relations existing between England and Russia on the outbreak of the war, and the subject of British interests in general, the reader may be interested to peruse the following declaration on the Laws of War which emanated, early in June, from the International Law Society. It is a document of permanent importance, and may be taken as laying down the concise result of the legal science of war. It is signed by Dr. Bluntschli, of Heidelberg, president; E. de Parieu, of Paris, first vice-president; T. M. Asser, of Amsterdam, second vice-president; and G. Rolin-Jaequemyns, secretary:—

"The war, which has for so long a time been dreaded, has at length broken out between two great European Powers. On both sides, powerful fleets and numerous armies have commenced, or are preparing to employ all the destructive means placed at their disposal by modern science, and religious and national passions are aroused. Before such a terrible reality, it becomes the duty of all who may be able, to exercise any influence, however modest it may be, in favour of the rights of humanity. Their duty

is not so much to inquire into the cause of the struggle as to endeavour to circumscribe its effects within the limits of strict necessity. It is to remind the combatants engaged on both sides that, even in the most just wars, there are certain means of carrying on hostilities which are repulsive, and are absolutely rejected by the laws of humanity. Non-compliance with the law of warfare, as laid down in treaties or implicitly recognised, would result not only in the infliction of incalculable injuries upon individuals, but in the return, in a greater or less degree, towards barbarity by civilised Europe. Under these circumstances, the Institute of International Law cannot remain indifferent. There exists a law of warfare—imperfect, no doubt, as yet—but which, from the present time, calls upon the two belligerents to observe certain clearly-defined rules. We consider it, therefore, to be necessary to resume these rules which have either been adopted in recent treaties, or which received the approbation, and a sort of consummation, in the collective labour of the representatives of all the European states at the Brussels Conference in 1874. 1. The Paris Congress of 1856 interdicted privateering; 2. It protected sea-ports and neutral commerce from the effects of a purely fictitious blockade; and, 3. It declared exempt from seizure neutral vessels with all their cargoes, and merchandise carried under the enemies' flag, with the exception only of contraband of war. The Geneva Convention protects sick or wounded soldiers, to whatever nation they may belong; neutralises in principle military ambulances and hospitals, with their *personnel*, and, in a certain measure, relieves the inhabitants of the country invaded who may have received into their houses and nursed wounded soldiers, from the expenses and burdens of the war. The additional articles to this Convention, which was signed in 1868, have not hitherto been ratified by the Contracting Powers; but those amongst the articles which extend the Convention of 1867 to the marine were adopted as a *modus vivendi* by the belligerents during the war of 1870-71; and might not a similar measure be adopted during the present war? The declara-



ALEXANDER II., EMPEROR OF RUSSIA.





tion of St. Petersburg of 1868, prohibits the use on land or at sea of any projectile of a lesser weight than four hundred grammes, which may be explosible or charged with fulminating or inflammable matter. Lastly, the proposed International Declaration, drawn up by the Brussels Conference of 1874, sets forth the essential rules of the laws of war, such as they are recognised at the present day in all civilised states. This declaration, which was due to the initiative of the Emperor Alexander II., shows the understanding which existed amongst the able men who represented Russia and Turkey, as well as the other states of Europe. It is true that up to the present time it has not received official sanction, but it ought not the less—having regard to its nature and its origin—to be considered as the reasonable expression of the obligations which European peoples now impose upon belligerent armies, as well as on the inhabitants of invaded countries, and it would on this account be eminently advisable to adopt it as a basis of instructions to be given to the belligerents or other respective armies. In any case, a state or an army which should neglect to comply with these rules would incur the reprobation of public opinion, and would lose all its honour as a power or a civilised army. This declaration adopts the following rules, the obligatory force of which appears to be incontestable :—

“1. The peaceable inhabitants of a country occupied by the enemy ought to be respected and protected as far as possible—viz., as far as the security of the invading army and military requirements will permit, and to be secured in the possession of their property, their institutions, their customs, and their rights and liberties.

“2. The honour and the rights of families, the lives and property of individuals, as well as their religious convictions and their creed, should under all circumstances be respected.

“3. The useless destruction and seizure of works of art and science, of religious, charitable, educational, artistic or scientific establishments, should be interdicted.

“4. The inhabitants may defend their coun-

try on condition that they bear arms openly, obey the orders of a responsible chief, and conform to the laws and customs of warfare; but irregular combatants who, ignoring the laws of war, perpetrate acts of brigandage and violence, would be justly punished.

“5. The use of poison or of poisoned arms, the murder by poison, or the killing of an enemy without defence, should not be considered lawful means of warfare.

“6. No places but those which are defended by the enemy should be bombarded, and even in this case all measures should be rather compatible with the requirements of the attack; and under no circumstance should a city, taken by assault, be given up to pillage.

“7. Should be considered as spies, and punished as such, only those persons who have acted *clandestinely and under false pretence*; and not soldiers without disguise, or messengers who accomplish their mission openly.

“8. Prisoners of war should be humanely treated—the object of their captivity should not be to inflict punishment upon them, but to keep them in a place of safety.

“9. The inhabitants of the invaded country should not be called upon to take up arms against their country.

“10. All pillage should be interdicted.

“11. War contributions and requisitions should only be imposed under determined conditions and limits.

“12. Flags of truce should be inviolable; but it should be lawful to take measures to prevent the bearers from procuring—by virtue of their privileged situation—information concerning the enemy's armies.

“13. Capitulations and armistices should be rigorously observed; and the terms of capitulation should never be contrary to military honour.

“We know well (the document concludes) how difficult it is, in the midst of the perils of warfare, to keep the rigorous precepts of humanity in mind. The soldier, excited by the heat of the combat, by the intoxication of victory, or



by the desire of self-preservation, is only too naturally induced to violate, without reflection, as without scruple, the rules of moderation which he himself fully approves when in his calmer moments. But the supreme end of the law, which is to secure and to maintain humane relations between the contending forces, should not the less predominate throughout the war itself; and this truth cannot be too often repeated to those who govern peoples or command armies."

## CHAPTER XII.

### "BRITISH INTERESTS."

THE great concern which had been felt in England from the first moment when the difficulties of the Eastern question were fully realised in this country was of course intensified by the actual outbreak of hostilities. The danger lest we should sooner or later be drawn into the conflict was manifest to us all, whatever might be our views of the right and wrong of the question, or of the policy which it would best become us to pursue.

There were two extreme sections of Englishmen, whose opinions at this time attracted a great amount of attention, rather for their extravagance than for any other reason. The first of these were the men who had allowed their indignation against Turkish crimes to carry them to the point of desiring an alliance with Russia, in order to coerce the Porte by force of arms, and who, failing that, candidly expressed their satisfaction at the punishment which the Mussulman oppressors were about to receive. They seem to have been animated by something of the spirit of the Old Testament warriors, who smote their enemies "in the name of the Lord," and hewed them hip and thigh, as a grateful service to the God of battles.

On the other hand, there were those who refused to see any ground of action in the terrible oppressions of the Porte, and clung to the an-

cient policy of supporting Turkey under all circumstances against Russia. The sentiments of this latter section are nowhere more clearly expressed than in the despatches from Sir Henry Elliot, our representative at Constantinople up to the closing of the Conference.\* In one of these despatches Sir Henry wrote:—"We may indeed, and we must, feel indignant at the needless and monstrous severity with which the Bulgarian insurrection was put down, but the necessity which exists for England to prevent changes from occurring here which would be most detrimental to ourselves is not affected by the question, whether it was ten thousand or twenty thousand persons who perished in the suppression. We have been upholding what we knew to be a semi-civilised nation, liable under certain circumstances to be carried into fearful excesses, but the fact of this having just now been strikingly brought home to us cannot be sufficient reason for abandoning a policy which is the only one that can be followed with due regard to our own interests."

Between these two extreme views of British interests in the Eastern question, there was room for an endless variety of opinions. The controversy as to our true and most politic course as a nation is even still undecided, and it would perhaps be in vain to expect that it will ever be finally set at rest. It is, however, most important that we should bear in mind the meaning attached to this expression by the English government, and the light in which our legitimate concerns in the East were regarded, throughout the war, by Russia. For this reason, it will be necessary to study the terms of certain documents exchanged during the first weeks of the war between the English and Russian governments.

It has been stated above that the English government disapproved of Russia's action in going to war with Turkey after the failure of the Conference. The Foreign Secretary's despatch was couched in the following terms:—

\* He was appointed, after a short interval, to the embassy at Vienna.

"Foreign Office, May 1st, 1877.

"MY LORD—I forwarded to your Excellency, in my despatch of the 24th ult., a copy of Prince Gortschakoff's circular despatch of the 7-19th ult., announcing that the Emperor of Russia had given orders to his armies to cross the frontiers of Turkey.

"Her Majesty's government have received this communication with deep regret. They cannot accept the statements and conclusions with which Prince Gortschakoff has accompanied it, as justifying the resolution thus taken.

"The Protocol to which her Majesty's government, at the instance of that of Russia, recently became parties, required from the sultan no fresh guarantees for the reform of his administration. With a view of enabling Russia the better to abstain from isolated action, it affirmed the interests taken in common by the Powers in the condition of the Christian populations of Turkey. It went on to declare that the Powers would watch carefully the manner in which the promises of the Ottoman government were carried into effect; and that, should their hopes once more be disappointed, they reserved to themselves the right to consider in common the means which they might deem best fitted to secure the well-being of the Christian populations and the interests of the general peace.

"To these declarations of the intentions of the Powers the consent of the Porte was not asked or required. The Porte, no doubt, has thought fit—unfortunately, in the opinion of her Majesty's government—to protest against the expressions in question, as implying an encroachment on the sultan's sovereignty and independence. But while so doing, and while declaring that they cannot consider the Protocol as having any binding character on Turkey, the Turkish government have again affirmed their intention of carrying into execution the reforms already promised.

"Her Majesty's government cannot therefore admit, as is contended by Prince Gortschakoff, that the answer of the Porte removed all hope of deference on its part to the wishes and advice

of Europe, and all security for the application of the suggested reforms. Nor are they of opinion that the terms of the note necessarily precluded the possibility of the conclusion of peace with Montenegro, or of the arrangement of mutual disarmament. Her Majesty's government still believe that, with patience and moderation on both sides, these objects might not improbably have been attained.

"Prince Gortschakoff, however, asserts that all opening is now closed for attempts at conciliation; that the emperor has resolved to undertake the task of obtaining by coercion that which the unanimous efforts of all the Powers have failed to obtain from the Porte by persuasion; and he expresses his Imperial Majesty's conviction that this step is in accordance with the sentiments and the interests of Europe.

It cannot be expected that her Majesty's government should agree in this view. They have not concealed their feeling that the presence of large Russian forces on the frontiers of Turkey, menacing its safety, rendering disarmament impossible, and exciting a feeling of apprehension and fanaticism among the Mussulman population, constituted a material obstacle to internal pacification and reform. They cannot believe that the entrance of those armies on Turkish soil will alleviate the difficulty, or improve the condition of the Christian population throughout the sultan's dominions.

"But the course on which the Russian government has entered involves graver and more serious considerations. It is in contravention of the stipulation of the Treaty of Paris of March 30th, 1856, by which Russia and the other signatory Powers engaged, each on its own part, to respect the independence and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman empire. In the Conferences of London of 1871, at the close of which the above stipulation, with others, was again confirmed, the Russian Plenipotentiary, in common with those of the other Powers, signed a declaration, affirming it to be 'an essential principle of the law of nations, that no Power can liberate itself from the engagements of a Treaty, nor modify



the stipulations thereof, unless with the consent of the contracting parties by means of an amicable arrangement.

"In taking action against Turkey on his own part, and having recourse to arms without further consultation with his allies, the Emperor of Russia has separated himself from the European concert hitherto maintained, and has at the same time departed from the rule to which he himself had solemnly recorded his consent.

"It is impossible to foresee the consequences of such an act. Her Majesty's government would willingly have refrained from making any observations in regard to it; but as Prince Gortschakoff seems to assume, in a declaration addressed to all the governments of Europe, that Russia is acting in the interest of Great Britain and that of the other Powers, they feel bound to state, in a manner equally formal and public, that the decision of the Russian government is not one which can have their concurrence or approval.

"I am &c., DERBY."

Five days later, Lord Derby sent a further despatch to the Russian government, by the hands of Count Schouvaloff, in which he clearly defined the "interests" of England in Turkey, as understood by the Cabinet. The document has constantly been referred to, on many subsequent occasions.

"Foreign Office, May 6, 1877.

"M. L'AMBASSADEUR—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter of the 6th inst., in which you inform me that you are about to proceed to Russia on a short leave of absence.

"As your Excellency will then doubtless have an opportunity of personally conferring with your government, I take this occasion of placing before them some considerations of importance to the future good understanding between Great Britain and Russia.

"Her Majesty's government do not propose again to enter on the question of the justice or necessity of the present war; they have already expressed their views with regard to it, and

further discussion would be unavailing. They have accepted the obligations which a state of war imposed upon them, and have lost no time in issuing a Proclamation of Neutrality. They from the first warned the Porte that it must not look to them for assistance, and they are determined to carry impartially into effect the policy thus announced, so long as Turkish interests alone are involved.

"At the same time they think it right that there should be no misunderstanding as to their position and intentions. Should the war now in progress unfortunately spread, interests may be imperilled which they are equally bound and determined to defend, and it is desirable that they should make it clear, so far as at the outset of the war can be done, what the most prominent of those interests are.

"Foremost among them is the necessity of keeping open, uninjured and uninterrupted, the communication between Europe and the East by the Suez Canal. An attempt to blockade or otherwise to interfere with the canal or its approaches would be regarded by them as a menace to India, and as a grave injury to the commerce of the world. On both these grounds, any such step—which they hope and fully believe there is no intention on the part of either belligerent to take—would be inconsistent with the maintenance by them of an attitude of passive neutrality.

"The mercantile and financial interests of European nations are also so largely involved in Egypt, that an attack on that country, or its occupation, even temporarily, for purposes of war, could scarcely be regarded with unconcern by the Neutral Powers, certainly not by England.

"The vast importance of Constantinople, whether in a military, a political, or a commercial point of view, is too well understood to require explanation. It is therefore scarcely necessary to point out that her Majesty's government are not prepared to witness with indifference the passing into other hands than those of its present possessors of a capital holding so peculiar and so commanding a position.

"The existing arrangements, made under European sanction, which regulate the navigation of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, appear to them wise and salutary, and there would be, in their judgment, serious objections to their alteration in any material particular.

"Her Majesty's government have thought it right thus frankly to indicate their views. The course of events might show that there were still other interests, as, for instance, on the Persian Gulf, which it would be their duty to protect; but they do not doubt that they will have sufficiently pointed out to your Excellency the limits within which they hope the war may be confined, or, at all events, those within which they themselves would be prepared, so far as present circumstances allow of an opinion being formed, to maintain a policy of abstention and neutrality.

"They feel confident that the Emperor of Russia will appreciate their desire to make their policy understood at the outset of the war, and thus to respond to the assurances given by his Imperial Majesty at Livadia, and published at your Excellency's request, when he pledged his word of honour that he had no intention of acquiring Constantinople, and that, if necessity should oblige him to occupy a portion of Bulgaria, it would only be provisionally, and until the peace and safety of the Christian population were secured.

"Her Majesty's government cannot better show their confidence in these declarations of his Imperial Majesty than by requesting your Excellency to be so good as to convey to the Emperor and the Russian government the frank explanations of British policy which I have had the honour of thus offering to you.

"I have, &c.,

"DERBY."

To this important memorandum the Russian government replied, after a considerable delay, in the following terms:—

St. Petersburg, May 18-30, 1877.

"M. LE COMTE—Your Excellency has been

entrusted by Lord Derby with a letter which develops the views of the English Cabinet as regards the questions which might be implicated in the present war, and would affect interests that England ought to defend.

"His Majesty the Emperor has perused it with deep interest, and appreciates the frankness of explanations, the object of which is to remove misunderstandings between the two governments.

"Our august Master instructs me to respond with complete reciprocity by putting you in a position to develop with equal frankness and with equal clearness our views both on the points raised by Lord Derby and on those that affect interests which his Imperial Majesty is bound on his side to protect.

"The Imperial Cabinet will neither blockade, nor interrupt, nor in any way menace the navigation of the Suez Canal. They consider the canal as an international work, in which the commerce of the world is interested, and which should be kept free from any attack.

"Egypt is a part of the Ottoman empire, and its contingents figure in the Turkish army. Russia might, therefore, consider herself at war with Egypt. Nevertheless, the Imperial Cabinet does not overlook either the European interests engaged in the country, or those of England in particular. They will not bring Egypt within the radius of their military operations.

"As far as concerns Constantinople, without being able to prejudge the course or issue of the war, the Imperial Cabinet repeats that the acquisition of that capital is excluded from the views of his Majesty the Emperor. They recognise that, in any case, the future of Constantinople is a question of common interest, which cannot be settled otherwise than by a general understanding, and that, if the possession of that city were to be put in question, it could not be allowed to belong to any of the European Powers.

"As regards the Straits, although their two shores belong to the same sovereign, they form the only outlet of two great seas in which all the world has interests. It is, therefore, import-



ant, in the interests of peace and of the general balance of power, that this question should be settled by a common agreement on equitable and efficiently guaranteed bases.

"Lord Derby has alluded to other British interests which might be affected by the eventual extension of the war, such as the Persian Gulf and the route to India. The Imperial Cabinet declares that it will not extend the war beyond what is required for the loudly and clearly declared object for which his Majesty the Emperor was obliged to take up arms. They will respect the British interests mentioned by Lord Derby as long as England remains neutral.

"They have a right to expect that the English government will, on their side, in like manner take into fair consideration the particular interests which Russia has at stake in this war, and in view of which she has imposed such great sacrifices on herself.

"These consist in the absolute necessity of putting an end to the deplorable condition of the Christians under Turkish rule, and to the chronic state of disturbance provoked by it.

"This state of things, and the acts of violence resulting from it, excite in Russia an agitation caused by the Christian feeling so profound in the Russian people, and by the ties of faith and race which unite them to a great part of the Christian population of Turkey. The Imperial government is the more obliged to take account of this since it reacts both on the internal and external situation of the empire. At each of these crises the policy of Russia is suspected and accused; and her international relations, her commerce, her finances, and her credit, are affected.

"His Majesty the Emperor cannot leave Russia indefinitely exposed to these disastrous accidents, which check her peaceful development and cause her incalculable injury.

It is in order to dry up their source that his Imperial Majesty has decided to impose upon his country the burden of the war.

"The object cannot be attained unless the Christian populations of Turkey are placed in a

position in which their existence and security will be effectually guaranteed against the intolerable abuses of Turkish administration. This interest, which is a vital one for Russia, is not opposed to any of the interests of Europe, which suffers too, on her side, from the precarious state of the East.

"The Imperial Cabinet endeavoured to attain the desired end with the co-operation of the friendly and allied Powers.

"Forced now to pursue it alone, our august Master is resolved not to lay down his arms without having completely, surely, and effectually guaranteed it.

"Be good enough to lay these views before Lord Derby, stating to him that the Imperial Cabinet has a right to hope that the government of her Britannic Majesty will appreciate them with the same spirit of fairness that induces us to respect the interests of England, and that they will draw from them the same conclusion as ourselves—namely, that there is nothing in the views that have been exchanged with reciprocal frankness between the two governments which cannot be reconciled, so as to maintain their amicable relations and the peace of the East and of Europe.

"Receive, &c.,

"GORTSCHAKOFF."

The effect of this important interchange of notes was that Russia freely and frankly accepted the reservations placed by England upon her neutrality in the war, which was clearly understood to be conditional upon the observance of the stipulations laid down by our Foreign Secretary. The position which we thus took up was confirmed on many subsequent occasions—notably in a speech by Mr. Cross, the Home Secretary, in the House of Commons, which embodied Lord Derby's statements in the despatch of May 6th.

On many occasions also the Russian government made a point of repeating its assurances that it would respect English interests, and that it acknowledged England's right to place the

specified conditions on her neutrality. In particular, the Russian Chancellor several times declared that the army would not enter Constantinople on any pretext, except one of absolute military necessity.

The question of the Suez Canal came to the front more than once during the war between Russia and Turkey. The sovereign rights over the canal were exercised by the Khedive of Egypt, subject of course to the suzerainty over the latter by the sultan; and thus it was strictly within the competence of Russia to bring the important waterway into the sphere of her operations. This was especially open to her after the khedive, in accordance with the terms of his vassalage, had sent a contingent of troops to the Porte, who opposed the Russians in the field. Prince Gortschakoff, however, undertook that the canal should not be made the scene of hostilities—showing in this case, as in regard to our other interests in the East, a natural desire to avoid a conflict with England.

Early in the course of the war, in the first half of the month of May, M. de Lesseps conceived the idea of permanently neutralising the waters of the canal in which he has such a large concern; and he accordingly approached our Foreign Office on the subject. The following correspondence, presented to Parliament on the 5th of June, will explain the proceedings which took place in connexion with these negotiations, and will also render clear the actual state of affairs in respect of the canal in time of war.

(No. 1.)

“THE EARL OF DERBY TO LORD LYONS.

“Foreign Office, May 16th.

“MY LORD—M. de Lesseps called upon me at the Foreign Office on the 10th inst., having, as he stated, come expressly from Paris to lay before her Majesty’s government a project for regulating the passage of ships of war through the Suez Canal.

“I received him in company with the Chancel-

lor of the Exchequer, and he handed me the draught project, of which I enclose a copy.

“After some conversation, I told him that the question of the position of the Suez Canal under present circumstances was a difficult and delicate one, and that I could not then say more than that the project which he had been good enough to submit to me should have full consideration.

“Her Majesty’s government have since carefully considered the project, and have come to the conclusion that the scheme proposed in it for the neutralisation of the canal by an International Convention is open to so many objections of a political and practical character that they could not undertake to recommend it for the acceptance of the Porte and the Powers.

“Her Majesty’s government are, at the same time, deeply sensible of the importance to Great Britain and other neutral Powers of preventing the canal being injured or blocked up by either of the belligerents in the present war, and your Excellency is at liberty to inform M. de Lesseps that her Majesty’s government has intimated to the Russian Ambassador that an attempt to blockade or otherwise to interfere with the canal or its approaches would be regarded by her Majesty’s government as a menace to India, and as a grave injury to the commerce of the world. I added that on both these grounds any such step—which her Majesty’s government hope and fully believe there is no intention on the part of either belligerent to take—would be incompatible with the maintenance by Her Majesty’s government of an attitude of passive neutrality.

“Her Majesty’s government will cause the Porte and the khedive to be made acquainted with the intimation thus conveyed to the Russian government, and her Majesty’s Ambassador at Constantinople and agent in Egypt will be instructed to state that her Majesty’s government will expect that the Porte and the khedive will, on their side, abstain from impeding the navigation of the canal, or adopting any measures likely to injure the canal or its approaches, and that her Majesty’s government are firmly deter-



mined not to permit the canal to be made the scene of any combat or other warlike operations.

"In stating this to M. de Lesseps, your Excellency will explain that her Majesty's government have thus taken the initiative in regard to the protection of the canal, on account of the pressing necessity, as regards British interests, of maintaining the security of the canal; and they do not doubt that, if the canal were to be seriously menaced, the French and other governments would adopt a similar course.

"I am, &c.,

"DERBY."

(*Inclosure I. in No. 1.*)

"MEMORANDUM BY M. DE LESSEPS.

"THE very clear declaration made by the English government to the two Houses of Parliament in its resolution to maintain the freedom of the passage of the Suez Canal, for its men-of-war, has led me to believe that there might now be an opportunity of concluding an agreement with other governments on this subject.

"As president of the financial company with which England is connected, I submit to Lord Derby a project, simply expressing my personal views, which I have reason to believe the Duc Decazes would be disposed to adhere to, after a private conversation which I had with him yesterday morning.

"Should the British Minister not think it well to initiate negotiations with the other Cabinets, I would make at Paris, to the representatives of the several Powers interested, the overtures which I have made to Lord Derby and the Duc Decazes.

"FERD. DE LESSEPS."

London, May 10th, 1877.

(*Inclosure II. in No 1.*)

"INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT AS TO PASSAGE OF SHIPS OF WAR THROUGH THE SUEZ CANAL.

"SINCE the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the complete liberty of passage through the Maritime Canal, and the ports connected with it, has been respected for state vessels as well as for merchant ships, even on the part of belligerent Powers at the time of the Franco-German War.

"The governments of ——— now agree to maintain the same liberty to all national or commercial vessels, whatever may be their flag and without any exception, it being understood that national ships will be subject to the measures which the territorial authority may take to prevent ships in transit from disembarking on Egyptian territory any troops or munitions of war."

(No 2.)

"THE EARL OF DERBY TO MR. LAYARD.

"Foreign Office, May 16th.

"SIR—I transmit to your Excellency herewith a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, respecting a project, of which a copy is also enclosed, communicated to me by M. de Lesseps for the neutralisation of the Suez Canal.

"Your Excellency will see that her Majesty's government have declined to adopt that project, but have informed M. de Lesseps of the intimation made by her Majesty's government to the Russian Ambassador that an attempt to blockade, or otherwise to interfere with the canal or its approaches, would be regarded by her government as a menace to India, and as a grave injury to the commerce of the world, and that on both these grounds any such step—which her Majesty's government hope and fully believe there is no intention on the part of either belligerent to

take, would be incompatible with the maintenance by her Majesty's government of an attitude of passive neutrality.

"I have to request your Excellency to acquaint the Porte with the intimation thus conveyed to the Russian government, and to state that her Majesty's government will expect that the Porte and the Khedive will, on their side, abstain from impeding the navigation of the canal, or adopting any measures likely to injure the canal or its approaches, and that her Majesty's government are firmly determined not to permit the canal to be made the scene of any combat or other warlike operations.

"I have addressed a similar despatch to her Majesty's agent and consul-general in Egypt.

"I am, &c.,

"DERBY."

The refusal on the part of our government to co-operate for the neutralisation of the Suez Canal strengthened the belief of many Englishmen that the policy of Lord Beaconsfield and his colleagues would be to acquire for this country certain exclusive rights over the waterway; and no doubt the idea harmonised with the purchase of shares in the canal, effected in the preceding year. On subsequent occasions, however, more than one member of the Cabinet disclaimed any such intention; and it does not appear that efforts were ever seriously made to pave the way for the acquisition of Egypt, or the suzerainty of Egypt, or even the entire proprietorship of the canal.

Notwithstanding this, it has been constantly maintained, and is still maintained by a large number of persons, that the best or only satisfactory issue of the Eastern question, so far as regards British interests, would be one in which we should obtain supremacy in Egypt, in one shape or another. Apart from the points in which Europe may be held to have common concern in the fate of Turkey—the aggrandisement of Russia, the position of the Slavonic Principalities and States, and the navigation of the Danube and the Dardanelles—the only inte-

rests of England are those which affect our route to India, and our prestige and prospects in India. Now, it is clear that our possession of the Suez Canal, or at all events our supremacy on the banks of the canal, would be the best guarantee which we could have that the nearest ocean-way to India could be perpetually kept open for us. Holding Egypt, it would be a matter of comparative indifference to us who owned, or exercised paramount influence in, the south-eastern corner of Europe. And if, in addition to this, the neutrality of the Dardanelles could be established under a European guarantee, England could scarcely desire a more complete provision for the safety of her route to the East. This view, however, does not seem to have commended itself to the English Cabinet; and it must be allowed that there were other considerations involved which could not easily be overlooked. A good deal of jealousy or annoyance at the Russian triumphs over Turkey may be accounted for by the fact that Russia was looked on by Englishmen as the enemy of twenty years ago, and that her government had been rendered odious by oppressions which had deeply moved our indignation. But there was also in this country another cause of jealousy against Russia, which played a very natural and very important part in the history of the time.

It was believed by many, and is believed to this day, that Russia had a design to attack us in India, or at all events to undermine our prestige and influence among the populations of southern Asia. It was therefore argued, more especially as a large proportion of our Indian subjects are Mahomedans, that our truest national policy would be to close with Russia at the first moment, and protect Turkey against her aggression. It was held that the destruction of the Turkish power in Europe, and the definitive success of Russia in the Balkan Peninsula and in Armenia, would redound to our great discredit in the East, and would even jeopardise our empire in India. The views of this party did not prevail; but there were few who did not recognise the reason clearly underlying their arguments.



Our course throughout has been a choice between various evils; and it is to our credit as a nation that we have not made duty and principle yield to what appeared, at any particular moment, to be important to British interests.

## CHAPTER XIII.

### THE FIRST ADVANCE IN ARMENIA.

THE Russians, as we have already seen, crossed the Asiatic frontier of Turkey immediately after the Czar's Manifesto of April the 24th. The principal body of the army of the Caucasus, as the forces intended for operations in Asia were called, under the command of Adjutant-General Loris Melikoff, advanced from Alexandropol upon Kars, while two other detachments marched upon Batoum and Bayazid, to the right and left respectively. The Turkish army was under the command of Mukhtar Pasha. General Melikoff at once set to work to cut off the communications between Kars and Erzeroum, and for this purpose sent out a body of cavalry to destroy the telegraphs. This they accomplished without difficulty, and, coming upon a Turkish detachment under the command of Mukhtar Pasha, who was falling back on Erzeroum, pursued and engaged them; while twelve battalions of grenadiers were at once despatched by the commander-in-chief to turn the Turkish flank at Kars, and press on to Vesinkoi *en route* for Ardahan.

General Melikoff did not think it necessary to follow Mukhtar Pasha, who, leaving a strong garrison at Kars, fell steadily back, and finally encamped on the slopes of the Soghanli range, where he employed himself in strengthening his position and collecting reinforcements.

The troops under the command of General Tergukassoff, marching upon Bayazid from Erivan, reached their destination on the morning of April 30th, and, without firing a single shot, took possession of the town and citadel, the

Turkish garrison beating a hasty retreat to the hills.

The detachment under Lieutenant-General Oklobjio, marching upon Batoum, had a serious encounter with the Turks, and succeeded in wresting from them the barrack camp of Muchaster.

Various engagements took place during the first three weeks of the war, of which very exaggerated reports reached us from time to time; but no event of real importance occurred until Ardahan was taken on the 17th of May. By this achievement the Russians opened up for themselves a direct road to Erzeroum in addition to the difficult route across the Soghanli Dag. A correspondent of the "Daily News" gives the following description of the capture of Ardahan:—

"Ardahan was captured on May 17th, twenty-three days after the declaration of war. The Russians, marching from Alexandropol, had already, on May 10th or 12th, arrived at Oltehek, near Kars, on the road between that place and Ardahan, and the communication between those two places was thus cut off. This detachment seems to have made a demonstration against Kars, and at the same time a real attack against Ardahan. In addition to this, Ardahan was attacked from the opposite side by a detachment marching from Akhaltsik on the frontier, which reached Ardahan at the same time as the column from Kars. They were before Ardahan on May 13th, and General Loris Melikoff immediately began making reconnaissances and combining a plan of attack. The column from Kars consisted of two regiments of grenadiers, three batteries of artillery, two regiments of cavalry, and a company of sappers, in all about seven thousand five hundred men, under the command of General Dewel. The column from Akhaltsik was composed of two regiments of infantry, two batteries of artillery, one battalion of sappers, half a battery of horse artillery, and three regiments of cavalry, in all about eight thousand five hundred men, under the command of General Gaiman. The Commander-in-Chief of the two columns was

General Loris Melikoff, under whose direction the attack was made.

"Ardahan is situated near the head waters of the river Kur, the same which runs through Tiflis and flows into the Caspian. The fortress is comparatively new, and did not exist in 1854. It was strongly fortified, defended by eleven forts constructed on modern plans, and one, it was said, on designs drawn up by an English engineer. On the south defending the road from Kars, distant two and a half miles from the town, was the fort of Guli-verdi, built upon a mountain and armed with nine guns, and near to it was another fort armed with three or four guns, on a hill dominated by Guli-verdi, from which it was separated by a valley only two or three hundred yards wide. Near the town, on the same side of the river, were three more forts: on the west Makhrah-tabia, in the centre Akhali-tabia, and on the east Singer-tabia. This latter is the one which was supposed to have been designed by an English engineer, and was of somewhat curious construction. There were three lines of defence, the escarpments were faced with stone, and they were built in a triangular shape, with the points towards the attack, and each line of defence rising terrace-like higher than the one before it. On the north side of the river there was another fort called Kai-tabia, which was connected with the southern side by two bridges, and on the north of the town, about two miles distant, was another strong fortress, called Ramazan-tabia, built like that of Guli-verdi, on a steep mountain which overlooks the town. The garrison, destined to defend all these forts, seems to have consisted of about eight thousand men, and all the forts together were armed with ninety-two guns. The greater part of these guns, however, were of small calibre, besides being old, and quite unable to compete with modern artillery. There seems to have been only two twenty-four pounders in all, the rest being principally twelve-pounders, and there is every reason to believe that there was very little ammunition even for these guns, such as they were.

"General Melikoff, after reconnoitring the place, decided to make his real attack on the south against Guli-verdi, while the Akhaltsik columns made a feigned attack against the fortress of Ramazan-tabia on the north. In the first place, the fortress of Guli-verdi seemed more accessible, and he besides discovered that Ramazan-tabia was not armed against the town, and that the guns of this fortress could not be directed against an attack from the south. On the night of May 16th he succeeded in planting four batteries, consisting altogether of sixteen guns, against Guli-verdi on three different points, and on the morning of the 17th the batteries opened on the fort, and poured a well-directed and destructive fire into the Turkish batteries. The Turks scarcely replied, either because the Russian fire dismounted their batteries, or because they had little or no ammunition, or it may have been in part owing to both these causes. However that may be, the whole Russian loss by the Turkish artillery was only six men wounded. About one o'clock the Russians began to perceive the Turks retreating in small parties from the fort to the town. In the evening General Dewel led three battalions to the assault of the heights of Guli-verdi, and carried them without losing a man and without firing a shot. The Turks offered little resistance, and, in fact, the fort seems to have been nearly abandoned when the assault was made. They found several of the guns dismounted, and the gunners lying dead beside them, and a considerable number of killed and wounded in the fort. As soon as Guli-verdi was taken, one of the Russian batteries which had been directed against that fortress was now turned towards the town, which was still defended by the forts, already mentioned, of Makhrah-tabia, Akhali-tabia, and Singer-tabia.

"While this attack was being directed against Guli-verdi, several other batteries had been planted and directed against the three forts defending the town. By half-past five in the evening of the same day General Melikoff thought that the assault might be delivered, and General Gaiman, who was operating on the left,



sent at about the same moment to ask if he should not make an attempt upon the works on his side. The assault was ordered all along the line at the same moment, and, although the fort of Singer-tabia was considered the strongest, it was the one which fell first. The others soon followed, although the Turks, as is usual with them, made a very desperate resistance on the walls, for they seem to have had plenty of ammunition for their small arms. After a desperate fight, in which the principal losses of the Russians occurred, the Turks were finally driven across the river by the two bridges already spoken of, and took refuge in the fort of Kai-tabia, everywhere hotly pursued by the Russians. When the latter, headed by General Gaiman, were a few yards from the opposite bank, the bridge gave way before them, but nothing daunted, the Russians sprang into the water, which fortunately was not very deep, and continued to cross by wading. General Gaiman himself was one of the first to leap into the water. The Russians had now possession of all the forts on the south side of the river; there remained only the fort of Kai-tabia and the fortress of Ramazan-tabia on the mountain. The Russians immediately attacked Kai-tabia, and the Turks were so discouraged by the Russian success that they scarcely made any resistance and fled. In fact, they had already begun to fly before the Russian attack began, so that by dark the town of Ardahan was in complete possession of the Russians. While this was going on General Dewel was occupying the attention of the garrison in the strong fortress of Ramazan-tabia on the north of the town. He soon succeeded in silencing the batteries in this fortress, which only fired three or four shots in all, and towards evening, about the time of the assault on the town, he likewise ordered an assault. But what was the surprise of the Russians, upon entering the fortress, to find that the Turks had all fled. They had evidently become panic-stricken when they perceived that the town was already in the hands of the Russians, and they had retreated to the west by the road towards Batoum.

"The Russian losses in the whole affair were sixty-seven killed and two hundred and ninety-three wounded, besides one officer killed and ten officers wounded, making altogether three hundred and seventy killed and wounded. The loss of the Turks, owing to the superiority of the Russian arms and the precision of the Russian firing, was immense. The account given by the Russian officer of the Turkish losses seems too absurd to be true. He says that the Russians buried one thousand seven hundred dead, and that two hundred wounded were found in the hospital, besides which the Turks had carried off the greater part of their wounded, as many bodies were found along the roads on which the Turks had retreated, evidently the bodies of the wounded who had died on the way. Among the wounded in the hospital was the constructor of the fort of Singer-tabia. He was found by Colonel Boolmering, the constructor of the Russian batteries, who was anxious to see him and talk with him, but the poor fellow died almost as soon as he was discovered. The Russians captured ninety-two guns, an immense number of tents and camp material, also a large supply of flour and provisions, but they do not speak of any ammunition, and I suspect that the Turks had little or none. There were very few prisoners taken, and those of the Redifs, or reserves, who had been forced to come in from the surrounding villages, were immediately released and allowed to return to their homes; the Nizans, or regular troops only, were held as prisoners of war. Among the prisoners taken was General Ali Pacha, commander of the Turkish left wing, and several Turkish civil officials, besides many officers who had been wounded or otherwise disabled. The inhabitants who had fled during the attack, upon being assured by the Russians that no harm should come to them, began to return, and in a very few days the town had resumed very nearly its ordinary aspect. The Turks taken prisoners had a feeble half-starved look, which showed how long they had been on short rations, and this in spite of the large supply of stores and

provisions which had been found in the town."

The miserable appearance of the Turkish soldiers is easily accounted for. The whole army, and, indeed, the whole of the forces on which the safety of the Ottoman empire depended, had been neglected and mismanaged in a most shameful way. The men were only half-fed, they had few of the conveniences indispensable to the well-being of soldiers in the field, their pay was in arrears, and their officers were incompetent. The Turkish Seraskierate, or War Office, was unable to bear the strain suddenly brought upon it, and gave no efficient assistance to its commanders, even when their capabilities had been proved and tested. Perhaps, also, the energies of the authorities in the capital were directed chiefly, and in the first instance, to the armies in Bulgaria. At all events, very little assistance was given during the earlier weeks of the campaign to the army of Mukhtar Pasha.

The original line of defence for the Turks in Armenia was that which runs through Bayazid, Kars, Ardahan and Batoum; and of these four towns the Russians had captured, by the middle of May, the first and the third. The Turks held Batoum to the end of the war; Kars was fast becoming isolated; and it was necessary for Mukhtar Pasha to take up new positions before Erzeroum. This he did, arranging his forces in the shape of an angle, having its apex in front of the Soghanli Dag, and extending its right branch to Topra Kaleh, with two advanced battalions nearer to Bayazid. The left wing of the Turks should have consisted of the force which had occupied Ardahan; but the demoralisation of that defeat had rendered the escaping forces comparatively useless. They seem, indeed, to have dispersed to their homes, which lay along the route by which they had fled; and it is a fact that the Russians, subsequently advancing along the Bardes and Olti road, found very little to oppose them in the shape of a left wing of the Turkish army.

Thirty of the sixty Russian battalions engaged in the assault on Ardahan turned immediately

on Kars, in order to assist in the investment of that fortress, and in severing its communications with Mukhtar Pasha's head-quarters. This, however, was by no means an easy task to accomplish, and it was never completely carried out during the summer months. Meanwhile, there were numerous cavalry engagements, of greater or less importance, between the Cossack horse on one side, and the Circassians and Kurds on the other. Early in June, Moussa Pasha, with a body of Circassians and Kurds, making a reconnaissance in the direction of Kars, was fallen upon and severely punished by the Russians. The "*Journal de St. Petersbourg*" published the following official report from the Grand Duke Michael to the Emperor of Russia, of the engagement which took place at the village of Begli-Akhmet, and in which the Turkish cavalry were reported to have been almost entirely annihilated:—"I hasten to forward to your Imperial Majesty the happy intelligence of a brilliant cavalry engagement which took place at the village of Begli-Akhmet. General Loris Melikoff's aide-de-camp, who arrived on the 17th at Hadji with a division of grenadiers, had been informed that the enemy's cavalry under Moussa Pacha had descended from Sag-anloug on the road to Kars, and he despatched on the same evening to Ardost the second cavalry division, with the second Dhagestan Regiment and sixteen pieces of mounted artillery, under the command of Major-General Prince Tchav-tchavadzé. At midnight this column perceived the camp fires of the enemy's cavalry, who were bivouacking at Begli. The camp was at once attacked on three sides. The Turks opposed a stubborn resistance, but after a prolonged hand to hand struggle, in which the brave dragoons of Nijni-Novgorod greatly distinguished themselves, the enemy was put to flight. We captured two mountain cannons and four ammunition waggons, two colours, and a number of arms. A superior officer of the Turkish regular army is among the prisoners. We lost an officer of the Nijni-Novgorod dragoons, and six men killed, and thirty wounded. The number of horses killed and wounded is fifty-one. The enemy



left eighty-three dead on the field. The commander of the Russian troops has established himself near Ardost."

Of the irregular horse in the armies of the sultan, which were destined to figure so frequently in the history of the war, those who had an opportunity of seeing them, and marking their behaviour, have given us no very favourable account. They were serviceable chiefly on outpost, reconnaissance, and vedette duty; but the harm which they did by their lawlessness, and by the constant scandal which their conduct raised amongst civilised nations, more than counterbalanced any good which they may have done to their commanders. Their appearance was, no doubt, picturesque enough. A "Daily News" correspondent, writing from Asia Minor, describes the entrance of a large force of Circassians into the camp on the Soghanli slopes. "They came filing two deep in lengthy column over the hill-side, each of the five squadrons having a crimson or parti-coloured red and white banner borne at its head, blazoned with white crescent and star. The horses were tolerably fair, but of diminutive stature. The men wore the long Circassian tunic, reaching to the middle calf, and confined at the waist by an embroidered belt, supporting the usual guardless scimitar and long dagger with primitive leaf-shaped blade, besides the accustomed supply of highly ornamented pistols, pipes, silver-mounted boxes, &c. The tunics were principally black or dark-olive, though there was a sparkling of bright saffron, green, and crimson, especially among the chiefs and princes, for I understand there are several such in the regiment. They wore the usual Circassian head-dress, a red or white tall cap surrounded by a mop-like covering of black or brown Astrachan fur, concealing all but the top of the inner cap. Both sides of the breast are covered by double horizontal rows of wooden or silver cartridge tubes, according to the social position of the individual. Each man carried at his back a sixteen-shooting Winchester rifle, and many, loth to part with their ancestral weapons, carried in addition the quaint-looking, straight-

stocked, silver-ringed flint-lock of his native mountains. As a rule the physiognomies, especially of the older, white-bearded men, were handsome and dignified; but there was also a fair share of long upper lips, prognathous jaws, and lowering, murderous brows and eyes. They are commanded by Moussa Pasha (not Zulu Moussa, the brigand), and have been sent on two hours in advance of the outposts. Next day came the Kurds, still more picturesque than the Circassians, with their huge bright-tinted turbans, and crimson and blue-flowing garments showing through light muslin and silk mantles. Extravagantly wide trousers, and red leather boots, turned up at the toe, complete the attire. The armament consisted of the Winchester rifle, curved scimitar, and long reed-like lance, which they shook and brandished till it quivered like a vibrating string. They were all much better mounted than the Circassians, each man's horse being his own property. For standard, the leading horseman carried a piece of Manchester handkerchief stuff, mottled red and green, tied on to his lance."

Meanwhile Mukhtar Pasha, holding his strong position in front of Erzeroum, awaited the Russian advance, and took such measures as were open to him to defend the direct route by which the invader would have to approach the Armenian capital. This route lay through the Deve Boyun Pass, on the main road from Kars; and, so long as the Turkish general was able to command it, there was no other alternative for the Russians except to try and turn his position on one or both flanks. Their right wing, as we have seen, had derived a great advantage by the capture of Ardahan; but no impression had been made upon the maritime fort of Batoum, which required to be covered by a large force. Notwithstanding this, they advanced as far as Olti and Pennek, from which the Turks retired, and thus threatened Mukhtar's left. The Russian left, on the other hand, having taken the fortress of Bayazid, was pushing forward from that point, under General Tergoukasoff, so that, early in the month of June, Mukhtar was seri-

ously menaced on both sides, as well as in the front.

The loss of Ardahan naturally caused much consternation in the Turkish capital. After the rejection of the terms offered by the Conference, and the dismissal of Midhat Pasha, it was generally believed in Europe that the government was in a state of confusion, if not of impotence ; but this was probably an exaggerated view of the actual situation. The constitution which had been promulgated on the eve of the Conference was so far carried into effect that an Ottoman Parliament was summoned, and delegates arrived in the capital from all parts of the empire. The discussions of this body were by no means a farce ; the representatives spoke their minds boldly, and insisted on calling the ministers to account for the disasters and shortcomings of the opening campaign.

A correspondent of the St. Petersburg "*Golos*," writing from Constantinople on the 9th of June, gave a high-flown description of the state of feeling in the Turkish capital after the fall of Ardahan. "Another Russian victory," he wrote, "and the throne and life of Abdul Ahmed will not be worth a day's purchase. Never popular, he is at present positively hated. His obstinacy in keeping Redif and Mahmoud Damat in office may yet cost him dear. I must not omit to mention that the sultan has some hope of dying a natural death, notwithstanding he is so ill that he may die any day. Fainting fits and vomiting of blood are of daily occurrence. When the capture of Ardahan was communicated to the government, the grand vizier cautiously toned down and remodelled the telegram before submitting it to his sovereign. The sultan heard the melancholy intelligence in silence. Pale as death and immovable, he stared in gloomy stupor at the vizier long after the latter had communicated the despatch. Edhem Pacha did not dare to break the spell of his sovereign's mute affliction, and with deep concern and fear looked upon his stony countenance. At last the speechless sultan, with slow, heavy steps, left the hall, went to his room, and immediately

swooned. He remained unconscious for two hours, and when he woke vomited streams of blood. After many a struggle for dear life the doctor succeeded in restoring the sufferer, but since then the vomiting and the swooning have frequently returned. Poor Abdul Hamed ! he has ascended the throne of the Osmanlis at an unpropitious hour, and pays dearly for the honour of ruling the faithful. The Cabinet are in dismay, and hardly know what they are about. Only Redif is undaunted, and endeavours to cheer the others. He is confident of victory, and the other day stated his little plan in this wise :—'The Danube,' he said, 'ought not to be too long and too persistently defended ; Rustchuk and Varna require to be guarded ; but the principal part of our troops should be concentrated at Shumla and Silistria. If the Russians wish to cross the Danube let them cross. Our resistance in that quarter should mainly aim at delaying their passage until the autumn, the season of rains and tempests. Having managed to cross, the Russians will find themselves in a country entirely devastated and stripped of all the necessities of life. Thenceforth, as the resources of Roumania will be speedily exhausted, anything and everything will have to be sent to the invading army from Russia. As to Asia, if the worst comes to the worst, they will take Kars, Batoum, and Erzeroum. Two or three months hence the season will be sufficiently advanced to prevent their getting much further in a country of hills and solitudes. Hunger and disease will fight on our side as soon as the autumn sets in.' With these and similar arguments, Redif is endeavouring to revive the flagging courage of the sultan and ministers. Quite lately he seems to have succeeded to a certain extent. There is also the hope of some great commotion in Europe. The Turks, indeed, have lost all confidence in England ; but there is the hope that France, Germany, and Italy, will soon come to blows, when Austria, being left alone with Russia, will be free to defend her interests against the czar. The rumour of an arrangement between England and Russia would have driven the Porte



to despair, had it not been contradicted by Mr. Layard, and by the opposite intelligence that Sir Henry Elliot would shortly return to his post. The return of this diplomatist to Constantinople would be regarded as a sure sign of England's determination to break with Russia."

This was manifestly an overdrawn and prejudiced view of the state of affairs at the moment; and still more so was the same correspondent's report of the proceedings of the Ottoman Parliament. His letter, however, was decidedly entertaining. He went on to speak of a lively scene amongst the delegates, which was near ending in a free fight. The quarrel was occasioned by a Christian complaining that the poor among his co-religionists, unable to pay the endless taxes, were being daily arrested and thrown into prison with thieves and robbers of the worst description. A Mussulman, in reply, approved the conduct of the authorities, when the Christians, retorting, caused the scene. The Mussulmans saluted the Christians with cries of "Dogs" and "Giaours;" while the Christians, giving as good as they received, called the Turks barbarians, blood-thirsty villains, and the like. When silence had been restored, Achmet Vefik Pacha, the President of the Assembly, resumed business without further remark, and half an hour later closed the sitting. By chance, added the correspondent, the Turcophile Ambassador of her British Majesty was present in the Ottoman Parliament when the storm arose. His Excellency grew very pale at the first symptoms of the hurricane, and vacantly gazing around, required some time before he could recover from his dismay. "At last he wrote a few remarks in his pocket-book, hurried home, and telegraphed a long report to Lord Derby. Did his report, perhaps, contain the remark that the British government had better lose no time in sending British troops to Constantinople? To tell the truth, it might be as well for the Christians were English or other troops to be despatched thither. Though there is little chance of an outbreak from religious fanaticism, yet fanaticism may be used as a pretext by the starving Mussul-

mans to plunder and possibly to kill the more wealthy among the Christians." The prediction was not destined to be fulfilled on a large scale, unless we except the outbreaks of the lawless hordes of Circassians and Bashi-Bazouks.

## CHAPTER XIV.

### THE CAUCASIAN REVOLT.

ABOUT this time it began to be rumoured that the rising of Russian subjects in the Caucasus was causing a good deal more apprehension in St. Petersburg than the Russian press cared to acknowledge. The "*Invalide Russe*," under the date of May 7th, made very light of the matter. "The declaration of war," it wrote, "has evoked among the Teketschenzen, one of the tribes of the Caucasus, a rising, instigated by a few fanatics. It having come to the knowledge of the Russian commander that an insurgent band of some five hundred men had been formed, the troops stationed at Ersenoi, under Colonel Nuriid, marched against them, and succeeded in dispersing them near Mayartup, after a conflict in which the insurgents lost ninety-nine men killed, and two hundred and fifty wounded. On our side three were killed and eleven wounded. In the province of Terek the state of siege has been proclaimed."

But subsequent events proved that the rebellion was not put down quite so easily. The Prussian correspondent of the "*Times*," writing from Berlin, May 21st, said:—"After the alleged destruction of the Tchetchna rebels at Mayartup, fresh bands assembled at Schali, a few miles west of Ersenoi, where they were again attacked and defeated by Colonel Nourid. The remnant retreated south to the Tchaarbilo hills, on the Daghestan frontier. Troops from Ersenoi and Arghun, as well as the local garrisons of Daghestan and the Tchetchna, are being concentrated for joint operations against the insurgents. The greater part of the Tchetchna is in arms against the Russians; Daghestan is quiet."

The Turks encouraged the rising as much as possible, knowing it would prove a source of great annoyance and danger to the invader, and in some instances actually forced tribes who were loyally disposed to Russia to take part in the rebellion. A correspondent of the "Daily News," writing from Mingrelia, under date June 6th, on the difficulties encountered by the Russians in the work of constructing a road for the purpose of attacking Batoum in the rear, says:—"Continual skirmishing goes on, and then there are the natural difficulties of the country—steep wooded mountain ranges, ravines and gorges clothed with dense masses of laurel, rhododendron and azalea, amongst which the wary Kabouletts, and other warlike Lazistanees, well supplied with arms and ammunition by the Turk, can lurk unseen, and by frequent attacks annoy the sappers, and disturb their operations. These Kabouletts are a Lazistanee tribe of the frontiers, originally Christians, but who, like the population round Akhaltsik, were forcibly converted to Islamism by the Turks in the seventeenth century. They were preparing to join the Russians, and had arranged to do so, but symptoms of this appearing, the Turks suddenly marched upon and occupied their villages, capturing the women and children of all the chiefs and principal people, whom they retain as hostages, only releasing them on the production of heads of Russian subjects by their relations, as proof of loyalty to the cause of the Padishah! In consequence of this policy, the able-bodied and effective fighting men of the tribe are compelled, *malgré* their tendencies to Christianity, to do a great deal of harm to their former friends and neighbours."

The Turks also set themselves to work to incite a rebellion amongst the Tartars of the Crimea, and, for the accomplishment of this purpose, a Turkish ironclad squadron was sent cruising along the shores of the Crimea, towards the end of May. But little or nothing was done in this direction. The Turkish captains seemed to have a decided fear of the Russian torpedoes, which had, indeed, already given them abundant cause for anxiety. Wherever it was known that these

dangerous instruments of warfare had been laid down, the Turks gave the vicinity a wide berth. The shores of Transcaucasia had been left almost undefended, and it was there that the Ottoman fleet found Russia most vulnerable.

Supplies and men were continually poured into the country at Soukhum Kaleh and the neighbouring points; and for some considerable time the insurgents more than held their own against the small Russian forces which could be spared to oppose them. The capture of Soukhum Kaleh seems to have been effected without much difficulty. The correspondent last quoted gives us an apparently trustworthy account of the fighting resorted to by the Turks and Circassians on the coast of Transcaucasia. Hassan Pasha, commanding the Turkish squadron, kept the whole coast in terror, cannonading the military stations on the sea-board, and landing companies of Circassian troops, who burned the villages, and laid the surrounding districts waste.\* "Soukhum Kaleh," he writes, "was burnt to the ground ten or twelve days ago, in this way, and the Abkhassians, who are in full revolt, have retaken the littoral between Sukhum and Pitsounda, and, in conjunction with the Circassians, are threatening Mingrelia along the line of the Kodor. Since then Ardler and Sochu, both open villages on the Circassian coast, have been destroyed, and probably all the estates thereabouts, as far as or beyond Tonapse, the telegraphs cut, &c. Hearing of these events, I left three days ago for Zugdidi, a large bourg some twenty miles from the coast (at Anaklia), between Poti and Soukhum Kaleh, which, if an advance in force should be contemplated by the Turks, combined with the insurgents and Circassians, would be an important centre of operations. Prince Nicholas, hereditary Dadian, or Prince of Mingrelia, has a country-house here, and very large estates all round, shooting preserves, &c. He is constructing a handsome palace. I called soon after my arrival upon Count Rosmorduc, a veteran resident of the Caucasus, who has married into the Prince's family; and afterwards

\* "Daily News" Correspondence, under date June 6th.



upon the governor, where I saw Prince Mirsky, who has the command of all the reserved Caucasian forces. They were preparing for a move in advance, and two corps of Imeritian irregulars had been detailed to cross the river that afternoon as advanced guard, to be followed by three battalions of Russian infantry, the artillery, the militia, and the rest of the irregular cavalry and Cossacks—in all, some eight thousand strong. This force is to repel the Turks, Circassians, and Abkhasian insurgents, should they advance, by holding the line of the Kodor, and eventually to reduce the revolted province.

“The general in command at Soukhum (Krachenkoff) has been making a ‘strategic movement to the rear,’ with undue precipitation, which, combined with the Abkhasian revolt, has encouraged the invaders. Indeed, were it not for the difficulties of the line of route, three considerable rivers, and ten or twelve deep nullahs having to be crossed, it is probable the latter would by this have been near Zugdidi. As it is, had the Circassians, some three thousand of whom are believed to have landed, possessed horses, it is probable that the panic here of a few days back would have turned out only too well justified. This alarm—one of those incidents common to the outbreak of hostilities anywhere—did not extend to the military, who, down to the latest raised levies, showed nothing but a commendable desire to come to close quarters with the supposed enemy. It was caused by the misinterpretation of a telegram from the general commanding at Azurget, on the Turkish frontier, who, having received a despatch advising that the Turks were landing at Anaklia (which they were cannonading), sent a message to Zugdidi, telling them to hold their ground as long as possible, and that he was sending reinforcements. This was interpreted as certain news that the latter position was about to be attacked by a superior force; and the civil and trading population, losing their heads, made a rush from the town, which, should the defenders be compelled to retreat, they of course imagined would speedily become another Batak. The alarm was ag-

gravated tenfold by the local budmashes and loafers, who, foreseeing a rich harvest of loot, did their best, by spreading all sorts of canards, to precipitate events, so that the shopkeepers, after offering fabulous prices for arabas and conveyances for their goods, which in many cases were not to be had, finally bundled helter-skelter out of the town, leaving their half emptied stores to the delicate attentions of the above gentlemen. By the time of my arrival, however, the commercial element had, after going half-way to Novi-Sevok, and passing two or three nights ‘*al fresco*,’ returned to its senses, and resumed its ordinary course.

“If the reports respecting the Turks having landed regular troops (Nizams) with artillery to match, and having armed the Abkhasian insurgents with Martini-Peabodys and the Circassians with Winchesters, are correct, it is probable that some severe bush-whacking engagements, followed by a small general action, will shortly take place between the Kodor and Nighor; unless, indeed, the Turks are even stronger than is supposed, and while menacing an advance on the direct line by land between Soukhum and Zugdidi should suddenly descend in force at Anaklia—thus avoiding the passage of the rivers—and strike at the Russian base; in which case the advance of the latter towards Batoum would have to be completely suspended, and the greater part of the force at present employed on it would have to be recalled for the defence of Kutais, which, as in Omar Pacha’s expedition in 1856, would be the point aimed at.

“There were about six hundred irregulars (cavalry) in Zugdidi alone, besides militia and regular (Russian) soldiers, all, especially the irregulars, fine-looking men. The extraordinary thing was that the resources of the country did not seem in any way overtaxed to support them; there was no scarcity of anything, in spite of the recent panic. As an officer, who has served in the French army, observed, there was scarcely enough in the place, in the way of meat, to satisfy two companies of English soldiers, yet here were three thousand to four thousand men,

many of them of the upper classes. With a little millet boiled into a pudding, or 'pasta,' some goat's milk, cheese and onions, and a goblet of 'vin du pays,' the chiefs even are quite contented, while the retainers make good cheer over cake of Indian corn flour, some curds, a piece of dried fish, or a strip of tough beef, among half-a-dozen. The Russian soldier is happy with his lump of black bread and glass of whisky, or tumbler of weak tea, with, in the evening, perhaps a basin of weak soup, something like the 'black broth' of the Spartans."

It is impossible to maintain that this style of warfare was unjustifiable on the part of the Turks. They were overmatched by the Russians in more senses than one, and were fighting for their existence. Their instigation of the Caucasian tribes to revolt brought a heavy punishment upon those who listened to their counsels and accepted their limited assistance; but they were doubtless entitled to act as they did, in the hope that the whole district between the Black Sea and the Caspian would rise *en masse*, and cut off the Russians from their base of supplies. Unquestionably this diversion of the Turks assisted their cause, even if it was not one of the principal motives of the subsequent retreat of the invaders in Armenia. But it was not carried out with sufficient vigour or force to be as formidable as it might have been made. If, immediately after the capture of Soukhum Kaleh, a strong expedition had been despatched southwards, and, supported by demonstrations from Batoum, had cut the line between Poti and Tiflis, the head-quarters of the Grand Duke Michael, it is clear that the Russians would have been very gravely menaced; and they might have been crippled past hope of recovery. More than one promising scheme of this kind was mooted at the time; but all of them came to nothing.

No doubt the Caucasian tribes had abundant reason to nurse a grudge against their Russian masters, and to seize any opportunity which might be given them of throwing off their yoke. It may not be uninteresting to recall the circumstances of the enforced Circassian emigration,

about thirteen years before the date of which we are now writing. The Russian government wished to clear out these lawless and troublesome people, who preferred theft and violence to the peaceful arts of civilisation. They offered them land in another part of the empire, and the means of removal; but, naturally enough, a considerable number of the Circassians refused to leave their ancestral homes. The Russians replied to this refusal with violence, and sent an army to drive the Circassians out.

A letter from Consul Dickson, at Soukhum Kaleh, dated March 17th, 1864, to Earl Russell, gave an instance of the barbarous deeds which were committed by the Russians on this occasion.

Mr. Dickson wrote:—"I feel it a painful duty to report a deed that has come to my knowledge, which has so exasperated the Circassians as to excite them to further resistance, however desperate their case may be.

"A Russian detachment had captured the village of Toubek, on the Soobashi River, inhabited by about one hundred Abadzekh, and, after these had surrendered themselves prisoners, they were all massacred by the Russian troops. Among the victims were two women in an advanced state of pregnancy, and five children. The detachment in question belongs to Count Evdokimoff's army, and is said to have advanced from the Pshish Valley. As the Russian troops gain ground on the coast, the natives are not allowed to remain there on any terms, but are compelled either to transfer themselves to the plains of the Kouban, or emigrate to Turkey."

This was one out of many similar acts, which prompted the unfortunate Circassians to make the following appeal to Queen Victoria:—

"Our most humble petition to her Magnificent Majesty, the Queen and Empress of England, is to the effect, that

"For more than eighty years the Russian government has been unlawfully striving to subdue and annex to its dominions the country of Circassia, which, from the creation of the world, has been our home.



"It slaughters like sheep the children, helpless women, and old men that fall into its hands. It rolls their head with the bayonet like melons; and there is no act of oppression or cruelty which is beyond the bounds of civilisation and humanity, and which defies description, that it has not committed. We have not failed from father to son, at the cost of our lives and property, to resist the tyrannical acts of the government in defence of our country, which is dearer to us than our lives. But during the last year or two it has taken advantage of a famine, caused by a drought with which the Almighty visited us, as well as of its own ravages, and has occasioned us great distress by its fierce attacks by sea and land. Many lives have been lost in battle, from hunger in the mountains, from destitution on the sea-coast, and from want of skill at sea.

"We therefore invoke the mediation and gracious assistance of the British government and people, the guardian of humanity and the centre of justice, to repel the brutal attacks of the Russian government on our country, and to save our country and nation together."

In 1877 the Circassians had an opportunity of renewing their struggle with Russia, and they, with most of the other Circassian tribes, availed themselves of the chance. The details of the insurrection are not yet clearly before us, but it is certain that the Russian generals had a great amount of trouble before they could suppress the rising. It was, however, soon seen to be hopeless. The Turks held Soukhum Kaleh for a time, and then evacuated it. They did their best to transport the insurgents to Turkish territory, their fleet enabling them to do this without much difficulty; and the Russians were left to settle with those who remained behind. The country was not thoroughly reduced to submission before the winter had arrived; but the extreme danger to the Russians had been surmounted when the Turks resolved to leave the Abkhasian coast.

## CHAPTER XV.

### THE CROSSING OF THE DANUBE.

THE time had at length arrived when it became possible for the Russians in Roumania to attempt the first great operation of the European campaign, and to cross the Danube with a reasonable hope of being able to follow up their advance in a vigorous manner. For two months they had been occupied in disposing their forces with a view to this event, in testing and strengthening their supply and commissariat services, and in guarding against every conceivable danger which appeared to menace them. The caution with which the Grand Duke Nicholas and his staff set about this first and critical movement, the thoroughness with which they applied themselves to remedy the shortcomings of their preparations, and the indomitable energy with which they struggled against such immense difficulties as were presented by the swollen stream, and the inclement season, augured well for the ultimate success of their undertaking. Few persons in Europe ventured to doubt their triumph; but the lookers-on were destined to see the most remarkable fluctuations in the tide of victory.

In the third week in May the Russians had succeeded in taking possession of an island in the Danube, close to Braila; and the circumstance gave rise to a report, which for some little time gained credence, that the crossing of the river had already taken place, and that Russian forces had entered the Dobrudscha. The actual passage, however, was not made until the night of the 21st of June, when General Zimmerman, with two regiments of infantry, and a body of cavalry and artillery, left Braila, and, marching to Galatz, crossed to the opposite side (a distance of about three miles) in boats towed by steam launches. The Turks were quite ready to receive them, and some desperate fighting ensued. The Russians met with heavy losses, but nevertheless they succeeded in making good their

footing. By the evening of the 22nd they had forced the Turks to relinquish their position on the heights in front of Garbina and Vakareni, and to retreat to those above Matchin; whilst they contented themselves at first by taking possession of a village near the latter place.

The news of the crossing was of course received with great interest throughout Europe, which had begun to look with much impatience on the delay of the Russian operations. In Germany especially this delay was made the subject of a good deal of ridicule amongst military men, who contrasted it, unreasonably enough, with the brilliance of their own invasion of France seven years ago. The two instances were hardly parallel. The Germans had no river to cross in the face of the enemy; they had excellent roads for their waggons and artillery, and more than one railway at their service. Their success depended on their generals alone, and it may be doubted whether Von Moltke himself, placed in the position of the grand duke and his staff, could have done much more. It is probable, however, that the Russians were not prevented from crossing by military considerations alone. They won almost as much by their diplomacy as by their arms; and they undoubtedly proceeded with the utmost caution, waiting until they felt some assurance in regard to the disposition of the various governments.

In any case, military critics have expressed an opinion that the Russians might easily have crossed the lower Danube, near Isaktcha, almost a month earlier than they chose to do. The Turks never had in the Dobrudscha a force sufficiently large to resist the enemy; and it would certainly have been possible for the Russians, before the end of May, to throw an army corps into the north-eastern corner of Bulgaria, and to compel the defenders to retire upon the fortresses of the Quadrilateral. With their great superiority in cavalry, the invader might then have anticipated, by some weeks, the successes subsequently gained.

In the fourth week of June, it was manifest to everybody that the decisive moment had ar-

rived; and the only uncertainty now felt was as to the spot which the Russians would select for the first crossing. The natural course adopted by the grand duke and his staff was to mystify the enemy and the correspondents as much as possible, by feigning preparations at different points of the river, so as to throw the Turks off their guard, and to prevent them from concentrating their troops at any particular place. The operation at Galatz, though it resulted in the first crossing, was only subsidiary to the principal effort at Simnizta; and it had been preceded by a feigned movement at Rustchuk. This affair, indeed, seems to have been too serious for a mere feint. The Russians advanced from Parapan, near Giurgevo, to the island of Gura Kame, on which they endeavoured to establish themselves. A large body of men occupied the position, and reinforcements were steadily brought up from behind. But the Turks sustained the attack with great vigour, and supported the fire of their men on shore by an effective cannonade from a couple of monitors. In the result the Russians were obliged to retire, bearing off their dead and wounded to Parapan.

On the following day an attempt was made to destroy the Turkish monitors with torpedoes; but it failed, as also did another, on the evening of the same day.

The crossing of the 21st of June at Galatz, is thus described by an eye-witness:—

*“Braila, June 22nd.*—The Russians have at last begun to cross the Danube. Contrary to expectation, the great movement commenced at Galatz. Everybody supposed that it would be somewhere between Giurgevo and Turn Magurelle. That the Turks were of the same opinion is shown by the fact that they had concentrated nearly their whole army between Rustchuk and Nikopolis, their line diminishing in strength towards Silistria, while the Dobrudscha was almost deprived of troops. The manner of crossing was equally unexpected and unforeseen both by the Turks and the spectators. On this side of the river during the last four days the Russians have been industriously constructing a bridge



near Braila, just below the confluence of the old and new channels of the Danube. This work has been done within sight of the Turkish forces at Matchin, and on the heights beyond; yet the Russians have been allowed to construct the bridge in peace and quiet. It was finished last night, except a narrow space left open for the passage of boats. The Danube is still very high here. A great part of the valley is still under water, which, however, is rapidly subsiding. The bridge was constructed from both sides of the river at once, for the Turks allowed the Russians to cross over and begin the bridge on the Turkish shore at the same time as it was begun on the Roumanian. A great part was constructed on trestles, and it is only in the real channel, where the water is swift and deep, consisting of a space of perhaps a thousand yards wide, that pontoons have been used. The pontoons had been floated to their places, anchored to trestle work constructed on both sides at the same time. The trestle work is continued along the old channel towards Matchin on the road to the latter place.

"A glance at the map will show two channels of the Danube, running nearly parallel to each other, from Hirsova, where they first separate, to Braila, where they unite, the old channel making a sudden turn to the left just below Matchin, forming a right angle. It is along the north or right bank of this stream that the road runs from Matchin to Braila, and along this road, still submerged, the Russians are advancing by means of the trestle work. How deep the water is along here I am unable to say, but the Russians are evidently going to push a bridge along this road until they meet with serious resistance from the Turks. That resistance they have not yet encountered, and how far they will be allowed to continue without opposition from the Turks it is impossible to say; but the fact is, it was expected last night that all would be ready for the passage. This seems to indicate that the Russians mean to take to the water, which cannot be more than a few inches deep, when they come to the end of their bridge.

The Emperor and his staff, and the Grand Duke Nicholas and his staff, were to come here last night, and the passage was to begin this morning at daybreak; but, owing to news yesterday from Ploiesti, the departure both of the Emperor and the Grand Duke was postponed until to-day, and it was understood that the passage of the river was likewise postponed, owing to the fact that a large force of Turkish troops had been discovered lying in ambush not far from the end of the bridge, where they were waiting quietly for the Russians to advance.

"However this may be, General Zimmerman, who is in command of the operations here, suddenly disappeared from Braila during the night, and this morning, a little after day-break, the people of Braila were awakened by the sound of artillery and musketry fire on the other side of the river, showing that the Danube must have been crossed, and that a fight was proceeding on the other side. The Turks had for some time occupied the line of the heights where the battle was raging. General Zimmerman had gone to Galatz, and crossed the Danube with two regiments of infantry, and a proportionate amount of artillery and cavalry, in a number of boats towed over by steam launches. The distance traversed in the boats seems to have been over three miles. That he should have succeeded, and have effected a landing in the face of the Turkish troops, is not a little remarkable. He had immediately attacked the height in front of Garbina and Vakareni, and the battle had been raging along the summit of these heights since daylight until now, two o'clock, when the Russians seem to have advanced as far as Zizila, about five miles from Matchin.

"The object evidently is to advance as near Matchin as possible in order to turn the Turkish positions and protect the long bridge and partly inundated road over which a larger Russian force will probably soon make the passage. They will undoubtedly fortify themselves near Zizila, maintain themselves in this kind of detached bridgehead, and protect the passage of the main body, which will of course rapidly move to their

assistance. The Turks probably were taken by surprise as usual, and although there was a good deal of artillery and musketry fire they do not seem to have made a very stubborn resistance on these heights, a fact which may be easily appreciated when we remember that the Russians made an advance from daylight until two o'clock of twelve miles, crossing a wide river, fighting their way, carrying the Turkish positions, and occupying the heights. The view from this side of the river has been splendid. From an early hour the inhabitants gathered on the river bank to watch the progress of the conflict. It is a beautiful sunny day. Nothing could be finer than the landscape seen from the Russian batteries just below Braila.

"Beneath us are a number of tall-masted ships and boats, among which are several Russian gunboats, and beyond is the low-lying valley of the Danube, half submerged, with islands of trees and brushwood rising out of the water all over it. Then beyond, the houses and minarets of Matchin are distinctly seen, and behind them rise the heights occupied by the Turkish forces here and there, along which a few tents may be seen. To the left of Zizila white clouds of smoke are suddenly leaping out from the hill-side, rolling away on the breeze, mixed here and there with the cloud of dust marking the rapid movements of the artillery or cavalry, while the heavy booming of the guns, and the sharp crashing musketry fire, come borne to us, softened by distance, on the still summer air. We could not distinguish the infantry, even with our glasses, though cavalry and artillery were easily made out, and we could only follow the progress of the Russians by the rising smoke which marked the line of the advance.

"The battle seems over for the moment. I have just made out what appear to be two or three batteries of artillery, and perhaps a couple of regiments of cavalry, dashing rapidly down the heights from Zizila towards Matchin, raising immense clouds of dust. I suppose them to be part of the Turkish forces retreating to the latter place. We have no details of the fighting

yet. General Zimmerman has not returned, and his chief of the staff here, who is expecting him momentarily, knows nothing more of the movement than what he has followed by means of a field-glass. As soon as the general arrives I hope to give you full details of the affair.

"10 P.M.—I have not been able to ascertain the number of killed and wounded on either the Russian or Turkish side, but reports are flying about which say that the Russian loss is heavy. A Russian doctor who crossed with the first detachment of eight hundred men informs me that he does not believe out of this number twenty men are left who have not been either killed or wounded. The Turks do not seem to have been taken by surprise at all, and appear to have made a very desperate resistance. They were seen before the troops crossed to bring down towards the spot where the troops would land mountain guns on horseback, and seem to have been aware of the Russian movement almost as soon as it began. Refugees coming in from the other side of the river this evening say that the Turks have abandoned Matchin and withdrawn to the heights above it, and that the Circassians and Bashi-Bazouks have pillaged the place. As I write the troops are marching through the streets, evidently on their way to the bridge, in order to be ready for crossing at daybreak."

Returning to the subject in a subsequent letter, the same correspondent writes:—

"When I arrived in Braila on Friday morning, I found that operations had already been begun. At five o'clock in the morning the inhabitants were already on the alert, gathering, in crowds, on the river bank, to watch the fight that was going on at the other side of the valley, which could be followed very distinctly by the smoke and the firing. The scene, when I arrived on the spot, was a most interesting and animated one. The left bank of the Danube, at Braila, is thirty or forty feet high. Below us lay the river gleaming brightly in the sunshine, covered here with boats, ships, steamers, and barges, which were unable to escape during the time of grace that was allowed to them after the declaration



of war, and which the Russians have seized and turned to account for military operations. Further down was the bridge, lying low upon the water, stretching far across the wide, swiftly rolling stream, and losing itself apparently among the marshes and reeds on the other side; beyond were marshes, trees, brushwood, tall grass, waving reeds, and rushes, through which could be seen everywhere the gleam of water, showing that the whole valley was still submerged; still further in the distance, and nearly ten miles away, was the town of Matchin, lying at the foot of a mountain slope, with a confused mass of houses, and two tall white minarets, rising from amongst them, and clearly defined against the low range of mountains beyond. Down the river the water, growing broader and wider and deeper, spread over the entire valley, until it seemed to take the dimensions of a lake, where, in the far-off distance, lay Galatz, dim and indistinct in a luminous haze, looking like a mirage city in a mirage ocean. On that range of mountains running down from Matchin, in the direction of Galatz, puffs and long lines of white smoke rose up from the mountain side, and were borne away on the air in thin fleecy clouds. The dull, booming, heavy sound of cannon, a distant roar of artillery, and the continued and rattling crash of small arms, were borne to us in a softened kind of roll on the still, sunny air. It was there that the battle was going on; the Russians were already on the other side, and were attacking the Turks on those heights, and the long lines and fleeces of white smoke marked the progress of the conflict.

“A battle fought under such circumstances—one army advancing and carrying successive positions, the other retreating, but defending the ground inch by inch—is a long affair. Slowly the two lines of smoke advanced along the range of hills towards Matchin, one pursuing the other, and marking the progress of the battle. Slowly the Russians drove back the Turks, following them from rock to rock, from point to point, from summit to summit, from hill to valley, and from valley to hill, over the irregular and un-

even ground; and the roll of musketry continued from daylight until two o'clock in the afternoon, until they had reached the heights above the village of Zizila, where the Russians halted, satisfied with their day's work and the ground already gained. The roar of cannon in the early morning was the first intimation that the people of Braila had that the Russians were already over the river, and the manner as well as the place of crossing was altogether unexpected and surprising. Everybody had been deceived by the construction of the bridge already spoken of. This bridge had been in process of construction for about ten days. It had nearly been completed on Thursday evening, and everybody supposed that the passage would be attempted on the bridge itself, and the idea of an army crossing over in boats was one which had not occurred to anybody but to the general in command. I do not know yet whether it was ever intended that the passage should be effected by this bridge. It does not seem probable that it should have been the case, unless it had been the intention of the Russians to wait several days or weeks longer for the water to subside, for the road to Matchin, with which it was connected, is still so deeply submerged that it would be very difficult to cross in the face of a determined resistance; in fact, the road is so deeply under water in some places that even a horse could not pass without swimming. All these places must necessarily have been bridged, while trestle-work must have been constructed nearly the whole way, a distance of nearly eight or nine miles. It seems probable, therefore, that the bridge was constructed, partly with a view of attracting the attention of the Turks to this side, and partly in order to serve for the purpose of transport across the river later on, when the real crossing should have been effected. If it was begun in the hope that by the time it should be finished the river would have sufficiently fallen to allow the passage of troops over the road on the other side, this hope had been abandoned when it was seen that the water was falling so slowly that possibly weeks would have to elapse before

the road would be in a passable condition, and another plan had to be adopted. It became necessary to effect the passage in boats; and, possibly in the hope that the attention of the Turks would be attracted to the bridge, it was determined to make the attempt at Galatz, where, although a great distance had to be traversed, the water was deeper and more navigable, and less obstructed by bulrushes and reeds. General Zimmerman, having assembled a great number of boats of all kinds, shapes, and sizes at Galatz, suddenly left Braila, where he had hitherto kept his head-quarters, and went to Galatz. He had a sufficient number of boats to carry over about eighteen thousand men at a time, and at day-break on Friday morning that number of troops was embarked and started across on the perilous adventure. The distance to be traversed in boats was nearly three miles, and when land was finally reached it was not *terra firma* at all, for the ground here on the edge of the water was a mere marsh overgrown with reeds and rushes, with the water all over it, too shallow for boats, but deep enough to make the further progress most difficult on foot. It had been hoped that the boats might manage to cross two or three times before the Turks received warning, but the latter apparently had received correct information of the projected movement, and when the first boat-load of Russians arrived they met with a warm reception."

The number of Russians who crossed on the first day was probably not more than six thousand. There were in all about seventy thousand men below Braila, though perhaps not more than one-half of these were ever in the Dobrudscha at the same time. The bulk of the grand duke's forces were higher up the stream, between Giurgevo and Turn Magurelle; and thus, important as the crossing at Galatz might have been, it was plain that still more decisive operations were to be looked for at other points. If the Russians had failed to pass over into Bulgaria on the west of the Quadrilateral, they would doubtless have used the bridge near Braila, and poured into the Do-

brudscha, with the intention of masking the fortresses of the Quadrilateral.\* It was destined, however, that they should succeed at once in their principal effort, which was made at Simnitza, opposite to the Bulgarian town of Sistova.

The mystery which was created in connexion with the place of crossing for the main army con-

\* The Russians subsequently had as many as six bridges over the Danube. An interesting account is given by a "Daily News" correspondent of the first one constructed, which was ready for use about a week after the crossing. "It is a splendid piece of work, strong enough to carry over the heaviest artillery, and is evidently made to last a long time. The first, one thousand six hundred feet from the Roumanian shore, is trestle-work, built along over the railway, which before the inundation ran down to the edge of the river, where it was met by the ferry-boat. Part of the railway has been swept away, and even that which remains is still under water, and the bridge is now some five feet higher than the railway track under it. The bridge is made of immense wooden trestles on benches, exceedingly strong and solid, and they are put down on sleepers which lie along on the ground. Over this is laid a roadway of planks, which is only wide enough for one waggon or cannon to pass. At the end of this trestle-work we come to the bridge proper, which is not constructed on pontoons, but on immense rafts. The length of this part of the bridge is one thousand seven hundred and fifty feet, and there are fifty rafts in all. These rafts are composed of long pieces of beautiful timber, whole trunks of trees from sixty to eighty feet long and from fifteen to twenty inches in diameter at the large end. From eight to ten pieces compose each raft, and they are solidly bolted and fastened together and anchored with strong hemp cables to heavy iron anchors dropped in the bottom of the river. The roadway is laid over this, as over the trestles. At the Turkish end we come to what was formerly the village of Getchet, which is a village no more. It was a place of probably twenty-five to fifty houses, not one of which is left standing. It was first demolished by the Russian batteries to drive away the Turkish outpost that was stationed there, and when Captain Klemenka began his bridge he found it necessary to continue the roadway to the other end, which was for the most part under water, in the best way he could. He simply used the débris and rubbish of these houses and walls to make a road, which is built right over the foundation of the houses. In no other way could he get a sufficiently solid foundation on which to build. The road, therefore, goes zigzagging about from house to house, with a piece of bridge here and a piece of trestle-work there, pieced into the chaussée in the most curious manner; but this new roadway has not been continued up over the old road for more than a mile, and there remain some five or six miles to be made yet before troops can pass over it. Altogether it is a most creditable piece of work so far, and does Captain Klemenka great honour."



tinued to the last. No one, except the grand duke, and one or two members of his staff, knew anything about it; and, up to the eve of the appointed day, the divisional commanders appear to have remained in ignorance of the exact spot. But the concentration of artillery and troops of all arms at Simnitz and Turn Magurelle rendered it evident that these two places were likely to be the chief points of departure; and so it turned out. On the evening of June 26th a favoured few were informed that the important movement would be made on the morning of the following day; amongst whom was Mr. A. Forbes, the most enterprising and successful of the English correspondents during the Turko-Russian war. We cannot do better than follow Mr. Forbes's account of this gallant exploit, in which he himself took an active part."

Mr. Forbes attached himself to General Dragomiroff's division—the 14th Division of the 8th Army Corps, commanded by General Radetzky. Dragomiroff had received orders to cross the river, with the vanguard of the army, on the morning of the 27th June. He was to be supported by Prince Mirsky's division, which had been stationed at Lissa, and was under orders to reach Simnitz at seven A. M. on the 27th. In the event of Dragomiroff's failure, Mirsky "was to take up the fighting, and force a passage at all sacrifices; for the Archduke Nicholas had announced that he would take no denial. The river had to be crossed at Simnitz, cost what it might. Other divisions stood within call if need were. The waters might be reddened, but they must be crossed."

At Sistova, the Turks were not strong, and they had made but feeble preparations. For two miles below the town the banks of the Danube are precipitous; but then the cliffs are broken by the course of a small stream, which creates a miniature bay at its influx into the Danube. A company of Turks occupied this depression; and the banks between it and Sistova were furnished with cannon. "About Simnitz the Roumanian bank is high; but between it and the Danube proper, which flows close to the Turkish bank, is a broad tract, partly of green meadow, sand,

and tenacious mud, the whole just emerging from inundation. This flat is cut off from Simnitz by a narrow arm of the Danube, so that it is really an island. A raised road and bridge leading from the town, across the flats, to the landing-place on the Danube, have been wrecked by the floods. It was necessary, therefore, for the Russians to gain access to the flats by a short pontoon bridge. These flats are still in many places under water, are scored by intersecting streams, and studded with impracticable swamps, so that the road through them is now difficult and tortuous. They are quite bare, except that at the lower end, exactly opposite the cove on the Turkish side of which I have spoken, there is a wood of willows and alders of considerable extent, and capable of affording a good deal of cover. The Danube all along the Sistova position is about sixteen hundred paces wide, and flows very rapidly." Simnitz itself lies low, so that the Turks in Sistova could see the movement of the Russian troops in the former town. The preparations were deferred, as far as possible, to the night of the 26th; but, as Mr. Forbes observes, the relative positions of the two places will account for the Turkish preparedness, such as it was.

"With the darkness General Dragomiroff had begun his dispositions. The first work was to plant in rude emplacements a row of field guns all along the edge of the flats, to sweep with fire the opposite banks. This was while his infantry was being marched over the flats down into the cover of the willow wood. The darkness and the obstructions were both so great that all was not ready till the first glimmer of grey dawn. There was no bridge, but a number of pontoon boats, capable of holding from fifteen to forty men each. These were dragged on carriages through the mud, and launched in the darkness from under the spreading boughs of the willow trees. The troops embarked, and pushed across as the craft arrived. Dragomiroff stood on the slimy margin to bid his gallant fellows 'God speed.' He would fain have shown the way; for he is a fighting as well as a

scientific soldier, but it was his duty to remain till later. The grateful task devolved on Major-General Yolchine, whose brigade consisted of the regiments of Valnisk and Minsk, the 53rd and 54th of the line. The boats put off singly, rowing across for the little cove, and later the little steam-tug 'Annette' was brought into requisition. For once, the Turks had not spent the night watches in heavy sleep. Their few cannon at once opened fire on the boats, on the hidden masses among the willows, and on the columns marching across the flat. Nor was this all. From the slopes above the cove there came at the boats a smart infantry fire. The Turkish riflemen were holding the landing-place. Yolchine has not gained experience and credit in Caucasian warfare for nothing. His boat was leading. The Turkish riflemen were in position about fifty yards from the shore. He landed his handful, and bade them lie down in the mud. Several were down previously with Turkish bullets. He opened a skirmishing fire to cover the landing of the boats that followed. One by one these landed their freights, who followed the example of the first boat-load. At length enough had accumulated. Young Skobelev was there, a host in himself. Yolchine bade his men fix bayonets, stand up, and follow their officers. There was a rush and a cheer that rang louder in the grey dawn than the Turkish volley that answered it. That volley was not fired in vain; but the Turks scarcely waited for cold steel. Yolchine's skirmishers followed them doggedly some distance up the slope, but for the time could not press on far from the base. Busily, yet slowly, the craft moved to and fro from shore to shore. The Russian guns had at once opened when the Turkish fire showed that there was no surprise: but however heavy a fire may be, it will not all at once crush another fire. The Turkish shells kept falling in the water, whistling through the willows, and bursting among the columns on the flat. One shell from a mountain gun fell into a boat containing two guns, their gunners, and the commandant of the battery. The boat was swamped at once, and

all on board perished. This was the only serious casualty; but numerous Russian soldiers were falling on both sides of the river. Nevertheless, the work was going steadily on, and when, soon after seven, I returned to meet Prince Mirsky on the high ground before Simnitsa, the report was, that already the whole brigade of Yolchine had reached the other side, that a Russian battery was there, and that Dragomiroff himself had crossed. We stood for some time surveying the scene.

"Cast your eye down there to your left front, athwart the flats, and note the masses of troops waiting there, or marching on towards the cover of the willows. See the long row of guns in action there by the water's edge, covered by the battalions of infantry, in this case a mischievous conventionality, owing to the exposure, for the Turkish cannon will not just yet be wholly silenced. Note how deftly the Russian shells pitch in to that earthwork on the verge of Sistova. But the gallant gunners stubbornly fight their guns under the rain of fire, and when one gun is quiet, another gives tongue. And what a mark! Half an army corps out there on the flat, with no speck of cover save that patch of willows down there. Hark to the crackle of musketry fire on the wooded slopes rising out from the cove. No wonder Yolchine's skirmishers are moving, for that Turkish battery on the sky-line is dropping shells with fell swiftness among the willow trees. Sistova seems stark empty. It might be a city of the dead. But the Turkish gunners cling to their posts and their guns with wonderful stanchness, amidst clouds of dust thrown up by the shells which burst around them. Nor are the single pieces among the trees wholly quiet. Shells are dropping among the troops on the flat, and the ambulance men are hurrying about with brancards, or plodding towards the Verbandplatz, with heavy blood-sodden burdens. You may watch the shells drop into the water, starring its surface as they fall, as if it had been glass. What a wonder that one and all should miss those clumsy, heavy-laden craft which stud the water



so thickly ! A shell in one of those boats would produce fearful results among the closely packed freight. Not less fell havoc would it work among those soldiers further on, massed there under the shelter of the clay-bank. One realises how great would have been the Russian loss if the Turks had been in any great force in the Sistova position, and how, after all, the commander-in-chief might have been forced to take a denial, accepting the inevitable. But as the affair stands, the whole thing might have been a spectacle especially got up for the gratification of the people of Simnitz, enjoying the effect from the platform high ground overhanging the flats. The laughter and bustle there are in strange contrast with the apparent absence of human life in Sistova opposite. But then Sistova was a victim lashed to the stake. The spectators on Simnitz bluff knew their skins were safe.

“ Prince Mirsky has received his reports and final instructions. He gives word to his division to move down on to the flats, to be in readiness to cross. Previously, their march finished, they had been resting on the grassy uplands behind Simnitz. As we leave the plateau the cry rises that a Turkish monitor is coming down the Danube. Sure enough, near the head of the island, is visible what seems to be a large vessel with two funnels moving slowly down the stream. Now the ferry-boats may look out. Now is the opportunity for some dashing torpedo practice. But the Russian officers evince no alarm—rather, indeed, satisfaction. The fact is, as we presently discern with the glass, that the seeming monitor is really two large lighters lashed together, which the Russians are drifting down to assist in transporting the troops. No individual is visible on board, yet some one must be steering, and the course held is a bold one. Slowly the lighters forge ahead past the very mouths of the Turkish cannon in the Sistova Battery, and are barely noticed by a couple of shells. They bring to at the Roumanian shore higher up than the crossing place, and wait there for their freight. Prince Mirsky takes his stand at the pontoon bridge to watch his division file past, and greet the regi-

ments as they pass him. But in front of the 9th Division comes a regiment of the brigade of riflemen formed especially for this war, and attached to no army corps. This brigade is armed with Berdan rifles, and comprises the most efficient marksmen of the whole army. Prince Mirsky's division is made up of four historic regiments which suffered most heavily in Sebastopol during the great siege. They are the regiments of Yeletsk, of Sefsk, of Orloff, and of Brianski, the 33rd, 34th, 35th, and 36th of the Russian line. Very gallantly they march down the steep slope and across the bridge on to the swampy flats. Soon there greets them a scarcely enlivening spectacle, the *Verbandplatz* of the second line, where the more serious cases were being dealt with before forwarding them to the house hospitals in Simnitz. As we passed, about twenty shattered creatures were lying there on blood-stained stretchers waiting their turn at the hands of the doctors. More than one I noticed required no further treatment than to be consigned to a soldier's grave. Beyond the first swamp we met a fine young officer of the Guards, carried on a stretcher with a shattered leg. But the plucky youngster raised himself jauntily on his elbow to salute the general, and wrote a telegram in my note-book to acquaint his friends that he was not much hurt. A little further on, as we were passing the rear of the guns, the Grand Duke Nicholas, the younger son of the commander-in-chief, rode out from the battery to greet our general. The members of the Imperial family of Russia do not spare themselves when other subjects of the czar are exposing themselves on the battle-field. In Russia it is not the fashion that lofty station gives exemption from the more dangerous tasks of patriotism. The young grand duke had been across the Danube, and was in high spirits at the success of the enterprise. Some distance further on we passed the second *Verbandplatz*, whither many wounded had been brought. It was within range of the Turkish batteries about Sistova, and the mud around was pitted with shell-holes. But the Turkish fire by this time was nearly

crushed by the steady cannonade of the Russians.

"Here I may speak of the very efficient work of the Russian ambulance service belonging to the army. The ambulance force is strong, and the casualties were well within its compass, so that the work went on like clockwork. The younger surgeons and the ambulance men were continually up among the fighting men, and the moment a soldier was struck he was attended to. If severely injured he was put upon a stretcher and carried off after simple bandaging. If lightly wounded he left the field on foot, assisted by one or two of the ambulance men. The first destination of all was the Verbandplatz of the first line, where the ambulance waggons were always waiting. The slighter cases went away sitting in the waggons. The severe cases were put on stretchers and taken to the Verbandplatz of the second line. The only hindrance was the deep sand and the deeper mud, which impeded all movement, and sorely distressed the wounded retiring on foot. Amateur help was present in plenty towards the end of the day, but, if not a nuisance, was at least a superfluity so far as concerned the work in the field. The wounds were severe in a large proportion. The Turkish shell practice was remarkably good.

"Going still forward towards the willows we all but stuck, horses and all, in the deep holding mud. It was admirable to see the energy with which the heavily-laden soldiers of the infantry-column battled on doggedly through obstruction. I should have said earlier that the troops were in complete marching order, and that for this day they had discarded their cool white clothing, and were crossing in heavy blue clothing. Two reasons were assigned for this. One, the greater warmth to the wounded in case of lying exposed to the night chills. The other, that white clothing was too conspicuous. The latter reason is rubbish. Blue on the light ground of the Danube sand is more conspicuous than white. Everywhere British scarlet is more conspicuous than any other. The true fighting colour is the dingy kharki of our Indian irregu-

lars. After the mud we met a batch of prisoners under escort. Most were Turkish irregulars, defiant-looking, ruffianly, splendid fellows, a few were nizams of the Turkish regulars, gaunt-faced, but resolute-looking, and there was a squad of miscellaneous civilians, Turks, and Bulgarians. Just outside the willows was a place where the dead who had fallen there had been collected. The bodies were already swelling and blackening under the fierce heat. The living soldiers stood around the corpses, looking at their dead comrades with concern, but with no fear or horror. The grass under the willows was littered with rags of the linen and bits of clothing, showing that the shells had not fallen thereabout for nothing among the masses of men gathered there in the early morning. One or two shells were still dropping as we reached the water's edge. All the Turkish opposition had seemed crushed, but it was not so. There was a regular little battle raging on the slopes above the cove where the landing had been made. The Turks, it appears, had rallied and concentrated on the upper slopes in front of their battery on the sky-line, and, gathering heart, had come down on the picquets of the brigade Yolchine, whose line had perhaps been scarcely sufficiently fed by reinforcements, as they landed at first. The Turks had made some headway and may have encouraged themselves with the hope of driving their northern foe into the Danube; but only for a moment. Men fell fast in Yolchine's skirmishing line, but it pressed upwards irresistibly. We saw the Turks falling back in trickling little streams, and the battery ceased to fire, and no doubt was removed, for fear of capture. For soon after noon the Russian infantry had crowned the heights and settled themselves there, looking down into the interior of Bulgaria, with the Danube conquered in their rear. The Turkish infantry detachment tried to work round and down upon Sistova, but was thwarted by an intercepting skirmishing force, which got into position *à cheval* off the road from Sistova, and thus it would appear cut off the Turkish guns, which had been in the earthwork near the town.



"And what of the Turkish monitor? She had been hemmed in by a cordon of torpedoes within the side channel to the south of the island of Vardim. Although she was puffing and blowing furiously in her circumscribed area, a Russian battery moving down the river bank on the Roumanian side shelled her into a melancholy victim of the acknowledged supremacy of the newest war machine. So the resistance terminated, and what followed is mere routine work. Iron pontoons began casually to make their appearance both from up stream and down stream, and accumulated about the crossing place, being used for the time as ferry-boats. A complete pontoon train is in reserve at Simnitsa, and will be on the water's edge to-night and be laid to-morrow. Probably there will be two bridges, for this is the crossing place of the main column, and will be the great thoroughfare to and from Turkey. Simultaneously with the pontoon boats appeared on the scene the emperor's brother, the Grand Duke Nicholas, with General Nepokoitchitsky, and spoiled my prospects of dinner by requisitioning the whole hotel. The emperor did not turn up.

"The crossing has been effected by a *coup de main* with marvellous skill and finesse. Until the last moment no hint was given. The foreign attachés were nearly all abroad. The emperor and suite were ostentatiously at Turn Magurelle, and, yet further to promote the delusion, the Nicopolis position was assiduously bombarded the day before. The successful effort has probably cost only a thousand men killed and wounded. By to-night, or at the furthest to-morrow morning, the whole of the 8th Corps will be across, and the brigade of riflemen as well. To-morrow follows the 35th Division, and later come the whole of the 12th Army Corps, the whole of the Cavalry Division of Skobelev, the whole cavalry Divisions of the 8th and 12th Corps, and probably the 13th Corps, to stand in reserve near the Danube, while the column pushes on over Tirnova. One hundred thousand men at the lowest computation will march in this column, practically an irresistible force. Nicopolis yesterday

was laid in ashes. It is reported that an attempt was made at Turna simultaneously with that at Sistova, but I believe that the real attempt there was to be made last night by the 31st Division of the 9th Corps. The Grand Duke Nicholas and General Nepokoitchitsky have received the Grand Cordon of the Cross of St. George from the emperor."

During the next few days the Russians crossed the river in great force; and here, as at Galatz, they lost no time in constructing a bridge for the passage of their waggons and artillery. The Turkish troops retired to Rustchuk, some miles down the stream, and the immediate neighbourhood of Simnitsa was at once freed from their presence. It was thought probable that an attack from the nearest fortresses might be made upon the Russians, in the hope of driving them back across the Danube, and the grand duke gave orders in view of such a contingency. But the Turkish generals seem to have taken things very easily, both here and in the Dobrudscha. In the latter district they fell back from Matchin, Isaktscha, Toultscha and Babadagh; and when the authorities at Constantinople demanded an explanation from Abdul Kerim Pasha, the generalissimo is reported to have declared that "the occupation by the enemy of the Dobrudscha was entirely in accordance with his own plans; for the possession of a barren and desolate tract of country, incapable of providing sustenance for an army, would do the Russians no good, and the Turks no harm." He apparently had the same opinion of the crossing at Simnitsa; and indeed for many weeks to come the Turks clung to the belief that their generals were preparing the ruin of their enemies by suffering them to advance into Bulgaria.

Simultaneously with the crossing at Simnitsa an energetic attack was made upon Nikopolis. If a passage was really attempted here, the attempt was abandoned as soon as the news arrived of General Dragomiroff's success; but the Turkish fortress was greatly injured by the Russian artillery.

Thus, before the end of June, the invaders had

made good their footing in Bulgaria at two different points, and the first great operation of the war was concluded in their favour. General Zimmerman held the Dobrudscha with a powerful force, and commanded the navigation of the Danube, from Hirsova down to the sea; whilst the grand duke, within three days of the occupation of Sistova, had at his disposal, on Turkish soil, the 8th, 14th, and 35th infantry divisions, a brigade of riflemen, two regiments of Cossacks, and other detachments, in addition to the artillery of two divisions, which was carried across in boats and rafts before the completion of the bridge.

On the 28th an alarm was caused to the Russians by the appearance of a Turkish monitor which steamed up the river from Rustchuk. The passage of the troops was immediately suspended, and it was feared that the unwelcome visitor would at least destroy the portion of the pontoon bridge which already had been commenced. She had run the gauntlet of Russian batteries in approaching the spot, and nothing could have prevented her from doing a vast amount of harm. She had actually entered the reach of the river on which Simnitza lies; but then she suddenly came to a standstill, and after remaining a couple of hours without any sign of activity, she got up steam and disappeared again. No doubt she was afraid of torpedoes; but the conduct of her captain looked suspiciously like arrant cowardice.

On the 29th the Emperor Alexander crossed to Sistova, and warmly congratulated his troops. He embraced General Dragomiroff, Major Yolchine, and Skobelev the younger. A Bulgarian priest received him at the gate of the town, having a cross in his hand, and presenting bread and salt, which the czar tasted, after the usage of countries professing the Greek form of Christianity.

Meanwhile there was warm work all along the river banks, and the Turkish ironclads and gunboats were here and there of great service to their possessors. It is impossible to pass over the account of a gallant fight between a monitor and the Russian torpedoes, as thus recorded by a correspondent of the "Daily News":—

"TURN MAGURELLE, *June 30th.*—A most interesting affair occurred on the Danube here during the operations attending the passage of the Danube—a fight between a Turkish monitor and four Russian torpedo boats. It was somewhere near the mouth of the Aluta. This monitor had been giving the Russians a good deal of trouble, and showed an amount of activity and energy very unusual with the Turks, continually shelling the Russian batteries, and destroying the boats. The Russians accordingly determined to destroy it.

"Four torpedo boats were prepared, and sent against the monitor. Hiding behind an island, they laid in wait, and when the vessel was steaming past suddenly darted out from their hiding-place, and bore down on her in broad daylight. This monitor, it soon became apparent, was handled and commanded in a very different manner from others with which the Russians have had to deal here. With wonderful quickness and skill she was prepared for action, and, nothing daunted by the fate of others, made a successful defence against her four terrible enemies, a defence of which the Russians speak with the greatest admiration. Her commander began by likewise thrusting out torpedoes on the end of long spars, thus threatening the boats with the danger of being blown into the air first, at the same time opening a terrible fire on them with small arms and mitrailleuse. He manœuvred his boat in a most skilful manner, with a dexterity and address which, with the torpedoes protecting, made it impossible for the Russian boats to approach sufficiently near. He besides tried to run them down, and very nearly succeeded in doing so. The reason soon became evident. The commander was a European, and, as the Russians believe, an Englishman, who directed the movements from the deck. He was plainly visible all the time, and was a tall man, with a long blonde beard parted in the middle. He stood with his hands in his pockets, giving orders in the calmest manner possible.

"The torpedo boats continued their attempts



for more than an hour, flitting round the monitor and seeking the opportunity to get at her, but without success. The monitor was equally active in trying to run them down, avoiding a collision by quick and skilful movements, backing and advancing, turning, and ploughing the water into foam as she pursued or avoided her tiny but dangerous adversaries—a lion attacked by rats. At one moment one launch, in rapid manœuvres, found itself between the monitor and the shore, with no great distance between them. The monitor's head was in the other direction, but her commander instantly began backing her down on the torpedo boat, with the intention of crushing it against the bank. Just at this moment the engineer of the launch was wounded. There was some confusion and delay in starting the engines, while the current carried her head aground in such a position as to render escape impossible. One of the crew sprang out into the water and pushed from the ground, while another started the engines just in time for her to escape, but the shave was very close. One Russian officer sprang ashore, and seeing the captain of the monitor coolly standing on the deck with his hands in his pockets, emptied his revolver at him, three shots, at a distance of not more than forty feet. The captain of the monitor, in answer, took off his hat and bowed, not having received even a scratch. Later, however, the gallant fellow seems to have been killed or wounded, for he suddenly disappeared from the deck. The monitor immediately afterwards retired precipitately from the scene of action.

"Since that time she has kept out of the way like the others. The Russians suppose that she is no longer commanded by the same man. The fight was conducted with wonderful skill on both sides. The Russian boats were commanded by Lieutenant Niloff, and the attack was a most daring and tenacious one. His loss was only four or five wounded, in spite of the incessant fire of the small arms and mitrailleuse which poured into them. This shows how well-handled the boats were. They were, however, con-

siderably damaged by the mitrailleuse fire. No attempt was made by the commander to use his guns, he evidently believing it impossible to hit such a small and rapidly moving object as a steam launch. That the boats should have suffered so little loss in one hour's fight shows how difficult it is to hit these launches. They were, I believe, fitted out in the same manner as those which blew up the monitor at Braila, but this attempt, as well as the one at Giurgevo, was made in broad daylight. This monitor has since been surrounded by torpedoes, so that it is believed she cannot escape. All the monitors now on the Danube are surrounded by torpedoes. It is believed that those at Nikopolis have been abandoned by the Turks, as no sign of life has been seen on them for two or three days."\*

On the whole, the crossing of the Danube at Simnitza was effected with trifling loss. The official returns gave the number of killed as two hundred and forty, and of wounded as four hundred and ten. As Mr. Forbes remarks, the same operation "in 1827 cost twelve thousand men! In 1853 it cost fifteen thousand men! a significant comment on the resisting capacity of the Turks."

Immediately after the crossing of the Danube at Galatz the Emperor Alexander issued a proclamation to the Bulgarians, couched in the following terms:—

"My troops have crossed the Danube. To-day they enter your territory, where they have already several times fought for the amelioration of the lot of the Christian inhabitants of the Balkan Peninsula. Faithful to their ancient historical traditions, and always deriving fresh strength from the intimate union which had bound them for centuries to the orthodox people of Russia, my ancestors succeeded, by their influence and their arms, in securing successively the position of the Servians and Roumanians by summoning them to a new political existence. Time and cir-

\* The surmise was so far justified that the ironclads were never used again, but fell into the hands of the Russians on the subsequent capture of Nikopolis.



THE GRAND DUKE NICHOLAS  
COMMANDING THE ARMY OF THE DANUBE





cumstances have not altered Russia's sympathies towards her co-religionists in the East. She still bears the same love and the same solicitude towards all the members of the great Christian family of the Balkan Peninsula. I have confided to my army, commanded by my brother, the Grand Duke Nicholas, the mission of securing the sacred rights of your nationality, which constitute the immutable conditions of the peaceful and regular development of all civic existence. These rights you have not acquired by force or armed resistance, but as the reward of centuries of suffering, and of the martyrs' blood with which you and your forefathers have for centuries soaked the soil of your country.

"Inhabitants of Bulgaria! Russia's object is to build up and not to destroy. She is called by the decrees of Providence to pacify and conciliate all races and all denominations in those parts of Bulgaria which are inhabited by a population of various origin and beliefs. Henceforth the Russian arms will protect every Christian against all violence. No attack will be made with impunity upon his person or his property by any one, and every crime will be followed by a fitting punishment. The life, liberty, honour, and property of every Christian will be equally guaranteed, to whatever class he may belong. Vengeance will not guide our acts, which will be presided over solely by a sentiment of strict equity, as well as by the firm intention of causing order and right progressively to succeed the reign of disorder and despotism. To you, Mussulmans of Bulgaria, I address a salutary warning. It is painful for me to recall the memory of crimes and acts of violence of which several among you have been guilty towards defenceless Christians. Their horrors cannot be forgotten, but the Russian authorities do not desire to hold all responsible for the crimes of a few. Regular and impartial justice will overtake those criminals who have remained unpunished, despite the fact that their names were perfectly well known to your government. Acknowledge now the justice of God which overtakes you, and bow to his will. Submit your

legitimate needs to the authorities, who will be appointed wherever my troops appear; become peaceful citizens of society, which is ready to accord you the benefits of a regular organisation. Your existence and your property, the lives and honour of your families, will be sacred before us Christians.

"Bulgarians, you are passing through a memorable period. The hour of deliverance from Mussulman tyranny has at last struck. Give the world an example of Christian love; cast into oblivion old intestine dissensions, scrupulously respecting the legitimate rights of each nationality. Unite your brothers in religion, in sentiments of concord and brotherly love, which alone afford solid bases for a durable edifice. Gather closely under the shadow of the Russian flag, whose victories have so often resounded on the Danube and the Balkans. As fast as the Russian troops advance into the interior of the country the power of the Turk will be replaced by regular organisations; the native inhabitants will be summoned to take an active part therein, under the supreme direction of special authorities, and new Bulgarian legions will be formed to serve as the nucleus of a local armed force, destined to maintain order and security. The zeal you will have displayed in honestly serving your country, and the impartiality you will have brought to the accomplishment of this great duty, will prove to the world that you are worthy of the destiny that Russia has prepared for you during so many years at the cost of such great sacrifices. Obey the Russian authorities, follow faithfully the indications they will give you; therein lie your strength and safety.

"With humility I pray our Lord to grant us the victory over the enemies of Christianity, and to send down His blessing upon our just cause.

"ALEXANDER."

A few of the more manly Bulgarians responded to the emperor's appeal, by forming an auxiliary legion, which did good service in the war; but the majority of them displayed no special gratitude to their deliverers.



## CHAPTER XVI.

## THE WAR IN MONTENEGRO.

WHILST the Russians had been gaining their earlier successes in Armenia, and the two foes had stood facing each other on the banks of the Danube, the war in Montenegro proceeded with considerable vigour. The Porte's refusal of anything like reasonable terms to her courageous vassal, at the time when the convention with Serbia was concluded, rendered it inevitable that another attempt should be made to subdue Prince Nikita. The obstinacy and short-sightedness of the Turkish government were, in fact, clearly exemplified in its determination, after the Conference of Constantinople, to keep open the sore from which Turkey had already suffered so grievously. The same folly which prompted her to refuse the moderate demands of the Conference led her to reject the chance of pacifying Montenegro. It was evident to most men, as soon as hostilities were resumed with the insurgent Principality, that the war between Turkey and Russia had definitely become inevitable.

Prince Nikita had demanded a rectification of his frontier, with an increase of territory, in recognition of the advantages which he had undoubtedly obtained over the Turkish generals in 1876. In particular, he required the possession of Nicsics, a dilapidated Turkish fortress in Herzegovina, which commanded and threatened him on his northern frontier. When the Porte had finally rejected his demands, and his delegates had withdrawn from Constantinople, he renewed the active investment of this town, around which his forces had been gathered since the previous autumn; and it became necessary for the Turks at once to attempt its relief. For this purpose Suleiman and Mehmet Ali Pashas were despatched with a large army; and these two generals, acting in conjunction with Ali Said in Albania, attacked the Principality on the north, east, and south, simultaneously, thus compelling Prince

Nikita to divide his slender forces, and weaken the army which was laying siege to Nicsics.

For some time after the virtual resumption of hostilities, everything seemed to languish; and several weeks elapsed before news of active operations reached us. A reason for this was presently afforded in the gloomy accounts which reached the outside world of the condition of the Turkish troops, especially in the division commanded by Ali Said. The "Times" correspondent with the Montenegrins telegraphed on the 27th of May that Ali Said's men were almost helpless from disease and hunger. "The troops," he said,\* "are underfed, having nothing beyond the barest means of sustaining life; they are obliged to get clothing as they can, are compelled to work continuously on new earthworks, and would desert in great numbers but that they are persuaded they would be killed by the Montenegrins in coming over." On the north, matters were still worse. A Christian doctor, who quitted the Turkish forces at Trebinje, in Herzegovina, reported that two thousand four hundred of Suleiman Pasha's troops had died since the campaign began. The head-quarters of the Turkish commander-in-chief were at Gatschko, where thirty-six battalions, of three to four hundred men each, had been collected; but of these, "at least half" were suffering from scurvy, dysentery, and diarrhoea. "The physicians and surgeons, subject to the fanatical outbreaks of the Mussulmans, are continually menaced, often insulted, and never paid, so that their number, never sufficient, is continually decreasing by enforced desertion. Of the thirty-six battalions at Gatschko, only six are well-disciplined troops, the remainder being new levies hastily enrolled, and Bashi-Bazouks formed into battalions. Three thousand sick are reported at Mostar."

The frontier of Montenegro, as it existed at this time, was deeply indented on the north and south, the Turkish fortresses of Nicsics and Spuz overlooking the boundary line in the respective angles, which were separated by about half a

\* The "Times," June 4th, 1877.

day's march. From Gatschko to Nicsics, in a straight line, is a distance of some thirty-eight miles, of which more than twenty are occupied by the Duga Pass, extending between Nicsics and Krstacs. This latter place was the first objective of Suleiman Pasha; whilst Ali Said directed his movements against Spuz, and Mehemet Ali, on the east, against Koloshin.

It is scarcely correct to say that the Montenegrins were laying siege to Nicsics. Their artillery was not equal to such an operation, even against so weak a place. The chief hope of the prince was to force the garrison to surrender before Suleiman could relieve it; and he centred his energies on the defence of the Duga Pass. The correspondent of the "Times" last mentioned thus summarised the condition of affairs at the end of May. "The health of the Montenegrin forces is excellent, and the hospitals are so far quite empty. The whole army appears in splendid condition, and is eager for work to commence. They desire to attack Nicsics; but the prince is altogether indisposed to risk his men in assaults against walls without adequate artillery force. A recent reconnaissance by the Russian engineer officers does not encourage an attack with the means hitherto at hand. The city is composed of about three hundred houses, built separately in most cases, with wide spaces between, and about sixty of them are occupied by Christian families. To bombard the city would not be difficult, but as each house must be reduced by itself, the work would be tedious. There is an old citadel, built on a small elevation, just outside the town, in which are the barracks. This commands the city, which has no exterior wall. In the plain are two or three small block-houses, without artillery. The garrison has still, it is believed, about two weeks' food; and, as there is a state of latent hostility existing between the population and the garrison most favourable to Montenegrin plans, it is not likely that the former will do much towards relieving the necessities of the latter—the more so as a majority of the population is well disposed towards the Montenegrin régime. Should, how-

ever, the attack on the Duga be long delayed, and the citadel hold out unexpectedly, it is probable that an attempt will be made with such artillery as the Montenegrins have to reduce the citadel by a battery established on the neighbouring heights, as much to compel the Turkish army of Herzegovina to give battle as to induce the garrison of Nicsics to surrender. The inactivity of the Turks in Albania has given the Montenegrins time to complete arrangements which will enable them to liberate a portion of their artillery from before Podgoritzza, and employ it, in case of need, at Nicsics. Thus the operations on both frontiers are made easy for the Montenegrins, it being not above ten hours' march from one frontier to the other, and from this position (Ostrog) we can hear a gun fired at either extreme of the line from Nicsics to Podgoritzza."

Suleiman Pasha, having received reinforcements, advanced from Gatschko early in June, and took various unfortified places previously occupied by the Montenegrins. The latter fell back gradually, though not without making a stout resistance. At Metrovic on the Martinitza, for instance, on the 5th of June, the Turks were caught in an ambush, and lost about five hundred men; but their overwhelming numbers compelled the troops of the prince to retire. Meanwhile the latter were preparing to bring such artillery as they could obtain to bear upon the fortress of Nicsics, and a number of cannon were carried from Danilo grad on the shoulders of the men. They forced their way into the plain surrounding the town, and drove the garrisons of the block-houses into the citadel; but the advance of Suleiman was too determined to leave them any hope of reducing the town unless they could defend the Duga Pass. Meanwhile Ali Said was pushing his way into the Principality from the south, and threatening to take the prince in the rear.

A Montenegrin official despatch, of 7th June, claimed several minor successes. "On the 5th inst.," according to this despatch, "the Montenegrins captured five Turkish block-houses and de-



stroyed them, putting the garrisons to the sword. The whole Turkish force at Spuz attacked the Montenegrins on the 6th inst. at Martinitza. The fight lasted from early morning until the afternoon, and during its progress the Turkish officers had thrice to lead back their wavering men by force to the front. Ultimately the Montenegrins took the offensive, and drove the retreating Turks back as far as the fortress of Spuz. Yesterday Prince Nikita gave orders for the strong fort of Uzrinice, on the road to Nicsics, to be bombarded. After a heavy cannonade, in the course of which some projectiles reached as far as Nicsics, the fort fell into the hands of the Montenegrins."

Whilst Suleiman advanced upon Krstacs, he sent a column to the relief of Goransko. Here the Turks were opposed by Socica, one of the prince's commanders; and, on the 7th of June, the latter reported to the prince that he had cut the Turks in two, driving the vanguard into the fortress, and capturing the provision train, with seven hundred horses.\* Before Krstacs, the Montenegrin Vukovics was strongly entrenched, and he repulsed three severe assaults by Suleiman Pasha. The Turkish loss was computed at three thousand; six hundred dead being counted in front of the entrenchments of one Montenegrin battalion. Immediately after this engagement, however, Vukovics was obliged to retire to the entrance of the Pass.

The Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs telegraphed to the Ottoman embassies on the 7th of June in the following terms:—"In my telegram of the 2nd I announced to you that the Montenegrins were marching on three different points. Suleiman Pasha, Commander-in-Chief of the army of Herzegovina, attacked them on the heights occupied by them between Oreata and Cristacs. After an obstinate fight the Imperial troops carried all the positions of the mountaineers, as well as the fort of Cristacs. After that defeat the siege of Diztstop was raised. Ali Said Pasha,

Commander-in-Chief of the Scutari Division, has occupied several important positions without difficulty, while Brigadier-General Hadji Hussein Pasha has obtained possession of the intrenchments of Yenckeni, Seok, and Bozalat. Mehmed Ali Pasha, Commandant of Novibazar, has also beaten the Montenegrins, and our soldiers have victoriously occupied Achvita Bala, one hour's march from Montenegrin territory. In these different fights the Montenegrins suffered great losses. Three of the inhabitants of Istorz, who had been taken alive by the rebels, have had their noses, lips, and arms, cut off. They have also cut off the head of a child, and killed two women and two men belonging to the Christian religion."

The accusation of cruelty against the Montenegrins was frequently repeated by the Turks during this campaign; and though it seems to have been exaggerated in some particulars, there can be little doubt that the mountaineers occasionally behaved in a barbarous manner, mutilating the bodies of the dead, if not of the living. Evidence to this effect was produced at the time, and it is scarcely credible that this evidence, including photographs of mutilated Turks, should have been concocted by the Turks themselves, as was actually affirmed by some persons. As a matter of fact, scarcely one of the combatants in south-eastern Europe can be acquitted of cruelty and barbarity; and the Porte seems to have spared no pains to collect all the testimony on which it could lay its hands to the discredit of its enemies. At one period scarcely a day passed on which the Ottoman Foreign Minister did not send to foreign embassies an account of alleged Montenegrin or Russian atrocities. Safvet Pasha and his colleagues knew well that the conduct of the Turkish irregulars was calculated to bring the greatest obloquy upon them. Their generals could not entirely restrain the savage Circassians and Bashi-Bazouks; and it was only natural that they should be eager to prove the existence of similar barbarities on the side of their enemies.

Suleiman Pasha had been so greatly weakened

\* This capture was, however, denied by the Turkish accounts.

by his attack on the entrenchments of Krstacs that he hesitated for several days before advancing through the Duga Pass. Eye-witnesses declare that the Turks had to be repeatedly driven to the assault by their officers at the sword's point, as many as three hundred being killed in this way. Whatever truth there may be in such statements, it would seem to be unquestionable that the Turkish commander lost more than four thousand of his troops *hors de combat*. He was successful in provisioning Goransko, on the river Piva; and the Montenegrins retired to Presjeka, more than half-way down the Pass. It was plain to every one that the mountaineers were overmatched, the strategy of the Turks in attacking them on three sides, in overwhelming numbers, having rendered a successful resistance almost hopeless from the first. Whilst Suleiman was preparing for still more vigorous efforts, Ali Said resumed the offensive on the south, and Mehemet Ali had crossed the eastern frontier, and threatened to advance into the heart of Montenegro.

A desperate two days' fight occurred at Presjeka, interrupted only by the darkness, in the course of which thousands fell on both sides; the result of which was, that the Montenegrins again retired, and the prince withdrew his headquarters from the plain of Nicsics to Ostrog, on Montenegrin territory. His reason for doing this was probably a mixed one. He might have made another stand at the southern mouth of the Pass; but he must have seen that he could not reasonably hope to prevent the relief of the fortress, and meanwhile the other Turkish columns were advancing. Ali Said was pressing Petrovics hard on the Albanian side, and Mehemet Ali was becoming extremely formidable with his comparatively small division.

The correspondent of the "Times" with the Montenegrins gave a brief account of the battle of Krstacs, or Krstaz, and of the subsequent fighting, which it seems advisable to quote here.

"According to information collected from the most trustworthy sources, confirmed by my own personal observation to some extent, the battle of Krstaz may be fairly regarded as a drawn bat-

tle, although, by bad generalship, the brunt of the fighting was borne by six battalions, three others not firing a shot, and the reserves not arriving in time. Both armies were exhausted by the struggle, and that of Suleiman Pasha had no communication. The Montenegrins lost no positions, and might have maintained Krstaz against any further direct attack, or, by following up the battle by an attack in full force with the six fresh battalions received a day or two later, might have forced Suleiman Pasha back on Gatschko, he being less able to sustain a renewal of the struggle than the Montenegrins. The interval of inaction which occurred sufficiently proves this. In falling back on Presieka, Vukotics, it is now clear, acted under exaggerated impressions of the Turkish force, and apprehensions which had no proper basis.

"At Presieka he made the graver mistake of spreading his army along a thin line of four miles, the battalions being often without any means of intercommunication or supports, and concealed from one another, and in great part from their commander, by dense forests, owing to which he could not follow the operations. Some battalions received no orders at all. The Turkish attack was concentrated on the right wing, two battalions of which, after a desperate fight of two hours, partly hand-to-hand, were driven in; and, there being no supports, the rest of the wing was cut off, and obliged to fall back. For two days many of the men had no food. What makes the blunder worse is, that Vukotics had decided not to oppose the further advance of Suleiman Pasha before the attack was made; but instead of immediately removing his troops and providing for the defence of Planinitza, the Montenegrin general waited till the Turks had entered Niksich, when he was compelled to make a circuitous march of two days to reach the prince, while the Turks, having rested two days, were in front of Planinitza before a sufficient Montenegrin force had arrived to fortify and hold it. The defence of this strong position being thus impracticable, Prince Nikita fell back on the Yalusl, followed by the Turks."



Nicsics was relieved by Suleiman Pasha on the 16th of June. On the same day Petrovics claimed to have inflicted a severe defeat on Ali Said at Zagaratch, near Martinitza, compelling him to retire; but on the 19th the Turks were able to occupy the village last named. From hence they attempted a movement against Danilograd, but they were once more driven backwards upon Spuz. In fact, the honours of the campaign on the Montenegrin side rest with Petrovics; for Ali Said was never able to match the success achieved by Suleiman and Mehemet Ali. His last defeat was of an important character. He was obliged to retreat precipitately, abandoning his camp, guns, and colours. Many of his Albanian troops, utterly demoralised, fled past Spuz to Podgoritza. The plains between Danilograd and Spuz were strewn with dead. Ali Said himself remained under the guns of Spuz, until he was relieved by the advance of the generalissimo.

Meanwhile Suleiman Pasha advanced from Nicsics into Montenegrin territory, encountering an obstinate resistance. The fighting was very sanguinary, little quarter being given on either side. At Ostrog the Turkish commander burned a convent, which had been spared in the last invasion of the Principality, in the year 1862. During the week commencing with the 18th of June, the date of the capture of Ostrog, there was very severe fighting in and around this town. The Turks were driven out on Wednesday, and they were unable, by the most desperate efforts, to pierce the narrow passage between Nicsics and Spuz until the 24th of the month. Nearly six days had been occupied in making an advance of about three hours' march; and the loss of the victors must have been immense. Suleiman Pasha may, indeed, be called the victor, inasmuch as he succeeded in his attempt to join hands with—or rather to relieve—Ali Said; but the operation was little better than a disaster. He had run the gauntlet of the Montenegrins, who poured an incessant fire upon him from close quarters, and covered the plains and mountain-slopes with corpses. The meet-

ing of the two Turkish commanders took place at Danilograd; but it was only under fire from the artillery of the prince and the musketry of Vukotics. The total loss of the Turks was reckoned at ten thousand men.

The Turks were now concentrated at Podgoritza, beyond the frontier; and as Mehemet Ali had retired, the soil of Montenegro was free from its invaders. Little more was attempted by Suleiman Pasha; for at this juncture the news arrived of the Russian passage of the Danube. A few days later Suleiman and Mehemet Ali were recalled, in order to assume high commands in Bulgaria. The forces of Ali Said were too demoralised to effect anything by themselves; and thus the Montenegrins were able to rest and recover themselves.

Meanwhile the Servians had been showing many signs of activity. Rumours were continually spreading to the effect that they would renew their struggle with Turkey, in spite of the convention entered into at the beginning of the year. Prince Milan went, in the latter half of June, to confer with the czar at Bucharest; and it was supposed that the Russian Emperor counselled the prince to abstain, at all events for the present. The Servians, therefore, contented themselves with preparing their army for active service whenever the opportunity might arise.

We may avail ourselves of the present break in our narrative, before returning to the operations in Bulgaria, to take into consideration a question which is not without importance in the general history of the Eastern question, and especially in regard to the views entertained of it in England. It is certain that the Jews, as a rule, took the Turkish side in the quarrel between the Porte and its vassals; and their attitude seems to have been determined chiefly by the fact that their race had been subject to constant persecutions in Servia and Roumania. A blue book on the subject of these persecutions was issued from the English Foreign Office, including correspondence which ranged over a period of ten years, down to March 1877. From this collection we may here cite a report from

Consul Vivian, in Bucharest, dated May 5th, 1876:—

"I regret to say that, as is not uncommon in times of political agitation here, the Jewish question has cropped up again. I cannot be certain that what has happened is the result of political intrigue, as both parties disclaim any responsibility for it, and impute to their opponents, which is so far satisfactory that it shows that both are ashamed to admit that they have used the Jewish question as a political weapon. On hearing from my American colleague on the 27th ult. that three Jewish families in the district of Dorohoi had been arrested and barbarously tortured, and that the prefect had issued a circular to all the authorities in his district requiring them to apply strictly in letter and spirit the existing rural police and license laws against the Israelites in the rural communes, and, in fact, to drive them away from their occupations, I at once desired her Majesty's Vice-Consul at Jassy to report to me immediately the true facts of the case; and meanwhile I earnestly appealed to the President of the Council of Ministers, promptly to stay the mischief before it spread any further, by revoking the circular at once. Upon receiving Mr. St. John's report I again spoke most strongly to the President of the Council of Ministers, urging him to take immediate steps to arrest the mischief before it assumed more serious proportions; and I addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and to certain of my colleagues, the notes of which I also enclose copies. The result of our combined representations was that the prefect of Dorohoi was immediately summoned to Bucharest to give an account of his conduct, and that the Government Procureur was sent to inquire on the spot into the charges of ill-treatment and torture of the Jews. I am now told by the authorities that the complaints of the Jews have been much exaggerated. One man, they admit, was arrested and beaten because he refused to pay his spirit license, and endeavoured to decamp with his property to avoid a distraint upon it; but the mayor who authorised this illegal punishment

would, they say, be dismissed. The prefect, they state, went round the villages, not to enforce, but to stay the execution of his orders when he perceived, on being summoned to Bucharest, that he had done wrong; and I am positively assured that the obnoxious circular will be suspended, and the Jews replaced in exactly the same position in which they were before it was issued. I have also asked that the prefect should not be allowed to remain at his post. It may be true, as is alleged by the authorities, that the mischief is only attributable to overzeal on the part of a new prefect; but so long as the existing penal laws against the Jews remain in force, it is always open to a prefect who chooses to interpret them literally, and enforce them rigorously, to cause great misery and suffering by driving the Jews away from their occupations in the villages. I shall not fail to watch closely that the promises of the government are fulfilled."

Owing to the joint action of the representatives of the Great Powers in Bucharest the troubles in Dorohoi ceased. The obnoxious prefect was removed, and a man well disposed towards the Jews was appointed in his place. On the 5th of January, 1877, Mr. Montefiore wrote to Lord Derby, stating that a memorial had been received from the Jewish inhabitants at Roman, in Moldavia, appealing for protection against a threatened expulsion of the inhabitants. The threat, however, was carried into effect. It would seem that two hundred Jewish families in the district of Vaslin had been driven from their homes under circumstances of great cruelty. Lord Derby forwarded the representations which were made to him to Colonel Mansfield, with instructions that immediate inquiry should be made into the matter. Colonel Mansfield reported on the 19th January, "that the investigation by M. Burian, the Austrian Vice-Consul, confirms the worst version of the late persecution of the Jews in Moldavia: ninety-five families, and perhaps even one hundred and twenty, from sixty communes, were expelled from their homes by order of the pre-



fect, M. Neron Lupascu, the brother of the Lupascu already notorious for the Galatz persecutions. Representation having been made to the central government, orders were sent that the expelled Jews should be restored to their homes; but, in the meantime, their habitations had been let or assigned to other persons, and their effects, furniture, &c., pillaged or disappeared. M. Protopopescu having been sent from Bucharest to investigate the matter, was met at Jassy by the Prefect Lupascu, of Vaslin, and was by him taken to localities where little or nothing had taken place, which gave rise to the official version, which I mentioned in my despatch of the 16th instant. It is currently reported that many families, on the payment, in bribes, of twenty-five ducats per family (about £12) were not molested, and that had two thousand ducats (about £900) been forthcoming, nothing would have happened. Colonel Pencovitz, of the Statistical Department, has been despatched to make an inquiry on the spot, and the Austrian Acting Agent has demanded the suspension of the Prefect Lupascu, to which the Roumanian government has declined to accede, until the report of Colonel Pencovitz shall have been received. It would appear that some of the outrages in question occurred so far back as last November, but that, owing to the terrorism employed by the authorities, nothing transpired until the article in the *Pester Lloyd*, some three weeks since; and, very recently, Jews, Austrian subjects, came to M. Bosizio, the Acting Agent, and told him that the whole story was much exaggerated, inferring that official action on his part might aggravate the evil. I have waited to communicate to M. Jonesco your lordship's despatch, directing me not to make an unofficial but earnest representation to the Roumanian government until I should have exact data with which to repel the official version, that the persecution had been the subject of exaggeration; but I propose to wait upon the minister this afternoon, and speak to him in the sense of your lordship's instructions."

In a subsequent despatch Colonel Mansfield

wrote—"As long as the present condition of the Jews is maintained by law, outrage and oppression must ever recur, and as all political parties in this country, whether Conservative, Liberal, or Radical, are equally determined not to relax an iota in this respect, it is feared that there is no issue to the matter. From terrorism and fear of denunciation being traced and visited on the individual, it is next to impossible to get even the Jews to enter into particulars as to how they are treated, and as the hand of every Wallachian and Moldavian is against the Jews, whatever occurs is invariably maintained to be either an invention or an exaggeration."

Writing on the 11th February, Colonel Mansfield said:—"Three sub-prefects have been dismissed in the districts which were the scene of the late outrages on Jews in Moldavia. I understand that the report of Colonel Pencovitz has been for some time in the hands of the government. The report, according to rumour, almost completely confirms the statements which were received in London; and I imagine that M. Jonesco, who shares M. Schendré's views that the Jews in Roumania are both contented and well treated, will have some difficulty in drawing up the note which he had promised me, in reply to the unofficial representation which I made under instructions from your lordship."

Taking these facts into account, we cannot wonder that the sympathies of the Jews in Servia and Roumania were rather with the Turks than with their enemies; and no doubt the persecution, of which we have given a few instances, had great weight in determining at least one section of public opinion in England.

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## CHAPTER XVII.

### MORE NEGOTIATIONS.

THE news of the Russian passage of the Danube naturally caused great consternation in the Turkish capital. Of course, it could hardly have been

expected that the invader would be prevented from achieving this preliminary success. Twice before in the present century a Russian army had effected a crossing in the face of a powerful opposition ; and the exploits of the Turks in Serbia had given no real grounds for supposing that their military skill or valour had greatly increased since the war of 1854. But the long delay in the operations had doubtless given the Porte and its friends considerable encouragement, and every day which passed without a serious effort on the part of the grand duke's army served to heighten the sanguine expectations of the Turks. Moreover the Ottoman government had made enormous preparations. They had many sympathisers in Europe, and they had been able, in one way or another, to collect vast stores of weapons and munitions. Their artillery was perfect of its kind, and admirably handled. Their small arms were the best that could be procured ; and their fleet, both in the Danube and in the Black Sea, inspired them with great confidence.

The Turks, moreover, placed much reliance on the temper of their soldiers. Their nizams, as well as their irregular troops, their European and Asiatic contingents, their well-trained infantry and their intrepid Circassian horse, all came of fighting races, and all were endued with the high soldierly virtues of patience, sobriety, and contempt of life. The Turkish authorities, at Constantinople as at the head-quarters, knew what these men were worth, and remembered how their fathers and ancestors had fought. All the correspondents on the Turkish side had spoken highly of the raw material of the sultan's armies. A few days before the crossing of the Danube, a correspondent wrote from Rustchuk to the "*Republique Francaise*":—"Whilst the enemy's cavalry makes its appearance on the bank of the river opposite Rustchuk, as if to defy the cannon which would certainly crush it, the troops encamped outside the town harden themselves by drill and manœuvring. We found the men in excellent health, sufficiently equipped, and, above all, well armed. They were Egyptians, Kurds, and Circassians, all brought under the

same discipline, and conforming to it with remarkable military spirit. It is wrong to suppose that the Turkish soldier does not know how to fight under the same conditions as the European ; that the troops are wont to disband and fight against all the rules of the art of killing their enemies mathematically. I have not seen him under fire, but if he then conducts himself with as much correctness as at drill, I do not see any appreciable difference between him and a European soldier. Short stature is exceptional in the Turkish army, and these men, of herculean strength, are sober to a fabulous extent. They do not drink ardent liquor, and rarely touch meat. I saw some this afternoon taking their meals beneath their tents. The repast consisted of pilan (stewed rice) and vegetables. It is difficult to converse with the simple soldier ; the officer is less laconic, and I learned from one of them a detail which shows how powerful the sense of duty is among these men. For eight months the troops have not received any pay ; they are content with their meagre ration and a little tobacco. What soldier anywhere in the world, and particularly what ignorant one, would not murmur at such a state of things ? And yet the Mussulman accepts all without a complaint ; on the contrary, the use of the rifle and life in the country please his warlike imagination, and I think that the artillerymen leaning on the ramparts, whom I see from my window, are furious that they are not permitted to send some shell among the newly-constructed works at Giurgevo."

Such was the testimony of every eye-witness ; and it is not surprising that the Turkish authorities had confidence in soldiers of this stamp. Hence, when it was heard that the Russians had crossed the Danube at two points, within a week, and at a comparatively trifling cost, the disappointment was very grievous. Some of the sultan's advisers at once recommended him to make terms with the czar, in the belief that the latter would be satisfied with very moderate terms. Others urged that the Standard of the Prophet should be unfurled, and that a Holy War should



be proclaimed in the most solemn manner. These counsels did not prevail ; and the Ottoman government preferred to put forth its most strenuous efforts to resist the invader.

It has often been alleged that the obstinate resistance of the Turks, on this and other occasions, was due in a large measure to their confident belief that England would sooner or later come to their rescue. It has been shown with sufficient clearness that Lord Derby constantly warned the Porte not to expect the aid of this country under any circumstances ; but it may well be that the Turks refused to believe that these assurances were final and irrevocable. They clung to the idea that England and Russia would have to measure their strength against each other, and they hoped, in that eventuality, to derive at least an indirect benefit from English intervention.

The anticipation was natural enough ; for no one can deny that the danger of a new quarrel between the enemies of 1854 was very considerable. England's suspicion of Russian motives was as justifiable as it was strong ; and the negotiations which were constantly being renewed between London and St. Petersburg kept the door perpetually open to misunderstanding. During the month of June the diplomatists were hard at work, both giving and receiving pledges ; and in order that we may comprehend the nature of the situation as we proceed, and the mutual influence of military and diplomatic events upon each other, we may here summarise the negotiations which took place whilst the armies of the czar were pausing on the banks of the Danube.

On the 8th of June, 1877, Count Schouvaloff, the Russian Ambassador in England, held a confidential conversation with Lord Derby, of which the following is the official memorandum.

Count Schouvaloff declared that—

His Majesty the Emperor attached the greatest importance to the maintenance of good relations between the two countries. "He will make every effort to that end, but the English Cabinet, on their side, must do the same. There

is nothing to add to Prince Gortchakoff's letter with regard to the Suez Canal and Egypt. Russia will not touch upon these two points. With regard to Constantinople, our assurances can only refer to taking possession of the town, or occupying it permanently. It would be singular and without precedent if, at the outset of a war, one of the belligerents undertook beforehand not to pursue its military operations up to the walls of the capital. It is not impossible that the obstinacy of the Turks, especially if they know themselves to be guaranteed against such an eventuality, may prolong the war instead of bringing it to a speedy termination. When once the English Ministry is fully assured that we shall under no circumstances remain at Constantinople, it will depend on England and the other Powers to relieve us of the necessity of even approaching the town. It will be sufficient for them to use their influence with the Turks, with a view to make peace possible before this extreme step is taken. On our side we shall willingly fall into this view. With regard to the Straits, the arrangements by virtue of which the Black Sea, which is closed in time of peace, is opened in time of war to all fleets hostile to Russia, were conceived in a spirit of distrust and enmity towards her. It is a question which can only be re-settled by a general agreement, in such a manner as to guarantee the Black Sea against the consequences of the abnormal and exceptional position of the Straits. Would it be possible for Russia, at the outset of a war which may end fortunately for her, to undertake not to make Europe appreciate the necessity of a re-settlement of a state of things which was established to her prejudice ; England appears to fear lest the spreading or consequences of the war should lead us to threaten Bassorah and the Persian Gulf. It is not at all to our interest to trouble England in her Indian possessions, or, consequently, in her communications with them. The war which is actually going on does not demand it, for its object is clearly defined, and matters would be complicated rather than simplified by so vast an extension of the struggle. Count

Schouvaloff is authorised to give the most categorical assurances on this subject; but, this being the case, Russia has a right on her part to expect that England will take no hostile action against her. What must be arrived at is the essential object of the war; this is the most important point of all. If an understanding could be come to on this point, if the object to be attained were well defined, and the field of operations clearly marked out, all accessory questions would arrange themselves, and the issue would be arrived at the more easily, because it would meet with the concurrence and good-will of all the powers instead of with obstacles which delay and complicate it. It is to this point that Count Schouvaloff invites Lord Derby's attention, whilst stating as clearly and practically as possible the views of the Imperial Cabinet on the subject. What is absolutely necessary to Russia is that she should put an end to the continual crises in the East, firstly, by establishing the superiority of her arms so thoroughly that in future the Turks will not be tempted to defy her lightly; and secondly, by placing the Christians, especially those of Bulgaria, in a position which would effectually guarantee them against the abuses of Turkish administration. What is necessary to England is the maintenance in principle of the Ottoman empire and the inviolability of Constantinople and the Straits. These views are not irreconcilable. When once we have engaged in the war we cannot admit of any restrictions on our eventual operations. They remain entirely subordinate to the military requirements, but the consequences of this war can be confined beforehand within certain limits agreed upon. We could give at the present moment the assurance that, if the neutrality of the Powers is maintained, and the Porte sues for peace before our armies have crossed the Balkans, the emperor would agree not to pass that line. In this case peace might be concluded on the following terms:—Bulgaria up to the Balkans to be made an autonomous vassal province under the guarantee of Europe. The Turkish troops and officials to be removed from it, and the fortresses disarmed and razed.

Self-government to be established in it, with the support of a national militia to be organised as soon as possible. The Powers to agree to assure to that part of Bulgaria which is to the south of the Balkans, as well as to the other Christian provinces of Turkey, the best possible guarantees for a regular administration. Montenegro and Servia to receive an increase of territory, to be determined by common agreement. Bosnia and Herzegovina to be provided with such institutions as may by common consent be judged compatible with their internal state, and calculated to guarantee them a good indigenous administration. These provinces being situated conterminously with Austria-Hungary gives the latter a right to a preponderating voice in their future organisation. Servia, like Bulgaria, to remain under the suzerainty of the sultan; the relations of the suzerain and the vassals to be defined in a manner to prevent disputes. As regards Roumania, which has just proclaimed its independence, the emperor is of opinion that this is a question which cannot be settled except by a general understanding. If these conditions are accepted, the different Cabinets would be able to exercise a collective pressure on the Porte, warning it that if it refused it would be left to take the consequences of the war. If the Porte sues for peace, and accepts the terms enumerated above before our armies have crossed the line of the Balkans, Russia would agree to make peace, but reserves to herself the right of stipulating for certain special advantages as compensation for the costs of the war. These advantages would not exceed the portion of Bessarabia ceded in 1856, as far as the northern branch of the Danube (that is to say, the delta formed by the mouths of that river remains excluded), and the cession of Batoum, with adjacent territory. In this case Roumania could be compensated by a common agreement, either by the proclamation of its independence, or, if it remained a vassal state, by a portion of the Dobrudscha. If Austria-Hungary, on her side, demanded compensation, either for the extension acquired by Russia, or as a security against the new arrangements above-mentioned,



for the benefit of the Christian principalities in the Balkan Peninsula, Russia would not oppose her seeking such compensation in Bosnia, and partly in the Herzegovina. Such are the bases to which his Majesty the Emperor would give his consent, with a view of establishing an understanding with England and with Europe, and of arriving at a speedy peace. Count Schouvaloff is authorised to sound Lord Derby ('*pressentir l'opinion*') on the subject of these conditions of peace, without concealing from him the value which the Imperial Cabinet attaches to a good understanding with the Cabinet of London. To resume, if the Porte sues for peace, and accepts the above terms before the Russian armies have crossed the Balkans, the emperor would consent not to press the operations of war any further. If the Turkish government refuses, Russia would be obliged to pursue the war until the Porte was obliged to agree to peace. In this case the terms of the Imperial Cabinet might be altered. In thus indicating, with perfect openness, the object which the emperor has in view, and which he will not exceed so long as the war is confined to this side of the Balkans, his Majesty offers a means of localising the war, and preventing the dissolution of the Turkish empire; but it is important for the emperor to know if, within the limits indicated, he can count upon the neutrality which would exclude even a temporary occupation of Constantinople and the Straits by the latter power."

It must be admitted that the Russian government stated its views, through its representative, with the utmost frankness; and the ultimate treaty of peace tallied in a remarkable manner with the pledges here set forth. The time selected for the purpose of sounding the intentions of the English Cabinet leads to the conclusion that Russia was unwilling to proceed further in the war until she had reason to believe that England would not actively intervene. This, probably, is the true cause of delay in the crossing of the Danube.

In consequence of this statement by Count Schouvaloff, Lord Derby telegraphed to Mr.

Layard at Constantinople to ask his opinion as to whether the Porte would be likely to assent to the proposals of Russia, if submitted to it by the English government. Mr Layard telegraphed a decided negative, and wrote a despatch, on the 13th of June, detailing his reasons for that opinion. The gist of his argument was contained in the following terms:—

"I received this morning your lordship's telegram of yesterday's date, referring to the terms which Russia would accept if peace is made before her armies cross the Balkans, and asking me whether, in my judgment, there is any probability of the Porte consenting to those terms. I have telegraphed, in reply, that in my opinion it would not; and that it would be even dangerous to suggest them to the sultan or to his ministers at the present moment. As the messenger is leaving this afternoon I have scarcely time to enter fully into my reasons for coming to this conclusion in this despatch, but I desire to point out several of them, at least, to your lordship. The Turkish government would feel that to construct Bulgaria, as far as the Balkans, into a vassal autonomous province under the guarantee of Europe, the Turkish troops and functionaries to be withdrawn, and the Turkish fortresses on the Danube to be disarmed and razed, would not only be to lay the foundation for the speedy and complete independence of the new province, but of its union with Servia and the other Slav provinces, and the inevitable extension of Russian influence and rule over the whole Slav Christian populations of Turkey in Europe; that to consent to the destruction of the Turkish fortresses on the Danube, and the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the new province, would be to give up the main line of defence of Turkey in Europe, and to place the rest of that empire, and Constantinople itself, at the mercy of Russia; and that to establish self-government in this province, with the support of a national militia, would infallibly bring about these results. The Turkish government would be convinced that Greece, foreseeing that to create a semi-independent Bulgarian principality

(for such the new province would be) must, sooner or later, lead to the annexation to it of the provinces south of the Balkans in which there exists a Bulgarian population, would take measures at once to invade Thessaly and Epirus, and to raise the Greek population in Macedonia, with a view to securing them from ultimate absorption with Bulgaria; that the Hellenes would be supported by Europe, and that a fresh dismemberment of the empire would then take place. The sultan and his ministers would further fear the effect upon all the Mussulman populations of the Turkish empire of handing over to Christian government and influence a large Mahomedan population. Such would inevitably be the result of forming Bulgaria, north of the Balkans, into an autonomous state. If the sultan were to consent to this under present circumstances it would most probably cost him his throne, if not his life. Such is the present exasperation of the Porte against Servia and Montenegro, and such its conviction that it is about to subdue the latter principality, that no proposals at the present moment for any augmentation of territory to either of them would, I am convinced, be listened to, except it were some trifling cession to Montenegro, such as that mentioned in my despatch of the 24th ult. With the augmentation of territory to Montenegro and Servia, Bosnia and Herzegovina would probably be cut off from the rest of Turkey in Europe, and, with the new institutions to be given to these provinces, the Porte would consider them as practically lost to the Turkish empire. To the independence of Roumania, the Porte would not probably make any very serious objection, but would appeal to the Powers who signed the Treaty of Paris. She would not, I believe, listen at this moment to any proposal for the cession of part of the Dobrudscha to Roumania. The cession of Batoum, with adjacent territory, to Russia, would be considered by the Porte as handing over to her the key of Armenia and of all Asia Minor; and, moreover, Batoum is still held by the Turkish arms. To add to all the concessions mentioned above, the Porte

might, as suggested by Russia, be called upon to give compensation to Austria in Bosnia and part of Herzegovina. No one who is in the least acquainted with the present temper of the Turkish government and people, with the exasperation which is slowly gaining ground amongst the Mussulmans of this empire, and with the means that they still have of inflicting incalculable injuries upon the Christian population, would, I feel sure, hesitate to declare that nothing but the direst necessity would induce the Porte even to listen to these conditions. There is not a Turk who would not see in them the dismemberment and destruction of the Ottoman empire. No sultan, no minister, would dare to entertain them. I believe it would be highly dangerous to England, or any other Power, to suggest such conditions to the Turkish government, much more to propose them. It may be stated with confidence that, however secretly they were placed before the sultan or his ministers, they would soon become known. There is a powerful party in the palace, supported by the old fanatical Mussulman party outside, averse to peace, and determined to carry on the war to the very end. They are desperate men, and would shrink from no measures should they believe that terms were about to be imposed upon Turkey which would lead to the fall of the empire, a general persecution of the Mahomedan religion, and to the ultimate extermination of those who profess it in the European dominions of the sultan. Whether these fears be well founded or not, they would prevail; and although I am very far from being an alarmist, I can scarcely doubt that they would end in frightful massacres. Up to the present time the Turkish government has managed to keep the spirit of fanaticism under control, and has succeeded in maintaining a friendly feeling between Mussulmans and Christians, and in restoring the confidence of the latter, especially in Europe. But it could not continue to do so if the Mussulmans were once induced to believe that their property, their faith, and their very lives, were in jeopardy. I think that it would be highly undesirable, if not actually



dangerous, to our interests, for England to suggest to the Porte the acceptance of such terms as those proposed by Russia. Any influence we may still possess there, and which may hereafter be usefully and powerfully employed in the interests of peace, would, in my opinion, be utterly destroyed if we were to do so. We should be looked upon as greater enemies to Turkey and to Islamism than Russia herself, as false friends and traitors. I must apologise to your lordship for the very hasty and imperfect manner in which I have placed before you these considerations; but I could not allow the messenger to leave without at least submitting them, even in their present form, to her Majesty's government. As to the result of the acceptance by Turkey of the conditions proposed by Russia upon the interests of England, I do not feel myself authorised to write. Her Majesty's government will, no doubt, take them into their fullest consideration. I may add that the observations I have ventured to make apply to the present state of affairs. Were Russia over the Danube and at the Balkan passes, and were she in possession of Armenia, there might be grounds for forming a different opinion to that which I have now expressed; but, it must be remembered that up to the present time the Russians have gained no very signal victories, and the Porte is still under the impression (however ill-founded) that it can resist the Russian advance with fair prospects of success."

Continuing his comments in a further despatch, on the 19th of the same month, Mr. Layard wrote:—"I have since received your lordship's telegram of the 14th instant, in which your lordship informs me that Prince Gortschakoff had telegraphed to Count Schouvaloff that Bulgaria could not be divided into two provinces, as such an arrangement would exclude from autonomous institutions the most industrious and intelligent part of the population, and that which had suffered most from Turkish misrule. The Russian Chancellor thus appears to demand the formation into one vassal autonomous province of the whole of Turkey in Europe inhabited by Bul-

garians. The limits to be assigned to this province can only be at present a matter of conjecture, but they might be made to include the vilayet of Adrianople and that of Salonica down to the Ægean Sea. If there are good reasons for believing that Turkey would not accept the terms of peace as first proposed by Prince Gortschakow, except after defeats and disasters which would leave her at the absolute mercy of her enemy, there are still stronger grounds for the conviction that nothing but the extremest necessity would induce her to listen to the further condition now suggested. The formation of the provinces north and south of the Balkans into one vassal autonomous province, with the withdrawal from them of the Turkish troops and functionaries, and the abandonment and destruction of the Turkish fortresses on the Danube, would be, in fact, the end of the Ottoman empire in Europe. It would take but a little time to convert this so-called 'vassal autonomous province' into a semi-independent principality or state. Its complete severance from Turkey would then be but a question of a few years. Like Servia and Roumania, it would become a mere dependency of Russia, to be annexed when necessary or convenient. With the creation of this vassal autonomous province the remainder of the territories of Turkey in Europe must be lost to her. Bosnia and Herzegovina would be completely cut off from Constantinople, both by sea and land, unless, which is altogether improbable, a right of way would be left for Turkish troops through the new Bulgaria. These two provinces would either be formed into another vassal autonomous state, or would be divided between Austria, Servia, and Montenegro, as Prince Gortschakow evidently foreshadows. Greece will be compelled to demand the annexation of Thessaly, Epirus, and will, no doubt, make a desperate struggle to obtain at least such part of Macedonia as would prevent her being altogether cut off from Constantinople, to the ultimate acquisition of which the hopes of the whole Hellenic race are directed. But Russia has been working for many years to bring the whole of Mace-

donia, and especially Mount Athos, within the boundaries of Slavism. She would probably, therefore, resist all attempts on the part of Greece to acquire territory so necessary to the development of the Slav race to the south, and without which the new Russo-Bulgarian principality would be deprived of access to the Mediterranean. The policy of Russia with reference to Greece has, of late years, been altogether changed, and the Greeks know full well that they have been abandoned by her for the more useful Slavs. The Encyclical recently issued by the Greek Patriarch, of which I have sent your lordship a copy, is a sufficient proof of the present feelings of the Greeks towards Russia. What would remain to the sultan but Constantinople and a part of ancient Thrace? How long could he hope to retain even this fragment of his European empire with the Danube, the Balkans, Varna, and every port in the Black and Ægean Seas, in the hands of his irresistible enemy? . . . What we have to fear is the effect upon the sultan, his ministers, his government, and his people, of telling them, or even of leading them to believe, that they were about to be driven out of Europe—for in such, and in no other light, would they view Prince Gortchakow's terms. They would, in all probability, be thrown into a state of reckless despair. I would venture to urge most earnestly upon her Majesty's government not to be the medium of communicating, or of suggesting, any such terms as those proposed by Prince Gortchakow to the Sultan or to the Porte. The Russian Chancellor's language does not admit of the possibility of a mediation. It is simply that of dictation. The terms offered are to be accepted at once, or the consequences will be a further dismemberment of the Ottoman empire. Let some other Power accept this task. It is vital to our gravest interests—to interests the importance of which no words can adequately describe, much less exaggerate—that we should be ready to interpose to save the Turkish empire from complete dissolution. If we have even determined to abandon it to its fate, we have not determined

to abandon to the same fate the highest interests of the British empire. Surely the policy which has hitherto made us support Turkey for our own purposes and safety, and for no abstract love of Turks or their faith—a policy approved and adopted by the greatest statesman that England has produced—is not one which the events of the last few months, having no relation whatever to it, are sufficient to reverse. That policy was partly based upon the belief that Turkey is a barrier to the ambitious designs of Russia in the East, and that the sultan, the acknowledged head of the Mahomedan faith, is a useful, if not a necessary ally to England, who has millions of Mussulmans amongst her subjects. He may be deprived of his empire, and may be reduced to the condition of a fifth-rate Asiatic potentate; but he will still be Caliph of Islam, and the Mussulman world, in a struggle for very existence, may turn upon England as the principal cause of the danger that threatens it. Some persons, not without authority, are, I am aware, disposed to treat this consideration lightly; but I am persuaded from what I see passing around me, and from what I have learnt, that it is one which we ought seriously to bear in mind."

In his despatches at this juncture, Mr. Layard showed that he had closely studied and fairly comprehended the nature of the Eastern question; and though our quotation is already a long one, we must not omit the most significant portion of the whole advice tendered by our ambassador to the home government. "If Her Majesty's government," he concluded, "are of opinion that there is nothing to be done to oppose the designs of Russia, we should, at least, be prepared to mediate when the time comes. In order to be in a position to do so, we should make Turkey feel that although, as we have warned her, she cannot expect any help from us in her struggle with Russia, we shall be ready, at a favourable moment, to do our best to see that she be treated with justice and moderation, and her Mahomedan and Christian subjects alike with impartiality and equal humanity. It has been my object to raise such hopes, as I have



none others to give, without committing in any way her Majesty's government, whose views and policy it is my duty to consider and carry out. It is the only course left to us, if we are not prepared to give Turkey even such indirect aid as the preservation and maintenance of our own national and imperial interests may render necessary. By following it we may recover and maintain a part of that great and preponderating influence—I hesitate to use a word which has been so indignantly denounced as 'prestige'—which England once enjoyed amongst the Mussulman, and even Christian nations and communities of the East, and which she was able to use most effectively for their good and her own. I have considered it my duty to place these considerations thus frankly before her Majesty's government. It appears to me that England has one of three courses to pursue: either to prevent the accomplishment of the designs of Russia by decisive measures, or by holding, at once, such language to her as will make her understand that we are prepared to prevent, if possible, the destruction and partition of the Ottoman empire; or to let matters take their course until a favourable moment comes for stepping in as an impartial mediator prepared to save Turkey from too onerous and fatal terms, or to fold our arms and do nothing, leaving everything to chance. I will not add the other alternative, that of proposing terms to Turkey which would cause her the utmost indignation, resentment, and despair, and which would only confirm the distrust and suspicion she has already been led, by the successful intrigues of Russia, to feel of England. There is a party in Turkey favourable to peace. I believe that the sultan might be induced to make considerable sacrifices to put an end to a destructive and sanguinary war. But when I wrote my despatch of May 30th to your lordship, suggesting that the present relative position of the belligerents might afford an occasion for mediation, I could scarcely have foreseen, after all the assurances of moderation and disinterestedness which Russia had given, that she would insist, even before she had achieved

a single success, except the capture of a small Turkish town (Ardahan), upon such terms as those proposed by Prince Gortchakow as the *sine quâ non*, terms which, when impartially examined by the light of past history and events, can only be intended to lead to the partition of Turkey in Europe, and the speedy dissolution of the Ottoman empire. In the foregoing remarks I have not touched upon the enormous difficulties of forming one vassal autonomous province out of the districts inhabited by Bulgarians to the north and south of the Balkans, of finding a governor for it, who, it is to be presumed, is to be a Christian, and not necessarily a Turkish subject; of dealing with the Mussulman populations that are to be placed under him; and of devising a scheme of administration that will provide for the security of the property and for the religious freedom of Mahomedans. In these questions alone there are the seeds of inevitable discord, wars, and, may be, massacres. They alone may afford pretexts for future interference, total independence, and ultimate annexation. It must be remembered that the new Bulgarian vassal province, with its large Mussulman population, will be very different from Roumania and Servia when they received their semi-independence. The former had no Mahomedans to embarrass her; the latter soon disposed of the few she had to deal with."

It was not until the end of July that the English Cabinet resolved to enter into communication with Turkey in regard to possible terms of peace. In his despatch to Mr. Layard, authorising him "to sound the sultan" on the subject, Lord Derby stated that, if his Majesty were disposed to open negotiations, he might rely upon the friendly offices of England, which would be "exerted with a view to obtain for him the most favourable terms possible under the circumstances."

In reply to this authorisation, Mr Layard sent, on the 2nd of August, the following despatch:—"My Lord—I have had means of ascertaining secretly whether the sultan would be disposed to consider overtures for bringing the war with Rus-

sia to an end. I may, I think, state with some confidence that his Majesty could not, under present circumstances, either propose or listen to any conditions of peace. Although his Majesty, I have every reason to believe, is personally most desirous and anxious to save his empire from the horrors of war, his ministers and others who have influence on the country are now so much elated by the recent successes obtained by the Turkish armies over the Russians at Plevna and Eski-Zaghra, and in Asia, and by the assurances given by Mehemet Ali Pasha that he will be able, within a few days, to commence offensive operations with every prospect of a favourable result, that they feel confident that the enemy will be ultimately repulsed and driven out of Bulgaria and Roumelia, as he has been out of Armenia. The manner, too, in which the Russians are stated to be carrying on the war has exasperated the Mussulmans, and has indisposed them to entertain any proposals for peace which Russia is likely to make or to accept. I have given the sultan to understand that her Majesty's government were not disposed to take the initiative in making any proposals for the termination of the war, but that, should a favourable opportunity present itself for opening negotiations for peace, his Majesty may rely upon their friendly offices to obtain for him the most favourable conditions that could be expected under the circumstances. I am of opinion that nothing more can be done on our part at present in the interest of peace."

Subsequent events showed that the hopes of the sultan and his advisers had been raised too high by the successes of the Turkish arms. It might have been better for Turkey if she had foreseen her defeat, and submitted six months before she did. No doubt, the Porte had heard and discussed the conditions proposed by Prince Gortschakoff; and we cannot be surprised if, under the circumstances, it preferred to tempt the fortunes of war, and make a desperate effort to roll back the tide of invasion. How gallant her attempt was, we shall presently have occasion to see.

## CHAPTER XVIII.

## THE ADVANCE INTO BULGARIA.

THE Russians lost no time in commencing active operations on the right bank of the Danube. They had evidently prepared for an advance as soon as they should set foot on Turkish soil, and whilst the grand duke and his staff, accompanied by the czar, exerted themselves to secure the position which had been gained at Sistova, General Gourko was sent forward into the interior. It was hardly anticipated by lookers-on, even if it was actually decided upon at the Russian head-quarters, that a column should at once ascend the slopes of the Balkans, and attempt to gain possession of one or more of the passes, which every one naturally expected the Turks to defend with the greatest pertinacity. But it would seem that a surprise of this kind was deliberately planned; and it was at all events thoroughly successful.

Gourko's force consisted of a brigade of riflemen and four brigades of cavalry. The first cavalry brigade of Russian dragoons was commanded by Prince Eugene of Leuchtenberg; the second comprised Cossacks of the Don, the third, Cossacks\* of the Northern Caucasus, and the fourth was made up of a regiment of Don Cossacks and a regiment of hussars, commanded by Duke Nicholas of Leuchtenberg. In addition to these five brigades, there was the Bulgarian Legion, recruited principally of Bulgarian refugees, who had been assembled and organised in Russia and Roumania before the outbreak of active hostilities. These being, for the most part, determined and enterprising young men, the bulk of whom had fled from their country for the express purpose of being enrolled in the Legion, were a serviceable and trustworthy body, who fought well, and on many subsequent occasions behaved gallantly in the presence of their

\* Circassians.



hereditary enemies. They formed the nucleus of a force which was constantly recruited from the country, as it was gradually liberated from the Turkish yoke; and they were particularly useful in the Balkans, where their familiarity with the neighbourhood was turned to great account by the invaders.

Whilst Gourko pushed southwards, the remainder of the army was steadily drawn across the river, and massed around Sistova. For a considerable period the Russians had to contend with immense difficulties in establishing their communications, providing the necessary supplies and means of transport, preparing ammunition and artillery trains, and generally bringing the army into a condition to advance. The grand duke passed frequently between Simnitza and Sistova, urging forward the work; and on the 1st of July he made a reconnaissance to the south-west of the latter town, in the company of Generals Nepokoitschitzky, Radetzky, and Dragomiroff, to a point from which he was able to encourage himself by his first view of the Balkan range.

Sistova was, at this time, a small, but well-to-do town, of about eight thousand inhabitants. Nearly one-half of these were Mussulmans, and they fled into the interior before the Russian advance. The lowest classes of the Bulgarians who remained behind had immediately fallen upon the property of the Turks, and destroyed or pillaged it without hesitation. It is easy enough to conceive why this should have been so. The intoxication of finding themselves suddenly relieved of all authority and surveillance, and the opportunity of satisfying the animosity which they had nursed against their privileged fellow-subjects, had turned their heads; and they instantly wreaked their vengeance upon the property of the fugitives. It is not necessary to suppose that the Turks of Sistova had been peculiarly oppressive. Indeed, they seem to have been, in many respects, of a superior class; and the *cadi*, with the officials representing the government, is said to have treated the Christians in a humane manner. But the hereditary en-

mity of the two races will suffice to account for the spiteful nature of the acts perpetrated by the Bulgarians of Sistova.

The Turks appear to have fled on the day before the Russian crossing; and the fact that the operation at this point had been foreseen is further proved by the preparations which had been made for this wholesale migration. As soon as they were gone, and before the Russians entered the town, the rabble set upon the deserted houses, sacked and wrecked them, leaving little mischief undone which it was possible to do. All that was of value was carried off, and when the Russians entered they found a considerable portion of the place in ruins—a proceeding all the more senseless because, the Turks having gone, there was a reasonable hope for the Bulgarians that they would themselves benefit in a legitimate manner by what had been abandoned. The better class of the Christian inhabitants lamented the lawlessness of their fellow-townsmen; and they now co-operated with the Russians in putting an end to the disorder.

Similar scenes occurred in many other parts of the country, during the months which followed; but the Russians seem to have taken pains to restrain the cupidity and violence of the lower orders of the Bulgarians.

The advance into Bulgaria was made in three principal directions. Of Gourko's force we have already spoken. A second division proceeded westward, towards Plevna, whilst a third turned aside on Biela, which lies on the Jantra, where that stream is crossed by the road from Rustchuk to Tirnova. This was of course a most important point, both for the Turks and for the Russians, and it was necessary for the latter to occupy it without delay. They had therefore despatched a few companies of hussars, dragoons and artillery, under Baron Driezen, general of division, and General Arnoldi, the brigade-general. Mr. Archibald Forbes, who accompanied this force, wrote home a lively account of his ride to Biela. "The time," he says, passed swiftly, although the pace was slow and the route circuitous, for we were going along two sides of

a triangle, in order to strike as early as possible the *chaussée* between Rustchuk and Tirnova, on which Biela stands. We passed the beautifully situated village of Burunli, lying in a deep grassy hollow, and the Bulgarian inhabitants crowded out with joy in their faces and words of welcome on their lips, carrying brimming pitchers of clear, cold spring water, which, in the boiling heat, was preferable to nectar. Here in the camp, knee-deep in natural grass, we left two squadrons of the hussars, and in half-an-hour we were on the *chaussée*, and in sight of the swift-flowing stream of the Jantra, overhung by dark umbrage. A patrol galloped out, and cut the wires of the telegraph line running along the *chaussée*, thereby interrupting telegraphic communication between Rustchuk and Tirnova, Nicopolis, Widdin, and indeed the whole of the north-western section of Bulgaria. If General Arnoldi had served in the American war, he might have learned to tap the wires instead of cutting them, and then perchance we might have gained some intelligence, which is wanted badly enough. But in all probability the Turks had abandoned the use of the line before the patrol cut the wires. At the junction with the *chaussée* we left all the hussars, except the advance guard, which still continued in front of us, and our way lay up the steep slope of a ridge which shut out from us the view beyond. As we topped it, the rich valley of the Jantra, waving with golden barley, lay at our feet, intersected by the sparkling river, and in the mouth of a little cross valley on the other side of the Jantra were the red-tiled roofs of Biela, half-hidden in foliage. But we were not yet in Biela. It was a smooth slope down through the barley to the river brink from the ridge on which we stood. But beyond the river, flanking Biela on its proper right, rose the steep marl heights, with abrupt grass-grown slopes beyond, of a position which at once arrested the eye of every trained soldier in the little band. If it were defended the carrying of it must be purchased at a great cost. On our side, on the gentle slope, there was no greater cover than that afforded by a casual stook of barley. Then the river would

have to be crossed—it would be necessary to search for a ford—and then these marl heights must be stormed, for there was no way of turning the position. It was a sight to stir the deepest interest—the loveliness of the scene, the gleaming river with the overshadowing masses of dark verdure above Biela, the dusky-red roofs recessed in the little valley, the golden slopes, the country village of Stirmana across the river on our left, where the marl steeps softened into green slopes—all this delighted the eye of him who looked at it in the spirit of the love of a sweet scene. And then how different the feeling of him who looked at it with a soldier's eye. If there be Turks on that crest opposite, ere it be taken the barley must wave over many a corpse; the silvery sheen of the Jantra must be dulled with blood; on the dazzling white marl must be dabbled many a red stain. The umbrage may hold sharpshooters; the pretty Stirmana may be a network of barricades; the bridge down there may be mined; among the red-roofed houses may be masses of infantrymen; behind these dark objects on the slopes, so like battery emplacements, may be lurking Krupp cannon.

"We took a long steady look at it, all standing there on the little conical knoll on the ridge—a knoll on which a battery had begun to be built evidently not a week before, and a flanking shelter trench dug. General Stahl von Holstein had come on thus far with General Arnoldi, and the two held some talk apart, and then the former went off to have his hussars at hand for support if need should be. And so Arnoldi, taking his place at the head of the column, gave the word to march, and the dragoons began to descend the straight road leading through the barley-fields to the bridge. Till now it seemed to me that the duty of scouting had been very much neglected, looking at the fact that we were marching through a country presumed hostile, and with an enemy known to be close. Arnoldi and his staff had constituted the advance guard; there were no flankers, and patrols were not thought of. But now the old soldier pulled himself together; out on the slopes to right and to left



galloped flankers, to peer down into the side valleys. A patrol trotted along the road in front. There was a cloud of dust, and three Cossacks came galloping up from the right front. They had poked their way across the river, but neither into the town nor on to the heights. The only information they brought was that some Turks were reported near Biela, and their only capture was a Turkish pony. Who is this galloping *ventre à terre*, with a gun carried by the muzzle across his shoulder? A wild scared Bulgarian, with the intelligence that there are some Turks plundering in Stirmana, whence he had come; he could tell nothing about the heights or about Biela. Half-a-dozen Cossacks are sent scouting away to the left toward Stirmana, and I accompany them—all of us led by the wild Bulgarian with the gun over his shoulder. He shouts and gesticulates with the maddest energy; he is in a paroxysm of furious rage and crazy terror, and yet he rides straight enough on his rat of a pony. We sweep down at a hand gallop, riding straight through the standing barley, and taking the banks and ditches in our stride. We lost no time, as my horse's heaving flanks testified; but the Cossacks were not quick enough for the light-heeled rascals of Bashi-Bazouks. As we dashed into the stream, I just caught sight of a very voluminous pair of blue unmentionables vanishing round the corner of a house, and that was all. The river turned out too deep to ford, and only one Cossack swam it; mine respectfully declined. So we went about, and as we were cantering back a single gun-shot sounded from above the village, as if in mockery.

"I rode for the bridge, and struck the cavalry column close to it. It was reported that some Turks were prowling about the heights, but not in force, and the informants could not tell precisely of their whereabouts. Colonel Bilderling and myself rode toward the bridge to find by the wayside there a company of Bulgarian people who had come out to welcome their deliverers. At their head stood their venerable priest. With streaming eyes the old

man tendered the cross for Bilderling to kiss as we stood there with bared heads in the presence of supreme emotion. Well might the old man weep in the glad agony of joy, and his primitive flock join their tears with his! I have known on the confines of Servia something of the feeling inspired by Turkish rule, but till now I have never realised how thoroughly a people can become sodden, as it were, with suffering and oppression, till they have come to look upon suffering and oppression as a matter of course—as things inevitable, and to be accepted without remonstrance and almost without remark. They are cowards, these crouching Bulgars; but who shall reproach them for their cowardice? So terrible has been the weight of years of oppression that it has worked in them the saddest degradation that can overtake humanity. It has beaten them down so abjectly that the deepest extremity of cowardice has not found its recoil in the recklessness of despair. Oppression has so crushed them as to falsify the proverb that even a worm will turn.

"Amidst sobbing and tears and kissing of hands, the attention of the general is not to be distracted from the work he has to do. He draws the back of his hand across his shaggy eyebrows, and the next moment his keen grey eye is scanning the white heights. He gives an order, and we ride across and stand at the feet of them, and note how they rise steeply, yet in flaky strata, the crumbling of which gives a foothold to the climber. Suddenly there is heard the quick, steady tramp of armed men on foot marching across the bridge. From whence came they? No infantrymen followed our column of dragoons. But there is the gleam of bayonets! Surely infantrymen must have come up somehow. Listen narrowly a second, and the ear detects through the duller sound of the feet-fall the jingle of spurs. The Russian dragoons are dragoons proper in the original signification of the term, and as, when occasion might offer, they would show that they are heavy cavalrymen of the right stamp, now they were to show that they could act as infantrymen as well as

the best foot soldiers who ever tramped. The outside men of threes in the first squadron had dismounted, giving over their horses to the centre men. They had drawn their short rifles from their leathern sheaths slung over their backs, and had taken their bayonets from the sheaths fastened on the sword scabbards. Their officers carry rifles like the men, all save the captain; and a fine, upstanding stalwart set of fellows they look, fit to go anywhere and do anything. Arnoldi points at the marl precipice, and they go at the face straight, extending to right and to left in skirmishing order as they climb. In splendid training, as hard as nails, and in the flower of agile youth, they climb up the cliff with a speed that winds me, unencumbered though I am with weight of rifle and sword. More follow the foremost. The top of the crag is reached, and we are on the steep green slopes. A moment's halt to get breath, and there is a run at the unfinished battery emplacements, which, to the great disappointment of the Russians, are found empty. The skirmishing line extends into the brushwood on the sky-line. A few snap shots are fired at skulking fugitives. There is hardly any reply. A prisoner is taken. Then I get tired of amateur skirmishing, and come down the marl cliff again.

"In Biela the Sistova example has been little followed. Not many Turkish houses have been wrecked or spoiled. There were comparatively few Turks in the place; the great mass of the population is pure Bulgarian. For the present they are a sufficiently abject people, but full of intelligence, and I do not know how to characterise the heartiness of their hospitality.

"The cavalry of the 12th Division, followed by the infantry, are to pursue the chaussée route on Rustchuk. The cavalry of the four special brigades, the details of which I have already given, have not advanced very far on the road to Tirnova; some of their camps we saw to-day in the distance. The conduct of the Russian soldiers is most exemplary, but an example is made of the Turkish villages in which resistance has been made to the Russian advance. These are not

numerous. One was burnt to-day on the right flank of our advance. It is impossible to understand why the Turks did not at least destroy the bridge over the Jantra. This would have retarded the Russian advance a couple of days."

The friendliness of the Bulgarian inhabitants, of which Mr. Forbes speaks, was natural enough, for they regarded the Russians as their deliverers, and had long since been given to understand that the Turks would be expelled from the country, which would be turned over into their own possession. They therefore rendered great service to the invaders, acting as their guides, scouts, and informers, and at the same time doing a good stroke of business with them by supplying necessities for man and beast at a fairly remunerative price. The Russian soldiers, as a rule, treated them well; but of course there were exceptions. At Biela, for instance, many lamentable scenes occurred, which Mr. Forbes narrates with his wonted independence.

A small body of infantry arrived at General Arnoldi's camp on the evening of the 6th of July, and as these were passing through the village a few stragglers fell out of the ranks, and at once set discipline at defiance. No efficient patrols had been left in Biela, and the lawless soldiers committed many excesses—limited apparently to robbery and destruction of property. Mr. Forbes had ridden back to Simnitz in order to forward a letter to the "Daily News," and when he returned on the 7th to the quarters where he had left his companion, Mr. Villiers,\* he heard from the latter an account of what had happened in his absence. One amusing episode of the night may be quoted here.

"Villiers sat at the window, for a long time expectant of an attempt to break into the house we occupied. At length came the challenge, 'Is that a Turkish or a Christian house?' My servant replied in Russian that it was a Christian house, and occupied by gentlemen accompanying the army. The soldiers no further attempted to gain an entrance, and apparently went away.

\* A representative of a London illustrated paper.



But presently a knocking was heard below, and the people of the house said they were breaking into the cellar, which, as in most Bulgarian houses, has its opening direct into the street. Presently there was a wild tumult about the door and a hammering for admittance, which quickly brought Villiers and my servant down to the door. And now came the comic element in a scene that was surely grim and lurid enough. The proverb that ill-gotten goods never prosper had come home to the Russian soldiers with more than ordinary swiftness. As Villiers opened the door, there stood four of them in the torch-light, clamouring wildly, with bottles in their hands, a strange blackness about their lips, and a curious smell pervading the group, which was certainly not the bouquet of any potable fluid known to my interesting young friend, who is not wholly destitute of experience in this department of practical knowledge.

"The owner of the house had in his cellar a number of bottles full of vitriol used for the purification of wool in the manufacture and dyeing of woollen stuffs, which, it appears, is the man's business. These the Russian soldiers, who, although they did not invade the house, took the liberty of breaking into the cellar, promptly annexed, and having extracted the corks began to drink. The drink did not exactly meet their views; on the contrary, they must have had cast-iron mouths and throats, and the vitriol must have been greatly diluted, or they would have paid with their lives the penalty of their lawless conduct. As it was they had fared pretty badly. Their lips and mouths were burnt black, their clothes, hands, and boots, were burnt, and they were half-mad with rage and pain. They had rushed to the conclusion that the house must be a Turkish house, and the cellar a Turkish cellar; that the proprietor had purposely stored a quantity of devil's drink in wine-bottles, wherewithal to poison his Russian enemies, and that they were the victims. They insisted on regarding my servant as the Turkish proprietor, and strove to revenge themselves by forcing him to drink as they believed he had brewed. With wild

cries and threats they forced bottles into his hands, and swore that he should drink. Now Andreas is always a sober man; he drinks only when he is thirsty; he has a will of his own, and would no doubt resent being made to drink under compulsion; still more recalcitrant would he unquestionless be if the proffered fluid were vitriol. He, it appears, objected to the beverage in the most emphatic manner. He imitated the unwilling horse in that they could not make him drink, but in the struggle he got his hands and clothes very much burnt with the vitriol. Villiers interfered physically in protection of one who is as much a comrade as a servant, and for the second time in this singular night he was in the hands of the Philistines. Still they had some sense of discipline and order left. They would not deal condignly with Villiers, although they professed to believe him both a Turk and a spy. They whirled him up to a solitary under-officer, who was addressed as the 'Patrol,' and who appeared to be serenely superintending the operations which I have attempted to describe. The patrol recognised the correspondent's badge on Villiers's arm, and ordered the soldiers to unhand him, whereupon the victims of vitriol retired, probably in search of a less fiery fluid as an alternative."

The advance of the Russians upon Biela and the Rustchuk road can hardly be said to have been well managed. It was on the 5th that General Arnoldi arrived there with his cavalry and artillery, and on the following day a division of infantry joined him. But six days later the strength was not increased, and Arnoldi was unable to assume the offensive. No doubt the difficulty of transporting men, ammunition and supplies across the improvised bridge at Simnitsa, which was only seven feet wide, and was every now and then rendered useless by an accidental block, had much to do with the delay. It was impossible to put a large number of men in fighting and marching condition, and to provide at the same time for maintaining the line of communications, without an immense amount of trouble, and a serious expenditure of time.

Moreover, the first care of all was to despatch the column of General Gourko to Tirnova and the Balkans; and when we consider that this was effected in such a manner as to enable a large number of men to cross the mountains, and hold their ground for some days on the other side, we must admit that the Russian intendance was not greatly discredited by its achievements.

Meanwhile the impatience of the force at Biela was very great. They knew themselves to be destined for the assault upon Rustchuk, and they firmly believed that it would not occupy them many weeks to capture that fortress. Their estimate may have been correct, judging from the probabilities of the case at the moment; but it was clear that every day's delay made their task more difficult. If a sufficient force had been able to advance upon Biela immediately after the crossing, and to double at once upon Rustchuk, before the Turks had time to cover the town, they might have forced it to capitulate without much trouble. This chance had already been lost, but the Russians still expected to make short work with the western angle of the Quadrilateral, and to be at liberty to move forward on Shumla or Silistria. They little thought that the Jantra would remain their base of operations throughout the campaign, and that Rustchuk would not open its gates to them until peace was concluded.

The difficulty created by the excesses of the Russian troops, or of a small portion of them, in Biela, on the first day of their presence in the town, was soon got over. The offenders were severely punished, and full restitution was made by the Russian generals. Everything taken from the Bulgarians was thenceforth duly paid for; and thus better relations were established between the invaders and the population. The Bulgarians began from the first to taste the fruits of their deliverance. They sold their whole stocks of merchandise at a good price; they obtained good wages for their labour, and services of various kinds, and they were able to harvest their crops in absolute security. In addition to this, wherever the Russians came, the Turks

fled, and thus solved one of the most troublesome problems which would otherwise have sprung out of the sudden destruction of the Mahomedan system of government.

On this subject Mr. Archibald Forbes has some sensible remarks. It was a pity (as he said) that some assurance of safety or good behaviour could not be conveyed to the Turks.\* "At present, so far as I can understand, they despair of good treatment, and act as if there was no hope. The men take up the rôle of Bashi-Bazouk—probably enough most of them were already Bashi-Bazouks, for your Bashi-Bazouk is nothing but an armed peasant, and the women are reported to have armed themselves. One of the unfortunate inhabitants of Biela, going to a village beyond Monastir, to discover whether the Turks had left it, and therefore whether its Bulgarian inhabitants were free to return to it, was killed in the woods, it is said, by Turkish women. . . . All this is miserable work. The Russian chiefs, in compliance with the proclamation of the emperor, are anxious to protect the Turkish civilian population, if these would only remain to be protected, or, if already gone, if they would come back, and intimate their desire to live quietly and peaceably under whatever *régime* they may find themselves. I do not know what may be thought with you, but, speaking as a man who tries to the best of his power to disabuse himself of prejudices, it seems to me that the conduct of the Turks, as they evacuate Bulgaria step by step, has a claim to the admiration of the civilised world. We hear once and again of isolated acts of cruelty—there are two Bulgarians with broken heads in the hospital in Simnitza. But what did the world anticipate? Was it not that the retiring Turks would make Bulgaria a wilderness and a solitude? And how has this anticipation been justified? In Sistova no Turk touched the hair of the head of a Bulgarian, handled no scrap of the property of a Bulgarian. In the intervening villages the Bulgarian inhabitants abide

\* Such assurances were on many occasions given to the Mahomedans; but they were rarely listened to, or acted on.



under their unharmed roof-trees with their flocks and herds around them, fearful only in the apprehension of visits from the Cossacks, which they have already learned are not simple visits of politeness. The crops, uninjured, wave rich and ripe in the fields; the hay stands in cocks in the fields; there is corn, and wine, and oil, and meal in the land. What the people of Biela have suffered in property has been at the hands of lawless Russian straggling soldiers, not at the hands of the Turk, 'unspeakable' though he may be. It is not my place to draw inferences, but it is my duty to state facts. It may be that the Turks simply went without doing damage or committing atrocities because of a consuming desire to get away, without waste of time in any *divertissements* which might occasion delay. It may be that they went as they have done because they are not ferocious except under provocation, or fancied provocation, which they may have considered to justify ferocity. It may be that, being naturally ferocious, and having been guilty of fearful atrocities, they were determined to prove to Europe that for once, when they set themselves to it, they could practise self-restraint. But waiving speculation on motives, I will aver this much, that whatever has been their sentiment or impulse, let what name soever be given to their actuating feeling, they have acted erroneously, speaking in a purely military sense. If their military policy has been that of retreat, the complement of that policy was to have left desolation behind them, not to leave a land flowing with milk and honey for the behoof of the invader. When Kutsoff and Barclay de Tolly retreated from Minsk to the Beresina, and from the Beresina to Smolensk, and from Smolensk to Moscow, before the legions of Napoleon, did they leave behind them a fat land, villages teeming with flocks and herds, growing crops asking for the sickle, granaries for the replenishment of the provision trains? We all know that they left desolation and ashes, and that the desolation and the ashes have counted to Russia for heroism and patriotism, and, what is more to the purpose in my argument, for sound military strategy."

The parallel of 1813 is hardly a close one, for there was no animosity between the retiring Russians and the inhabitants of the districts through which they passed. The animosity of the Turks would have naturally accounted for the devastation of Bulgaria, and such devastation would doubtless have been good strategy. But, on the other hand, there would have been infinitely more of barbarity in such a course as Mr. Forbes suggested than there was in the wasting by the Russians of their own country.

Though reinforcements were sent to the army at Rustchuk, and though the czarewitch and his brother Vladimir had taken up their headquarters at Paolo, the troops were still forbidden to cross the Jantra. Reconnaissances were made into the districts lying between that river and the valley of the Lom, as well as along the Rustchuk road; and it was found that the Turks had fallen back on the Rustchuk-Rasgrad line. The czarewitch himself urgently requested to be allowed to advance, but his request was refused. It was manifest that, whatever the first design may have been in reference to this army, the present policy was to hold Biela in force, so as to prevent an attack on the line of communications between Sistova and Tirnova. So long as the Russians were at Biela, the Turkish army of the Quadrilateral could not move far from its base, for fear of being taken in flank or rear by the czarewitch. The Quadrilateral was, in fact, masked by the army of Rustchuk, which performed as valuable service as any corps during the whole campaign. If it had been allowed to lay siege to the fortress from which it took its name, there would have been the most imminent danger lest the Russian communications should be cut, and the whole army destroyed or captured.

It was not until the 18th of July, ten days after the occupation of Tirnova, three days after the taking of Nicopolis, which for the moment freed the Russian right from danger, and four days after the crossing of the Balkans, that the czarewitch crossed the Jantra with his staff. But his army was not destined to make any

serious advance upon Rustchuk, or even to engage in any serious fighting, for some time to come.

Meanwhile the right flank of the Russian advance required to be protected in the same manner as the left. The first success on this side was in the capture of the river fortress Nicopolis, which fell to the 9th Corps, under Baron Krüdener, on the 15th of July. After a slight bombardment, followed by a determined attack, Hassan Pasha found himself unable to maintain his position, and capitulated. He was brought before the czar at the Imperial head-quarters, temporarily established with the czarewitch at Paolo, previous to their removal to Tirnova. "As he fought when free," says a correspondent, "so Hassan Pasha acted when a prisoner, bearing himself before the Great White Czar with true Turkish nonchalance. When asked why he capitulated, he said his ammunition was all gone, and he had been obliged to kill with his own hand three or four soldiers who left their duty. He said it was a stupid war, into which the Turks had been mainly led by the attitude of England, and the nation would be glad when it was over. He spoke as rank folly of the conduct of a Russian artillery officer who, when one position was barely carried, rode his guns in among the still undefeated Turks, and, unlimbering, came into action against other positions as yet uninjured. . . . . The losses sustained by the Russians at Nicopolis are not yet wholly ascertained. They are estimated at one thousand two hundred killed and wounded. The gain of the fortress frees the Russians from the threat of attack on their right flank. Of the 9th Corps which gained the success one division, the 31st, will, for the present, remain on the line of Plevna-Nicopolis to protect communications and guard against any trouble from the Widdin direction. The other, the 5th, will form a portion of the Balkan advance, which will comprise several columns operating in different directions.

"On Sunday evening, when the emperor was camped at Sarevica, a few miles south of Sistova, there was a sudden alarm. A Cossack rode in with

a hurriedly scribbled despatch from a telegraph clerk at the bridge across the Danube to the effect that the Turks were marching from Nicopolis on Sistova, and threatening to sever the Russian communications, destroy the bridge, and compromise the safety of the emperor. Immediate steps had to be taken. One brigade of the 11th Corps was in Sarevica. The other brigades of the same corps were forwarded. Dispositions were made with the artillery and infantry covering the line of the heights protecting the line of approach from Nicopolis. The emperor himself assumed the chief direction of affairs, and is said to have shown at once the most perfect coolness and competent military ability. The scouts sent out brought back the intelligence that the country in the direction of Nicopolis was quiet, and presently arrived intelligence from Baron Krüdener, commanding the 9th Corps, respecting his success at Nicopolis. It was ultimately discovered that the telegraph clerk had become confused and alarmed by the noise of firing at Nicopolis, and concern for the emperor's safety. The incident seems trivial, but shows on what thin ice the Russians have been treading with hostile forces left on both flanks."

The number of prisoners taken with Hassan Pasha, and interned in Russia, was about six thousand. In addition, several small Turkish ironclads were captured on the river, and were at once manned by Russian sailors, and utilised.

Whether from slowness on the part of Baron Krüdener, or from unavoidable causes of delay, he failed to take and hold Plevna against Osman Pasha, who advanced from Widdin, and took possession of the place from which he gave the Russians so much trouble. This circumstance paralysed the movements of General Gourko, and, coupled with the appearance of Suleiman Pasha south of the Balkans, rendered it necessary to suspend his operations. It is possible enough that the campaign would have ended in half the time if Plevna could have been occupied and retained by a Russian force.

The net result of the Russian movements



during the earlier days of July was that they had virtually annihilated the Danube, and secured a firm footing in their enemy's country. The more discerning Mahomedans in Europe at once perceived that the fatal hour had struck for them, and that they were never again likely to enjoy peaceable possession of the settlements which their forefathers had conquered. As was well pointed out by a contemporary writer, not many days after the Russian invasion of Bulgaria, the Mahomedan population of European Turkey had most formidable forces arrayed against it. "In the immediate dominions of the sultan the Mahomedans are 3,500,000; the Christians 4,600,000. Then the Roumanians are 5,000,000, the Servians, 1,400,000, the Greeks of the kingdom 1,500,000, the Montenegrins 100,000. Thus the Christian populations who are likely to be more and more drawn into an active participation in the war are 12,000,000, against 3,500,000 Mahomedans. Moreover, it has to be noticed that of the latter the able-bodied men are already with the Turkish armies, and everywhere the Christians who will rise in the rear of the Russians will find only old men, women, and children. It is obvious from these considerations that the Mahomedan population stands in the greatest danger of being crushed out. This, indeed, must be its fate if the Porte resolve on a desperate resistance, and the war assumes the character of a steady but obstinately contested conquest of the Turkish provinces. The greater part of the Mahomedan population will probably be driven like game into the Roumelian peninsula, and Constantinople will, perhaps, have to shelter not only a beaten and disorganised army, but a starving mass of fugitives. But if the catastrophe occurs it is absolutely certain that great numbers will make their way to the Austrian frontier. The adjacent region is again in a ferment. The irrepressible Montenegrins are besieging Nicsics, and will probably capture it. They would then inevitably carry the war into Herzegovina. The war party among the Servians are calling for action, and if the Russians gain decided successes in Bulgaria, the soldiers

of Prince Milan, anxious to retrieve their laurels, will be once more in the field. The main body will probably operate towards Nish; but Bosnia will be thrown into a violent commotion, and the Austrian frontier will be correspondingly disturbed. The progress of this great revolution, the most momentous that Europe has known in our time, ought not to find a neighbouring Power unprepared, least of all one which reckons millions of Slavs and Roumanians among its own subjects."

But Austria made no movement; and not a single Power came to the rescue of the Ottoman empire.

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## CHAPTER XIX.

### RUSSIAN REVERSES IN ASIA.

IN the meantime the Russians had been pursuing, in Asia Minor, the same policy which they are wont to pursue in all their invasions of a hostile territory, for the purpose of preserving order amongst the inhabitants. The "*Tiflis Gazette*" published particulars of the several measures taken by General Melikoff. Immediately after the army crossed the frontier he issued a proclamation, couched in the vernacular, in which he placed the people under the protection of the laws of Russia, and threatened death to any individual, and annihilation to any village, that should interfere with his forces in the execution of their duty. His second measure was to proclaim a promise to pay ready money for all provisions brought into the camp. This policy coincided with that pursued by Paskievitch in 1829, which, according to Russian statesmen, was attended with such good results that they ascribed more influence to it than to the general's victories. "Travellers have repeatedly narrated how that, in the most inaccessible provinces of Asia Minor, they have heard the natives expressing a high opinion of the Russian people, speaking of them as a nation who do no evil, and pay

ready money for all they buy. It is in this manner that the Russians mean to act during the present campaign!" After the troops had crossed the Arpatchi a tariff was drawn up, based upon information which had been previously collected respecting the price of provisions in the country. Nothing could be purchased by the troops except in accordance with the terms laid down in this document. Each requisition had to be made in the presence of an officer, furnished with the necessary powers by his chief. Any requisition other than this was regarded as marauding, and punished severely as such. "If the natives refuse to part with the provisions they have in store, the commissaries are empowered to seize them by force. Granaries are emptied, cellars cleared, live stock carried away, and payment afterwards given according to the military tariff. On entering a district an approximate estimate is formed of the quantity of provisions the people can furnish. This is afterwards apportioned among the villages, each of which is bound, under severe penalties, to bring into the camp a certain amount of forage and food within a given time." The price fixed by the Russian government, according to the "Tiflis Gazette," was almost double that which the people would receive in the market place at Alexandropol. No mention is, however, made as to the esteem in which the paper money is held, or whether the unscrupulous Cossacks adopt the same policy while engaged on outpost duty far away from the eye of the main army. "Directly a detachment enters a village the peasants hasten to sell bread, milk, poultry—in short, all that they wish to dispose of. By the time that the troops have bivouacked a bazaar is improvised, where transactions of the most animated nature take place. The Turks are promptly paid ready money for all they sell, and as the demand is always in excess of the supply, the provisions are rapidly disposed of, to the great satisfaction of the peasants, who retire elated with the profits they have made. All these measures were taken in connection with the Armenian population only. No other great difficulties were anticipated ex-

cept those arising from the bellicose character of the people inhabiting the mountainous portions of Kars and the outlying provinces of the Kurds. These tribes, which, in ordinary times, are the terror of the peaceful inhabitants of the plains, were expected by the Russians to have played a prominent part in attacking the rear of the army, in cutting off outposts, and in capturing couriers. During previous wars they had furnished the sultan with an effective force of from twenty-five thousand to forty thousand men. It was, therefore, highly important to secure their goodwill, if that were possible. General Loris Melikoff, who possesses an intimate knowledge of their character, set himself to work in a most astute manner to effect this, and his efforts have been crowned with complete success."

These measures were, of course, only subsidiary to the military designs of the invaders, which were actively carried out in every direction.

It has been seen how the troops of the Grand Duke Michael carried the war into Asiatic Turkey, and how they gained a few decided successes without any notable loss. Ardahan was captured on the 17th of May, and by the first week in June Kars had been almost completely invested. A Russian force occupied the roads leading from that fortress to the interior of Armenia. Mukhtar Pasha had fallen back upon Soghanli, and was almost cut off by the rapid advance of the Russian right and left. General Melikoff faced the Turkish commander in the centre of his line; General Tergoukasoff, leaving a garrison in the town of Bayazid, pushed forward towards Erzeroum, by way of Topra Kaleh and Koprikoi.

Much severe fighting took place at various points, of which no precise details reached us at the time, and which will not be thoroughly elucidated until an authoritative Russian account of the campaign is published. Determined assaults were made upon Kars, which offered a stout resistance. The Turks claimed to have put as many as six thousand Russians *hors de combat* under the walls of the fortress; whilst



the strong position of Batoum, on the Black Sea, was defended with equal success.

The object of the Russians was to make a concentric attack upon Erzeroum, keeping Kars and Batoum well masked; and the idea was carried out so far that General Melikoff and General Tergoukasoff all but made a junction across the hills lying between Zewin and Bardiz, on the Soghanli Dag, and Topra Kaleh, on the south of Erzeroum. Meanwhile a battle was daily expected at or near Olti, on the Russian right.

In view of these dangers, and of the fact that the Russian troops excelled their enemies in efficiency and steadiness, if not in numbers, Mukhtar Pasha thought it advisable to contract his line, and draw his forces into a better focus for the defence of the Armenian capital. He fell back slightly at all points, until, about the 7th of June, his right centre rested upon Koprikoi, between Hassan Kaleh and Erzeroum, his extreme right resting upon Delibaba, and his left on Gurdji and Baggaze, in the rear of Olti. The Turkish general thus held the command of the all-important Deve-Boyun Pass, through which lay the best route to the capital for the Russian centre and left.

At this moment the Russians somewhat surprised their friends, and perhaps their enemies, by retiring from Olti and Pennek, instead of giving battle, as they had been expected to do at that point. Their object seems to have been to strengthen their centre, which General Melikoff apparently did not think strong enough to engage Mukhtar Pasha in the formidable positions which he now held. Meanwhile the Turkish generalissimo received reinforcements from Erzeroum, which gave him courage to court, rather than avoid, an attack. And at the same time the Grand Duke Michael, who had had much trouble with the Circassian revolt, and who was unable to reduce Kars, and thus liberate the large force which was investing it, appears to have grown anxious concerning the length of General Melikoff's communications, and the widely-extended front of the army before the

capital. The movements of the Russians pointed to a desire on their part to defer an engagement with Mukhtar Pasha until Kars should be captured, and the supplies requisite for so large a force in a hostile country should have been duly assured.

The friends of Russia were greatly disappointed by this manifest hesitation in the advance upon Erzeroum, which had been undertaken in the first instance with so much vigour. In fact, nothing in connexion with the whole war was more striking than the brilliant dashes of the invaders on first entering the enemy's country, or after passing points where they had encountered a temporary check. The moral effect of these dashes upon the Turks was naturally very great. Thus we were told that after the capture of Ardahan, "General Komoroff despatched a large force of cavalry in haste towards Olti, and this body was duly followed by a strong detachment of infantry. The Turks at Olti, surprised by the sudden appearance of the enemy in the front, retired in hot haste to Erzeroum, where, no doubt, they spread the tale that the Russians were close at hand in overwhelming numbers, in order to excuse their own stampede. In another part of the field a similar panic is represented as having fallen on the Ottoman forces, who fled from Kara Kilissa, without striking a single blow in its defence, the moment General Tergoukasoff appeared before its walls. It would be unfair to blame Mukhtar Pasha for these reverses, which were due to the bad materials of the army under his command. Where he seems chiefly open to censure is for having attempted to defend too wide a front, so that his line became very attenuated in some parts, and the more distant detachments naturally feared being cut off."

To this audacity of the Russians, and consequent alarm of the Turks, we may attribute the fact that the former frequently gained considerable successes at a very trifling cost. Russian accounts very possibly understated rather than overstated their losses;\* but there can be no

\* The following well-deserved hit, from the "Evening Standard," is worth quoting in this connexion:—

doubt that, in the minor engagements of the campaign, the invaders suffered much less than they ought to have done in a hostile country.

On the 16th of June the Turks sustained a severe defeat at Taghir, near Delibaba and Zeidikan. They were under the command of Mehemet Pasha, the generalissimo being with the centre at Bardiz; and, though the Ottoman troops appear to have fought with much gallantry, they were badly handled. The Russians under Tergoukasoff advanced to the attack, and contrived to outflank and nearly surround the enemy, upon whom, moreover, they were able to bring to bear a heavy fire from their field guns. The battle lasted two days, and Mehemet was killed early on the second. After an obstinate resistance the Turks fled in great disorder, and suffered desperately at the hands of the Cossacks who pursued them.

“What is by comparison an extremely serious engagement has taken place near Kars, resulting in—always, of course, by comparison—a terrible loss on the Russian side. As a rule, it is well known that the Russian average of disaster is ‘one Cossack wounded,’ while the sufferer is avenged by the slaughter of several hundred Turks and the capture of regiments. But this last engagement near Kars was a graver matter. ‘Yesterday General Scheremetjeff, with a dragoon regiment and three sotnias of Cossacks, reconnoitred to the north-west of Kars by way of Ainal Topadjik and Tschachmur,’ says the Russian official despatch from Tiflis. ‘On its return march the Russian column had a sharp encounter with four battalions of the enemy’s cavalry, sent from Kars to bar its way. A squadron of dragoons and two sotnias of Cossacks drove the enemy’s cavalry into the Bezdihtschai mountains. While, however following the pursuit, some masked batteries opened fire upon them, and they were attacked by four battalions of Turkish troops.’ Now, after a sharp encounter between these large bodies of troops, and especially after ‘some Turkish masked batteries had opened fire upon the Russians, it might be supposed that heavy loss would have been experienced by the men thus exposed to masked batteries and the rifles of so many battalions; and, indeed, by comparison with the wounded Cossack, the loss was severe, but only when looked at strictly by the light of that comparison. The result of all this Turkish fire was the death of one Russian dragoon, of two horses, and the wounding of no fewer than nine men. As a matter of course, judging from the number of men and horses remaining on the field, the enemy’s loss must certainly have been very large. If things go on at this rate, it is clear that, before the Turkish army is absolutely destroyed, at least half a dozen Russians will have been killed and nearly a score wounded.”

Mukhtar Pasha, on hearing of this misfortune, sent immediate assistance, and the Russians were cool enough to perceive that their victory had not done much for them. They had every reason to expect that the Turks would lose no time in endeavouring to take their revenge; and in the meantime they were not a little discouraged to hear of the imminent danger of Bayazid in their rear, which, of course, seriously compromised their position. The news was confirmed beyond doubt; the twelve hundred Cossacks left behind in the fortress by General Tergoukasoff had been attacked by Faik Pasha, advancing from Van, and they were compelled to surrender on the 19th of June. Shortly afterwards there arrived a large body of Kurds; and they were guilty of a dastardly act of treachery towards the prisoners. A “Daily News” correspondent, writing from Erzeroum five weeks later, reverts to the circumstances in the following terms:—

“The Russians, thinking only of Turkish regulars, had left a slender garrison of some five hundred men in Bayazid, and pushed on towards Alashkir with their main forces, with the intention of trying to force Mukhtar’s position beyond Delibaba. While he was engaged in this operation, an enormous horde of Kurds, estimated at twenty-two thousand horsemen, and under the influence, if not actual guidance, of Sheik Jelaledin, swept down from the Ararat chain of mountains, and surrounded the little garrison of Bayazid. The Russians retired within the walls of a mediæval building, half-fortress, half-palace, which occupies the summit of the hill above the platform on which Bayazid stands. Provisions were scanty, water still more so; and after a couple of days’ blockade the Russians offered terms. In Bayazid at the time, apart from the twenty-one thousand Kurds, were seven regular Turkish battalions, under the command of Faik Pasha. These had arrived subsequent to the Russian failure to carry the Delibaba ridge. The Pasha willingly received the overtures of surrender, and half the entire beleaguered garrison, without arms, marched from their stronghold. Ere the regular troops could take any measures for



their security, which at the time no one had any reason to doubt, the Kurd horsemen fell on the disarmed and surrendered prisoners, massacring every one without exception. On this the gates of the stronghold were closed, the remaining portion of the garrison refusing to entertain any proposition after the untoward event which had just taken place. In vain the Turkish commander of the regular forces urged on the besieged the expediency of surrendering rather than die of hunger and thirst. The Russian colonel had fallen in the first assault of the Kurds on the town, and his wife, within the beleaguered stronghold, incited the soldiery to resistance, taking her share in the defence like any of the troops. Anything was better, the Russians said, than again trusting themselves to the mercy of a faithless horde of blood-thirsty savages. And so several days went by. Water was falling short, but the besieged hit on the plan of mining towards the town, and thus establishing an unseen connection with one of the public fountains. For some time this expedient was successful, the adventurous water-seekers being almost entirely hidden from view in the depths of the subterranean opening. But in an evil day a stray Kurd observed the top of a Russian's hat protruding in an unaccountable manner from the soil. He observed, and soon guessed the truth. An ambuscade was prepared, and day after day the poor thirsty Russians had to lament one of their number shot through the head at the gallery entrance. Twenty-six days' siege since the massacre had gone by. Provisions had long since run exceedingly short, and the besieging enemy had over and over again shouted to the caged foe the intelligence that artillery was coming up to drive them from their refuge. Just ten days ago, as if falling from the clouds, five Russian battalions, with six guns, and four thousand cavalry, attacked the Turkish force. The struggle was short. The twenty-two thousand Kurds fled at once. The regular battalions resisted bravely, but were forced to retreat, leaving over a thousand men and three guns in the assailants' hands. The long-suffering detachment in the stronghold

above the town were relieved, and, after passing a night in Bayazid the Russians deliberately retired, taking with them their relieved comrades, their prisoners, captured guns, one of them of heavy calibre, and several families of the town, who declared any exile preferable to further association with the mountain savages. Many maimed and cruelly mutilated towns-people were thus escorted from Bayazid; for when the Kurds and other irregulars arrived they vented their wrath on the Christians of the place, accusing them of having willingly welcomed the Russians, and proceeding to every extreme by way of punishment. My informant estimates that over twelve hundred Christians of both sexes suffered death or mutilation at the hands of the Kurds. For some weeks past the advent of regular battalions has entirely ceased. In their place enormous numbers of irregular cavalry have been pouring in. Horsemen from Bagdad, from Sivas, from Egypt, from Africa, fill the town and suburbs with their motley squadrons. Horses have been largely requisitioned to mount them, and some thousands have already been sent to the front. A very brief period will suffice to show whether this somewhat heterogeneous gathering can be made more useful than their confreres, the Circassians and Kurds."

The loss of Bayazid compelled General Tergoukasoff to bring things prematurely to an issue in front of Delibaba, and contributed very largely to the failure of the first Russian advance in Asia. There can be no doubt that the invader was virtually beaten by the Turks in Armenia, and that, if this had been the only theatre of war, the armies of the sultan would have completely established their superiority. The Russian staff had miscalculated the difficulties and dangers of the situation. They had provided too small a force for the conquest of such a widely extended tract of country, they had pushed too rapidly into the heart of Armenia, in several different directions, and with inadequate support and supplies. They had left enemies behind them, continually threatening their lines of communication. Even in their own country, their sole

route to the capital and the interior lay through a disaffected province which actually broke out into revolt at the most critical moment. Thus it came to pass that, just as the invaders seemed to be on the eve of victory, when more than one important success had been achieved, and when Generals Melikoff and Tergoukasoff threatened Erzeroum with capture, the whole attack collapsed.

The battle of Taghir was the last success of the Russians during the summer campaign. Reinforcements began to pour in upon Mukhtar Pasha from Erzeroum, and the Turks seem to have made up by their energy for the shortcomings of the previous months. On the 21st of June, the Ottoman generalissimo turned the tables on his enemy, and delivered a severe attack upon the Russian left. For a day and a half—thirty-three hours of almost continuous fighting—the Turkish nizams kept up a perpetual fire upon their enemy, whilst the Circassian and Kurdish horsemen dashed themselves with the utmost bravery upon the troops of Tergoukasoff. The latter could not sustain the onslaught, and fell back slowly upon Zeidikan; and on the evening of the 22nd the victory rested with the sultan's army.

In the meantime assaults were made upon Kars and Batoum, the most strenuous efforts being put forth to gain one or both of these highly important positions. In both cases the Russians were repulsed; and these disappointments, coupled with their want of success before Erzeroum, caused the greatest disappointment to the invaders. They were pressed hard at all points; and it became necessary for the Russian commander to stake the fortune of his campaign upon a decisive engagement. On the 25th of June General Melikoff, personally commanding the centre, at the village of Zewin, on the slopes of the Soghanli Dag, half-way between Kars and Erzeroum, attacked the Turks with the utmost vigour and determination. The Turks were by this time overwhelmingly superior in numbers; and though General Melikoff had summoned General Heimann to his assistance from

the neighbourhood of Kars, he was not able to oppose a sufficient force to the enemy. Mukhtar Pasha held a strong position on a ridge of the Dag, from which his men, scarcely touched by the Russian fire, were able to meet the assailants with an unintermittent volley of bullets, whilst the artillery of the former was employed with destructive effect. The result of the determined and obstinate assault was that the Russians were beaten with great loss—upwards of two thousand, on the lowest estimate, being placed *hors de combat*. General Melikoff found it necessary at once to fall back upon Kars; and, indeed, one of his principal dangers at this moment was lest the garrison of the last-named town should sally forth and cut off his retreat.

The situation produced by this defeat is described in concise terms by a correspondent writing from Tiflis on the 13th of July; and his account seems to be more trustworthy, as a contribution to the history of the war, than that of any other writer. General Tergoukasoff, he observes, was now reduced to a most critical position. "He had not the slightest chance of overcoming the fourfold stronger forces of his opponents, and had subsequently to avoid all general and decisive actions, even at the cost of his reputation as an able commanding officer. He was influenced, moreover, by another cause of no special military character. More than three thousand Armenian families, to whom he had promised aid and protection in the name of the emperor, followed his columns with all their domestic animals and movable household goods. Such an encumbrance completely tied his hands. It is true that he might have abandoned these unfortunate fugitives on the plea of hard necessity, but he felt his responsibility so deeply engaged in a moral point of view that he preferred to appear in the eyes of the world as defeated rather than dishonoured. And it was no light matter. Notwithstanding the assurance of the Porte in its diplomatic notes, nothing is more certain than the prevalence of murder, theft, violence, rape, and all sorts of indescribable outrages, in its Asiatic dominions. It makes little difference, I



fancy; whether Armenian or Bulgarian throats are cut by merciless brutes, or whether an Armenian or a Bulgarian child or young girl is outraged or carried off into slavery. It is beyond doubt that the same kind of atrocities which were committed in Thrace last year are now going on, or are even being surpassed, in Armenia, where no control is likely to be exercised, and where no consuls feel called to watch events officially. When the Russians, yielding before innumerable enemies, found themselves under the necessity of rapidly retiring towards their own frontiers, thousands of bewildered Christian families joined them with all they had, imploring protection, in the fear that the Turkish troops would not only rob them of everything, but would murder them after subjecting them to terrible tortures. That this fear was justified has been shown by painful experience.

"The very day after General Tergukasoff retreated from a place called Suleimania, five Christian villages near had been sacked and burned, and every living soul in them killed. Russian soldiers and officers found women and babes ripped up and their throats cut on the highway. From all that has been witnessed it is obvious that Turkish warfare is in no respect better than that of the Sioux Indians. What could the Russian general do in such perplexity? He acted like a man of honour and conscience, and, forming a rearguard with his brigade, conducted the Armenians, their animals, and property, without losing a cart or a horse, and without giving the enemy an opportunity of attacking him, across the Russian frontier. Then he occupied an excellent position near Igdyr, on the road to Erivan, about twenty miles distant from Bayazid, where he is to receive the necessary reinforcements. Some regiments have arrived there already; others are on their way from the north. I saw myself, three days ago, two regiments, coming from Vladikawkas, pass this city. Splendid, courageous-looking, and good-humoured fellows they were, who certainly are superior in aspect to the best Turkish troops that I have ever seen. Only the Syrians, not the genuine

Turks, or any other Mahomedan race, are a match for them, as their officers state. Within a fortnight well-nigh thirty thousand men are expected to complete the army here, some of whom are conveyed by steamers to Baku over the Caspian Sea.

"The siege of Kars has been partially abandoned, and the Russian troops have retired towards Alexandropol in connection with some military plan, the execution of which, however, will depend on the arrival of fresh troops and the enemy's movements. This is all a mere question of time.

"While writing these lines repeated detonations announce to the people a victory which General Tergukasoff obtained on the 10th instant at Bayazid over the Turks. After having received reinforcements sent to meet him from Erivan, he returned without losing a moment, and attacked the besiegers as soon as he could reach them. The bulk of the enemy, mounted Kurds, Arabs, and Bashi-Bazouks, fled in all directions, but the Arabian regiments resisted, and did not retreat until heavy losses had been suffered on both sides. Four field-pieces fell into the hands of the Russians, but only ninety prisoners were made. The main object, however, was the deliverance of the garrison shut up in the citadel during a blockade of sixteen days. They suffered very much from the want of water, and had to depend upon cisterns inside the fortifications. For all that, they had faith in their comrades, and were finally rewarded for their endurance. The details of the engagement are not known yet here. Notwithstanding this brilliant success, the position of the Russians is a precarious one in Armenia. The Turks there are, in fact, at least twenty-five thousand men stronger than their adversaries. Mukhtar Pasha is just now advancing with thirty thousand of his best troops on the road from Erzeroum to Kars, with the view to disengage that fortress at any cost. After his victory over General Heimann, near Meshingered, he boldly crossed the Soghanli mountains, and occupied three days ago a strong position on their northern

slopes. General Loris Melikoff, the Russian commander-in-chief, judging his army too weak to besiege Kars and resist Mukhtar Pasha simultaneously, ordered the heavy guns to be withdrawn, and suspended the bombardment, or rather the siege, of that stronghold. Then he prepared for an action in the field, and is at present encamped at Zaim, where he was decided to wait for Mukhtar Pasha's attack, till the expected reinforcements allow him to push forward again.

The general impression of this necessary retreat may not be favourable to the Russian arms and prestige, but ere long all will be set right again, and in the second part of this campaign it may be supposed that the faults committed before will be avoided, and especially the most serious one, the underrating of the enemy's means. The Russian troops continue to be in excellent spirits. Even the want of food and water under the scorching sun does not alter their disposition, and they will stand every hardship to the end with unshaken courage. The inhuman cruelties of the Turks against inoffensive persons, women, children, wounded soldiers, and prisoners, have stirred them. They are so enraged against the villanous Kurds and Bashi-Bazouks that they give no quarter to them now, and ask for none."

## CHAPTER XX.

### GOURKO ACROSS THE BALKANS.

THE serious disasters to the Russian arms in Asia Minor, which culminated, as we have seen, early in July in the relief of Kars by the troops of Mukhtar Pasha, were to some extent compensated and effaced by the rapid advance of the Grand Duke Nicholas in Bulgaria. From the time when the passage of the Danube was made between Simnitsa and Sistova to the capture of Tirnova and the occupation of the Schipka Pass, the Turks made no resistance worthy of the

name. For weeks past their friends had been assuring themselves that Abdul Kerim Pasha, the generalissimo of the forces, had some subtle plan in his head, whereof it was only one of the subtlest elements to permit the invader to cross the river. "Let the Grand Duke," said these apologists of the incompetent old general, "bring over a hundred thousand men on the southern bank of the Danube, and then his fate will have been sealed. Nothing will be easier than to push half a dozen or a dozen monitors up the stream, cut the bridge or bridges which the Russians may have constructed, and so take the rash invaders in a trap. The flower of the czar's army, the best of his generals, perhaps the czar himself, will pay for their temerity with their lives. The whole invasion will thus be crushed out, more certainly than if the Turks had attacked their enemy in Roumania, or had met him in force in the neighbourhood of Sistova."

There was much plausibility in this idea; and at all events it seemed not unlikely that some such plan would be resorted to after the crossing had actually been effected. But those who expected any good generalship from the Turkish staff, any brilliant feats of arms, or even any energetic action from the war department at Constantinople, were doomed to disappointment. The conduct of Abdul Kerim was inexplicable from the beginning, and it was soon perceived that he was utterly unequal to the occasion. The correspondents and military critics who had followed his steps or watched his course during the Servian war of the previous year had, from the first, given us reason to doubt whether he would achieve anything great against the formidable armies of Russia. Instead of moving forward with his troops to oppose the advance of the Grand Duke, he remained supinely in Shumla, displaying the mysterious wisdom of silence, but never translating his silence into vigorous action. As one of the newspaper correspondents expressed it, the Turkish subtlety was a pricked bladder; there was nothing to show for it, and the Russian advance was virtually unchecked.



Between the Quadrilateral on one side, where Abdul Kerim, Prince Hassan of Egypt, and the other generals of the sultan held an aggregate force of nearly a quarter of a million men, and the line running from Widdin, through Nisch to Sofia, there was scarcely a single body of Turks which could stand before the Russians for a day. The Ottoman commander, and even the Seraskierate itself, seem to have thought that the mere defensive attitude of their armies in the Quadrilateral would suffice to arrest the progress of the enemy. It is true that there is no strongly fortified position within the district referred to, and it is also true that the Turks did not in the beginning of the campaign know their own strength; but it is precisely in these two respects that Abdul Kerim and Redif Pasha, the Ministers of War, were most to blame. They ought to have perceived that the Sistova-Tirnova road was the very one which most needed defence; and, being amply provided with good fighting material in the shape of men, and with the best arms which science could supply or money purchase, they ought to have thrown up earthworks between Shumla and Plevna, or even nearer to the Danube, in order to compensate for the absence of fortified towns.

Perhaps the greatest evidence of weakness, both in the Seraskierate and in the commanders, was afforded by the inactivity of the Turkish fleet on the Danube. In such an extremity of danger, and amongst the defenders of a country which has never lacked gallantry in war, neither batteries nor torpedoes ought to have reduced the monitors and ironclads to silence. The Russian bridges might certainly have been destroyed as fast as they were made; and this ought to have been done at any risk and cost. Little could be expected of a nation which, driven to a supreme struggle for its very existence, permitted this great opportunity to pass. From the moment when it became evident that the Turks were without a plan, it was impossible for their friends to avoid a grave suspicion that their cause was absolutely hopeless. And, but for the commanding genius and resolution of

one man, whose ability was almost sufficient to rescue his country from ruin, Turkey would have made a very poor show against the invader.

As soon as the Russians had crossed the Danube, Redif Pasha hastened to Shumla, in order to inquire the reason of Abdul Kerim's inactivity, and to consult with the staff on the measures which should now be taken. By this time—towards the end of the first week in July—the Russians had a hundred thousand men in Bulgaria; they held Biela, threatened Rustchuk, were pushing on Towards Plevna, and advancing by forced marches on Tirnova. It was not too late for an army corps to throw itself out of Shumla and cover the road through Tirnova and Gabrova to the Schipka Pass. Tyros in military criticism were able to predict, days and weeks before it happened, that an attempt would be made to secure possession of this pass. The mere selection of Sistova as the point of crossing was enough to show that Tirnova and Schipka were the most probable objective of the Russians; and even if it was confidently anticipated that the Quadrilateral would have to be masked or attacked before an effort was made to cross the Balkans, yet it must have occurred to the Turkish military authorities that no chance would be lost to secure one or more passes at the first opportunity.

In spite, however, of the supineness of Abdul Kerim, and the weak defences of the country between Sistova and the Schipka Pass, it was a bold and hazardous policy on the part of the Russians to send their flying columns under Gourko to the Balkans. The expedition might well have encountered a serious check, or have been completely cut off from its base of operations. It must have been a work of vast difficulty to keep Gourko's army supplied with provisions and war material; and the resistance which the advanced force of the invaders actually met with shows how easily it might have been destroyed.

General Gourko, as a matter of fact, marched

to Tirnova\* virtually without striking a blow, entering it on the 8th of July—just eleven days after the crossing of the Danube. Here he rested for four days, whilst the heavy columns came up to reinforce him; and on the 12th the Grand Duke Nicholas entered the town. A correspondent of the "Daily News," writing on the date mentioned, gives us a graphic account of the Russian advance, and of the reception accorded to the invaders by the inhabitants of the country.

"The Grand Duke arrived to-day at noon, with the greater part of the 8th corps, so that now the town may be considered really occupied by the Russians. The march from Sistova was rather like a military promenade or a triumphal procession than a forced march, which it really was. Everywhere the inhabitants came out to meet us, offering bread and salt and the most friendly greetings; while the women and girls offered fruit, and pelted us with flowers. At

\* Tirnova is the ancient capital of Bulgaria, of which Rustchuk was afterwards made the seat of administration. "There reigned, at the end of the tenth century, the second Slavobulgarian dynasty of the Sismanides, heirs of the Fingo-Bulgarian race, driven out by the Greek Emperor. In 1186, Tirnova was the residence of the Bulgarian princes of the race of Asen, who restored the former splendour of the kingdom. The Czar Kalojan, one of the princes of that dynasty, was the conqueror at Adrianople, in 1205, of the first Latin Emperor of Byzantium, who, after eight months of captivity, was precipitated from one of the rocks of the upper city. The Czar Boris, in 1213, married at Tirnova his daughter to the Emperor of Byzantium. By turns the Bulgarian capital saw within its walls the Greeks, the Tartars, the Magyars. In the 14th century came the turn of the Turks. Sufficient attention has not been paid to the circumstances which facilitated the conquest of the Mussulmans. To understand it we have only to study the chroniclers and historians who speak of the depravity of manners and the corruption of the great, as of the people in those Bulgarian countries. On the 17th July, 1393, Tchelebi, the son of Bajazet, took the citadel of Tirnova by assault. Soon the first mosque was constructed there, and the Greek bishops—allies, however, of the conquerors—were assigned to a particular quarter of the city. In 1810 it had the Russians in its walls for some time. Since then it has ceased to be the political centre of Bulgaria, while remaining one of the nuclei of the Slave propaganda. Down to 1867, the date when the villayet of the Danube was created, France, Austria, and Russia, had consulates at Tirnova, since suppressed."

the entrance of many of the villages, arches were erected, covered with leaves and flowers. Processions, headed by priests, came out singing to meet us, with pictures from the churches, standards, and banners. There were deafening cheers, and the most extravagant joy. They insisted on shaking hands with us, would have kissed our hands had we allowed it, and sometimes they even shed tears. At the entrance of the village of Zavada, which is at the beginning of the gorge that leads to Tirnova, a rude arch was constructed of branches of trees. The whole population of the village gathered at the roadside near it. The soldiers, without orders from their officers, uncovered as they passed under, to the great delight of the people; while a huge bar of iron beaten by a mallet gave forth the first sound resembling a bell heard here for four hundred years. Just inside this gorge or hollow are two very ancient monasteries, built one on each side of a steep mountain side. The priests from these monasteries came down to meet us with banners and pictures, and a large beautiful Bible, which as many of the soldiers as could kissed as they passed, the people of these monasteries hoisting old bells which had lain hidden in the basements for four hundred years, and the voices of which will soon again be heard rolling up and down the hollows and gorges of the mountains.

"The reception at Tirnova was splendid. The appearance of the town to-day presented a striking contrast with what I saw here last summer. Then, not a woman was to be seen in the streets nor at the windows of the houses, and men went about with a frightened, cringing air, that showed the state of terror in which the people were kept. The zaptiehs were the only inhabitants who did not appear afraid of their own shadows. Now, all is changed. The zaptiehs are replaced by Russian soldiers. The streets are full of women, girls, and children, who mingle with the soldiers on the most friendly and sociable terms. The windows are teeming with the faces of pretty girls, flags, and streamers. The narrow, crooked streets are choked up by crowds of peo-



ple, soldiers, horses, and waggons, and the town is ringing with excitement and joy. Such is the greeting the invaders receive at all hands. The Grand Duke arrived about noon. He was met at the usual entrance to the town by priests in robes chanting prayers in the old Slavonic tongue, and by an immense crowd of people. With deafening cheers he was conducted to the church, where he attended a short service, then passed through the streets, where several arches had been erected with the inscription upon them of 'Welcome,' followed by a multitude of girls singing. The women and girls at the windows literally covered him with flowers, while Christo Ignatieff was quite buried in the carriage under the leaves, flowers, and wreaths, showered upon him. The Grand Duke then went to the quarters already prepared for him.

"The people have opened their houses to the Russians. There is no trouble about getting billets. The officers have only to inquire at the first house, and if not already occupied they are sure to be received. I obtained a room in the first house I asked at. The people are all smiles and words of welcome. I can only hope that the Russians will not cause them to change their ideas before they go away. In only one village had we a cool reception. That was Akchair, where the people showed a disinclination to sell anything, either because they were afraid the Russians would go away and the Turks come back, or because some flying band of Russians had taken things without payment. The Turkish population fled everywhere. We passed through several villages which had been abandoned, the Turks carrying off all their effects that they had not been plundered of. I have been told that some of these villages had been fired by the Cossacks. I am inclined to think this a mistake. I saw myself an occasional out-house or heap of straw burning that may have been fired by accident; but when I passed there was not the slightest indication of an intention to burn any village; nor do I think any has been burnt. The country along the road is very rich, but little under cultivation. Most of it is

grass land, offering abundance of forage for horses. Nearly the whole Turkish population fled from Tirnova, carrying off their goods and chattels. The houses of those who fled were more or less damaged by the Bulgarian juvenile population. Windows and doors were smashed, as at Sistova. The most needy part of the population helped themselves to what the Turks left behind, which was not much. These acts were committed during the day or two of anarchy which followed the departure of the Turks and preceded Russian rule. They are repudiated by the better class of Bulgarians, who express great chagrin at them, but who are powerless to prevent them. There appears to be a disposition to attach more importance to these acts of Vandalism than they deserve. The breaking of a few doors or windows is, after all, but a slight revenge for the oppression which culminated in the horrible massacres last May. These acts, besides, were not committed in the houses of Turks who remained at home. Fifty Turkish families have remained here quite undisturbed and unmolested. Had the Turkish population remained quietly at home none of these things would have happened. The conduct of the retreating Turks deserves mention. I have heard of isolated cases of outrage and murder and violence, but these are rare. They drive off all the Bulgarian live stock—sheep, horses, and cattle—they can lay their hands on, but do not go further. Several villages we passed through had not one four-footed beast left. This measure, however justifiable upon military grounds, naturally exasperates the Bulgarians greatly. As far as can be ascertained, very few troops are in the Balkans. I have just seen a young man from Elena whom I saw there last summer, who came here yesterday and goes back to-morrow. He tells me there are no Turks in the vicinity. Yet this place is on the direct road to Slivno, from which point Yamboli on the railway is soon reached. General Gourko has gone forward in that direction to-day with cavalry and artillery and the Bulgarian legion.

It is not likely that the Grand Duke will leave

here under a week or ten days. His march so far has been remarkable for its rapidity when once begun, and for the complete absence of opposition or even annoyance by the Turks. Not a single alarm, not a single shot fired. When we consider the distance penetrated into the enemy's country, it is remarkable. It is not easy to understand the plan of the Turks, if, indeed, they have a plan at all. I do not know how many troops there are before us, nor what force is destined for the defence of Constantinople; but unless they impede the march of this army more than hitherto, it will be in sight of Saint Sophia within a month, whether Rustchuk falls or not. The Russian plan is very evident. They mean to imitate the Prussians in the Franco-German war, carry on the siege of a fortress, and attack the enemy's capital at the same time. Unless the Turks make a more stubborn defence than hitherto, this army may dictate peace at Constantinople possibly before Shumla and Varna have fallen."

On the 12th of July General Gourko set out from Tirnova eastward, making a reconnaissance against Elena and Osman Bazar, in order to feel the strength of the Turks in this direction. He came, as he doubtless expected, upon a fairly numerous and well-handled force, which he found to be the extreme left of the enemy's line on the western face of the Quadrilateral. Seeing that the position did not actually rest upon the Balkans, and that the Hainkoi Pass was practically without defence, he retreated before the Turks, only too happy to leave them with the apparent victory. There are two other narrow passes on each side of the Hainkoi, and through each of these three he sent a detachment of his force. A small body of Turks was found in the central pass, who were so disconcerted by the appearance of the Russians that they fled, after a short and half-hearted struggle. In all the passes were found preparations for defence, of greater or less magnitude; but the force of men was wholly insufficient, and the earthworks, or the emplacements constructed out of the rock, unprovided with guns. Here also, as on the Da-

nube, the Turkish defence failed. Three months had passed since the declaration of war, and six months since war was morally certain, and yet the second great defensive line of Turkey had been pierced by the invader within a fortnight after the first.

This feat of General Gourko's took all Europe by surprise. The long delay of the Russians on the left bank of the Danube, to whatever cause it might be attributed—Turkish strength, Russian caution, or weakness, or unreadiness—served only to heighten the dramatic effect of the sudden appearance of a Muscovite force in the valley of the Tundja, ready to descend into the Maritza valley, and thus to threaten Adrianople, and even the capital itself. Many had imagined that Rustchuk and Shumla would be first attacked, or at all events that the Balkans would not be reached and crossed for some considerable time. Hence the news of Gourko's success was for a while doubted; but telegrams and correspondents' letters were not long in confirming it.

The village of Esekei, where Gourko debouched upon southern Bulgaria, is nearly equidistant from the three towns of Kezanlik, Eski Zaghra, and Jeni Zaghra, all of which it would be necessary for the Russians to occupy. The first of the three was by far the most important, since it commanded the southern mouth of the Schipka Pass—the village of Schipka itself lying higher up the road.\* As Gourko had reason to know

\* In Bulgarian, Schipka means "wild rose." The village which bears the same name, consists of eight hundred houses, the inhabitants of which are occupied in the cultivation and sale of roses, and of the famous attar of roses. The principal town of the valley of roses is Kezanlik. Count von Moltke, in his letters on the East, has the following remarks on this region:—"The little town of Kezanlik is hidden in a small forest of gigantic walnut trees. Even the minarets do not succeed in rising above the mountains of foliage and branches under which they are buried. The abundance of water surpasses all conception; just as in Lombardy, all the fields and gardens are irrigated by ditches and rivulets. Kezanlik is the Cashmere of Europe, the Gulistan of Turkey, the country of roses; that flower is not cultivated, as with us, in pots and gardens, but in furrows, like potatoes. Nothing can be more charming than such a plantation of roses. Millions



that the Schipka Pass was strongly held by Turkish troops; he turned at once upon the town of Kezanlik, sending detachments of cavalry to Eski Zaghra, and to cut the railway line at Jeni Zaghra.

Of the operations of General Gourko up to the time of his crossing the Balkans, and of the dispositions of the Russian troops in Bulgaria, a correspondent wrote home, on the 15th of July, as follows:—"When I visited Tirnova on the 13th inst., General Gourko's advance command had gone forward forty-eight hours previously. A brigade was making a reconnaissance on the Shumla road, where some Turks were reported in position, supported by some infantry and artillery, of the 9th Division. Colonel Judolmin's Circassian Cossacks were leading the advance of General Gourko's column, which has taken the bold and perhaps even rash course of marching direct on Slivno, whence Yamboli and the railway, as also the valley of the Tundja, leading straight down on Adrianople, are easily accessible. Of course the march has its dangers. So wretched are the tracks through the passes of the Elena Balkans that General Gourko's column of infantry as well as of cavalry have resigned their waggon transport, and convey the baggage and provisions upon pack horses. Reports have come from Elena that there is not a Turkish soldier between Tirnova and that place, and that indeed no force bars the way to Slivno. It is difficult to ascertain anything respecting the whereabouts of the Turkish troops in force, but some evidence exists that Abdul Kerim's field army drawn from Rustchuk and Shumla is echelloned on the line from Rasgrad over the Juma to Osman Bazar, apparently with the intent to cover the western face of the so-called Quadrilateral. If this be so, General Gourko's daring crossing of the Balkans need apprehend no interruption, for Slivno is nearer to Tirnova, whence he started, than it is

upon millions of red leaves are spread over the bright green of the rose field, and yet, at this moment, not one quarter of the buds are opened. At Kezanlik is made the oil of roses which is of such great value, and which is difficult to procure unalloyed, even at Constantinople."

to Osman Bazar, whence the Turkish intercepting column might be expected to start. General Gourko need have no fear of the Turks breaking in upon the line of his communications, for he has cut himself adrift so far as regards the space between Elena and Slivno, and will operate nimbly as a detached force in the great Roumelian valley till joined there by the main force of the Russian invading column, marching by the more practicable but more circuitous route through the Balkans, over Drenova, Gabrova, Kezanlik, and Eski Zaghra. The head of this main column will consist of eight corps, of which one division, the 9th, was already in Tirnova on the 13th inst., while the other, the 14th, was a day's march behind. The 8th Corps will be supported by the great bulk of the 11th Corps, now partly on the march on Tirnova, partly crossing the river, and probably the 9th Corps will spare one of its divisions, the 5th, to take part in the grand advance, which would thus consist of five divisions, or eighty thousand men, not including General Gourko's advance contingent of some fifteen thousand more. There are, indeed, more troops to spare for this purpose. The 30th Division belonging to the 4th Corps, the other half of which is with General Zimmermann in the Dobrudscha, is now on the road between Bucharest and Giurgevo. Its destination may be to co-operate in the siege of Rustchuk, wholly relieving the 11th Corps at Giurgevo, or its *role* may be to march to Simnitza, and, advancing on Tirnova, act as a reserve to the main invading column. In any case, after muzzling the fortresses of the Quadrilateral and neutralising Nicopolis and its troops, quite one hundred thousand men are immediately available for the crossing of the Balkans by the western line of invasion, over Tirnova, putting out of the calculation General Zimmermann's army on the eastern section of the theatre of war. General Gourko's celerity is an exception to the general deliberation of the advance. It was not expected that the eight corps would move forward in force till about the 20th; and other portions of the advance would be later."

The Hainkoi Pass was occupied by the Russians on the 14th of July; and the Turks who had held it fell back on Konaro, on the way to Kezanlik. There they found, or were joined by a small body of troops, and determined to make a stand. The foremost column of Gourko's force, consisting of a battalion of rifles, was attacked as it approached the village on the 15th; but after a short engagement the Turks were obliged to retreat, leaving their camp and munitions in the victors' hands. On the 16th, Gourko pushed on through Maglish and Uflami, encountering at the latter place a very formidable resistance from Turkish infantry, cavalry, and artillery.

Our narrative may now be continued by Mr. Forbes, who, being still at Biela on the 23rd of July, sent home a report which he had doubtless received on the best authority at the Russian head-quarters. Speaking of the battle of Uflami, he describes how, at the moment when Gourko was gaining the advantage over the Turks who had first attacked him, five battalions of Anatolian Nizams came up, and made themselves very troublesome. "Their fire, begun as it was at two thousand paces, caused the Russians considerable loss. The Russian orders are not to open fire till within six hundred paces of the enemy, and it was in the interval that the Russians suffered. But when their distance was reached they poured in a fire which very soon compelled the Anatolians to give ground. The Russian direct attacking force was four battalions of rifles and two sotnias of infantry Cossacks, whom the Turks call 'priests,' because of the cross they wear to distinguish them from the Circassian Turks. While the direct attack was being delivered the Russian hussars and dragoons charged the Turkish flank. There was very fierce fighting, sabre and bayonet both being used freely. The Turks were at length driven from their position with loss; four hundred were left dead at one point. The Turks fought very hard here, but their defeat at Uflami seemed to destroy their morale, and subsequently they did not fight so stoutly.

"On the 17th General Gourko approached Kezanlik. There was terrible heat, and it was

fearfully severe marching. The infantry waded into little streams to become soaked and so gain coolness. There was fighting more or less all day. On the evening of the 17th Gen. Gourko entered Kezanlik. The Turks had detailed from the force holding the Schipka Pass a column to occupy the heights flanking the entrance to Kezanlik and hinder General Gourko's advance; but his riflemen were beforehand in occupying these heights, and the Turks retired disappointed. It had been designed that Gourko should reach Kezanlik on the 16th, and on the 17th be free to assail in the rear the Turks holding the Schipka Pass, while Prince Mirsky with the 9th Division attacked them in front. But he was delayed by hard fighting, and the troops were too much fatigued to move further on the same day after the occupation of Kezanlik. So there was no co-operation between General Gourko and Prince Mirsky in attacking the Schipka Pass, but the latter nevertheless delivered an attack on that position, marching southward from Gabrova. He sent against the Turks but one regiment, that of Orloff, which he divided into three columns. The pass was strongly fortified with six successive tiers of intrenchments and batteries, and defended by picked Turkish troops, Circassians and Egyptians. The latter fought very hard. Of Prince Mirsky's three columns, that on the right encountered little opposition and went on some distance, till it missed the support of the centre column, fought five or six hours, and then made good its lodgement in the hostile lines. The left column, consisting of two companies, missed its way, and was beset by twelve companies of Turkish soldiers. It fought a retreating combat for four hours against terrible odds, losing eight officers killed and wounded and about one hundred and fifty men. It was brought out of action by the only officer left standing, and he was wounded.

"On the 18th General Gourko, his men refreshed, advanced to the attack of the Schipka position from the rear. Two battalions of rifles formed his advance. As they neared the rear of the position a flag of truce came out with a



*parlementaire*. The rifles at once halted, and an officer acting as escort went forward to meet the *parlementaire*. While negotiations were going on, the Russian riflemen in their curiosity quit- ted their extended formation, and drew together into a mass behind where the officer was com- muning with the *parlementaire*. Suddenly volleys of rifle fire were poured in upon them from the Turkish position. The *parlementaire* took to his heels at a signal which the Russians heard but did not comprehend. So sudden and fierce was the fire that in their two battalions the Russians lost one hundred and forty-two men killed and wounded in a few minutes. The survivors in their fury waited for no order to attack, nor re- garded any formation. With one common im- pulse and with yells of wrath they rushed on. It was a bad quarter of an hour for the Turks, but the riflemen, finding no signs of co-operation in the attack from the north by Prince Mirsky, contented themselves with driving back the Turks some distance, and occupied the aban- doned Turkish camp in the rear of the fortifica- tions. On the same night, in reply to General Gourko's summons to the Turks to surrender and abandon the further unavailing defence of the pass, there came a letter from the Turkish commander, Mehemet Pacha, offering to surren- der. Negotiations were entered into, and the hour for the surrender of the Turks was fixed for twelve o'clock the next day. An armistice was arranged, and early on that morning the sanitary detachments went forward to bring in the wounded which the rifle battalions had been forced to leave behind. They sent back word that the Turks had fled and vacated the position. The offer of surrender was a ruse to gain time.

"Meanwhile, on the 18th, Prince Mirsky had remained quiet, waiting for further information about Gourko's movements. But on the 19th, young Skobeleff, taking some troops of Mirsky's, had pushed forward a reconnaissance into the pass from the north. To his surprise he met with no opposition as he passed line after line of fortifications, and the hastily abandoned Turk- ish camps, with fires yet burning, rations half

cooked, and half-written telegrams. At length he reached the crest of the pass, and the view to the south opened before him. In a hollow at his feet he saw troops in camp. Were they Turks or Russians? The tents seemed Turkish, but the soldiers looked like Russians. Skobeleff tried the Russian hurrah as a test, but it was not replied to. At length he saw the red-cross flag of the ambulance staff, and he knew that the men in the valley were his own people. A junction was immediately effected. All the Turkish camps and baggage, twelve cannon, four of them guns of position, and four hundred Turkish prisoners, were taken.

"The Schipka position is chiefly in a forest, and very difficult. The fortifications are very skilfully designed, and are alleged to have been constructed by an English engineer officer. Gen. Gourko reports that all his wounded had been killed on the field where they fell, and the dead and wounded were found headless, and other- wise fearfully mutilated. There had been appa- rent deliberation, for the fallen Russians had been gathered together into groups. Some Turk- ish wounded were found who, in expectation of a similar fate, drew their daggers when the Rus- sians approached, and prepared to sell their lives dearly. Their lives were spared, and they were attended to. General Gourko remains in Kezan- lik till the 8th Corps, now occupying the defiles of the Balkans, shall have passed through them and massed, with supplies, for further progress. The road at present is only practicable for ve- hicles drawn by bullocks; but large numbers of men are engaged in improving it. Several days will elapse before the onward move is made. Even the cavalry expeditions are suspended for the moment. The Turks sacrificed their chances of defence by continually dribbling forward rein- forcements of two or three battalions at a time, instead of either attacking in force, or keeping the bulk of their troops in hand for a strongly sustained defensive effort. Their treachery re- specting the flag of truce, and their mutilation of the wounded, are barbarities which place them beyond the pale of civilised warfare."







The attack on Kezanlik is described by another graphic correspondent of the same newspaper,\* who also gives us details which go far to explain the extraordinary success of General Gourko in forcing the Hainkoi Pass.

"This pass and this road I may say were discovered by Prince Tserteleff, to whom had been confided the whole business of obtaining information about the roads, the movements of the enemy, their numbers, dispositions, and so on. He soon ascertained that the Turks had fortified the Slivno and Gatrova Passes in such a way as to render the forcing of a passage at either of them a very difficult matter, and he determined to look for another. Count Moltke in his book refers to a pass between those of Gatrova and Slivno, but speaks of it as only a passage impracticable for an army. Prince Tserteleff decided to investigate this pass, in the hope that it might lead to something. He soon ascertained that it had a very bad reputation—a place that was usually frequented by brigands, and rarely used either by Bulgarians or Turks. Among the Turks he found it had even a worse reputation than among the Bulgarians. It was a kind of tradition among them that this pass was in the clouds, that the defiles leading to it were so wild, so savage and barren, as to be unfrequented by either bird or beast—a kind of mountain desert, where nothing could live. Pursuing his investigations, the prince heard of a man who had been through this pass, and, finding him, he learned that he had been through in fact, but that was two years ago, and the road might have become impassable since then. But what made the information really important was that he had been through with one of the ox-carts of the country. If an ox-cart could go through, very probably a cannon might be got through somehow, and it was determined to reconnoitre and explore. Three days before the arrival of the grand duke at Tirnova, General Rauch went forward with two hundred Cossacks for this purpose, taking with him Bulgarian guides. With-

out waiting to explore the road to the end, he immediately began preparing it for the passage of artillery, a task which, as far as the pass itself was concerned, turned out to be no very difficult matter, as the worst part of the road was on the south side. The most wonderful part of it though, which forcibly illustrates what I was saying about the Russians being among friends, was this: that, although these two hundred Cossacks were working three days on this road, with the Bulgarian peasantry coming and going all the time freely, the Turks never got a whisper of their presence here, nor any intimation of the evident intention of the Russians to try this pass. They even sent three battalions from Kezanlik to Slivno to strengthen the positions before the latter place, and these three battalions passed by Khaini the day before the Russians issued out. These three battalions were just where they ought to have been had they known it, and they could have prevented the success of the movement. And yet, although the whole Bulgarian population of a dozen mountain villages knew the Russians were there, not one man was found among them to inform the Turks. Such is the advantage possessed by an army operating among a friendly population. The Turkish staff either did not know of this pass at all, or, knowing it, believed it to be so impracticable that they did not even think it worth while to place a corps of observation to watch it. The small body of troops mentioned in my telegram as being here turn out to have not been placed here, as I supposed, to watch the place. They were merely a small body whose retreat had been cut off by the Russians at Elena, and who had retreated by this road two or three days before the Russians came, without thinking it worth while to leave a single man to guard the pass.

"The only danger, therefore, that the Russians had to fear was that some wandering party of Bashi-Bazouks or marauders should pass that way and discover what they were at, or that the noise made by the Cossacks in repairing the road should excite the curiosity of the small Turkish

\* "Daily News Correspondence," under date.



force which it was known was at Khaini, at the outlet of the defile. They did not dare to use powder for blasting the rocks, by which they might have made the road passable in several places where it could hardly be called so for artillery in the condition in which it was left by the Cossacks. Prince Tserteleff, who has greatly distinguished himself during the passage, and to whom must be given the honour not only of discovering the pass but of conducting and piloting the advance guard through it, went forward continually with one or two Bulgarians, reconnoitring the route far in advance of even the advance guard. He even disguised himself in a Bulgarian peasant's clothes, and went forward on foot, anxious to see if the road were really practicable, before the whole column should advance to what might, after all, be only a sheep-path, over which it would be impossible to take artillery; and he was the first man of the Russian army, and his the first horse, to cross the summit, and the first to open out the defile at Khaini. For a diplomatist turned soldier, still a non-commissioned officer, the Prince is not doing badly."

The same writer continues, from Kezanlik, July 19th:—"The road from Parovci to the top of the pass was not nearly so bad as I had supposed. Indeed, the road all the way up to this point has been much better than I could have imagined. It has been rough, to be sure, full of holes and stones, in some places passing for a hundred yards at a time over mere heaps of stones that covered the whole bottom of the hollow; at other times through the fields by gates that we opened as we passed; but there have been but two or three places as far as Parovci where it has been at all steep. With help from the men in these two or three places, the horses have been able to draw the artillery through with ease. At Parovci the road began to grow steep, and from here to the summit, a distance of about two miles, the men had to help the horses nearly the whole way. But even here the great difficulty of mountain roads, their narrowness, does not seem to have been encountered

at all. The road all the way to the summit was made wide enough for the wide-tracked artillery waggons without any difficulty. It leads up the side of the little hollow, which is thickly wooded to the very top, and brings us out on a long narrow ridge, shaped like a saddle, and not more than fifty or sixty feet wide. This is the summit of the pass, and the descent on the south side is, we perceive, far more precipitous than the ascent has been. Here the men will have to help to hold the artillery back instead of pushing it forward.

"We are 200 Cossacks drawn up on this ridge, with our horses' heads turned southward, looking away over the interminable labyrinth of mountains, hills, ridges, valleys, hollows, and gorges, through which we still have to bore our way to the valley of the Tjunda before our passage can be assured. The first streak of day is just growing visible in the east, and a long flash of rosy light is climbing slowly up the sky. Before and beneath us is a dark narrow gorge, still a pool of blackness, into which we slowly descend. We are soon down into the depths of the dark defile. The first three or four hundred yards are very steep; but at the end of that time we have come fairly into the little hollow, and the descent the rest of the way is gentle and easy, although the road is rough. The hollow is narrower even than the one on the other side, and the trees here are large, the branches completely uniting overhead, making it as dark as a cavern. We move on as silently as we can, for, to tell the truth, it is, for aught we know, a most perilous venture. The Turks might choose to lay an ambuscade for us—to let us pass, and place a small force on the road behind us—and a hundred or even fifty infantry would quite suffice to bar the way, and render retreat impossible. So we push on cautiously, watching for any indication of the presence of the enemy. Daylight soon begins to spread everywhere, even down in the bottom of this narrow gorge, in spite of the thickly overhanging trees that do their best to keep it out. General Rauch, who is in command, detaches here and there eight or ten men to re-

pair the road where it appears necessary, and pushes on. This operation is repeated so often, that finally we have very few men left, and so we halt and wait for the detachment to come together again; and still there is no sign of the Turks. The little force at the end of the defile evidently does not dream of a Russian being nearer them than Tirnova.

"Slowly we work down the hollow, repairing the road as we go, and by evening we have arrived at a place where the hollow spreads out into a little valley where there is plenty of grass for the horses, and here we camp for the night. As it turns out, we have made just half the distance between the pass and the outlet of the defile, and have likewise made the road passable for the army to this point. But we still have five or six miles before us to do to-morrow, and as the Turks are now so near, no fires are lighted, no suppers are cooked, no tea is made. We eat a piece of hard bread and whatever bits of cold meat we have left about us, make shift to smoke a cigarette, wrap our blankets about us, and lie down on the ground for a sleep, expecting to hear the alarm sounded at any moment. But the night passes quietly without even a false alarm, and at break of day we are again in the saddle, without breakfast and without tea. We begin the work of the day before, pushing cautiously forward, repairing the road, watching for the enemy, who may appear at any moment, but who does not. The really most difficult and dangerous part of the road had still, as it turned out, to be discovered and repaired. The character of the country had quite changed since yesterday. Instead of the one high, steep, wooded mountain rising on either hand high above us, we were flanked on both sides by a labyrinth of low, rocky, steep hills and ridges, through which the road wound in the most tortuous manner, sometimes down deep in the bottoms of the gorge, sometimes skirting along the rocks two or three hundred feet from the bottom. It would have been a more dangerous place to meet an enemy even than higher up between the two great wooded mountains. A small force of infantry posted

along these sharp rugged heights could have kept at bay almost any number of troops, for the reason that but a small number could advance at a time, and it was for the most part impossible to scale these rugged heights to turn the positions once they were occupied by a resolute enemy.

"General Rauch paid less attention to the road here than hitherto, partly because of the necessity of pushing rapidly forward and seizing the outlet of the defile, partly because it would have required powder and blasting to repair the road in the places most needing it, and this would have given the Turks the alarm. We pushed cautiously forward, therefore, and about nine o'clock we turned sharp round a projecting bluff that a moment before seemed to completely bar the way, and found the defile suddenly open out to the width of half a mile and beheld beyond the valley of the Tundja, and here, not more than half a mile distant, we saw a Turkish camp. General Rauch had already learned from the Bulgarians that there were only a couple of companies here, and counting upon the effect of the surprise and the certainty that the Turks could not know that the whole Russian army was not at our heels, he determined to attack and clear the outlet at once. For 200 Cossacks to attack two companies of infantry would be the height of absurdity in any other country in the world but Turkey. Here, however, it seems the most natural thing to do imaginable, and we accordingly began to advance, firing. We did not attempt to charge them, as our object was rather to drive them away than to come to close quarters, where we should certainly have got the worst of it. The Turks were, as usual, taken by surprise. It is not a little remarkable that outpost service should be often the very last thing learned, and that it should never be learned at all by some nations, as by the Spaniards and the Turks, in spite of their having everything else—arms, equipments, organisation—appertaining to modern warfare. I have seen a Spanish army march boldly within the enemy's lines, billet the troops in a village in a hollow surrounded by hills half a mile distant, without putting out a single



picket, with the usual result of surprise and defeat. The military history of Turkey is full of surprises and defeats caused by the neglect of the outpost service, and yet they have learned no more on this simple point during the last four hundred years than on any other. So the force here watching a most important point had put out no pickets, it was taken by surprise, thrown into consternation at the near approach of the Russians, and instantly began to retreat—two companies of infantry of the regular army before two hundred Cossacks. I could hardly have believed it if I had not seen it. They fired upon us as they fled, and we pursued, firing upon them, but there was little harm done on either side, our loss being five or six wounded. We drove them out, on the Slivno road, beyond the village of Khaini, and waited the approach of reinforcements. In the course of the day General Gourko arrived with six battalions of Russian sharpshooters numbering about two thousand men, and toward evening the Bulgarian legion, the dragoons, the hussars, the rest of the Cossacks, and the artillery arrived, making up the detachment, and the outlet of the defile was made safe. The force under General Gourko's command now consisted of seven battalions of Bulgarians, about 5,000 men; six battalions of sharpshooters, about 2,000 men, the battalion of sharpshooters being very small; a brigade of dragoons, 1,000 men; a regiment of hussars, 500; and three regiments of Cossacks, 2,500 men; three batteries of field pieces of six, and a battery of mountain guns sufficiently light to be carried on horses—in all, about 11,000 men. With this force, one-half of which were recruits not yet four months under arms, and one-fourth more (the Cossacks) irregulars, the Russians made and secured the passage of the Balkans, one of the most formidable bulwarks ever raised by nature for the defence of a country. And they did it with a loss of six men wounded. For the passage was secured from this moment. Even had the attempt to force the pass at Kezanlik proved unsuccessful, the whole army could have crossed this pass with ease.

The next day there was some appearance of

the Turks concentrating to attack us. The three battalions that had passed on the way to Slivno two days before seemed to have returned, and made a show as if they would attack. General Gourko took the dragoons and started to meet them, giving orders for the Bulgarian troops to follow, as he wished to try them once under fire. But the three battalions of Turks retired so rapidly before the two regiments of dragoons that the Bulgarians could not get up to them. The dragoons drove them some ten miles in the direction of Slivno, and then returned to Khaini. This retreat of three battalions of infantry, 2,000 to 3,000 men, before 1,000 cavalry, was almost as bad as the flight of two companies before 200 Cossacks.

"The next day after this affair, or the third after the arrival at Khaini, General Gourko, leaving the Bulgarians to guard the place, took the rest of the detachment, and started for Kezanlik. We met a small force a short distance from Khaini, which fled before us firing a few shots, which proved to be a most unfortunate circumstance for four or five Turkish villages, on the way to Kezanlik. Either they or the inhabitants fired on us from the houses. The result was that we set fire to every house from which we had been fired at, and the fire spreading, these villages were for the most part destroyed. The Turks seem to have the faculty of always doing the wrong thing, and never the right one. Had they fired at us from behind the rocks and trees in the defiles of the Balkans it would have annoyed us very considerably, delayed our progress, and have done the Turkish population no harm. Instead of that, they fire at us from villages in the plain in the most senseless and useless manner, where this kind of resistance could not delay our march an hour, with the natural result of getting these villages burned. They leave no mistake uncommitted that perversity, ignorance, and stupidity, can commit.

"In the meantime the news of our arrival had spread to Kezanlik, and the Turkish commander there despatched three battalions from the force guarding the Schipka Pass, and sent them to meet

us. We met this force near Maglis, when we had made about two-thirds of the distance to Kezanlik, and the fight began at once. The Turks had taken position in the gardens, and opened fire upon us as soon as we came within range. Without a moment's delay, the Russians formed in order of battle, and advanced firing, and the Turks instantly began to withdraw. A running fight ensued, which was kept up all the way to Kezanlik, a distance of six or seven miles. That the resistance opposed by the Turks was not very stubborn may be judged by the fact that we made our usual march that day, and reached Kezanlik in the evening, having made the whole distance from Khaini in two days. The Russian loss in this running fight was some sixty killed and wounded, nearly the whole of which took place near Maglis, when the Turkish positions were first carried.

"We got into Kezanlik in the evening, and were most enthusiastically greeted by the Bulgarian population. The Turkish inhabitants had withdrawn into their houses, frightened nearly to death. They had been kept in ignorance of the real progress of the Russians by the Turkish papers, which had been announcing a continued succession of victories for the Turkish arms. Their relief upon finding that the Russians passed through the town without molesting them was very great. But they still had the lower classes of their Bulgarian neighbours to deal with, and this proved to be a far more difficult matter than appeasing the Russians. These Bulgarians had many an old score to settle up, and they proceeded to call the Turks to account with a promptitude and decision which showed how firmly they believed that Turkish rule and domination were things of the past. Getting a Cossack or two, of whom there are always a number everywhere without any very absorbing occupation, to go along with them, they would go into a Turkish house and rife it of as many valuables as they could conveniently carry off. Money, where it was to be obtained, jewellery, trinkets, ornaments, linen, clothing, and carpets, were the things that were seized. No house was,

however, thoroughly pillaged and ruined, except a small number that had been abandoned by their owners, and those owners were men who, owing to their misdeeds of last year, did not dare to remain and allow themselves to fall into the hands of the Russians. One of these was a Sadoullah Bey, a namesake of the present Turkish Minister at Berlin, whose house was filled with plunder taken from the Bulgarians last year, and whose fields were likewise filled with cattle obtained from the same source. You may be very sure this man's house was thoroughly pillaged and wrecked, as were the houses of half a dozen others of the same class. The fault of it all must be fixed upon General Gourko, who for two days allowed the town to take care of itself, so intent was he upon carrying out the task which had been entrusted to him. Until the Pass of Schipka was taken, his position was, of course, a most precarious and critical one. With a small force, completely cut off from the main army, and separated from it by the Balkans, against which the Turks might have rapidly concentrated their whole army south of the Balkans, he was, of course, justified in trying to get possession of the pass, and thus secure his own safety, before looking after the property of the Turks.

"Nevertheless, I must say the Prussians managed things better. They did not appear in a village half an hour until there were proclamations on the walls, telling the inhabitants exactly what they were to do and not to do, with the penalty of disobedience printed in very large characters indeed. That penalty was usually Death. *Dura lex, sed lex*, and a hard law is, after all, perhaps better than no law at all. But to those people who may wish to prove by what occurred here that the Bulgarians are just as bad as the Turks—as I have no doubt there are people who will—I should like to observe that there were no houses burnt here, that there were no Turks murdered, that no Turkish women were outraged, that no Turk was roasted alive, and that no Turkish children were spitted on bayonets and carried about the streets. Let it further



be remembered that many of the Turks living here now were engaged in the massacres of last year, and we have the measure of difference between the Turk and the Bulgarian. I should have been glad if the Bulgarians had shown themselves free from stain in this business, but I fear that perfection is not to be found in human nature, and the Bulgarians must take their chance with the rest. The greater part of the Russian officers did all in their power to put a stop to the looting, though the fact of there being no regular government organised, and that it was nobody's business, made it difficult. Among others I saw Prince Tserteleff laying about with his nagaika, or Cossack's whip, in the most unmerciful manner. Among others who had the misfortune to fall into his hands, was the interpreter to one of the brigade commanders, a Greek or Italian, who had been received and treated as a gentleman. The prince found him in a Turkish house, dividing the spoil with some Cossacks, and without any more ado struck him a savage blow across the face with his riding whip, and ordered him under arrest, thus bringing his career as a gentleman interpreter to a close; an undiplomatic measure, but for that reason effective and necessary.

"To return to the military operations. General Gourko, having reconnoitred the positions of the Turks in the Schipka Pass, determined upon an immediate attack. The village of Schipka is some six or seven miles north from Kezanlik, right at the foot of the mountains. A peculiarity of the Balkans is, that while, on the north side, there is a long series of hills, lesser mountains before you come to the main range, here on the south they stop off short, without any foothills at all, unless the other range south of the Tundja Valley may be considered such. As you ride along the valley of the Tundja you see those monster masses of earth and rock and forest, rising like a row abruptly out of the plain without any intermediate hills or irregularities, like a row of sugar-loaves placed along a floor and rounded off at the top. The pass is therefore only a couple of miles from the foot of

the mountain on this side, and the road up to it is very steep and difficult. The Turks had fortified it in the most thorough and effective manner, and had the Russians been obliged to attack it from the other side it would have cost them a fearful loss of life. As it was, it has cost the Russians something like four hundred killed and wounded. But the Turks were disconcerted when they found their positions were turned, and did not fight with any hope or chance of success. A Russian force had advanced on the Gabrova side, and it had been arranged that an attack was to be made on the pass from both sides at once; but, owing to the difficulty of communication, the combination failed. The attack from the Gabrova side was made a day earlier than it ought to have been, or the one from this side a day later, I do not know which, and both were repulsed. The Turks might have held out a long time had they but had a supply of water; but although they had victualled the fortress, they forgot what was more necessary than food, and that was water. It soon became evident that they would have to fly or surrender. Nevertheless, in spite of this necessity, which was self-evident, and of the certainty that a great many of them must inevitably fall into the hands of the Russians, they committed first an act of treachery, and then acts of brutal atrocity, that would justify the Russians in putting them without the pale of civilised warfare. During the attack made by General Gourko they raised the white flag, and when the Russians ceased firing, and sent forward a flag of truce, they seized the bearer of the flag, murdered him, and opened fire upon the Russians without warning. The whole business is so barbarous and so savage that the story would probably not be believed if it rested on Russian authority alone. Fortunately it does not. There was a Prussian officer present, Major Liegnitz, on whose authority, as well as on that of many Russian officers, the truth of the story rests. The Russian sharpshooters were pushing up the heights, gradually approaching the batteries, when suddenly a number of white flags were seen, and the Turkish

trumpets were heard ordering the cessation of the firing. The Russians immediately ceased firing, and the whole line uncovered itself in what proved to be a very careless manner. A large white flag was then waved from the Turkish batteries, and a Russian went forward with a white flag to parley. During this time there seems to have been a general relaxation of vigilance, and Major Liegnitz went near enough the Turkish lines to open a conversation with a Turkish soldier. No sooner had the bearer of the flag of truce gone into the fort than fire was opened by the Turks without warning of any kind; and it was opened, Major Liegnitz assures, not accidentally by the soldiers, but by the sound of the trumpet, showing the order was given by the commander of the fort.

"The next day, when the Russians entered the fort, they found the body of the bearer of the flag of truce decapitated and horribly mutilated, together with the bodies of a number of other Russian soldiers who had fallen in the affair either killed or wounded, and whom their comrades had not been able to carry off. Most of the Russian loss in this affair was caused by the treacherous fire of the Turks after raising the white flag. What could have been the object of the Turkish commander in thus deliberately decoying a flag of truce into his lines and then murdering the bearer? Evidently a pure outburst of savage ferocity; the rage of the savage who finds himself beaten on all hands by a civilised enemy, and flings a deliberate defiance at civilised modes of warfare, and revenges himself in the only way his barbarous nature can find satisfaction, by violating the most sacred law of civilised warfare—the inviolability of a flag of truce. It is even believed by those who have seen the body, from the marks of bleeding, that the bearer of the flag was first mutilated, and afterwards killed."

Meanwhile the Turks, foreseeing that their enemies would not be long in making an attempt to cross the Balkans, and not considering Reouf Pasha strong enough to resist them, especially if they should force their way into southern Bul-

garia, had ordered Suleiman Pasha to proceed by sea from Montenegro, where he had practically triumphed over the mountaineers,\* and land his victorious army on the coast of the Ægean. He arrived at the seaport of Enos, and at once marched up the country, having been made commander-in-chief of the army south of the Balkans.

A letter from Adrianople to the "Daily News," dated the 24th of July, describes his arrival. "The hero of the hour in European Turkey at this crisis of the country's danger is, without doubt, the victor of Montenegro, Suleiman Pasha. The difficulties thrown in the way of correspondents at Shumla following the military operations of the commander-in-chief are such that I naturally inferred similar restrictions would be imposed with the army of Adrianople; but I am glad to find, in an interview with Suleiman Pasha himself, this will not be the case. Fortified by a good introduction, I called upon him here, and he instantly relieved me of any other restraint than such a position would of necessity entail, and invited me to accompany him in the forthcoming operations. He was in the midst of soldiers encamped on the northern outskirts of the city near the old palace of the sultans of Adrianople, which was until very recently the pride and boast of the place. Now it is in rapid progress of demolition, the materials as I write being carted away to aid in the fortifications around, which are fast being raised. Some fifty battalions are already collected here, the grass on the river's bank forming their bed, and the clear summer's sky above their only covering.

"The general is hardly forty years old, a man of middle height, and for a wonder not inclined to corpulency, as appears to be the almost invariable effect of high command in Turkey. To look at his fair complexion, sandy beard and whiskers, and his grey eyes, one would almost imagine oneself in the presence of a migratory Scotchman, bent upon amassing wealth in a foreign land, and that pure English with an un-

\* See above, ch. 16.



mistakable accent would proceed from out of his mouth ; but no such phenomenon, unluckily for me, occurred, and instead the conversation was carried on in French. The general informed me he was hard at work incorporating the new troops, whom he found on his arrival here, with his old soldiers from Montenegro, and forwarding them up to Jeni-Zagra, near the terminus of the railway at Yamboli, where Reouf Pasha was at the moment. The news of the withdrawal from Eski-Zagra and Kezanlik, and the Schipka Pass, on the approach of the Russian advanced guard, had come in, and did not seem, in the least, to give cause for any anxiety, or to be unexpected by him. Various versions of the number of the enemy who had up to this moment crossed the Balkans had reached him, extending from 8,000 to 30,000, but the latter seemed to be in excess of the real figure, and was extended over a wide area. That atrocities had been committed did not admit of a doubt, but they occurred out of the main body, and were committed, it was said, by isolated bands of foraging Cossacks, who were not the easiest of troops to tame and civilise, and also by Bulgarian Christians upon their Mahomedan fellows. Nothing of the kind had occurred at Kezanlik or Eski-Zagra ; and as regards his own army, and the Turkish troops in general, the strongest orders of which language was capable (and that is not without meaning in the land of the sultan) had been issued to prevent the slightest excesses of the men, who were fully aware that the eyes of all Europe were upon them. In a very few days important operations would assuredly take place, in which the army of this part would bear a foremost part. More information was given which it would be imprudent to reveal, and the general invited me to accompany him to witness the march out of camp of ten battalions, which were on the point of being sent by the railway to Jeni-Zagra. More than three-fourths of the men bore unmistakable symptoms of having gone through the campaign of Montenegro ; the faces of the majority, naturally embrowned with the toil of the fields, had assumed a far deeper

dye, comparing strongly with those of the half-drilled recruits—much so in face, but more still in uniform ; the smartness, in comparison of the one so recently turned out of the tailor's hands, rendering still more marked the utter discoloration and dilapidated appearance of the other. . . . . They are good soldiers, and tried by every hardship, extremes of weather, and the utmost amount of privation. Proud indeed the general has reason to be of them, and he can rely on their making themselves a name amongst the myriads of the czar now beginning to pour through the Balkans. But the order to march is given, the band plays its few wild notes as a prelude to the soldiers' shout, thrice uttered by the whole as one man, of 'Long live the Padi-shah !' and onward they go to the defence of Islam."

Suleiman's soldiers fully justified this good opinion in the desperate attempts to retake the Schipka Pass.

On the 29th of July Gourko advanced from Kezanlik upon Jeni Zaghra, where the railway and telegraph lines had been cut at the time of the crossing. He had with him, for his right column, the Bulgarian Legion, two batteries, and three cavalry regiments, ordered up from Eski Zaghra ; for his centre, the rifle brigade, a regiment of Cossacks, and four batteries ; for his left, five battalions of infantry, two batteries, and a force of Cossacks, who had been holding the Hainkoi Pass.

Early on the 30th, in spite of a forty miles' march on the preceding day, the Russians attacked the Turkish positions in front of Jeni Zaghra, and took the town after desperate fighting. On the next day Gourko heard that his right column had been checked near Eski Zaghra by a large force of the enemy, and instantly set out to relieve it. But now the end of his daring raid across the Balkans was at hand. It has been estimated that as many as thirty thousand Turks were massed around Eski Zaghra, and between that town and Jeni Zaghra. Gourko, ignorant of the enemy's strength, attacked him at Dzurani on the 31st of July, and was immedi-

ately raked by a murderous fire. Within a few hours, one battery of artillery lost forty-eight horses, and another eight. The Turks in their turn now fell on the Russians in overwhelming numbers. An attack on the left having been repulsed with difficulty, and the army having been saved from destruction by the opportune arrival of Prince Leuchtenberg's cavalry on the right, Gourko contrived to fall back upon the Hainkoi Pass, and to make good his retreat into northern Bulgaria, on the 2nd of August. The Bulgarian legion was in the meantime entrapped in Eski Zaghra, and cut to pieces by the Turks, who fought with the utmost animosity against their rebellious fellow subjects. Only four hundred escaped out of four times that number; and the town itself, after being the scene of terrible massacres on both sides, was reduced to ashes. The correspondents gave us shocking accounts of the cruelties committed at this time, and in this neighbourhood. As early as June 29th one of them wrote from Karabunar, the head-quarters of Suleiman Pasha, some twelve miles from Eski Zaghra, as follows:—

"The villages between this little station on the Jamboli line and Eski-Zaghra appear likely to become infamous in history. . . . It is to be hoped that the Russian commander-in-chief is in earnest in his desire to carry on the war in a civilised manner; and it certainly appears almost incredible to find the Turkish side professing to be horror-stricken at outrages which they have so lately been doing their utmost to palliate. The first object I was taken to see on my arrival here was the severed head of a Bulgarian peasant, which had just been brought in by a Turkish soldier, who had himself performed the horrid operation in revenge for being fired at. The head was then thrown into a ditch close to the station, and there remained, a ghastly object enough until some charitable person covered it with earth. Next seven spies, as we at first heard—but afterwards a civil staff officer informed us they were not spies, but Bulgarian insurgents—who had been charged with having blown up a railway bridge across the river here, were brought to

the place of execution, which happened, much to my disgust, to be two stunted trees—the only ones growing near—adjoining the modest shed in which I was quartered. Not one of the unfortunate beings appeared to show the least emotion as they stood surrounded by a few dozen soldiers and bullock drivers; and a rough but ready set of volunteer Calcrafts tied the ropes to the sparse branches of the trees, slipped the knots round their necks (excepting the last, an old man, who quietly performed that duty for himself, and sat down cross-legged on the ground, his eyes shut, murmuring what appeared to be a prayer, and patiently awaiting his turn), and, hauling them up, the end came almost without a struggle. Human life in Turkey, as in all other Oriental countries, is certainly taken and lost in a different manner to our own; but I never could imagine such a scene possible as this that I most reluctantly was called upon to witness. The train just starting for Adrianople has in it the body of a Mussulman split in halves, and otherwise mutilated in the most frightful manner, which Suleiman Pacha has sent to the Consuls there as a terrible proof of what the Russians and their followers are capable of. A telegram from Reouf Pacha has just been shown to me, stating that the inhabitants of five villages near Eski-Zagra have been slaughtered, man, woman, and child, three hundred and forty in number, by the retreating Russians. Within the next few days I shall have an opportunity, I trust, of making inquiries from the few survivors who made their way in a lamentable state to Jeni-Zagra, whither our head-quarters are now moving. Burning villages of the Christians are to be seen marking the line of march, and a spirit of ferocity has been stirred which will make the war a byword and reproach for many a year. The whole population is flying, and can be seen in countless thousands between here and Adrianople, with their miles of bullock waggons, containing their families and household goods, their cattle and sheep in common droves and flocks, toiling painfully along in the vain hope of finding rest in a peaceful country."



It has seemed advisable to quote the newspaper correspondence at considerable length at this point of our narrative, inasmuch as we have not, and are not likely to have, any more graphic and impartial record of this most important phase of the Turko-Russian war.

The history of the campaign of 1877 contains many episodes of remarkable interest. It has indeed been declared by competent critics that the war did not furnish as many useful lessons to military men, or to students of military tactics, as might have been expected from it. It taught us, for instance, little about the effectiveness of the heavy artillery of recent introduction, or about the use of torpedoes, or of ironclad monitors. But it must be admitted that, from the time of the passing of the Danube to the arrival of the Russians in Adrianople, its progress supplied us with not a few examples of extreme gallantry in fighting, of vast endurance, of astonishing skill and rapidity in the surmounting of very difficult obstacles. Thus the Balkans were twice crossed by General Gourko, once in the heat of summer, and again amidst the winter snows. But for pure audacity and brilliant enterprise, no achievement of either army will be found to eclipse the forcing of the Hainkoi Pass so soon after the commencement of hostilities.

Meanwhile the Turkish capital had been intensely excited by the news of the Russian successes in Bulgaria, and especially by their rapid advance to the Balkans. The populace demanded that a "holy war" should be proclaimed in a most solemn manner, by the public unfurling of the standard of the Prophet, and the summoning of every Mahomedan to come to the defence of Islam as a sacred duty. The ceremony here referred to, which has been mentioned in a former chapter, never took place throughout the campaign. Some have attributed the fact to an unwillingness on the part of the Porte to embarrass England by arousing the fanaticism of her numerous Mahomedan subjects in India; whilst others assigned the more prosaic reason, that the green banner of Mahomet no longer existed.

Reports of the crossing of the Balkans reached

Constantinople in an exaggerated form—and even before the movement had been effected. A correspondent of the "Globe" newspaper, writing from the capital on the 18th of July, says:—"I can find but one word which adequately expresses the state of public feeling in Constantinople for the last forty-eight hours, and that is—panic-stricken. Yesterday morning sedate and sober men of business, on returning into town from their weekly holiday, were astounded at seeing the streets in a state of unusual commotion, and the more so on learning the cause, which was nothing less than the alarming intelligence just received that the Russians had crossed the Balkans in force, and were marching unimpeded upon Adrianople. Imagination, heightened by fear, rapidly swelled the numbers of the enemy as the story flew from mouth to mouth, until our good folks in Stamboul completely lost their heads, and finally brought themselves to believe that Adrianople had fallen, and that to-morrow would see the Muscovite hordes at the gates of the capital. As far as I have been able to learn, the exceedingly alarming reports which have thus troubled the peace of Constantinople were based upon no more substantial authority than the word of a telegraph clerk at Yamboli—similar evidence, it will be remembered, was accepted as conclusive proof of the recapture of Ardahan—who, hearing from the terrified villagers of his district that a small force of Cossacks had been seen upon this side the mountain chain, saw fit to transmit the intelligence to his chiefs at Constantinople, embellished by the addition of a dozen or so regiments of regulars and a whole battery of field artillery. There is never smoke without fire, and there can therefore be no doubt that a troop of Cossacks did find their way through the pass of Hain Boghaz, where they encountered and put to flight the solitary battalion of Turkish infantry which mounted guard over this most important defile. Reinforcements, however, were immediately sent forward by Reouf Pasha, and the Cossacks in their turn were forced to beat a precipitous retreat the way they came. The Minister of Marine

was himself soon after on the spot, and is understood to have strengthened materially the Turkish outposts along the whole line of the chain. It is very fortunate for the Ottoman cause that the enemy did not attempt to force a passage at this particular spot in greater numbers, for from the fact of only one battalion being left to guard the pass, it would seem that but ineffectual measures were taken to arrest their progress. The Turks are evidently determined to concentrate as many men as they can possibly muster in Lower Bulgaria. At the terminus of the Adrianople railway in Stamboul the scene for the last few days has been one of continual activity and excitement. The Roumelian Company has been obliged to suspend entirely its passenger traffic, and to place its trains and wagons at the exclusive service of the government. Between sunset last night and sunrise this morning over ten thousand troops were despatched along the line, in addition to large convoys of ammunition and provisions. A pressed gang of three hundred or four hundred hamals (native porters) were at work during the whole night loading trucks from the powder magazine at San Stefano. In the conveyance of such a dangerous commodity as gunpowder, some little method and precaution are generally observed, but in this case the kegs were dashed wildly about without the slightest regard to consequences, more than one being broken to pieces in close proximity to the lighted narghilé which an Ottoman official was smoking with the imperturbable calmness and dignity characteristic of his race.

"The Porte, with a view, doubtless, of pacifying the excited public mind, has issued a proclamation, denying formally the reported passage of the Balkans by the Russians, and stating that the people might have every confidence in their government for the due protection of the country. Curiously contradictory appears the following announcement, wherein a stirring appeal is made to the entire population of the capital, irrespective of nationality or creed, to arm, and leave their homes and families for the front, as the country

is in danger. There is no doubt that ministers and sultan are fully alive to the present precarious situation, for the councils at the War Office, frequently presided over by the sultan in person, are now held at every hour of the day and night, and on occasions have lasted as long as twenty-four hours at a stretch. Recruits continue to arrive from the provinces, and after undergoing two or three days' drill are drafted off to join the regular armies either in Asia or Europe.

"Their behaviour, on the whole, has been exemplary, and though for a short period during the stay of the dreaded Circassians, the Cafés Chantants and other places of public resort were closed, this measure was adopted by their proprietors more on the principle that prevention is better than cure than because of any serious loss attendant upon the presence of the unwelcome visitors.

"The following incident is somewhat at variance with the spirit of unreasoning and blind fanaticism which is generally ascribed to the Turks as a people, though more especially to the Ottoman soldiery, both Bashi-Bazouk and regular. On Saturday last, a funeral, followed by an immense crowd, slowly wended its way along the densely crowded streets of Pera to the church of St. Antoine. In front, as a matter of course, were the priests and choristers, with banners, crosses, candles, and other paraphernalia attendant upon a high-class Roman Catholic interment. On turning a corner into the Grande Rue, the *cortège* suddenly came face to face with a body of recruits who had just arrived from Symrna, and were on the march to join their camp in the suburbs. Not a few amongst the followers dreaded that some insult was about to be offered to the cross, the hated emblem of an alien faith, which was borne in front of the procession. No idea, however, of disrespect dwelt in the minds of the Mussulman redifs. With common accord they one and all reverently drew aside to let the funeral pass, and as the coffin went by them these rugged and untutored sons of Islam raised their hands in military salute."

Turkey was certainly in no need of recruits



during the earlier months of the campaign, nor yet of ammunition or military stores. The government had money enough and credit enough, in spite of all that had gone before, to place its armies in the field. What it lacked was power of organisation and direction ; and it was chiefly for want of this power that its efforts eventually failed.

## CHAPTER XXI.

### OSMAN PASHA AT PLEVNA.

WHILST Gourko had been making his adventurous raid in Southern Bulgaria, the Russian armies on the right and left of the Sistova-Tirnova line had made considerable progress. By the last week in July the Rustchuk army, under the command of the czarewitch, had pushed forward upon the river Lom, having its left wing at Pirgos, on the Danube, and wheeling round on that point with the apparent intention of besieging Rustchuk. No spirited preparations were made for a siege, although the bombardment of the fortress from Giurgevo steadily continued. The Turks fell back behind the Black Lom as the Russians advanced, so that about forty thousand men had been brought into position almost without loss. Here also the defenders seemed to have no settled plan, and they even divided their forces, a part retreating towards Shumla. It is questionable how far the Russians might not have been able to push their out-posts if they had boldly made the most of their opportunity, and broken through the face of the Quadrilateral.

The Grand Duke Vladimir made a reconnaissance in force, on the 21st of July, through the village of Kadikoi, and as far as Guvemli, a station on the Rustchuk-Shumla line, where he blew up a bridge, and severed the rail and telegraph lines. It is true that in this expedition the invaders began to feel the strength of the enemy, and suffered some loss ; but nowhere as yet did the Turks give evidence of an intention

to make a decided stand. In another direction Colonel Bilderling, commanding a regiment of dragoons, pushed on from Kaceljevo—a village on the Lom, subsequently the scene of a sanguinary battle—down the banks of the river, for a similar purpose ; but in his absence, the Turks fell upon the village, and massacred all the Bulgarians whom they could find, including a hundred men, women and children, who had taken refuge in the church. When Bilderling returned at night-fall, he found Kaceljevo “empty and desolated, and its church a shamble.” This showed that the enemy was at least in sufficient force to make it dangerous to leave unguarded a position once taken up. The Kaceljevo affair was one of the earliest manifestations, since the Russians crossed the Danube, of the Turkish animosity against the non-combatant Bulgarians. Perhaps they had been roused to vengeance by the assistance afforded by the Christian inhabitants of the country to the invading troops. The Russians have been reproached frequently with leaving the Bulgarians to the mercy of the Turks ; but it would have been difficult for them, if not absolutely impossible, to render secure every village or district through which they had passed in the course of their advance.

Meanwhile the czarewitch retained his headquarters at Obertenik, whilst the emperor was at Biela, and the grand duke at Tirnova—at all which places the fugitives, including some Turks as well as Bulgarians, began to settle down again, and carry on their former callings under the protection of the authorities. Bulgarian volunteers were constantly enrolled, drilled and equipped, either for drafting into the Bulgarian Legion, or for the purpose of forming a gendarmerie. At Tirnova Prince Tcherkassky, who had earned a reputation as a civil administrator in Poland, had already set to work on the organisation of a Bulgarian state. In the Dobrudscha General Zimmermann had occupied the whole line from Tchernavoda to Kustendjie, which towns are connected by a railway line. His object was supposed to be to wheel round upon Silistria, as the czarewitch was doing upon

Rustchuk ; but circumstances intervened to prevent the movement in both cases, if it was ever seriously entertained.

The Russians had taken measures to protect their base of operations by stopping the navigation of the Danube—a precaution against any possible attack from the Black Sea, whether by the Turkish fleet or by any other future enemy. This they had effected by sinking obstructions in the Sulina branch of the river, and by laying torpedoes in the stream.

Before the end of July the Turks began to show an increased activity in all directions. The tide of their fortunes had turned with the defeat of General Melikoff in Asia, with the return of Suleiman Pacha from Montenegro, and with the brave stand made by Osman Pacha at Plevna. The demoralisation of the earlier part of the month was disappearing, and the government seemed to be at last exerting itself to the utmost to support its generals in every direction. The dismissal of Abdul Kerim, and the appointment of Mehemet Ali to the command of the forces in the Quadrilateral, at once infused new spirit into the Turks on the Lom, whilst the forced retreat of General Gourko gave renewed courage to the northern armies. Some idea of the absence of efficient preparation in the first instance may be gained from the statements of Hassan Pacha, commandant of Nicopolis, who had surrendered on the 15th of the month. He declared to his captors that, being a general of division, he ought to have had at least fifteen thousand men under his command, whereas he was left with barely five thousand, only one battery, and no cavalry. He had an altogether insufficient supply of ammunition, and his men were of such an inferior stamp, and so demoralised, that he had been compelled to shoot three of them with his own hand, on the day before the surrender. He attributed the rapid advance of the Russians to such causes as these, and especially to the want of spirit amongst the Turks, owing to their indifferent equipment. So serious was the situation regarded, even at Constantinople, that a message was sent from the sultan's palace to the

newspaper correspondents, intimating that they would be allowed to telegraph that the occupation of the capital was imminent.

Before the Russians had been long in Bulgaria, the Turkish government began to send to its embassies in the various capitals frequent accounts of Russian and Bulgarian atrocities, evidently intended to show that the blame in this respect was not all on one side. Whilst a number of these accounts appeared to be based on indisputable facts, it is only right to say that others were proved to be without foundation ; whilst in many cases the Cossacks, and even the Russian regulars, were made to bear the reproach of cruelties due entirely to Bulgarian revenge. One of these official communications to the embassies, dated the 21st of July, and emanating from the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, may be quoted here.

"I have to communicate to you the text of a minute signed at Shumla by the representatives of the following foreign newspapers :—Cologne Gazette, Journal des Débats, Neue Freie Presse, Standard, Daily Telegraph, Illustrated London News, Manchester Guardian, the Times, Frankfurter Zeitung, Morning Post, République Française, Pester Lloyd, Wiener Tagblatt, Morning Advertiser, Scotsman, New York Herald, and Manchester Examiner. It is as follows :—

"The undersigned representatives of the foreign press assembled at Shumla, deem it their duty to sum up and sign the narratives they have separately addressed to their newspapers on the acts of cruelty committed in Bulgaria against the inoffensive Mussulman population. They declare that they have with their own eyes seen, and have interrogated, both at Rasgrad and at Shumla, women, children, and old men, wounded by lance and sword thrusts, not to speak of injuries from fire-arms, which might be attributed to the accidents of legitimate war. These victims give horrible accounts of the treatment the Russian troops, and sometimes even the Bulgarians, inflict on the fugitive Mussulmans. According to their declarations, the entire Mussulman population of several villages has been mas-



sacred. Every day there are fresh arrivals of wounded. The undersigned declare that women and children are the most numerous among the victims, and that they bear lance wounds.’”

It was on the 20th of July that the first news of Osman Pacha's activity on the Russian right flank was received at Constantinople, and from thence circulated throughout Europe. It would seem that this diversion in their favour was almost as unexpected by the Turkish government as it was by lookers on; and Osman appears to have acted very much on his own responsibility and initiative. On the 21st the Porte issued the following circular, in which it will be observed that the general is still spoken of as “commandant at Widdin”—where he had been supposed to be simply facing the Roumanians in Kalafat.

“Osman Pacha, commandant at Widdin, telegraphs to us from Plevna that, after a furious engagement, which lasted seven hours, the enemy, being defeated, beat a retreat after suffering heavy losses. On the following day, Friday, the Russians, in considerable numbers, divided into several columns, and again attacked the Imperial troops. Unable to resist the vigorous onslaught of our soldiers, the enemy hastily took to flight in disorder, and sustained enormous losses. A large quantity of arms and ammunition, and three artillery trains, remained in possession of our troops.”

This account turned out to be substantially correct; and it may be remarked that Osman Pacha's reports were always of a trustworthy character.

The fact is that General Baron Krüdener, who had made but slow progress from Sistova to Plevna, had been anticipated by Osman Pacha's rapid advance from Widdin, the Turks arriving first at the strong natural position with which he was doubtless well acquainted. It was a great mistake on the part of the Russians to overlook this important point, which, though it is only a natural fortress, has all the strength of a vast fortification, and commands the road southward to Sophia. It was on the 19th of

July that General Krüdener, commanding the 9th Corps, sent General Schilder-Schuldner, with an infantry brigade, supported by cavalry and artillery, to occupy the place. It was afterwards estimated that the Russians had a force of 1,500 men as against 8,000 Turks; but however this may have been, the attack was repulsed with heavy loss. During the night General Krüdener reinforced his subordinate with 6,000, whilst Osman Pacha was said to have brought his force up to 20,000 men. On the 20th a sanguinary engagement of twelve hours' duration was fought; and General Schilder was eventually driven back, with a loss of close upon 2,000 men. It was here, for the first time, that the Russians experienced the withering effect of the Turkish fire from behind entrenchments, and with the repeating rifles with which the troops of the sultan had been armed.

The Russians lost no time in endeavouring to repair this disaster, the serious effects of which were instantly perceived. General Schahofskoy, commanding the 11th Corps, was hastily ordered to proceed to the assistance of General Krüdener, and he marched across the country, from the lines of the Rustchuk army, with as little delay as possible. It was determined to renew the attack on Osman Pacha on the 31st of July; and a correspondent of the “Daily News,” telegraphing on the following day, sent a long account of the battle, from which we may select a few of the more interesting passages:—

“*Poradim, before Plevna, August 1st.*—The previous affair at Plevna had been the only serious reverse the Russians had encountered in the European campaign, but it had been very serious, and as an aggravation it occurred through neglect of common military precautions. When the commander of the 9th Corps proceeded against Nicopolis he made the omission of protecting his flank by not sending cavalry to occupy Plevna, then only weakly held. Afterwards an easy chance did not offer. The Turkish column from Widdin, marching too late to succour Nicopolis, turned aside and occupied Plevna. With intent to repair the blunder General Krüdener

sent three regiments of infantry against Plevna and without a previous reconnaissance. These, after hard fighting, actually occupied the town. They had laid aside their cloaks and packs in the streets, and had quitted the fighting column formation, believing all was over, and were singing as they straggled along. No patrols had been pushed into the recesses of the town. No cavalry had been sent forward beyond. The whole business was slovenly to a degree. The penalty was paid. Suddenly, from a hundred windows and balconies, a vehement fire was poured into the troops straggling along the streets. They were beset on all sides, and had to retreat. One regiment left its packs where they had been taken off in the street. During the retreat, more or less precipitate, about two thousand nine hundred men were lost. One regiment lost nearly two thousand men. The retreating troops witnessed the butchery of their wounded. On the 22nd Prince Schahofskoy received orders to leave in position at Osman Bazar two infantry brigades, and march on Plevna, right across the theatre of war from east to west, with one cavalry brigade and one infantry brigade of his corps. The 30th Division of the 4th Corps, who were crossing the river at Simnitsa, *en route* for Tirnova, were ordered also on Plevna, to stand under Schahofskoy's orders. The 9th Corps, about and in front of Nicopolis, was ordered to co-operate in a combined movement against Plevna. The regiments which suffered in the previous affair clamoured to lead the vanguard of the renewed attack. Riding across the country from the Rustchuk front I overtook Prince Schahofskoy's head-quarters, on the evening of the 28th, in the village of Karajac Bugarski, above twelve miles due east of Plevna. He had marched from the foot of the Balkans in six days. Regiments of infantry streamed through the village in the dusk amid clouds of dust, and tramped on to take up their bivouac for the night on the downs beyond, the cavalry brigade covering the front further in advance. Reconnaissances had been pushed forward, which proved that the work in hand was

no child's play. Plevna was reported to be occupied by the whole of Osman Pacha's army from Widdin, which, strengthened by troops from Sophia, and others coming from the late Montenegrin campaign, was in all believed to be from thirty-five thousand to forty thousand strong. The Turkish intrenchment line ran through a series of villages lying in a semicircular order round Plevna, at a distance from it of about five miles, and touching the river Vid on both flanks. A very strong Turkish advance force was reported at Grivica on the road along which lay Schahofskoy's line of advance. From north to south the villages of the Turkish forepost position were as follows:—Plizitsa, Bukova, Radisovo, Tucenica, and Bogot. Schahofskoy was, as I have said, in the village of Karajac Bugarski. His brother corps commander, Baron Krüdener, was for the night in the village of Kalisovit, on the road from Nicopolis to Plevna, and about eight miles north-west of Schahofskoy's head-quarters. As senior general Krüdener was nominally in chief command of the whole of the operations, but he acted under peremptory instructions from the Grand Duke Nicholas in Tirnova. In the night of the 28th the younger General Skobelev reached Prince Schahofskoy's head-quarters from Tirnova, appointed to the temporary command of the Cosack brigade in the force of the prince. He received instructions to march his brigade to the southward, and occupy, if possible, the town of Loftcha, an important position between Plevna and the Balkans—a hazardous expedition, conducted along the face of a hostile front, and likely to meet with resistance *en route* and also at the point of destination. But Skobelev galloped off with a light heart on this dangerous duty.

... "The night between the 29th and 30th was spent with tents struck and horses saddled, waiting for the order to advance, in anticipation of the commencement of fighting at sunrise; but Baron Krüdener had determined to wait yet a day longer to perfect his dispositions and give the troops, fatigued by severe marching, some



rest. The 30th was therefore spent in inaction, except that the troops were somewhat drawn forward to be within striking distance for the morrow. Tidings came that no more Turkish troops were marching from Plevna on Loftcha, which simplified matters, since fewer troops were required to watch the latter place. A general council of war was held at Poredin on the afternoon of the 30th, at which were present Baron Krüdener, Prince Schahofskoy, and the generals of division and brigades. The colonels of regiments and staff officers waited to receive instructions as to the final dispositions. It was settled that the action should commence next morning at five o'clock by a general concentric advance on the Turkish positions in front of Plevna, and that Prince Schahofskoy and the general staff should move forward at four o'clock. Several aides of the Grand Duke Nicholas arrived, and were detailed to various points to make observations, and after the battle to carry reports of the results back to Tirnova. The gravity of the task before the army was fully recognised, for reconnaissances had proved the Turks to be in greater force than was at first believed. Twenty thousand regulars had come from Widdin. The Turkish positions were known to be strong by nature, and strengthened yet further by art. The night between the 30th and 31st was very wet, and troops did not begin to march forward before six instead of four. The number of infantry combatants was actually about 32,000, with 160 field cannon and three brigades of cavalry. Baron Krüdener was on the right with the whole of the 31st Division in his fighting line, and three regiments of the 5th Division in reserve at Karajac Bugarski. He was to attack in two columns, a brigade in each. On the left was Schahofskoy with a brigade of the 32nd Division and a brigade of the 30th Division in fighting line. Another brigade of the 30th Division was in reserve at Pelisat. The Turkish position was convex, somewhat in horse-shoe shape, but more pointed. Baron Krüdener was to attack the Turkish left flank from Grivica towards the river Vid. Schahofskoy was to as-

sail their right from Radisovo, also towards the river Vid. On the left flank of the attack stood Skobeleff, with a brigade of Cossacks, a battalion of infantry, and a battery, to cope with the Turkish troops on the line from Plevna to Loftcha, and to hinder them from interfering with the development of Schahofskoy's attack. On the right flank stood Lascareff, with a brigade of the 9th Cavalry to guard Krüdener from a counter flank attack.

"The main fault of the dispositions was that Krüdener and Schahofskoy were practically independent of each other, that the two attacks were too far apart, and without a connecting link; but the gravest evil, which did not rest with the commanders on the spot, was the weakness of the assailing force. After the previous reverse nothing should have been left to chance, and it is a tempting of Providence to attack the Turks in a strong defensive position with inferior numbers. The falseness of the economy stands proved to-day, when yesterday's defeat makes the Russian hold in Bulgaria extremely precarious, and must compel the withdrawal of troops from some other point where they are nearly as badly needed, to beat the Turks at Plevna; and beaten they must be, and that speedily, if the risk is to be averted, lest the Russian army be forced to retire ingloriously into the Principalities. Preparation for the infantry was to be made in regular form, but the artillery preparation loses much of its value when delivered against constructed positions spread widely. Krüdener's blunder had given the Turks time to intrench themselves, nor had they neglected the chance.

"The morning was gloomy, which the Russians regarded as a favourable omen. The troops cheered vigorously as they passed the general. Physically there are no finer men in the world. In the pink of hard condition, and marching without packs, carrying only great-coat, haversack with rations, and ammunition, they seemed fit to go anywhere and do anything. Schahofskoy's right column marched over Pelisat and Sgalince. The left column

headed straight for Radisovo. The artillery were pushed forward from the first, and worked independently. Marching forward, we found the cavalry foreposts on the sky-line above Pelisat, and on the sloping downs infantry deployed as they advanced, as the Russian practice is on open ground. The formation was in column of double companies, with rifle company in front of each battalion. The line and rifle companies have the same weapon, the *Kranke*. The rifle company is made up of marksmen whose rifles are sighted up to 1,200 yards, whereas the line is only to 600, the maximum fire-range of the Prussian infantry in the Franco-German war. Krüdener, on the right, opened the action at half-past nine, bringing a battery into fire from the ridge on the Turkish redoubt above the village of Grivica. At first it seemed as if the Turks were surprised. It was some time ere they replied, but then they did so vigorously, and gave quite as good as they got from Krüdener. The objective of Prince Schahofskoy, with whom I rode, was in the first instance Radisovo, and it behoved us therefore to bear away to the left. But before doing so we were for a short time in a position which afforded a wonderful view of the theatre of action.

"Plevna is in the hollow of a valley, lying north and south. The ground which intervened between us and this valley was singularly diversified. Imagine three great solid waves with their faces set edgeways to the valley of Plevna, and therefore end on to us also. The central wave is the widest of the three, and *à cheval* of it are the main Turkish positions, of which there seem three, one behind the other. Although the broadest wave, it is not the highest. The right and left waves are both so high that one on the crest of either can look down across the intervening valleys into the positions of the central wave. But then the Turks are astride of all three waves. The crest of our wave, the ridge above Radisovo, they do not hold in force. Thus far we are fortunate; but on the most northerly wave of the three, that against which Baron Krüdener is operating, and which is

broader and flatter than ours—more like a sloping plateau, if the expression is not a bull—the Turks have intrenched position behind intrenched position. Both on top of this ridge and of the central swell we can discern camps of Turks with tents all standing behind the earthworks. It is clear they don't intend to move if they can help it. Their tents stand as if they had taken a lease of the ground in perpetuity. Baron Krüdener's cannon are in action, not only in front of Grivica, which is the toe of the horseshoe, but against its northern flank also, but the return fire is so heavy that he makes no way, and for the time, at least, is fast held. We try to aid him from the crest of our ridge by bringing a battery into action against the Grivica earthwork, but the traverse of the redoubt is so high that we do no harm. We of the left column have our own business to attend to, and so we leave our casual outlook place among the plum trees and move on in the direction of Radisovo.

"This village lies in a deep valley behind the southern wave or ridge of the Turkish position, and there is another ridge behind this valley. On that ridge our cannon, placed by Colonel Bischofsky, chief of Prince Schahofskoy's staff, were firing in line on the Turkish guns on the ridge beyond the valley, with fine effect. The infantry went down into the valley under this covering fire and I accompanied the column. We carried Radisovo with a trivial skirmish, for in the village there was only a handful of *Bashi-Bazouks*, who, standing their ground, were promptly bayoneted. The Russian infantry remained under cover of the village. I returned up the slope to our batteries. These, firing with great rapidity and accuracy, soon compelled the Turkish cannon to quit the opposite height. During the last spurt of this firing Prince Schahofskoy rode along the rear of our batteries, from the right to the left, under a fire which killed two horses in our little group. Our cannon playing on the Turkish guns on the opposite ridge quelled their fire after about half an hour's cannonade, and it was then practicable for our batteries to cross the valley passing through Radisovo and come



into action in the position vacated by the Turkish guns; and following them our infantry also descended into the hollow, and lay down in the glades about the village, and on the steep slope behind our guns in action.

"Presently we had five batteries ranged right along the crest of the ridge beyond Radisovo, directing a converging fire on the Turkish guns on the central wave or ridge beyond. Notwithstanding the exposed position of these batteries, their fire was heavy and steady. The row of cannon in action reminded me of the German batteries on the crest of Verneville on the day of Gravelotte, only that the Germans had ninety cannon engaged and we had but forty. The staff awaited the result of the preparatory cannonade on the ridge behind Radisovo. I went forward again and got up to where our batteries were in action, and there lay down. On the way I passed through Radisovo, into which were falling many Turkish shells, which flew over the ridge occupied by our cannon. It was passing strange to witness peasant villagers standing in bewildered groups in front of their houses while shells were crashing into the place, while the children played unconcernedly about the dust-heaps, and enjoyed themselves without misgiving as to danger. For once Bellona was gracious to non-combatants. Not a single villager was injured by the shell fire, although several hundred shells must have fallen in the village. From my point of vantage with our batteries I could look right down into the Turkish positions. Four batteries were defending the earthwork about the little village which seemed to me to be the foremost of their fixed and constructed positions on the central ridge. It stood on a little knoll, and was well placed for searching with its fire the valleys by which it could be approached. Beyond were more, and yet more, earthworks right to the edge of the broad valley, where the roofs and church-towers of Plevna sparkled in the sunshine from out a circle of verdure. The place had an aspect of serenity strangely contrasting with the turmoil of the cannon fire raging in front of it. It seemed so near that a short ride

would have brought me there to breakfast, yet ere we could reach it many men were to die. Men were dropping fast around me in the battery already, for the guns were greatly exposed and the Turkish practice was mostly very good.

"By this time, one o'clock, our infantry had nowhere been engaged. The operations hitherto were confined to the artillery. Krüdener on the right flank had scarcely progressed at all, and his co-operation in a simultaneously combined attack on both flanks was indispensable to success. Would that Schahofskoy had but acted on a full recognition of this fact, which the obvious strength of the Turkish positions should have impressed on him. Krüdener had gained much less ground than we. He seemed little farther forward than at the commencement, whereas we were at comparatively close quarters, and within striking distance. Krüdener was behind, either because his attack was not pushed energetically, or because he was encountering obstacles with which we had not met. Now Krüdener is regarded as a slow soldier and an unenergetic man. We swore at what seemed his inertness, but it was not swearing only. Schahofskoy, in his impatience, determined to act independently, and strike the Turks single-handed. If Krüdener was slow, Schahofskoy was rash. If the whole force was too small for the work, how much more so was one-half that force? Fearful was the retribution exacted for that error of judgment. About half-past two the second period of the battle commenced. To ascertain whether the artillery had sufficiently prepared the way for the infantry to act Schahofskoy and his staff rode on to the ridge where our batteries were firing, and had to dismount precipitately under a hurricane of shell-fire which the Turkish gunners directed against the little group. A long and anxious inspection seemed to satisfy Schahofskoy and the chief of his staff that the time had come when the infantry could strike with effect. This conclusion was arrived at in the face of the fact that we of the left flank attack had but three brigades all told, one of which constituted the reserve. In other words,

we were about to launch ten or twelve thousand men against commanding intrenched positions held by an immensely superior force, and no whit crushed by our preliminary artillery fire. I will now quit criticism for narrative.

"Two brigades of infantry were lying down in the Radisovo valley, behind the guns; the 32nd Division—General Schekoff's brigade—on the right, the 1st Brigade of the 30th Division on the left. The leading battalions were ordered to rise up and advance over the ridge to attack. The order was hailed with glad cheers, for the infantrymen had been chafing at their inaction, and the battalions, with a swift, swinging step, streamed forward through the glen and up the steep slope beyond, marching in company columns, the rifle companies leading. The artillery heralded this movement with increased rapidity of fire, which was maintained to cover and aid the infantrymen when the latter had crossed the crest and were descending the slope and crossing the intervening valley to the assault of the Turkish position. Just before reaching the crest the battalions deployed into line at the double, and crossed it in this formation, breaking to pass through the intervals between the guns. The Turkish shells whistled through them as they advanced in line, and men were already down in numbers, but the long undulating line steadily tramps over the stubbles of the ridge, and crashes through the under-growth on the descent beyond. No skirmishing line is thrown out in advance. The fighting line remains the formation for a time, till, what with impatience and what with men falling, it breaks into a ragged spray of humanity, and surges on swiftly, loosely, and with no close cohesion. The supports are close up, and run up into the fighting line independently and eagerly. It is a veritable chase of fighting men impelled by a burning desire to get forward and come to close quarters with the enemy firing at them there from behind the shelter of the epaulement.

"Presently all along the face of the advancing infantrymen burst forth flaring volleys of musketry fire. The jagged line springs onward

through the maize fields, gradually assuming a concave shape. The Turkish position is neared. The roll of rifle fire is incessant, yet dominated by the fiercer and louder turmoil of the artillery above. The ammunition waggons galloped up to the cannon with fresh fuel for the fire. The guns redouble the energy of their cannonade. The crackle of the musketry fire rises into a sharp continuous peal. The clamour of the hurrahs of the fighting men comes back to us on the breeze, making the blood tingle with the excitement of the fray. A village is blazing on the left. The fell fury of the battle has entered on its maddest paroxysm. The supports that had remained behind lying just under the crest of the slope are pushed forward over the brow of the hill. The wounded begin to trickle back over the ridge. We can see the dead and the more severely wounded lying where they fell on the stubbles and amid the maize. The living wave of fighting men is pouring over them ever on and on. The gallant gunners to the right and to the left of us stand to their work with a will on the shell-swept ridge. The Turkish cannon-fire begins to waver in that earthwork over against us. More supports stream down with a louder cheer into the Russian fighting line. Suddenly the disconnected men are drawn together. We can discern the officers signalling for the concentration by the waving of their swords. The distance is about a hundred yards. There is a wild rush, headed by the colonel of one of the regiments of the 32nd Division. The Turks in the shelter trench hold their ground, and fire steadily, and with terrible effect, into the advancing forces. The colonel's horse goes down, but the colonel is on his feet in a second, and, waving his sword, leads his men forward on foot. But only for a few paces. He staggers and falls. I heard afterwards that he was killed.

"We can hear the tempest-gust of wrath, half howl, half yell, with which his men, bayonets at the charge, rush on to avenge him. They are over the parapet and shelter trench, and in among the Turks like an avalanche. Not many Turks got a chance to run away from the gleaming bay-



onets swayed by muscular Russian arms. The outer edge of the first position is won. The Russians are bad skirmishers. They despise cover, and give and take fire out in the open. They disdained to utilise against the main position the cover afforded by the parapet of this shelter trench, but pushed on in broken order up the bare slope. In places they hung a little, for the infantry fire from the Turks was very deadly, and the slope was strewn with the fallen dead and wounded; but for the most part they advanced nimbly enough. Yet it took them half an hour from the shelter trench before they again converged and made their final rush at the main earthwork. This time the Turks did not wait for the bayonet points, but with one final volley abandoned the work. We watched their huddled mass in the gardens and vineyard behind the position, cramming the narrow track between the trees to gain the shelter of their batteries in the rear of the second position.

"So fell the first position of the Turks. Being a village, it afforded ample cover, and Schahofskoy would have acted wisely had he been content to hold it and strengthen it till Krüdener, on his right, should have carried the Grivica earthwork, and come up in line with him. But the Grand Cross of St. George dangled before his eyes, and tempted him to rashness. Krüdener was clearly jammed. The Turks were fighting furiously, and were in unexpected force on that broad central ridge of theirs, as well as against Krüdener. The first position in natural as in artificial strength was child's play to the grim starkness of the second on that isolated mamelon there with the batteries on the swell behind it. But Schahofskoy determined to go for it, and his troops were not the men to balk him. The word was again 'Forward!' The first rush, however, was out of them. Many must have been blown. They hung a good deal in the advance, exposing themselves recklessly, and falling fast, but not progressing with much speed. It is a dangerous time when troops sullenly stand still and doggedly fire when the stationary fit is on them. Wyndham knew what it meant, and

gnashed his teeth in rage over it when the fate of the Redan hung in the balance which one rush would have turned for us.

"Schahofskoy kept his finger well on the throbbing pulse of battle. Just in the nick of time half his reserve brigade was thrown into the fight immediately below us, while the other half took part in the attack more on our flank. The new blood tells at once. There is a move forward, and no more standing and craning over the fence. The Turks on the flank in the earthwork are reinforced. I had noticed some Turkish officers on horseback, standing coolly behind the bank of the vineyard that serves as a parapet to the prolongation. They ride off and speedily return, with an addition to the defending force. I can hardly say how it all happens, but all of a sudden the white smoke spurts forth all along the lip of the epaulement, and swarms of dark-clothed men are scrambling on to it. There is evidently a short but sharp struggle. Then one sees a swarm of men flying across the green stretch of the vineyard. But they don't go far, and prowl along the western and northern faces of the work, rendering its occupation very precarious. The Turkish cannon from behind drop shells into it with singular precision. As a matter of fact, the Russians carried, indeed, this the second position of the Turks, but never held it. It was all but empty for a long time, and continuous fighting took place about its flanks. About six the Turks pressed forward a heavy mass of infantry for its recapture. Schahofskoy took a bold step, sending two batteries down into the first position he had taken to keep them in check. But the Turks were not to be denied, and in spite of the most determined fighting of the Russians, had re-occupied their second position before seven. The first brigade of the 30th Division had early inclined to the left, in the direction where the towers and houses of Plevna were visible. It was rash, for the brigade was exposing its right flank to the Turkish cannon astride of the central ridge, but the goal of Plevna was a keen temptation. There was no thoroughfare, however. They would not give

up, and they could not succeed. They charged again and again; and when they could charge no more from sheer fatigue, they stood and died, for they would not retire. The reserves came up, but only to swell the slaughter. And then the ammunition failed, for the carts had been left far behind, and all hope failed the most sanguine, as the sun sank in lurid glory behind the smoke-mantled field. Two companies of Russian infantry did indeed work round the right flank of the Turkish works, and dodge into the town of Plevna; but it was like entering the mouth of hell. On the heights all around the cannon smoke spurted out, and the vineyard in the rear of the town was alive with Turks. They left after a very short visit, and now all hope of success anywhere was dead, nor did a chance offer to make the best of the defeat. Schahofskoy had not a man left to cover the retreat. The Turks struck at us without stint. They had the upper hand for once, and were determined to show that they knew how to make the most of it. They advanced in swarms through the dusk on their original first position, and recaptured the three cannon the Russians had previously taken before these could be withdrawn. The Turkish shells began once more to whistle over the ridge above Radisovo and fall into the village behind, now crammed with wounded. The streams of wounded wending their painful way over the ridge were incessant. The badly wounded mostly lay where they fell. Later in the darkness a baleful sort of Krankenträger swarmed over the battle-field in the shape of Bashi-Bazouks, who smote and spared not. Lingered there on the ridge till the moon rose, the staff could hear from down below on the still night air the cries of pain, the entreaties for mercy, and the yells of blood-thirsty fanatical triumph. It was indeed an hour to wring the sternest heart. We stayed there longing to learn, if it might be, what troops were coming out of the valley of the shadow of death below. Were there indeed any at all to come? It did not seem as if it were so. The Turks had our range before dark, and we could watch the flash of flame over against us,

and then listen to the scream of the shell as it tore by us. The whizzing of rifle bullets was incessant, and the escort and the retreating wounded were often struck. A detachment of cavalry at length began to come straggling up to take over from the staff the forepost duty on the ridge; but it will give an idea of the disorganization to say, that when a company was told off to cover somewhat the wounded in Radisovo, it had to be made up of the men of several regiments.

"About nine o'clock the staff quitted the ridge, leaving it littered with groaning men, and moving gently lest we should tread on the prostrate wounded. We soon lost our way as we had lost our army. We could find no rest for the soles of our feet, by reason of the alarms of the Bashi-Bazouks swarming in among the scattered and retiring Russians. At length at one in the morning, having been in the saddle since six on the previous morning, we turned into a stubble-field, and, making beds of the reaped grain, commander, correspondent, and Cossack, alike rested under the canopy of heaven. But we were not even then allowed to rest. Before four an alarm came that the Bashi-Bazouks were upon us, and we had to rouse and tramp away. The only protection of the chief of what in the morning was a fine army was now a handful of wearied Cossacks. About the Bashi-Bazouks there is worse to tell. At night they worked round into Radisovo, and, falling upon the wounded there, butchered them without mercy.

"Krüdener sent word in the morning that he had lost severely, and could make no headway, and had resolved to fall back on the line of the river Osma, which falls into the Danube near Nicopolis. There had been a talk, his troops being fresh, of renewing the attack to-day with his co-operation; but it is a plain statement of fact that we have no troops to attack with. The most moderate estimate is that we have lost two regiments—say five thousand men—out of our three brigades; a ghastly number, beating Eylau or Friedland. This takes no account of Krüdener's losses."



The whole Russian force now fell back upon the Osma river, not only for the purpose of recovering from the rude blow which it had sustained in this desperate second attack upon Plevna, but also with the object of covering Nicopolis and Sistova, and the communications from thence to Tirnova. It was evident that the utmost danger existed for Russia in the presence of such a powerful army as that of Osman Pasha on their right flank. Their line of attack was so extended, and at certain points so weak, that it was impossible not to recognise the possibility of its being broken at any moment by the victorious Turkish commander. Even before the battle of the 31st, Osman Pacha had pushed forward in the direction of Tirnova, and captured the town of Loftcha, or Lovatz, previously occupied by the invaders. A subsequent attack upon Selvi was repulsed; but with Plevna and Loftcha in their hands the Turks held out a perpetual menace to the Russian armies.

In fact, the whole plan of the campaign was altered by this vigorous and timely action of Osman Pacha. He alone, there can be little doubt, prevented the enemy from advancing again, with irresistible force, through the Passes so gallantly won by General Gourko, and anticipating, by several months, the conclusion of the war. If Osman had been beaten and his army dispersed, or if he could have been driven back into Widdin, and there masked by a sufficient detachment, the Russians might have pushed along the Orkhanie road, and assaulted or invested Sophia, thus turning the Balkans before the approach of winter. Or they might have sent a large force into the Schipka Pass, and transferred the centre of operations at once into Southern Bulgaria. It was the same day, the 31st of July, which saw the defeat of General Krüdener at Plevna and the repulse of General Gourko at Eski Zaghra by overwhelming numbers. The success of Krüdener on this occasion might not have been too late to reverse the state of affairs in the Balkan Passes; but if Osman could have been anticipated at Plevna, and held in check, Gourko would never have

been left with his small force to bear the brunt of the combined armies of Suleiman and Reouf Pashas.

As it was, the invaders were threatened on both flanks, for Mehemet Ali began to show signs of great activity on their left. Beyond the force of the czarewitch, on the Lom, and the advanced divisions of Tirnova and the Balkans, the Russians had scarcely any troops in Bulgaria except those which had just been so severely handled at Plevna. The bulk of these fell back on Bulgareni, between Plevna and Biela; and it now remained for the grand duke and his staff to consider how the situation might be improved, and the army rescued from the imminent danger to which it was exposed.

Mr. Archibald Forbes, whose account of the battle of Plevna we have quoted above, and who was well placed for learning as much as could be learnt of the Russian feelings and plans, sums up the results of the disaster in a letter from Bucharest, dated the 3rd of August.

"The battle in front of Plevna has without doubt wrought a *bouleversement* in the Russian position and prospects of a character almost unique in the history of modern warfare. How bright seemed the Russian military future this day week! Gourko stretching out his arm almost within clutching distance of Adrianople; the czarewitch waiting but the word from Tirnova to cast a girdle of stalwart soldiers and solid earthworks around Rustchuk; Schahofskoy and Krüdener, in the full expectation of wiping out the slur of Schilder's failure at Plevna; Zimmermann swaggering at his will about Eastern Bulgaria, threatening Silistria, sending a reconnaissance in force toward Varna, and within a few marches of giving the hand to the right flank of the army of the czarewitch, when that army should have invested Rustchuk. One bad day, or rather six hours' hard but disastrous fighting, and, lo! the scene changes; the sunshine is overcast by black clouds; the advantages of the Russians crumble like burnt-out tinder; the grim question confronts them, whether their position is not so dangerously compromised as to create

disquietude for their mere safety. Devise what scheme of action they may, any and every disposition opens up a new danger. Do the broken forces of Schahofskoy and Krüdener remain unstrengthened on the line of the lower Osma, or strengthened but by the other division of the 4th Corps, with intent to cover Sistova, and the all-important single link there between Bulgaria and the Principalities—the bridge between Simnitza and the Turkish town opposite? Beaten disorganised, and weakened, there can be no certainty that this force is able to withstand the Turks advancing in force against it, and the result of another battle that should go against the Russians would be the clearance for the Turks of the road to Sistova, and the absolute severance of the whole Russian force in Bulgaria from its base in Roumania. Do the Turks in Plevna and Loftcha prefer rather to march against Tirnova, co-operating with Mehemet Ali Pacha's army of Shumla, already known to have strong advanced detachments about Osman Bazar? There is not a Russian battalion between Loftcha and Tirnova, and in the latter place there is a mere handful of the fag end of the 8th Corps, now partly in, partly through the Balkans. All the Russian force that stands between Osman Bazar and Tirnova is a weak infantry division, General Ernrot's, the 11th Division of the 11th Corps, with a cavalry brigade of the same corps. Isolated, and with its line of retreat compromised, what stand could this force be expected to make? And with Osman Pacha and Mehemet Ali shaking hands together in Tirnova, or indeed with either of them there alone, what is the plight of the 8th Corps and Gourko's people, jammed in the Balkans or dispersed in reckless raids on the farther side? Cut off from their line of retreat, it would only remain for these forces to draw together into the Balkans and hold out in the hope of succour coming in the shape of fresh troops fighting their way up from the Danube. Men aver that it is possible for Radetzky and Gourko to hold out for a month; if so, all the luckier for them. . .

"The fact is, that to have any assurance of

safety in Bulgaria now, the Russians require there two more army corps. They are in the position of a man who is urgently pressed for five pounds, and has only about three pounds ten in his pocket, without the chance of opportune borrowing. They are borrowing, it is true. They have brought the Roumanian division under Manu up into the line of the Lom; and I hear they are pressing for the other Roumanian division now in fighting trim either to create a diversion at Widdin, or to march on Nicopolis, and cross there into the Bulgarian theatre of war. Of course there is for the present a total cessation of offensive operations on the part of the Russians on this side of the Balkans—we do not know what is happening on the other side; but probably paralysis prevails there also, and I believe that what is regarded as the least evil has been chosen, the withdrawal of troops from the Rustchuk army to operate against Plevna. The truth is, Plevna must be taken, and Osman Pacha's army must be beaten. That is an absolute *sine quâ non* to the continued stay of the Russians on the other side of the Danube. The Grand Duke Nicholas has left Biela for the Osma, and will himself command in the pending operations, the preparations for which must consume some time."

The Russian prospect was to become darker before it could become brighter; and we must turn once more to the Schipka Pass and the army of the Lom in order to understand to what a depth the fortunes of the invaders appeared to have fallen during the summer of 1877. Weary months were to pass before the invaders could regain the confidence which they had felt in July.

## CHAPTER XXII.

### THE DEFENCE OF THE SCHIPKA PASS.

It would have been surprising indeed if the Turks had overlooked the fact of the Russian



peril, but still more surprising if, having perceived that their enemies were practically at their mercy, they had failed to take advantage of it. And yet it is at one or other of these conclusions that we are forced to arrive on reviewing the events of August. That the Russians were in great difficulties there can be no doubt whatever. All Europe saw it, and the Russians themselves admitted it. They were obliged to call in the assistance of the Roumanian army, and to bring up large reinforcements of their own, including the regiments of the guards. They were entangled in an angle, between the Lom and the Widdin-Plevna-Loftcha line, with Suleiman Pasha at the apex, ready to co-operate with Osman and Mehemet Ali, and with the two latter generals threatening to join hands in their rear, and thus completely surround them.

Every looker-on at the war was expecting that the Turks would form some vigorous combination, whereby all their armies might assume the offensive at the same moment, with a fair prospect of overwhelming the enemy, or at least of forcing him to withdraw across the Danube, and thus gaining a respite for the remainder of the year. No doubt such an attempt would have been a desperate one; but the circumstances of the Turkish empire were altogether desperate, and the choice was between victory in the field and national collapse.

No such combination was effected, and the chance had passed away before anything of the kind was undertaken. It is true that there was a good deal of severe fighting in August, and that the Turks were the assailants in almost every instance; but their attacks were desultory and isolated, and the Russians proved strong enough to resist them at almost every point. Thus, on the 19th of August—nearly three weeks after the Russian defeat at Plevna—Suleiman Pasha made a series of most vigorous attempts to regain possession of the Schipka Pass. On the 22nd an attack was made on Selvi, a few miles west of Tirnova. On the 29th Mehemet Ali drove the Russians across the Lom, and a week later he pushed still further forward near Kacel-

jevo. On the 31st Osman Pasha made an unsuccessful sortie from Plevna. But it is very doubtful whether even the last two movements were preconcerted. If they were, they ought to have been made at an earlier period, and certainly they ought to have coincided with the efforts of Suleiman Pasha in the Schipka Pass. The opportunity of the Turks came early in the month of August, in the flush of their victories at Eski Zaghra and Plevna, and at a time when the Russians were very much discouraged. Yet nearly two-thirds of the month were virtually wasted before a blow was struck.

It was on the 2nd day of August that General Gourko retreated into the Schipka Pass. Suleiman Pasha did not occupy the village of Schipka until the 19th, and did not open his attack on the Russian positions until the 21st.

Meanwhile the Russians had not maintained a very large force in the Pass. At the moment of Suleiman's first attack there were not more than three thousand men in Schipka and the various fortified positions commanding the mountain road. Some forty guns had been mounted, and the Russians clearly intended to defend the gate of Southern Bulgaria to the last extremity; but they relied on the difficulty of the position more than on a large number of defenders, and felt confident of their ability to call up reinforcements from Gabrova and Tirnova as soon as the necessity might present itself.

The same hard fate befell the unhappy Bulgarian families of Kezanlik and the surrounding districts which had already befallen the places first occupied and then abandoned by the invaders; and nowhere was there afforded a more painful illustration of Turkish animosity, or rather of the brutality of the Turkish irregulars and mercenaries, than at Gabrova itself. Hither, from the moment of General Gourko's retreat across the Balkans, a continuous stream of fugitives, of every age and sex, had poured in from the southern side of the mountains, where towns and villages and farms had been laid waste by the Bashi-Bazouks and Circassians. The hapless inhabitants had been driven, for the most part

utterly without resources, through the position held by their would-be deliverers, and down the northern slopes. Between Gabrova and Tirnova, wherever the refuge of sheds or trees could be obtained, or where exhausted nature compelled them to end their panic-stricken flight, these unfortunate wretches were encamped along the roadside—not the least of their sufferings being the fear that their oppressors would presently drive the Russians before them, and repeat the cruelties to which they had already been subjected. The sight of these fugitives greeted the Russian reinforcements as they came up from Tirnova, and naturally served to incite the soldiers to guard at all hazards these helpless and guiltless victims of war.

General Radetzky was in command of the foremost divisions of the Russian army—Gourko having gone to the frontier of Roumania in order to place himself at the head of his own regiment of mounted guards. The czar's head-quarters were at Gorny Studen, whither he had come from Biela so as to be present at the preparations for the renewed attack on Plevna; and the Grand Duke Nicholas was with him at the time when Suleiman Pasha gave indications of his intention to attempt the crossing of the Balkans.

On the 16th of August Suleiman despatched a column to the Hainkoi Pass, by which Gourko had in the first instance made his way into Southern Bulgaria. The attack was so far successful that it reached the middle of the defile; but there it was effectually checked. The Russians had made good use of their time during the previous three weeks, and had mounted a number of heavy guns in favourable positions; so that, as soon as the Turkish column advanced within their range, it was severely punished for its temerity, and was compelled to beat a hasty retreat.

Suleiman then devoted his attention to the Schipka Pass, which he had probably from the first intended to make the scene of his principal efforts. Fresh from the forcing of the Duga Pass, and the invasion of Montenegro, he may have been disposed to think that his men were

specially suited for, or inured to this mode of warfare; and no doubt his forty battalions included the bulk of the nizams whom he had brought with him to Enos. But the Schipka Pass, if not so long as the Duga, is in some ways more difficult; it was strongly defended by artillery, whereas the Montenegrins had scarcely any; and the Russian troops, though not more chivalrous or hardy than the mountaineers, were more skilled, better disciplined, and better led. Amongst them were the remains of the Bulgarian legion; but there were three battalions of the Russian 9th Division to begin with, and all the reinforcements who were afterwards brought up were the pick of the regulars—Dragomiroff's brigade of the 8th Corps, Mirsky's brigade of the same corps, and the rifle brigade which accompanied Gourko in his famous march. These were hurried up, in the lightest marching order, to the relief of the hard-pressed defenders of the pass, and flung themselves almost breathless, footsore and hungry, into Fort St. Nicholas and its surrounding positions.

According to Mr. Forbes, the Schipka Pass is not a pass at all in the proper sense of the term. "There is no gorge, no defile; there is no spot where 300 men could make a new Thermopylæ; no deep-scored trench as in the Kyber Pass, where an army might be annihilated without coming to grips with its adversary. It has its name simply because at this point there happens to be a section of the Balkans of less than the average height, the surface of which, from the Jantra Valley on the north to the Tundja Valley on the south, is sufficiently continuous, although having an extremely broken and serrated contour, to afford a foothold for a practicable track; for the Balkans generally present a wild jumble of mountain and glen, neither having any continuity. Under such circumstances, such a crossing-place as the Schipka Pass affords is a god-send, although, under other circumstances, a road over it would be regarded as impossible. What was a mere track is now a really good and practicable, although steep, high road. The ground on either side of the ridge is depressed sometimes



into shallow hollows, sometimes into cavernous gorges; but these lateral depressions are broken, and have no continuity, otherwise they would clearly afford a better track for a road than the high ground above.

"The highest peak is flanked on either side behind the lateral depressions by a mountainous spur higher than itself, and therefore commanding it, and having as well the command of the ridge behind. The higher one, that is to say, the westmost of these two spurs, can rake the road leading up to the Russian positions. These spurs break off abruptly and precipitously on their northern edge, and therefore afford no access into the valley north of the Balkans. Their sole use to the Turks, therefore, was in affording positions whence to flank the central Schipka ridge. It is practicable also for troops to descend from them, struggle across the intervening glens, and, climbing up the steep slopes of the Schipka ridge, give the hand to each other on the road which runs along its backbone to its summit. This done, the Schipka position would of course be turned, but such an advantage would be of little avail till the road had been opened by carrying the fortified positions on it. Without the command of the road an enemy might indeed send bands down the road on to which he scrambled, into the lower country about Gaborova, to burn and plunder, but I repeat that the road over the Schipka constitutes for an army the only practicable line of communication in this division of the Balkans. Much has been said of the strength of the Schipka position. In these opinions I do not concur. It seems to me that unless strongly held, with wide extending arms of defence, it is easy to be attacked, and very difficult to be held with any security. The strength of a position does not depend wholly on its elevation, or even on its difficulties of access to a direct attack, but on the clear range around it which its fire can sweep, and its ability to concentrate its fire on critical points. Herein lies the defect of the Schipka as a defensive position. It cannot search with its fire the jumble of lateral valleys and reverse slopes which

hem it in. A brigade of light infantry might mass in a hollow within one hundred yards of the Russian first position without exposing itself to the artillery fire of that position."

A long telegraphed account of the assault and defence of the Schipka Pass, by the same hand, appeared in the columns of the "Daily News," and was read with the deepest interest at the time. It has not yet been superseded by any better or more authentic narrative, and is too interesting to be paraphrased into less graphic and nervous words. The letter is dated from the Schipka Pass, August 24th.

"The Turks began the attack on the 21st, pushing on directly up the steeps above the village of Schipka. The Russian garrison in the works of the pass then consisted of the Bulgarian Legion and one regiment of the 9th Division, both weakened by previous hard fighting, and probably reckoning little more than three thousand bayonets, with about forty cannon. No supports were nearer than Tirnova, a distance of forty miles—a grave omission. The garrison fought hard and hindered the Turks from gaining any material advantage, though the latter forced the outer line of the Russian shelter trenches on the slopes below the position of Mount St. Nicholas, the highest peak of the Schipka crossing. The Russians had laid mines in front of their trenches, which were exploded just as the head of the Turkish assaulting parties were massed above them, and it is reported that a large number of Moslems were blown up into the air in fragments. The loss to the Russians on the first day's attack was but two hundred, chiefly of the Bulgarian Legion. On the second day, the 22nd, the fighting was not heavy, the Turks being engaged in making a wide turning movement on the right and left flanks of the Russian position, and these attacks were next day developed with great fierceness and pertinacity.

"Yesterday the Turks assailed the Russian position on the front and flanks, and drove in the defenders from their outlying ground. The radical defects of the position became painfully

apparent—its narrowness, its exposure, its liability to be outflanked and isolated. Fortunately reinforcements had arrived, which averted the mischief which had otherwise, to my thinking, imminently impended. Stoletoff hit his hardest, and a right good fighting man he is, full of energy and force after four long days of intense mental and physical strain; but he could not perform impossibilities with thirty thousand men thundering on his front and flanks. But there had come to him, swiftly marching from Selvi, a brigade of the 9th Division, commanded by a valiant soldier, General Derozinski, and this timely succour had been of value to Stoletoff. The fight lasted all day, and at length, as the sun grew lower, the Turks had so worked round on both the Russian flanks that it seemed as though the claws of the crab were about momentarily to close behind the Russians, and that the Turkish columns climbing either face of the Russian ridge would give a hand to each other on the road in the rear of the Russian position.

"The moment was dramatic with an intensity to which the tameness of civilian life can furnish no parallel. The two Russian generals, expecting momentarily to be environed, had sent, between the closing jaws of the crab, a last telegram to the czar, telling what they expected, how they had tried to prevent it, and how that, please God, driven into their positions and beset, they would hold these till reinforcements should arrive. At all events, they and their men would hold their ground to the last drop of their blood.

"It was six o'clock; there was a lull in the fighting, of which the Russians could take no advantage, since the reserves were all engaged. The grimed, sun-blistered men were beaten out with heat, fatigue, hunger and thirst. There had been no cooking for three days, and there was no water within the Russian lines. The poor fellows lay panting on the bare ridge, reckless that it was swept by the Turkish rifle fire. Others doggedly fought on down among the rocks, forced to give ground, but doing so grimly and sourly. The cliffs and valleys send back the triumphant Turkish shouts of 'Allah il Allah.'

"The two Russian generals were on the peak which the first position half encloses. Their glasses anxiously scanned the visible glimpses of the steep brown road leading up there from the Jantra valley, through thick copses of sombre green, and yet more sombre dark rock. Stoletoff cries aloud in sudden access of excitement, clutches his brother general by the arm, and points down the pass. The head of a long black column was plainly visible against the reddish-brown bed of the road. 'Now God be thanked!' says Stoletoff, solemnly. Both generals bare their heads. The troops spring to their feet. They descry the long black serpent coiling up the brown road. Through the green copses a glint of sunshine flashes, banishes the sombreness, and dances on the glittering bayonets.

"Such a gust of Russian cheers whirls and eddies among the mountain tops that the Turkish war cries are wholly drowned in the glad welcome which the Russian soldiers sent to the comrades coming to help them. Some time elapses. The head of the column draws near the Karaula, and is on the little plateau in front of the khan. But they are mounted men. The horses are easily discernible. Has Radetzky, then, been so left to himself, or so hard pushed, that he has sent cavalry to cope with infantry among the precipices of the Balkans? Be they what they may, they carry a tongue that can speak, for on the projection to the right of the khan a mountain battery has just come into action against the Turkish artillery on the wooded ridge, by the occupation of which the Turks are flanking the right of the Russian position. There are no riders on the horses now, and they are on their way down hill. But a column of Russian infantry are on the swift tramp up-hill till they get within firing distance of the Turks on the right, and then they break, scatter, and from behind every stone and bush spurt white jets of smoke.

"It is a battalion of the Rifle Brigade, hurried up on Cossack ponies. The brigade itself is not three kilometres behind, and it is a rifle brigade that needs no more fighting in the Balkans to



link its name with the great mountain chain. It is the same rifle brigade which followed General Gourko in his victorious advance and chequered retreat. The brigade has marched fifty-five kilometres straight on end without cooking or sleeping, and now is in action without so much as a breathing halt. Such is the stuff of which thorough good soldiers are made. Their general, the gallant Radetzky, accompanies them, and pushes an attack on the enemy's position on that wooded ridge on the Russian right. But Radetzky, who himself brought up the tirailleurs, and so at the least reckoning saved the day, marches on up the road with his staff at his back, runs the triple gauntlet of the Turkish rifle fire, and joins the other two generals on the peak hard by the batteries of the first position. As senior and highest officer present, he at once took command, complimenting General Stoletoff, whom he relieved, on the excellence of his dispositions and stubbornness of defence.

"In the night the renewed attempt to carry the Turkish positions threatening the right flank might well have been spared. But it was felt that there was no safety, far less elbow-room, for the Russians, until the Turks should be driven off that dominating wooded ridge looming so ugly on the right flank. The left flank, which the Turks assailed the previous day, was now comparatively safe. So to-day's fighting began at daybreak with a renewed attack of the Russians on the position specified. The Bulgarian peasant boys displayed singular gallantry in the same work as that in which the despised Indian bheestie has so often done good service to our soldiers, by going down into the actual battle, right into the first line, with stone crocks full of water for the fighting men. This water was fetched from far in the rear, along a bullet-swept road—for there is no water on the position itself. One lad had his crock smashed by a bullet as he passed me, and he wept, not for joy at his fortunate escape, but for sorrow at the loss of the article which enabled him to be of service.

"The fighting hung very much in the valley, and the reinforcements of the 9th Division sent

down affected not much perceptible good. About nine Dragomiroff arrived with two regiments of the 2nd Brigade of his own division. The Podolsk regiment, he left in reserve near the khan; with the Jitomer regiment, he marched up the road to the first position. There was no alternative but to traverse that fearfully-dangerous road, for the lower broken ground on its left was impracticable, and reported besides to be swarming with Bashi-Bazouks. The Jitomer men lost heavily while making this promenade, and having reached the peak, found no safe shelter, for the Turkish rifle fire was coming from two quarters simultaneously. So the infantry were stowed away till wanted in the ditch of the redoubt. Radetzky and his staff remained on the slope of the peak, and here Dragomiroff joined, and was welcomed by his chief.

"The firing in the valley waxed and waned fitfully as the morning wore on to near noon. The Turks were very strongly established in their thickly-wooded position, and there was an evident intention on their part to work round their left and edge in across the narrowed throat of the valley towards our rear. About eleven the firing in the valley swelled in volume. It was almost wholly musketry fire, be it remembered. Taking off my white hat I crept up to the edge of the ridge and looked down upon the scene below. The Russians had their tirailleurs in among the trees of the Turkish slope, leaving the bare ground behind strewn with killed and wounded. The ambulance men were behaving admirably, picking up the wounded under the hottest fire, and indeed not a few were themselves among the wounded. As to the progress of the Russians in the wood little could be seen, the cover was so thick, but it was clear that the battle waged to and fro, now the Russians, now the Turks gaining ground. Occasionally the Russians at some point would be hurled clean back out of the wood altogether, and with my glass I could mark the Turks following them eagerly to its edge, and lying down while pouring out a galling fire. It seemed an even match; the Turks and Russians alike accepted valiantly the

chances of battle. The Russian *tirailleurs*, finely-trained skirmishers, looked out dexterously for cover, and the Turks displayed fine skirmishing ability, but the soldiers of the Brianski line regiment were not so fortunate in finding cover. There was clearly no thought among them of quailing, but they stood up in the open as I have seen our Guards do in a sham fight, and took what came. As a natural result, this fine regiment showed the greatest proportion of casualties.

"There is something terrible in a fight in a wood. You can see nothing save an occasional flash of dark colour among the sombre foliage, and the white clouds of smoke rising above it like soap bubbles. Hoarse cries come back to you on the wind from out the mysterious inferno. How is it to go? Are the strong-backed Muscovites, with these ready bayonet points of theirs, to end the long drawn-out fight with one short, impetuous, irresistible rush; or are the more lissom Turks to drive the northern adversaries out of the wood backwards into the fire-blistered open? Who can tell? . . .

"The fire rages still. The mad clamour of the battle still surges up and around into the serene blue heavens. Wounded men come staggering out from among the swarthy trunks and sit down in a heap, or crawl on to the ambulance men. I leave the edge of the ridge soon after eleven, and pick my way up towards the peak, on the slope of which the generals and staff are surveying the scene. The bullets here are singing like a nest of angry wasps. One bullet strikes on the right knee General Dragomiroff, who has been standing calmly in the face of the fire, looking down upon the battle. One of the best generals in the Russian army is *hors de combat*. He is as brave as he is skilful. He never so much as takes his spectacles off, but when we have borne him into comparative shelter quietly sits down, and, ripping up his trouser-leg, binds a handkerchief round the wound. Surgeons gather round him; but, like the true soldier he is, he says he will take his turn when it comes. He is carried further out of the line of fire, his boot removed,

and the limb bandaged. Then he is placed on a stretcher, and is borne away. The last words on the noble soldier's lips are a fervent wish for good fortune to the arms of the czar.

"The *tirailleurs* and Brianski regiment were not making headway in their difficult enterprise of attacking direct in front the steep Turkish slope, with its advantage of wooded cover, although they have foiled the efforts of the Turks to work round by their own left into our rear. We can see on the sky-line the Turkish reinforcements as they come up out of the valley by the road close to their mountain battery, on the bare spot near the edge of their left flank. It is determined at twelve o'clock to deliver a counter flank attack on the right edge of the Turkish ridge, simultaneously with a renewed strenuous attack of the *tirailleurs* and the Brianski men from below. The two battalions of the Jitomer regiment, each leaving one company behind as supports, emerge from their partial shelter of the peak of the Russian first position, and march in company columns across the more level grass land at the head of the intervening valley. They have no great tip to traverse, and their way is good marching ground, but the Turkish mountain guns, from the battery higher up on the wooded peak of the Turkish position, are ready for them, as also is the Turkish infantry on the Turkish right edge of the ridge. The fire sweeps right through them, and many a gallant fellow dyes the grass with his blood. But the battalions press steadily on, and dash into the wood at the very double. The Russian artillery had done its best to prepare the way, for their battery on the peak had fired hard while they were crossing over, and a reserve battery near the khan down below had come into action. But now the artillery had to cease, for there was danger in blind firing into the wood when our men were in it. The arbitrement had to be left to rifle and bayonet.

"The crisis of the battle had now arrived. It remained for us but to gaze into the perplexing mystery of forest, and to hope fervently. The fighting of the infantry on the Turkish front and



flank lasted for a long hour, and raged with great fury, but it was clear that the Russians were gradually gaining ground. The Turks were seen withdrawing their battery of mountain guns near their right flank, a sure sign that danger menaced it if it stayed longer. Then the left battery followed their example, a sure sign too that the *tirailleurs* and *Brianskis* were gaining the ridge on the Turkish left also. There remained but the central peak of the Turkish position. That carried, the ridge was ours, and our right flank would be set free from the dangerous pressure on it.

"The fight was on the balance. The Russians as they stood could all but succeed, but not quite. It was an intensely exciting period, and Radetzky was equal to the occasion. I have mentioned that the *Jitomer* battalions had left two companies in reserve when they marched out from behind the peak. Radetzky realised that fortune was not unkind; but that she needed just a little more wooing. He himself took one of these companies; the colonel of the *Jitomer* regiment placed himself at the head of the other; and thus led, the two companies set forward to throw themselves into the fray. Military critics will say that the chief of an army corps should not be at the head of a company. The abstract truth of the criticism may be owned; but there are periods when specific advantages outweigh conventional and general objections; and a brave leader, with a cool head, may be left to judge for himself if the opportunity has come to commit an error that he may gain a victory. To be headed by the general in command would have inspired the least spirited troops. The soldiers of the czar want no adventitious encouragement to stimulate in them the ardour for the fray. The *Jitomers* had been chafing at their inaction, but it was clear that the leadership of their chief thrilled them with increased zeal. Their ringing cheers rose high above the rattle of musketry as they dashed across the grassy slope at the head of the valley, and precipitated themselves into the wood.

"Fortune, thus energetically wooed, yielded.

There was a concentric rush on the peak. Its rude breastworks were surmounted; there was some hot bayonet work, and then a tremendous volley of Russian hurrahs told that the Turkish ridge was cleared and the position won. This was at two o'clock to the moment. The Turk, if unspeakable, is also irrepressible. All day he had fought with stubborn valour, and would not yet own himself beaten. He came on again out of the valley beyond his late ridge, and strove to retake it; but the Russian soldiers are not fond of relinquishing positions earned by the price of blood, and the Turks were repulsed. By three o'clock they had abandoned the effort for the time, and the fire hereabouts had all but died out.

"Radetzky now came back to the peak of his first position, panting, but content. He had fought a good fight and won it. Now he determined to strike while the iron was hot, and endeavour to recover the outlying positions in his front towards *Schipka*, on which the Turks had encroached on the first day of the fighting. The *Podolsk* Regiment was called up from reserve, and went down to the attack under cover of a heavy fire of artillery from the Russian batteries around and beyond the position on *Mount St. Nicholas*. This attack also was partly successful, and Radetzky increased his elbow-room in front as well as on the flank. The Turks will renew the attack to-morrow with fresh troops, probably in front and on the flanks. They are reported as pressing on through the narrow and difficult pass on the east of the *Schipka*, and leading down into *Triavna*. But I know that the grand duke has ordered a brigade to that point, with more troops to follow. I know that reinforcements are streaming on to the *Schipka* position. As I write, the 1st brigade of the 14th Division is arriving. Radetzky has broken up the dangerous pressure on his flanks. He means to hold the ridge from which he expelled the Turks, and he certainly ought to be able to hold it. All danger is not yet over, but the atmosphere looks so clear that I think myself safe in leaving here to despatch this long telegram, notwithstanding

that the Turks are recommencing their efforts to regain the lost position.

"The Turkish troops engaged were nearly all Nizams—trained regulars, who fought admirably. There are only a few Turkish prisoners. One avers that Suleiman Pacha has one hundred thousand men, which must be an exaggeration, even if they included the swarms of Circassians and Bashi-Bazouks collected to ravage the country north of the Balkans. I put down the Russian loss to-day at over 1,500 killed and wounded—a large proportion of the small force engaged. The Turks lost perhaps fewer to-day, but on the previous days, when they attacked, they must have suffered heavily."

Suleiman Pacha obstinately clung to his idea of forcing the pass, and continued the fighting for two days longer; but the gallant exploits of Radetzky and his forces—of which the Bulgarian Legion proved itself not the least valorous—had made the position of the Russians virtually safe. Mr. Forbes, hastening to Gorny Studen, where he was the first to inform the czar of the welcome success, met further strong reinforcements on the way; and these sufficed to render the pass impregnable. On the 27th of August Suleiman Pacha confessed his defeat by telegraphing to Constantinople for fresh troops, though he had begun the hopeless attack with a splendid army, consisting of not less than thirty thousand men.

The attempted turning of the pass, or rather of the central track of the pass, by the Turks, was all but successful. Indeed, so far had the assailants pushed on either flank of the Russian line that they were able to cross their rifle fire on the Gabrova road. Many lives were lost at this point in the rear of the defenders' position, including that of General Petroceni.

Europe looked on amazed and engrossed by this duel in the Schipka Pass, of which, if it had not been for the account above quoted, it would have had such an indistinct idea. No one could deny the title of heroism to the soldiers on either side who, for a week together, fought almost without intercession for the mastery.

Suleiman Pacha has been severely blamed for the obstinacy with which he persisted in his attempt; but all have admitted his great courage and supreme confidence in the efficiency of his men. Indeed, it is by no means certain that any blame can justly attach to Suleiman Pacha for his conduct on this occasion. The Schipka Pass was, for many reasons, the key of the whole position in the month of August, and especially so long as Plevna held the Russians in check. If the pass could have been forced, at any time during the month, and the fine army of Suleiman could have poured down, in the flush of a new victory, upon Tirnova, it can hardly be doubted that the czar, the grand duke, the staff, probably the whole of the Russian forces down to the last man, would have had to fall hurriedly back upon Sistova, even if they had not been forced across the Danube to prepare for a new campaign. In that case—taking also into account the abortive invasion in Asia, where the Russians were by this time at bay upon the frontier—the fortunes of Turkey would have been altogether changed. She might have gained what she had hitherto failed to gain, a powerful ally; or Europe might have intervened in some form or other, and rescued her from the worst extremities which afterwards befell her.

Suleiman Pasha doubtless perceived all this, for he was a statesman as well as a general. He may well be excused for thinking that the best way of giving support to Mehemet Ali and Osman Pachas was to make straight for the enemy, by the nearest route, and thus either give them the signal for a combination which would have proved decisive, or end the campaign at once in the manner just described. And, as we have already suggested, he was naturally encouraged to employ in the forcing of the Schipka Pass the same troops which had recently been successful in forcing the Duga.

To the Russians also the situation was one which called for the utmost exertion, and the last degree of heroic resolution. They saw their danger as well as any one; probably a great deal better. The insufficiency of the force with which



they had invaded Bulgaria became painfully apparent; they had suffered in Europe from much the same causes as those which led to their disasters in Asia. The plan of their campaign evidently included the masking of the Quadrilateral, whilst their main columns marched southward to the Balkans. Either they had not made sufficient provision for the masking of Widdin, and the blockade of the Orkhanie-Sophia road, or else they had anticipated that the main columns aforesaid would suffice to insure their own safety as they proceeded, so far as any interference on their right flank was concerned. However this may have been, the unexpected strength developed by Osman Pacha had disconcerted their plans, and it became evident that their forces were absolutely insufficient. No sooner had the second attempt on Plevna, under Krüdener and Shahofskoy, been repulsed, than they sent for reinforcements; and these, including the guards, were being despatched with all possible speed. But, in the meantime, they were almost at the mercy of their enemies; and at all events, it was necessary to strain every nerve in order to prevent their being surrounded and overwhelmed. No sacrifice would have been too great to insure the repulse of Suleiman Pacha's attack.

The fighting in the pass was maintained, as we have seen, until the 27th; and it was to all appearance a simple question as to which side would hold out the longest. The result proved that the palm of endurance belonged to the Russians. When Suleiman telegraphed to Constantinople for fresh troops, and withdrew beyond Schipka to rest and re-organise his shattered army, Radetzky not only retained his former positions, but had been able to push out on his right and left. The Turks had entirely abandoned the mountain heights; and for a time, at least, the battle of the Schipka Pass was at an end.

The total loss on both sides was estimated at over ten thousand men, of whom about six thousand fell on the Turkish side.

It may be useful to add to the account already quoted, which was written from the Russian side

of the Balkans, the narrative of a correspondent with the Turkish army, dealing with the last phases of the struggle. His letter is dated from Adrianople, August 26th.\*

"The Schipka Pass is being most obstinately defended, and, notwithstanding the utmost bravery which Suleiman Pacha's troops have shown, victory as yet has been withheld, although on one occasion it has been almost within his grasp. His bold method of pushing his enemy hard after striking a blow, instead of losing half its value by pausing to recover himself, has brought him at one bound, as it were, to within five hundred yards of the Russians. The Balkan road runs through the village of Schipka (now almost burnt to the ground), and creeps along and along the bare mountain, on the summit of which is the chief Russian position. The highest point nearest this, as well as every ridge before reaching it, is thickly entrenched by the Turks, and it will be impossible for an enemy of ten times his strength to attempt to make a descent. The mountains to the right and left, both of which are wooded, and form excellent cover to the attacking parties, have batteries established upon them, altogether numbering sixteen guns; those on the right (three batteries), being of higher elevation, effectually command the Russian side before them, where the Balkan road runs at their feet. The left has not such an advantage, and the ascent from the bottom of the defile is exceedingly precipitous, and almost inaccessible.

"On Thursday and Friday last the severest fighting which Suleiman's army has had occurred—the first day's fighting being on the right—and towards the close of the day the Russians were actually forced to beat a retreat, and the Turks gained momentary possession of a trench. By some strange error they were not properly supported, and had in their turn to retire, to the intense mortification of their commander, who, it is said, had fully determined that the battle should be won before the day closed. On Fri-

\* "Daily News" Correspondence.

day a change of tactics occurred, and the firing was entirely on the left, and went briskly on the whole day, without any advantage, however, excepting the loss it has inflicted on the already weakened garrison. Your correspondent on the other side will doubtless have given you correct information of the numerical strength of the Russians before us. We hear they do not exceed seven thousand men, with twelve or sixteen guns, but these are all heavy Krupps, whilst we have only at present brought up sixteen mountain pieces. Suleiman's army is variously estimated at from thirty thousand to fifty thousand men. . . . It must not be supposed that the Russians, even if they lost their position on the stony ridge above referred to, could not hold those adjoining, although at a lower elevation; still, they are regular forts, and will stand a very strong attack. By threatening to cut off their retreat we may—should the first position fall—hear of surrender, but unless the Russian general is extremely unfortunate, he will make a hard fight until ample reinforcements arrive. . . .

“Matters looked rather differently in Suleiman's camp on Saturday. A lull in the din of battle had taken place, that hot, drowsy morning, and for a few hours the unwonted silence was almost unbroken, occasional shells only being exchanged as mere matters of courtesy. Just when the general himself, and not a few of his soldiers, were snatching a welcome doze on the plain at the pass foot, the whirr of a shell aimed near head-quarters broke the pleasant stillness. As if to prove there was no mistake about it, another and another fell; but this time aimed apparently directly at a long train of covered bullock waggons toiling slowly across the plain, freighted with the wounded from the left Turkish position, where their losses had been particularly heavy. A white flag, with the crescent, was carried at the head of this sad procession, but the small size of the flag prevented its being easily distinguishable at the distance from which the Russians fired, their batteries on the main Balkan road to the spot in question being not much less than four thousand yards off. Two

bullock waggons were broken by the frantic efforts of the drivers to get away. The shelling went on even after the string of waggons had passed from view at such a pace as few bullocks ever went before. The Russians could hardly have seen the fall of their shells, owing to the proximity of the foot of the mountain, and it may charitably be supposed that they imagined some battalions of troops were massed at the place in reserve.

“It transpired afterwards that the Turkish troops on the left had met with a check, and had retired precipitately from a position which they had succeeded in occupying, and the Russians wishing, no doubt, to make the most of the occasion, had lost no time in endeavouring to increase what threatened to be a panic with their foe on this side. Suleiman awoke to the sense of danger, and promptly ordered three batteries of his heaviest field artillery and three battalions of troops to form line across the plain at the mouth of the pass, so as to ensure the Russians a warm reception if they should have had the temerity to advance. His precautions were well taken, and he has since continued them as a precautionary measure against any contingency.

“The English Societies of the Red Crescent have established themselves in conjunction with one of the Turkish ambulances and the surgeon-in-chief of the army, on the roadside, in a shady place, with a clear stream of water running beside it, and 5,000 yards from the nearest Russian battery. The number of wounded increases daily. . . . The opinion of Dr. Leslie Hume and Dr. Sandwith, who are in charge (Dr. Attwood doing good service in directing the hospital arrangements at Adrianople), from the numbers passing through their hands, from those whose wounds are dressed in other quarters, and from what they can learn, is that there have been at least 6,000 in killed and wounded up to the afternoon of the 26th—a heavy price to pay for the positions gained, but as nothing in comparison to the importance of establishing the foothold he has obtained from which to drive out the Rus-



sians. The enemy's losses cannot fall far short of the same total.

"The night of Saturday will not soon be forgotten by either side. It commenced at nine o'clock with a sharp rifle fire on the Turkish left, and proved to be a night attack by the Russians on a battery which had been effecting great damage in the trenches on the face of the main Russian centre or rock position. The flash of the Turkish rifles as they met the ascending Russians could be easily distinguished, sparkling through the trees, from the plain, and their vividness and frequency showed only too well how hotly the contest was proceeding. Hour after hour passed thus with varying success, and it was not until six in the morning that silence reigned again, and the news circulated throughout the camp that, severe as had been the Russian attempt, it had been resolutely held at bay, and by a greatly inferior numerical force, without the advantage which the Russians had of drawing upon their immediate reserves to an almost unlimited extent. The losses on both sides must have been enormous, for the firing did not cease for one moment in its violence throughout the night. The Turkish loss was heavier, owing to a sad error in the regular troops imagining, in the obscurity of the night, that the dismounted Circassians and Bashi-Bazouks were Russians; a mistake natural enough as regards the former, excepting that they are not always to be met with in the front, at least when fighting is going on; in their turn they fired into the regulars also.

"It is subject of remark that during the whole night the Turkish batteries on the right did absolutely nothing to help matters by way of diversion, as they might easily have done by shelling the Russian batteries in the front and such of their enemy's troops as were within range. The position was held unsupported, and the glory of its defence is alone due to its own scanty battalions, and their slight reserves. With the heavy losses which Suleiman's army has now sustained, and notwithstanding the admirable manner in which they fight, it is somewhat doubtful if any

general attack will be made for a few days. The Russians, with their telegraphic communications open from the positions themselves to their main body, can call up, as they evidently have already been compelled to do, any amount of reinforcements on the instant, whereas those of the Turks are far behind."

Let us now turn to the army of the Lom, and see what use Mehemet Ali was making of his position on the Russian left.

## CHAPTER XXII.

### MEHEMET ALI'S ADVANCE.

ALTHOUGH no achievements of a specially brilliant character were recorded of the army of the Lom, from the beginning to the end of the campaign, and although this army was fairly held at bay by the successive Turkish commanders in the Quadrilateral, yet it is certain that the czarewitch performed excellent service with the troops under his command, and contributed in no slight degree to the eventual success of the Russians. His task was nothing less than to hold in check the bulk of the sultan's forces between the Danube and the Balkans, and to mask the four strong fortresses of Eastern Bulgaria. He did this in a very effectual manner, holding a long line from the neighbourhood of Rustchuk to Osman Bazar and Elena, on the spurs of the Balkan range, and presenting an impassable barrier to the generals who, but for him, would have closed in upon the Russian left. The invaders could not have maintained their line of advance with a Plevna on both sides of them; but they would have had to deal with something even worse than a Plevna if the czarewitch had been disposed of.

This part, at least, of the Russian plan had been well conceived, and was well executed. So long as the army of the Lom could hold its positions there was no need for it to attack either Rustchuk or Shumla, or to court a general engagement with Abdul Kerim, Mehemet Ali, or

his successor, Suleiman Pasha. Moreover, even if the czarewitch had been driven back as far as Biela, or beyond it, General Zimmerman stood prepared to fall upon the rear of the advancing Turks. There is little doubt that these two Russian armies, posted one on each side of the Quadrilateral, did as much service by their patient inactivity as other corps did by their rapid marches.

The czarewitch suffered considerable losses in his engagements with the enemy; but both he and Zimmerman were greatly weakened by the exposure and sickness to which they were subjected, and which were even more fatal to their troops than to those which were, by comparison, kept in constant motion.\* The Russian army as a whole was very badly handled by those who had charge of it, especially in the earlier part of the campaign; and much of the blame seems to rest on the shoulders of General Levitzky, the assistant-chief of the grand duke's staff, who, still more directly than General Nepokoitschitzky, was responsible for the manipulation of the forces.

\* Mr. Archibald Forbes wrote from Biela, on the 9th of August:—

"The Russian army begins to suffer in health, owing in some corps to irregular rations, in others to hard marching, in all to heat; but the greatest predisposing cause is the total neglect of all sanitary precautions. They never bury dead horses or oxen, or the entrails of slaughtered cattle. They never dream seemingly of the wisdom of the latrine system. The result is a general tainting of the air, which poisons men predisposed to fall ill by reason of lassitude from over-fatigue or long abstinence from food, although men in stalwart health escape. Strangely enough, the greatest proportion of illness has manifested itself in the personnel of the Imperial suite, whose members are comparatively nursed in the downy lap of ease and fare sumptuously every day. General Ignatieff for three days was dangerously ill from a species of gastric fever, and is still confined to his room. Prince Galatzin has been equally ill from the same disorder, and is still in bed. The emperor has five high officers known as general-adjutants on personal service about him. Of these but one is now fit for duty; the other four are ill. Nearly everybody is more or less sick, squeamish, and out of sorts. The reason is not far to seek. When I first came to Biela it was fresh and sweet; now it has more stinks than Cologne, and the slums of Strasburg are a nosegay to it. The air is tainted thick and heavy with filth and rotten offal. Even tobacco smoke and brandy are powerless to avert nausea."

Levitzky had earned a high reputation by the ability which he had displayed, during several years, in the manœuvres of the army at St. Petersburg; but his conduct in the enemy's country hardly justified the confidence which had been placed in his judgment.

One fact is to be remembered in connexion with the tactics of the czarewitch; and it goes far to explain his manœuvres throughout. The country between the Lom and Jantra rivers, on one side, and the Plevna-Sofia line on the other, is occupied by a wide plain, only slightly broken by gentle undulations. There are no fortified places, and no strong positions for defence. Now the Turks are notoriously more skilful in defence than in attack, and though, on one or two occasions, they have behaved well in the open country, their greatest achievements have been made whilst fighting behind earthworks. The Russians continually courted engagements in the open, but were rarely gratified by an assumption of the offensive on the part of their enemy. If the czarewitch had been compelled to fall back beyond the Jantra, the fact would by no means certainly have implied a severe disaster for the Russian arms. It was doubtless the wisest plan to hold the line of the Lom as obstinately as possible; but there were many reasons why the grand duke and his staff should have been tempted to draw the Turkish generals from the Quadrilateral, so as to deal a heavy blow at them with the aid of a detachment from the Plevna army.

These views are borne out by the remarks of a correspondent, writing home on the 19th of August, on the situation of the Russians as it then stood. "The Russians," he says,\* "have a sufficient number of troops across the Danube to take Plevna, and they had enough after the battle to do so. They had six army corps, giving an effective of 150,000 men, after deduction of losses. They should have provisioned the Schipka and Khaini Passes for two months, and placed 20,000 men there to defend and hold them. They should have placed 20,000 more

\* "Daily News" Correspondence, under date.



in front of Sistova to defend that place, and 20,000 more in Tirnova; then abandoned the whole of the line occupied by the army of the czarewitch. This would have left them an effective of 90,000 men, which, by a rapid concentration, they could have flung against the Turkish army at Plevna and have crushed it. It may be objected that I forget the army of Shumla, which could advance in that case, take the Russian army in the rear while attacking Plevna, and thus put it in a very dangerous position. To this I reply, that the Turks having adopted a purely defensive plan of campaign, to which they have hitherto adhered with the greatest pertinacity, there is little likelihood of their doing this. But if they did move out of their fortified camp at Shumla, this is the very best thing for the Russians, the very worst move the Turks could make. In the first place, the Russians could easily get three days' start of them, and very probably more, a time quite sufficient for the affair at Plevna. They could crush the Turkish army there, and then turn round and beat the Shumla army in its turn. If the Russians can catch this army anywhere west of the Jantra, they can simply annihilate it, providing they have first settled accounts with the Plevna army. The Turks, however strong they may be behind intrenchments, cannot stand against the Russians in the open field. The country between the Jantra and Plevna is an open, rolling plain, more or less broken up, it is true, but offering no strong positions for defence, nor any capable of being rapidly fortified. If the Turks venture out here they are sure to be beaten, and this is in fact the very move the Russians have been waiting for and wishing for all along. But while wishing for and hoping for it, they have not had the courage to offer the Turks a sufficient temptation to induce them to do it. And, in fact, up to the battle of Plevna no good occasion had offered. That battle furnished the occasion, and one which the Russians should not have neglected.

"Had the Turkish army come out of Shumla, it, as well as the army of Plevna, would have

been crushed in two successive battles, and the war would be virtually at an end. Had it remained inactive, then the Russian army could cross the Balkans, and, with the reinforcements which are already arriving, might now have been on the march to Adrianople. The Russian generals, however, after having blundered into the affair of Plevna through negligence, now run to the other extreme, and, through an excess of caution, adopt a safe and slow plan of campaign, that will prolong the war another year. They intend to crush the Turks by mere brute force and superiority of numbers instead of by skill and generalship, even at the fearful expense of another campaign. So much for generalship. There is, of course, another view of the question. Should this plan be adopted by the Russians, a considerable portion of territory now occupied by them would have to be abandoned for a few days; and during this time the Turks might come in and massacre the population, as they invariably do wherever the Russians have passed. The emperor is, it is understood, very much against such a plan if it can be avoided, for this very reason. But the number of villages that would have to be abandoned are, after all comparatively few, and the population of these might retreat into Tirnova and Sistova for a few days, where they would be quite safe until the battle would be over; and although those villages would undoubtedly be burnt, this would after all cause less misery than the prolongation of the war another year. Everything considered, therefore, the Russians seem to be managing badly; and their generals, with one of the finest armies in the world at their command, are showing neither military science nor skill. They will undoubtedly crush the Turks in the end, but it will be by mere brute force and overpowering numbers, and that too against an enemy unable to take the offensive. They began their advance as though they had no enemy at all, and since the battle of Plevna they have been acting with as much caution as though they were fighting the Prussians. What would it be if they were fighting the Prussians or even any ordinary ene-

my, as capable as themselves of taking the offensive?"

The czarewitch had at his disposal two corps, as already stated, and one division of Shahofskoy's corps, about sixty thousand men in all; and the great extent of his line did not permit him to concentrate any large number at a single point. He was obliged to watch the Turks, from Rustchuk to beyond Osman Bazar, whilst the enemy was in a position to mass a numerous force at any spot along the whole line, and take the Russians at a great disadvantage. The situation was critical in the extreme, and it cannot be denied that the Turks lost a grand opportunity of crushing, or seriously crippling, the army of the Lom. The Russians daily expected an attack during the first weeks of August, and had directed a part of the reinforcements now hastening to the seat of war from Russia to proceed to the aid of the czarewitch.

Meanwhile the artillery duel between Rustchuk and Giurgevo was being steadily carried on. The Turks threw up fresh earthworks on the bank of the river, facing Slobosia and Malarus on the Roumanian side; and these were furiously bombarded by the Russians on the 14th and 15th of August. No great effect seems to have been produced by the fire, either here or in Rustchuk itself; and, indeed, the heavy siege artillery achieved few notable successes during the campaign. Some destruction was of course done to the buildings in Rustchuk—the consulates of several Powers, and even the Turkish hospitals, being injured by shells. But it can hardly be said that this sacrifice of property served any of the legitimate ends of war, or tended to bring about the capitulation of the fortress.

On the 16th of August the Turks pushed forward against the Russian line, from Rustchuk and various other points, down to Bebrova in the Balkans. At no part was the fighting very severe, nor can the engagement be said to have become general. A vigorous attempt was made by the Turks to gain ground in front of Kadi-koi, a town on the Osman Bazar road, about a

dozen miles south of Rustchuk, and a couple of miles from the right bank of the Lom; but it was unsuccessful. A series of desultory attacks on both sides marked the next few days; and then, on the 22nd, a Russian detachment advanced against the Turkish outposts at Rezin-koi, on the right bank of the Kara Lom. The assailants had eight battalions of infantry, six squadrons of cavalry, and fifteen guns, whilst the Turks who came into action were only seven battalions, three squadrons, and twelve guns. But the latter held a strong position on the heights, and, being armed with breechloaders of excellent quality, they repulsed the attack, and compelled the Russians to retire again across the river.

The object of the Russians was apparently to take the enemy unprepared, and before he could deliver the general attack on the army of the czarewitch. The neighbourhood of Osman Bazar was of the utmost importance to both sides, for it was the meeting point of roads coming from Rustchuk, Shumla and Eski Djuma, the Balkans, and Tirnova. Turkish cavalry had already pushed westward from Eski Djuma, and the right wing of the Shumla army was being wheeled round by Mehemet Ali, with the apparent purpose of cutting off the Russian army from its communications. Thus the possession of the Lom valley, with the roads passing through it, was eagerly contested. The circumstances of the engagement on the 22nd were briefly these. The Russians had crossed the river overnight, and occupied the lower heights at Kiricen, from whence they advanced in the early morning upon Rezin-koi. Planting a couple of batteries at Kueskoi, they cannonaded Rezin, whilst their cavalry occupied Kizil. Both positions were recaptured by the Bashi-Bazouks with little delay; and the Turks presently regained the heights of Kiricen, throwing the Russians back to the left bank.

In this engagement Baker Pasha (ex-Colonel in the English army) was present, he having been attached to the command of Mehemet Ali.



On the following days the Turks themselves assumed the offensive; and on the 24th of August they occupied Jaslar, compelling the Russians to fall back on Sultankoi. The advantage thus gained was considerable, the Turks securing a footing on the bank of the Kara Lom, and turning the Russian right. The whole line was weakened by this loss of position. Between the sources of the Kara Lom and the River Chali—an affluent of the Jantra, there is a series of plateaux; and the aim of the Turks was evidently to push along these plains, so as to cut off the right of the army of the czarewitch from the Russian forces which held the road from Tirnova to Osman Bazar. In this they had partly succeeded by the taking of Yaslar; but the Russian communications, lying further in the rear, by way of Kadikoi, were not actually interrupted. The divisions which fell back after the two days' fighting withdrew to Sultanieh, near Popkoi—a strong place destined to be the centre of still more vigorous work, and being virtually the key of the position on the upper Lom.

It became urgently necessary that the Russians should bring up reinforcements in aid of the right wing of the czarewitch's army, which was now hard pressed by Mehemet Ali's left, and which, moreover, had to fear the advance of Suleiman Pasha's right across the Balkans, by way of Bebrova or Elena. There would have been less cause for alarm if it had been known that Suleiman was at this moment wasting his strength in the Schipka Pass, and was himself telegraphing to Constantinople for assistance.

On the 28th Mehemet Ali again pressed forward, and after some heavy fighting pushed the Russians back from Sultanieh upon Popkoi, and even this position it was not deemed prudent to maintain. The forward movement of the Turks appeared to be a general one, all along the line; for on the last day of August a Turkish force, estimated at eight battalions and four squadrons, moved against Kadikoi, in the lower basin of the Lom, and occupied the village, driving out a regiment of Cossacks. Later on the same day, however, the assailants were in their turn driven

from Kadikoi, and compelled to retire under the guns of Rustchuk.

Writing on the 31st of August from Gorny Studen, the head-quarters of the czar, Mr. Forbes sums up the results of the previous days' fighting:—"Commencing on Thursday, and continuing yesterday, there was general fighting along the front of the centre and right flank army of the czarewitch from Nisova on the White Lom southward over Solenik, Gagovo, Sultankoi, Popkoi, Mehemedkoi, and beyond, in front of Osman Bazar. Here it is believed Mehemet Ali Pacha was personally in command. Great masses of Turks everywhere drove in the Russian forepost line. An important battle is imminent, but the tactics of the Turks resemble those of the combatants in the American civil war. When they gain any ground they sit and fortify themselves in it by entrenchments before moving to acquire any more. There is obvious caution in this policy. The Russians have abandoned the Popkoi position, after having entrenched themselves in it. The reason is stated to be the discovery of its ineligibility, as being commanded by higher ground within cannon range. The new position is behind the old one. I have not learned whether the Turks have occupied the Popkoi position. A parlementaire from Mehemet Ali Pacha, on the subject of the treatment of the wounded and the Bulgarian civil population, has been here. He is singularly incoherent as to the objects of his mission, has no definite proposals to make, and there are suspicions that in reality he is a spy. On some subjects he is charmingly frank. Speaking to him of the Bashi-Bazouks, the grand duke called them 'wild beasts.' 'Oh' said the envoy, 'I am not expected to defend them. I always take an escort myself when I must pass through their camp.'"

Of the fighting on the 28th we have a graphic account from the "Times" correspondent with the Turkish army. Early in the morning, he tells us, Nedjib Pacha advanced from Adakeui, near Rasgrad, with three brigades, two batteries of artillery, two squadrons of cavalry and one brigade of Infantry Reserve. "The Commander-

in-Chief and Prince Hassan took up a position with their staff on a high hill situated almost immediately north of Yenikoi, and, standing there, saw the whole action. This hill was taken from the Russians last week, and commands an uninterrupted view from Rasgrad to beyond Osman Bazar. The Russians opened fire about nine o'clock on the advancing Turks from batteries in the rear of Sadina, in front of a village called Kutcheles, not remarked on the map. Nedjib steadily advanced, and entered the burning village of Sadina by 11.30. The retreating Russians were hotly pressed, and retired precipitately to Karahassankeui. Here they made a vigorous stand. Sabit Pacha created a diversion by attacking Haydarkeui. The Russians had a battery of three guns to their right near Haydarkeui. They made splendid practice at the advancing Turks and Egyptians, but these cleverly opened out and advanced to the right and left of the village in really workmanlike style. The engagement now became general, and it extended over some fifteen miles. The heavy and continued roll of the fire of the skirmishers was heard along all the ridges from Basisler to Kutcheles. By four o'clock Karahassankeui was in flames. The Russians gradually gave way, and the Turks redoubled the energy of their attack. At 5 P.M. the enemy were scampering out of Hayerkoi, and horses were trotting up to take the guns out of the battery. The Turkish battery, making splendid practice, fired just as the guns were taken off, and one gun was struck with the last shell. The Turks cheered and dashed through the blazing village and away to the left to Popkoi, like a pack of hounds. The Russian camps were hastily cleared out, two guns covering their retreat and making excellent practice. But the Turks and Egyptians still scampered over the ground in fine style. The Russians were now in full retreat in every direction, and by sundown the Turks had proved for the second time not only capable of meeting the Russian in the open, but also of driving him from strongly intrenched positions. In ten days the Russians have lost the magnificent double

positions of the Lom and the Kara Lom. What may happen next no one knows. It is impossible to tell what forces the Russians had engaged, nor can the losses as yet be estimated; probably they were not heavy, except around Karahassankeui, by which name this engagement will be designated by the Turks."

Mehemet Ali's own account of his achievements against the army of the czarewitch was given in a despatch to the Porte, dated August 30th, in which he wrote as follows:—

"This (Thursday) morning strong columns of troops, detached from the camp at Rasgrad and Sarinassouhler, made an offensive movement, and gave battle to the Russians near the village of Karahassanler. The fighting was of a desperate character, and the village, after being taken and retaken several times, finally remained in our hands. The enemy was defeated, and retreated in disorder, which was increased by the pursuit of our troops. Towards 5 P.M. two other columns started from the camp at Sarinassouhler, crossed the River Lom, and engaged the enemy, forcing him to abandon Haidar Ayaz and fall back on Pop. My head-quarters are established at Sekar. We are awaiting reports of the losses on both sides."

A subsequent telegram from Mehemet Ali, dated August 30, night, says:—

"The Chief of the Staff, Rifaat Pacha, who was sent during the day to Karahassanler, returned this evening, and reports that a battalion of the Jerusalem Redifs, belonging to the Salih Brigade of the Division of the town of Djuma, captured a cannon, four ammunition waggons, a quantity of carts, with two thousand rifles, two thousand coats, and a large amount of military equipments. The booty was very considerable. The other troops engaged were the Rasgrad Division under General Assaf Pacha and the Eski Djuma Division under Salem Pacha. The English officer, Baker Pacha, greatly distinguished himself. We lost three thousand killed and wounded, and the Russians had four thousand *hors de combat*. I shall start in the morning to join Ahmed Eyoub Pacha, who is encamped at Karahassanler."



It is only fair to add to this the account of the engagement on the 30th supplied from the Russian head-quarters at Gorny Studen :—

“The Turkish attack on August 30, directed against the Upper Lom, was carried out with great determination, Mehemet Ali Pacha commanding in person. Twelve thousand of his troops made a vigorous attack on General Leonow’s Division. After ten hours’ resistance, General Leonow was obliged to retire definitively from Karahassankoi, the village having been already taken and retaken six times. At about eight o’clock he evacuated the principal Russian position, retreating in the best possible order, his troops carrying away with them the wounded, numbering four hundred. The Turkish attack had been made in three different columns. The one coming from Rasgrad attacked Karahassankoi; the other two advanced towards Haidarkoi and Gaslar, crossing the Lom without great difficulty.”

The same despatch stated that a considerable number of Turkish troops had concentrated between Gadova and Popkoi on the 31st. On the same day eight Turkish battalions, with some cavalry, took position on the high road between Rustchuk and Rasgrad; and altogether it was manifest that Mehemet Ali had gained very important advantages—in which it is admitted that our fellow-countryman, ex-Colonel Baker, rendered the greatest assistance.

It was supposed on all hands that the Turks had now begun their combined attack upon the Russians, in the hope of completely surrounding and crushing them. The “Times” correspondent in Vienna wrote on this subject, on the 2nd of September, as follows :—

“The attacks of Mehemet Ali from Rasgrad and Eski Djuma on the line of the Upper Lom, and that of Osman Pacha from Plevna on the Russian line at Pelisat, look like the beginning of a Turkish offensive movement on a large scale. Whether and how far the fight for the Schipka Pass formed part of such a movement, whether it was simply a miscalculation, or whether, by attracting a notable portion of the Rus-

sian forces to the apex of the triangle occupied by the Russians, and thus weakening the sides of it, it has formed a rather costly preparation and introduction to the general offensive movement, it would not be easy to say in the present state of our information. For the moment, however, the forward movements from Rasgrad and Plevna make it of secondary importance, for if the Turks succeed in breaking through the Russian line at either of these points, the Russian position, not only on the Schipka Pass but likewise at Tirnova and Selvi, becomes untenable, while if they fail, even if Suleiman should succeed in forcing the Schipka Pass, or else manœuvring the Russians out of it, this will only force the Russians to do what they ought to have done in their own interest before—namely, contract their extended and weak position, and take up a strong central position, where they may wait till their reinforcements have arrived.

“The affairs of the 30th of August on the Lom, and of the 31st at Pelisat, though they ended to all appearance in favour of the Turks, cannot be looked upon as of any decisive influence. As regards the former, it has, however, given the Turks possession of the country between the two branches of the Lom—the Beli and Kara Lom. One might have supposed that the Russians, having lost Ayaslar, which is on the left bank of the Kara Lom, would have drawn their forces from there; but this does not seem to have been the case, for the Russian bulletin says that General Leonoff sustained a most obstinate fight with his advanced guard at Karahassankoi against superior forces; while at Haidarkoi, likewise on the banks of the Lom, there was a severe engagement, which decided the day, and forced the Russians to fall back on their entrenched positions on the heights of Popkoi.”

Before we follow the fortunes of the Russians in their recovery from the perilous position in which their rashness and blunders had placed them, we may turn aside to consider the state of public feeling in Europe in connexion with this sanguinary war, and especially the attitude of Turks and Russians at home.



KAHK IN ASIATIC TURKEY





## CHAPTER XXIV.

## PUBLIC OPINION IN TURKEY.

THE feelings and dispositions of the Turks varied, as was natural, from day to day, in accordance with the varying fortunes of their armies. We have seen many proofs of the unstable qualities by which the sultan, his ministers, and the inhabitants of Constantinople, were distinguished. At one time they seemed to be fully equal to the defence of their country; but, after every success, or every display of useful tactics and remarkable energy, they almost invariably relapsed into the characteristic indolence and ineptitude of their race. Thus, the best friends of Turkey could ask nothing better of her generals than that which had been done by Mukhtar Pacha at Zewin, and by Osman Pacha at Plevna. These two commanders deserved the title of "Ghazi" (victorious), which was conferred upon them for their gallant exploits; but in neither case was the triumph of the Turkish armies made the most of. Again, the energy exhibited by Suleiman Pacha in transporting his troops from Montenegro to southern Bulgaria was worthy of all praise; but his operations, which saved his country for the time being, failed to produce the results expected of them. It was the want of strong directing hands, to organise and command, to turn every element of strength to account, and to control the movements of all the armies for a common purpose, which caused the ultimate collapse of the Turkish defence.

The inhabitants of Constantinople bore the reverses of the generals, as they bore their successes, with patience and moderation. Frequent predictions were indulged in to the effect that the capital would break out into a revolution, that the sultan would experience the fate of his two predecessors, or that the ministers would be driven from office by the popular indignation. Nothing of the sort took place.

Ministers and generals were doubtless removed and replaced; but this was done quietly and peacefully, without trouble or commotion. In fact, the capital displayed a spirit of harmony and philosophical calm which might have set a good example to more than one country during the continuation of the war.

Whilst the Ottoman parliament was sitting, several of the delegates showed much independence, and questioned the government very narrowly upon their conduct of affairs. There was even a certain amount of violence in speech, never fully reported; but no question was ever raised which could seriously cripple the action of the ministers.

If the Turks, however, were patient under adverse circumstances, there can be no question that they were deeply moved by the desperate and almost friendless condition of their country. They still regarded England as their truest friend, and firmly believed that English statesmen would be compelled to use the old policy of protecting them against the intrigues and open hostility of Russia; and they did not lack able and ingenious advocates to set their cause before the English nation.

One of the most skilful expositions of the Turkish view of an Anglo-Turkish alliance was afforded in a pamphlet published in the month of August, in the French tongue, under the title of "*Rapport adressé par un journaliste Turc à son Excellence l'Ambassadeur de sa Majesté Britannique à Constantinople.*" This essay was summed up as follows by the correspondent of the "*Times*" at Therapia:—

"The writer begins by declaring that, thanks to God, Turkey has displayed a vitality and energy exceeding all the anticipations formed in Europe. The Ottomans are now convinced, and with good reason, that the country, strong in the justice of its cause, will repel the Russian invasion.

"Kars has shown with what stubborn energy and tenacity the Turkish soldier can fight, nor is it to be wondered at, since he is fighting for his faith; and what in other countries is an ordinary



duty, with no special religious character attached to it, is to the Mussulman a sacred service, ordained by his creed. All these things combine to make the Mussulman soldier—and every Mussulman is born a soldier—capable of bearing privations and fatigues which would crush any European army. All the world knows that Turkey has not provoked this lamentable war; on the contrary, she would gladly have avoided it if her enemy, by his unjust demands, had not made peace impossible. He took no note of the large and liberal reforms, undertaken in a spirit of perfect loyalty, but tried to impose conditions which must have ended in the country's ruin; and when Turkey refused to submit to these conditions, Russia declared war on grounds professedly humane and generous, but which were really at bottom dictated by that ambitious policy which for one hundred and fifty years has sought to obtain the right of passage through the Dardanelles to the Mediterranean, and gain possession of a position with no parallel in the world, but which, fortunately for the world, belongs to a non-aggressive power like the Ottoman. It was by many thought that in such a war, involving interests of the greatest consequence to Europe, Turkey would have found allies, especially in England, whose traditional policy has always hitherto laid most important stress upon maintaining the independence and integrity of the Ottoman empire. Did not England refuse adhesion to the Berlin Memorandum, as inviting an interference not sanctioned by treaties with the international affairs of Turkey? Did she not send her fleet to Besika Bay? Did not the House of Lords declare that England was ready to go to war rather than let injustice be done? And what greater injustice could there be than Russia's violation of international treaties? By such declarations as these, and such acts as the sending of the fleet to Besika Bay, England has encouraged Turkey to resist Russia, and assumed, before public opinion and history, her share of responsibility for the present war. Turkey, nevertheless, has counted on herself. She will even regard as inopportune all foreign assistance which

might impose upon her concessions not less onerous than the triumph of her enemy." The writer says further:—"I think I exactly express the opinion of my countrymen when I declare, that in this struggle for life or death, we need not wish for allies. This is not because we do not attach a high price to the sympathies and kindly support of Europe. But we have a legitimate ambition to defend with our own force the integrity and independence of our own country. If we are vanquished we would rather conclude a separate peace with the victor, a peace which will at least deliver us from deliverers. Having nothing to hope from Europe we shall have no debt of gratitude to pay her, and, naturally, we shall try to make as advantageous a peace as possible with Russia without concerning ourselves about European interests. Not, however, that our conduct will be dictated by any feeling of bitterness for Europe's desertion; but in our situation it would be impossible for us to act otherwise, and Europe will only be reaping the fruits of her own selfish policy if the interests of civilisation in the East become gravely imperilled. Russia does not fight us loyally. After having treacherously tried to ruin us by exciting rebellion, she now permits, in the country occupied by her troops, unspeakable atrocities. Yet humanitarian Europe, which professes to be the home of civilisation, has done nothing to prevent Russia and her *protégés*, the Bulgarian rebels, from exterminating the Mussulmans. The system of autonomy invented by Russian diplomacy is simply the extension, in disguise, of Muscovite dominion. By it Russia counts on opening the Dardanelles, which, in the hands of a weakened Turkey, would become a mere passage for Muscovite fleets, threatening at every moment the vital interests of Europe. For Turkey, the autonomy of her European provinces would be equivalent to the loss of them. Without them she could no longer successfully resist the assaults of her northern neighbour, who would then have on his side both strength and *prestige*. Treaties will have no hold on a power which has already shown its contempt for international rights or

pledges. There will be no longer any limits to Muscovite ambition, in consequence of the indifference which Europe has displayed for the maintenance of treaties and the balance of power."

The paper ends here, but the writer adds a postscript to say that he has just read Lord Beaconsfield's last speech in the House of Lords, and that it has produced here, in Turkey, the most painful impression. "The Turks see, with regret, that the considerations which long constituted the essence of the policy pursued by English statesmen are now entirely overlooked. Lord Beaconsfield no longer talks of resisting the Russian occupation of the Turkish provinces, or of going to war for the cause of justice and the maintenance of treaties. He merely declares that England will remain neutral so long as Russia respects the Dardanelles, the Suez Canal, and the Persian Gulf. But it is impossible to suppose that the Dardanelles and Constantinople will be safe if Russia succeeds in establishing autonomous Slav states, receiving their orders from St. Petersburg? Is it not evident that autonomous Bulgaria will be virtually a Russian province, stretching from the right of the Danube to the south of the Balkans, and that therefore, in the next war, the Russian troops will operate from that country as if it were their own, and have the very heart of Turkey laid bare to their attacks? How will the Dardanelles and Constantinople be safe when the empire has been deprived of its natural lines of defence by the formation of a state which will ever be an instrument in the hands of Russia, and when violence and confiscation shall have driven out its Mussulman population?" The writer declines to discuss the questions of the Suez Canal and Persian Gulf, as these are not yet threatened. He concludes by saying "that the only satisfactory conclusion of the questions he has raised is to be found in the triumph of the Ottoman arms, and that the Ottoman nation is resigned to every possible sacrifice to secure victory, or, failing this, to save its honour. In either alternative, its ancient friends and allies will, perhaps, have some reason for regret, but regret will come too late."

There was both justice and injustice in these strictures. It was quite true that Europe had made insufficient provision for guaranteeing the international rights and treaty obligations of Europe. It is impossible to apportion the blame amongst the different governments. Some blame England for refusing to adhere to the Berlin Memorandum, and for failing to impress upon Turkey, after the Constantinople conference, the necessity of submitting to the will of Europe. Others blamed Russia, like the writer of the pamphlet above quoted, even before she had given any direct evidence that she combined selfish motives with her philanthropic ones. But the accusers of Russia, at the beginning of the war, based their arguments on little else than conjectures—reasonable, no doubt, considering Russia's past history, but yet only conjectures.

It was natural enough that the Turks should feel the utmost animosity against Russia, and the fullest assurance that the only aim of their invaders was to promote their own interests, and to satisfy their lust of aggression. It was natural, too, that they should expect England to assist them. They refused to believe that the country which had come to their aid in 1854 would withhold similar help in 1877, on what seemed to be much more urgent grounds for interference. We have already considered the reasons which weighed with the bulk of the English nation in declining to form a new alliance with Turkey. Rightly or wrongly, Englishmen believed the Bulgarian massacres an effectual bar against such an alliance. The Turks could not understand—or they professed themselves unable to understand—why a single crime should be thought deserving of so great a punishment; whilst, at the same time, they stoutly maintained that the crime itself had been exaggerated out of all proportion to its true character. We need not go back to the well-worn subject of the atrocities of 1876; but it may be observed that the feeling of Englishmen (as of Europe in general) was based rather upon the whole conduct of the Turkish government, and of the Turkish irregular troops, than



upon the single occurrence in Bulgaria. That occurrence had brought the savage element of the Turkish nature into stronger relief, and had intensified the objections of our countrymen to continue the old alliance between England and the Porte; but the indignation naturally felt in May, 1876, had been kept alive, and even increased, by the behaviour of the Turks during the earlier part of the campaign.

As already stated in a foregoing chapter, mutual recriminations had been freely exchanged between Russian and Turkish sympathisers in respect of alleged atrocities on both sides. Whatever may have been the case with the Cossacks and Bulgarians—and no doubt the latter acted in a most revengeful spirit towards their Mussulman neighbours, as soon as the tide of invasion overtook them—the Turks gave their former friends in England only too much reason to believe that cruelty and ferocity were ineradicable vices in the national character. Many who would have reverted to the traditional policy of the country in spite of the Bulgarian atrocities, were prevented from doing so by the harsh and unreasoning severities which the sultan and his ministers persisted in employing towards the Bulgarians, whom they began to visit with condign punishment, often on the most flimsy pretexts, and long before the Russians had made their appearance in the several localities. In the month of August many of the Christian inhabitants were put to death, at Sofia, Adrianople, and elsewhere, on the charge of conspiring against the government. At the end of August Ahmed Vefyk Pacha, who had been president of the first Ottoman parliament, and who was a man of considerable culture, was appointed governor-general of Adrianople, for the purpose of superintending the trials of the Bulgarian prisoners, which had already become numerous, and which had aroused not a little indignation and remonstrance in Europe. Ahmed Vefyk had the reputation of being a stern man, as well as a fanatical Mussulman; and for some time after his arrival at Adrianople the executions of the Christians continued unchecked.

On the 28th of August a correspondent of the "Times" wrote that the executions were still going on at Adrianople, but that the batches were "smaller than before, averaging fourteen instead of forty. The majority of those executed belong to the richer class, and this fact gives rise to a suspicion on the part of the Bulgarians that they are sacrificed in order to confiscate their property. Adrianople has, in fact, been turned into a 'Bloody Assize' town. Lady Strangford has been besieged by appeals for her intervention from the families of the sufferers, but to her great grief she can do nothing."

As for the justice of these punishments, another correspondent wrote that, after making numerous inquiries among the Turks, he was convinced they were protected by the Russian army from the violence of the Bulgarians. He thought, also, that there had been far more victims among the Bulgarians than among the Turks, the latter always having arms at hand, while the former had them only when the Russians supplied them. This correspondent complained that the military authorities had not restrained the excesses of the Circassians and Bashi Bazouks.

A third correspondent wrote, a few days later, from Syra:—"An *employé* of the Porte, who is well informed, and whom I have no reason to suspect of misleading me, assures me that the Bulgarians continue to be treated with the severity which the exigencies of the political and military situation have long ceased to justify. Even in undisturbed districts, where there has been no revolt attempted, the executions are so conducted that no Bulgarian Christian, however innocent, is safe. Worse still, the savage hordes of Circassians and Zeibeks, instead of being restrained, are actually encouraged by the authorities in this wholesale massacre and spoliation, which are continued on such a scale as almost to justify the belief that the Porte is bent upon making it impossible for the Bulgarian Christians to live in the country. The English ambassador earnestly remonstrated with the Porte as to these proceedings, but obtained only the

usual ample promises, but no performance. On the same day that the grand vizier assured the ambassador that all sentences upon Bulgarians were referred to Constantinople for confirmation in order to give time for careful inquiries as to the guilt or innocence of the condemned men to be made, an official order was sent to Adrianople that the executions were to be continued. There have been many victims, and their property is transferred to Mussulmans. The police are suspected of making accusations to extort money, and innocent men condemned are carried with ropes round their necks from house to house, that householders may pay money to prevent an execution being carried into effect at their doors.

"Ahmet Vefik has been appointed governor of Adrianople, and as he is an intimate friend of the English ambassador, it is hoped he will inaugurate the policy of clemency recommended by Mr. Layard; but his previous history, and the severe policy he pursued at Broussa, and when minister of justice here, give rise to the apprehension that he will continue the same policy towards the Bulgarians. Large sums of money are coming in, but much more still is wanted for the victims of the war. It seems a matter of regret that sums should be sent exclusively for Mussulman sufferers; and this is all the more to be deprecated as the English embassy is made the medium of this exclusiveness, and thus incurs the charge of being influenced by political feeling in what should be essentially the cause of pure humanity. This is in marked contrast to the other relief agencies, which are careful to assist the sufferers without distinction of race or religion. Bulgarian sufferers are probably more numerous than Mussulmans."

In other respects, the Turks showed themselves capable of better things. For instance, they behaved humanely enough to their co-religionists in Transcaucasia, where their unsuccessful attempt to cut the communications of the Grand Duke Michael had left the population virtually at the mercy of the Russians. Admiral

Hobart Pacha was commissioned to transport the Mussulman population from the east to the south coast of the Black Sea. An Englishman who accompanied the admiral graphically describes the character and extent of this operation. His letter to the "Times" is dated August 14th.

"Hobart Pacha has been released at last from his transport duties, and the Arsari Tefyk is now on her way to Sinope, where the remainder of the squadron is to rendezvous as soon as possible. My letters and telegrams will have kept you pretty well informed as to the movements of the fleet in this part of the Black Sea up to the present, and there is nothing much to add, but a few details, perhaps, respecting the improvised jetty for the embarkation of the Circassians, and the measures adopted by Hobart for the defence of his fleet at night. It has hitherto been the practice with all Turkish men-of-war at anchor anywhere near the enemy's coast to remain with steam up all night, and only to 'bank the fires' during the day. This is, however, a very costly proceeding, owing to the expenditure of coal, and one the advantage of which may seriously be questioned. A torpedo attack is always a surprise, and between the time when the alarm is given, the engines ready to move, and the anchor slipped, there will be an interval, however short, during which the torpedo ship or boat may succeed in delivering her blow. With such an operation as had just been placed in his hands, to economise the fuel was of the utmost importance, so Hobart Pacha at once gave an order to put out all the fires except on board of the Mukademieh Hhiar, which was to act as guard-ship during the night. This order was not given because no torpedo attack on the part of the enemy was to be feared, for, on the contrary, a crowded anchorage would seem to invite such, more especially when no mistake could be made as to the character of the ship attacked, and Soukoum Kalé is but a few hours' run from Kertch. Hobart Pacha, therefore, wisely placed a cordon of armed boats outside the shipping at night, which would have met the first attack of



the torpedo boats and given time for the guard-ship to slip her cable and be under way. Every ironclad sent her launch and pinnace manned and armed, and the smaller vessels their cutters. Such a good look-out was kept that the admiral himself nearly came to grief by trying an "alarm." Without making his purpose known to any one in the fleet, he started in his galley one night to go the round, but had not proceeded very far before a gruff hail and a rifle bullet unpleasantly close warned him to stop, and the next moment a heavy ship's launch came swiftly alongside, almost cutting him down, and, before anything could be said, cutlasses were flashing about, and the admiral was a prisoner to his own men. The Turks are like 'burnt children' now, and it will not be their fault if they are caught napping again. The guns are kept loaded at night, as well as the mitrailleuses, of which every ship has two or three pointed over her gunwales, and the crew under arms keep 'watch and watch.' The Russians, however, have no enterprise, and perhaps have more wisely determined, since the failure of the affair at Sulina, not to interfere again with the Turkish fleet.

"The jetty, of which mention has been made, was constructed in the following manner:—The launch of the *Fethi Bulend* was moored abreast of a small landing jetty, and then outside her, 'end on,' a small Turkish brig was moored. Beyond this vessel, again, the *Talia*, a small despatch-boat, was moored, also 'fore and aft,' and then all the open spaces between the ships, the boat, and the shore, being bridged over with planks, a strong compact jetty was formed, by which the people and cattle could march on board the transports. When one of the latter came to receive cargo she merely dropped her bower anchor at some little distance, and then veering her cable, her stern would be hauled on to the *Talia's* bows. This emigration affair is likely to prove a long business. It is not the removal of a few thousand people, but pretty well a whole nation, and how it will all end no one can foresee. The people are flocking down to the coast from all parts, and ships have been de-

tached occasionally to watch the shore and keep the Russians at a distance. The Admiral's tender, the *Sureya*, was sent to bring off people from Pitsounda Point, a little to the northward of Look Low, and the frigate *Mukbir* took in her cargo of emigrants at Gogri, a small town some thirty-five miles to the northward of Soukoum Kalé. Every ship, transport, and ironclad, has made the voyage with emigrants to Trebizonde, and yet not one tithe of the work is finished. Twelve thousand have been landed at this last-named town, and now the others are being sent to the towns further along the coast. Those who have arrived as yet are principally women and children, all of them apparently miserably poor, wretchedly clad, and half-starved. The government authorities are doing their best to feed and place them under cover, and have seized upon all the khans and empty houses for the purpose, but still a good number of the poor wretches have to camp out in the court-yards of the mosques and other open spaces in the town. The Porte should be urged to commence locating the emigrants as soon as possible, and to furnish them with the means of building their houses. Winter will be upon them soon, and unless properly provided for in the meantime, disease will make sad havoc among the refugees. One looks in vain among these women for the famed Circassian beauties. Here and there, it is true, among the younger girls, a pretty face will occasionally be seen, but the generality have a long, drawn, pinched expression, which, taken with the scanty raiment in which they are clothed, tells its own tale of want and privation. The Abasses must be a very prolific race, for nearly every one of the women is accompanied by three or four children, and a mother is sometimes seen nursing two at the same time, twins being evidently anything but rare among them. It is a sad spectacle to see the poor things encamped, with their few household goods, a bundle of old clothes, a mattress or so, and a few earthenware pots and pans on the upper deck of a transport, the little children half-naked running about crying for food. Fortunately, the run is short,

and the weather fine; though a few weeks hence it will be very different. The Turkish government should look to this, and throw the emigration open to private venture. The Abbases have abundance of cattle, maize, and other grain. They would willingly pay well in kind for the safe transport of the rest, and it would be far better that the grain should be removed, if even to be sold in a Western market, rather than it should fall into the hands of the Russians. A short time hence the weather will break up, and shipping operations on the Circassian coast become most difficult and dangerous, and yet at the present rate of progress the embarkation will not be finished for another six weeks.

"Hobart Pacha received his order on Friday, the 11th, and having handed over the command of the station to Vice-Admiral Achmet Pacha, sailed the same evening for Sinope. We touched at Trebizonde the next day, and remained for a few hours, and then went on with the *Makademieh Ilhair* to *Kerrasonde*, the *Shear* transport in company, she having also a cargo of emigrants to be landed at that place. The *Fethi Bulend* having discharged her cargo of refugees on the 10th, returned to *Batoum* to coal, but has been summoned to join the flag with all despatch at *Sinope*. The *Sureya* left *Soukoum Kalé* with Hobart Pacha, but was sent into *Batoum* to fill up with coals. She also has been directed to proceed to the rendezvous, after calling at *Trebizonde* for the mail, so that in a few days the whole squadron will be once more together. Vice-Admiral Achmet Pacha remains at *Soukoum Kalé* to continue the embarkation, and has under his orders the *Mahmoudieh*, ironclad frigate, the *Avni Illah* and *Arsari Shefket*, ironclad corvettes, and the *Mukbir*, wooden frigate. The direction of the transports has been more particularly intrusted to Vice-Admiral Hassan Pacha, who has hoisted his flag in the fine wooden frigate *Selimiye*. He has under his orders four wooden paddle-wheel transports, with power to seize upon any stray Turkish postal steamer which by chance may have found its way either to *Trebizonde* or *Batoum*. What

are Hobart's next movements are only known to himself, but I should think it not at all unlikely you will hear of us later on in the direction of *Kustendje*."

The anticipations of the last sentence were not destined to be fulfilled, for the Porte made little practical use of Hobart Pacha, or of any portion of its fleet for offensive purposes against the Russians. Several reasons seem to have contributed to this. Partly, no doubt, the torpedo boats kept the Turkish ironclads at a respectful distance; and, again, the tendency of modern civilisation being to oppose the destruction of undefended towns, the operations of a fleet are confined to maintaining or contesting the supremacy of the ocean. But it is true, in addition, that Hobart Pacha was every now and then kept inactive or checked on the point of a decisive movement, by the jealousy of the authorities in Constantinople. The sultan's ministers—Mahmoud Damat, his brother-in-law, Saftvet and Edhem Pachas, and one or two others, who retained their influence throughout the campaign—probably acted for the best, according to their judgment or knowledge. Many faults might be pointed out in their management of the war; and their critics did not spare them, whenever results had shown the inadequacy or the failure of their efforts. But it must not be forgotten that at one time they had decidedly got the better of the Russians, in spite of the great superiority of the latter in point of numbers and equipment. We have already seen that the Turks had brought their enemies to bay, both in Armenia and in Bulgaria; and it was only through lack of resources, and through the greater organisation of the Russian armies, that the tide of fortune was turned again. Amongst the unquestionable faults of the Ottoman government was its disposition to suspect and interfere with its generals, and to listen to the promptings of jealousy and favouritism. Mukhtar Pacha was the only commander of an army corps who was left undisturbed in the same command during the whole campaign; and even he was more than once threatened with removal.



It is an established fact that Hobart Pacha was on several occasions prevented from doing what he thought best for the cause of his adopted country; and the jealousy of the sultan's advisers was most frequently assigned as the cause.

There was doubtless some improvement in the intendance and commissariat of the Turkish army between the outbreak of the war and the month of September; but at the best these services were never very efficiently performed. Great abuses were continually being discovered in both; and the central authorities were scarcely able to remedy the evils when they came to light. It was the system which failed, more than the willingness or the energy of individuals; whilst of course a bad system necessarily implies inefficient and dishonest officials. It may be questioned, however, whether there were as many of these black sheep amongst the Turks as there were amongst the Russians; and it is not to the dishonesty of the Mahomedan character that we must look for an explanation of the military disasters of the Ottoman troops.

One of the principal sources of weakness was the absence of efficient transport. A modern army without ample means of transport, especially by rail, labours under the most serious disadvantage when opposed to another army better supplied in this respect. The Turks had, it is true, a railway from Constantinople to the foot of the Balkans; but they had at an early period of the campaign practically abandoned the mountain passes to the invader. Of the stores which they were able to gather together at Adrianople, Philippopolis and Sofia, they could only transport small quantities at a time along the Orkhanie road to Plevna, whilst little or nothing was carried by land into the Quadrilateral. The supplies for the army of Mehemet Ali, and for the fortresses of Shumla, Rustchuk, and Silistria, had to be taken by sea to Varna, at the risk of accidents of various kinds, and at the cost of much delay in shipment, disembarkation, and subsequent transfer across hundreds of miles of very inferior roads.

A Shumla correspondent, writing to the

"Times" on the 7th of August, gave sundry examples of the difficulties with which the Turkish generals had to contend, though, at the same time, he bears testimony to the fair sanitary arrangements of the army, or, at least, to the healthy condition of the men. "Speaking generally," he wrote, "I may say the condition of the army in that respect has hitherto been very satisfactory. The sick of all the troops occupying the tract stretching from the east of the Jantra and to the north of the Balkans are distributed among four principal field hospitals, which are situated at Silistria, Rustchuk, Varna, and Shumla. According to official statistics, the total number of sick lodged in these hospitals is at present 2,300, distributed as follows:—Silistria, 350; Rustchuk, 300; Varna, 460; and Shumla, 1,150. When it is considered that the field hospital in Shumla receives the sick not only of the garrison there, but also of the army of operation at Rasgrad, and of the forces of the army located at Eski Djuma and Osman Bazar, and that the hospital at Varna was opened for the sick among the troops scattered in the Dobrudscha, while the hospitals of Rustchuk and Silistria lodge only the sick of their respective garrisons, it will be seen that, in proportion to the area over which the care of the different hospitals extends, Shumla has the fewest inmates, and Silistria the most. These statistics, it must be added, do not include the soldiers wounded in battle. Moreover, six weeks ago all the sick and convalescent capable of being removed were sent to Stamboul. There have been no epidemics here hitherto, and the cases of typhus fever, scurvy, and dysentery, which at this time of the year are usually prevalent in the East, have not been numerous. In the hospital of Shumla, of which I have the most accurate knowledge, slight fevers and colds are the most common complaints. One-and-a-half per cent. of the cases are scorbutic, and scarcely one per cent. dysentery. The mortality is exceedingly small, and the course of most of the cases does not run beyond a fortnight. The number of fresh admissions into the hospitals is about

counterbalanced by the number of the convalescents.

"According to the conclusion I arrive at by a comparison of past and present statistics, and according to the unanimous opinion of all the European physicians in the Turkish service, the health of the army has not for years been so good as at present—a fact which is all the more surprising when we bear in mind the abnormal condition of the army, and the season of the year, which is anything but favourable to health. This happy result—that the mortality is small, that epidemics are prevented, and that the sick so speedily recover—is due in large measure to the good arrangement of the hospitals, and to the satisfactory treatment and nursing of the sick. But whether the number of hospitals, the medical staff, and the stock of instruments, bandages, &c., will be sufficient after the battles already fought and in view of the battles yet to be fought, is a question which must be answered in the negative. In a far worse condition still are the ambulances, in connexion with which almost everything necessary for the help of the wounded is wanting. In the midst of this sad state of things, however, there shines out with all the greater distinctness the work of the Stafford-House and Lord Blantyre Committees. Carrying out their noble resolution, they have brought to the service of Turkey several field ambulances and the necessary medical equipment. Eight physicians whom they have sent have already, for some time past, been exercising their healing art at the seat of war, and but for them the wounded would often have been without help.

"The commissariat of the Turkish army shows many deficiencies. The feeding in the garrisons is poor, in the army of operation bad. Flesh meat is seldom dealt out, rice and vegetables irregularly, money never. Only the distribution of bread is regular, and saves the troops from starving. That this poor fare suffices for the support of the soldier, and for the fatigues of the long marches he must make, and that at the same time the health of the army

is so good, may well excite astonishment. But it is still more extraordinary that this miserable living in no way affects the spirit and high tone of the troops. The celebrated saying of one of the most distinguished generals of last century, 'that an army marches on its belly,' seems, in the case of the Turkish army, to be falsified. After the concentration of the corps of Ahmed Eyoub Pacha, the troops, officers as well as common soldiers, during their retreat to Rasgrad, had for fully six consecutive days nothing to support them except biscuits. I saw the troops on the evening of the sixth day march into their camp at Rasgrad. They betrayed no ill effects of their long marches and privations; their appearance was in every respect satisfactory, and their only regret was that they were led back instead of forward. Troops which can not only endure such fatigues, but endure them with such spirit, must compel the respect even of the enemy."

One of the Porte's difficulties during a war professedly undertaken for the deliverance of its Christian subjects naturally arose from the temptation of the latter to sympathise with the invaders, and consequently to exhibit a feeling of disaffection towards the government. This feeling was undoubtedly very strong in the European provinces of the north; but it is a notable fact, that in many parts of the Ottoman empire the Christians displayed a sincere loyalty to the sultan, and repudiated the idea that they welcomed, or even needed, the interference of a foreign Power on their behalf. A remarkable interview between the sultan and the Armenian patriarch at Constantinople, held on the 22nd of August, was recorded at the time by a well informed correspondent; and the account is worth quoting, for the evidence which it affords of the fact above stated.

Monsignor Nerses, the Armenian patriarch, went to Yildi Kiosque, at the special invitation of the sultan. "Arriving at the palace, he was met by the master of the ceremonies, who conducted him to a private waiting-room, whence, after the short space of a quarter of an hour, he



was ushered into a magnificent reception chamber. His holiness prepared, on entering, to make the usual low obeisance, but the sultan advanced immediately to shake hands and to prevent this act of homage, and invited the patriarch to take a seat in an arm-chair placed close in front of the sultan's seat. 'Sire,' said the patriarch, 'in the presence of a sovereign like your majesty, it is honour even to stand.' 'Pray be seated,' replied the sultan, and the patriarch then took the chair, making a low salutation. 'How are you?' continued the sultan, also seating himself. 'I hope your health is good. I have long desired to see you, but waited a favourable opportunity. I have great regard for you. Consider yourself at home here, and come to me whenever you have an opportunity.' 'Sire, we do not think of ourselves, but all the yearnings of our nation are turned towards your majesty and the Ottoman army, for whose welfare we constantly pray.' His majesty replied, 'I truly deplore the present times. I, who would not willingly crush an insect, am deeply pained at the shedding of so much innocent blood. God knows, however, I am not responsible for this war, or its consequences.' 'You are truly the greatest of monarchs, Sire; you have surpassed predecessors who came to the throne of Osman in prosperous times, while you have shed glory over the Ottoman banner in time of trouble and adversity.' 'Since my accession to the throne of Osman, I have not enjoyed a single instant's peace or repose.' 'Therein is your majesty's greatness. The whole nation prays day and night that your majesty may be able to carry out during your reign the promises of reform contained in your solemn imperial decrees—the advancement of agriculture, commerce, industry, and public instruction.' 'I am much satisfied with my Armenian nation, and return them my best thanks. I desire you to communicate to the Armenian nation the expression of my satisfaction, and assure them of my affection.' 'I can assure your majesty that the paternal rule of your glorious dynasty is cherished and venerated, not only by the Ar-

menians of Turkey, but by the Armenians of all countries.' 'I thank you, and repeat that the sentiments are reciprocated on my part. I charge you to say to the nation, I am equally well pleased with the Armenian functionaries of the Porte, who have always served with devotion and loyalty. I know that my Armenian nation have suffered much through this war, but they must know that, as the recompense of privations, they will see better days and reap the fruits of their loyalty. I love all my subjects, but particularly my Armenian nation, which under difficult present trials has abundantly shown its long-standing fidelity. I make no distinction between Mussulmans and Christians; all are Ottomans. Religion belongs to God. I gave the constitution'—the sultan used the word in French—'in order that all may repose in brotherly equality.' The patriarch then offered up a prayer for long life to the sultan and success to the army, and for the realisation of the sublime intentions of the sovereign, adding, 'The Armenian nation, closely attached to the throne of Osman, prays for increased power and maintenance.' The sultan crossed his hands on his breast, listening in a religious attitude, bending his head as if in prayer, and repeating several times, 'I thank you.' The patriarch then prepared to rise, but the sultan desired him to stay, saying, 'May God Almighty grant your prayers and that my intentions be accomplished! I grieve very much for the Bulgarian nation, which has failed in loyalty to my throne.' 'Your Majesty justly deplores their treason, but cannot believe that the whole Bulgarian nation is disloyal; it is only a misguided fraction. I implore your majesty for pity for the innocent ones who have not failed in their obedience.' 'I am truly sorry for it, but must repeat that I am not responsible for this cruel bloodshed.' Thereupon, at a sign from the sultan, the master of the ceremonies brought in on a silver salver the Riband of the First Class Order of the Osmanlie, with the plaque, which his majesty ordered to be placed at once round the shoulders of the patriarch in his presence. The

patriarch again recited prayers, adding that he considered this high distinction as an earnest of the sultan's affection for the Armenian nation. 'I confer this decoration,' said the sultan, 'out of regard both for you and my Armenian nation, for which I have great esteem.' They will strive to be worthy subjects of your majesty.' Here the audience ended."

It is only right to add that the patriarch, who thus expressed the loyalty of his co-religionists in August, was, a few months later, appealing to the Powers for their protection, especially in regard to the Armenian Christians of Asia Minor.

We have had occasion to see how philosophically, as a rule, the Turks bore the changing fortunes of the war. Their religious fanaticism, which made them such excellent soldiers in the field, supported them, when out of action, against the many disappointments which they were called upon to endure. They proved themselves, on the whole, eminently patient; and whether we attribute the fact to a superstitious idea of fatality, or to a true religious earnestness, it is certain that they displayed a noble spirit in the presence of misfortune.

There can be little question as to the devoutness of Mahomedans in general. A good illustration is given by a "Daily News" correspondent at the head-quarters of Mukhtar Pacha. Writing on September 17th, he says:—"Now that Ramazan"—a religious feast of the Mussulmans—"has arrived, people seem more intent on their religion than on their military exercises. I don't mean to say that the latter are neglected. Mukhtar Pacha, as rigid a Moslem as exists in the sultan's dominions, is too good a soldier to allow that. But the interval is well taken up with the prolonged prayers which at this season seem to make the Turkish soldier forget his empty stomach, his parched throat, and unlighted cigarette. Whatever may be said of the Turks, they are in their way a strictly religious people, and scrupulous to the last degree in adhering to the external forms of their worship.

"At this austere season, from the moment the dawn colours the eastern sky until the Ramazan

gun booms out into the evening air, not a morsel of food crosses the lips of the soldiers, not even a drop of water, and frequently, when seeing the wistful eye of a trooper turned towards my lighted chibouk, I have proffered my tobacco pouch, it has been motioned away with a self-denial worthy of an eremite of the wilderness. And each of the many times a day as the long-drawn, wailing cry of the Muezzin rises above the murmur of the camp, soldiers are to be seen hurrying eagerly to prayer as to a banquet, and unhappy seems the man on duty who cannot join the serried rows of worshippers who, in company, sometimes in battalion, face toward Mecca and follow the orisons and genuflexions of the Imaum who stands before their centre. Each man takes his place in the ranks, his hands hanging close by his sides. Then he lifts them to his ears, as if to shut out all worldly sounds. Then he lays them on his knees, and bowing his head forward seems lost in contemplation. After a few seconds he sinks to his knees, and leans back upon his heels, and then bowing with his forehead to the earth, exclaims, or rather chants, 'Allah Akhbar' (God is great). Three times he thus bows and chants, and then he stands up, bowing forward, chanting three times 'La Allah il Allah' (there is no God but God). The remainder of the somewhat tedious prayers which follow consists principally, as far as I can make out, of long verses of the 'Koran.'

"In all his simple religious exercises the Turkish soldier is devoutness and attention itself, and it is perhaps most in privacy that this is most apparent. I have frequently come unexpectedly upon some rugged soldier in one of the wild lonely ravines that gash the hillsides around, standing before the ragged overcoat which served him for a praying carpet, and going through his rather active religious motions with a zeal which would do credit to the most self-conscious Pharisee. The stranger who, for the first time, witnesses the united prayer of Turkish soldiers in camp, is considerably puzzled by the selection of heterogeneous articles brought forward to the place of worship, when the Muezzin's call has



concluded. Religious custom requires that each man be provided with a praying carpet of one description or another, and that he take off his shoes as well. One man brings a jagged sheep-skin, another a goat-hide, a third the saddle-cloth of his horse, a fourth, mayhap, his jacket; every one has something or another, on which he may kneel. To see some hundred men thus hurrying to the spot where the blue-robed, white-turbaned Imaum stands, a stranger to their ways might be easily led to imagine them so many persons eager to dispose of their superfluous garments, and about to take advantage of the fortuitous presence of a dealer of Israelitish nationality.

"The Russians, too, have been lately celebrating national festivals. On the 9th ult. we were startled by the thunder of cannon from Karajal, the fortified hill on which their right flank rests. The marshal's long brass telescope was at once put in position, and every field-glass was directed against the frowning heights along which the heavy white smoke-clouds clung in the morning air. We looked in vain for the little secondary smoke-bursts that should have indicated exploding shells. In our advanced positions men ran to their arms and the parapets were black with eager, puzzled soldiers. It was only a salute of twenty-one guns in honour of the anniversary of the czar's coronation. 'May Allah destroy him,' was the appropriate Moslem exclamation when, after due search in a Russian military calendar, the cause of the salute was discovered and conveyed to the soldiery. Three or four days after another blank salute sent us again to our almanack. This time it was an imperial birthday, that of the emperor or czarewitch, I forget which. Whichever it was, the object of the salute had the same Turkish good wishes as on the former occasion."

The practical value and strength of superstition of any kind may be measured by its results. The superstition of the Turk, childish as it may appear to be on the surface, makes him one of the best soldiers in the world. That is not the highest test of religion, but it is a consideration

not to be neglected when we are tracing the history of a war.\*

## CHAPTER XXV.

### PUBLIC OPINION IN RUSSIA.

THE Russians at home had been deeply moved by the events of the war. The pride with which they entered upon the campaign had been gradually humbled by the great reverses experienced by their armies. They had been as confident as the majority of lookers-on that the force of the Russian empire was incomparably greater than that of Turkey, and they were ashamed to find that the despised Mahomedans had utterly defeated the efforts of their generals and soldiers. They had, indeed, never held the bravery of the Turkish troops too cheaply. The experience of past wars had guarded them against such a mistake as this; but it was from past wars, coupled with

\* On this soldierly character of the Mahomedans Mr. E. A. Freeman wrote, in one of his earlier works:—"Mahomedanism is essentially an obstructive intolerant system, supplying just sufficient good to stand in the way of greater good. It has consecrated despotism, it has consecrated polygamy, it has consecrated slavery. It has declared war against every other creed. It has claimed to be at least dominant in every land. And in one sense it has so rightly claimed. So long as the Mahomedan nation is dominant and conquering so long is it great and glorious after its own standard. When it ceases to have an enemy to contend with it sinks into sluggish stupidity and barbarism far viler than that of the conquerors who raised it to greatness. Islam has founded mighty empires, has reared splendid palaces, has accumulated libraries of countless volumes; but it has done nothing for man in the highest earthly capacity as the citizen of a free state. It has done nothing for the higher even of his speculative faculties. By slightly reforming it has perpetuated and sanctified all the evils of the Eastern world, and by its aggressive tenets brought them into direct antagonism with the creed and civilisation of the West. Let individual Mahomedans have the fullest equality with individual Christians, but let not the individual Christian have to recognise a Mahomedan master as his sovereign. So long as a government remains Mahomedan so long must it be intolerant at home. So long will it only be restrained by weakness from offering to other lands the old election of Koran, tribute, or the sword."—*History of the Saracens*.

a knowledge of Turkey's national decline, that they had derived their conviction of their own superiority. Many Russians were exasperated at those whom they held responsible for their defeats, from the imperial commanders at the seat of war to the blundering officials who had mismanaged the organisation of the armies, and to the government at St. Petersburg, who held the supreme direction of affairs.

This feeling was reflected in more than one Russian newspaper; and the criticism of the military authorities was, for a time, both bitter and incessant. The disasters at Zewin and Plevna, at Eski-Zaghra and at Karahassan, drew down upon the various commanders a succession of reproaches and condemnations which was only qualified by a wholesome respect for the censure under which the public press still laboured.

There was a double danger for the Russian government in this discontent, and in its expression in the columns of the newspapers. The condition of society throughout the empire was such as to cause much anxiety to the czar and his ministers. They knew that influences were at work to foment the popular restlessness, and to stimulate the demand for more liberal institutions. They had even made use of associations which, though their present and ostensible purpose was merely to promote an attack upon Turkey, and to liberate the Slavonian subjects of the sultan, might easily become a menace to themselves. The policy of Russia had always been to encourage, more or less privately, the secret societies which undertook useful intrigues in foreign countries. The Greek insurrection of 1821 had been thus prepared and supported by an association having its head-quarters in Odessa, to which the government of St. Petersburg was proved to have rendered great assistance.\*

It has been stated in a foregoing chapter of this book that the war between Russia and Turkey was specially led up to by the action of the Panslavonian committee of Moscow. It may be

interesting here to revert to this committee, which continued its activity throughout the war.

The Russians have systematically claimed, during the last thirty years, the right of directing and assisting the general emancipation of the Slavs, with a view to their absorption. The movement, chiefly promoted in Austria by the Czechs of Bohemia, had, for its principal organ in Russia, the "Moscow Gazette," under the direction of M. Katkoff. It is only, however, since the war of 1866 between Prussia and Austria, and the close understanding between the former country and Russia, that the Russian Panslavonian movement has been openly patronised by the czar and the official world of Russia. The evolution was announced by M. Katkoff in an article which has remained famous. (February 17th, 1867):—"The new era at last begins to shine," said he, "and it is for us, Russians, that it is of momentous importance. That era is ours; it calls to life a new world, kept up to this time in the shade, and in the expectation of its destinies. The Slavonian world, after centuries spent in sorrow and servitude, that world at last reaches the hour of its renovation; what has long been forgotten and suppressed comes again to the light, and prepares for action."

The practical comment on the foregoing solemn utterance was to be given in the celebrated "Ethnological Exhibition of Moscow," and the "Panslavonian Congress," which was its consequence.

In 1864, the "Society of the Friends of Natural Science" of Moscow had resolved to form a collection of "Russian types," as an affirmation of the unity and integrity of the empire. The idea, however, had little success, and in fact had collapsed, when, immediately after Sadowa, under the influence of the sudden impulse given to the Panslavonian propaganda by the Austrian defeat, the suggestion was again taken up, and the intended "Russian Exhibition" became a "Slavonian Exhibition." The important fact is, that it was entirely prepared and arranged under official patronage, the czar and the empress

\* See Finlay, "History of Greece," vol. 6, book 2, for a clear exposition of the character of this association.



openly subscribing large sums of money towards its success, the Grand Duke Vladimir acting as president, and all the great or little officials of the empire being put in motion. The same great event was the occasion of the formation of Panslavonian committees in every foreign country of Slavonian origin. On May 5th, 1867, the Exhibition was solemnly opened by the czar in person in a government building of Moscow. It consisted of a number of figures clad in their national costumes, in the following order: Great Russians, Little Russians, Poles, Slovacs, Czechs, Moravians, Croatians, Dalmatians, Servians, Montenegrins and Bulgarians. In the middle of the gallery, the imperial box was the symbolic centre of the Slavonian world in effigy.

As for the Congress held on the same occasion, and also under official patronage, it assembled delegates, or at all events representatives of the various Slavonic groups above named (with the exception of the Poles). The guests of Russia, solemnly received at the frontier by officials specially sent for that purpose, conveyed through the empire in special government trains, were entertained at numerous banquets in all the principal cities. At the banquet of St. Petersburg the minister of public instruction, Count Tolstoi, was in the chair. The visitors were shown the arsenals and the fleet at Cronstadt, and were entertained by the "Nobility Club," by the army, the clergy, and all the state officials. The great banquet of Moscow, however (with Prince Tcherkasky in the chair), surpassed all others by the enthusiasm displayed, by the significance of the toasts, and the violence of the innumerable speeches pronounced. A significant incident took place when M. Rieger (a Czech delegate) ventured, although in the most guarded terms, to claim some indulgence for the "Polish brothers," those misguided Slavs who systematically refuse to understand the beneficent effect of the Russian conquest. The whole assembly rose at once, protesting tumultuously against the imprudent speaker, and Prince Tcherkasky himself, amidst deafening applause, declared that, "as there is no force which could

make a river wind up to its source, so there is no force which could change anything in the relations established between Poland and Russia." As for M. Aksakoff, another leader of Muscovite Panslavonism, he had previously made the following declaration: "The mission of Russia is to effect the Slavonian fraternity in the Slavonian freedom. Any Slavonian people which declines to fulfil that common mission—which secedes from its brothers and deserts them—loses its own right to existence, and must be destroyed. Such is the immutable law of Slavonian history."

The Ethnological Exhibition and the Congress of Moscow, derided at the time by not a few persons as a childish manifestation, undoubtedly derived an immense significance from the fact that it was held under imperial patronage, on Russian soil. It made a deep impression on Slavonian minds, which began to consider Moscow as a kind of Slavonian Mecca. It was the formal installation of the czar in the post of chief and natural protector of the Slavs of Turkey and Austria; and it has been possible for us, during the last few years, to appreciate its real import. After an interval of ten years, the speech of Livadia was a significant comment on the speeches delivered at Moscow.

Practically the meetings of what has always since been called, in Panslavonian phraseology, the "holy week," had, for their immediate result, to create direct and active connexions between the central Panslavonian committee of Moscow and the various committees of the Slavonian provinces of Austria and Turkey.

We have quoted once before from a speech made by M. Ivan Aksakoff to the Panslavonian committee in October, 1876, and we may here add a few sentences from the same address, showing the spirit of the movement on the eve of the rupture between Russia and Turkey. There can be no doubt that this spirit was genuine in the minds of a vast number of the Russian people, whatever may have been the motives of the Russian government in patronising the Panslavonian agitation.

"The Russian people," said M. Aksakoff, "will not abandon the work which it has begun; of that we may be sure. One cannot but remark that, in the last few days, under the influence of the newspaper correspondence, the public sympathy for the Servians has cooled. Whatever may have been the faults of some Servians towards some Russians, on the whole we are to blame—not the Servians. Yes, we, as a community, as Russia. The Servians cannot be expected to know, and cannot understand, that the help offered to them is merely the result of private efforts. Nor can they understand the peculiar conditions in which we are placed. They write, print, and talk about the help from Russia, 'the millions of Russia.' Under the name of Russia, the Servians and all Trans-Danubian Slavonians do not understand a certain class of society, but the Russian empire in its entirety. In a word, they are not accustomed to distinguish in Russia between the people and the government; and, trusting to Russia, they began a struggle above their strength. The results of this mistaken belief are known to everybody. Towns in flames, hundreds of villages destroyed, the occupation of the third part of their land by the Turks, exhaustion of means, and general ruin. Are we to punish them for their ruin? We must also not forget that the Servians of the principality have fought, not only for their country, but for the deliverance of all the Slavonians who are suffering and dying under the yoke of the Turk, and whose fate is just as near to the heart of the Russian people. *We are in debt to the Servians!* But we shall not long remain so. The Russian people will not allow the Russian name to be disgraced; and the blessed hour, so much hoped for by all, is near when this work, which belongs properly to the state, will pass into the hands of our strong organised government. Being led and aided by the popular force, the government will take into its powerful hands the defence of the Slavs."

A valuable testimony to the honourable sentiments of the Russian people, which, however, can only be received with a qualified concur-

rence, was borne by Lord Radstock, in a letter addressed by him from St. Petersburg to the "Times," in June, 1877. Lord Radstock wrote as follows:—

"I am not in the habit of entering into political questions, but at a time like the present, when a bitterness of spirit, and antagonism in action, begin to appear among a part of the people of England against the Russian nation, I feel (as one who knows something of Russian feeling) that I have no right to be silent when it seems this antagonism is owing to the fact that a considerable part of the English nation are ill-informed as to the state of things here, and have, therefore, been led to the adoption of a policy which is incomprehensible, not only to Russians but to Englishmen who know Russia. There appears to be in the mind of some an idea that the Russians are making the state of things in Turkey only a pretext for national aggrandisement. Having now, for four successive years, spent several months in Russia, and lived almost exclusively with Russians, I can say I never met one person who desired to extend the limits of the Russian empire. The thoughtful among them know that they have much to do in the development of their own country, and shrink from the thought of adding fresh elements of complication to an empire already so large. The present war with Turkey is the result of a national feeling of sympathy for the oppressed, intensified by a reverence for the name of Christian, which is, I fear, incomprehensible to many in England. When the atrocities inflicted on the Christians in Bulgaria were known, ladies of all classes went from house to house to collect money for the help of the sufferers, and it was the poorest, who do not know what the word 'politics' means, that gave the most largely in proportion to their ability. They have a real sympathy for suffering, and especially for those who only suffer because they bear the name of Christian, and their sympathy is happily not quenched by reflections as to 'material interests,' or the possibility of personal loss. There never was a time when peace would have



been in the 'material interest' point of view more acceptable; but sympathy for the oppressed has overbalanced every consideration of prudence, and led to the declaration of war at a time when the emperor, and many around him, believed that peace was most desirable for the prosperity of Russia. Now that war is declared, the strength of the national feeling is evidenced by the large contributions from all parts of the country, and also by the fact, that about five hundred ladies have volunteered to act as nurses (many of them ladies of rank), and are being trained and despatched to the seat of war. In St. Petersburg, which is supposed to be less war-like than the provinces, you can hardly go into a house where the ladies are not working, and many working hard, to supply all that is requisite for the wounded. It may be said that this war arose out of a state of feeling excited by the Russian agents in Bulgaria and Servia. It may be true there were such agents, but if so, they were agents, not of the government, but of a Pan Slavist propaganda, whose views and aims are wholly opposed to, and incompatible with the ideas of the present government; and certainly it was not they who outraged and murdered the thousands of helpless victims, whose sufferings provoked the outburst of national feeling. Others, in England, imagine that because the territory of the Russian empire has increased most remarkably during the last century, therefore there is a deliberate intention of continued annexation, but it must be remembered that we ourselves, in India, surrounded by lawless races, have been compelled, during a like period of time, to annex a far larger population, simply for the tranquillity of our own territory. I am thoroughly convinced, if there was found a means of really securing the improvement of the Christians in Turkey, peace would be hailed with joy by ninety-nine out of a hundred of the population, and by the government, even if there were not one foot added to Russian territory. Consequently I, in common with others, cannot help most deeply regretting that the policy of the English government has

conveyed to the minds of the people of this country that English people are indifferent to the cries and sufferings of the oppressed, and that supposed 'material interests' are the guide to our own national policy, to the exclusion of considerations of the commonest humanity. If England had heartily co-operated with Russia, not only would this war and its war-like consequences have been avoided, but association with England would have given a happy direction towards the establishment of civil and religious liberty in those unhappy provinces, and would indirectly have much strengthened those principles in this empire and elsewhere. English influence would have been exercised in the right direction. I should not have trespassed on your space, but the possibility of the severance of the ties of friendship between the two countries is a very grave contingency, and one which every sane person would look upon as a great disaster, and no effort should be spared to prevent it. Were the two countries united they would exercise a most beneficial influence on Eastern nationalities, whereas divergence of action may lead to complications and troubles of which none can foresee the end."

A more important and more valuable document, however, is a communication from Mr. Mackenzie Wallace to the "Times," dated August 27th, which reflects for us the feelings and judgments of the Russians during the lull at the seat of war which followed the second unsuccessful attack upon Plevna. Under the head of "Sacrifices and Compensations," Mr Wallace writes as follow :—

"When endeavouring to calculate in a rough way the probable cost of the present war, one is naturally led to think of the cause and object of this enormous expenditure. Involuntarily one asks, Why did Russia go to war, and what are her present aims and intentions ?

"This question, though apparently simple enough, contains, in reality, two distinct lines of inquiry—parallel, perhaps, but by no means identical. The influences which caused Russia to declare war last April are not necessarily

identical with the aims which she has at present in view, and we need not accuse her of hypocrisy if we find that the explanations which she now gives are somewhat different from those given six months ago. All the information which I gather here tends to show that she gradually drifted into war without any clearly perceived aim, and now she is endeavouring to explain her conduct theoretically to herself and to others without distinguishing accurately between springs of action and *post facto* justifications. Of the various conflicting winds and under-currents I hope to give an account at some future time, when I shall have obtained fuller information on the subject. For the present I wish to confine myself to the theoretical explanations of her actual position. How do the Russians now explain the foreign policy of their country? What is now regarded as the real object of the war? Above all, what is desired as a moral and material compensation for those enormous sacrifices of men and money? Such are the questions which I propose at present to consider.

"Let us begin our inquiry by consulting the specialists, the men who ought to know more than their fellows. Here, for instance, is Mr. Martens, Professor of International Law in the University of St. Petersburg. Mr. Martens kindly offers his view of the matter in a French *brochure*, entitled '*Étude historique sur la Politique Russe dans la question d'Orient.*' The *brochure* itself I have not yet been able to obtain, but I have before me a Russian *résumé* of its contents. If that *résumé* be correct, Mr. Martens considers that the mission of Russia is to protect the Christian civilisation of Europe against the Mahomedan barbarism of Asia. For centuries she has shown herself true to her mission. She has, however, never isolated herself, and never attempted to settle accounts independently with the Porte. On the contrary, she has always endeavoured to induce the other Great Powers to act with her—a proof that she is not actuated by selfish motives. Thus she acted all through the first half of the present

century, and thus she has acted in the recent negotiations; witness the Andrassy Note, the Berlin Memorandum, and the Constantinople Conference. But now, as formerly, the Turks have shown themselves obstinate, and have insulted Europe by haughtily rejecting the demands of the Powers. In these circumstances, what has Russia done? True to her mission, she has taken upon herself the part of an avenger, and has drawn her sword for the purpose of forcing the Porte to fulfil the just and legal demands of Europe.

"It must be admitted that this is a very ingenious and, in one sense, a most satisfactory explanation. If we could only accept it confidently we might at once withdraw the fleet from Besika Bay, reduce the Mediterranean garrisons, and lay aside all our fears and apprehensions, knowing that at the future Conference we should have nothing to do but to express to Russia our heartfelt gratitude for her noble and disinterested conduct. Unfortunately, Mr. Martens's view has not found favour among his countrymen. They remind him that he is not quite accurate in his statement of the case. 'Russia,' say those who look at the matter from a less ethereal and more common sense point of view, 'may be in a certain sense disinterested, but surely she is not such a Don Quixote as Mr. Martens represents her. It may be seriously doubted whether Europe felt insulted, and certainly she never empowered Russia to act as her champion. Did not Lord Derby expressly protest against any such interpretation? But such a protest was quite unnecessary. Our peasants give their mites and our brothers shed their blood on the battle-fields, neither for the sake of the 'European concert,' which is so dear to Mr. Martens's heart, nor for the sake of any European interest. As the representatives of Europe, we should be obliged to stop when she desired it, and not when we think fit, satisfying ourselves with concessions very like soap bubbles. For that service Europe would perhaps thank us and pat us on the back, but we should thereby awaken little gratitude in the Russian people or



in our Balkan brethren. Russia wished, it is true, to act with the other Powers. For that purpose the government waited patiently, repressed the enthusiasm of the people, and made all possible concessions, but the members of the European concert would do nothing. If we bear alone the burdens of the war, we have alone the right to determine the conditions of peace, and it is absurd to represent us, not as an independent power, but as the champions of insulted Europe.'

"Mr. Martens, as a member of the Belgian Institute of International Law, looks at the question from the diplomatic point of view, and endeavours to allay the fears and suspicions of the Western Powers. Perhaps he may find a few disciples among the west Europeans, who devoutly wish that his words were true; but among his own countrymen he will find none. The few who have taken the trouble to read his pamphlet are indignant that a man calling himself a Russian should so distort facts in order to please foreigners.

"To whom, then, shall we turn for information? Let us try Moscow. The Muscovites have, perhaps, their own 'idols,' in the Baconian sense of the term, but an inordinate desire to please and conciliate Western Europe is certainly not among them. We shall avoid, therefore, the error into which Mr. Martens has fallen. In the shadow of the Kremlin we shall find opinion and feeling which are, at least, genuinely Russian. It is useless, however, to attempt extracting information from those burly, bearded, long-coated merchants whom we see walking about. They are at present thinking more of Nijni Novgorod, where the great annual fair is being held, than of Bulgaria or the Bosphorus. If they have their own ideas about the Eastern question they do not like to talk on the subject, least of all with foreigners. We had better, therefore, go at once to the fountain-head of Muscovite political opinion, and consult Mr. Aksakof, who is at present the chief political oracle in 'the white-stone city.' Mr. Aksakof has no hesitation in speaking out, and, unlike ordinary oracles,

he never gives forth an uncertain sound. What he has to say he proclaims on the house-tops, so that among his more cautious countrymen he has earned the reputation of an *enfant terrible*. What, then, does he say? If we would understand him we must listen attentively, for he looks at the question from an extremely elevated point of view, and his utterances are consequently a little dark, as oracular utterances ought to be. Those who have not been initiated into the mysteries of transcendental politics may at first find his words 'too high to understand,' but let such have patience, and they will discover that the practical conclusions at which he arrives are plain enough. According to his view, Europe is composed, so to speak, of two distinct creeds, differing widely from each other. In the west is the Roman Catholic and Protestant world; in the east, the world of Greek orthodoxy. The former, composed of the Greco-Latin and Teutonic races, is proud, hard-hearted, coldly logical, selfishly aggressive; the latter, composed of the Slavonic race, is humble, benevolent, and imbued with true Christian spirit. Hitherto the western world has played the most conspicuous part in universal history. It has developed a peculiar, outwardly magnificent civilisation, which it aspires to spread over the whole earth; but in this ambitious design it will not succeed, for it will find an insurmountable barrier in the Slavonic race. The orthodox Slavonic race has long been silent, and apparently apathetic, but in reality it possesses an enormous amount of vitality, and certain fundamental principles, which will some day create a higher, purer, truer, and more Christian civilisation than that of Western Europe. It has long been prevented from developing itself freely by the barbarous tyranny of Asiatic hordes on the one hand, and on the other by the less violent but more insidious and more powerful influence of the Teutonic race. But that humiliating period of its history is now drawing to a close. Already the sun of Slavonic emancipation has risen. The indescribable sufferings of the southern Slavs have disclosed to the Russian people a whole world of

brotherhood and brotherly obligations. But, perhaps, the reader of practical mind is tired of these mysterious entities. I shall spare him, therefore, and pass at once to the conclusion of the whole matter:—

“You ask what the Russian people has to do with Bulgaria? Why should it shed its blood and squander its modest fortune in such a cause? Such a phenomenon must seem to you strange, not to say incomprehensible; but to us it appears quite natural. We do not seek military glory or material advantage. We are fighting for the political and intellectual emancipation of the Slavonic race, of which we form a part. As Russia is the only politically independent, powerful Slavonic state, it is our duty to take the lead. Conscience calls and excites us to battle. It is a war for the Christian faith, for the emancipation of our enslaved and oppressed brethren—a great, just, and sacred war, which God has entrusted to Holy Russia. And now she goes forth rejoicing to the bloody feast, loudly and boldly proclaiming the name of God, to the astonishment of the wise-aces of the age!”

“On reading this forcible peroration the reader probably opens his eyes very wide and wishes to know whether all people in Moscow are like Mr. Aksakof. Let us see. Here comes a typical Moskvitch, the occupant of one of those delightful sinecures which confer official rank and decorations without corresponding duties. He reads his ‘Moscow Gazette’ every morning; is looked upon almost as part of the furniture of the ‘English Club’—so called on the *lucus a non lucendo* principle; sleeps regularly for an hour and a half after dinner, spends the evening in card playing and smoking cigarettes, grumbles against St. Petersburg and the Court, but always ‘presents himself’ when any member of the Imperial family visits Moscow—in a word, does everything that is requisite to imbibe the genuine ‘Moscovite’ spirit. Let us ask him what he thinks of Mr. Aksakof and his opinions:—

“What, Aksakof? Ivan Sergevitch, you mean. Ah! Ivan Sergevitch is a splendid fellow—the

most honest in the world. He has his own peculiar ideas about the “brother Slavs” and orthodoxy, but in the main he is right. We are fighting for the Slavs. Perhaps the Turk may not be quite so black as he is painted—the prisoners I see are not bad fellows in their way—but think of the atrocities of the last year, and of the horrors which are now being committed in Bulgaria. It is enough to make one’s blood run cold. *Pomiluite!* Even you hard-hearted, cold-blooded, commercial English, could not help shuddering when you heard of them. Imagine then what we must feel—we who are connected with these people by blood and religion. And when we are trying to do our best for them you English come and say, “You must not do anything; for if you do, you may injure our interests. Let the Turks massacre as many as they choose, English interests are the first thing to be considered.” How can we be otherwise than angry with you? You look quietly at Christian blood being shed as if it was water. But enough of politics. Let us go and have something to eat and a little glass of vodka.”

“However much these three authorities—Mr. Martens, Mr. Aksakof, and the anonymous Moskvitch—may differ in their opinions as to the object of the war, they all seem to agree in representing this country as actuated by entirely disinterested motives. Are, then, all Russians angels of disinterestedness, who think of nothing less exalted than the welfare of Europe, the good of humanity, and similar abstract ideas? Are they all so engrossed with these grand abstract ideas as to forget national interests? Not at all. There are, indeed, some who regard human affairs from the cold summits of philosophical abstraction; but these are few, and I leave them for the present out of consideration. The Slavophil, for instance, who talks like Mr. Aksakof, makes no pretensions to reach elevation of thought. In his opinion the interests of the Slavonic world and the interests of Russia are identical, and consequently Russian patriotism and Slavonic patriotism are one and the same feeling. Men who are not Slavophiles hold simi-



lar views. In emancipating the Slavs from the cruel tyranny of the Turks Russia is performing a noble act, and the emancipated races will be in future her natural allies. There are thus in the policy of assisting the Slavs of Turkey two elements, one of which is disinterested and the other selfish. If Russians commonly speak more of the former than of the latter, they act merely as ordinary mortals generally do. When it happens that there are sublime reasons for taking a step which will bring us personal advantage, we have all a tendency, in explaining our conduct to ourselves or others, to give a marked prominence to the high moral motives. As they are the most honourable, we politely give them the precedence. Russians, being also human beings, do precisely the same. If you hint to a Russian that there are doubtless interested motives in the background, he will probably not deny the fact, but he will beg to explain. Possibly he will begin his explanation by a somewhat disagreeable *argumentum ad hominem*—‘If we acted from purely selfish motives, you would have no right to reproach us, for we should be simply following your worthy example. For weeks you have been dinning into our ears that for you there is nothing in the world but British interests, and that your foreign policy will be influenced by no other considerations. Suppose we made a similar declaration about Russian interests. Would you not call us ambitious, grasping barbarians *sans foi ni loi*? Yet, why should the disinterestedness be all on one side?’ This is a somewhat novel view of the situation, and requires reflection; but before we have time to collect our thoughts, our friend continues—‘We have no intention of acting as you do. The liberation of the Bulgarians was, is, and will be our chief aim. But it does not follow that we must fall into the other extreme and entirely forget our own country. It cannot reasonably be expected that, for all the enormous sacrifices which we are now making, we are to receive no compensation whatever?’

“We are thus brought back to the question from which we started. What is the compen-

sation which the Russians desire for the sacrifices they are making? So far as I can judge they desire three things: the free passage of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles for their ships of war, the acquisition of Batoum, and the recovery of the little strip of land at the mouth of the Danube, which was taken from them and transferred to Roumania by the Treaty of Paris. Such, it would seem, is the little bill that is to be presented to Turkey in the event of the campaign terminating favourably to Russia. Of the real value of these items I shall speak at some future time. For the moment the subject is not much thought of here. . . .

“In conclusion, I wish to make a statement, for which I shall doubtless be soundly scolded by a certain section of the Russian press. It is this: I am firmly convinced that if the Russians had, six months ago, known, and clearly realised all that they know now, war would never have been declared. No one ventures as yet to say this publicly, but I have more than once heard it admitted in private by people who may be regarded as very good reflectors of public opinion. Let it not, however, be supposed that Russia will on that account hasten to conclude peace. Until she has gained at least one great victory she cannot think even of an armistice.”

This view was perhaps as fair and impartial as we could have expected to be taken, and it expressed the sentiments of Russians with much apparent fidelity. Two things are beyond question, namely, that the bulk of the Russian people were earnestly desirous of liberating the Slavonic Christians from the Turkish oppression, and that the Russian government, and a large number of Russian politicians, had motives beyond and behind this, looking to an ulterior selfish end of their own. In addition to these there was a third fact, to which reference has already been made—the existence in the middle and lower orders of the Russian people, amongst the merchants, the students and the peasants, of a wide-spread aspiration for increased freedom, both in social and political life, which undoubtedly gave grounds for anxiety to the czar

and his advisers. Nor was this the only ground for anxiety. As early as 1875, in the words of a recent writer,\* Russia seemed to be in a perilous condition. "Embroidered in financial difficulties, distracted by intestine plots, and plagued with an administrative corruption so deep that its effects were felt under the form of a festering discontent in all classes, it was evident that a fierce crisis was approaching, and that the first phase of it would be war. Corrupt states in difficulties always think of war; and Russia had one of those big, ill-paid, ill-officered armies which, if not turned to account for the purpose of slaughtering foreigners, are apt to become mutinous at home."

It is probable enough that the danger of revolution was one of the principal reasons which urged the official world of St Petersburg to engage in the war of 1877. Conspiracies, plots, and projected insurrections, were being continually discovered by the Russian secret police; and persons in every rank of life were found to be implicated in them. Executions, floggings, banishment, instead of suppressing, only seemed to stimulate these agitations, and many Russians confidently expected a serious attempt to overthrow the government, more extended and better organised than any of those which had been detected.

It was only in recent years that men had begun to talk of Nihilism in Russia. Imported from Germany,† this new form of Socialistic doctrine was rapidly accepted by the masses of the Russian people, and soon came to the front in fresh conspiracies.

A very important trial of Nihilists, which extended over many months, and created a vast amount of interest both in Russia and abroad, came to an end in February, 1878. In connection with this trial a number of facts came to light concerning the Nihilist associations; and

we may quote here a paper\* which sums up what was ascertained even from the official records of the Russian authorities. The trial, observes the writer, "has proved beyond doubt that the whole of Russia is infected with revolutionary doctrines, that immediately one secret society is broken up two fresh ones take its place, and that the government is utterly unable to cope with an element which every year is growing more and more beyond its power. Of the one hundred and ninety-eight individuals charged with conspiracy one hundred and sixty have been found guilty, and, as usual in such cases, have either been sentenced to various periods of imprisonment in a fortress, or dispatched to populate the outlying provinces of the empire. In consequence of the vastness of the association the members have been placed in the dock in groups of ten or a dozen at a time, and by this means an opportunity has been given to the counsel of the excluded defendants to inveigh vehemently against the injustice of trying prisoners in their absence. Although the proceedings have taken place in a small law court with a partially packed audience, scenes of the greatest disorder have not unfrequently occurred; and on one occasion, when all the Nihilists were assembled, they created such a disturbance that the more violent had to be dragged by force from the dock. No reports of the trial have been allowed to appear in the papers, except a short official *resume*, but permission has been accorded to publish the voluminous *Acte d'Accusation*, and as this document is nothing more nor less than a lucid and circumstantial history of the conspiracy written in an impartial manner, the Russian public have probably as clear a notion of how revolutionary societies are started and maintained in Russia as if they had attended the court itself. Furnished with one of these documents a person is in full possession of the *modus operandi* of founding secret associations; and from what we know of Russian students we have no doubt that it serves as an ad-

\* "The Russians of To-day," by the Author of "The Member for Paris," chap. 35.

† See an article on the subject in the "Nineteenth Century" for June, 1873.

\* In the "Globe," February 13, 1873.



mirable text-book to the future Tchikovskis and Kooropathins of St. Petersburg.

"The present Nihilist association was started in 1873 at St. Petersburg by certain individuals who had escaped conviction at a trial of Socialists, which had then recently come to a close at the capital. At first the operations of the conspirators were of an isolated and desultory character, but towards the end of the year a certain Nicoli Tchikovsky, a university student, conceived the idea of combining their efforts, and without much difficulty succeeded in carrying his purpose into effect. From that time the leading coterie of conspirators was always known after its originator, and to be one of the famous 'Tchikovtsi' was an ample guarantee for unbounded enterprise and skill in the dissemination of subversive doctrines. For some months the proceedings of the 'Tchikovtsi' were confined to correspondence and intercourse by emissaries with the Russian refugees and foreign Socialists at Geneva, from whom pamphlets were received, and also Nihilist principles, both of which were in their turn passed on to the 'circles' or centres which were then forming all over the country. Comprehensively speaking, by Nihilism the 'Tchikovtsi' meant the destruction of all the upper grades of society before establishing a peasant commonwealth that was to have ushered in the millennium. Had the 'Tchikovtsi' been of a motto-making tendency, 'Chaos before Creation' would have aptly expressed all they meant by their doctrine of Nihilism or Nothingness. The reduction of society to the one dull level of universal peasantry was the leading principle of the Nihilists, but there were among their number many persons who joined the conspiracy solely to agitate in favour of free institutions. Such men as Yarvitz, the landowner who sold his estates, or Voinorsky, the affluent merchant of Penza, who supplied the society with several thousand roubles, or ladies of title who worked disguised among cotton spinners at Moscow in order to propagate their opinions, undoubtedly desired only the establishment of such liberty of the person and

press as should loosen the gag which successive czars have tightened round public opinion in Russia. At the close of 1873 the police became aware of the existence of the association, and broke up several 'circles' at St. Petersburg, among them the 'Tchikovtsi,' who fled to the provinces, and there setting up fresh 'centres' aggravated the evil a hundredfold. In fact, the dispersal of the 'Tchikovtsi' did so much good for the association at large, that by the summer of 1874 it had established ramifications all over the empire, from the Prussian frontier to the Pacific, and from Archangel to Samarcand. Curiously enough, many of the most energetic of the new members were men who had been exiled to outlying provinces of Russia for the part they had played in previous conspiracies. These individuals manufactured the false passports, forged the false roubles, and in their particular districts exerted more influence than the local administration itself. A large quantity of the subversive literature intended for circulation was smuggled across the frontier from Germany; but printing presses existed in all the large towns, and from these were struck forth thousands of circulars, songs, and pamphlets, many of which at present lie hid in the private collection of forbidden books which most Russians, even state officials, keep secreted in their houses.

"The work of propagandism was carried on in an elaborate manner. Under the pretext of teaching the workmen to read and write, a large number of artisans employed in the outskirts of the capital were invited in detachments to the lodgings of the students, and there, after a few weeks' preliminary instruction in pothooks and hangers, gradually talked into Nihilism. At these little 'self-help' *séances* female students used to attend, notably a certain Miss Korniloff, a lady who had travelled a good deal, and who dished up her Nihilist opinions in the guise of romantic adventures. As soon as a workman was found to be thoroughly impregnated with Nihilism he was furnished with funds by the association, and sent to the provinces to infect the people there.

At most of the manufactories of St. Petersburg an agent was maintained by the association, and supplied with books to distribute among the workmen. The 'Tchikovtsi' also emulating the example of the founder of modern Russia, betook themselves to various trades. Some became apprenticed to farriers, and in course of time opened smithies; others turned tailors, butchers, and cobblers; and it was at a boot manufactory established by an emissary at Saratoff that the police first laid hold of the thread of the conspiracy. In the *Acte d'Accusation* is a curious list of the trades and professions taken up by the 'Tchikovtsi' in order to bring themselves into closer communication with the people, from which it would appear that there was not a single walk of life, save that of policemen, that was not filled by a Nihilist. Lady 'Tchikovtsi's' acted as midwives and indoctrinated their patients during their confinement; princesses with blood in their veins, descended from Rurik, bore the hardship of a factory girl's life in the factory girls' dens of Moscow; students, discarding their favourite 'Buckle's civilisation' for the crossing sweeper's broom, acted as beggars in order that they might more readily 'get inside the skin of the masses.' In the provinces peripatetic Nihilists wandered about from fair to fair, or, disguised as pilgrims and pedlars, disseminated their opinions at wayside villages. If the true history of the Nihilist proceedings between 1873 and 1875 could only be written by a 'Tchikovtsi,' it would be one of the most remarkable revelations that have come to light since the disclosures of the Dekabrists.

"The expense incurred in carrying on the work of propagation was very heavy, large sums being expended in despatching emissaries from one part of the empire to the other. But the self-devotion of the Nihilists was fully equal to the occasion, and not only did wealthy landowners mortgage their estates, but peasants and workmen paid regularly large subscriptions to the fund. In the *Acte d'Accusation* the gradual growth of the conspiracy, the curious circumstances that led to individuals joining the asso-

ciation, the adventures of pedlar propagandists, the midnight meetings of the 'Tchikovtsi,' their songs and their lectures, and the ruses adopted by the police to ferret out the secrets of 'the circles,' read like the pages of a romance, and fully bear out the opinion expressed by the Premier some time ago, that secret societies were exerting greater influence on the history of Europe than the public gave them credit for. In the end, the association became so powerful that it grew careless. A cobbler propagandist was sent to Saratoff to set up a store. In less than a fortnight resident revolutionists mustered so strongly at the nightly meetings that the suspicions of the police were aroused. A search was accordingly made, and papers discovered which, when examined at Moscow, threw such a light upon the conspiracy that the spy police were able to follow it through all its ramifications. One by one the 'circles' were pounced upon and the leaders arrested, and in the end tons of revolutionary literature were transmitted from the provinces to St. Petersburg, together with one hundred of the principal Nihilists, who were kept imprisoned in the fortress of the capital more than two years before they were placed on their trial.

"The 'Tchikovtsi' conspiracy, as it ought to be called, has now been officially disposed of, but the only real result of the trial has been to show that the police are totally unable to suppress the secret societies of Russia. Within the last twelve months a dozen other illicit associations have been brought to light at St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Odessa. At the latter place there are 400 Socialists in prison awaiting trial; and only a short time ago a fight had occurred between the police and the conspirators during the breaking up of another organisation. As most of these associations have been discovered by accident, and not by the vigilance of the police, there are good grounds for believing that many monster revolutionary societies still flourish whose existence is not known to the spy department. Banishment has no effect in checking the evil, nor yet incarceration in the



terrible salt mines of Siberia. Wherever exiled the revolutionary enthusiasts of Russia, whether Socialists or Nihilists, or 'Tchikovtsi,' or any other sect for promoting the same object—free institutions—unless kept in solitary confinement obstinately persist in propagating their opinions, and, as we have seen, are sometimes more dangerous after their banishment than they ever were before. It is noteworthy, also, that with each successive trial the public of Russia take greater interest in the proceedings, and that the most gifted members of the bar range themselves on the side of the conspirators. Sooner or later it is evident the czar will have to slacken his despotic authority, and the sooner the better, for the yearly exile of several hundred of the rising generation of Russia cannot go on indefinitely without, in the end, provoking results fatal to the interests of the Romanoffs."

Not long before the termination of this trial, the attempt by Vera Sassulitch on the life of General Trepoff, chief of the St. Petersburg police, had created a vast amount of interest throughout Russia; and her unexpected acquittal by a jury on the 12th of April, 1878, served to intensify the interest, and to command attention to the condition of society in the empire.

Before turning to a new subject, we are inclined to adduce the evidence of experts and eye-witnesses to the condition of the Russian army in the field, as we have already done, in the last chapter, for the Turkish army.

At the beginning of the Turko-Russian war it had been predicted that the invaders of Turkey would soon find themselves attacked by fevers and diseases of all kinds, and that the troops would be destroyed in hundreds and thousands by the effects of a hot Bulgarian summer. These evil prophecies were thoroughly falsified. There had, indeed been considerable mortality up to the month of August, but not more than there always is in the case of a numerous army. Even in Dobrudscha, the most unhealthy district into which the Russians had penetrated, the losses were by no means abnormally great. The sanitary precautions taken by generals and privates

alike doubtless saved the lives of vast numbers and prevented any serious epidemic disease. Perhaps nothing contributed so largely to the comparative healthiness of the Russian armies than the cleanly habits of the Muscovite soldiers, who never lost an opportunity of bathing, whenever they came to or rested at a place where that was possible.

A "Daily News" correspondent at the headquarters before Plevna, writing on the 19th of August, declared that the climate of Bulgaria was very healthy, and that the condition of the troops was "exceptionally good." "There had been no rain of any consequence, until five days ago there was a steady downpour, which lasted two days, and rendered the roads very muddy and filled some of the mountain streams to overflowing. The sky has now cleared again, and we shall probably have another long spell of dry weather. The hospital service is well organised, and besides the military hospital and ambulance service there is that of the Russian Red Cross, and others maintained by private societies. The sick and the wounded are therefore well cared for, and the mortality is very slight. The commissariat service seems likewise to be well managed, and I hear no complaints from the soldiers of insufficient or bad food. I have many times had occasion to try the soldiers' fare when I could not easily procure any other, and must say that, for making a good soup, the Russian soldier is unrivalled. Their rations are excellent in quality and sufficient in quantity, and I have not heard any complaints of their failing, or of the soldiers going even a single day without food.

"There are complaints, I believe, about the Russian artillery. It is said the guns have not the range that was expected of them, owing either to inherent defects in the guns themselves, or the bad quality of the powder furnished. But the service of the artillery is excellent, and capable of making all that is to be made out of the guns. The horses of both artillery and cavalry are still in excellent condition, with the exception of some of the Cossack cavalry, which have been overworked. The Russian engineer ser-

vice, with the famous Todleben at its head, is said to be the best in Europe. If this be true, all I can say is, that the engineer service had better do something to justify its reputation. I never in my life saw roads and bridges in the condition in which they are used by the Russian army. Even the Carlists did better than this. The roads and bridges literally take care of themselves; and had the Russians had an ordinary enemy to deal with, they might meet with a disaster from this cause alone. There appears to be absolutely nobody to look after them. The Russian staff is, of course, in a great measure responsible for this state of things; and the Russian staff, I should say, is by no means the best in Europe. Everything that depends upon the staff is done in a careless slipshod manner that is not to be mistaken. If the head of the staff can commit such blunders as I have already pointed out, it is not to be wondered that the rest should not be up to their work. Of the troops of the line it is unnecessary to speak. The Russian soldier is beyond all praise. The officers themselves say, 'Ah, if we were half as good as our soldiers, the Russian army would be the best in the world.'

"As to the officers of the line, the company officers and heads of regiments are undoubtedly excellent, and will compare favourably with officers of the same rank in any army in the world except the Prussian. But the same cannot generally be said of the battalion commanders, who are proverbially careless, neglectful, and indifferent. The reason for this difference is obvious, and is more or less the result of a law decreed some few years ago. By this law company officers are made more dependent on their good conduct for their positions and promotion than they formerly were, and more than is possible with regard to the heads of battalions. The command of a company may be given to a lieutenant, even when the company has its captain, should the latter show himself incapable or negligent; and as the actual command of a company brings an addition to the pay of five hundred roubles, the lieutenants are very anxious to show

themselves capable of commanding a company, while the captains who have companies are careful by no neglect of duty to give occasion for losing their commands and being simply attached to the regiment.

"Once the captain becomes a major, however, and receives the command of a battalion, the case is different. He then has little to fear and little to hope for but his retirement and his pension. Unless he does something very bad, his battalion cannot be taken from him; and unless he has some opportunity to really distinguish himself, or unless he has powerful friends, it is difficult for him to get a regiment. The consequence is, that he generally settles down into an apathetic, indifferent officer, who barely does his duty and no more, with nothing better to look forward to. The commanders of regiments are a much better class of men. They are either those officers who distinguished themselves in the lower grades, and were promoted for bravery, a brilliant action, or great and undisputed cleverness, superior education and intelligence; or else officers from the Guard, men belonging to families with position, education, and fortune, generally a superior class of men. They are not often either very studious or very much given to consuming the midnight oil—at least for purposes of study, but they are brave, clever, active, and intelligent, with honour and reputation at stake, and, taken all in all, a very good class of officers.

"When we come to the generals we find ourselves for the most part among a different class of men, especially if we take the older ones. The period of service of the greater part of these dates from before the Crimean war, and although there are many exceptions to this statement, they cannot, upon the whole, be considered a superior, or even a moderately good set of men. They are rather below than above the average, and do not compare favourably with the class of younger officers that are growing up under them. The reason for this difference may be attributed in great measure to the following circumstances: At the close of the Crimean war,



the feelings of the Russian people were most intensely excited against the government and against the army, in consequence of the defeat, and the conclusion of what was universally regarded as a disgraceful and dishonourable peace. The violence of this feeling, especially against the army, may be judged by the following incident. There was a regiment, or the remnant of a regiment, that had lost twice its number in the siege of Sebastopol, that had distinguished itself among the bravest of the brave, and when on its way home, passing through the streets of a large town, shattered and broken, reduced to one-tenth of its normal number, began to play a victorious march; when the population, rich and poor, young and old, noble and peasant, rose up as one man and began to hurl stones and mud at the poor fellows, who were expecting a very different reception, to insult them with cries of 'Cowards,' 'Runaways,' and asking them why they did not play that march when before the enemy.

"The popular feeling was so strong against the army that for two or three years the government bent before it, and neglected the army; the service became unpopular, and the best and bravest of the officers who had distinguished themselves in the war, the men of good families, and those who were capable of profiting by the experience gained, who had become really splendid officers in the stern ordeal of battle, became disgusted and indignant at the treatment they received, resigned their commissions, and either retired into private life or embraced civil professions. These are the men who should have been the generals of to-day. When they retired, their places were filled by men of an inferior class, whose want of means prevented their retiring into private life, or whose want of education prevented their adopting a civil profession, or whose want of sensibility made them indifferent to the contumely heaped upon them. And these are the men who are the generals of to-day. Naturally, there are among them a few who remained from a sense of duty and a love of their profession, and one of these is General Nepoko-

itchitsky. There are others among the younger officers who have achieved distinction since the Crimean war, either on the field of battle, as General Skobeleff; in the Cabinet, as General Levitsky; or by their writings on tactics and strategy, as General Dragomiroff; but these are few, and even of these there may be some who, like General Levitsky, will not come through the present war without damage to their laurels."

One important element in the Russian army contributed as much as any other to the ultimate success of the invasion; we mean the Cossack horsemen. An interesting historical account of these useful auxiliaries of the Muscovite troops is given by a writer in the "Globe," from which we will quote the following passages:—

"It was at the battle of Pultusk, in December, 1806, as Colonel Denison shows in his admirable 'History of Cavalry,' that Cossacks made their *début* in Western warfare. General Benningsen then employed them for the first time to cover and conceal the formation of his regular troops, and so well did they perform this duty that military scientists at once became aware of a new factor in the game of war. In the following year Napoleon himself arrived at a similar conviction, when the hardy light horsemen of the North almost destroyed Augereau's corps at the battle of Eylau. Up to this date, the French cavalry had no rival in the field. The annihilation of the whole military force of Prussia after the disastrous day of Jena was due to the vigour with which Murat pressed the pursuit. Contingent after contingent of the retreating army had to surrender to that ubiquitous cavalier, who, by dint of almost miraculous activity and energy, always managed to come upon the Prussians in the nick of time to prevent concentration and reorganisation of their scattered and demoralised columns. At last, however, Murat found an equal of the splendid cavalry he commanded so well in the fierce, uncouth-looking horsemen the czar recruited in his least civilised provinces. After the sanguinary fight at Eylau Benningsen retreated, and Murat thought that he would be able to deal the same destruction to the Rus-

sians as he had done to the Prussians after Jena. He reckoned without his host. His cuirassiers got sadly mauled when attempting to delay Benningsen's retrograde movement on Konigsberg, and from that date Napoleon's star began to wane. Colonel Denison remarks justly enough that this campaign was the first ever carried on by the French emperor 'in which his successes were not decisively and vigorously followed up.' Within a very few years Napoleon received his *coup de grâce* from the Cossack. The French army might possibly have wintered at Moscow, although the greater part of the city was burnt, but for the certainty of being reduced to starvation. Platoff, the gallant Hetman of the Don Cossacks, surrounded the ancient capital of Muscovy with a *cordon* of horsemen, so that it became impossible for the French to collect supplies. At last the word was given to retreat from the city whose capture Napoleon had imagined would bring the czar to his knees. Then it was that the Cossack became a terror to the huge columns that were endeavouring to get back anyhow to the regions they had left some months before in all the pomp and majesty of war. Every straggling detachment was cut off, every convoy harassed unceasingly, and, when occasion offered, these terrible centaurs of the desert would make bold swoops on the main body itself, convinced of their ability to get off without much loss, owing to their lightness and knowledge of the country. How they subsisted no one knew, but there they were, an ever present portent of the dismallest sort.

"As he was then, in himself and his manner of fighting, so is the Cossack now. Only in one military particular is he altered. During the struggle against Napoleon, the Cossacks had but little discipline. Like the North American Indians and the Tartar cavalry of the Chinese army at present, their method was to swarm in isolated bodies round an enemy, each *sotnia* acting pretty nearly for itself, and having a regard to its own safety independently of the others. To a certain extent, this method of fighting still obtains with them, but their disci-

pline is more strict; thus a commander can keep them better in hand than when Platoff hurled his wild squadrons at the chivalry of France. Captain Nolan, in his 'Cavalry Tactics,' gives the opinion of a distinguished French officer, General Morand, regarding the special merits of the Cossacks in the campaign of 1812. After dilating on their hardihood and wonderful mobility, the general thus speaks, in the bitterness of defeat:—'What a magnificent spectacle was that of the French cavalry, flashing in gold and steel under the rays of a June sun, extending its lines upon the flanks of the hills of the Niemen, and burning with eagerness and courage. What bitter reflections are those, of the ineffectual manœuvres which exhausted it against the Cossacks, those irregular forces, until then despised, which did more for Russia than all the regular armies of the empire!' One has but to read the history of that tremendous struggle, without prejudice, to reach the conclusion that the Cossacks, and not the snows of Russia, broke the military power of Napoleon. How much more formidable, then, must this ruthless nomad be now, when he is well-armed, well-horsed, well-clothed, and fairly disciplined? The late capture of Tirnova, a fortified place, by cavalry, with a small contingent of light infantry, excited some suspicion that treachery must have been at work in the garrison. Yet almost exactly the same thing happened in 1813, when a flying column of Cossacks and some foot soldiers took the important city of Hamburg by a *coup de main*. Bolder still was the exploit of General Tchenicheff, when, with only three thousand of these troopers and four light guns, he dashed across a great part of Germany, swept down upon Cassel, and compelled Jerome Bonaparte to fly from his newly-created kingdom of Westphalia. These, then, are the sort of horsemen with whom the slow-moving Turk has to deal. Quick as lightning in his assault and retreat, hardy as his own ewe-necked horse, full of brute courage, with a wonderfully acute scent for supplies, and not very particular about paying for them, utterly remorseless, the Cossack



falls upon a hostile country like a demon of destruction. There is no getting away from his thirsty lance, no assuaging his fierce fury, no appeasing that innate devilry which makes him regard cruelty to his fellow creatures as a delightful pastime. Mercy to the conquered is not a part of the Cossack creed."

As regards the health of the troops, however, a different state of things was experienced some six months later, when great numbers of the Russians died of fever. Amongst the Turkish prisoners the mortality was terrible; and we will anticipate so far as to repeat details which were printed at the time in the *St Petersburg Golos*, in February, 1878. At Revel, out of three hundred and seventy-four Turkish soldiers, one hundred and five died from typhus and small-pox. At Vratka, out of a detachment of four hundred more than a half were suffering from some malady or other. Seventy of the prisoners had fallen out of the ranks and died on the road—this in the very heart of Russia. At Novgorod typhus spread from the prisoners, who brought it from Kars, and caused great mortality among the inhabitants. At Kisheneff every train passing through on the way to Russia left at the station several corpses of men who had died during the journey. Round about Alexandropol and other neighbouring towns in Armenia the epidemic of typhus caused greater mortality than the plague in Persia. In one village alone one hundred and twenty children died during six weeks. The spread of disease was entirely owing to the stupidity of the authorities, who took no precautions to ward off infection. Thus the typhus-infected Turkish prisoners from Kars were permitted to stay in the sanitary camp at Alexandropol during their march to Tiflis, and communicated the disease in such a virulent form to the patients in the hospitals that some buildings were entirely cleared of their occupants, even the doctors and nurses succumbing with the rest. The fever stream, as it was called, extended in a broad, thick band across Armenia, from Erzeroum to Tiflis, including in its limits twenty

thousand sufferers; thence trickling through the Caucasus, all over European Russia as far north as St. Petersburg. The medical authorities at Tiflis were ordered to make arrangements for fourteen thousand Turkish invalids lying ill at Erzeroum. At Tiflis the Turkish prisoners died at the rate of fifty a day.

We have already said something of the alleged cruelties of the Russians towards the Mahomedans in Bulgaria. It may not be amiss to give the testimony of two impartial witnesses on this subject—Colonel Wellesley, the English military *attaché* at the Russian head-quarters, and Mr. Zorab, consul at Erzeroum.

Colonel Wellesley wrote to Lord Derby, on the 6th of August, as follows:—

"My Lord—On my arrival from Bulgaria I had the honour to report verbally to your lordship the effect created at the Russian Imperial head-quarters, as also generally in the Russian army, by the repeated appearance in the English press of apparently well-authenticated cases of cruelty on the part of the Russian troops. These accusations, said by the Russian authorities to be virtually without foundation, made so deep an impression in Russia, and especially in the Russian army, that it was considered advisable that I should proceed to England, with the object of submitting to Her Majesty's government all the facts which, owing to my having been attached to the Imperial head-quarters, and owing also to my having visited many Bulgarian villages, have come to my immediate knowledge. Your lordship is aware that, although attached to the Emperor of Russia's staff in Bulgaria, I have not been at the front, nor have I visited personally the villages in which the alleged cruelties are supposed to have been perpetrated; but I have nevertheless seen many trustworthy persons, both Russian and English, who have been present at the various engagements of the war, and who, without exception, deny having witnessed a single case of massacre or cruelty on the part of the Russian soldiers. During my stay at the Imperial head-quarters I was daily in communication with persons going to and re-

turning from the front; and when the newspapers commenced to draw the attention of the public to alleged Russian atrocities I made it my especial business to inquire into the matter so as to be able to communicate to your lordship the real facts of the case. The results of the inquiries I made, not only, as I said before, of Russians, but also of Englishmen, have led me to the firm and honest conviction that the statements of Russian cruelties are entirely without foundation. It is of course possible that such cases may have occurred without their having come to the knowledge of myself, or of those from whom I obtained my information; but it is scarcely possible that wholesale massacres could have been perpetrated by the Russian troops without the facts having reached the ears of the many correspondents of English newspapers who have watched the military operations from the commencement of the war, without being in any way restricted as to their movements. I had many opportunities of questioning these gentlemen, some of whom represented papers decidedly hostile to the policy of Russia, but they one and all emphatically denied having witnessed any such acts as those of which the Russian soldiers have been accused. On the other hand, they have testified to many acts of kindness on the part of the Russians towards Turkish prisoners, with whom they even frequently shared their rations. The reports of English correspondents from Shumla respecting the wounding of many women and children by the Russians are accounted for at the Imperial head-quarters in the following manner: A short time since some Russian cavalry came across what was considered to be a Turkish convoy leaving Rustchuk, and summoned it to surrender. The Turks replied by firing on the cavalry, which led to a *mêlée*, in which women and children may easily have been either killed or wounded, for the supposed convoy turned out to be a caravan of Turkish peasants leaving Rustchuk with their household goods. Orders were given by the emperor to have this matter thoroughly investigated, but the report had not

been received when I quitted head-quarters. It is my duty to add, that, although I utterly disbelieve in the alleged Russian atrocities, I feel sure that the present is a war in which little quarter is given or expected on either side. Cases of plundering by the Russian troops have come to my knowledge, but not to any great extent. I have also heard of many cases of incendiarism and plunder on the part of the Bulgarians, but I believe that every effort is made by the Russian authorities to check these barbarous and revengeful people; and I have known cases where Turkish peasants have actually applied for a Cossack guard to protect them from Bulgarian attack. In conclusion, I will only add that my long experience of Russian soldiers has taught me to look upon them as good-natured and kind-hearted, and quite incapable of such wanton acts of cruelty as those which are attributed to them."

Consul Zorab wrote to the Earl of Derby as follows:—"My Lord, I have read with surprise the protest entered by the Porte against the Russians for atrocities perpetrated by them in Bulgaria and Asia Minor. As regards what may have taken place in Bulgaria I can, of course, say nothing; but, as to what relates to this part of Turkey, I am bound to state I have been unable to gather any information which can justify the accusation; on the contrary, from Bayazid to Ardahan, the conduct of the Russian troops towards the inhabitants has been reported as humane and just, alike to Mussulmans and Christians. Severity has, I am told, been sometimes employed, but only when villagers have provoked it by trying to escape from the villages after being told that, by remaining in their homes and attending to their labours, they would be protected and cared for. The Turkish government brings forward, as evidence to justify its accusation, the conduct of the troops at Ardahan after its capture. I hardly think a more unfortunate choice of evidence could have been made. I have seen many persons, Mussulmans and Christians, who were in Ardahan during the attack, and for some time after, and from all I have heard only praise of the Russian authorities. Not more than a week



since one of the hospital dressers, a Mussulman, was showing me the bandages, oiled linen, &c., which had been given to him by the Russian doctors for the use of the wounded whom he escorted to Erzeroum, and he was warm in his expressions of gratitude at the conduct of the Russians towards himself and the wounded. The authorities here have, on two or three occasions, stated to me that atrocities have been perpetrated by the Russians; but when I asked them to bring forward specific accusations, so as to enable me to report them, they have been unable to do so."

About the same time the German government took occasion to communicate to the English government the "reserve" with which they had received the statements of the Porte against the regular Russian troops. The whole evidence, in short, goes to prove that these regular troops were rarely, if ever, to blame for the worst of the crimes laid to their charge.

## CHAPTER XXVI.

### OPINION IN ENGLAND.

It would be an absurdity to write a contemporary account of the Turko-Russian war for English readers without tracing from time to time the current of opinion in this country on a series of events by which it was so deeply stirred. We need, therefore, make no apology for interposing a brief review of the sentiments expressed in England during the summer of 1877, in connexion both with the war itself and with the conduct, by the English government, of its foreign relations.

The Cabinet, with Lord Beaconsfield at its head, consistently pursued its policy of strict neutrality between the two belligerents, and, at the same time, of caution and suspicion as against Russia. It recognised the fact that Russia's professions were thoroughly honourable and it had seen no reason to suppose that

she would overstep the line marked out by England as defining her own interests in the East. It never simulated what it could not feel—confidence in Russia's disinterestedness, and sympathy with the acts of her government; and for the rest it awaited the termination of the war, and the revelation of the ultimate terms of peace.

The negotiations between the two Cabinets, during the months of June and July, which have been reviewed in a former chapter, clearly illustrated this attitude of professed unselfishness on the part of Russia, and ill-concealed suspicion on the part of England. The general English public were, of course, not enlightened on the subject of the Russian despatches until some time later; but it was already understood by them that the czar and his ministers were deeply pledged to moderation, and there was a large section of Englishmen who were determined to accept the word of the Russian diplomatists until it had been shown to be valueless. The country, there can be little doubt, was pretty evenly divided; and at all events opinion veered about from one side to another, the policy of the government being eagerly discussed, and alternately challenged and defended. The tone of the press, the results of the bye-elections, and various other indications of the changes of popular sentiment, were sufficient to show that the country was never overwhelmingly inclined to a definite course of action on the Eastern question. The waiting mood of the government was the mood which, on the whole, most commended itself to the people of England.

Nevertheless, a strong desire for the maintenance of peace swayed the vast majority of Englishmen throughout. The Cabinet constantly professed its own desire to the same effect, and contended, through several of its most eminent members, that the policy which it had adopted was best calculated to avoid a rupture with Russia. On this point it was opposed by the Liberal party as a body. The opposition both in and out of Parliament declared that the policy

of the government would lead, not to peace, but to war; that it was a selfish policy, unworthy of England, and that humanity at all events required us to do nothing which could interfere with the complete liberation of the subject races of Turkey. It was a contest of the old traditional statesmanship, cold, calculating, and far-seeing, with the newer principles of humanity and generosity, even at the cost, or risk, of some national disadvantage.

The doctrine enunciated by Lord Beaconsfield and his followers was stigmatised by the majority of the opposition as rank selfishness. The doctrine of Mr. Gladstone, and of those who generally worked with him, earned from the Tories the reproach of fanaticism, political heresy, and even party obstruction.

We have seen what was said on both sides at the beginning of the crisis—in the autumn of 1876 and the spring of 1877. Opinions had changed very little up to the autumn of the latter year, when the Russians had suffered their greatest reverses, and were showing signs of recovery. All those in England who had from the first consistently advocated an armed intervention in the quarrel, for the purpose of defending Turkey against her enemy, and baulking what they conceived to be the selfish ambitions of Russia in the East, had been somewhat calmed by the brave stand which the Ottoman armies had been able to make, wherever they had fallen into the hands of efficient commanders. The achievements of Suleiman, Osman, Mukhtar, and Mehemet Ali Pachas, with the stubborn defence of the northern fortresses of the Quadrilateral, and the maintenance of supremacy on the sea, had shown that the hosts of the sultan were capable of more than had been thought possible; and that the friends of Turkey abroad, in England, Hungary, and elsewhere, conceived that a favourable opportunity might yet arise of making common cause with her. The least that was counted upon in September, after the repulse of the third attack on Plevna, was that a second campaign would have to be fought in 1878; and thus Russia's enemies by no means despaired.

But in proportion as the war party in England grew more sanguine, the advocates of peace, especially those who had resolved that nothing should interfere with Russia's liberation of Bulgaria, grew excited and aggressive. Before Parliament separated for the recess, several occasions had been taken of formally and clearly enunciating the views which most of the opposition entertained of England's duty under the circumstances. On the 7th of May, Mr. Gladstone had moved his famous resolutions, which were to the following effect:—1st, "That this House finds just cause of dissatisfaction and complaint in the conduct of the Ottoman government with regard to its treatment of the despatch of Lord Derby of the 21st September, 1876, in relation to the massacres in Bulgaria. 2nd, That until such conduct be essentially changed, and guarantees given other than the mere promises or ostensible measures of the Porte, the Ottoman government shall be deemed to have lost all claim for receiving material or moral support of the British crown. 3rd, That in the midst of the complications which exist, and the war which was actually begun, this House earnestly desires the influence of the British Crown to be employed in the councils of Europe in the effectual development of local liberty and practical self-government in the disturbed districts of Turkey, by putting an end to the oppression that they now suffer, without the interposition upon them of any other foreign domination. 4th, That, bearing in mind the wise and honourable policy of this country in the Protocol of 1826, and in the Treaty of the 6th July of 1827, with respect to Greece, this House furthermore earnestly desires that the influence of the British Crown may be addressed to the promoting of the concert of the European powers in exacting from the Ottoman Porte by their united authority such changes in the government of Turkey as they think necessary for the purposes of humanity and justice, and for the effectual defence against intrigue and towards the peace of the world." The fifth resolution combined the other four, and moved an address to the Crown.



These resolutions were sufficiently statesman-like in their form to deserve the attention of the House and the country. What was chiefly complained of in them was that they came at a wrong time, and in a wrong manner, and that their adoption would have encouraged Russia to advance her alleged schemes of conquest at the very moment when they required to be checked. They were rejected by a large majority—three hundred and fifty-four against two hundred and twenty-three. One of the most noteworthy points in the debate was the bold advocacy of coercion by Mr. Gladstone; and this boldness probably accounted for a portion at least of the three hundred and fifty-four votes, which comprised those of several Liberal members. Referring, in his closing speech, to some remarks of the Marquis of Hartington, deprecating the idea of bringing the coercion of the great Powers to bear upon Turkey, Mr. Gladstone said he did not believe that the time had passed for an authoritative interference of Europe. That, he believed, was the only weapon by which a satisfactory settlement could be arrived at. The resolutions did not contemplate a sole alliance with Russia. Replying to the assertion that coercion meant war, he emphatically denied it. “Adequately supported, coercion need not be followed by war; and as instances of the successful employment of foreign armies in the internal affairs of other nations, he mentioned Holland, Spain, and Portugal.” Insisting on the obligations imposed on us by our destruction of the protectorate which Russia exercised under the Treaty of Kainardji, Mr. Gladstone argued that the shortest way to put an end to the war and stop bloodshed would be by drawing a naval cordon round Turkey, and neutralising the Turkish fleet. He concluded by expressing his regret that the voice of the nation had not prevailed, and that England had “not been permitted to take her place in this great work of civilisation.”

It is only right to say that Mr. Gladstone appears to have maintained this view to the end—that is, until Russia had proved herself able to subdue the resistance of Turkey unaided.

The state of feeling in England six months later, after the fall of Kars, and the second advance of the Russians upon Erzeroum, is manifested in the last few passages of a speech made by Mr. Gladstone at Hawarden, on the 24th of November. Having enlarged upon the abject condition of the Bulgarians before the invasion by Russia, and of the explanation, if not the excuse, which this condition afforded of their occasional cruelty to the Mahomedans, Mr. Gladstone continued in this strain:—

“If I am asked why I take all this trouble, and give you all this trouble, as to the character of the Bulgarians and their liberation from a degrading servitude, I might reply that I do it for the sake of justice and humanity. But there are some journals and some classes of people in this country, of whom it may be said that such language stinks in their nostrils. In order, therefore, not to offend them, I will say that I do it for the sake of British interests. Under cover of that phrase I may perhaps obtain from them a hearing. If I am so fortunate, I will use my opportunity to repeat to them in substance what was admirably stated by Lord Derby some twelve or fifteen years ago. As Lord Derby then seemed to hold, so now, the main ‘British interest’ in the slave provinces of Turkey is to knit closely the ties of sympathy with the subject races, who already constitute the mass of the population, who have exclusive possession of the civil elements of progress, and who are undoubtedly to become (so thought Lord Derby) the rulers in these provinces in which at present they are slaves. For some time it has been the object nearest to my heart, though I would much have preferred a life of repose, to cherish these sympathies between my country and these subject races, and to make the existence of such a feeling known in Europe. In that cause, until the great issue still pending is decided, I for one, if my life is spared, shall persevere. Perhaps I may further venture, without over-boldness, to speak in some measure on behalf of those who have laboured in the same cause. I say, then, I am glad that at the present moment the ques-



SKIRMISH NEAR PLEVNA.





tion is not one of controversy with the existing government. We endeavoured twelve months ago to support, not oppose, the government, when it sent Lord Salisbury to Constantinople. So now the Prime Minister says at the Guildhall he remains in conditional neutrality. We therefore remain in conditional quietude. But we have got to watch a large portion of his press, and of his friends, who are labouring hard to drive the nation into war on the side of tyranny and wrong. If, yielding to this pressure, the government desists from neutrality, we too, I think and hope, shall desist from quietude, and shall take care not to be responsible for national disgrace and crime. We shall show fight like Englishmen. The nation will decide.

"There is a strong feeling in the country, in which I share to a certain extent, that it will be a misfortune if Russia should acquire an exclusive or dominating influence in the Slav provinces. With others, I have laboured to the best of my ability to prevent this mischief. But those who call themselves friends of the Turk have done all in their power to bring it about. I fear they are as blind as moles; but they do not share this fear, and believe they have been very wise, each and all, like what they call practical men, preaching up the prosecution of their own interests. The Jews, and the leaders of the Greeks subject to the Porte, have for the most part been strangely hostile to the Slavs in this day of their need. The Poles, who would have had the greatest excuse for violence, have shown the greatest moderation. The Magyars of Hungary, who have the least excuse of all, and who themselves appealed to all the Liberal sympathies of Europe to establish their own freedom, have been conspicuous beyond all others in their efforts to prolong the servitude and suffering of the Slavs of Turkey. They have, I suppose, been promoting 'Magyar interests'—which, no doubt, are all the world to them. Russia, and, I grieve to say, Russia without the aid of Europe, has held out the hand of help, at an enormous cost of life and

treasure, to the unhappy Christians of the Turkish empire. Who can be surprised if they shall regard her as their only friend? Who can blame them if they requite such service with attachment? But then, we are afraid that, after all, as we are thinking of British interests, so Russia may be thinking about Russian interests. Whether she is or not, I do not pretend to say. I believe in the honour of the emperor, and in the strong humanity of the people; but I know that, in other countries besides Russia, classes working underground, and watching their opportunity, sometimes get their way against the nation. In such classes I have no confidence. I lament the errors which gave to Russia the opportunity of assuming the position which may place so much power in her hands. If she misuses it, the world, I hope, is strong enough to prevent the mischief that might follow. But if victory crowns her arms, and if the emperor has moral strength and self-denial sufficient to master its temptations, then unjust suspicion and spiteful reproach will only recoil upon their authors; and, whatever may be said of some other chapters of Russian history, he will, in the liberation of the many millions of the subject races from a cruel and debasing yoke, have conferred upon mankind a boon among the most splendid that history records, and a boon that will never fade from the grateful memory of man. Of the events of this war I do not speak, but may its issues be such as shall most conduce to the happiness of the countries now so grievously afflicted, and of all their inhabitants."

The reader may like to have a few more instances of the recorded opinions of eminent Englishmen in regard to the war in Turkey. Two or three of these follow.

At a banquet given by the Merchant Taylors' Society, on June 12th, 1877, the Marquis of Salisbury, then Secretary of State for India, said, in regard to the apprehension of a Russian invasion of India:—

"I am far myself from seeing many of the apprehensions which I hear around me. Some-



times these apprehensions take an extreme form. I have a colonial friend who has been very much exercised in his mind in connection with the Cape of Good Hope. He pointed out to me that Russia was in Armenia, that Armenia is the key to Syria, that Syria is the key to Egypt, and that any one advancing into Egypt has the key to Africa. By this link of keys, long drawn out, he shows that the present victories of the Russians seriously menace South Africa. I have done my best to console him, but I feel his anxious feelings are only characteristic of the apprehensions which I constantly hear around me. . . . . Caution, and extreme caution, is necessary before a government risks the wealth, the prosperity, and the freedom we have around us, and before it breaks the peace of the world, perhaps bringing all the horrors of war into Europe, and this not in pursuit of real honour, but for a theory and a dream. It has generally been acknowledged to be madness to go to war for an idea, but, if anything, it is yet more unsatisfactory to go to war against a nightmare.\* On the same occasion Lord Derby expressed his concurrence in all that had been said by his colleague.

If members of the Cabinet could speak in this way, distinctly and significantly controverting the ideas of the war party, we might naturally expect that those who were unfettered by official connexions, and even accustomed to act with the opposition in political matters, would take a still more forcible view. The following remarks were made by the historian, Mr. J. A. Froude :—

“To Russia and England has fallen the task of introducing civilisation into Asia. It is a thankless labour at the best, but circumstances have forced an obligation upon both of us, which neither they nor we can relinquish; and our success depends for its character on the relations which we can establish between ourselves. If we can work harmoniously together as for a

common object, the progress of the Asiatic people will be peaceful and rapid. If we are to be jealous rivals, watching each other's movements with suspicion, and on the look-out to thwart and defeat each other, every kingdom and tribe from the Bosphorus to the Wall of China will be a centre of intrigue; and the establishment of the new order of things may be retarded for centuries, or disgraced by wars and revolutions, from which we shall all alike be sufferers. On the broadest grounds, therefore, it is our interest to be on good terms with Russia, unless there is something in the Muscovite proceedings so unqualifiedly bad that we are positively obliged to separate ourselves from them. . . . “The Turk has gone back, not forward. He remains what he has always been, a blight upon every province on which he has set his heel. His Christian subjects have appealed once more for help, and the Great Powers, England included, have admitted the justice of their complaints, and the necessity of a remedy. Unhappily, England could not agree with the other Powers on the nature of the remedy required. Russia, unable to trust further to promises so often made, and so uniformly broken, has been obliged to take active measures, and at once the Crimean ashes have been blown into a flame; there is a cry that Russia has sinister aims of her own, that English interests are in danger, and that we must fly to the support of our ancient friend and ally. How we are decently to do it, under what plea, and for what purpose, after the part we took at the Conference, is not explained. The rest of Europe is not alarmed. The rest of Europe is satisfied that the Turk must be coerced, and look on, if not pleased, yet at least indifferent. If we go into the struggle we must go in without a single ally, and when we have succeeded in defeating Russia, and re-establishing Turkey (there is another possibility that we may not succeed, but this I will not contemplate), as soon as we have succeeded, what then? After the censures to which we stand committed on Turkey's misconduct, we cannot in decency hand back Bulgaria to her without some check upon

\* As quoted in the leaflets of the “Eastern Question Association.”

her tyranny. We shall be obliged to take the responsibility on ourselves, England will have to be sole protector of the Bulgarian Christians, and it is absolutely certain that they would then be wholly and entirely at the Turk's mercy. It is absolutely certain that we should be contracting obligations which we could not fulfil, if we wished. We should demand a few fine promises from the Porte, which would be forgotten as soon as made. A British protectorate is too ridiculous to be thought of, and if the alternative be to place Bulgaria under a government of its own, that is precisely the thing which Russia is trying to do. To go to war with such a dilemma staring us in the face, and with no object which we can distinctly define, would be as absurd an enterprise as England was ever entangled in. Yet, even after Lord Derby's seeming recognition of the character of the situation, there is still room for misgiving. In constitutional countries politicians will snatch at passing gusts of popular excitement to win a momentary victory for themselves or their party. Our Premier, unless he has been misrepresented, has dreamt of closing his political career with a transformation scene—Europe in flames behind him, and himself posing, like Harlequin, before the footlights. Happily there is a power which is stronger even than Parliamentary majorities—in public opinion; and public opinion has, I trust, already decided that English bayonets shall not be stained again in defence of Turkish tyranny.”\*

On the same side, the Bishop of Manchester, the most out-spoken bishop on the bench, addressed a meeting at Manchester in July, 1877, in words thus summarised by the “Daily News:” Dr. Fraser said that, for the last two years, diplomatists and foreign secretaries had been peddling with this great question, and they were no nearer the solution to-day than when the insurrection commenced in July, 1875. Lord Derby had told them—he (the bishop) spoke of him with the greatest possible respect, and he did

not know that any other Foreign Secretary moving on his lines could have managed better—that all through the transaction the aim of himself and the English government was to keep this country out of war. He (the bishop) was no politician or statesman, but when persons who were simply gifted with the ordinary faculties of observation saw how little light statesmen and diplomatists had been able to cast on those mysterious transactions, they began to think these ordinary faculties were sufficient for coming not altogether to an erroneous conclusion upon the great and important subject. He ventured to say that they were never so close to the brink of war as they were at the present moment, and that of all the wars they had been engaged in this would be a war they would be less able to justify than any. About twelve months ago the English government sent a fleet to Besika Bay. It was said to have been sent for the protection of the Christians at Constantinople, but it was felt in Constantinople, and throughout Europe, to be a moral and almost a material support to the cause of the Turks. It was not to his mind altogether improbable that the sending of the fleet to Besika Bay in May or June, 1876, had more or less sustained the Turks in their dogged determination not to yield to the united force of Europe, nor in any way to abate one jot of the pretensions to govern these subject provinces in that violent and dogmatic way which Dr. Ziemann had so graphically described. Now again, in the month of July, 1877, a year later, the English fleet is again in Besika Bay, because, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer said, it was a convenient situation to operate from. Convenient for what purpose, he might ask? A year ago the fleet in Besika Bay was regarded as a support to Turkey. He ventured to say that to-day the presence of the fleet could only be regarded as a menace to Russia. What the English nation ought to do was to resolve to throw in her lot with those who were endeavouring to remove the cause of the present distress. So long as Turkish misrule and Turkish misgovernment prevailed in those provinces, Man-

\* Extracted from Preface to “Is Russia wrong? Letters by a Russian Lady.”



chester, Liverpool, Birmingham, and England generally, would have to subscribe to relieve it, because it would be chronic and perpetual."

Mr. Bright's opinion will always have great weight with his fellow-countrymen; though, when he speaks on a question of war or peace, it is to be remembered that he is firmly and unalterably pledged beforehand to the peaceful settlement of every international quarrel, and is in this respect frequently opposed to the convictions of the majority of Englishmen. In a speech addressed to his constituents at Birmingham (before the opening of the war) he put the case of Russia very forcibly in reference to the navigation of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus.

"Russia," he said, "is a country that, for its magnitude, has fewer navigable rivers running to the sea than any other country in the world. Almost all its great rivers run into the Caspian or into the Black Sea, and at present the Black Sea is a sea from which the Russians are not allowed to emerge through the straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. If you go to the Baltic you find another great sea . . . and the only way out of it is through a narrow passage called the Sound . . . a passage where the Danes only a few years ago levied a toll upon all ships passing—and the different nations agreed to pay them a sum of three or four millions to abolish that toll and to make the passage free. But the Russians are shut by frost in the Baltic nearly half-a-year, and when the ships come out they have to come out through this narrow passage. I should like to know whether, with that state of things, it is likely that Russia would perpetually consent, as she is blockaded by the frost of the north, to be blockaded by England through the hands of the Turk in the south? The thing seems to me intolerable and impossible, and it cannot long be sustained. If we were in that position, what should we do? I have no doubt whatever that there would be a unanimous discovery on the part of all people in England that we had a just claim to go through that only passage, and though I for one should be very much in favour

of negotiation, I am afraid that not a small minority—perhaps a large majority—of my countrymen would be determined to enforce that claim by such means as came first to their hands. . . .

"It is supposed that if Russia had ships of war in the Black Sea, as she has, and if they could come to the Mediterranean, as they might do but for the closing of these straits—that Russia would be more powerful in the Mediterranean—which of course she would. Nobody denies that—and that there would be another naval power added to those whose ships are now found in that sea. . . . I ask what would happen—would the sky fall, or would the British flag be lowered and dishonoured for ever—if half-a-dozen, or ten, or two or three, as the case might be, Russian ships of war were permitted freely to navigate these straits—not made by Turkey, or made by England, but made by nature—and intended, of course, to be a passage open to all the world between these two great seas, the Mediterranean and the Black Sea? Now it is a very curious thing, and it is worth considering as a fact, that we who live here, so far off, and who have the biggest fleet in the world—a rather bigger fleet, I believe, than all the rest of the world put together—that we are the only alarmists upon this matter. Nobody cares about it except the English government. No people believe it has the smallest interest in it except the English people; and I think it might be shown that we have no real interest in it. Other nations have no panic about it, and have no idea of going to war to support the Turks for any such purpose as keeping the Russians blockaded in the Black Sea."

To these opinions may be added a more specific and comprehensive defence of their conduct by those who had been most active in keeping up the popular agitation against the policy of the Conservative government. The "Eastern Question Association," which we have already described as being the outcome of the great conference in St. James's Hall, issued a paper

at the end of the year 1877, in order to explain and justify its action. We will quote only the more pertinent paragraphs of this pamphlet.

"The very first principles of those who are indiscriminately classed together as '*Russians*' by the Philo-Turks of the present time seem to be so generally misunderstood, that it may be well at this stage of events to sum up as briefly as possible the views that some of Lord Beaconsfield's '*Cosmopolitan critics*' hold on the great question of the East.

"We believe that the subject races of the Slav provinces of Turkey are, as Lord Derby saw some twelve or fifteen years ago, destined to shake off the Turkish yoke; and, in the words of Mr. Gladstone, 'to become rulers where at present they are slaves.' We point to the internal condition of Turkey, and to the examples of Greece, Roumania, Servia, and the Lebanon, and ask confidently, does not history justify us in this belief? We believe that until this result at the very least is obtained, until, that is, these provinces secure their independence, the Eastern question will remain as a firebrand in our midst, threatening the conflagration of Europe. We believe that the *word* of Turkey is exactly as good as her *bond*, and no better; that her promises and her *constitution* are alike waste paper. We are not fond of Russia, for we hate despotism, and we love liberty—civil and religious. We admit that there are unpleasant chapters in the history of Russia, though we remember that there are such also in the history of England. For the above reasons we do not wish to see the Slav provinces of Turkey thrown under a Russian protectorate; we wish to see them independent and autonomous. On this point we would refer ardent philo-Turks to the opinions expressed by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, whom at least they cannot suspect of Russian sympathies. We maintain that the course adopted throughout by the British government has been such as to force these provinces into the arms of Russia. We are lovers of peace, and we say that the conduct of the government has been such as to make the present war inevit-

able; and we further charge them, or at least the Prime Minister, with having put England in danger of being drawn into it also; a danger with which the panic-mongering section of the press still threatens us. Although we do not wish to see a Russian protectorate established in the Slav provinces of Turkey we think such a result would be incomparably better than the maintenance of the miserable *status quo*. We believe that Russia is a country of progress and life; Turkey one of retrogression and decay. We say that in Russia there is a government and a civilisation; in Turkey, brigandage and barbarism. We say that the Turks are, in the words of Mr. Forbes, 'barbarians pure and simple,' and that their crimes are without parallel in history, committed as they are under the auspices of the government, which also praises and promotes the villains who have perpetrated them. We say that to compare the misdeeds of Russia with these unspeakable crimes of Turkey is a task which may be left to those fanatics whose mental vision is blinded by gross ignorance or reckless prejudice. As to the alleged cruelties of the Russians in the present war, we say that we prefer the independent testimony of eye-witnesses, *e.g.*, Mr. Forbes, Colonel Wellesley, Colonel Brackenbury, Mr. McGahan, to the trumped-up *tu quoques* of the Porte. We say that if it be true that the Bulgarians are a degraded people, that is to be charged against those who have for five centuries ground them under the yoke of a detestable tyranny. We are simply bewildered that English men and English women should be found on the side of murder, rapine, ferocity, and lust, albeit they set their panegyrics to the tune of 'British Interests.' We say that it is for the interest of England to assist a young and rising people, rather than to prop up any longer a decrepit and falling power; that it is for the interest of England to put the breasts of freemen between Russia and Constantinople; but we say further, that the cause of Bulgaria, Montenegro, Bosnia, and the Herzegovina, is the cause of humanity; and we say that the interests of the British nation



are identical with those of humanity, as the interests of the individual are identical with those of the community in which he lives. We say that, whatever be her motives, Russia is fighting on the side which we consider the side of Freedom, Justice, and Right.

"As to the future, we say that the Russian scare is as absurd as it is undignified. We believe that there is ample room both for ourselves and the Russians in Asia; that it is for the interests of civilisation that both nations should be there, and we can see no reason why they should not be there as friends. We believe that we are strong enough to hold India, even if in the distant future Russia should conceive the idea of attacking it, which for many reasons we consider highly improbable. Maps teach us that Erzeroum is not on the frontier of Hindustan, nor Constantinople at the head of the Suez Canal. We know what is the financial condition of Russia; we know that she is in danger of falling to pieces from her very magnitude; we know that Asian Khanates mean weakness rather than strength; we read the lesson taught us by the present war, and in the words of Lord Palmerston, spoken in the House of Commons in 1853, we say that 'there never has been a state whose power for external aggression has been more overrated than Russia.' We say that it is impossible to preserve any longer a restriction so artificial as that which closes the Dardanelles to ships of war."

On the other side, in defence of the ministerial policy, the expressions of opinion were equally forcible, conscientious and argumentative. It was contended by the government and their supporters that their conduct would be fully justified by events; and that the course pursued by the opposition in fettering the action of her Majesty's ministers was neither just nor warranted by precedent. The earlier declarations of Lord Beaconsfield and some of his more prominent colleagues have been cited in a previous chapter of this work, and it is unnecessary to add much on the present occasion. A summary of the remarks made by Mr. Cross, the

Home Secretary, in reply to Mr. Gladstone's speech in introducing his five resolutions, may be quoted to show the nature of the defence usually made by government in face of the criticism of their opponents: Mr. Cross indignantly repudiated the notion that the Cabinet had been unsympathetic on the subject of Turkish cruelty and oppression, or that, because they were ministers, they had ceased to be Englishmen, actuated by all an Englishman's abhorrence of such outrages as had unfortunately occurred. He complained of the agitation which had been got up, and he hinted that any agitation could be promoted anywhere, on any subject, if its promoters chose to make an unscrupulous use of such stray accretions of ignorant popular enthusiasm as would serve the purpose of the hour. He maintained that the policy of the government on the Eastern question had been plain and straightforward throughout, and he asked Mr. Gladstone not to waste many sentences, but to reply by a plain "yes or "no" to the question whether he wished us to go to war against Turkey as an ally of Russia or not. He admitted that Turkey had been blind and foolish in what she had done in reference to the Protocol, but he wished to know what excuse Russia had had for holding that Protocol like a loaded pistol to the head of Turkey. He said that the policy of her Majesty's government would be one of strict neutrality, and expressed his belief that there was no reason to fear that the war would raise any question concerning the navigation of the Suez Canal or the possession of Constantinople. If such questions were raised, neither England nor Europe would permit them to be settled in a sense exclusively favourable to Russian ambition. He contended that Mr. Gladstone's resolutions were neither more nor less than a threat to Turkey, never intended to be carried out, and that to adopt them would be beneath the dignity of a great country; and he concluded by promising that whenever an opportunity for friendly offices occurred, her Majesty's government would intervene between the belligerents.

At the Lord Mayor's Banquet, on the 9th of

November, 1877, Lord Beaconsfield claimed for his government the credit of consistency throughout the crisis. "No sooner," he said, "had war been declared than her Majesty's government felt it their duty to announce, in language which could not be mistaken, the policy which, under the circumstances, they adopted. It was not a policy formed for the occasion, and merely because war was declared, but it was a policy which, from the opportunities which had been afforded to us for a considerable time, we had deeply considered. That policy was unanimously adopted, that policy we have unanimously carried out, and from that policy we have never swerved. It was a policy of conditional neutrality. Under the circumstances of the case we did not believe it was for the honour or interest of England, or of Turkey, that we should take part in the impending contest. But while we announced that neutrality which we were prepared to observe, we declared at the same time that that neutrality must cease when British interests were assailed or menaced. Cosmopolitan critics, men who are the friends of every country save their own, have denounced this as a selfish policy. It is as selfish as patriotism; but it is the policy of her Majesty's government, which they adopted from the first, and which they have maintained, and they believe that it is their duty to protect British interests. That is a policy which they believe the people of this country have sanctioned and adopted. There might have been many reasons which might have induced us to adopt that policy, but there was one which I may mention that was more for the benefit of England than of Turkey. For some years it has been a dogma of diplomacy that Turkey was a phrase and not a fact, that its government was a phantom, that its people were effete, and that it was used merely as a name by statesmen to maintain the balance of power to secure the peace of Europe. If that were the case in the mind of her Majesty's government, a repetition of what took place in the Crimea would have been the greatest error; and if a people are effete, if their government is a great fiction, why, the sooner that is proved in the

face of the civilised world the better. Well, you know what proof has been given upon those subjects during the last year."

Lord Beaconsfield spoke after the Russians had been three times repulsed by the Turks before Plevna, and once before Erzeroum. He argued that Turkey could not be in danger of collapse or dismemberment when she had an army capable of such great things. The events of the next month were to prove an unfortunate commentary on this observation, natural as it was at the time when the words were uttered.

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## CHAPTER XXVII.

### THE ROUMANIAN ADVANCE.

WE have traced the course of events in Bulgaria up to the last week in August, when a general attack had been made upon the Russian forces by the three main armies of the Turks. The position of the Russians had become very precarious, and they had sent in hot haste for the Guards, in addition to summoning the help of the Roumanian army. If the Turkish attack had been more persistent, or better concerted, it may well be that the invaders would have suffered the gravest disasters. As it was, they had been able to stand the brunt of a terrible assault in the Schipka Pass, under Suleiman Pacha, whilst the czarewitch had succeeded, though with considerable loss, in preventing the advance of Mehemet Ali. The attack by Osman Pacha from Plevna was not made until the last day of August, ten days later than the first attack of Suleiman Pacha, and eight days later than Mehemet Ali's attack on Jaslar.

We may now resume our narrative from the time when the Roumanian army took up its position before Plevna. This movement was gradually effected during the middle and latter part of August, the main body not crossing until the 25th, though small detachments had already reached the place assigned to them in



front of Plevna before that date. The place in question was on the extreme right of the Russian army, beyond the division of General Krüdener, on the north-east of the town. As early as the 22nd of August the first arrivals exchanged a few shots with the Turkish outposts. For a time there was no little uncertainty as to the dispositions which would be shown by the Roumanians, and the correspondents spoke of the unwillingness of the prince's troops to obey the Russian officers. The fact is, that the relations which were to exist between the Russians and their new allies had not yet been determined, and were not determined until the 30th of August, after a visit of the prince to the Russian head-quarters at Gorny Studen.

Roumania and Servia were negotiating with Russia at the same time, both offering assistance to the grand duke on condition of the Russian government entering into a formal alliance with them. This Russia refused to do. She offered to form a military convention with both states, guaranteeing them certain advantages in return for the troops which they might contribute; and the Roumanians, who had not been very well satisfied by the manner in which their powerful neighbours had fulfilled their part of the contract entered into some four months previously, hesitated before accepting their new offer. In the end, however, Prince Charles and his advisers thought it well to trust to Russia's good faith, and cast in their lot with her.

The bearings of the question are clearly explained by the Vienna correspondent of the "Times," writing on August 30th. "For the Roumanians and Servians," he says, "the political, for the Russians the military, side of such a convention is the vital one. Apart from the guarantees for the future which the Roumanians and Servians wish to secure by such a convention, the very fact of Russia concluding with them a regular international alliance would be a direct recognition by Russia of the right of these two vassal states of Turkey to conclude international treaties of alliance, and hence of their independence. While ready to make use of their

co-operation, Russia has been very careful not to identify her cause with those of the two Principalities, as this might not only prove very inconvenient to her, but might look like anticipating the decision of the other Powers which may claim to be consulted at the final settlement. Even as regards Roumania, which has already declared her independence, Russia has been more cautious than the other Powers in giving an opinion approving or disapproving the declaration, so that, except a certain moral obligation which she has incurred, Russia has not compromised herself even in this respect. All that Russia is offering to do with regard to the convention is to have, not a treaty of alliance between the czar and the two princes, but a military convention on the model of that concluded on the 16th of April between the Russian military commander and the government of Roumania, which was signed on the Russian side by the Grand Duke Nicholas, and on the Roumanian side by M. Cogolniceano, the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

"After their experience of the first convention, the Roumanians, at any rate, do not seem to attach much value to the conclusion of such another convention, and the prince, weary of the struggle, prefers to trust to the word of the czar that all will be right, and has therefore sent over his troops, without waiting for the conclusion of a convention. Not so Servia, it seems. There, too, the prince is quite ready to follow the example given by Prince Charles, but M. Ristic endeavours still to hold out. Though he may not entertain any illusion about his gaining his point and forcing the hands of Russia, he evidently thinks it a good opportunity to make the best possible bargain for Servia, at least as regards the material assistance to be given by Russia, while at the same time there may be the calculation that it cannot be long before an end is put in one way or another to the present uncertainty in the operations, and that then Servia would be in a far better position to strike the line where least risk will be incurred, and most advantages may be gained; but it stands to

reason that, however prudent on the part of Serbia, such a policy cannot well suit Russia. If at all, it is at the present critical moment that the co-operation of Serbia would be of value. Once things have taken a decisive turn, it would matter very little whether Serbia joined in the war or not. She could neither retrieve the fortunes of the Russian arms in case of reverse, nor would her co-operation be much wanted in case of success. Fertile as M. Ristic is in expedients to gain his ends, it may well be doubted whether he will succeed in deferring intervention until the present state of uncertainty is somewhat cleared up. In the meantime, the concentration of troops on the frontier has begun. To-day eight battalions belonging to the Regular Army, which have been encamped on the heights of Toptshidere, were to leave for the frontier."

It was before the 30th of August, however, that the die was cast for Roumania. On the 25th, as already stated, the main body of the army, some twenty-five thousand men, crossed the Danube by a bridge thrown over the river at Corabia, nearly thirty miles above Nikopolis, and five days later Prince Charles assumed the command of a combined Russian and Roumanian corps, which became the right wing of the investing army. To him was attached the Russian General Zotoff, a tried and discreet officer, as chief of his staff; and the general appears to have acted with considerable circumspection in his somewhat equivocal position.

It should not be forgotten that Prince Charles was a Hohenzollern, that is to say, a member of the most exalted German family, having all the traditions of military instinct and success. In view of this fact we cannot be surprised that the prince should have insisted on retaining the chief command of his troops, and that the Russian authorities should have been constrained to accede to his request, and to gratify him further by placing Russians, as well as Roumanians, at his disposal. There was at the same time a special strategical value in thus associating the old troops of the czar with the young and com-

paratively untried soldiers of the principality. No one at that time anticipated that the Roumanians would be able to achieve great things in their first campaign. Most people confidently predicted that the prince's corps would make no better show against the Turks than the Serbians had done a year before. The prediction was destined to be entirely falsified; but still it was wise in the grand duke and his staff to provide against the worst by insuring a nucleus of steadiness in the Roumanian force.

It was with mixed feelings of hope and misgiving that the Roumanians thus entered into the war. The correspondent last quoted bears witness that public feeling was very much depressed, not only in Bucharest, but all over the country, on account of the passage of the army over the Danube. "Although the Roumanians are confident that their army will do its duty, they have never seen, and do not see now, what it has to do on the other side. However bravely it may behave, they know it will not decide the question of their independence; while, in case of reverse, the army on which they could have relied for the defence of the country against a raid of the Turks into Roumania would be wanting. As for any acquisition of territory on the other side, they know that there is but little chance of it, as even in the event of a thorough Russian success others will have to be consulted and heard on the subject at the final settlement. The possible advantages which might be gained are thus not thought to be at all in proportion to the risks that may be incurred." And again—"While confident that their army, although untried, will do its duty, the Roumanians have never understood, nor do they understand now, what their army had to do on the other side of the Danube. However bravely it may fight, they know that it will not decide the question of Roumanian independence, while, in the event of reverse, the army on which they might have relied for defence, will have been destroyed. Again, as for any acquisition of territory, they know equally that there is but little chance of



it, as, even in the case of a thorough success, others will have to be consulted on the subject. The possible advantages to be gained were thus not considered as in proportion to the risks that might be incurred; and now there comes the humiliation of seeing their army incorporated with the Russian."

The troops themselves were not all actuated by the same feelings, nor did they all imagine that their association with the Russians was humiliating to their dignity. It was said that when the Roumanians crossed, one of their officers said to a Russian general, "*Soyez tranquille; nous sommes ici*"—"You may dismiss your fears now that we have arrived on the scene." This was doubtless a jest at Roumania's expense; but as things turned out, the notion was not so absurd as it seemed to be at the time. The Roumanians were extremely serviceable to the Russians during the remainder of the siege of Plevna.

When Prince Charles had taken up his position, the allied troops surrounding Osman Pacha amounted to something like 80,000; that is to say, if we may accept the estimate of an apparently well-informed correspondent of the "*Wiener Tagblatt*," writing from Sistova on the last day of August. Till the middle of August, he said, no reinforcements had arrived at Plevna. It was only at the end of the second week in August that fresh troops began to pass Sistova; they were the 2d and 3d Divisions of Infantry from Kasan and Nijni Novgorod. One of these—the 3d—was attached to the 9th Corps d'Armée, under General Krüdener, which had been most weakened, while the other was attached to the 9th, the corps under Kryloff, so that each corps now consisted of three divisions of Infantry. Besides this, the 4th Brigade of Riflemen was likewise destined to reinforce the army before Plevna. Owing, however, to the necessity for sending up reinforcements to the Schipka Pass, the Brigade of Riflemen and the 2d Division had departed. There were, therefore, the 4th Corps d'Armée, two Divisions, and the 9th Corps three Divisions. That is, in all,

five Russian Infantry Divisions, about 40,000 men; besides which there was the Roumanian corps, now brought up to a total of 31,000, and the cavalry and artillery, another 8,000 or 9,000.

The general condition of affairs in Bulgaria on the eve of Osman Pacha's sortie of the 31st of August may be gathered from the despatches sent to the Porte by the Turkish generals-in-chief.

A despatch from Suleiman Pacha, dated the 30th of August, said:—"There is nothing worthy of note to report. The artillery and outposts exchange shots. We are in strong possession of the positions we have gained." On the same day the Porte published the following despatch from Mehemet Ali Pacha:—"On the morning of the 30th of August, in consequence of the offensive movements effected by the troops from Rasgrad and Sari Nassouhlar, a desperate battle was fought in the neighbourhood of the village of Karahassankoi. After this village had been successively captured and recaptured, the Imperial army remained master of the field of battle. The enemy was completely defeated and was pursued by our troops, who inflicted fresh losses upon him and completed his rout. Towards evening two columns detached from the camp of Sari Nassouhlar crossed the river Lom and forced the Russians, after a violent artillery and musketry engagement, to abandon the villages of Haidar and Ayaz and fall back upon that of Wow. Our troops took from the enemy a gun, four ammunition waggons, two thousand rifles, the same number of great coats, some uniforms, and other articles of equipment, as well as a certain number of carts containing biscuits. The Russian losses exceed four thousand men *hors de combat*; ours are relatively inconsiderable."

In corroboration of this despatch, Mehemet Ali, telegraphing on the 1st of September, said—"The enemy before evacuating Karahassankoi set fire to his stores of provisions and ammunition, of which we, however, succeeded in saving a portion. The Russians destroyed the bridge across the Lom in order to secure their safe retreat."

Ahmed Pacha telegraphed from Rustchuk on the same day, to the following effect:—"We made a sortie yesterday with seven battalions of infantry, eight guns, and a body of Circassian cavalry, and carried the village and intrenchments of Kadikoi, which were defended by two regiments of cavalry, some infantry, a gun, and six battalions, who came up as reinforcements. The Russians lost two hundred killed and double that number wounded, as well as four thousand head of cattle and sixty horses. We had thirty-five men *hors de combat*."

On the last day of August, as already stated, a sortie in force was made from Plevna against the Russian centre, of which Osman Pacha sent somewhat vainglorious accounts to Constantinople. His despatch was to the following effect:—"Subsequently to a reconnaissance made yesterday (Friday) towards the village of Plichad, which was occupied by the enemy, to the east of Plevna, a violent engagement was fought near that village. At the end of two hours, the Russians, completely defeated, took refuge behind their intrenchments; but our troops, under a hail of shot and shell, attacked those intrenchments and carried three of them. The enemy, who numbered little under thirty thousand men, was put to rout, with very considerable loss, leaving in our hands a gun, with ammunition waggon, three horses, a large number of rifles, and other military articles." And in another despatch:—"We made an offensive reconnaissance in force against the Russian fortified position at Plichad, to the east of Plevna, and encountered the enemy about half an hour's march from Plichad. After two hours' desperate fighting, the enemy took to flight. We carried three redoubts by assault and captured one gun, together with a number of horses and arms. The Russian forces numbered thirty thousand, including reinforcements that came up from Mersenk. Their losses were heavy, ours being very small."

What amount of truth there is in this account of the battle of Plichad, or Pelisat, may be judged by comparing it with the narratives of the correspondents who were eye-witnesses of the

whole affair, and from whom we derive the narrative which follows. Osman Pacha seems to have magnified trenches into redoubts and hundreds into thousands, in addition to representing a particular point of the day's achievements as a definite result.

At eight o'clock on the morning of the 31st the Turks made a sortie from Plevna in the direction of Pelisat and Sgalince, to the front of Poredim, the Russian head-quarters. It had been feared by the grand duke's staff that Osman Pacha would attack the Roumanians before they had taken up their assigned positions, either by a sudden movement northwards, or simultaneously with an advance against the centre. General Zotoff had not yet assumed his command under Prince Charles, and it was he, in fact, who superintended the defence of the Pelisat lines. The Russians also anticipated an attack on their extreme left, and were not without anxiety for the safety of General Skobelev, who was at this time, with a very moderate force, on the road between Loftcha and Selvi. It did indeed appear that Osman Pacha had contemplated a general assault on the whole investing army, in the hope of breaking through the lines, and perhaps effecting a junction with one of the remaining Turkish forces. So much the Russians learned from the prisoners taken during the day; but in any case the idea was not carried out. The Roumanians were not attacked in force until they had themselves taken the offensive; and General Skobelev also was left to his own initiative at Loftcha.

The advance of the Turks was precipitate and furious, and the first success of the day fell to their share. They captured with the bayonet a redoubt lying about a mile in front of the village of Pelisat, and the Russians, withdrawing, were compelled to avail themselves of their artillery in order to shell their own works. Their left now rested on Pelisat itself, and a hot struggle ensued for the trenches which defended the village. In these trenches, and in the redoubt aforementioned, the principal work of the day was done. Three times the Turks bravely



advanced, reaching the very edge of the trenches, and falling in masses before the withering fire of the enemy. Twice they took and lost the redoubt. But it was destined that they should experience here precisely the same result as the Russians had experienced in their attacks upon the earthworks of Osman Pacha, namely, the virtual impossibility of taking by assault positions which were manned by a steady force of riflemen, armed with breechloaders, and well supplied with ammunition.

For eight hours the battle raged with unabated fury, and with indomitable bravery on both sides. At four o'clock the Turks were beaten, and retired to the positions which they had held in the morning. A correspondent of the "Daily News," who witnessed the greater part of the day's engagement, estimated the force on either side at twenty thousand men, and the Russian loss at five hundred; whilst the loss of the Turks he put at four times as many. It is clear that this estimate is more to be depended on than that of Osman Pacha's despatches; for an attack on such positions as those held by General Zotoff could not possibly be made with a "very small" loss.

Some passages of this correspondent's account will be read with interest. "As I rode out towards Pelisat," he says, "I met great crowds of Bulgarian refugees, some of whom had fled from the Turkish advance in front of the Russian lines, others from the village of Pelisat itself, where there would probably be hard fighting in case of a battle. The whole population had put all their movable effects into waggons and carts, with the women and children, and were driving their live stock before them. The country behind the Russian lines everywhere, I may remark, is covered with refugees camped in waggons, and in hastily-constructed straw huts. They retreat with the Russians, and again move forward with them, showing unabated confidence when the Russians make even a slight movement in advance.

"In a few minutes I had passed over the level plain between Poradim and Pelisat, a plain

planted with Indian corn and vines. The ambulance waggons were already coming back with wounded. The vine hills between Pelisat and Sgalince were covered with clouds of smoke, which rose up in great white flecked balls, that rolled off and disappeared in the direction of Plevna, while the deep savage roar of small-arms mingled with the thunder of artillery, in a way which showed that, if the Turks were making a demonstration, it was a very violent one, to say the least of it.

"Just to the right of Pelisat was a Russian battery throwing shells, that went skimming along over the hill that rose beyond, and exploded out of sight, right in the direction of a Russian redoubt, which I knew was about a mile in front of Pelisat. This was a most alarming circumstance. If the Russians were shelling their own redoubt it could only be by a fearful mistake, or else because the Turks had taken it, in which case our left wing must have already been driven back on Pelisat, and in danger of being turned. But, strange to say, there were very few balls falling here, while the fight seemed to grow more terrible towards the centre, in the direction of Sgalince.

"Full of anxiety, I galloped forward to the hill just to the left of Pelisat, which promised a view of what was going on at the front. I found a squadron of dragoons hovering just behind the crest of this hill, and with half-a-dozen officers on the top watching the progress of events. I was now on the extreme Russian left, and, as I soon ascertained, on the extreme front likewise. In front, and beyond Pelisat, the ground rose in a lazy incline for a distance of a mile. About the point where the Russian redoubt stood, which was not, however, visible, a mile and a-half to the right, was the village of Sgalince, the Russian centre, before which was another redoubt and a series of trenches. Forward, towards Plevna, the ground still rose higher, so that the Russian positions were and are commanded by the positions taken by the Turks in their forward movement. The disadvantage cannot be avoided by the Russians without fall-

ing back several miles. The Russian redoubt, a mile in front of Pelisat, had been taken by the Turks early in the fight. The Russian left wing had been driven back on Pelisat, in front of which trenches had been dug and lined with troops.

"The battle began to look like a serious one indeed. It had been raging more than an hour since we heard the first gun fired, and in that time the redoubt had been taken by the Turks, retaken by the Russians, and retaken again by the Turks. This accounted for the strange firing of the battery in the centre in the direction of Sgalince, to the right of Pelisat, which was still blazing away, sending its shells screaming along the ground as they rose with the hill before us and exploded beyond.

"I had not been at my new standpoint more than five minutes, when the crest of the hill, a mile in front, suddenly grew black as with a line of ink drawn across the sky. What was it? We applied our glasses, and soon made it out to be the enemy, who had just crowned the hill after taking the redoubt behind, and was now preparing for an assault on the Russian centre. Their presence there showed that the redoubt must have been again captured by the Turks, though for a minute we could not make out whether they were infantry or cavalry. In less than a minute they began to descend the hill right in our direction, as though determined to drive our left out of Pelisat, and turn it. The battery to the right of the village now limbered up, and retreated back on the plain about a quarter of a mile, and again took up position. My own position, with a handful of cavalry behind the hill, now became rather disagreeable. If we were pressed back on the plain we could see nothing. If we remained where we were there was an extreme probability of being cut off and obliged to make a wide circuit to rejoin the army, not to speak of the probability of being directly in the line of fire. In less than five minutes the Turks began to descend the hill in our direction, not with a rush, but leisurely, and without firing, not in masses nor lines, but scattered and

diffused. They came down about half-way in this manner, the Russian artillery tearing up the groups among them all the time in the most savage manner.

"I was just beginning to think of the expediency of clearing out when there was a change. The Russian infantry fire, which had, for the last five minutes, been very heavy about Sgalince, now began to roll along the hill-crest in our direction, and the Turks, who were just coming into range, began to drop rapidly. I do not know whether the Turks originally intended to attack our left or not, but the fact is that there was a change in the direction of the attack. The advance now veered to the left, and went at the Russian trenches on the crest of the hills, half-way between Pelisat and Sgalince, with a shout, opening fire at the same time. When they descended into the little hollow and were lost to sight for a time, while the Russian trenches flamed and smoked, a storm of balls was poured into the advancing Turks. This lasted from fifteen to twenty minutes, during which time a fearful loss of life must have occurred. Then we saw them begin to withdraw, as they went carrying off the wounded. But they had not yet had enough.

"Encouraged by their success in taking the redoubt, and believing they could also take this line, they had no sooner withdrawn from the Russian fire than they formed and went at it again. They dived down into the Valley of Death to struggle there amid smoke and fire, a death-struggle of giants; for there is nothing to choose between Russian and Turk on the score of bravery. Many bodies of Turks were found within ten feet of the Russian trenches. The little slope, on the crest of which the trenches were situated, was literally covered with dead. I counted seven on a space of not more than ten feet square. The battle here was terrible, but the Turks were again repulsed, and again they retreated up the hill. It will hardly be believed that they went at it again; and yet they did so. To us who had watched the two preceding assaults it seemed madness, because we could



see that the Russian fire never slackened an instant, and that the Russian line never wavered, while we knew the Russian reserves were waiting behind, ready to fall in at the least sign of wavering. The scene of carnage was again repeated, but it only lasted for a moment. The Turks, completely broken, withdrew, 'sullenly firing,' and taking time to carry off their wounded, and many of their dead. . . .

"On the ground between the left redoubt and Pelisat the Russian and Turkish dead were lying side by side. This ground had been fought over twice. The little hollow breaks through the crest of the hill of Sgalince, and curves to the left in the direction of Pelisat for a distance of a quarter of a mile. It was along the brow of the low banks of Pelisat, by the side of the hollow, that the Russian trenches had been dug, among low brushwood two or three feet high, which partially hid them. It was here that the battle had raged hottest. Here, half-way between Pelisat and Sgalince, the Turkish attack was made with the greatest violence and persistence. The Turkish dead were lying here so close to the trenches that they might have shaken hands with the Russians lying inside. It was certainly a desperate attack and a desperate resistance; but had the Turks even carried these trenches, as seemed possible, they would have been driven out by the Russian reserves lying in wait behind. The Turks, I observed, fired comparatively little, for what reason I know not, and they evidently hoped to win the day with the bayonet alone. It was in this little hollow I saw the Turks descend three times.

"Everything considered, the attack seems to have been well directed. It was made so suddenly, and with such violence, that the Russian redoubt was taken almost by surprise. The first time it was, in fact, taken almost before General Zotoff knew the attack had begun; but I look upon both the attack and the defence as useless expenditure of blood. The capture of these positions would have been of comparatively little importance to the Turks, unless they had followed it up by an attack on the positions

behind Poradim, which General Zotoff has fortified as his second line of defence, and they did not bring forward enough troops to have followed up the advantage had they gained one. They should have attacked with fifty thousand men instead of twenty thousand; or, better still, have attacked the Roumanians while only making a strong demonstration against General Zotoff, which everybody thought they would do."

This attack by Osman Pacha only anticipated the third general assault of the Russians upon the defences of Plevna, which, however, it probably delayed by a few days. In the meantime Skobelev's force was not idle; and on the 3rd of September it succeeded in wresting the important town of Loftcha from the small Turkish force which had held it.

Skobelev's colleague, Prince Imeritinsky, had under him about twenty-two thousand men, consisting of the 2nd Division, a brigade of the 3rd, a brigade of Cossacks, and a rifle brigade, which had returned from Gatrova, some fifty miles, whence they had been sent back as soon as Radetzky felt himself able to dispense with further reinforcements in the pass. The Turks, who were outnumbered by more than three to one, found themselves compelled to retire from Loftcha, which Skobelev's positions commanded, and to await the attack behind the town. They made a brave resistance, but were eventually driven back; and, retreat being cut off in the direction of Plevna and of the Trojan Pass, they retired across the country towards the Orkhanie road.

There was a "Times" correspondent with Skobelev for some days before the capture of Loftcha; and he wrote home, on the 19th of August, some interesting details of the situation. "The Russian lines," he says in his letter, "are from two to six miles from those of the Turks, and the interval is broken by hills and valleys, unsafe to venture into without a strong escort, and therefore it is impossible to get an idea of the exact conformation of the Turkish lines of defence, except when an opportunity occurs to accompany a general officer and his escort to some particular point on the line. Yesterday

morning, at seven, I received an invitation from Major-General Skobelev to accompany him to the cavalry camp forming the extreme left of the Russian line near Lovatz. Seated in a handsome caleche, drawn by four splendid little ponies, we rattled away at a spanking pace over the hills and valleys, covered with rich pasturage and Indian corn, while the stubble fields in all directions showed evidences of a bountiful harvest of wheat and barley; the country is rolling, with heavy undulations of hill and valley succeeding each other like the waves of ocean, each ridge forming an excellent military position; therefore it is a difficult country to take the offensive in, as the enemy can find a strong line of defence every few miles as he falls back, which necessitates incessant work on the part of the invading army. There are no fences or hedges, and the scattered trees dotting the landscape afford a pleasant relief to the eye, wandering over the expanse of grass and stubble. The soil is exceedingly rich, the cultivation, rude as it is, producing a heavy yield to the husbandman. The villages grow more picturesque, and the houses are more substantially built, as we approach the Balkans, while the peasants look healthier, and are larger in stature than along the Danube. A number of Turks have remained in this part of the country, and they are very well treated by the Russians, although they do not fare so well sometimes at the hands of their Bulgarian neighbours. They bring produce for sale in the Russian camps, and I saw several of them working in a cavalry camp near Lovatz; they were great stalwart fellows, and appeared vastly superior to the Bulgarian peasants.

"Major-General Skobelev is a character—one of the most striking men I have ever met; he is a son of Lieutenant-General Skobelev, of the Russian army, and has been in every campaign the Russians have had since he was old enough to enter the field. In Khokand, where everything was considered in a critical state, young Skobelev was left to cover the rear of the army with five battalions and twenty guns. His elders in rank and years had selected him to bear

the disgrace of the expected catastrophe; but he did not fancy this situation of affairs, attacked the enemy (numbering forty battalions) in the night, threw them into a panic, and utterly routed them, remaining master of the province. For this he was made a major-general at thirty-one, and became the object of much envy and calumny at the hands of the officers whose heads he had passed over. At the recent battle of Plevna he had his brigade of Cossacks and a battalion of infantry, the latter numbering about seven hundred men. Three hundred and forty of this battalion fell in the desperate contest, one hundred and seventy of them being killed outright; unsupported the remnant were compelled to fall back, but they retreated in good order, bringing away all the wounded, and actually left the deadly line of battle singing one of their wild but very melodious mountain airs. A major-general thirty-three years of age, tall and handsome, Skobelev is the ideal of a *beau sabreur* of the old Murat type. Brave almost to recklessness, yet possessing a certain shrewd aptitude for estimating chances, and the strength of positions, he will make his mark in this campaign should his carelessness of personal danger not bring him before some fatal bullet. He has already been wounded six times during his career. Having been appointed to the staff of the commander of the Plevna army, he was *en route* to the camp of his cavalry brigade, to turn over the command to his successor."

The correspondent's estimate was well founded; and we shall hear of Skobelev again.

## CHAPTER XXVIII.

### THE THIRD ATTACK ON PLEVNA.

THE first attack on Plevna, under General Krüdener, was made on the 19th of July, and the second on the 21st of the same month. Both were repulsed with enormous losses to the Russians; and from that time until the beginning



of September unremitting labour was devoted to the preparation of a third and more deliberate attempt. Various circumstances contributed to postpone the carrying out of the design, the principal cause being the necessity of awaiting reinforcements, or at least of pausing until some assurance had been given that the invaders were approximately safe at their other points of contact with the armies of the sultan.

It was not until the 11th of September that the assault was delivered. It had been preceded by four days of incessant bombardment—a regular *feu d'enfer*, which, though it did but little actual damage in the open village, and in the wide encampment of Osman Pacha, was described by some of those who witnessed it as being impressive in the extreme, not to say demoralising.

The allied forces around Plevna, of which some account has already been given, were estimated by Mr. Forbes rather more minutely than by the correspondent of the Vienna paper, though, of course, with a closely approximate result.

The following is Mr. Forbes's enumeration of the corps and divisions, with their commanders and numbers:—The 9th Corps, Baron Krüdener, comprising the 5th and 31st Divisions, 18,000 men. The 4th Corps, General Kriloff, containing the 16th and 30th Divisions, 20,000 men. One Brigade of the 2nd Division, Prince Imeretinsky, 6,000 men. One Brigade of the 3rd Division, 6,000 men. One Rifle Brigade, 3,000 men. The 1st Roumanian Division, Colonel George Angelescu, 14,000 men. The 2nd Roumanian Division, 14,000 men, Colonel Alexander Angelescu. In all, say 80,000 infantry. The following are the cavalry details:—The 4th Cavalry Division, 2,000 sabres. The 9th Cavalry Division, 2,000. One Brigade of the 11th Cavalry Division, 1,000. One Brigade of Circassian Cossacks, 1,000. A portion of the Imperial escort, 200. The 1st Roumanian Division, 2,000; the 2nd Roumanian Division, 2,000. Total of Cavalry, say 10,000. In all a compact and well-equipped army of about

90,000 men, with 250 field guns and 20 siege guns of 15 centimetres.

The cannonade of the 7th to the 10th of September was vigorously sustained on both sides; but the Turks were apparently little concerned by the fire of their enemy, which does not seem to have inflicted much loss upon them. So far as one may judge from the accounts of eye-witnesses, there was a coolness and sense of power about Osman Pacha, which precluded any idea of the Russians gaining great results by intimidation. No doubt the effect of the firing, from a moral point of view, must have been very great; and in the case of the Grivitza redoubt it probably contributed not a little to the partial success of the Romanians on that side. But Plevna was a hard nut to crack; and the allies were not destined to get at its kernel on this occasion.

Since the former assault on the place, Osman Pacha appears to have occupied his leisure in a most effectual manner. Mr Forbes, who gives a very intelligent account of the whole attack, says that he could perceive a great increase in the defensive power of the position since the unfortunate attempts of the Russians in July. "On the south and south-west," he wrote on September 9th, "are several wholly new redoubts. There is a very large one on a detached knoll due south of the town, and on the long wooded ridge stretching up from it toward the Vid there is quite a chain of redoubts linked together by a covered way, and making a good line of Turkish cover on their right flank, and indeed partly in their rear, as far as the river Vid. It was against the farthest of these redoubts that general Skobeleff went last night. Through the glass I can see little knots of Russian soldiers among the trees, and a few Turkish soldiers out on the stubble behind the works. These new redoubts command also the Loftcha-Selvi road, and they cover the side road coming into Plevna from out of the valley of the Vid, which otherwise might be utilised in a turning movement. On this southern face of which I speak there are three strong redoubts connected by a

covered way, with battery emplacements at intervals and rows of shelter-trenches. In front, on the central swell, I discern eight separate redoubts, besides a line of defence on the downs immediately covering the town of Plevna, and this is wholly exclusive of the great northern ridge. Its summit and slopes are one great entrenched camp, studded with redoubts and battery emplacements. The longer one looks at the place the more thoroughly does one come to feel the toughness of the work taken in hand by the Russians. The position must be attacked as a whole and taken as a whole. Granted that the northern ridge is taken and occupied in its integrity, the position of the central swell is not materially impaired. Suppose a lodgment effected on the central swell, that lodgment would be commanded by the northern ridge and the redoubts on the south of the town. All that is wanted to make the Turkish position virtually impregnable was the occupation and fortification of the ridge in front of Radisovo, that ridge on the exposed crest of which I am now writing. Probably this was not undertaken owing to a conviction that the force available was not strong enough to hold so wide an area. Where is the Turkish force, be it great or small? I sweep the scene with my glass, and the only living things visible are the gunners on the slopes under the entrenched camps. But there are no moving figures around them; no soldier treads the brown sward between the redoubts; and yet it is said that in the entrenched camps on the northern ridge alone are quite thirty thousand Turks, and I venture to aver, that, let the Russian infantry advance, and very soon, from the edge of the shelter-trenches and redoubts, would burst out white jets of musketry fire. Toward the afternoon the cannon-firing has been much heavier than in the early part of the day. The field-guns were within eight hundred paces of the Turkish redoubts, which, as night fell, offered great temptation to the Turkish infantry. In the afternoon a battery was constructed on the height above Radisovo. This battery will be armed in the night with six or

eight siege cannon from the great battery, and the fire of these will fall at a short range on the first Turkish position. All the preparations are being made for the assault to-morrow."

The Roumanian fire upon the first redoubt at Grivitza seems to have been admirably directed and maintained. It was the first to begin, and it was the only section of attack which was permanently successful. The attempt of Skobelev upon the southern defences of Plevna is described by another correspondent of the "Daily News," writing on the evening of the 8th of September. "The attack on Plevna," he says, "resembles a siege more than anything else. So far there does not seem to have been a single shot exchanged by the infantry. After a hard day's work yesterday the big battery of twelve siege guns opened fire this morning at daybreak, and has been pounding away ever since until now, twelve o'clock. I observe a considerable escape of gas from the heavy steel guns of thirteen centimetres calibre, of which there are four. Behind this battery is an observatory, consisting of a ladder about sixty feet high, sustained by ropes, on the top of which is generally a soldier with a field-glass, watching the result of the firing. The position of this man when a shell comes along, as it does every now and then, threatening to cut the ladder in two and bring him down with a rush, must be very disagreeable.

"The Roumanian batteries away to the right can be heard pounding away on their side, and from our position in the big batteries smoke can be seen to the left overlooking Radisovo, where the Russian guns are blazing away in exactly the same position they were in yesterday; and although yesterday evening the necessity of advancing the batteries nearer the Turkish positions was admitted on all hands, we found this morning, on looking at the position, that nothing of the kind had been done. The fire of the Turkish redoubt of Grivica does not seem to have slackened in the least, in spite of the number of shells thrown into it yesterday; and although we can see the earth flying into the air



in the middle of the redoubt, and now and then pieces of the parapet are carried away, the Turkish guns reply to the Russian as regularly as clockwork. Whatever loss may have been inflicted upon them in men, certainly we do not seem to have succeeded in dismounting any of their guns. It is very probable that the Turks have not many men in the redoubt, but they are hidden in the trenches and low places in the ground outside, and beyond that, a few only are kept in the redoubt for the management of the guns, who, as fast as they are killed, are replaced by others. Were it otherwise, if the Turks kept the redoubt full of men, the loss would be terrible, for an enormous number of shells have been thrown into it by the Russians and Roumanians.

"Part of the guns of the big battery are fired upon this redoubt, part on the entrenched camp away to the left of the redoubt overlooking Plevna, and part on the Turkish batteries in the hollow between Grivica and Plevna. The fire of these batteries is less steady, more irregular, and not so well sustained as yesterday. It is probable that some of the guns have been dismounted. The firing, nevertheless, is still kept up. I must say I do not believe much in the effect of this artillery fire. There were to be mounted altogether four hundred guns bearing upon the Turkish positions; but, so far, not more than one hundred or a hundred and twenty seem to have been brought into position; and, as far as may be judged, the effect to the present moment has been very slight. They will have to come to much closer quarters than at present before the artillery fire can be made to tell.

"If on the Russian right and centre the attack maintains its character of a siege, such is not the case on the left, where General Zoff has ordered an advance. Leaving the big siege battery about noon, which was slowly pounding away with sledge-hammer blows on the Grivica redoubt and the lower batteries, I rode along the line to the left, passing behind the whole series of batteries, from the centre past Radisovo, almost to the Loftcha road. We found a battery behind Radisovo, throwing shells into one of the

Turkish redoubts in front of the town. No embankments had been thrown up here, but the guns simply placed in line along the brown hill, were worked very rapidly, and I observed that there was no escape of gas from the breeches of these guns. This battery was behind, and to the left of Radisovo, on the ridge which runs parallel to the little hollow which goes down through Plevna from Grivica. In front of Radisovo is another ridge running parallel to this, and on this ridge was placed one more Russian battery, while the side opposite to the Turks was covered with infantry lying behind cover on the crest. This battery was also pouring a well-sustained fire into the lower Turkish redoubts before Plevna.

"We passed behind the battery, proceeded farther to the left, where the hillside was covered with cornfields, vineyards, and a number of trees, threw ourselves down under the shade of the trees to lunch with the aid of some delicious grapes just ripe, and watch the battle from this point. Plevna was quite visible, and we could have been little more than two miles distant from it. And far down before us, distant about a mile, was a line of troops still lying under cover of the ridge, apparently waiting for the moment to begin the attack. These troops could not have been more than a mile from Plevna, and from our standpoint seemed not more than two or three hundred yards from the town.

"The view from here is exceedingly fine. Down in what seemed a narrow valley or gorge, we could perceive the town of Plevna, with its masses of green foliage, from which rose the slender spires of two or three minarets. On the mountain behind Plevna, some distance above the town, we could distinguish two redoubts on the other side of the Loftcha road, from which rose two columns of smoke. Behind and above these redoubts were high wooded mountains extending round towards the right. On the other side of this valley is a ridge beginning behind Plevna, and extending to the right as far as Grivica. It is on this ridge that the principal

Turkish defences are built—two entrenched camps and two or three redoubts, the last of which, behind Grivica, is the one against which Krüdener's forces were broken, and against which the Roumanian batteries, and part of the heavy siege batteries, are now playing. From the hills all around rose columns and columns of white smoke, and there was not an instant when these hills were not echoing with the thunder of a hundred and fifty guns, Turkish and Russian, that were roaring at each other.

"Then again on our left, on a ridge this side of the Loftcha road, at the distance of a mile and a half or two miles, was another Russian battery pounding away at some invisible foe on the other side. The sun is hot, and a veil of smoke hangs over hill, valley, and mountain, which often makes it difficult to distinguish with certainty anything but a sudden flash of fire and a huge ball of white smoke that rises from each discharge of the line described by the Russian and Roumanian positions round Plevna, which begins opposite Bukova, extending nearly parallel with the Sistova road until beyond Grivica, then curving round past Radisovo until within two miles of Plevna, nearly on the Loftcha road, then extending along the Loftcha road on the ridge as far as opposite Krishine. The line thus described is exactly in the form of a reaping-hook, with the point over against Bukova, the middle of the curve opposite Grivica, the junction of the handle close into Plevna, and the end of the handle at Krishine. The point nearest Plevna, it will be perceived, is near the Loftcha road, at the junction of the handle with the blade.

"We had not been in our position under the trees more than ten minutes when we were evidently perceived by a look-out in one of the Turkish redoubts below Radisovo, and probably believing that the Indian cornfield by the side of us, interspersed here and there with trees, was very likely filled with troops, they began to shell us. After they had thrown three shells, all of which fell within twenty yards of us, and the last considerably nearer, we thought it was

time to decamp, and withdrew behind the ridge, where a considerable number of soldiers were lying. We finished our lunch under the shade of another tree in a less advantageous position for sight-seeing, and when I again mounted the top of the ridge I was surprised to see two more Russian batteries far down the ridge, in the direction of Plevna, just to the right of the spot where we had seen the Russian troops previously. These batteries were now within a mile of Plevna, and were shelling one of the redoubts behind Plevna in a corner formed by the course of the Sofia road. Columns of white smoke were rising to the sky, and the sharp whip-like cracks of these field pieces were mingling angrily with the dull heavy roar of the siege guns in the big battery above. I pushed down through the vineyards and cornfields and trees farther and farther towards the Loftcha road, following the ridge down to where it ends in the deep narrow ravine running almost parallel to the Loftcha road.

"I had here climbed up into a tree to get a better view of the situation, when a Cossack came and informed us that there was something more interesting going on on our left, that the Russians were advancing there, with 'hurrahs.' We went back across the ridge a short distance and saw what it was. The Russians under Imeretinsky and Skobelev, the same who took Loftcha the other day, were advancing rapidly along the ridge bordering on the Loftcha road towards Plevna. The Loftcha road, before entering Plevna, passes over the high round of a hill covered with trees, which are not so thick, however, as to be called a wood. The summit of this hill is about a mile and a half distant from the Turkish redoubts in the bend of the Sofia road. The Russians were advancing over this mountain in loose order, with cavalry ahead, for we saw a number of horsemen making their way through the trees, and a few minutes later perceived a couple of squadrons of dragoons advancing along the Loftcha road, cautiously treading their way as they went. They were already over the top of the



hill, probably half a mile, when we saw the dragoons, in skirmishing line, turn their horses' heads back, and begin firing as they slowly retired. Then there was considerable firing from the skirmishing line on both sides, although I could not distinguish the Turks from the Russians among the trees. Then the Turks began throwing shells towards where the dragoons were massed under the trees. They must have been able to see these dragoons, for the shells fell directly in the line. Each successive shell fell closer and closer, so that the dragoons began to shift their position.

"This lasted perhaps twenty minutes. Then from the whole side of the mountain began to be heard the rattle of small-arms, which grew heavier and heavier, and the mountain and trees were soon covered with clouds of thin blue smoke. It was the infantry arriving in line and beginning the attack. The Turks were posted in the trees at the foot of this mountain, and probably half-a-mile in front of the redoubt, and replied to the Russian fire with vigour. The Russians gradually advanced down the side of the mountain through the trees, driving back the Turks, part of whom seemed to retire upon Plevna, but the greater part upon the redoubt. The Russians pushed down to almost the bottom of the hill, and we saw the Turks retreating up the smooth slope leading towards the redoubt by hundreds, and from the redoubt itself began to be poured forth a heavy fire upon the Russians on the opposite slope. The Russians pushed down steadily nevertheless in loose order, firing as they came; but as they neared the foot of the slope the Turkish fire became terrible. From the parapets of the redoubt poured forth a steady wave of flame, and the redoubt itself was soon hidden in the thick fog of white smoke that rose over it. The roar of this tremendous fire was simply fearful. I do not remember to have ever heard anything like it, or to have ever seen in any battle anything like so well-sustained a fire.

"This also lasted about twenty minutes. Then the Russian skirmishing line, which had already reached the foot of the slope, began to withdraw,

and in a few minutes they had retired to a position half way up the slope, where they halted, and the slackening of the fire told that, for the moment, the attack upon the redoubt, if attack it was, had failed. We now saw the Turks coming down again from the redoubt, and re-entering the trees at the foot of the slope where the Russians had been, and likewise those who had retreated towards Plevna seemed to come out again, for we saw them in the maize fields, just on the other side of the ravine between us and them, pushing along as though they would turn the right of the Russian attack. This was impossible, because the infantry on our side were lying close behind the ridge, and would have effectually prevented any movement of this kind.

"During all the time this fight lasted our batteries, which I have already spoken of as having advanced so far down towards Plevna, were quite silent; why, I cannot understand, for just at this moment when the attack was going on they should have concentrated their whole fire upon the redoubt, and I cannot understand why the infantry, which was lying in masses near these batteries, did not take part in the attack. The whole burden was on the left column advancing by the Loftcha road, nor was there any attack made anywhere else at the same time, nor on any other of the Turkish positions. The artillery fire had ceased everywhere. Everybody seemed to be waiting the result of this attack. This was just the very way to make the attack a failure, even if it had any chances of success, for the whole army to stand still and look idly on, while one small detachment was trying to attack the redoubt. It is a very strange proceeding. Not a single shot was fired at the small body of skirmishers who came out from Plevna, and annoyed the right of the attack, although they were within easy range both of the artillery and infantry.

"The attack had begun about five, too late in the day to accomplish anything if the capture of the redoubt had been intended. This was probably not hoped for to-day. The Russians remained in the positions to which they had with-

drawn on the slope of the mountain, and the Turks began to swarm out of the redoubt down to the foot of the slope. They were evidently attacking in their turn, and bent upon driving the Russians back to the point which they had originally occupied in the morning. Although it was not light enough to see, I imagine that the Russians had already been strengthening their positions by digging, for they now poured a fire from the line they had occupied, which in steadiness and fury was only equalled by the Turks from their redoubt. The Turks had already advanced a considerable way up the slope before the Russians opened fire, and they did not stand a moment under it. They retreated through the trees, and again up the slope to the redoubt, hotly pursued by the Russians, who followed them to the foot of the slope.

"The fire on both sides was now dreadful, and the Russians seem to have received a considerable number of reinforcements, for their advance was far more steady and swift, more self-confident than the previous one had been. They swept down into the little hollow between the opposite slopes, and then poured a terrible fire on the Turkish redoubt from behind the trees, and under cover of the banks, stones, earth, and anything they could find to shelter themselves. This time the attack was, moreover, supported by our batteries on the right, which now advanced still nearer Plevna, and concentrated their fire on the Turkish redoubt.

"At the time the Russians were advancing down the hill, the whole valley was filled with smoke. The town of Plevna, as well as the Turkish redoubts, and even part of the wood where the Russians were, had become invisible. The sun was now just setting behind a mass of clouds, but it was seen for a few minutes like a fiery blood-shot eye, which tinged the smoke hanging over everything with the colour of blood. Then it suddenly disappeared behind the mountain, and darkness settled down over the scene. The fire continued for some few minutes longer, and from the redoubt, as from the foot of the slope and the foot of the moun-

tains, sprang forth thousands upon thousands of jets of flame like fire-flies. Then the fire suddenly ceased. The fight for the night was over. The Russians remained in their positions at the foot of the slope which leads up to the redoubt, about a quarter of a mile from the parapet."

It was not, however, until the morning of the 11th, after four days of unintermittent bombardment, that the general advance of the Russian infantry took place. This is described by Mr. Forbes in his characteristically vigorous and graphic style, and we cannot do better than transfer his telegram, despatched on the day of the battle, to our pages.

"To-day was the fifth day of the bombardment. After the thunder of last night the morning broke with rain, which settled down into a dense mist, through which objects were invisible at a distance of one hundred yards. We lost our way several times in riding from the place where we had snatched a few hours' sleep to our old position of the day before on the heights in front of Radisovo, which exposed position the Artillery-General of the 9th Corps, Colonel Wellesley, a Prussian correspondent, and myself, had all to ourselves. Affairs did not seem much altered since yesterday. About 10 A.M. the fog lifted somewhat, and let us have a partial view of the scene before us. The guns of the redoubt of the Turkish first position on the central swell still replied to the fire of the Russian batteries in the valley to the east of it. The Grivica redoubt was still alive, although its fire could not be called brisk. To our left, near the Loftcha-Plevna road, there were occasional bursts of infantry fire, but these were very intermittent, and always died out after a few minutes. The Turks were visible out in the open between their first and second positions, on the central swell, toiling away at spade work under the shell-fire of the Russian batteries. The Russian siege-gun battery near us was occasionally firing over the central swell at the entrenched camps on the northern ridge of the Turkish position, and occasionally throwing shells into the town of Plevna.



"Soon after ten almost total silence prevailed, only a single report echoing sullenly among the heights at rare intervals. There grew somehow upon one the impression that this was but the calm before the storm. Of this lull the Turks jauntily took advantage to come out from behind the parapets of the earthworks and stroll about the glacis with the utmost nonchalance. Everybody spoke in whispers, as if afraid or loth to break the universal unnatural stillness, interrupted only feebly by the far-off cannonade and musketry fire of Imeretinsky, round on the extreme left, near the Valley of the Vid. The drizzling fog came down again, and veiled alike friend and foe.

"At eleven precisely, a furious musketry fire suddenly burst out on our left. We could judge that it came from the soldiers pushing their way out of the gap through which passes the Loftcha-Plevna road, but the fog hid everything from us. Only the sound told us that the attack must be on the redoubt on the summit of the isolated mamelon south-east of the town of Plevna. It was impossible to see twenty yards in front of one. Everywhere the cannon opened a heavy fire, and their smoke made the obscurity denser. It must be the assault at last, and, alas! it is invisible. Louder and louder swells the roll of the hidden musketry. We reckon that Skobelev must be at work down there on our left, but we can hardly discern each other as we lie upon the crest of the ridge. We are in the thick of the din, but we might as well have no eyes.

"It is the most mysterious, weird situation possible to conceive. It is impossible to tell how the fighting is going. The musketry fire seems to advance but little, but its roll unquestionably swells in volume. The hiddenness of the whole thing is intensely torturing. The thick air above us, as we are lying down, is torn by the whistle of bullets, and the yell and scream of shells. In vain we chafe for the merest glimpse down into the hollow on our left. The thick waves of fog and smoke swathe everything as with a huge dingy pall. The ar-

tillery-general is almost mad with irritation at his inability to see anything. We can do nothing, however, but possess our souls in patience; but as the minutes wear on, we can discern by ear that the Russians must be gaining ground.

"It seems to us here at one moment, to judge by the sound of the firing and of the cheering, that they had actually carried the redoubt on the summit of the isolated mamelon. Will they then assail the redoubts of the central swell, or make a dash for the town of Plevna, or do both? It must be a terrible time for the Turks thus assailed by invisible foes, and in ignorance whence the next blow is to be struck and where it is to fall. So far as I can make out they seem to be reserving their fire till their foes come to close quarters. As for the Russians, although they are firing heavily as they advance, it must be firing at random. It is certain that they can see no enemy. In one sense the fog is an advantage for them, because by it they are being somewhat spared in the rush forward. But the sound of their firing must indicate some mark to their enemies, and in the obscurity the directness of their advance must be impaired. The Turks make little response to the furious shell-fire of the Russian batteries on their positions, perhaps because many of their guns have been dismantled, or because they are short of ammunition, or because they feel that it would be in a great measure labour lost in the thick fog. We know nothing, save that the air is full of noise and of missiles, that we are a prey to a suspense which would be altogether insupportable were it not that it must be endured.

"About twelve the fog begins to lift, almost as dramatically as it fell. We can see the line of the Turkish northern heights, but the intervening valley is full of dense white smoke. Then presently we get a glimpse into, as it were, the interstices of smoke, and discern the Russian field batteries in the valley, blazing away with all their might at the Turkish first and second positions on the central swell, but the fog and smoke still obstinately hang round

and above those positions themselves, and utterly obscure for the time the region of the attack on our left. At one moment it seems as if the roll of the Russian musketry fire were wavering and receding. Then the sound swells again. There is an evident rally, and the noise moves forward. Just for a moment in the break of the smoke I get a glimpse through the obscurity at the Turkish second position on the central swell, and note that its cannon, disregarding the Russian fire poured into it, are firing in the direction of the hostile musketry fire. So mysterious is the situation that a Russian officer sitting by us starts the theory that it is an attack, not by the Russians at all, but by the Turks; and it is certainly impossible to adduce any evidence to the contrary.

"One thing is certain now, as the time passes on, that if the sound of firing be any indication, the infantry fighting has a tendency to retrograde from the Turkish front. It is coming nearer and nearer to us, and if it indeed be an attack on the part of the Turks they are storming the western verge of the ridge on which we lie. In utter desperation we abandon our position, walk westward along the ridge farther to our left, and nearer to the fighting just above the western edge of the village of Radisovo, exactly along the space held by Schahofskoy's staff as forepost line on the night of the 30th July. I found several batteries of Russian field artillery of the 31st Division in steady action against the first and second Turkish position on the central swell, and only a little to the right and rear of the infantry men still engaged in desultory fighting, as evidenced by the maintenance of a dropping fire.

"The colonel in command of the battery told us with an assumption of indifference, which I am sure was feigned, that the fighting dying out was merely forepost work, to clear the way for the grand assault against the redoubt on the isolated mamelon, which was to be made in the afternoon. He may, indeed, have believed what he said, but another tale was told, when for an instant a sharp eddy of wind blew fog and smoke

away from the mamelon and slopes leading up. There was no fighting there now, but with my glass I could discern the Russian dead and wounded lying about sadly thick. As for the Turks, some of them were dispersed at random, in among the wounded on the slopes. We could divine their fell purpose. Successive bodies of Turks were streaming down the slope of the mamelon against the huddled mass of Russians retiring seemingly on their shelter-trenches athwart the mouth of the road ravine and ascending the slopes to our immediate right. There could be but one inference, that the Russian infantry had unsuccessfully assailed the mamelon redoubt, and that its garrison was taking the counter offensive. It was also clear that Skobelev had attacked the redoubt and covered way due east from the isolated mamelon. My artillery friend stated further that all the four-pounders of his division had been sent to the left on towards the Sophia road with intent, he believed, to hinder the Turks from any attempt to retreat in that direction; an attempt which did not seem to be probable. It was edifying to witness the composure with which those soldiers of the battery who were off duty slept steadily while the cannon were being fired close to their ears, and while the shells were whistling over their heads.

"Anxious to command the position a little more fully, we went yet farther to the left on the extreme westward peak of the Radisovo ridge, and thence, since the fog had now in a great measure cleared away, we looked down upon the whole scene. A regiment of the 16th Division was languidly plying its musketry fire down the valley traversed by the Loftcha-Plevna road, and appeared to have half a mind to emerge therefrom for the purpose of attacking again the redoubt on the isolated mamelon. But the place was scored by the Turkish shelter-trenches, and the Turks there blazed away, steadily but not ardently. Near to us the skirmishers of a brigade of the 30th Division were dodging their way down to the base of the south-eastern face of the mamelon. This was



at two o'clock, and for nearly two hours little forepost affairs of no consequence went on.

*Evening.* — I spent the greater portion of the afternoon in and about the battery on the height directly in front of Radisovo. This battery was on the extreme left of Krüdener's position, and points its fire partly against the redoubts of the first and second Turkish positions and partly against the redoubt on the detached mamelon south-east of the town. It was this last redoubt which the Russian chiefs clearly considered the weakest point of the Turkish position. The heavy firing at eleven o'clock on our left, which the artillery-colonel told me had been mere forepost work, was in reality an assault on this redoubt by three regiments of the 4th Corps, pushed home in the fog right up to the Turkish shelter-trenches outside the ditch of the redoubt. In spite of the spirit with which the attack was made it failed, and Kriloff's men had to fall back up the valley traversed by the Loftcha-Plevna road, and unto the slopes opposite the Turkish redoubt. I also learned that a curious order had been given to all the artillery to fire each alternative hour hard and gently.

"It was observable from this elevation that the Roumanian cannon on our right had actually passed by the Grivica redoubt still held by the Turks, and had come into action against the redoubts on the central swell, with the two guns left in the Grivica redoubt as armament, firing into their rear. This was gallant but inexplicable till one learned that the redoubt and the entrenched camp behind it were full of Turkish infantry. To anticipate, let me state that these at sundown compelled the Roumanian guns to retire in a line with the village of Grivica. At half-past three all the Russian batteries began to fire with great swiftness, and continued till it was necessary for the gunners to hold their hand, lest the missiles should fall among the Russian stormers once more assaulting the redoubt, on the detached mamelon of which I have already spoken.

"At four o'clock a mass of infantry in loose order, preceded by a skirmishing line, and fol-

lowed by supports and reserves, came up out of the Chaussée valley, drove the Turks out of their shelter-trenches at the foot of the mamelon, and pressed on vivaciously up its southern slope. This was a Brigade, or thereabouts, of the 16th Division. Simultaneously, down the slopes of the heights which are a prolongation of that on which we stood, another brigade advanced. This one belonged to the 30th Division. The brigade crossed the intervening valley at full speed, and began to advance up the south-eastern and eastern sections of the slope of the mamelon, while on the lower slopes they hung somewhat, and it seemed did not quite like the work cut out for them. They extended to the right under shelter, and then after a moment's lingering the skirmishing line dashed out of shelter, and began swiftly to ascend the wide natural glacis lying below the redoubt. This glacis was already dotted with the dead of the morning.

"The mass deploying steadily, followed the skirmishers, with the supports behind them, the reserves lying down under shelter behind. At that moment the shell-fire from the guns of the first and second Turkish positions crashed in among the advancing Russians. From tier above tier of continuous shelter-trenches lining the outside of the ditch of the redoubt streamed a torrent of musketry fire from the Turkish infantry lining them. Still the Russians laboured doggedly onwards and upwards in the teeth of these impediments. But the slope was steep, and the ground slippery. Just at this moment we descried at first a slender column, then a heavier, on the edge of the reverse slope of the mamelon, making for the redoubt from the direction opposite to the Russian advance. This proved to be Turkish reinforcements coming up to strengthen the garrison of the redoubt. To deal with this new enemy on the right flank, the Russians with great promptitude threw back their right, the soldiers lying down and firing into the advancing Turks, while the mass, with which the supports had by this time mingled, pressed on towards the Turkish shelter-trenches outside the redoubt. Here for the first time

came sounding back to us, through the thick moist air, the volleys of Russian cheers. That the leaders with that cheer actually gained the first Turkish shelter-trench, I can testify from my own eyesight. For about five minutes the fate of the redoubt hung in the balance. Then, tortured by the fire on the front and flank, the Russians began to fall back, at first slowly, but presently at a run. The reserves took no part in the attack.

"The Russians had fallen fast as they advanced. Perhaps they fell faster as they retired. The Turkish infantry promptly followed up their advance, sallying out with flaming volleys down the slope after the Russians, and driving them to the shelter of their own trenches, over ground studded with Russian dead and wounded. The second assault was thus, like the first, a failure; and as the dusk was coming on I anticipated no more fighting for the day, and was walking back out of the exposed battery to find my horse and ride to such shelter as the battle-field affords. The Turkish infantry, regardless of the fire of the Russian batteries, were streaming into their redoubts for night duty. The artillery fire was gradually waning. Suddenly it swelled again. Yet another desperate effort, followed hard on the last, was in course of being made, on that stubborn isolated redoubt there.

"The troops engaged were three fresh regiments drawn from the same divisions as those composing the previous attacking force. The previous attack from the opening to the finish had occupied just half an hour. This one was disposed of in the gloaming in a similar manner after twenty minutes. The mamelon redoubt of the Turkish Plevna position remains intact."

The gains of the day were Skobelev's two redoubts, and the Grivitza redoubt captured by the Roumanians. Skobelev was unable to hold his conquered position for more than twenty-four hours, and his expulsion by the Turks is described by one of Mr. Forbes's colleagues in a letter, dated September 12th, and written from a point on the Loftcha road, near Radisovo.

"A little to my right, where General Kriloff

attacked the redoubts down near Plevna, invisible from the point where my colleague took his stand, the fire had been raging with fury for nearly two hours, a steady, continuous roll and crash, intermingled with the louder thunder of cannon, which filled the air with the uproar of the bullets and shells. During all this time there was little to be seen along the crest of the Radisovo ridge, where the Russian guns could be perceived at work, with figures flitting round them, dimly seen through the smoke, strangely magnified by the intervention of the fog, until the gunners appeared like giants, and the guns themselves, enlarged and distorted by the same medium, appeared like huge uncouth monsters, from whose throats at every instant leaped forth globes of flame. There were moments when these flashes seemed to light up everything around them. Then the guns and gunners appeared for an instant with fearful distinctness, red and lurid, as though tinged with blood. Then they sank back again in shadowy indistinctness. The uproar of the battle rose and swelled until it became fearful to hear—like the continuous roar of an angry sea beating against a rock-bound coast, combined with that of a thunder-storm, with the strange unearthly sounds heard on board a ship when labouring in a gale.

"This terrible storm of battle continued without ceasing for nearly two hours. The Russian guns were pouring their fire into the redoubt, and the Russian infantry into the trenches, while the attacking columns were advancing cautiously under cover of the smoke and fog and standing corn to get a position as near as possible before making the final rush. At about five o'clock the smoke lifted again, carried away by a gust of wind. At this moment I saw before the redoubt, down near Plevna, a mass of Russian soldiers rise up in a field of Indian corn, and push forward with a shout. The Turkish fire just then seemed to have been dominated, nearly silenced, by the terrible storm of shot and shell poured in by the Russians. The moment seemed favourable for the assault. Either the Turks



were abandoning these redoubts, or they were lying behind the parapet, awaiting the attack. Which was it? we asked. The question was soon answered. The Russian shout had scarcely died away when there flashed along the parapet of the redoubt a stream of fire that swayed backwards and forwards, while the smoke rose over the redoubt in one heavy white mass. One continuous crash filled the air with bullets, from which to the spectator looking on it did not seem possible for even a rabbit to escape.

"Into this storm of bullets plunged the Russians, with a shout as though of joy, and then disappeared into a little hollow, and for the moment were lost to view. Then they emerged again, disappeared in the low ground at the foot of the glacis, rushing onward as though the bullets were but paper pellets; but, alas! sadly diminished in number. Would it be possible for them to reach the parapet? Was it possible for flesh and blood to break that circle of fire? To me it seemed utterly out of the question. Did but one bullet in ten find its billet, not one of these gallant fellows would return through that cornfield. While waiting to see them emerge from this little hollow, my excitement was so great, my hand trembled so, that I could not hold the field-glass to my eyes, and for the moment was obliged to trust my naked vision. They were evidently very near the redoubt. A rush might do it. Victory was almost within their grasp, but they required a fresh accession of strength; a rush of new men from behind; another wave coming forward with new impetus to carry the first up over the glacis; a second wave, and perhaps a third, each bringing new impulsion, new strength. I looked for this wave of reserves. I looked to see if reinforcements were coming up—if the general was doing any thing to help the gallant fellows struggling there against the circle of fire.

"I looked in vain. My heart sank within me, for I saw that all this bravery, all this loss of life, would be useless. While these poor fellows were madly fighting their lives away by hundreds in a desperate struggle—when the vic-

tory was trembling in the balance—not a man was sent to help them. They were left to die overwhelmed, broken, vanquished. It was sublime, and was pitiful. I see a few of them struggle up the glacis one by one. They drop. They are not followed, and here they come again, a confused mass of human beings rushing madly back across that cornfield, less than half of those who went forward. When this disorderly remnant was seen flying back—broken, destroyed—two more battalions were sent to pick them up, and carry them back to the assault. Two more battalions! they might as well have sent a corporal and two more men. Two more regiments were what was required, and they should have been sent at the moment when that mass of men rose up in the cornfield, and went on with a cheer. The new troops would have reached the glacis just as the assault began to waver, would have carried the hesitating mass onward, and all would have gone into the redoubt together. Instead of this General Kriloff sent two battalions, and that when it was too late. The poor fellows went over the hill singing gaily, and disappeared in the fog and smoke. I could have cried for pity, for I knew that most of them went uselessly to simple slaughter. It was impossible for these fresh battalions to renew the assault with the slightest chance of success. These two battalions, like the rest, were doomed to almost certain destruction.

"The fog again settled down over the redoubt, hiding Turks and Russians alike. I could tell by that fearful rifle-fire that they were going at it again, and I turned away. Soon the cessation of firing told that it was all over; but the second attack was more easily repulsed than the first, and I perceived likewise that the whole Russian attack made from the Radisovo ridge by Krüdener and Kriloff was repulsed all along the line. It was inevitable; I foresaw it from the first. The mistake was made and repeated continually by the Russians of sending too few men against such positions, according to old rules made before breech-loading days. In those days a fixed number of men were considered enough

to carry a position, and sending more was only increasing the chances of loss without increasing the chances of success; but the number required to carry a position defended by breech-loaders is about four or five times as great as against muzzle-loaders—a fact which the Russians have not yet learned, but which is all the more important when the breech-loaders are in the hands of soldiers like the Turks.

"I will now relate the events which occurred on the Russian extreme left, commanded by Prince Imeretinsky and General Skobelev. Here the attack was conducted in a very different manner. While the battle was raging in front and to the right of me, it raged with no less fury round the redoubts and on the other side of the Loftcha road, but up to the moment of the second repulse of Kriloff, Skobelev had not yet made his assault. He had well prepared the ground, however. At four o'clock he had brought down twenty pieces of artillery to the spur of the ridge overlooking Plevna. Not more than a thousand yards distant from the redoubt I saw an immense volume of smoke rising, and heard a terrible thunder, which was not more than five or six hundred yards away on my left. It was evident that Skobelev, risking his artillery in this advanced position, was determined to make a desperate effort to capture the redoubt in front of him.

"I have already described the positions here, and now only need refer to them to make the description understood. The redoubt Skobelev was attacking was a double redoubt in the bend of the Loftcha road down near Plevna. He had advanced his troops down the slope of the mountain to within easy range. As the Turks immediately opened fire upon him from the redoubt he returned the fire with steadiness and precision, putting his men under cover as much as possible, his cannon pouring a steady stream of shell and canister into the redoubt as well. In fact he worked his cannon so much that several pieces have been spoiled. He had evidently determined to risk everything to capture this redoubt, and if Plevna were not taken it would

not be his fault. For three hours he kept up this fire, and just after Kriloff's second repulse, the Turkish fire having somewhat relaxed, dominated by the Russian, he thought the moment had come for making the assault.

"He had four regiments of the line, and four battalions of sharpshooters. Still keeping up his murderous fire, he formed under its cover two regiments in the little hollow at the foot of the low hill on which was built the redoubt, together with two battalions of sharpshooters, not more than twelve hundred yards from the scarp. Then placing himself in the best position for watching the result, he ceased fire and ordered the advance. He ordered the assaulting party not to fire, and they rushed forward with their guns on their shoulders, with music playing and banners flying, and disappeared in the fog and smoke. Skobelev is the only general who places himself near enough to feel the pulse of a battle. The advancing column was indistinctly seen, a dark mass in the fog and smoke. Feeling, as it were, every throb of the battle, he saw this line begin to waver and hesitate. Upon the instant he hurled forward a rival regiment to support, and again watched the result. This new force carried the mass farther on with its momentum, but the Turkish redoubt flamed and smoked, and poured forth such a torrent of bullets, that the line was again shaken. Skobelev stood in this shower of balls unhurt. All his escort were killed or wounded, even to the little Kirghiz, who received a bullet in the shoulder. Again he saw the line hesitate and waver, and he flung his fourth and last regiment, the Libansky, on the glacis. Again this new wave carried the preceding ones forward, until they were almost on the scarp; but that deadly shower of bullets poured upon them; men dropped by hundreds, and the result still doubtful. The line once more wavered and hesitated. Not a moment was to be lost, if the redoubt was to be carried.

"Skobelev had now only two battalions of sharpshooters left, the best in his detachments. Putting himself at the head of these, he dashed forward on horseback. He picked up the strag-



glers; he reached the wavering, fluctuating mass, and gave it the inspiration of his own courage and instruction. He picked the whole mass up and carried it forward with a rush and a cheer. The whole redoubt was a mass of flame and smoke, from which screams, shouts, and cries of agony and defiance arose, with the deep-mouthed bellowing of the cannon, and above all the steady, awful crash of that deadly rifle-fire. Skobelev's sword was cut in two in the middle. Then a moment later, when just on the point of leaping the ditch, horse and man rolled together to the ground, the horse dead or wounded, the rider untouched. Skobelev sprang to his feet with a shout, then, with a formidable, savage yell, the whole mass of men streamed over the ditch, over the scarp and counter-scarp, over the parapet, and swept into the redoubt like a hurricane. Their bayonets made short work of the Turks still remaining. Then a joyous cheer told that the redoubt was captured, and that at last one of the defences of Plevna was in the hands of the Russians.

"Having seen as much as I have seen of the Turkish infantry fire from behind trenches and walls, I thought it was beyond flesh and blood to break it—a belief which had been strengthened by Kriloff's repulse, which I had just witnessed. Skobelev proved the contrary, but at what a sacrifice! In that short rush of a few hundred yards, three thousand men had been left on the hill-side on the glacis, the scarp, and the ditch—one-fourth of his whole force. I believe that Skobelev looks upon such attacks upon such positions as almost criminal, and disapproved highly the whole plan of attack on Plevna; but he believes that if an attack is to be made it can only be done in this manner, and that, although the loss of men may be great, it is better that the loss should be incurred and the victory won, than half the loss with a certainty of defeat. Skobelev seems to be the only one among the Russian generals who has studied the American war with profit. He knows it by heart, and it will be seen by those who have studied the great civil war, that in this assault

Skobelev followed the example of the American generals on both sides when attempting to carry such positions, to follow up the assaulting column with fresh troops without waiting for the first column to be repulsed. If the position proves too strong for the first column, then reinforcements are at hand before they have time to break and run.

"Skobelev had the redoubt. The question now was how to hold it. It was dominated by the redoubt of Krishine on the left already spoken of. It was exposed at the Plevna side to the fire of the sharpshooters, and to the Turkish forces in the wood bordering on the Sophia road, and open to the fire of the entrenched camp. There was a cross fire coming from three different points. At daylight next morning the Turks opened fire from all sides. The distance from the redoubt at Krishine had of course been accurately measured, and the guns dropped shells into the redoubt with the utmost precision on the exposed sides. The back of the redoubt was a solid rock on which it was impossible to erect a parapet. All the earth had been used for the construction of the parapets on the other side. It was evident that the position was untenable unless the entrenched camp on the other side of the Plevna and the Krishine redoubt could be taken. Skobelev renewed his demand for reinforcements made the evening before. Although his losses had been great, the spirit of his troops was so good that with another regiment he was willing to undertake to capture the redoubt and the entrenched camp, or he would undertake to hold the positions until something could be attempted in some other quarter. Could one or two more positions be carried during Wednesday, say the Krishine redoubt, and one entrenched camp on the same ridge as the Grivica redoubt, the fall of Plevna might be considered certain. At sunrise the Turks began an attack upon the captured redoubt, and the storm of battle again raged with fury here while all was quiet everywhere else. The desperate attack of the Turks was repulsed. Another attack was made and another repulse, and this

continued all day long, until the Turks had attacked and been beaten five successive times.

"The Russian losses were becoming fearful. General Skobelev had lost, he thinks, two thousand men in attacking the redoubt. By the afternoon he had lost three thousand more in holding it, while his battalions shrivelled up and shrank away as if by magic. One battalion of sharpshooters had been reduced to one hundred and sixty men. A company which had been one hundred and fifty was now forty. An immense proportion of officers were killed, or wounded only. Only one commander of a regiment is alive; scarcely a head of a battalion is left. Two officers of the staff are killed, one of whom was Verastchagine, brother of the great artist. Another brother was wounded. General Dobrovolsky, commander of sharpshooters, was killed. One officer was blown to pieces by the explosion of a caisson. Captain Kurapatkin, chief of the staff, standing beside this officer, had his hair singed and suffered a severe contusion. Only General Skobelev himself remained untouched. He seems to bear a charmed life. He visited the redoubt three or four times during the day, encouraging the soldiers, telling them help would soon arrive; Plevna would soon be taken; victory would soon crown their efforts; telling them it was the final decisive blow struck for their country; for the honour and glory of the Russian arms; and they always replied with the same cheery shouts, while their numbers were dwindling away by hundreds. He again and again sent for reinforcements, and again and again informed the commander-in-chief that the position was untenable. The afternoon wore away and no reinforcements came.

"General Levitsky, as I have been informed, formally refused reinforcements, either because he thought the position, in spite of General Skobelev's representations, was tenable, or because he had no reinforcements to give. General Kriloff, on his own responsibility, sent the remnant of a regiment which had attacked the redoubt, which I saw rush forward and then back through the Indian cornfield. Of the two

thousand five hundred there were barely one thousand left, so it was utterly incapable of going into action that day, and even this regiment arrived too late. General Skobelev had left the redoubt at four o'clock to go to his tent on a woody hill opposite. He had been there scarcely an hour when he was informed that the Turks were again attacking the right flank on the Loftcha road immediately above Plevna. He galloped forward to see, and was met by an orderly with the news that the Turks were also attacking the redoubt a sixth time. He dashed forward towards the redoubt in hopes of reaching it in time, but was met by a stream of his own men flying back. They were exhausted by forty-eight hours' incessant fighting, and were worn out, hungry, and dying of thirst and fatigue. Owing to the inactivity of the Russians during the day, the Turks had been enabled to collect an overwhelming force, which had made one last desperate effort, and had succeeded in driving Skobelev's force out. One bastion was held till the last by a young officer, whose name I regret I have forgotten, with a handful of men. They refused to fly, and were slaughtered to the last man.

"It was just after this that I met General Skobelev, the first time that day. He was in a fearful state of excitement and fury. His uniform was covered with mud and filth; his sword broken; his Cross of St. George twisted round on his shoulder; his face black with powder and smoke; his eyes haggard and blood-shot, and his voice quite gone. He spoke in a hoarse whisper. I never before saw such a picture of battle as he presented. I saw him again in his tent at night. He was quite calm and collected. He said, 'I have done my best; I could do no more. My detachment is half destroyed; my regiments do not exist; I have no officers left; they sent me no reinforcements, and I have lost three guns.' They were three of the four guns which he placed in the redoubt upon taking it, only one of which his retreating troops had been able to carry off. 'Why did they refuse you reinforcements?' I asked. 'Who was to blame?'



'I blame nobody,' he replied. 'It is the will of God.'

The account of the memorable 11th of September would not be complete without a description of the capture of the Grivitza redoubt by the Roumanians; and of this event, as of so many others during the earlier campaign, we have no fuller or more trustworthy narrative than one supplied by the "Daily News" correspondents. A friend of Mr. Forbes sent him the following account from Poredim, on the day after the battle:—

"As you may remember, when we rode to the rear last night, we saw no reason to doubt that the Grivica redoubt was still in Turkish hands, knowing as we did that the assault made upon it at three o'clock had been repulsed, and we set down the smoke rising round below it to an attempt on the part of the Turks to drive back the Roumanian artillery, which had passed the redoubt, and were in action absolutely in its front. In reality, however, the Grivica redoubt fell last night before the determined bravery of the Roumanians. I forward you detailed information concerning the severe and protracted struggle.

"It appears that at half-past two P.M. the redoubt was attacked by two Roumanian brigades, each consisting of four battalions, and three battalions of Russians. The Roumanians attacked from the east and south-east, the Russians from the south and south-west. The attack was made in the following manner:—First a line of skirmishers, with men carrying scaling ladders, gabions, and fascines among them. The latter had their rifles slung on their backs, and were ordered in no case to fire, but merely to run forward, fill up the ditch, and place their ladders behind. Then followed the second line in company column formation for the attack, followed by the third line to support the assault. At half-past two P.M. the attack was made by the Roumanians, and it is said that by some mistake the Russians arrived half an hour too late. Be that as it may, the assault was repulsed, and all retired except two companies of infantry,

which rallied, and, keeping under cover, maintained a brisk fire against the work.

"At half-past five the attack was renewed by a battalion of the Roumanian militia, followed by two Russian battalions of the 17th and 18th regiments. The redoubt was then carried, and the Turks withdrew to the other redoubt, a little to the north of the captured work. But it was soon apparent that the redoubt could not be held without reinforcements, and three Roumanian battalions, with a battery of artillery, were ordered forward. They lost their way, however, in the fog, and were thus precluded from rendering the required assistance, consequently, when the Turks returned to the attack, the allies were driven out.

"The third assault soon followed, and the work was finally captured at seven P.M. Four guns and a standard were the trophies of the feat of arms. More than once during the night did the Turks advance with shouts of 'Allah!' but no serious attack was made. Thus, to my surprise, when I reached the Plevna valley this morning, I beheld a flag-staff up, defiantly exposing the Roumanian flag in that hitherto dreaded Grivica redoubt. I was given to understand that preparations were in progress for an attack on the Turkish entrenched camp on the Turkish northern ridge about two thousand metres west of the Grivica redoubt.

"I found the village of Grivica full of ambulance waggons and wounded bearers, and in a line running from the top of the hill in front of the redoubt down into the valley in front of the village, was a line of field batteries just coming into action. In the rear of the village, and also lying down the slope of the hill, was a line of Roumanian infantry under the shelter of the cover-trenches; and in their rear again was a reserve of field batteries. The infantry force in this advanced line amounted in all to about four thousand Roumanian troops.

"By this time it was past ten o'clock. As the position we occupied yesterday on the height above Radisovo had the double advantage of the best view of any assault on the entrenched

camp opposite, and also of anything occurring on the Russian left flank nearer Plevna, I rode thither, passing under a very heavy cross fire, as I traversed the valley and the way between the Turkish and Russian batteries. Reaching the Russian positions, I rode along the reverse slope of the Radisovo height until I came behind our old observatory of yesterday, and I remounted the ridge to find our old friend Krüdener's left flank battery still in position. Just before I arrived a shell from this battery had caused a great explosion in the redoubt forming the second Turkish position on the central swell, much to my intense regret that I was not in time to see this fortunate shot. Having satisfied myself that I might safely push on a little nearer Plevna without missing the attack on the Turkish entrenched camp opposite, I made my way still farther to the left to the tree beneath which we yesterday witnessed the Russian unsuccessful assaults on the Turkish mamelon redoubt. The guns of Imeretinsky and Skobelev, which half encircle the western half of the valley, were pounding away as yesterday, but did not appear to have made much advance, if any. There soon, however, became visible a long line of fitful puffs of bluish smoke out of the wood which faces the covered way connecting the two redoubts covering the town towards the southwest. This rifle fire was speedily answered by a line of Turkish fire from behind the covered way, as well as a hot fire from some shelter trenches in the middle of the valley which separated the combatants.

"Having watched this apparently harmless duel for some time, we came under the notice of the Turkish skirmishers in the valley too closely to render it advisable to remain here any longer. I therefore remounted and returned east along the reverse flank of the Radisovo height, with intent to cross the valley, and, if possible, get into the Grivica redoubt. On my way every now and then I had a glimpse of the slowly progressing, or indeed almost stationary, attack on the Turkish entrenched camp opposite. I descended the slope into the valley, crossed it,

and made my way up through the village of Grivica towards the redoubt. On mounting the plateau above I soon found myself under cover of the transverse hillock running down into the valley from the height above, and sheltered behind it from the fire of the Turkish camp were massed a few battalions of Roumanians, with a battery or two, constituting the reserves intended to support the attack on the entrenched camp.

"I was here told that it would be impossible to ride up into the redoubt, for as soon as I left the covered way by the hillock I should come on to an open gap between it and the redoubt, which is continually swept by two Turkish guns. Intent on persevering, I observed a short way off a ditch running up the hill in the direction of the redoubt. This I determined to avail myself of as far as it reached, and leaving my horse, I commenced my way up the ditch, which was filled with Roumanian infantry. After meandering about in all directions I found that the ditch soon ended in a cul-de-sac. Between me and the redoubt, a distance of about six hundred yards, there was a small Roumanian battery, and for this I ran at speed, the ground I traversed being literally strewn with dead Roumanians and Russians. The fire seemed to become heavier as I neared the battery, which, however, I reached in safety. There was nothing for it now but to commence running again as soon as I had caught my breath in the little battery. The Roumanian officers squatting in the entrance of the redoubt shouted to me to run in their direction. This I did, and was thankful when, in rushing in among them, and picking my way through the dead, they pulled me down to the ground and made me squat beside them for security against the continuous shower of lead.

"I had now time to look about me, and examine the work. It has a ditch all round it, and the parapets are high and thick. The only entrance, curiously enough, is a narrow opening facing to the south, it having been constructed for defence towards the north. Presently I asked leave to enter the redoubt, which was granted



with the advice to make a bolt of it, as there was a dangerous corner to pass. This I did, and pray I may be spared ever again witnessing the sight which met my eyes.

"The interior of this large work was piled up not only with dead, but with wounded, forming one ghastly undistinguishable mass of dead and living bodies, the wounded being as little heeded as the dead. The fire had hindered the doctors from coming up to attend to the wounded, and the same cause had also kept back the wounded bearers. There were not even companions to moisten the lips of their wretched fellow-soldiers, or give them a word of consolation. There they lie, writhing and groaning. I think some attempt might have been made, at whatever risk, to aid these poor fellows, for they were the gallant men who twenty-four hours before had so valiantly and successfully struggled for the conquest of that long uncaptured redoubt, and it was sad now to see them dying without any attempt being made to attend to them.

"I could fill pages with a description of this harrowing scene and others near it which I witnessed, but the task would be equally a strain on my own nerves and on those of your readers. I am aware that Colonel Wellesley, the English military attache, having visited this redoubt and witnessed the spectacle it presented, spoke of it to a Roumanian officer, who explained that the doctors were obliged to take cases in the order of their occurrence, and since the Roumanians had suffered not a little two days before, the doctors had not been released from their attention upon those early cases.

"In the centre of the redoubt is a kind of traverse, and a curious covered corridor runs around it. In this I imagine the Turks sought protection from the shells which fell into it intermittently for so many days before its capture. An incessant rain of bullets poured over the work as I made my way over the bodies on the ground. I was naturally deeply interested to know whence the Turks were firing, and having reached the parapet I crawled up, and taking off my cap, peeped over. To my immense as-

tonishment I saw another Turkish redoubt not more than two hundred and fifty yards from us, to the north-west, from which this fire was being maintained. The Roumanians, it appears, had failed to capture this redoubt yesterday; but it is absolutely necessary that they should become masters of it, as their position is rendered almost untenable by its remaining in the hands of the Turks. The fire had not diminished as I returned from the redoubt down hill towards the village, and the Correspondent of the "*Scotsman*," who had joined me, was struck by a bullet on the ankle, which luckily did little harm, only grazing the ankle bone.

"We rested a little behind the hillock where the Roumanian reserves were lying, and then pushed back in order to see what progress was being made, towards the Turkish entrenched camp. We had scarcely left the Roumanians when a tremendous Turkish shrapnell fire, which searched most thoroughly the reverse slope of the hill where they were, was opened against them, and maintained until they were compelled slightly to change their position, and the skirmish line had also to fall back. Since by this time it was 6 P.M., I knew that the attack had been abandoned for that day, and therefore returned to quarters. The Russians estimate their losses on the 11th at one hundred and twenty-five officers and five thousand men. I estimate the Grivica losses at about one thousand five hundred killed and wounded."

The general result of the third great attack upon Plevna was thus almost a complete failure. The Roumanians had won their spurs, but that was all; the fighting of the 7th to the 12th of September issued in a great defeat and check for the Russians, and in renewed glory and confidence for the Turks. Osman Pacha was a hero whom every one began to praise, and the friends of Turkey made the utmost of his success.

Outsiders were perhaps rather slow in realising the true proportions and results of the last battle of Plevna. Its real effect was to confirm most of the evil forebodings which had arisen amongst the Russians during the preceding



CARRYING WOUNDED TURKS DOWN FROM THE SHIPKA PASS.





month. Few of them were now sanguine enough to look forward to a definite conclusion of the war before the winter season put an end to fighting—as it was commonly assumed that it would do. The staff, the principal officers, and most of the organs of opinion in Russia and other countries, began to speak of a second campaign as a necessity; and the gravity of such a prospect was only to be appreciated by those who knew the serious condition of Russia at home, both from a financial and from a political point of view.

Still there was no absolute discouragement amongst the invading armies. There was no thought of peace, or of abandoning the designs with which the war against Turkey had been undertaken. It was felt that the task was much harder than had been supposed, and that it would take a longer time, and greater sacrifices, to complete it; but there was no question as to its continuation, and one of the chief effects of the new reverse was to nerve the Russians to greater vigour and determination. Preparations were at once made for another and more deliberate attack; and it was hoped, not without reason, that the arrival of the guards would render the armies of the czar more than a match for their Mahomedan foes.

Some of the critics who followed the course of the operations in Bulgaria were of opinion that the Russian soldiers had betrayed their inferiority, man for man, to the Turks. Even men of Mr. Forbes's perception began to lose a little of their confidence in the grand duke's troops. Thus, in a contemporary letter, this gentleman wrote:—"The Russo-Roumanian army has abandoned now even the pretence of prosecuting the attempt against Plevna, and has fallen back into the positions occupied before the commencement of the bombardment. The field artillery remain still in some of the positions of the bombardment. The intention is announced of a third renewal of the attempt in a fortnight with the arrival of the guard. I have great doubts whether another attempt will be made on Plevna, and very much stronger doubts whether such an at-

tempt, if made, can succeed. The Turks are better soldiers individually than the Russians. Of that, after seeing not a few battles, I stand assured. The strategy of both, perhaps, is equally bad; but as regards both major and minor tactics, the Turks are simply immeasurably superior. The Turks are better armed than the Russians, both in great and small arms. The Turks have engineers who can design admirable defensive positions. The Russian engineers seem incapable of repairing a hole in a bridge. The Turks seem as well provisioned as the Russians. The Turks are flushed with success. The Russians are depressed by failure after failure. Nor is this all that impairs the Russian soldiers' dash, for that it is becoming impaired my reluctant personal observation of the war can testify. There is no braver man alive than the Russian soldier, but a brave soldier cannot continually face more than the fair chances of war. The Russian soldier is called on to face these, and dangers in addition which appeal with infinitely greater intensity of horror to his imagination. He knows that if he but receives a bullet in the ankle joint when he is in the front of an unsuccessful attack, the chances are even that he will die a death of torture, humiliation, and mutilation. No moral courage, no mental hardihood, can stand against this horrible consciousness; and in the attack on the 11th I distinctly observed his reluctance to begin the storming part of the attack."

From another correspondent we may quote a shrewd summing-up of the blunders and misfortunes due to the Russian mismanagement. After speaking of "the madness of attacking trenches defended by breechloaders by assault," he goes on to say that artillery fire, to be effective against such positions, should be directed, not against earth, but against men. Now, the Russians never once advanced their infantry. The consequence was, that the Turks were not obliged to advance theirs. "They kept their troops stowed comfortably out of the way of the shells, and only put them forward when they saw the Russians were preparing for the assault.



Naturally the Russian shell-fire did them very little harm, and for all the effect it had upon the result, they might as well have made the assault the first day. The Russian infantry should have been advanced as if to attack; this would have compelled the Turkish infantry to occupy their trenches, where they would have been exposed to the fire of the Russian shrapnel. I do not believe much in modern artillery anyhow, except where the fire of a large number of guns can be concentrated on a small space; but if it is to be of any use at all, it must be by directing it against men and not heaps of earth.

"With the recapture of the redoubts taken by Skobelev the attack upon Plevna ended. Up to that moment, there was still a hope that the attack might be continued, and that success might finally crown so many heroic efforts. The Russians had taken three strong positions; could they get two or three more equally important, Plevna would inevitably be theirs. There seems to have been some idea of renewing the attack, for Skobelev, I am told, on Wednesday afternoon, was requested to hold his position a few hours longer, even after he had reported several times that the place was untenable. Only a few hours longer! When men were going down by the hundreds, and companies and battalions under the terrible fire of the Turks were shrivelling up like green leaves in a furnace flame.

"The melancholy part of it is, that generals who send men by the thousand to perish under fire have themselves no idea of what fire is. They have no grip of the battle, no feel of the fire, and they have no other way of discovering that a position is untenable, or a line of resistance too strong, but in seeing their soldiers in flight after having performed perhaps prodigies of heroism and of valour. So Skobelev was requested to wait a few hours, while the headquarter staff would reflect on the situation. The situation was as follows:—The redoubts taken by Skobelev were untenable, but they, as well as the redoubt of Grivica, offered a foothold from which the other positions might have been attacked with success. Skobelev asked for rein-

forcements, but not to hold the redoubt, for so far as the redoubt was tenable he had enough troops to hold it as long as it could be held. He asked for troops to continue the attack upon the redoubt of Krishine, or upon the entrenched camp on the other side of Plevna, or he would undertake to hold the place while something was attempted on some other point; only whatever was to be done would have to be done quickly. But the morning wore away with the continued attacks of the Turks, continually repulsed and continually renewed, and the whole Russian army lay quiet all day long and watched that heroic struggle and did nothing. This inactivity of the Russians allowed the Turks to finally concentrate in the evening an overwhelming force against Skobelev and to overpower him. The headquarter staff could not make up its mind what to do, and while meditating on the subject the redoubts were lost.

"It is true, as I have already stated, that General Kriloff took the responsibility of sending a regiment which had made the unsuccessful assault of the day before, and which was reduced from two thousand six hundred to one thousand men, a regiment utterly unfit to go into action; and even it arrived too late. It is likewise true that a fresh regiment was sent, which arrived an hour after the redoubts were lost, and thus just in time to assure the retreat. But sending these regiments, even had they arrived in time, was a mistake. They would, of course, have enabled Skobelev to hold the redoubts a few hours longer; but this would only have resulted in a still greater loss of men, without any object. Unless it was intended to continue the attack from this side, the redoubts should have been abandoned as soon as the attack failed on other points, for holding them these twenty-four hours resulted in a loss of some four thousand men. If, on the contrary, it was intended to continue the attack from this side, then a division, and not a regiment, should have been sent to Skobelev. The whole plan of attack was a mistake; but there is little doubt that the attack, having been begun, might have been, and should have

been, continued the next morning. The line of defence had been broken in two places. Had the Russians concentrated all their strength on these two points early next morning, and renewed the assault with vigour, they would, in my opinion, have carried the place. Their loss would have been fearful, but the army of Osman Pacha would have been destroyed, and the way would have been open to Adrianople. As it is, fifteen thousand men have been lost, and, because they have been lost, the Russians are not quite so near Adrianople as they were before.

"All the mistakes of the campaign have been repeated in miniature in the attack upon Plevna, with a fidelity which shows how little the head-quarter staff have profited from previous blunders. Their first intention was to await the arrival of the guard before beginning the attack, and unless they had adopted the plan I had already sketched out, of abandoning the line of the Jantra, and making a rapid concentration of the whole force of both armies upon Plevna, this was the only possible thing for to do; for to attack Plevna with less than one hundred thousand men was simply folly. Suddenly it occurred to them, that if they waited for the arrival of the guard they would be thrown into another campaign. This was a consideration that might have occurred to them at first, and which should have necessitated a complete change in the whole plan of campaign. When it finally did occur to them, it resulted in a spasmodic fit of energy and this last attack upon Plevna. But instead of bringing together a force sufficient for the purpose, that is, a hundred thousand men, they hurriedly scrape together what they could without interfering with the army of the czarewitch, and make the attack with sixty-five thousand bayonets in the forlorn hope of taking Plevna, and thus being able to reach Adrianople this year. It was a forlorn hope only, and not even General Levitsky believed in success. It was a plan that did not merit success, and it was only the unexpected valour of the Roumanians—an element nobody had counted upon, the sublime bravery of the

Russian soldier, and the splendid dash and generalship of Skobelev, that ever made the result doubtful for a moment. I know that the forces brought up during this last attack have been estimated at one hundred thousand, but I also know that the estimate is greatly exaggerated. I know that the whole force of General Zotoff, up to the time of the arrival of the second and third Divisions, did not amount to 30,000 men; that these two divisions between them, after the loss incurred by the second in the affair of Loftcha, did not add an effective of more than 15,000 men, thus making the Russian force 45,000. As to the Roumanians, I know that their army is estimated at 32,000 men—on paper; but, when you deduct from this the cavalry, the sick, the men detached for guarding communications and for various other duties, and last, but not least, the difference between the complement on paper and the actual number of bayonets, their effective did not give more than 20,000—or 65,000 bayonets in all.

"The attack, therefore, was made in the first place with an insufficient number of troops, for the Turks had an equal or perhaps a greater number. But the question is not in war to have a numerical superiority upon every point, but to have it upon one or two important points. An inferior force, skilfully handled, will often suffice to beat a much superior force, and the Russians who had, when we consider the advantages of the position held by the Turks, an inferior force or power, should have endeavoured to make up for this by concentration against one or two points, only making at the same time demonstrations on the whole line. This would have given them the required numerical superiority on the given points. In a conversation I had with Skobelev before the battle, he agreed with me that the plan of a general attack was a mistake, and the result proved it. Had the attack been confined to the Grivica redoubt and the redoubts on the Loftcha road, and demonstrations made by Krüdener and Kriloff, instead of those furious attacks, repulsed in such a bloody manner, the loss incurred by Krüdener and



Kriloff would have been avoided, and the ninth and fourth Corps would have been fresh for the renewal of the attack next day on the points of the Turkish line which gave way.

"The plan of a general attack was, in short, the reproduction, in miniature, of the general plan of the campaign—instead of concentration, the distribution of forces already too small. That the Russian staff should have adhered to this plan, and should still adhere to it after the repeated disasters of Plevna, shows that they are simply incapable of profiting by the lessons of the war, and that the Russians, with one of the best armies in the world, will be beaten as long as the present staff remains in command, by what may be technically considered one of the worst. In my opinion there are, besides the plan of a siege and starvation, two ways of taking such a place as Plevna. The first is the plan of an assault, made with about three times as many men as the Russians had in the last affair, that is, about one hundred and twenty thousand, and handled in the manner of Skobeleff, by hurling them against the positions, brigade after brigade, until by mere force of momentum and bravery they sweep everything before them like the waves of a rapidly rising sea. The loss to be incurred in such a plan is fearful, but the loss of the enemy would be greater still, for the reason that wherever there is a crossing of bayonets, the beaten side must be simply annihilated. Had the Russians attacked Plevna in this manner, they would have lost thirty thousand men, but the army of Osman Pacha would have been destroyed. Not five thousand would have escaped to tell the tale. The other plan is more slow, and perhaps not more sure, but it requires a far smaller force for its execution. It is that of advancing by means of flying saps—narrow shallow trenches, rapidly constructed under cover of night, or a heavy rifle fire. A man can, with a shovel, in ordinary ground, and stimulated by an enemy's fire, put himself under cover in three minutes, and he will make himself a comfortable rifle-pit in five. Give the Russian army shovels, and they will

dig their way into Plevna in a week at the outside. The trouble is, that while in the Roumanian army every two men out of three have shovels, in the Russian army there are only five hundred shovels to the division, or about one to every twenty men, and this in a war against the Turks, which the whole military history of the Russians might have taught them was destined from the first to become a war of sieges, a kind of war in which the shovel plays a no less important rôle than the rifle! This plan I have every reason to believe was under discussion, and had to be laid aside owing to the want of shovels.

"So far, it must be admitted, that the Turkish generals have shown far more skill in the conduct of the campaign than the Russian. Their plan consists simply in placing their soldiers in trenches and supplying them with cartridges, bread, and rice. But true generalship, after all, consists, not in carrying out a theoretical plan by a theoretical army, but in adapting existing means to required ends. In this, which is really the highest kind of generalship, the Turks have excelled; and they have taught a bitter lesson to the French generals who, during the late war with Germany, showed their incapacity, and not only their incapacity, but their unwillingness, to fight with anything but the army of their dreams. I have spoken of Russian generals in a previous letter, and I may add another reason to the ones I then gave for the want of capacity and talent displayed among them. In the first place, all those high in command are very old men. They are men who studied the military art forty and even fifty years ago, since which time the science of war has undergone most important changes and developments—a revolution, in short. In addition to this, they are men who, for the most part, never look in a book, and who rarely read a newspaper, and appear to be utterly oblivious of the march of progress and of science, especially in the military art. Their whole lives may be said to have been passed in one occupation; their whole minds, whatever they ever had,

concentrated on one object, and that one of the most trivial to which the human mind can descend—card-playing. They have done nothing else, thought of nothing else, for years. Their minds have rusted until they are as dull, as heavy, and as incapable of receiving new impressions as the veriest clodhopper.”

The judgment is a very severe one, but it can hardly be thought too harsh. Moreover, all the events of the war confirmed it. The successful generals were the comparatively young men; the greatest failures were committed by the senior generals and members of the staff, both in Europe and in Asia. The same correspondent adds a fact curiously illustrative of the want of thoroughness in the Russian head-quarter staff. At the time of Suleiman Pacha's attack upon the Schipka Pass, six weeks after that position had been captured by General Gourko, there was actually no one present at the grand duke's military council who possessed an accurate knowledge of the position. No plan of so important a place had been prepared throughout the forty days, so that those on whom it devolved to take the supreme direction of affairs at such a critical moment were unable to appreciate the exact character of the fighting which proceeded for the greater part of a week.

Immediately before this attack upon Plevna, and before the entrance of the Roumanian army into the struggle, Prince Charles issued the following proclamation, dated from his headquarters at Poredim, September 8th :—

“ TO THE ROUMANIANS.

“ Since the Chambers declared war against Turkey three months have elapsed, during which we have endeavoured to remain on the defensive, and to confine ourself to the defence of our frontiers. Notwithstanding the devastations and the increasing cruelties of the Turks, we tolerated everything in the hope that the Russo-Turkish war would quickly end, thinking that our moderation would give us, in the settlement of the peace conditions, a fair claim to the consideration of the great Powers. Unfortunately the

war is, contrary to expectation, protracted, and is assuming, on the part of the Turks, an obstinate and fanatical character towards the Christians, and the fate of Roumania is becoming most critical. Roumania is the first to suffer through the war. How terrible would be the situation if the Turks were to carry the war to this side of the frontier. Our duty requires us to make efforts for the prevention of so fearful a contingency. Exposed to the danger of losing everything we possess, we maintain a passive attitude, and being without guarantee that the Turks would make a difference between an offensive and a defensive war, we are compelled to co-operate with the Russian army, in order to hasten the end of the war at all costs. Action is rendered imperative by circumstances, and by our national and economical interests. It is the feeling of self-preservation, and not the desire of conquest, which draws us from the defensive. Bulgaria having been laid waste, its population abandoned to the cruelties of undisciplined Asiatic hordes, and a war of extermination having been declared against all Christians, we should have no guarantee that our lot would be better than that of the Christians in Turkey. Victorious Turkey would make herself mistress of Roumania. So long as the Turkish fortresses, from Ada Kaleh to Matchin, bombard our towns, and destroy the international and local commerce of the Danube, so long as a humane administration is not introduced into Bulgaria, and the rights of the Christians in Turkey are unsecured, Roumania cannot believe, and has no right to believe, that it is at peace, and protected against present and future catastrophes. Roumania must contribute in proportion to her strength to the establishment of such a state of things. Are we for ever to lean on other's shoulders, and never rely on our own increased strength and vitality? The time has come when Roumania, by the self-abnegation of all classes, and by the army of her children, can prove to Europe that she possesses the requisite vitality for the fulfilment of her mission at the mouths of the Danube, and for contributing towards the establish-



ment of order and stability in the East. By the side of the Russian flag, on which is inscribed, 'The emancipation of the Christian peoples of the East,' we raise the Roumanian flag, which bears the device, 'Independence of the State of Roumania.'"

In the Grivitza redoubt the Roumanians had the satisfaction of capturing two Turkish standards, which were carried to Bucharest and presented to the princess, amidst the most intense self-congratulation of Russia's new allies.

## CHAPTER XXIX.

### TURKEY AND GREECE.

It had been thought possible, by a few of the more sanguine amongst the friends of Russia, and of those who desired to see Turkey stripped of her dominion over all her Christian subjects, that, as soon as the Ottomans were pressed hard by the invaders, all the oppressed nationalities would combine against them, and a simultaneous effort would be made to throw off the yoke of the sultan. A little reflection would have shown that such a combination as this was not by any means probable. In the previous wars which Russia has waged against Turkey she has never had the assistance of more than one, or at most two, of the subject races.

The fact is, that Russia has not been able to stir up the enthusiasm of these peoples to such an extent, or to inflame them with such general determination, as to unite them in a new crusade against their Mahomedan masters. None of the Turkish rayahs, not even the Slavonians, have shown themselves hearty in their appreciation of and attachment to Russia; whilst even those whom she has helped, directly or indirectly, have had no great reason to congratulate themselves on the result. Moreover, the Christian provinces, whether partially free or still entirely subjected, have had such good cause to remember the power of the Turkish arms,

and the severity with which the Ottomans are wont to repress every kind of insurrection, that they have always entered upon war with the greatest hesitation.

Montenegro alone has been found invariably ready to defy her powerful neighbour. Turkey knows full well that she can never be at war without having the mountaineers against her; but it is only on the slopes of the Black Mountains that the Turks need fear to be attacked by this hardy little principality—the Montenegrins do not fight far from home; and that it is possible for the sultan's commanders to choose their own time for dealing with them. In 1877, Suleiman and Mehemet Ali Pachas contrived to penetrate into the centre of Prince Nikita's dominions. They did not subdue their enemies, and they did not venture to leave a garrison in the country. From the moment when they had withdrawn, it was precisely the same as if they had never relieved Nisics, and pushed across the mountains. The prince and his warriors resumed the offensive; and we shall see what good use they made of their opportunities.

The Roumanians were assisting Russia in a very thorough and effectual manner; and the Bulgarians, all things considered, were undoubtedly serviceable to their deliverers. But beyond these allies, none of the natural and hereditary enemies of Turkey rendered the invaders any active and direct assistance. The Servians, as we have already seen, continually threatened to put their armies in the field again. At the beginning of the war they were held in check both by Osman Pacha at Widdin and by a corps of observation at Nish. When these obstacles were removed, the courage of the Servians began to rise, and they constantly spoke of their intention to make common cause with the Russians, and to cross the frontier on the flank of the Turkish left. But they had not yet forgotten their reverses of the previous year, and were, in fact, hardly able to move an armed force in any direction. The Russians sent them a large sum of money, with which they equipped their troops;

but the movement was delayed from month to month, on one pretext or another. It seemed as though the Russians themselves were not particularly urgent in seeking the aid of the Servians. They have conceived no great idea of them during the campaign of 1876; and, moreover, European opinion was decidedly adverse to any hostile action of Servia against Turkey, after the convention concluded between the two governments early in the year.

It was not, in fact, until the actual capture of Plevna, and the retreat of the Turks across the Balkans, that the Servian army was ordered to cross the frontiers, and seize upon such territories as it might find within its grasp.

The Bosnians and Herzegovinians were, of course, still in revolt, but it cannot be said that they occupied any considerable body of Turkish troops who might have been opposing the Russians. They were comparatively powerless for the purpose of attack, and, being undisciplined, ill-supplied, and without efficient officers, were compelled to restrict their operations to a local guerilla warfare.

The Albanians were entirely on the side of the Turks. Large numbers of them were enrolled in the sultan's armies, chiefly as irregulars, whilst the discontented districts, of which there were doubtless many, did not break out into open rebellion—unless we except the Mirdite mountaineers on the north. Of course the inhabitants of Thessaly and Epirus, two Greek provinces sometimes erroneously classed amongst the Albanians, were now, as for many years past, in a state of continual disaffection towards Turkey. Their rebellion, if veiled, was still in existence, and it received more or less open encouragement from the Greeks across the border.

The relations between Turkey and Greece are of an interesting and important character, and it will be found that they were not without considerable effect upon the settlement ultimately arrived at, as the result of the Russian invasion. All the more recent attacks by Russia on the Ottoman empire tended in some degree to promote the complete liberation of the Greeks from

their oppressors. The war of 1770 ended in the Treaty of Kainardji, which gave Russia a sort of protectorate over the Christian subjects of the Porte, who were mainly the co-religionists of the Russians. That is to say, the Porte engaged on all occasions to listen to the representations of the Russian embassy in Constantinople on behalf of the Christians in Turkey, to give toleration to the Greek religion, and to respect the Russian flag when hoisted on Greek vessels.

During the wars which arose out of the French revolution and the extravagant ambition of the first Napoleon, the Greeks were comparatively quiet. A large portion of the eastern Mediterranean trade fell into their hands, and they took advantage of it to accumulate wealth, and lay the foundation of their future prosperity. The fortunes of the European conflict did little to disturb Turkey. The Ionian Islands, which had belonged to Venice, fell alternately into the hands of the French, Russians, French again, and the English; but the Greek mainland was not touched, and the storm passed away, leaving no appreciable change either in Greece or in Turkey. Meanwhile the idea of Philhellenism had been generated and taken root; and during the five or six years succeeding the Treaty of Vienna it progressed wonderfully in the public opinion of Europe. The consequence was experienced in the War of Independence waged by the Greeks from 1821 to 1829, in which latter year the combined forces of the English, Russians and French compelled the sultan to resign his dominion over this portion of his empire.

Russian agents, if not the Russian government, had done much to stir up this revolution of the Greeks; but if the foreign intriguers ever thought that their influence would be permanently established in the new kingdom, they were soon undeceived. The Greeks were strong enough in themselves to be independent, not only of the Turks, but also of the Russians. Their rejection of the Turkish yoke was due to a genuine effort of patriotism, inflamed to the point of enthusiasm by the long series of injuries which they had endured from their tyrants.



But unfortunately the intervention of the three Powers on their behalf was not carried far enough. When Thessaly and Epirus were left under the Turkish yoke, it was not possible that the Greeks of the Morea and the southern mainland would ever rest content until these two provinces should be added to their dominions. The Ionian Islands became theirs in 1864, thanks to the statesmanlike instincts of Mr. Gladstone, who perceived the injustice of retaining even so much as a protectorate over what was so distinctly a portion of the legitimate territory of Greece. Both before and since that time the statesmen of the new kingdom have worked patiently, as opportunity offered, for the annexation of the two provinces, as well as of Crete and the other islands. Insurrections against Turkish rule have taken place both in Crete and on the mainland, and, naturally enough, the liberated Greeks have lent assistance to their struggling brethren. It was to be expected that when the war broke out between Turkey and her enemies on the north, the Greeks also should see a chance of once more asserting their claims.

The question of Crete was one of the first to crop up, as soon as Turkey was fairly engaged with her Northern foe; and this outbreak was all the more significant because it was barely ten years since the Turks had "pacified" the island, and granted it a "constitution." It will be interesting to hear what an authority on this matter, Mr. Hilary Skinner,\* has to say in regard to the recent conduct of the Turks towards their Cretan subjects. After speaking of the scheme of Ali Pacha, and of the refusal of the Cretans to lay down their arms on the strength of Turkish promises, Mr. Skinner proceeds:—

"There was an armistice during the autumn of 1867; by hook or by crook another 'National Assembly' was got together under Turkish auspices. The details of its election are almost farcical in their barefaced roguery. The men were simply government nominees, the Mahomedans doing as they were bid with stolid indifference,

the Christians literally compelled to come in fear of their lives, and having no more of a representative character than would a lot of passers-by, caught hap-hazard in Portsmouth and Southampton, have a representative character for Hampshire. To this 'bogus' Parliament, Ali Pacha made known the benevolent intentions of his master, and the 'deputies' listened in respectful silence, and accepted what they were told, as they would have accepted any thing else from the superior authorities. But as to debates and legislation, or even petitions of grievances, those were things to be prudently postponed to a very remote future. There was no idea, on the part of Ali Pacha, or any one else at Constantinople, of giving the Cretans political power, and they did not know enough of constitutional forms in the island to be amused by playing at local self-government. The great facts of the situation were the strongly reinforced Turkish army, the increasingly vigilant Turkish marine, and the lengthening chain of block-houses, which made resistance more difficult to the mountaineers. Those were the palmy days of Turkish officialism, when a certain aroma of barbaric simplicity still clung to the Frenchified Osmanli. His ancestors had been strong enough to speak the truth in their savage fashion, and though now Turkey had become weak and deceptive he could still obtain a readier belief for his fallacious statements than could Greeks or Armenians, who had not the honour to wear the sultan's uniform. If these latter happened to be in Turkish employ, they were, oddly enough, endowed by Europe with a certain credibility, perhaps because they were then serving against their own race and religion. Anything so rude as official inquiries upon the spot, conducted by responsible Europeans, was not to be thought of in 1867-8. Turkey did not wish it, and her feelings must be respected. Therefore Lord Stanley was obliged to be content with what our ambassador at Constantinople told him of the liberal declaration of Fuad Pacha or Ali Pacha, with no further guarantee of Turkish good faith than our being in the

\* "Turkish Misrule in Crete."

nineteenth century, instead of the fifteenth, and the sultan's having tasted champagne at the Crystal Palace. There were plenty of consular reports, I may be told, and plenty of Greek complaints against the Turks to balance the Ottomans' praise of themselves. But these things form no guarantee such as might have resulted from a formal commission of inquiry. There was no outside European, superior to local influences, responsible for seeing the new constitution fairly started. Turkey had promised quite enough to make a very important change in the condition of the Cretans, if only her promises had been brought to book. I need not dwell on the various good things contained in Ali Pacha's constitution, because my contention is that those good things have been quite illusory with regard to every-day life. The General Assembly for the island, the district assemblies presided over by Christians, the mixed tribunals, with their elective judges, are alike creatures of Turkish phantasy. The courts of arbitration have yet to be seen at work, and the Christian inhabitants have yet to find that they can get protection from the law when Turkish interests stand in the way.

"After the armistice had expired, hostilities were renewed in a desultory fashion, the Turks being much more cautious than formerly, and the insurgents having somewhat lost heart through the protracted hardships of a second winter campaign. Ali Pacha, the 'pacificator' of the island, had returned in triumph to Stamboul, so had Omar Pacha, the Serder Ekrem, leaving his lieutenant, Hussein Avni Pacha, to fight it out with the pacified Cretans. Month by month the block-houses were advanced, month by month the resources of the Greek committees became more attenuated, and the burden of supporting the Cretan refugees was more felt in Greece, as time wore on, without bringing any advantage to the good cause. It became evident that Europe would not go behind the sham constitution, and that, without European intervention, the Turks must ultimately win. I visited Crete again in 1868, and

found the National Assembly of the insurgents much discouraged by the progress of events. They were still masters of the interior of the island, but were harassed by the necessity of watching the Turkish block-houses, were more closely shut in by sea, and found their supply of ammunition running very short. It was a quiet time in Crete, compared with the fierce and bloody struggle a year before. The refugees had been shipped off in such numbers that there were no longer encampments of starving women and children on the mountain sides. The Greek volunteers were reduced to a few hundred men stationed in the neighbourhood of Candia; and as to the Turkish troops, they had completely changed their tactics since the erection of Ali Pacha's constitution, behind which they could play a waiting game. Instead of headlong attacks upon any and every position occupied by the insurgents, there were now only cautious attempts to hamper them and shut them in. One might travel far and wide over the mountains, but those chains of block-houses in the valleys made it constantly more difficult to avoid running the gauntlet of a Turkish fusillade at certain points on the road. When I ran the blockade for the last time in the autumn of 1868, and saw the Cretan mountains fade out of sight behind me, it was clear to my mind that, without foreign intervention, the insurrection could not last much longer. The Cretans had thoroughly proved that they were in earnest, if braving death and ruin can prove anything. They had made a wonderfully good fight of it, considering their early disadvantages, and had brought Turkey to grant them a constitution, little as it might be worth. But they could not, unaided by Europe, achieve complete independence, or that union with Greece which they desired even more. There was nothing for it but to submit to the Turks, to accept such terms as they would grant, and make the best of a bad bargain. By the end of 1868 the insurrection was suppressed, the remaining bands of volunteers, with a force just arrived, at the eleventh hour, from Greece, were obliged to



capitulate to Hussein Avni Pacha, and Turkish authority was completely re-established throughout Crete.

"Cruel and violent as the Turks had been during their contest with the Cretan insurgents, it is only fair to them to state, that they committed fewer excesses after their pacification of the island than might have been expected. The reason for this moderation is not far to seek. It was the cue of those in power at Constantinople to be moderate in victory, for, had they not kept Europe from interfering by their gift of a constitution to Crete, and were not the eyes of Europe still fixed curiously upon the island? At the outset of their struggle with the Cretans the Turkish authorities had been inclined toward what we should now call a Bulgarian policy. They let their Bashi-Bazouks make an example of the rebels, and tried to strike terror into all who opposed them. But when Crete finally submitted to her fate in the end of 1868, another policy had been adopted by her conquerors. Things were to be smoothed over as much as possible, and Europe was not to be shocked by further cruelties. Therefore, the Turks, both regulars and irregulars, were kept tolerably well in hand—a matter not difficult when their chiefs really meant it, for they have unlimited power over the men. Crete was conquered and slid into her old state of subjection. She had made her protest against an unendurable tyranny, and had made it in vain, save that a plausible constitution was granted her, as above described. How much it was worth may best be gathered from the subsequent complaints of the people and promises of the Porte. An assembly in which the large Christian majority has no more representatives than the small Mahomedan minority, and in which the casting vote is always with a zealous Turk, would not be likely to do much in the way of reform. But I venture to assert that it has done nothing. It has been a mere pretence, simply kept up to deceive statesmen like Lord Derby, who, whilst honestly desiring to see the Cretans better governed, have not been prepared to exact the ne-

cessary guarantees for better government. Without some foreign pressure of a constant and practical kind it is impossible to secure Parliamentary privileges to the Christian subjects of the Porte. You may paint your constitutional picture an inch thick, and combine the colours of every political party to make it seem more liberal, but, underneath it all, there is still the dominant Turk, who views himself as appointed by Heaven to rule his subject Giaours, and whose real authority rests upon the fanatical support of a swarm of half-civilised Asiatics. So long as this authority is paramount in Crete, the local assembly must of necessity be little better than a sham. Its members can only petition against undoubted grievances at their own personal risk, and its deliberations can amount to nothing more than humbly listening to the suggestions of the governor-general.

"The Cretans were promised remission of taxes, but the taxes have not been remitted. They were promised that the revenue of the island should be expended in some part on various local improvements, but the revenue has not any of it been so spent. They were assured of equality before the law for Christian and Mussulman alike, but such equality has as yet remained in the regions of theory, and not descended to the realm of fact. Certainly they have good ground of complaint against Turkey, and their case affords a striking example of the futility of a mere paper constitution, imposed by foreign opinion upon a despotic government and unsupported by any substantial guarantees. Would it be too much to hope that the necessity for patching up a rotten empire like Turkey may some day cease, and that the Cretans may be united to their kindred of Greece, with the best of all securities for their political future, in the absolute right to manage their own affairs, to govern for the people and by the people, without even the shadow of dependence upon an Asiatic conqueror, whose predecessors have done their island nothing but harm, and whose final departure would be a relief to all concerned?"

Mr. Skinner wrote in February, 1877; and it is hardly necessary to contend, to English readers, that he showed sufficient justification for the renewed efforts of the Cretans to obtain political freedom, and union with the mother country of Greece.

Meanwhile the Greeks themselves threatened to take matters into their own hands by sending an army into Thessaly, and another into Epirus, in order to seize what they maintained to be their lawful inheritance. There can be no doubt whatever that during the summer of 1877 preparations were actively and unremittingly carried on for this purpose. The inhabitants of the two provinces, especially those of the villages near the Gulf of Volo, on the eastern shore of the peninsula, broke out into open revolt; and the National Assembly of the Greek kingdom had begun to put great pressure upon the ministers of King George, who had much difficulty in delaying a hostile movement. But there were several weighty reasons which prevented the Greeks from committing themselves. The correspondent of the "Times" in Vienna expressed some of these reasons in a short letter written at the end of August.

"Trustworthy information from Athens," he wrote—"does not represent the intervention of Greece as so near at hand as it was thought. The delay is owing to military, as well as political reasons. As to the first, the armaments are still very incomplete; above all, as regards small arms, which would be necessary, not only for the Greek forces, but even more for the rising which is expected in Epirus and Thessaly. There has, indeed, been a contract entered into by the Greek government with an arms manufactory at Werndl, in Styria, for one hundred thousand stand of arms, but as cash payment for the first instalment has not been forthcoming, the delivery has been stopped. It is more or less the same with all the other preparations.

"All these considerations would, no doubt, have been set aside had the situation been otherwise favourable. But such is not thought to be the case. Had the Russians been thoroughly suc-

cessful, nothing could have kept back the Greeks from endeavouring to make good their claims to Epirus, Thessaly, and Macedonia, so as to secure the last-named province against the Slav pretensions; but the Greeks are far too calculating to enter just at this moment into action, it being very doubtful whether the Russians will be able to gain their object—at least, this year. By going to war at this moment the Greeks would be likely to draw down upon themselves the whole weight of the Turkish arms; so that they might be crippled when the real time for a decision arrived next Spring. In their mild climate they would not be protected against a winter campaign, which the Turks would probably undertake when their operations in Bulgaria were interrupted.

"These considerations seem to have told, and not only has the order gone forth from Athens to discourage any movement in Epirus, Thessaly, or Crete, but the Greek government has offered to co-operate with the Turks to suppress brigandage along the frontier, which had already begun, as the usual precursor of insurrection. As long as fortune favours the Turks they may therefore consider themselves tolerably safe from that side."

But there was another, and perhaps a still more weighty argument which was brought to bear upon the Greeks, and which rendered it almost impossible for them to enter upon a war with Turkey. This was the direct interference of England with the government of Athens, undertaken, to put the thing in its boldest form, at the request of Turkey herself. England's interference in the quarrel might have been regarded by Russia as a breach of her promised neutrality, if it had not been for the special relations existing between this country and Greece—in the establishment of which relations Russia herself had been a party. Greek independence had been secured and guaranteed by England, Russia and France, on terms by which Greece was at all events morally pledged to listen to and abide by the counsels of these three Powers, or of either of them. It is a question whether Lord Derby



did or did not go further than was equitable in bringing pressure to bear upon Greece. Turkey appealed to England distinctly as one of the guaranteeing powers, and it was the opinion of many persons that this country had no option but to commend neutrality to the government of Athens. At all events Greece attended to the representations of Lord Derby; or rather, she professed that she did not contemplate an attack upon Turkey.

The exact character of the relations between Turkey, Greece, and England, in the autumn of 1877, will be manifest from the following official notes and telegrams, exchanged during the months of August and September.\*

On the 21st of August Server Pacha telegraphed to Musurus Pasha, the Turkish representative in London, as follows:—

"You are aware that the military preparations in Greece are being carried on with ever-increasing activity. Although the Cabinet of Athens does not cease to endeavour to reassure us on this point, yet the action of the revolutionary committees and the language of the Greek newspapers become daily more pronounced. The government is urged on to war by the press; the nation is being called to arms; and to say nothing of the volunteers who, contrary to the Greek laws, are recruited from among our populations, paid emissaries are circulating through our frontier provinces in order to organise a rising there. It is also the aim of Greece to excite the feelings of Europe; witness the representation she has made to the Powers on the pretext of the insignificant incident which occurred at Kavarna. This state of affairs causes deep and unceasing anxiety to the Imperial government, and obliges me to call to it the serious attention of the guaranteeing Powers of Greece.

"I have to request you therefore to speak on this subject to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who will not fail, I am sure, to exercise a salutary influence over the Cabinet of Athens."

A further complaint of the same character

was made two days later; and Mr. Layard also transmitted to Lord Derby a message to the like effect.

On the 25th of August Mr. Stuart, our representative at Athens, wrote to Lord Derby:—

"M. Tricoupi was more ready and earnest than usual yesterday in declaring to me that there was no intention to make any attack upon Turkey at present, and I understood from him that the government and the committees, acting in concert, were endeavouring to discourage any outbreak in the Hellenic provinces of Turkey, as well as to prevent any armed bands from crossing the frontiers from Greece.

"I had questioned him upon the subject in consequence of having seen some reports in the Greek newspapers of yesterday morning respecting more than one alleged engagement between Turkish troops and Greek brigands, or so-called insurgents, in the neighbourhood of the frontier.

"He was much annoyed at having received, shortly before, two official notes from Photiades Bey, accusing the Hellenic government of having connived at the violation of the Ottoman frontier, and of having protected the escape of bands who had lifted cattle and committed other worse outrages upon Turkish villages, before being repulsed and pursued by the troops.

"Photiades Bey had made those representations in consequence of information which had been sent to him by telegraph from the local Ottoman authorities, and M. Tricoupi said that the facts had been entirely misrepresented; that no bands had crossed the frontier; that the engagements in question must have taken place with Greek subjects of Turkey, or between Greek and Mussulman or Circassian villages, or with bands of brigands; and that as regards those who had escaped with cattle into Greece, the Greek authorities had at once arrested them and initiated judicial proceedings against them, besides restoring the cattle to the Turks.

"M. Tricoupi complained very much of the disadvantage at which the Hellenic government were placed by such official misrepresentations, as the Ottoman government would not permit

\* As printed in the Blue Book on Turkey, No. 19, 1878.

the Greek consular agents to communicate with their government by telegraph in cypher, nor indeed to send any telegram of which the local authorities might disapprove. As he had received a telegram from the consul at Larissa, to the effect that the accusations of the Ottoman authorities in the present instance were unfounded, he presumed, from the fact of such a telegram having been permitted to pass, that those authorities must have been aware that they had been previously misinformed.

"As the reports in the Greek newspapers to which I have alluded appear to refer to several different encounters and outrages near the frontier, which may possibly be brought to your Lordship's notice by Mr. Layard or by Her Majesty's consular agents in Thessaly, I have thought it might be of use to inclose the accompanying collection of extracts relating thereto. That from the 'Hora' may almost be taken as official, as it exactly corresponds with some of the explanations which were given to me yesterday by M. Tricoupi."

The extract here referred to from the "Hora" of August 13 (25th), is as follows:—

"The Ottoman authorities maliciously represent the events at Passali as having been caused by one hundred and twenty men who had crossed the frontier from Greece. The letters received yesterday from Thessaly assert that this rumour is entirely false, and unanimously testify that the attack on Passali was, for reasons of vengeance, made by the inhabitants of the neighbouring village of Masli, and that the proprietor of this village was arrested and imprisoned by order of the Ottoman authorities. Whilst the Ottoman authorities endeavoured to accuse the Greek troops on the frontiers of having rendered assistance to the inhabitants of Masli pursued by the Turkish forces, it has now been proved, even by the official reports of the Ottoman employés, that the Greek troops had seized and has spontaneously restored to the Turks the cattle lifted, and that the persons pursued had not been protected, but that twenty of them who had crossed the frontier had

been arrested and imprisoned, and handed over to justice, proceedings against them being already instituted."

On August 30th Server Pacha wrote once more on the subject to Musurus Pacha, in the following terms:—

"Please express to Lord Derby the thanks of the Sublime Porte for the friendly counsels which he is good enough to give us, and state that we are happy to consider them as a further proof of the benevolent interest which the government of Her Britannic Majesty takes in the Ottoman empire. The Cabinet of Athens does not cease to give us assurances of its desire to maintain friendly relations with us. I have formally to state to you that the Imperial government is, on its part, very sincerely animated by the same desire, and that it has no hostile intention with regard to Greece. Unhappily, the facts do not correspond with the pacific assurances of the Greek government. Thus, the bands which have crossed the frontier have not yet been recalled. Their ringleaders are still unpunished; fresh bands are allowed to be organised and formed; volunteers continue to be secretly recruited wholesale from among our population, which constitutes a flagrant breach of international law; the revolutionary committees are agitating with an ever increasing activity, and yet the Greek authorities, who are perfectly aware of what is going on, do not make use of the right conferred upon them by the constitution of the country itself to deal vigorously with the intrigues which directly affect the common interests of the two States; and finally, although the liberty of the press in Greece secures complete independence for the newspapers, the official organs of the Cabinet permit publications in the papers without saying a word against their flights of language which over-excite public feeling. As long as this state of affairs lasts, the Imperial government will consider the tranquillity of its border provinces to be seriously menaced, and cannot, consequently, let the matter pass unnoticed. At a moment when the empire is engaged in a struggle with a strong



and powerful enemy, it is certainly not the Sublime Porte who will provoke fresh complications; but when under its very eyes an attempt is being made to take advantage of the situation, and every device is resorted to to stir up a country which enjoys order and tranquillity, is it not a sacred duty for a government, anxious for the security of its populations, not to allow the evil to become still more aggravated by the employment of half-measures, but rather to try to strike at its root?

"In submitting the above considerations to the kindly appreciation of Lord Derby you will be good enough to lay stress on this last point, with all necessary details."

Mr. Layard also wrote to Lord Derby on the 28th of August, repeating the substance of a diplomatic conversation in Constantinople:—

"The Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke yesterday very seriously to the Greek Minister respecting the attitude of Greece. His Excellency pointed out that for some time past the Hellenic government had been openly making preparations to attack Turkey. There had been no disguise in the matter, as the Chamber had voted funds with that object, and the arrival of arms and ammunition from Russia for the purpose of arming the Greek volunteers was publicly announced. Recently an armed band, consisting of a considerable number of men, had crossed the frontier into Thessaly. They were fortunately defeated and driven back by the Turkish troops. The Hellenic government now pretended that they were simple brigands; but the Sublime Porte had evidence that they were sent over by the Greek authorities in order to get up a rising of the Greek population in the province.

"The Porte, his Excellency said, had repeatedly brought these proceedings to the notice of the Hellenic government, and had asked for explanations. It was invariably met with assurances that, 'for the present,' Greece had no intention of attacking Turkey. This meant simply that Greece was not yet prepared to do so, but that as soon as she was ready, and could

fall upon Turkey with a prospect of success, she would make an aggression upon her.

"The Turkish government, his Excellency declared, could no longer remain indifferent to this state of things. It required something more than vague assurances. It must have some guarantee that Greece would pursue a friendly and neighbourly policy, and would abstain from attacking Turkey under any circumstances. If such a guarantee were not forthcoming, Turkey would be under the necessity of taking such measures as she might deem fit for her own protection. She could not permit Greece to complete her preparations with impunity, and with the avowed intention of making use of them whenever the suitable time came. The Porte was determined to hold the Greek government responsible for any bands that might cross the Turkish frontiers from Greece.

"M. Countourioti replied to Server Pacha that he would immediately inform his government of his Excellency's communication.

"I received from both yesterday evening an identic account of what had passed between them. Server Pacha spoke as if the Turkish government were determined to act with vigour and decision in dealing with Greece."

Lord Derby wrote to Mr. Stuart, and to his coadjutor at Athens, Mr. Wyndham, communicating the views of the Turkish government, and inviting Greece to give satisfaction to Turkey. On Sept. 3, he wrote to Mr. Wyndham:—

"I have received a telegram from Mr. Layard, stating that he has been requested by the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs to ascertain whether the Greek government have given any distinct assurances to her Majesty's government that Greece will not attack Turkey or endeavour to cause her embarrassment by conniving at attempts to raise the Greek population, and, if so, whether her Majesty's government will authorise Mr. Layard to make an official communication to that effect to the Porte.

"Mr. Layard adds that he has stated to Server Pacha that the last accounts from her Majesty's Minister at Athens lead him to believe that

there is much less danger now than there was a short time ago of an attack on Turkey.

"I have to instruct you, with reference to Mr. Stuart's despatches of the 24th and 25th ultimo, *to ask the Greek government if they will authorise her Majesty's government to give assurances in their name to the Porte that they will not attack Turkey, or connive at attempts to stir up insurrection in the Greek provinces.*"

The words italicised show the extent to which Lord Derby thought himself entitled to go in his appeal to the Greek government. The result of this appeal may be appreciated from the following correspondence between his Lordship and Mr. Wyndham :—

*(Lord Derby to Mr. Wyndham).*

"Foreign Office, Sept. 10, 1877.

"SIR—I received, on the 5th instant, your telegram of the 4th, stating, in answer to my telegram of the 3rd instant, that the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs had informed you that her Majesty's government might assure the Turkish government that Greece would not attack Turkey at present; but that he did not mean by this declaration to give a pledge for the future, as Greece, like every independent state, must always reserve her liberty of action according to circumstances. M. Tricoupi added that the Greek government would pledge itself not to connive at insurrections in the Turkish provinces, but would not undertake to discourage them, though he added that they were doing so at present, and intended to do so as long as it was in their interest to follow that policy.

"On the 7th instant I learnt from Mr. Layard that he had received the above telegram from you, but that he feared that the answer of the Greek government would be considered far from satisfactory by the Porte, and that he should not communicate it to the Turkish government without instructions from home. Mr. Layard had been confidentially informed that, although hopes were still entertained at Constantinople that the difficulty with Greece might be overcome, strong

measures would be used unless some guarantee were given that she would not attack Turkey.

"In communicating to you Mr. Layard's observations, I instructed you by telegraph to state to the Greek government that the assurances which they had authorised her Majesty's government to give on their behalf to the Porte were likely to be considered so unsatisfactory, in consequence of the qualifications which accompanied them, that her Majesty's government felt that it would be of no advantage to communicate them to the Turkish government as they stood. You were to add that they consider it very important that the Greek government should reassure the Porte as to their intentions.

"I am, &c.,

"DERBY."

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*(Mr. Wyndham to the Earl of Derby.)*

"Athens, September 4th, 1877.

"My LORD—With reference to your telegram of the 3rd instant, M. Tricoupi, Hellenic Minister for Foreign Affairs, has stated to me, firstly, that the government of her Majesty may assure the Porte that the Hellenic government will not attack Turkey at present, but that, by such a declaration, the government of his Majesty does not mean to give a pledge for the future; for Greece, like every independent state, must always reserve her freedom of action according to circumstances. Secondly, that the Hellenic government will pledge not to connive at, but will not pledge to discourage, insurrectionary movements, although they are doing so, and intend to do so, so long as it is in the interest of the Greek government to follow that policy.

"I have, &c.,

"HUGH WYNDHAM."

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*(Mr. Wyndham to the Earl of Derby).*

"Athens, September 4, 1877.

"My LORD—With reference to your telegram



of yesterday's date, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I had an interview this morning with M. Tricoupi.

"I commenced by stating to his Excellency that, judging from information recently received by her Majesty's government from Mr. Layard, there appeared to be a great deal of irritation at the Porte at the present attitude of Greece. I then communicated to him the substance of your Lordship's telegram, and I also read him Mr. Stuart's despatches of the 24th and 25th August, to which reference is therein made; and I asked him whether her Majesty's government might assure the Porte that Greece would not attack Turkey, or connive at endeavours to promote insurrections in the Turkish provinces bordering on Greece.

"M. Tricoupi stated that what Mr. Stuart had reported in his despatches of the 24th and 25th August was perfectly correct, that there is no intention on the part of the Hellenic government to attack Turkey at present, and that her Majesty's government might assure the Porte that the Greek government does not intend to attack Turkey at present, but that the government of Greece cannot give any pledge for the future, for, as an independent state, Greece has the right to make war if she chose, and that, if Turkey were to give her cause for offence, she might find it necessary to resort to force in defence of her dignity or of her interests.

"With regard to the Greek provinces in Turkey, M. Tricoupi stated that the Greek government was not conniving at promoting insurrections there, and that they would pledge themselves not to do so, for such an act on the part of Greece would be in violation of her international duties and engagements; but that the Greek government could not pledge themselves to discourage insurrection, although they were actually doing so, and intended to do so, so long as it was, in their opinion, in their interest to follow that policy.

"I then asked M. Tricoupi if he thought the statements he had made would be deemed quite satisfactory; that the reservation, 'at present,'

had already been commented upon by Mr. Layard in one of his recently published despatches, and that there was evidently very much irritation at the Porte; that the Porte had suffered from hostile attacks from Servia, Montenegro, and Roumania, neighbouring states, and that it was not unnatural that she should therefore take umbrage at the presence of a large body of Greek troops on the northern frontiers of Greece; and that I should be very glad indeed if I could say something on his part to allay the irritation.

"M. Tricoupi replied that he could not admit that his present statement should be considered as unsatisfactory by the Porte, as Greece could not be required to take engagements beyond her international duties, and that he did not consider the Turkish government had any reason to take exception to the formation of an army of thirty thousand men, which was not in point of numbers out of proportion to the amount of the population.

"In conclusion, I think I may say that the Greek government is, under the present circumstances, desirous of living at peace with that of his Majesty the Sultan.

"I have shown the draft of this despatch to M. Tricoupi, and he tells me that it rightly interprets his ideas and policy.

"I have &c.,

"HUGH WYNDHAM."

This intervention of England between Greece and Turkey not unnaturally caused the former country much annoyance, which was openly expressed by the government of Athens to our representative. On the 4th of September M. Tricoupi wrote in the following terms to M. Gennadius, the Greek Chargé d'Affaires in London, who communicated the despatch to Lord Derby shortly after its receipt:—

"SIR—The Chargé d'Affaires of the British government called upon me this morning, and communicated to me the contents of a telegram which he had received for that purpose from Lord Derby. In this telegram her Britannic Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs, mention-

ing the anxiety which, according to Mr. Layard's despatches, the conduct of Greece causes to the Porte, asks if the Greek government authorises that of Great Britain to give to the Porte the assurance that Greece will not declare war against her, and will not become the accomplice of acts with the view to incite insurrectionary movements in the neighbouring provinces. Mr. Wyndham was requested by the same telegram to read to me two despatches of Mr. Stuart to his government, in which the Minister of her Britannic Majesty related conversations with myself on the subject of the policy which the Greek government intended to follow as regards Turkey. Having read these documents, I hastened to acknowledge the exactitude with which Mr. Stuart had rendered the sense of my words. I had in truth told Mr. Stuart, as he reports in his despatches, that Greece did not intend for the present to declare war against Turkey; and I repeated to Mr. Wyndham that this was all that the Porte, or any other Power in her name, had any right to ask, for no independent state is under the obligation to fetter beforehand its future as regards the liberty of declaring war. For independent states the declaration of war necessarily follows as a consequence of certain circumstances, and the Greek government, in the present crisis more than ever, would forget its duty to the independence of the country, and to the interests of Hellenism, if it deprived itself of this liberty, or restricted it, either absolutely, or with reference to future contingencies.

"The Porte put forth the same pretensions at the time of the formation of the Greek kingdom. As mentioned in a protocol signed July 21, 1832, at Constantinople, it asked 'that it might be forbidden to the Greek government, and to Greeks in general, to give any sort of assistance whatever to the governments, powers, people, or nations with which the Porte might happen to be in a state of war, and that they should be bound to observe a strict neutrality.' This pretension was summarily and categorically rejected by the English government, acting in concert with the governments of France and Russia, by the proto-

col of the Conference assembled the 30th August, 1832, in the London Foreign Office, according to which 'the right of participation in whatsoever war which may break out between third powers is inseparable from independence, except in the case of those states that have been for ever constituted neutral.'

"The Greek government will not, I need scarcely say, abandon now the international position it succeeded in obtaining the recognition of forty-five years ago. Consequently, although I declared to the English *Chargé d'Affaires* that Greece does not intend to declare war under present circumstances, I remarked to Mr. Wyndham that this declaration did not in the least lessen the right, co-existing with the independence of all autonomous states, to regulate our future conduct according to circumstances, and in view of duties that events may impose on us, with a view to protect our dignity or legitimate national interests.

"Mr. Stuart remarked also in his despatch that I told him that the Greek government is exercising at present its influence to prevent the outbreak of insurrectionary movements in the neighbouring Turkish provinces. I remarked to Mr. Wyndham that Mr. Stuart had reported very accurately what he had heard from me, but that I thought it right to explain that I had made that announcement as mere information. The Greek government, by its international obligations, is bound not to cause trouble in the provinces of a state with which it continues in friendly relations, but the Porte has not the right to ask it to help to prevent or put down revolts in the said provinces, and Greece does not consider itself bound to undertake such an obligation. As I said to Mr. Stuart, if she uses the influence she possesses in those provinces to stop insurrection, she does it for reasons which only concern herself, but the Greek government considers herself in no way bound towards foreign powers to act thus, and she intends to continue this policy only as long as she thinks it beneficial for the interests of Hellenism, which are at the same time her own interests. After I had thus



explained the meaning of the declaration required, I did not hesitate to tell Mr. Wyndham that he could inform Lord Derby that the Greek government is fulfilling, and will continue to fulfil its duty, by not exciting insurrectionary movements in the neighbouring provinces.

"This obligation is taken for granted between countries remaining at peace with each other. Greece, recognising her international obligations, does not intend to violate them. Mr. Wyndham then asked me whether I thought that these explanations would tranquillise and satisfy the Porte. I answered that my explanations ought to satisfy the Porte, for they were the only ones she could expect from a state mindful of its independence, of its dignity, and of the duties which it owes to others. But, however, I said, I am sure that they will satisfy the English government; for I cannot doubt that that government respects the rights and the obligations of the Greek government, which dictate these explanations. Mr. Wyndham, in explanation of the anxiety of the Porte, mentioned our armaments and military concentrations; but he did not hesitate to acknowledge that, if the military and recruiting organisations everywhere introduced during these last few years were taken as a standard, our army was not disproportioned to the population of the kingdom. Besides, the protocols I have already referred to preclude the possibility of discussion on this point. During the negotiations for the recognition of the kingdom of Greece, the Porte asked that its military and naval forces should be limited to a number sufficient to keep order in the interior. But the English plenipotentiary (Lord Palmerston), as well as the plenipotentiaries of France and Russia, answered that it was sufficient to point out that the right to maintain military and naval forces, without limitation as to number, was a right belonging to every independent state; that the independence of Greece, and all the consequent rights had been confirmed by the protocol of the 3rd February, 1830; that the Ottoman Porte had fully accepted that protocol; and that, consequently, neither the signatory powers nor

the Porte, could now, without violating their engagements, curtail one of the rights which the said protocol secures to Greece. I recognise with pleasure that the Porte, in its direct relations with the Greek government, has never hinted that it disputed those international decisions.

"Mr. Wyndham immediately reported to his government the step he had taken and the explanations I had given him. He communicated to me his despatch and telegram reporting on the subject, and I found that my ideas had been faithfully rendered. Nevertheless, I thought it necessary to sum up here the remarks that Lord Derby's note has suggested to me. I request you to submit this note to her Britannic Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs, and to leave him a copy of this despatch if he asks for one.

"I have, &c.,

"CH. TRICOUPÉ."

Turkey was obliged to be content with the qualified assurances given to her by Greece; and though the correspondence between the three foreign offices continued up to the end of the year, being constantly stimulated by new events on the frontiers, Greece did not actually put her army in the field, and no positive rupture took place between the sultan and King George.

But there is no doubt that a feeling of considerable soreness was left on the minds of the Greeks against England—tempered always by the conviction that England would, in the general settlement, be pledged to advance the cause of the Greeks all the more on account of her action in the present instance.

A very interesting question, which arose in connection with the endeavour of the Greeks to regain possession of their ancient northern provinces, was that which concerned the race of the populations inhabiting Epirus, Thessaly, and especially Macedonia, and the shores of the Ægean more remote from the Greek mainland. That there is amongst these populations a considerable intermixture of Greeks has never been

questioned, though some persons have imagined the Greek element to be much less important than it actually is. As a matter of fact, there are nearly four and a half millions of Greeks still under the domination of the Turks, whereof three millions are in the European provinces, particularly along the coast, from the actual kingdom of Greece (as it was constituted in 1877) up to Constantinople, and including the islands.

The Greeks do not seem to have any deadly antipathy against the Mahomedans as such. The extreme bitterness of that feeling was worked off in the terrible conflict of independence, between 1821 and 1828. What the Greeks of to-day feel is a simple desire to bring together the whole of their scattered race, and to cast off the dominion of the Turkish government. Greeks and Mahomedans get on fairly well together, wherever they are left at peace. The conditions under which they lived together in Greece itself is graphically described by the Athens correspondent of the "Times," in a letter dated August 22, 1877; and the account is of sufficient interest to be quoted in this place, before we go on with our narrative.

The writer describes a visit to Chalcis, a flourishing town of Negropont, close to the narrow channel which divides that island from the mainland. "I had heard," he writes, "that at Chalcis Christians, Mussulmans, and Jews, live together in perfect equality, and in the closest amity, under the rule of his Christian Majesty George, King of the Hellenes. I determined to inspect personally this natural phenomenon, and accordingly left Thebes one glowing morning of last month on the box of the daily coach. At first, while our road lay across the plain, there was nothing very striking in the view. After climbing a long ascent we gained the mountain crest, marked by the ruins of a tambouri or drum-shaped fort, which during the revolution some champion or other had held for an indefinite time against the Turks attacking him from the town below. I did not, however, pay much attention to the details of heroism which my

companions poured forth, for I was busy devouring with my eyes the prospect before me—the mighty mountains of Eubœa, black with timber and brilliant with marble, the peak of Delphi, where snow still lingered, overtopping all, and glittering as gold; the Euripus stretching to eastward like a chain of lakes; the Gulf of Volo, and homely Pelion, covered with green forests and white villages. Right beneath us stood Chalcis itself, still giving glory to the great Venetian builders who left the stamp of their individuality on every coast they conquered. There is much in it that is Turkish and much that is Greek, but yet it is essentially Venetian. The walls of gray stone which surround the city proper, on three sides rising from the waves, and on the fourth from a ditch into which of old the sea flowed freely, declare it at the first glance a palace of the bridegroom of the Adriatic. The Turkish Crescent or the Greek Cross may float above the bastions which flank the water-gate, but the winged lion of St. Mark upon the lintel, though reversed by the Ottoman successors, is still the only true ensign of the place. The appearance of the town is most picturesque. The battlemented walls and towers, reared for the stern uses of war, yet designed with a superfluity of costliness and beauty, the tall minarets, no longer, with one exception, minarets of prayer, and the modern Greek houses around them, give delightful variety, and tell the history of the place even to the bodily senses. One beholds mingled, as the scenes of a varying dream, the Athenian colony, the capital of the kingdom of Negropont, the residence of the Capitan Pacha, and the latest addition to free Greece.

"At last, passing the Karabala Fort (the ancient Canethus), we reached the foot of the mountain by a winding road, entered the massive gateway and crossed the draw-bridge, which some ten years ago was substituted for a more permanent structure, not, indeed, to prevent the entrance of foes, but to allow the passage of vessels between the two bays on either side of it. The channel which separates Eubœa from Boeotia is at this point only a few yards in width, and



through it rushes four times a day the current which has perplexed the sages of every age. I made no attempt to solve the mystery, remembering the fate of Aristotle, who was drowned here while inquiring into the matter too closely.

"As soon as I was within the walls of Chalcis I was welcomed with the courtesy and hospitality which await the stranger in every part of Greece except Athens, where the advance of civilisation has made such good things impossible, and I was soon in a condition to begin an inspection of the place. The streets themselves are interesting. Rambling Turkish 'palaces' and smart Greek villas stand side by side. In every open space is a mosque, utilised as a barrack or some other public building. Huge Turkish cannon-balls of stone are to be seen, here ornamenting the gate-posts of a Greek cottage, there serving to mark the boundaries of a recreation ground. Venetian forts and prisons, a Venetian church more interesting than beautiful, and Greek buildings of every date, complete the town. It was a feast day, and almost everybody was at the fair in the market-place, buying or selling cheap haberdashery imported from Europe. The Israelites seemed to occupy a large proportion of the stalls, though they are here not rich as in most other places where they have settled, but desperately poor, owing, no doubt, to the very limited scope for their talents which the place presents. They seem to be of the same race as those of Salonica—that is to say, the descendants of the Spanish Jews who fled to Ottoman toleration from Christian persecution at the beginning of the 17th century, for they still speak a Spanish dialect. As I was talking to a most ragged fruit-seller, hearing that I was English, 'Ah,' he said, 'two of the first men in your country are Israelites—Rothschild and Disraeli.' One Jew only had any complaint to make against his fellow-citizens. He was an unwholesome-looking fellow, the keeper of a wine-shop, and endeavoured to send me away with the belief that the new reserves had pillaged his house. On being pressed, however, he reduced the affair to its true dimensions,

when it appeared that one soldier of the reserve had taken wine in his shop and left without paying.

"Of the whole population of Chalcis, eleven thousand one hundred and thirty-five persons, the Jews number only two hundred and fourteen, divided into forty-one families. In the poor school, containing sixty-three children, seventeen are Jews. I could see no trace whatever of the persecution of Jews in Greece which the Don Pacifico affair seemed to disclose. I found the synagogue which I visited perfectly unmolested, and the people, though oppressed by poverty, happy to testify to the justice of the government under which they live.

"In the market-place I met also some of the principal Mussulmans; Halleel Effendi, one of the richest persons of the place, the farmer of the government taxes, an office which entails considerable envy rather than the opprobrium which attached to the Roman publican; the Turkish Consul, whose brother I had met serving as a doctor during the Montenegrin war; a young fellow, who was studying diplomacy in Constantinople, and others. All, with the exception of the last named, concurred in expressing their satisfaction with their political and social position. The consul, on the other hand, took me to see the mosque, the windows of which were certainly broken, probably by stones still lying on the floor, though, judging by the general state of cleanliness and repair in which the building was, these might have been there for the last half century, and repeated in French the oft-heard formula about the respect which the Porte shows to all sects and religions. His zeal does not seem to have given satisfaction to his co-religionists, for he has since felt constrained to publish in the newspapers the following letter:—

"During the last few days many statements have been made in our town to the effect, that I, being asked by the correspondent of the 'Times' of London whether we live well with the Greeks, answered that we are oppressed. But since these are altogether false and ground-

less I deny them publicly ; for how is it possible for me, or any other member of my family, to have any other complaint, since we receive equal justice with the Greeks, and, above all, since the Greek nation gave us a property in Peloponessus, and while my father and I are honoured and loved, as are all the Mahomedans living here ?

“ PHAEZES ARNAOUTOGION,

“ Student of the University of Constantinople.

“ Chalcis, 5 (17) August, 1877.

“ The Mussulmans in Chalcis are daily becoming fewer and fewer ; the young men go to seek their fortunes in Constantinople, and the girls remain unmarried, for no one ventures to have more than one wife. At present they number only sixty-eight souls in all, yet, owing to their comparative wealth, their position is high. As an English resident said to me, ‘ They are the happiest people in the world.’ They take a keen interest in local politics, and it is proposed among the Greeks to secure for them at the next election a representative in the Municipal Council. If a concert is given, Turkish airs are played to gratify them, and in every way they are considered. They are, in appearance and manners, quite Turkish, and among themselves invariably speak their native language, but they do not live in a separate quarter of the town. In the afternoon I paid a visit to a most interesting Mahomedan lady, Doodóo by name. She is the daughter of a surgeon, and practises her father’s art with such success that the Greek doctors have to content themselves with a smaller share of the local business ; yet, to their credit be it said, though it is contrary to the law that Doodóo, unlicensed as she is, should carry on her profession, they have taken no steps to prevent her. Her patients are Christians as well as Mahomedans (one Englishman at least has been cured by her), and she sues those who fail to pay the fees in a Christian Court by means of Christian lawyers. I found Madame Doodóo seated with her husband, who is also a surgeon, and wearing of course the yashmak. She was very affable, and talked to me about her daughters

and the difficulty of disposing of them ; but said, in answer to my sentimental inquiry, that she could not get over her prejudices sufficiently to allow either of them to marry a Christian.

“ It must now be more difficult than ever for the Mussulmans of Chalcis to live at peace with their neighbours, for the town is overrun by new reserves called into existence for the destruction of Ottomans, and the drilling ground echoes with the word of command all day long. They can scarcely be expected to take part even in the festivals, so long as they are conducted as at present. On the night when I was there the market-place was covered with dancers dancing the war dance. Each band had its rustic candelabrum fixed in the earth, and piled with blazing wood ; and round it they circled, holding hands and following the leader, whose inspired steps they responded to or imitated. There was a certain clownish grace in the movements. Now they touched the ground with one knee, and sprang up again with a yelp. Now they spun round and cast their fezzes before them. Now they footed it in solemn sort, waving their arms with voluptuous bandishments. Within the circles strutted wild-looking, half-naked gipsies making horrid music, and without some seventy-five members of the Sacred Theban Band moved about howling songs of war to the mild tinkling of a guitar. All this must have been very trying to the nerves of a pious Mussulman.

“ About two o’clock the next day I went on board a small sailing vessel laden with corn, shot the Euripus with the current, passed Aulis more fortunate as to wind than the fleet of Agamemnon, and after twenty-eight hours cast anchor in the Piræus, having made a thoroughly Homeric voyage. Certainly I was none the sadder, possibly none the wiser, for what I had seen, for I knew before I left Athens that the Turks are much like the rest of the human race, in themselves neither better nor worse than their fellow-men, and that the Greeks are an advanced and liberal-minded people, free, though they have suffered more than others, from the anti-Turkish fanaticism, which is found chiefly among those



who have little or no personal knowledge of the East. If the Greeks make war upon Turkey either this autumn or next spring, as seems probable, they will not make war upon the Turkish race, or the Mahomedan religion, but upon the government which usurps their fatherland, and ill-uses their fellow-countrymen. Until the last religious revival in Turkey it was believed that the Mussulmans of Crete would gladly throw in their lot with the Christians, and even now the Greeks count upon the Mahomedan Albanians as allies. The Greeks do not wish to turn the Ottomans out of Hellas, but to have them among the faithful subjects of a just government."

This is most valuable testimony, as showing the possibility of a fairly satisfactory co-existence of Christians and Mahomedans in the same country, and under the same institutions, when justly and equitably governed. That must be the solution of the difficulty in south-eastern Europe, and it is well to be able to think that the problem can be solved by the mere removal of incompetent rulers, without the wholesale expulsion of a race. It is, moreover, to the honour of the Greeks that they have been the first to give proof of this possible amalgamation. It has been exhibited, though on a smaller scale, in Servia and Roumania; but in those countries both Mahomedans and Jews have been subjected to petty persecutions, which show that the Slavonians are not so well fitted for humane government as the Greeks.

Meanwhile active preparations were still being carried on in Thessaly and Epirus, even in quarters where the struggle had not yet been begun. Though the Greek government had undertaken to hold aloof, the insurgents had many friends, who supplied them with arms and money; and the Turks made their dispositions to suppress the insurrection. A correspondent of the "*Levant Herald*" wrote from Volo, August 18th:—"So many wild rumours are afloat that I find it difficult to ascertain what is really worth reporting. One thing is certain, that an uneasy feeling possesses all, Turks and Christians alike, and passing events do not tend to tranquillise

or remove this. Last Saturday two steamers came in, one a Tunis boat, and the other a Turkish gunboat, which convoyed her. The former brought and landed ten thousand carbines and ammunition to be distributed among the Mahomedan population, after which they left on Monday morning for Prevesa with arms and ammunition to be distributed in Epirus. A number of the carbines have since been given away here with five packets of ammunition to each man; the rest have been sent to different parts of the province. About three weeks since the Beys of Larissa telegraphed to Constantinople for troops, but were informed that there were none available. A proposition was made to send Kurds and Circassians, but this naturally met with strong opposition, and it is now rumoured that four thousand Zeibecs will come shortly from Smyrna. A few days since parties of the Arab Redifs stationed at Volo were sent to occupy stations commanding some of the passes in Pelion, and other measures of precaution have been taken. Brigands are reported at Karditra-Dereli and many other parts of the interior; in fact, a feeling of insecurity prevails everywhere, and it seems scarcely possible that the present state of things can continue much longer. Several Turkish families have come down with the intention of going to Constantinople; but it is said that the authorities have refused permission, on the ground that, as they are influential people, it may create a panic. The prohibition to export cereals has been again withdrawn, after being in force a few days."

We must not close the present chapter without referring to a correspondence which arose at this time on the subject of some letters written by Mr. Gladstone to a Greek resident in Constantinople. The "*Daily Telegraph*" of August 27th contained a telegram from its representative in the Turkish capital, asserting in a mysterious fashion that documents had been discovered which showed that the ex-Premier had been writing to a M. Negroponte, and inciting Greece to make war upon Turkey. The accusation

caused no little sensation in England, as well as abroad; and Mr. Gladstone denied the truth of the statement, without, apparently, being able to remember any correspondence to which the telegram in question could refer. A few days later the "Times" contained the following letter from M. Negroponte:—

"SIR—On the 27th of August, there was published by one of your contemporaries a despatch from Constantinople, of which I only received cognizance yesterday, representing that a correspondence had been discovered between Mr. W. E. Gladstone and myself, from which it is gathered that Mr. Gladstone had endeavoured to incite the Greeks against Turkey, advising them to join with the Slavs in fighting the Turks; and that I had written, in reply, that the best policy that Greece can and ought to pursue, would be to declare war against Russia rather than Turkey.

"Now, I have no intention of denying that a brief correspondence did actually pass between the distinguished British statesman and myself. It was I, however, who first took the liberty of addressing a letter to Mr. Gladstone that called forth the expression of his sentiments with regard to affairs in the East. But what I must most emphatically deny is, that the contents of the letters interchanged were at all of the nature attributed to them by your contemporary, or that Mr. Gladstone ever, by letter or action, within my knowledge, encouraged the Greeks against the Turks, or advised a Slavo-Greek alliance, or, further, that I ever expressed an opinion in opposition to any views on his part.

"Consequently, I have no hesitation in declaring the statement wholly unfounded, and an unworthy perversion of the truth by certain persons intriguing here to damage the political reputation of Mr. Gladstone, and who, not having the courage to meet their adversaries in fair fight, are obliged to have recourse to underhand methods. In support of my statements, I must add that to no one did I communicate the said correspondence, having no special authority to that effect, with the exception of two English gentlemen, to whom I chanced to submit, in order to

have them more fully explained to me, certain portions of a letter from Mr. Gladstone, of which, owing to my imperfect knowledge of the English language, I could not quite comprehend the meaning; but to these two gentlemen only after I had received their solemn promise that the matter would remain strictly private between us.

"Out of delicacy, I will not mention the name of the person from whom undoubtedly proceeded the information, which gave rise to the despatch to your contemporary, and the perversion of the contents of the letters in question. I leave it, however, to public opinion in England, to form a judgment as to how far this may be considered honourable conduct on the part of a person of consequence.

"As regards the opinion, not only of myself, but, I believe, of every Greek, on the subject of the present political situation of his country, this I think, may be found in the strict neutrality which Greece has hitherto maintained, and will no doubt continue to maintain, in the present Russo-Turkish War. Having for whole ages fought for the noblest aspirations, she is now content to watch attentively events and wait for the proper season to fulfil her national mission. In this respect Greece, I think, may be said to be following the example of England, and will only take up arms when she sees her interests threatened.

"I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

"M. J. NEGROPONTE.

"Constantinople, Sept. 7."

This letter considerably increased the sensation caused by this affair; because it was generally understood that the "person of consequence" referred to by M. Negroponte was no other than our ambassador at Constantinople, Mr. Layard. Mr. Gladstone himself did not let the matter rest, for, a fortnight later, he addressed the following letter to the "Daily Telegraph":—

"SIR—On August 27, your special correspondent announced from Pera, in your columns, that 'important papers' had just been 'made known' there. The knowledge, which he declared him-



self to have acquired by these 'important papers,' was as follows :—

"First, That I had written a letter to a Greek merchant in Constantinople on the Eastern question; that is—for the meaning was perfectly clear—that I had addressed him spontaneously, and without invitation.

"Secondly, That I had done this 'about two months ago,' which would be about three months from the present time.

"Thirdly, That the purport of my letter was to advise the Greeks to 'unite with the Slavs in an attack upon the Turks.'

"Your correspondent went on to state that there was a second letter, 'curtly written,' to the same effect; that these letters had been shown to all the members of the Diplomatic Corps, and that my interference was generally deprecated by that body.

"Apprised by you, in a telegram, of this publication, I replied by referring to my published writings, and by calling for the production of the documents 'made known.' I had not by me the means of referring to or producing any of them, and I made no doubt that your correspondent, who had so boldly announced his knowledge, would in a few days lay the papers before the world.

"I will not now discuss the duties of neutrality as they are understood either by myself or at Constantinople; but I happen to have an habitual feeling of strong disapproval, not unmixed even with contempt, of those who gratuitously advise others to go to war while they themselves have only to 'sit at home at ease.'

"I had another reason for calling upon your correspondent to perform the obvious duty of supporting his statements. Forged letters have been written, both to me and in my name, within the last 'two months' in the most heartless manner, and I hoped your correspondent might vindicate himself by showing that he had been the victim of some of these forged letters.

"I have used every effort in my power to assist him and you to do justice in the case, without my public intervention, but in vain.

"I fortunately found that I had in London a copy of the principal letter which had been described. Of the second and 'curtly written' letter of repetition I have no recollection; but I assume that, as your correspondent says, it briefly repeats the first. The first and principal letter is subjoined in the French original, of which I have now made a translation, also subjoined.

"From this letter it will at once be seen that no one of his assertions has any foundation in fact.

"1. I wrote to M. Negroponte, not gratuitously, but in answer to an earnest appeal from him, written, if my memory serves me right, either with the authority or on the behalf of others.

"2. I wrote not about 'two months' before, and during a state of war, but more than six months before, when the Conference was sitting at Constantinople, when we all contemplated as well as desired a peaceful solution, and when a recommendation of war from a private person would have been even more absurd than mischievous.

"3. The letter has not the smallest reference to any question of war, contains no expression capable of being tortured into such a meaning, and speaks only of sympathy and moral support, as that which Greek ought to lend to Slav and Slav to Greek.

"During these four weeks, while I have been silent the public have been egregiously taken in; and there has been what I once heard Lord Russell call 'a waste of much good indignation.'

"Your correspondent, it appears, is too busy either to sustain or to withdraw what he has said, and has been pursuing his duties, I hope, with a greater regard to the rules of equity and prudence.

"It is, however, plain that he has been no more than a dupe in the business. There is some Polonius behind the curtain, and I call upon him to come out. From the letter of M. Negroponte it might be inferred that he is a person of some importance. The only thing I feel sure of is that he must be a man of peculiarly

delicate and fastidious perceptions in the matter of neutrality. Be he who he may, let him come out. An accusation has been made, and believed, and has fluttered all the 'Diplomatic Body.' I am justified in now saying, from the evidence before us, it is a false accusation. I ask your correspondent, if he can do it honourably, forthwith to name his informant. If he cannot, I ask the informant, in vindication of his own honour, to name himself.

"It has been with great reluctance, and after long waiting for your spontaneous action, that I have thus troubled you, amidst the rush of great and terrible events, with an affair in which I myself may appear to be the central personage. I have done it, first, because I know that the interests really struck at in these attacks are those of a deeply-wronged and suffering population; secondly, because I hope that my effort may tend to purify, in a particular instance, the sources of intelligence.

"I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

"W. E. GLADSTONE.

"Hawarden, Sept. 24.

"I observe that Mr. Negroponte, in his letter of September 7th, speaks as if I had written in English. This is a mistake. I replied, as he wrote, in French."

The following is the letter which Mr. Gladstone wrote to M. Negroponte:—

"Hawarden Castle, Chester,

"Jan. 9, 1877.

"Monsieur—Je vous remercie de l'honneur que vous m'avez faite en m'adressant votre lettre du 29 Décembre, des pièces y incluses et des paroles si bienveillantes dont vous vous servez envers moi.

"Je me préoccupe incessamment de la question d'Orient et je n'ai à présent rien à retrancher de ce que j'ai écrit à faveur des Hellènes, et des provinces Helléniques, dans le 'Contemporary Review' du mois passé. Mais je ne suis qu'un particulier, sans moyens de mettre en état d'action ma pensée et en outre je n'ai qu'une

connaissance très imparfaite, et assez vague, d'une foule de faits qui touchent à l'extérieur pour ainsi dire la question Slave, proprement dite, matière des discussions de la Conférence de Constantinople.

"Je ne peux donc parler qu'en termes généraux et avec tous les réserves qui sont dûs.

"Pour moi, la question d'Orient n'est pas une question de la Chrétienté contre l'Islamisme; c'est une question cependant, des Chrétiens contre la Porte et les Ottomans gouvernans; parceque tous les griefs des sujets Mussulmans et Juifs, et sans doute il y en a, doivent disparaître en portant remède efficace et bien disposé aux griefs des Chrétiens qui forment la masse des opprimés.

"Je ne connais donc pas de causes diverses; pour moi la cause est une seule, et je ne peux pas louer ni Grecs qui refusent leur concours moral aux Slavs, ni Slavs qui le refusent aux Grecs.

"Ce remède efficace je le trouve dans le développement des libertés locales de toute province prouvée d'être souffrante; pour mettre fin aux maux qui ont fait frémir tout le monde, pour empêcher les menées égoïstes, si il y en a, de quelque Puissance que ce soit; et pour donner à la Turquie la faculté, ou au moins la possibilité, d'un repos qu'elle n'aura jamais sous les conditions actuelles, ni sous ce qu'on appelle sa constitution.

"La délimitation équitable des provinces Helléniques et provinces Slaves, question assez difficile et grave, est aussi question ultérieure, qui ne pourra jamais selon moi s'ajuster d'une manière satisfaisante, que quand Grecs et Slavs indistinctement se seront donnés, sur la base d'un projet de libertés locales, leur sympathies réciproques également généreuses et sages.—Avec beaucoup d'égards, votre serviteur très obéissant,

"W. E. GLADSTONE."

It was evident from these letters that Mr. Gladstone had never incited the Greeks to revolt, and that he had not overstepped the fair limits of private opinion in his letters. Further ex-



planations were naturally looked for from the persons who had been concerned in making the accusations against him. Mr. Layard sent an account of his share in the transaction to the Foreign Office late in October, but it was not made public until the commencement of the session of 1878, when Mr. Ashley asked for a copy in the House of Commons. The following is Mr. Layard's despatch, with Mr. Gladstone's commentary upon it.

Mr Layard wrote to the Earl of Derby, from Therapia, October 29th, 1877 :—"MY LORD, I am desirous, in justice to myself, to put on record what took place between M. Negroponte and me with reference to the correspondence between that gentleman and Mr. Gladstone, which appears to have given rise to much unfavourable comment and a good deal of misrepresentation in England and elsewhere, and to have exposed me to very serious accusations from Mr. Gladstone, which I have no other way of meeting than by addressing your lordship. The facts of the case are the following: M. Negroponte is a Greek gentleman, but a Turkish subject, whose sympathies and connection with the revolutionary committees in Greece are no secret. He called upon me in August last, and endeavoured to persuade me that the time was come for a general rising of the Greek population of Turkey against the Turkish rule. My advice to him was the same that I have given to all Greeks who have held similar language to me—that the greatest injury would, in my opinion, be occasioned to the cause of Greece herself, and terrible misfortunes would be brought upon the Greeks of Turkey, by the insurrection in Thessaly, Epirus, and Macedonia, which he desired to incite. M. Negroponte did not agree in my views, and complained of the opposition that, according to him, England had systematically placed in the way of the legitimate aspirations of Greece, and of her support of Turkey, adding that he had received a letter from Mr. Gladstone, who, on the contrary, was of opinion that the time was come for the Greeks to unite with the Slavs and to throw off the Turkish yoke. M. Negro-

ponte did not show me the letter, nor did he mention the date. Had he done either, I should have at once perceived that he was misrepresenting the terms and object of it. Finding that I was not converted by his arguments, M. Negroponte sent me, on the 5th of September, a paper recapitulating them at greater length. There can be no doubt as to his meaning. I subsequently heard from several persons, amongst them my Greek colleague, that a correspondence was going on between M. Negroponte and Mr. Gladstone, who had expressed himself in favour of a Greek rising. But I have not seen M. Negroponte himself since his visit to me in August last. There was a feeling of deep regret on the part of many that Mr. Gladstone was giving encouragement, as alleged by M. Negroponte, to designs which might add to the bloodshed, devastation, and misery which were already falling upon the Christian, as well as Mussulman populations of this unhappy country. That this feeling did prevail is proved by a letter from Constantinople, published by the 'Pall Mall Gazette' of the 15th September, the author of which, a well-known publicist in this capital, had been informed by M. Negroponte of his correspondence with Mr. Gladstone, apparently towards the end of July, but had not been shown any letters that had passed between them. In the evening of the 20th August (circumstances enable me to fix the date), the correspondent of the 'Times' came to a reception at the embassy, and produced before a number of people, and handed to me, a letter from Mr. Gladstone to M. Negroponte, which, he informed me, he was at liberty to show me, but not to permit me to copy. The letter was not the one in French since published by Mr. Gladstone. It was in English. I do not remember its date. As far as I can recollect its substance, from a very hasty perusal of it, it was to the effect, that as M. Negroponte was not inclined to take his (Mr. Gladstone's) advice that the Greeks should throw their lot in with the Slavs, he had none other to give. I remember observing to the person who showed it to me that, although there was not much in the letter

it might be very mischievous when in such hands, and that it appeared to me that Mr. Gladstone did not understand the true feelings of the two races, which would rather fight than unite. In concluding this letter, Mr. Gladstone requested M. Negroponte not to write to him in future in Greek, as he was not sufficiently well acquainted with modern Greek to understand its meaning readily. Mr. Gladstone, in a letter to the 'Daily Telegraph' of the 26th September, says, 'I have said that M. Negroponte wrote in French; I am not sure of this. His letter or communication may have been in Greek.' The letter was shown to me under no pledge of secrecy. So far from such being the case, it seemed to me, as it was in the hands of a newspaper correspondent, to be public property. It was, I know, shown to my Italian and Greek colleagues, and, I have every reason to believe, to many other persons. I mentioned its contents to a gentleman connected with the embassy, adding that, if he saw the correspondent of the 'Daily Telegraph,' he could mention it to him. He did not do so, but a third person, to whom he spoke on the subject, did inform the correspondent of the latter on the following day. The correspondent took time to inquire into the matter, and having satisfied himself that a correspondence was going on between Mr. Gladstone and M. Negroponte, and that the Greeks were under the impression that Mr. Gladstone had been stirring them up to unite with the Slavs to attack the Turks, he telegraphed to that effect on Monday, the 27th of August, and his telegram was published on the following day. M. Negroponte, alarmed at the consequences of his imprudent and unjustifiable use of Mr. Gladstone's letter, wrote his letter to the 'Times,' in which he stated that 'to no one did he communicate the said correspondence' (between himself and Mr. Gladstone) 'with the exception of two English gentlemen, to whom he chanced to submit, in order to have them more fully explained to him, certain portions of a letter from Mr. Gladstone, of which, owing to his but imperfect knowledge of the English language, he could not comprehend the meaning;

but to these two gentlemen only after he had received their solemn promise that the matter would remain strictly private between him and them. One of these persons,' he added, 'was a person of some consequence,' and he leaves it to public opinion in England to form a judgment as to how far the conduct of this person may be considered honourable. The letter of M. Negroponte is, I grieve to say, a tissue of falsehoods from almost the first to the last. 'The person of consequence' to whom he alludes has been assumed to be myself, and Mr. Gladstone, without further inquiry, has denounced me, if not by name, at least indirectly, as having calumniated and misrepresented him. I have called upon M. Negroponte to give a direct denial to the statements contained in his letter as far as they are supposed to affect me. He has sent to me, through a near relation, a statement in writing that neither of the two persons to whom he alluded were in any way connected with the British Embassy, and he offered to telegraph this statement to the 'Times.' I did not ask that he should do so, as I wished, out of consideration for some of his relations for whom I have regard, to spare him from adding another falsehood to those of which he had already been guilty. Mr. Gladstone has published only his first letter in French to M. Negroponte, and not the one in English shown to me, nor any others that may have passed between them. I am aware that M. Negroponte has transmitted to Mr. Gladstone either the originals or copies of all the correspondence, but he has not thought fit to publish them. Moreover, I have the authority of the 'Times' correspondent to say that he sent Mr. Gladstone a letter for publication in that journal, which would have disproved the statements made by M. Negroponte in his letter to the 'Times.' Mr. Gladstone has not thought proper to publish this letter, and it is still, I am informed, believed in England that M. Negroponte's statements are true, and that I have been misrepresenting and calumniating a distinguished statesman for whom I cannot but have the highest esteem and respect. Such being the



case, I trust that your lordship will think fit to communicate this despatch to Mr. Gladstone, in order that his mind may be disabused of the impression that he appears to have formed of my conduct in this matter, and that he may learn the use made by M. Negroponte of a correspondence into which he unfortunately succeeded in drawing him.—I have &c.,

“A. H. LAYARD.”

This despatch having been communicated to Mr. Gladstone by Lord Tenterden, on behalf of Lord Derby, the ex-premier wrote as follows, on the 20th of November, 1877:—“DEAR LORD TENTERDEN—I am much obliged to Lord Derby for sending me the despatch which you inclose; and I am glad that Mr. Layard has supplied an explanation of his part in this tangled business, which I have done, and shall do, everything in my power to clear. My part in it is indeed a simple one: it is only to make plain what I have done. Apart from this I have neither time nor inclination, in a personal matter, for censuring others. 1. In some degree I hope to relieve Mr. Layard's mind. He says he has been exposed to ‘very serious accusations from Mr. Gladstone’ in connection with this affair. It is an entire mistake. I have stated publicly what I think of Mr. Layard's discharge of the duties of neutrality. This is a sufficiently clear statement. But, in saying this, I referred to Mr. Layard's official despatches, not to the Negroponte correspondence. In a published letter of September 24 I called upon an unknown person to declare himself. The prior documents not proceeding from me, appeared to point to him. But without proof I should not have been justified in making the accusation he supposes; and I have never made it. A short time ago, in Ireland, a common friend acquainted me that he had heard from Mr. Layard on this subject, and that Mr. Layard declared he was not the informant of the ‘Daily Telegraph.’ I replied to this effect: ‘That is quite enough for me.’ 2. Mr Layard observes that I have published my first letter to M. Negroponte, but

not my second, ‘nor any others that may have passed between them.’ This is not a careful statement. In my letter of September 24, which he had read, I showed why I could not publish the second letter, namely, because I did not possess it. Nor could I publish any others that had passed between us, because no others had passed between us. 3. Mr. Layard says: ‘I am aware that M. Negroponte has transmitted to Mr. Gladstone either the originals or copies of all the correspondence, but he has not thought fit to publish them.’ I have received from M. Negroponte no communication whatever. 4. Mr. Layard has ‘the authority of the ‘Times’ correspondent to say that he sent Mr. Gladstone a letter for publication in that journal, which would have disproved the statements made by M. Negroponte in his letter to the ‘Times.’ Mr. Gladstone has not thought proper to publish this letter.’ I am not aware of having received such a letter. I may add that, if I had received it, I should have been disposed to reply to the correspondent, that it was for him and not for me to judge what letters about M. Negroponte he should send to his own journal. Having thus cleared my position in respect to Mr. Layard, I add a few comments. 1. As this is an essentially public correspondence, in which Mr Layard has given an account of his own proceedings, I am content, on grounds I have already mentioned, to leave them without any comment. 2. With regard to my second letter to M. Negroponte, I should be very glad to have it in my possession, and to speak from fact in lieu of surmise. In the meantime I am of opinion that Mr. Layard's account of it (as might well happen after a ‘very hasty perusal’) is inexact. What I feel confident of (for reasons I need not now detail) is, that it was a brief letter of reference to a full letter of detail; and I think it alike singular and unfortunate that, on seeing this letter, neither the British ambassador, nor the agents of newspapers with whom he appears to be in free communication, should have perceived the propriety of inquiring what were the contents of the full text to which the

second letter referred in summary. For they were thus the means of bringing into existence a statement alike injurious and inflammatory, upon words which, if ambiguous in themselves, did also themselves point to the document by which they would have been cleared. There is one and only one allowance, which I must ask for myself, with regard to my statements in this correspondence. Circumstances have imposed upon me personally a correspondence exceeding, I believe, that of not a few public departments, without the aids which the admirable machinery of our public departments affords. I have therefore to trust to an over-burdened memory for much which would, in them, be matter of full record and easy reference. I ought also to add that I have for some time had by me letters Slavonic, Oriental, and in cursive Greek, of which as yet I do not know the contents; but I think it highly improbable that any of them touch the subject of this correspondence. In conclusion, I do myself the pleasure of recording my full belief that the British ambassador, whose name I have so often had to mention, has in this, as in all other matters, acted exclusively according to his view of public duty. And I will likewise add that, if I had even inadvertently used any language which, when reasonably construed, would make me responsible for advising a people to rise in arms, I should have acted in a manner contrary to all my habits and convictions, and should have deserved the gravest censure for taking upon me such a responsibility.—I remain, &c.,

“W. E. GLADSTONE.”

Mr. Layard did not see fit to “continue the controversy with Mr. Gladstone,” as he expressed it in a telegram to Lord Derby; and accordingly Mr. Gladstone wound up the correspondence by the following letter, dated January 28th, 1878:—

“DEAR LORD TENTERDEN—More than five months have now passed since her Majesty’s ambassador at Constantinople transmitted to the anonymous irresponsible correspondent of a

London journal an injurious accusation against me, which accusation was forwarded by telegraph and published accordingly, without, however, any indication of the source from which it had come. This accusation was, that I had incited the Greeks to enter into the war between Russia and Turkey, in which my sovereign was neutral. I called at once, and in vain, for the production of the evidence on which the charge was founded. The ambassador made no reply. After a month had elapsed, I searched my papers in London, and produced the letter on which the anonymous correspondent had founded his accusation. I showed that it was entirely without foundation. This was in the end of September. I referred to the author of the accusation as a person still unknown, and called on him to disclose himself. I believe that what I had thus written was conveyed by telegraph to Constantinople. After five more weeks had elapsed, on the 31st October, the ambassador made a reply, which, on the 19th November, Lord Derby was good enough to transmit to me in the country. This is a public document; and I need only here say that the ambassador expressed no regret for what he had done, but made two new charges against me of having ‘not thought fit to publish’ information material to the case, which, within his knowledge, had been sent to me. On the 20th November I replied that no such documents as were mentioned by the ambassador had ever reached me. In order to make the way as open and easy as I could for the ambassador, avoided a controversial tone, and simply pointed out the new wrong which had been added to the old one. I waited for nearly two months more, and then made inquiries from you whether any further communication had been received from the ambassador. I have not, down to the present date, heard of any such communication. This highly injurious charge, of which he caused the publication and wide circulation, continues to be repeated against me even by persons of exalted rank. Of them I take no notice, but the ambassador is a public officer, and the present



case very obviously bears upon the question for what purposes ambassadors are maintained at foreign courts, within what lines their action ought to be confined, and whether it is allowable for them to make or cause to be made anonymously and irresponsibly, through correspondents of newspapers, serious and injurious charges against individuals, to which charges they are not disposed to attach their own name and responsibility. I have to enquire, with great respect, whether Lord Derby, as the official superior of the ambassador, approves, or does not approve, of his conduct in this instance. And, after the period of five months has been suffered to pass, I further respectfully ask that the Secretary of State will lay before Parliament the ambassador's despatch of October 31st, 1877, together with the subsequent correspondence, at as early a period as he may think agreeable to his public duty.

"I have, &c.,

"W. E. GLADSTONE."

The personal history of any period is always interesting, and often extremely important. Such, no doubt, is the case with the series of events which took place in Europe during the years 1876-1878. Mr. Gladstone's part in the discussion of the Eastern question, and in the severe criticism to which the English government was subjected, must find a place in every faithful narrative of the times. The ex-premier was much blamed, in many quarters, for importing the element of personality into national concerns. It is only fair to him to point out that, on more than a few occasions, such as the one which has just been mentioned, the personal accusation came from Mr. Gladstone's enemies, and not from himself.

At the same time, if Mr. Gladstone did not directly incite the Greeks to take up arms against the Turks, there were others in England who did. The government, however, succeeded in restraining them, under the distinct promise that their interests should be protected in the final settlement.

## CHAPTER XXX.

### MONTENEGRIN SUCCESSES.

As already pointed out, Suleiman Pacha and Mehemet Ali had no sooner quitted the soil of Montenegro than the irrepressible mountaineers again resumed active hostilities, and took up the positions from which they had been driven. Ali Saib, and the other Turkish commanders who were left behind, were unable to resist the perpetual attacks of Prince Nikita's warriors, and soon lost all the advantages which had been gained by the two pachas.

It was the overwhelming number of regular Turkish troops which had brought about the disasters of the summer months. The Montenegrins had been forced back by the mere weight of the invasion; but that they had not been crushed was evident from the rapidity with which they recovered as soon as Suleiman Pacha had turned his back. It is impossible to conquer Montenegro without first crushing it by a great superiority in strength, and then permanently holding the positions gained, with a full determination to make the sword keep what the sword has won. The Turks probably could not afford to leave sufficient troops to keep the Montenegrins in check; and they soon found that the campaign of June and July was to have little practical result.

Of course the mountaineers were some time before they worked back into their former threatening positions; but they had friends outside, who enabled them to arm as many men as they could bring forward. They were assisted by volunteers from their neighbours on the north. Thus, in the month of August, there were in Montenegro at least seventeen battalions of native troops, and seven of Herzegovinians, all well armed and eager to fight. In addition to these, there was a force under Pejovics, opposed to the Turks in Sheranza, whom they succeeded in driving back beyond the little river Tara.

There were at this time two main Turkish columns threatening the Principality, one on the north, above Nicsics, and another on the south. They had originally menaced a second invasion; but the mountaineers managed so well to hold their own in the first skirmishes that the Ottoman troops showed little desire to push beyond the borders.

Nicsics had been invested soon after the departure of the pachas. It had been so well provisioned by Suleiman that there was no longer any hope of reducing the garrison by starvation; but the Montenegrins were more successful in the autumn than they had been in the spring, and managed to gain possession of it by force of arms. In the beginning of September the besiegers had not made much progress; and as the rainy season was approaching, when the mountain paths would be almost impassable for an army, the Turks seem to have been confident that they could hold out through the winter.

An interesting account of the whole series of operations which led up to the capture of the town and fortress of Nicsics, or Niksich—which had never yet fallen into the hands of the Montenegrins, during three centuries of war with the Turks—was given by the “Times” correspondent at the head-quarters of Prince Nikita.

Writing on the 10th of September, he says:—“The garrison, composed of a reduced battalion of Nizams, and another of natives of Niksich, numbered about seven hundred men, holding Niksich and eight ‘kulas,’ strong blockhouses, of which three enter into the defence of the city. Besides these there was a series of open redoubts of loose stone on the summit of a range of rocky hills (called glavitzas) to the west of the citadel, and on a glavitza, called Petrova, to the south-east. The commanding hill to the east, Trebieshka, was not held except by a picket, being too far and too large to be held by the small force of which the commander could dispose. The kulas Tjadjalitza, Dzikanovach, and Hassan Djedin Grob, and the redoubts near the city, have been the objects of the attacks of the besiegers for nearly two months of the siege, the

city and citadel having received the benefit only of occasional shelling to diversify the proceedings. The bombardment of Tjadjalitza, the key of the line of western defences, on the capture of which the taking of the citadel depended, began about the 25th of July, and so rapidly demolished the kula that the garrison abandoned it, taking refuge in breastworks on the hill around it. The tower being burnt, an assault was ordered for the 28th, but, under the advice of Vukotich, was countermanded, and from that date until the 19th of August nothing was done to push matters to a conclusion, except keeping up an intermittent and objectless artillery and musketry fire. The batteries were posted on Trebieshka Glavitza, and two points on the range to the west, one to the north, and one to the north-east. They consisted of two twelve-pounder field guns and ten or twelve mountain guns, the former alone having breaching power. On the 19th of August Tjadjalitza and a position in advance of the principal Turkish redoubt were taken by assault, with a loss of eight killed and twenty odd wounded. A detachment from Trebieshka also took one of the redoubts on the Petrova, but was recalled as too venturesome and not having had orders. From this date matters were quiet again until the arrival of the Russian guns, when an active policy was urged on the prince influentially, and finally decided on. The new guns were stationed at the Umaz Rock (two thirty-pounders on one, two twelve-pounders on the other), and the bombardment was mainly directed on Hassan Djedin Grob Kula. The second day the thirty-pounders were carried to Trebieshka and the kula demolished, assaults being made on that work and on Petrova Gravitzza the second night about 9 o’clock, both being carried after the Montenegrin manner, with a rush and without firing. The following day fire was opened on the city and citadel promiscuously as usual, but finally was directed mainly on the batteries of the citadel and Dzikanovach, a strong kula on a hill which guards the approach to the citadel from the north, the Russian heavy guns being carried to



the Dragova Luka. The fire was very destructive to the kula and embarrassing to the gunners on the citadel, the Medun twelve-pounder field piece on Tjadjalitza also telling with great accuracy on the redoubt in the centre of the citadel, nearly every shot falling within the enclosure. The men in the redoubts at the west were also much demoralised, and at one time I saw nearly the whole of those in the redoubt on Verizovich take refuge on the rocky slope towards the city.

"The advance on the previous day having been on the side of the city and the fire from the captured redoubts on Petrova commanding it completely, the assault on the third day was expected from the same side, but while a hot and general fire was kept up from nightfall on that side and on the citadel and Dzikonovach, the assault was made on the redoubt of Musevich, the southernmost of the western range, which was, with another work near it, captured with the silent rush so rapidly that the attacking party was in possession within ten minutes of the order being given.

"To understand this attack one must know that these peaks are about 150ft. to 200ft. high, very precipitous, and composed of bare rocks, pointed and cloven in a manner which makes walking on them a matter of extreme difficulty to the inexperienced. It is climbing rather than walking. The darkness favoured the attack, night firing being universally much too high, and the storming parties, one Montenegrin and the other Herzegovinian, suffered a loss of one killed and two wounded only, eighteen Nizams being killed in the assault. I watched from an elevation on Sdomir, but saw nothing but the bombardment and general fusillade, which was very misleading, being entirely directed on the side opposite that intended to be assaulted. The position taken simultaneously with Tjadjalitza made a favourable approach, and enabled the besiegers to prepare their attack unobserved. The taking of Musevich made the holding of Verizevich and Scitan redoubts impossible, as the Musevich is the highest of the range and the

nearest the citadel, cutting communication between it and the other redoubts. The commandant had no choice but to withdraw the troops in the redoubts, which were immediately occupied by the Montenegrins. The possession of Petrova Gravitz placed the Montenegrins within pistol-shot of the nearest houses of the city, and that of Musevich gave them easy command of the open batteries of the citadel and prevented the working of the guns. The city was thus defenceless, and if the resistance had been prolonged the houses would have been assaulted and taken one by one probably the next night. The panic of the population was very great, and consideration for the lives of the townspeople made it obligatory on the commandant to abandon resistance if he would obtain favourable terms, and a flag was sent to the prince to treat. But considerations even more imperative than care for the citizens compelled the Turks to accept whatever terms were offered. The supply of rifle cartridges only sufficed for a half-hour's fire, and powder for the cannon during the past two days had been only obtained by breaking up old pistol and musket cartridges, and of this only enough remained for a few hours' fire with shot for five guns, a small supply.

"The prince, on his part, was glad to finish with an affair which menaced further complications if the threatened advance of the Turkish armies was executed, and though I telegraphed on official authority that the surrender was unconditional, I have good reason to believe that this information was intentionally misleading, and that the brave Miralai, who had exhausted all his means of defence, and was absolutely at the mercy of his besiegers, was offered everything which military honour could ask, his troops marching out with arms and baggage, and being furnished with transport to Gatschko for all their property.

"We had early intimation of the surrender of Gosnje Polje in numerous rumours from various battalions, and the event was welcomed by a general *feu de joie* of all the troops encamped there, and a discharge of whatever firearms they



THE WORK OF THE RED CRESCENT





happened to have at hand. Balls from rifles, revolvers, and old smooth bores, were singing about in all directions. The wrath and contempt of our military attachés at such a barbarous and perilous usage can be imagined. I can only be surprised that, on a plain two or three miles long by nearly as much wide, on which half-a-dozen battalions, with all their impediments, were encamped, no one was hurt. It shows the providence which watches over children, of whom these people are merely full-grown specimens. We hurried breakfast, and rode into Niksich in time to see the exodus. Long processions of the Mussulman inhabitants were already on their way to their new homes, women staggering and hesitating by the way, under bales of bedding, carpets, and household utensils, others carrying children sick or too little to walk, while beside them ran, as best they could, the elder ones, some hardly able to walk a tenth of the distance they will have to go to reach permanent shelter, some pale and feverish, a few in various stages of smallpox, and others full-faced, ruddy, and fearless. Some, both women and children, were in a pitiable state of panic, trembling and shrinking at the least approach of one of the terrible 'Kara dagh,' and shrinking when we attempted to approach them with any kindness or gifts. The prince attempted to stop and reassure them, and in some cases succeeded in getting men, and even a few women to return, but many were in such panic or animosity that they would hardly recognise the friendliness. I planted myself in the road, and tried to buy the children with small change. Some took it with delight and smiles, and their mothers acknowledged it with thanks, others timidly, and shrinking from the hand that offered, quite wild with fear, not recognising the European dress as a qualification for confidence. Some obeyed the order to accept the money as they would if it were hot iron, afraid to refuse, but trembling so that their teeth chattered. Yet everywhere, and in every way, the Montenegrins did everything possible to reassure them and to establish friendly relations. The Mussulmans were all armed as usual, and

the prince went to harangue a mass of them, drawn up by the road ready to march. They crowded round him, listened, questioned, discussed with him, and with each other, and finally, all in the best of humours, returned to the city. The troops filed past, in good condition as to flesh, but with a motley show of apparel and baggage, which, but for the rifles they carried and the military order they kept, would have made them undistinguishable from a band of Bashi-Bazouks returning from a raid. Every man carried whatever he chose; there was no supervision and no restriction.

"The exodus of the people continued all yesterday and goes on to-day, and it is impossible to convince them that they are in safety. Yesterday, at the entrance to the Duga, where they encamped for the night, they were still panic stricken, fearing that their entry into the interior of the pass would be the signal for a general massacre. The commandant told the prince that the whole population during the siege, and until the final surrender, were in alternating moods of panic and confidence, one day wanting to fight because they thought they would conquer, and the next because they were sure the Montenegrins would massacre them all if they got into the town. The majority were finally quite discouraged and anxious to surrender, a few up to the last wishing to hold out. There are some still in the city who will leave, and a considerable number who will remain. Some, indeed, have already put themselves on most satisfactory terms with the prince, and are among the most demonstrative of his suite. He went into the city yesterday, and visited, in state, the chief Mussulman of the community. There are, however, some Mussulman families who, while not quitting the place, brood sullenly in their houses and keep their goods in a state of preparation. They evidently have no faith in the unnatural truce between the two people, and perhaps still hope that the Turkish armies will return one day to reverse their fortunes.

"I found yesterday a little fellow of five or six by the road-side to whom I offered a piece



of money, but though he did not attempt to run away, he absolutely refused to take it. He had money of his own, he said, and did not need mine, and when I continued urging him to take it, he angrily told me to 'Go away, he didn't want my money.' He had the half-defiant, half-alarmed air of a young tiger, indisposed to submit to any familiarity, and still less disposed to turn his back to the danger, which he, however, believed to be very real.

"Niksich is a dirty and wretched town; few of the houses are better than stone hovels, and many are mere wattled sheds, plastered with clay. There are also many more bare walls from which all interior has long gone, while others have been abandoned and are falling into decay.

"The citadel is an old composite structure, with towers three hundred years old, and about them and on the platform, temporary and patched-up structures of all kinds, wood, turf, and empty boxes—all in confusion, decay, and filth. One of the military attachés, who resided here many years ago, says that nothing has been done since then to make things more solid or protect what remains. Mukhtar Pacha's labours in restoring this ancient citadel was thrown away. It will now disappear as a fortress, the Montenegrin, like the Spartan, not fancying a combat within walls. There is in all the principality only one small tower, which is in ruins, and it is only used as a prison. Every fort which falls into the hands of the Montenegrins is at once blown up."

Referring to the evil effects of the war on the country, the same correspondent speaks of "the utter disorganisation of all branches of the Montenegrin service." "The post and telegraphs even go to the dogs, and in some cases dispatches are a week in transmission from Cettinge to the camp, or *vice versa*. The demoralisation and decay in discipline which the war has brought promises utter disorganisation and anarchy if it should continue a year longer. The prince has an administrative capacity which barely meets the needs of normal times—now it fails utterly. Stealing, not a Montenegrin vice when I came

into the country, is now hardly noticed, or, if noticed, is rarely punished, and is increasing accordingly. The war is doing more to ruin the country in two years than the Turks in two hundred."

Ever since the desperate fighting, when Su-leiman Pacha raised the first siege of Nicsics, Montenegro had, of course, been full of wounded men; though it is admitted by all who know the Montenegrins well, that they are not accustomed to allow much time for the curing of wounds, considering it more serviceable that a wounded man should strike another blow for his country than that he should die on a sick bed.

The benevolent associations in Russia, where Montenegro was regarded with special favour, had undertaken the charge of the sick and wounded; and they seem to have done their work well. But their efforts were not sufficient to prevent the existence of much destitution. Wherever the Turks had been, the country was devastated, and the crops destroyed. During the autumn of 1877, and the ensuing winter, there seems to have been something approaching to a famine amongst the hardy little tribe, which was relieved by constant supplies from without, and chiefly from Russia.

In the meantime Prince Nikita did not sheathe his sword. He continued to press the Turks on all sides of his little principality, up to the close of the war. His first successes after the capture of Nicsics were gained in upper Herzegovina, where he soon subdued the district of Banjani, and immediately notified the czar of this fact, claiming to have added the tract of country to his dominions, and begging his majesty to secure it for him in the eventual settlement. He followed the same course on subsequent occasions, having a natural idea that the goodwill of the Czar of Russia would suffice to confirm him in the possession of his conquests.

Early in October the prince turned his attention to the south, where Ali Saib still retained the command of a large force of Albanians and other irregular mercenary troops. Amongst the latter were a number of Mirdites, occupying a

mountainous district on the northern border of Albania. They had been enrolled as *Bashi-Bazouks* by the Turkish Pacha, in the hope that they would prove formidable opponents for the troops of Prince Nikita, towards whom they had frequently displayed a feeling of rivalry and jealousy. In this expectation, however, the Turks were disappointed; for the *Mirdites* withdrew to their mountain homes as soon as they heard that the Montenegrins were advancing in force upon Podgoritza. It was certainly not cowardice which made them abandon Ali Saib at this critical moment.

On the 5th of October, the last named commander sent word to the Porte that the troops of Prince Nikita had attacked Podgoritza, Spuz, and the smaller forts in the neighbourhood, and that they had been driven back by the defenders. But it soon turned out that the repulses of the Montenegrins denoted nothing more than the natural delay before their vigorous assaults became successful. First the open country, then the forts, fell into the hands of the prince, until at length he had subdued the northern Albania as far as the river Boyana and Lake Scutari, and had made himself master of the important towns of Dulcigno and Antivari, on the Adriatic.

Before we turn to the consideration of the progress of the war in Asia Minor, a word or two may be said of the condition of naval affairs, which, as has already been observed, had no special importance, and no great influence upon the development of military affairs. The Turks nominally held the command of the Black Sea; but the fact meant little for them. They were precluded from bombarding Russian towns, both by the defences and the watchfulness of the Russians, and by the recognised maxims of modern warfare. They did shell a few Russian forts; but this had no practical effect. They were able to ride triumphantly on the waves; but they could not prevent the Russians from making occasional use of the sea, especially in running the blockade from port to port along the coast.

The conduct of Hobart Pacha has been referred to in a previous chapter, and reasons have been

given which seem to account for the fact of his not accomplishing more than he actually did with the vessels at his command. A better idea of what he attempted, and what he actually performed, may be gathered from the notes of an eye-witness, who accompanied the admiral on some of his expeditions.

A correspondent of the "Standard" newspaper, writing from Sulina on the 19th of September, gives us some details on the subject of the navigation of the Danube during the war, and of the threats of Hobart Pacha to interfere with the bed of the river, and the works of the International Commission. "Since my last letter," he writes, "in which I gave an account of the chase of the *Livadia* by the flag-ship of Admiral Hobart, the flying squadron under his command has been cruising off the coast between Kustendjee and Varna. The gallant admiral was brought back in all haste on the 3rd, by the scare given to the good people and authorities at Sulina, by the Russian general in command at Toultscha, who had written to announce his intention of attacking that place, and requesting, therefore, all neutrals to take care of themselves. The arrival of this letter caused such alarm that not only the townspeople, but all the consuls cleared out at once, 'bag and baggage,' and proceeded in lighters and open craft of all description, down the coast to St. George's, at the southern branch of the Danube delta. The panic did not stop with the shore-going people, but the admiral in command specially stationed here with the squadron for the defence of the place, acting upon the supposition that Sulina was untenable, and having ever before his eyes visions of an attack by torpedo boats and *Popoffkas*, hurried off at once to Baltschick to send a telegram to Constantinople and pick up Hobart Pacha. The people on board of the *Arsari Tefyk* could hardly believe their eyesight when they saw the *Osmanieh* come steaming towards them, and still less could Hobart Pacha understand the junior admiral's desire to evacuate the place. With chains across the river; two small ironclads inside, a monitor and a gun-boat; two earthworks mounting



Krupp guns and a squadron outside—surely a small town situated in a swamp, against which it would be impossible to bring artillery by land, might be considered safe enough; and if attacked it could well hold its own against the enemy. Without commenting upon conduct which will appear very strange in the eyes of all acquainted with naval discipline and the articles of war in our own service, suffice it to say that, under the protection of the Arsari Tefyk, Hassan Pacha returned to his command. Hobart Pacha, as the wisest course to pursue under the circumstances—not that he feared the Russians for a moment would dream of carrying out their threat—hastened back to Sulina to reassure the authorities and calm the fears of the people.

“All sorts of reports were flying about respecting a concentration of troops at Toultscha, and the preparations made for a descent by the river, whilst the town was being attacked seaward by the Popoffkas, mortarboats, gunboats, and torpedo craft. Twenty-five thousand Cossacks was the smallest number the fears of the people would allow them to imagine as marching against them, and I am told that a declaration prepared by superior authority was in course of preparation, to be signed by all the officers, to the effect that the position at Sulina could not possibly be maintained. To the honour of the naval officers, however, not more than one, I believe, would sign it, and I hear that he was afterwards ready to deny his signature. There is nothing like looking things in the face, and threatened dangers often vanish when stoutly confronted. The fleet off Sulina had been kept too long from a look at the enemy, so Hobart Pacha sent a couple of the smaller vessels up the coast towards Kilia, under the command of Manthorpe Bey, to see what could be made out as to the intentions of the Russians. Beyond a small outpost near the shore, some twelve miles to the northward of Sulina, there was nothing, and a few shells soon brought this to the ground and sent the few Cossacks who were holding it scampering away inland as fast as their small nags could carry them. Whilst

lying at anchor off Sulina on this occasion a court of inquiry was held as to the conduct of the captain of the Fethi Bulend during the now celebrated chase of the Vesta. The court fully exonerated the captain, Shukri Bey, from all blame in the matter, and were unanimously of opinion that he had done his utmost to come up with the chase. The log, and the depositions of the officers, showed clearly enough that the Fethi Bulend continued to chase for more than an hour after the Vesta had ceased firing, and that the course was not altered until it was clearly seen that they were losing ground. The members of the court of inquiry, which sat under the presidency of Manthorpe Bey, were of opinion, however, that an error of judgment had been committed in not following up the chase whilst she still remained in sight.

“Hobart Pacha, looking at the letter of the Russian general as a *ruse de guerre* to draw the ships all to Sulina, resolved not to play into the hands of the enemy by paying too much attention to it, and he slipped away a few days afterwards for another cruise with the Fethi Bulend in case the Russians should be attempting to run stores and provisions into Kustendjee. He returned here on the 15th, finding the authorities still in a state of great excitement. Their fears, which had been somewhat allayed by his presence, returned with renewed force after his departure, and they were now hourly expecting the attack of the Russians. As the only approach open at the present time to the enemy is by the river, the admiral at once directed Manthorpe Bey to proceed with the turreted ironclad Hifzi Rahmin and a gunboat up the stream to the barrier sunk by the Russians just below Toultscha, and make a full reconnaissance in that direction. The expedition started at daylight on the 16th, and reached this barrier, at a distance of forty-five miles, without encountering the slightest opposition. Up to the fortieth mile not a trace of the enemy was visible, but at that point there was a Cossack outpost. A few of the men were observed skulking about the trees preparing to open fire, but a well directed volley from the

small-arm men on the top of the turrets caused a rapid retreat on their reserve, and a shell or two from the heavy Armstrongs broke them up entirely, and sent them galloping off inland. Arriving at the barrier, a full view was obtained of Toulcha and Ismael: not an enemy craft was visible; no boats were sent out to attack the ships or troops along the shore to annoy them with rifle fire, although they remained at anchor for a short time in order to examine this barrier; and in returning the Hiftzi Rahmin ran on shore and did not get clear of the bank again for several hours, the delay thus causing her to remain in the river miles above Sulina all night. This reconnaissance, unopposed by the Russians, clearly shows that they can have no very considerable force anywhere but at Toulcha; and as for gun-boats and rafts, &c., torpedo craft and countless Cossacks, they probably exist but in the imagination of the fear-stricken inhabitants of Sulina. The barrier referred to has been caused by the sinking of a number of stone-laden barges. Two passages have been left open wide enough even for the Hiftzi Rahmin, and one can hardly understand, therefore, the motives of the Russians in thus obstructing the navigation of the river. If these barges are allowed to remain much longer immense damage will be done to the works of the Commission. The barrier has already so sensibly checked the flow of water from above that the depth of the Sulina branch of the river has decreased some three feet, and in time the whole course of this, the only navigable entrance from the sea to the main stream, will be entirely altered. The sinking of the barges can only be considered as a most malicious act, done with the deliberate intention of destroying the trade of the Danube to the profit of Odessa and the other grain-ports of the Black Sea.

"But to continue my story. In getting under weigh the bow of the Hiftzi Rahmin, whilst swinging round with the current, took the ground on a bank where there should have been, according to the chart, plenty of water. Her stern was but a few feet from the shore, and here she lay across the stream perfectly helpless for several

hours, offering a capital opportunity for an attack by the Russian torpedo boats and mortar vessels, were there any at Toulcha. Eventually her bow was hauled off, and she commenced steaming down the river, reaching Sulina the next morning, having anchored during the night a few miles above. The course of the river has already been so altered by the presence of the above-mentioned barrier that in several places only twelve feet were found where there should have been seventeen. The Hiftzi Rahmin, in which the reconnaissance was made, is a splendid vessel for river work. She is sister ship to the ill-fated Lutfu Djellil, and has already done good service about Toulcha. She carries four heavy guns, in two revolving turrets, on her upper deck, those in the foremost 6½-ton Armstrong's, whilst the others are French guns of a somewhat similar calibre. The tops of the turrets, with a breastwork of hammocks, form capital stations for small-arm men, and during the trip up the river these places were occupied with Turkish marines.

"A mail from Constantinople has just reached us here, and, to the indignation and astonishment of all who know anything about what is going on in the Black Sea, the 'Times,' in its issue of the 7th, contains a letter from its Odessa correspondent, under the heading 'Utilising the Eclipse,' in which a brilliant account is given of the sinking of a Turkish ironclad at Soukhoum Kaleh. It is often said, with truth, that a despatch is half the victory, and I have known on more than one occasion men wake up to find themselves made famous in the 'Gazette' who up to that moment were not at all aware of having done anything much out of the common; but until I read the said correspondence I was not aware to what lengths audacious lying could be carried. It is now several weeks ago since I reported this affair as another successful repulse of an attack by torpedo boats upon a Turkish man of war, and since then I have announced the arrival of the ships in question at Constantinople. It is really sad that these poor Russians should have their exploits thus torn to



pieces and held up to scorn ; but if they will announce successes which never occur, what is to be done, for the truth ought surely to prevail ? This *Arsari Tefyk*, which the 'Times' triumphantly reported to have sunk amidst the cheers of the brave crews of the torpedo boats, is now lying at anchor in the Bosphorus, under orders to proceed to the Mediterranean ! As a full account of the whole affair as related to me by her captain was sent to the 'Standard' several weeks ago I need not refer to the matter further than to point out how very extraordinary it must be that this ship should not have met with the slightest injury. Had I not seen the vessel with my own eyes, and visited her but a few days ago in the Bosphorus, I should, upon perusal of this account in the 'Times,' be firmly convinced that she is now at the bottom of the bar of Soukhoun.

"Since that affair the place has been abandoned to the Russians, and no Turkish men of war have been in those waters. No one hitherto has doubted the pluck and energy of the Russian naval officers, but if such bombastic reports continue to be made public people will begin to remember that true courage is generally accompanied by modesty, and they will only have themselves to blame for loss of *prestige* and renown. A torpedo attack is liable enough to failure, and it is no discredit to be foiled in an attempt to destroy an enemy's vessel through the vigilance of her crew and the precautions taken to defend her. As to the hand-to-hand fight said to have taken place between one of the torpedo launches and a Turkish guard boat, it is very strange that hitherto I should have heard nothing about it, and now I am quite bewildered, for I know not whether to attribute this circumstance to the modesty of the Turks, preventing all mention on their part of the matter ; or whether the very exalted imagination of the Russians has led them to see things which never occurred. The Russian captain in his report lays great stress upon his having drawn the Turkish ironclad off shore on two occasions ; but it does not seem to a naval officer a very brilliant exploit to induce a man of war to chase

an enemy's vessel. Had the Turkish captain not proceeded in chase another victory would probably have been proclaimed, and the Turks held up to scorn as afraid to attack a second *Vesta*. Whilst upon this subject of Russian correspondence I may as well send a copy of the letter sent by the Russian general to the authorities at Sulina, together with what may be considered as Hobart Pacha's countermines :—

"SIR—I have orders to attack the military establishment of the Ottoman fleet at Sulina, where that fleet has landed troops, artillery, and war material. This has been notified to the International Commission of the Danube, as also to the neutral boats. I have, therefore, to call upon you within twenty-four hours to choose the positions which will suit you during the attack, because, after the expiration of that time, I will avail myself of my right to take all necessary measures for carrying out my orders. As an evidence of due notice having been given you by the Russian authorities, I have to beg you to be good enough to give me a certificate to that effect. I have the honour to be, &c., FEREWKINE, Lieut. General Imperial Army, Commander-in-Chief 36th Division Infantry.'

"Flag-ship *Arsari Tefyk*, Sulina, Sept. 17, 1877.—SIR, As the Russian military authorities have declared their intention of attacking Sulina ; moreover, as the said authorities have, by their action in sinking ships in the Sulina branch of the Danube, ignored the treaty of 1856 as regards the neutrality of the works of the Danube Commission during war, I beg to inform you that I must maintain and insist on the right of the Turkish government to sink ships, lay down torpedoes, or otherwise act for the purpose of impeding the movements of the enemy's ships of war in the Danube and its branches. Being fully aware, however, of the serious detriment that would accrue to the valuable works of the Danube Commissioners should this action be carried out to any great extent, I can safely assure you that the Turkish government will not act on their rights except in case of absolute necessity for the safety of the Imperial ships and munitions of war.

I have the honour to be, &c., HOBART PACHA.—  
MONS. KUHNE, &c., Danube Commission.'

"Mr. Kuhne, in acknowledging the receipt of the letter, respectfully begged the admiral not to take any such step as the sinking of barges until the members of the Commission had been communicated with, and informed Hobart Pacha that he had reason to believe steps were being taken with a view of having the obstruction laid down by the Russians shortly removed. In the meantime, however, two vessels have arrived from Constantinople, one the Imperial yacht *Izzedin*, with stores and provisions for the fleet, and the other the Tunisian vessel *Bechir*, with torpedoes and the necessary stores for mining the river and the approach to the entrance. These torpedoes are in charge of a young and very talented naval officer, a Lieutenant Sleeman, who lately retired from the service, and has now joined the Turks. They are, I believe, of the same description as those placed in the Bosphorus and elsewhere, large ground torpedoes, containing very heavy charges, to be fired by electricity. Lieut. Sleeman has also improvised some very ingenious mechanical torpedoes to explode by contact. Of these, however, I intended to write later on when describing more particularly the measures which have been taken for the defence of the place in view of the threatened attack on the part of the Russians.

"I left off writing at the above point, upon hearing that a Cossack party, with a flag of truce, were approaching along the shore from the northward; and, anxious to hear the news, I crossed the river to join the officer on guard, with whom I made acquaintance through the timely offer of a cigarette. The party consisted of a squadron of mounted Cossacks, with two officers, escorting Colonel Tregalsky, the Danube Commission's inspector general of shipping, stationed at Toultscha, who had been summarily ordered to quit that place by the Russian authorities. The first intimation the colonel received was on Sunday last, when he naturally protested against this flagrant breach of the rights of the Danube Commission. Telegrams were sent right and left on

the subject, but to no purpose; and last night, at midnight, the Danube Commission's officer was roused up and politely requested to accompany the head of the police. Embarking in a steam launch, they descended the Kilia branch to Vilcovich, and from thence came on by carriage. Colonel Tregalsky says that the appearance of the monitor the other day at the fortieth kilometre from Sulina threw the whole place into the greatest state of consternation. The garrison were all called to arms, for they fully expected her to approach nearer and open fire, not being aware of her draught of water nor of the object of her voyage. The attack upon Sulina, the colonel thinks, was fully intended; but at the present moment the greater portion of the troops that had been assembled there for the purpose have been sent on towards Tchernagavada, which had been threatened by a Turkish force from Silistria. What the European Powers will have to say to this forcible ejection of the Danube Commission's officer I cannot say; but it seems to me that they are carrying matters with a very high hand, and it is time that the Austrian as well as our government began opening their eyes to the extent to which their trading interests in this part of the world are being threatened. It really looks as if Russia were anxious to get rid of a person who might report too quickly to those interested measures and steps intended to destroy the work of the European Commission, which has conferred such benefit upon Central Europe."

It was evident that Hobart Pacha could do little or nothing against the Russians under these circumstances. The time to secure the command of the Danube was in the early spring months, when the Turks held the whole of the right bank, and before the Russians had effected their crossing. When Hobart Pacha and his monitors escaped from the Danube, it was the last time, in all probability, that a Turkish man-of-war was fated to show itself on the stream.

Mr. E. J. Reed, the former chief constructor of the English navy, has written an interesting comparison between the naval forces of Russia and Turkey before the war, from which our



readers may like to have a short extract. The Russian navy, Mr. Reed observes, is of a much more composite and diversified nature than that of Turkey. "While the latter consists entirely of broadside ships (excepting the river boats), the Russians have adopted both broadsides and turrets, and both broadsides and turrets have been embodied in vessels of very different types. Until within the last few years, and more particularly before the advent of Admiral Popoff to that somewhat undefined but very powerful office of extra-constructor which he has of late years held, the Russian navy had but a remote relation to the British navy. In the days of wooden ships, the Russian navy was, no doubt, modelled in pretty close conformity with western war-ships; and, even since the introduction of armour-clads, the examples of England and France certainly have had great influence with Russian designers; but there were other powerful influences also at work, and the American monitor type of vessel, and the English turret system of the late Captain Cowper Coles, obtained admirers and imitators in the Russian Admiralty. Admiral Popoff has subsequently established closer relations with British constructors, and his admiration of our ships and systems of design has often been publicly expressed by him; but the gallant admiral seems to be himself so original a designer as to give the freest scope to his own inventive faculties, and the Russian navy accordingly now includes more than one type of vessel bearing his peculiar impress, and among them the famous circular ironclads, which have been described and illustrated in these columns. In the Turkish navy on the contrary, British influence has been paramount in all essential respects, and the result is that the Turkish ironclads are of much less variable type, and entirely free from the influence exerted in America by Mr. Ericsson and in England by Captain Coles.

"Counting ironclads of all kinds and sizes, including gunboats, and ships in progress, as well as finished ships, the Russian navy is the larger of the two, comprising twenty-nine ves-

sels against the twenty-one of the Turkish navy, and an aggregate tonnage (displacement) of ninety-two thousand one hundred and seventy-eight against seventy-nine thousand seven hundred and twenty-two. Of ships of five thousand tons and upwards, the Russians have four, while the Turks have six, of which only five are available, as will presently be seen; of ships between five thousand and two thousand tons each, the Russians have twelve and the Turks ten (eight only available); of vessels between two thousand and one thousand tons, there are thirteen Russian and no Turkish, the remaining five Turkish vessels being small river gun-boats of only three hundred and twenty-eight tons each, carrying only  $3\frac{1}{2}$ -in. armour, and so constructed as to be capable of being readily taken to pieces (*demonstrable*). We shall presently have occasion to show that two—and probably three—of the most important vessels that appear in the list of Turkish ships are still in England, more or less incomplete, and must be deducted from the twenty-one ships with which we have credited the Turkish navy. This will at the same time reduce the tonnage from seventy-nine thousand seven hundred and twenty-two tons to sixty-one thousand two hundred and ninety-four tons, or two-thirds the tonnage of the Russian ships.

"Before looking more closely into the character of these two ironclad navies, it will be well to observe that, in the present war, Turkey will probably derive a special advantage from the fact that her ships are to operate at home, or near at home; while the Russian fleet must operate chiefly at an enormous distance from its base and from Russian ports. This assumes, of course, that the war will be carried on in the south only, and not in the Baltic, as it is highly improbable that the Turks will attempt anything against the Russian ports of the Baltic or of the Gulf of Finland. For whether the Russian Baltic fleet, on the opening up of the navigation, remains in the north or proceeds to the Mediterranean (as has been, in the latter case, confidently asserted), it is exceedingly improbable that Turkey will be able to spare any great and pow-

erful squadron of her ironclads for operations in the north, because in the former case she would scarcely care to encounter the Russian fleet at so great a distance from her own ports, especially as even a decisive victory there would be comparatively barren of results now that every port of importance can be readily protected by electric torpedoes; and if the Russian Baltic fleet comes south, the Turks must either watch or fight it. Of course there is the possible case of the Russian Baltic squadron coming to the Mediterranean, and being there engaged and defeated, or even destroyed, by a superior force of Turkish ironclads; but, in that case, there can be but little doubt that the Turkish fleet would be so much knocked about as to be effectually prevented—even if other causes did not exist to deter it—from going so far afield as the Baltic for further advantage and glory. The presence of a Turkish squadron in the Baltic is, in fact, under any circumstances of the present war, so improbable a contingency that it need hardly be considered, and would not deserve even to be mentioned but for the daring and enterprising qualities of Hobart Pacha, its present commander-in-chief, to whom the bold and unanticipated nature of the expedition might be a strong inducement to undertake it. Its improbability is, however, so great as to lend great credit to the rumour that a squadron of at least ten Russian ironclads may shortly make its appearance in the Mediterranean. In the Black Sea, Russia has but two ironclads, and these are the two circular vessels, the *Novgorod* and the *Admiral Popoff*, which have been specially designed for the defence of the mouths of the Dnieper and of the Straits of Kertch. Powerful as those two vessels may be for their intended purposes, they are small in comparison with the large Turkish frigates (which are, indeed, three times their size), and are not, we have reason to believe, in the best condition. It was stated in public that the boilers and machinery of the first vessel, the *Novgorod*, were not in good order even at the date of our visit to her in November, 1875; while the *Admiral Popoff* has only temporary

gun-carriages of an inferior kind, the splendid hydraulic gun-carriages which Messrs. Easton and Anderson, of Erith, have lately constructed for her are either still in their establishment, or must have left there within the last few days. It is likely, therefore, that these two vessels will act chiefly on the defensive, and consequently the entire extent and circuit of the Black Sea lie open to the operations of the Turkish fleet. It is not at all probable that, even under these circumstances, the Russians will attempt to force the Dardanelles and Bosphorus with their ships from the Baltic; but it will scarcely be consistent with their naval prowess, or with their historical naval establishments. In time of war, and especially in these days, events occur so swiftly that what we are now writing, and are about to write, may possibly be set aside even before it comes under the eyes of our readers; but at the time of writing there would appear to be grounds for giving credence to the statement that a considerable squadron of Russian ironclads will shortly come south, will make their appearance in the Mediterranean, and will compel the Turks either to send their most powerful ships south or to submit to have Salonica, Alexandria, and other ports, ravaged by the enemy."

It is unnecessary to remark that the Russians never seriously contemplated sending their warships to the Mediterranean, and that the Russian navy distinguished itself even less during the war than the Turkish. No great naval battle was fought in 1878; and the world must wait—let us hope many years—before it sees a battle on a grand scale between ironclad ships.

Ironclads are costly; but it would seem that the mere building of them tends to prevent their use. Nevertheless it is certain that a powerful fleet of monitors and rams might be made to do much better service than has hitherto been attempted.



## CHAPTER XXXI.

## THE SECOND SIEGE OF KARS.

WHEN we last considered the position of the opposing armies in Asia Minor, we saw the Russians retreating upon the frontier, after being repulsed by Mukhtar Pacha from Zewin. The Turkish generalissimo had pursued General Loris Melikoff beyond Kars, had raised the siege of that fortress, and had taken up a strong position facing the Russian lines between Kars and Alexandropol. Near Bayazid Ismail Pacha had actually crossed the Russian frontier, and was pressing his foe very hard; whilst in front of Batoum the invaders were fairly held in check.

There had been months of weary waiting for the Grand Duke Michael and his staff, and for the impatient Russian troops, since the precipitate retreat from the Soghanli Dag. But the delay had not been entirely wasted. Reinforcements of every kind, in men, ammunition, guns and stores, had been sent to the front, and great preparations had been made to renew the advance upon Erzeroum. In September the Grand Duke received sixteen battalions of Moscow grenadiers, each a thousand strong, together with two regiments of cavalry; and the field artillery was at the same time strengthened by forty-eight guns.

At last, after long consideration, it was resolved to attack Mukhtar Pacha early in October; and on the 1st of that month an important battle was fought on the slopes of the Aladja Dag, which formed the key of the Turkish position. From this mountain the line stretched, along the Arpa Tchai river, by way of Ani, to the neighbourhood of Kars.

The Russian plan was as follows:—The fortieth division, under General Sholkovnikoff, was ordered to advance from Ani, up the Aladja Dag, and descend the other side upon Mukhtar Pacha. General Heimann was to attack the

Turkish centre with his Circassians, whilst, on his right, General Melikoff, with the Moscow grenadiers, was to advance towards the Yagni Hills, which it was the main object of the Russians to gain.

The battles of the 2nd and 3rd of October are described in an intelligent manner by the "Daily News" correspondent at the Russian headquarters, who was almost alone in giving English readers an account of the critical events of the month. Speaking of the Yagni Hills, in a despatch from Karajal, on the fourth of October, he says:—

"The real and most important point, according to the views of our staff, against which all our efforts had to be concentrated, was Little Yagni, an entirely isolated, bulky elevation, with a comparatively extensive platform on the top. Though of considerable less height than its namesake, its sides are quite as steep, while a rocky crest, very much like that of the Kizil Tepe, borders its extended summit. This, however, does not consist of a uniform level, but is separated by an intervening flat depression, so as to form three distinct terraces, of which the southern one is about two hundred feet higher than the northern. This hill, situated at a distance of about nine miles from Kars and two from the Great Yagni, completely stops the road from Kurukdere to that fortress. It is very probable that the information upon which it had not only been strongly fortified and garrisoned by Turkish infantry, but was also armed with twenty cannon of heavy calibre, was received from spies. The honour of taking by assault this commanding point was conferred upon the second brigade of the Moscow grenadiers, under Major-General Count Grabbe, and eight battalions detached from Ardahan for that purpose, under General Komaroff. This gallant officer, who had been slightly wounded on the 25th of August, has since recovered. His fellow-sufferer, General Tshadtchewadze, wounded on the same day, had also reassumed his command of our whole cavalry. Three battalions, which, as a rule, garrison the fortress of Alexandropol,

had also been ordered to Karajal, to cover the camp and headquarters, and to form the reserve of the second Brigade of the seventieth Division, which, as I have stated above, had nothing to do but to check an improbable offensive movement of the Turks against our left wing opposite the Kizil and the Yagni Tepes.

"The general object apparently was to carry out a complete turning movement on both hostile wings, either to surround Mukhtar Pacha entirely, or to cut off his communication with Kars. Could this have been effectually managed, no doubt he would have been compelled to surrender with his army within a few days, for, his supplies of ammunition and provisions being in danger of immediate exhaustion, he must either have broken through the Russian lines, or tried to make his way with disbanded troops across the Russian territory, in the hope of joining his comrade, Ismael Hakki Pacha, who is still entrenched before Igdyr.

"After this explanation, let me come to the events which I witnessed in following General Loris Melikoff's staff. The troops ordered for the advance started from their camps at eight o'clock in the evening of the 1st inst. At three o'clock precisely the next morning we followed, riding at a moderate speed, to the south-west, on a country track over the vast plain. Our way was lit by the waning moon and countless stars shining with intense brilliancy. A cold wind made our trip by no means pleasant, as it brought the temperature near to the freezing-point. The staff consisted of about fifty persons—general officers, aides-de-camp, and servants—escorted by three sotnias of Cossacks from the Caucasus, not armed with lances, but accoutred and dressed like genuine Circassians. The ground, in appearance almost level, is in fact cut through at intervals by a few rocky ravines, between which lie long-stretching undulations rising gradually towards the south. After two hours and a half of wearisome riding, we arrived at dawn of day at an eminence some one hundred and fifty feet above the flat-topped ridge of the rising ground called the Kaback Tepe (Pumpkin Hill).

"Hitherto no reports of fire arms had reached us. But from the top of this commanding point, at half-past five, sharp and general firing suddenly struck our ear. To our right and left the roar of the cannons, and the sharp, dry, knocking, rattling of the musketry came down, sounding in the distance like the noise produced by the work of some hundred road-makers breaking flint-stones in a re-echoing hall. The principal object of attack, the Little Yagni, rising now clear in sight, frowned over the plains of Kars like an impregnable fortress. Its summit was surrounded with breastworks, ditches, rifle-pits, and blinded batteries. The Moscow Grenadiers and the Ardahan Division were already supposed to be at work. I say supposed, because in fact they were not. On seeing from the Kaback Tepe some forty guns firing with a range of three miles, at earthworks which were prudently left empty by the Turks, it seemed to me that the attack lacked the character which was likely to secure victory. Had the infantry been led immediately to the assault in tirailleur lines before the dawn of day, without firing a single round they would have carried that hill, I am sure, within half an hour. In the way the attack was conducted it was obvious that the enemy, who, judging by the number of his tents, had there about three thousand men, had time to bring all his available means to the defences.

"I have not the slightest doubt that the twelve hours' cannonading did no harm whatever to the earthworks, and inflicted only trifling losses on the garrison, for they had for the most part retired to the sides of the hill that were out of range. To our left, the impetuous General Heilmann had already hurled his division in skirmishing lines against the Aladja mountain, and its southern continuation, the Awly-yer hill, separated from it by the upper part of the Subatan ravine. The incessant sharp volleys gave evidence that the Turkish main force had been concentrated there. It was soon clear also that a direct assault on those rocky steepes and terraces, strengthened by many entrenchments and stone barricades, had no better chance of succeeding



to-day than on previous occasions. Within the first half an hour it was clear that the carefully elaborated plan of operations again combined all the faults of previous tactics, magnified, moreover, by the absence of that dash which, at the beginning of the present campaign, was characteristic of this army.

"Some one has suggested, and brought others to believe, that in this breech-loading time an assault by infantry is obsolete and unnecessary, and that all war might, with less effusion of blood, be just as well, or better done, by the artillery alone. Such, unhappily, seems to be the erroneous idea at headquarters. Yet, of all the shells which I have had the opportunity of watching here, fired on our own or on the Turkish side not a single one caused damage worth the pains and the powder. When they burst in the earth it was at such a depth that their weak charges were unable to overcome its resistance, and, consequently, the fragments did not fly off. They only exploded properly when the shell happened to strike on a rock or other hard substance. I have not even heard that a single one of our soldiers has been killed by the famous shrapnels, which, at all events, are much more efficacious than simple grenades. At ridiculous distances of above three miles they, too, are likely to produce little more than an innocent shower of leaden drops. Anyhow, artillery alone is not capable of dislodging such stubborn soldiers as the Turks are from the bottom of their deep rifle-pits. Further discussion on the subject would be preposterous, in the face of a series of experiments which are everywhere conclusive in favour of my assertion.

"Our cannon still boomed at the rocks and the earth, while masses of infantry were either idling as reserves in the depressions of the ground, or were employed in a disastrous but useless skirmishing with the enemy. For hours each tirailleur lay behind a heap of stones, which he had previously piled up for his shelter, and took a deliberate aim at some similarly protected adversary. Such fighting only kills and wounds, without the hope of a useful result. At six o'clock

in the morning this state of things was on both wings as clear as the rising sun, whose rays gilded the glorious white crown of Mount Ararat. In the centre before us stood, three miles off, cutting the blue sky with its regular conical profile, Great Yagni. It covered the front of Mukhtar Pacha's centre and left wing, commanding the plain before them, and enjoyed the reputation of impregnability, since at different times various Russian assaults on its steep slopes had been repulsed with considerable loss. From its foot to its top it was covered with rifle-pits and ditches in three superposed rows, cut in conformity with the configuration of the ground in projecting and re-entering angles.

"The prospects of success there appeared, indeed, so very poor, that it was considered by the Russian staff useless to attempt the conquest of that natural fortress. Therefore only a demonstration, supported by a brigade and two batteries, was intended against it, calculated to distract the enemy's attention from the more serious attacks on the Little Yagni. On examining through our glasses the greater hill, we found that its garrison was exceedingly feeble. The breastworks on its base and its middle were not manned at all, and even the fortifications bordering the top plateau were only very insufficiently armed, as was proved by the spasmodic and unconnected rifle firing and the apparent absence of cannon. On learning this General Loris Melikoff ordered a general assault on the hill. From three sides the troops advanced merrily in skirmishing lines, with supports and reserves, cheering, as they passed, their commanding general, who spoke to them some encouraging words. The cannons redoubling their firing, flung shrapnel after shrapnel to the top. An hour afterwards the whole hill was swarming with grenadiers, who steadily climbed up its steepes, despite the frantic firing of its defenders. At eight o'clock the Turkish battalion on the summit of the Great Yagni had ceased to exist. Our men had entirely occupied the impregnable hill, and were waving joyously their caps and muskets.

"While this was being accomplished, the in-

different cannonading on the right, between our batteries and those on the Little Yagni, was still going on. It might have continued for a century, and nothing would have come of it. As soon as it became evident that the men on the top of the Great Yagni were genuine Russians and not Turks, as some of us still supposed, the staff rode off in order to inspect the conquered position, and to decide the further course of operations now possible through so brilliant a beginning. The hill was rather too steep for our horses, and we rode round it to the right, over the plain two miles wide which separates it from Little Yagni. What in the world had we to do with that Little Yagni? Had it been blocked up after the defeat of Mukhtar Pacha's main army, its defenders must have surrendered within three days from want of water. The opinions on that point were unanimous among all the officers. The task of shutting in the garrison of Kars—at the utmost six thousand men—ought to have been entrusted to a single brigade, which might have occupied and fortified the heights contiguous to Great Yagni, and opposite Little Yagni. When our staff passed by, one of our infantry regiments had already been deployed in skirmishing order, and was engaged with that garrison. Besides, strong bodies of our numerous cavalry, commanding that plain, challenged in vain the Turkish irregular horsemen. All their ferocious Circassians, disgusted on account of their receiving neither pay nor food, had left Mukhtar's camp in a wholesale desertion a fortnight ago. Only worthless cowardly Kurds remained for the sake of murder and plundering.

"All of a sudden the Turkish heavy battery on the top of Little Yagni changed its mark. Cutting the air with portentous howling, a well-aimed shell struck in the very midst of the squad of Cossacks forming our vanguard, throwing the earth high up. A horse with empty saddle sprang about bewildered, but his stunned rider, recovering his senses, caught him, quickly mounted, and joined his troop at a gallop. Old General Loris Melikoff, keeping his horse in the same steady pace as before, did not seem to care for such

trifles as shells and the stray rifle-bullets humming around us. Taking the lead of his staff, with his green Mahomedan standard embroidered with red inscriptions in Arabic letters flying before him, he gave an example of cold-blooded courage to his officers. Almost immediately a shell whizzed by and struck the ground, bursting some twenty yards behind our party. Then came another and another, all passing over us, till at last one fell only five yards off the very centre of our crowd. The officers, huddling together nevertheless, received the noisy failure with a scornful laugh.

"A few seconds more, and another big shell burst right amidst our staff, perhaps only one yard behind general Loris Melikoff's horse. Earth and small stones flew about. For an instant, as the foremost part of the crowd disappeared in the dust, I thought the commanding general killed. He, however, rode quietly on and smiled, as a somewhat fainter hurrah accompanied the bursting of the iron monster. It had grazed the right side of Lieutenant Petroff's face, and the pressure of the air made him deaf on that side. His cheek became swollen, and severe headache ensued. This was the only accident we had to complain of. No other officer was wounded or contused. Some of the horses, however, were scratched or bruised a little by the earth and the pebbles. The shell itself produced no effect in the middle of such a crowd of horsemen, and the fragments found their grave on the spot where they intended to dig ours. A few minutes afterwards we were out of dangerous range.

"As we wheeled round into the valley, four hundred yards wide, which separates Great Yagni from the bulk of the Aladja mountain, two regiments of cavalry dashed at full speed into the plain, where the Turkish battalions from Kars were engaged with our skirmishers. Of course, I expected that they would sweep like an avalanche over that dry, level ground, and cut down in a gallant charge the enemy's scattered soldiers. As far as I could see no such thing happened. The cautious warriors, when the bullets began to tell on them, lost much of their



pluck, and placing their confidence rather in their muskets than their broadswords, indulged in a skirmishing entertainment. Afterwards I heard of their achievements, and how they had slain hundreds of Nizams and Bashi-Bazouks, but I had not the good fortune to see this feat of arms. Presently, four Red Cross men carried a man on a litter to the ambulance in the rear. We went up to the patient and discovered that he was not, as we thought, a Russian, but a wounded Turk. All our soldiers are well acquainted with the fact that the Turks kill, torture, and mutilate every Russian prisoner, yet they cannot murder in stupid, fanatic hatred, a helpless suffering wretch, although the inexorable law of retaliation seems to demand it. All the Turkish prisoners, some one hundred and forty—wounded and unwounded—were kindly treated and well attended to in my presence. At the time when we had reached about the middle of the valley, from which a road, cut in zigzags, leads to the summit of Great Yagni, victory turned her smiling face towards the Russian commander, but he disdained the opportunity, and listened to General Heimann's opinion.

"Opposite Great Yagni runs a high barren ridge, sloping gradually upward to a flat-topped summit called the Awly-Yer, which is severed from the Aladja mountain by the Subatan ravine, about two miles above the village of Hadji Veli Koi. This commanding point—the most important of the whole Turkish position, and subsequently well fortified—was literally inaccessible from the plain at the foot of the Aladja, towards which it falls off some one thousand five hundred feet in a succession of steep gradients and perpendicular rocks. At its base the Turks had concentrated their main force; and Mukhtar, relying on the strength of Great Yagni, had neglected to occupy with the necessary troops the summit of the Awly-Yer. This fact had been ascertained by our cavalry patrols. Two squadrons of Cossacks had even remained for two hours at Veli Koi, a village situated to the south of that elevation, right across Mukhtar's

only line of retreat, where they met not a single Turkish soldier. The Pacha, moreover, was utterly unable to send a sufficient force quickly enough to the Awly-Yer, because he was closely pressed in front by the second brigade of the Caucasian grenadiers, under Major-General von Schack, a Prussian by birth and education. Six of our battalions had just descended the Great Yagni, six others were near at hand, and had they been momentarily withdrawn from the superfluous attack on the Little Yagni, it is probable that they would have taken the Awly-Yer almost without loss from the side of its totally unoccupied southern ridge. Possibly such movements did not enter the original plan; but plans are worthless when the fighting has once begun, and all depends on the capacity to seize favourable opportunities.

"It seems that General Loris Melikoff asked an officer whether he knew the road to Vezin Koi. The Awly-Yer was obviously the only tactical object worth storming at any cost; it was the magic point from which the fate of the day was suspended by a thread. Its occupation by the Russians would have unavoidably led to the destruction of Mukhtar Pacha's entire army. Its very key, the Great Yagni, was already in our hands. At this moment, unhappily, General Heimann, in an interview with Loris Melikoff, was pleased to assert formally that his troops, advancing from the Subatan plain, were quite able to finish taking the Awly-Yer, as they had done with the Great Yagni, and that, therefore, our available force might be advantageously employed against the Little Yagni and the garrison of Kars. This strange opinion prevailed. General Loris Melikoff's genius was impaired by pernicious advice. His whole staff recognised it, but nobody ventured to utter an objection. General Heimann, of course, did not take the Awly-Yer as he had promised, in his sanguine fashion, but was, on the contrary, repulsed with considerable loss; while the three brigades ordered to assail the Little Yagni had no better chance. Even had we had a reserve of fifty thousand men more they too would never have

succeeded in the attempt of taking those fortifications and works by assaulting them. This was conspicuous enough at nine o'clock in the morning, and the wisest plan would have been then to withdraw the troops, for the opportunity had been missed.

"The staff turned its back to the Awly-Yer, and followed the zigzags of the road which the Turks had recently made for the convenience of the garrison on the summit of the Great Yagni. Company after company as they passed us descending, cheered the commanding general, who wished them good luck. On the hillside, as we went up, lay a young grenadier, moaning as he tried to lift his head and rest on his elbow to answer the questions and receive the consolations of the general. Overcome, however, by weakness and pain, he fell back and shut his eyes, while the blood still gushed from the wound in his side. Higher up a dead Turk, stretched across the narrow track on his face, compelled us to make a circuit. On reaching at last the level top of Great Yagni a ghastly sight struck our eyes. All the pits and ditches around were filled with the corpses of Turks. The dead were almost all shot through the head, because the remaining parts of their bodies had been sheltered by the parapets. Here they lay as they fell, on their backs or faces, side by side, or one above the other. A negro with grinning teeth hung right across a white soldier, and his long arms stretched out over the rocky abyss. Some preserved the ferocious expression which they had borne when still alive, and lay with clenched fists and distorted limbs; others, calm and quiet, looked like stone. In a pit, opposite each other, sat two softas. Though in the uniform of soldiers, they were easily recognised as religious students by the white muslin band tied around their fezzes. One had his skull laid open by a shell fragment, the other was shot through the temple. Both had obviously been killed by the same shrapnel. Some hundred dead bodies encumbered the trenches; others lay strewn over the hillside."

In the same battle was killed the "Turkish

Joan of Arc," Kara Fatima. The prisoners captured by the Russians declared that she had been shot through the heart; but her body was not found. It was asserted by some that the prisoners had persuaded some Russian soldiers to bury the corpse, in order to save it from possible profanation.

General Sholkovnikoff had succeeded in climbing the Aladja Dag, and threatened Mukhtar Pacha; but the latter was able to hold his own for that day.

On the 3rd, to take up the story of the same correspondent, about half-past two in the afternoon, three lines of Turkish tirailleurs advanced against the positions occupied by the Russians on the preceding night.

"They occupied a front of at least three miles in length, were preceded by two batteries, and followed by compact supports and reserves, all arranged in perfect order. The whole force must have consisted of about fifteen thousand men, having their right wing covered by the Kizil Tepe. It was obviously their intention to make a desperate attack on the Karajal camp, and they seem to have supposed that the whole Russian forces had been brought over to our right wing. They were the more led to believe this, as on the previous day no signs of troops had been shown here. General Lazareff, with the 40th division, backed by a regiment of the garrison of Alexandropol and numerous horsemen, lay in ambush for them during the course of that day. The Russians were quite prepared to receive the assaulting foe. Their soldiers lay in rows concealed in the folds of the ground, or behind pyramidal heaps of loose stones. Ostensibly, only two battalions and a battery, together with some cavalry, leaving the Karajal position, marched to the fight. The Turks, encouraged by this apparent weakness, hastened their steps. Their batteries galloped ahead, and opened a brisk shell-fire on those of the Russians, who replied steadily with only eight guns. At the same time, the Kizil Tepe flung shell after shell at all moving objects on the field—ammunition carts, Red Cross waggons, cavalry, herds, and labourers



—fortunately without hurting anything but the soil. The skirmishers, too, rattled away while the Turkish infantry drew nearer and nearer, without firing a round. They dived down into the ravines and re-appeared, always resolutely advancing against the Russian cannons, which had in the meanwhile been reinforced by another battery of eight pieces. Although both were exposed to the bullets, they made no preparations for limbering up, but continued their slow firing. The Turkish batteries were soon silenced by the advance of their own men, who masked them.

"Then at last the enemy saw the sunbeams dancing on the levelled rifle barrels peeping behind stones and sods. Now, at once, he began firing with frantic rapidity, but did not slacken his moving ahead. Only stray shots from sharpshooters answered the challenge. Finally, however, the Russians lost their temper, and returning the fire volley for volley, showed a line of battle of no less extent and power than that of their adversaries. Then they rose together and faced the shower of lead, advancing and firing, firing and advancing, line after line, running from cover to cover, but always moving ahead, right down on the enemy. Every soldier seemed to believe that the grand duke's eyes were especially fixed on him. It was refreshing to see how this division, in contrast with the monotonous unproductive skirmishing of their comrades on the previous day, went on without a moment's hesitation, with admirable and matchless courage. The Turks became demoralised by this unexpected resistance, supported by forces quite equal to theirs. Their advance was checked, and came to a standstill. Soon they retrograded slowly, but always firing. It was of no avail. They were driven back irresistibly from undulation to undulation, till at last they turned their backs and ran, seeking shelter behind their pits and breastworks. But again and again the Russians followed and dislodged them at a rush with the bayonet, compelling them to recede, either step by step or in short runs. The Turks became, from minute to minute, more disheartened. Soon they had had enough of the

game, and shortly after nightfall were in precipitous flight towards their fortified camp around Subatan, at the foot of the Aladja Dag. General Lazareff pursued them fast, even through the dark. His lanterns were the incessant sparkling of the long line of firing rifles, and the occasional broad flash of the cannons. When he had lost sight and feeling of the frightened enemy in that pitch-dark night, the firing died gradually out, and the slaughter came to an end.

"The Turks, completely routed, took refuge behind their entrenchments, while the Russians, after having thrown up breastworks and pits, passed the night on the ground they had so gallantly conquered. Their losses were severe. The 40th division had nearly seven hundred killed and wounded in these three hours' fighting, whereas the Turks had left about four hundred dead on that part of the field which the Russians chose to occupy. I was at a loss to understand why General Heimann, who commanded to the right of General Lazareff, did not assist him. Two regiments of cavalry could have outflanked and annihilated the scattered enemy at the right moment. Be this as it may, I have not yet witnessed here a more judiciously combined and a more brilliantly conducted affair than that of the afternoon of the 3rd instant. It was carried on in the true military style. Careful plans and brave troops concurred in bringing it to a very satisfactory result. It is to be regretted that the time was too short for a full display of the general's abilities and his soldiers' courage, as otherwise I do not doubt the camp of Subatan and the Kizil Tepe would both have been taken. On both sides there was no interminable, never progressing cannonading, no timid skirmishing. The guns did not fire for a minute longer than was necessary to introduce the action, and the tirailleurs, with most laudable pluck, were eager to settle the question of victory or defeat at once. Every single man had visibly made up his mind either to die or to conquer.

"General Lazareff must be proclaimed the hero of the battle, and the grand duke was highly gratified with this striking proof of his ability.

For the 4th a general renewed assault on the Little Yagni was announced. This seemed incredible after the bitter experiments on the 2nd. Luckily the rumour has not been confirmed by events. As the staff had not returned yet, I presumed that something important was in view. I at first intended to ride directly to the foot of the Great Yagni, but learned that our headquarters had been transferred to the Kaback Tepe. Everybody in the camp laboured in the belief that the Great Yagni had, once for all, remained in the possession of the Russian troops, and that the line of communication of the Turkish army with Kars had been efficaciously interrupted. My astonishment was, therefore, equal to my disappointment on being informed at the Kaback Tepe bivouac that the Great Yagni hill and all the surrounding valuable positions, which the Russians had conquered on the 2nd with so considerable an effusion of blood, had been finally given up on the plea that it was difficult, if not impossible, to provide the troops and animals there with water. It is true that both had undergone, during the last two days, extreme hardships and privations. On the other hand, however, it would be difficult to deny that the inconvenience might have been mitigated easily enough, as thousands of carriages and beasts of burden, camels and others, in the Commissariat Service, are at the general's disposal. The Turks, moreover, had made, two months since, the necessary arrangement for the proper sustenance of their garrison on the summit of the Great Yagni. What they had managed to overcome the Russians might have overcome too. I don't know why the system of digging Abyssinian wells has never been tried in this barren country, where water must be found at a certain depth. The rich cold spring spouting out of the Kurukdere ravine indicates the presence of large supplies, filtered down from the high mountains all around. The question, anyhow, is worth an attempt.

"At the Kaback Tepe a little shelling and skirmishing was going on without visible effect. Mukhtar Pacha stood triumphantly with his staff on the top of the Great Yagni, which he

was allowed to occupy without spending a single drop of his soldiers' blood. He has, after a narrow escape, due only to unaccountable blunders, the right to boast that he has succeeded in stopping the Russian advance. The Russian staff has since returned home to headquarters. Whether another effort will be made on the Turks, whether it will be more wisely planned and conducted than the previous ones, and arrive at any substantial result, nobody can tell yet. Bad weather has now set in, the troops have been withdrawn to their former quarters, with the exception of General Count Grabbe's brigade, which is still waiting on the Kaback Tepe for further orders. I believe that something grand is projected, then only it will be decided whether the actual campaign will come to a conclusion or not. Should, however, the previous conspicuous faults be repeated, I cannot anticipate much glory or success.

"The system of scattering all available troops, say sixty thousand men, over a length of eighteen miles, cannot but lead to discomfiture in tactics as well as strategy. No sufficient reserves are at hand, and, if they were, would be too far off to act immediately on the enemy's weak point. Two such points were discovered in the course of the late battle: Vezinkoi and the rear of the Aladja position, where General Skolkovnikoff operated. Both advantages, if followed up, would have led, no doubt, to an entire victory. Where was the *coup d'œil*? Where were the reserves? Why was the pluck shown on the next day by General Lazareff only? No concentrated action of artillery, no sweeping dash of the cavalry on the broad plain, and, for all that, heavy losses. We had, according to the latest accounts, three thousand three hundred and sixty men *hors de combat*, among them nine hundred and sixty killed and two thousand four hundred wounded. We lost only two prisoners. Fifty-four officers were wounded, a small and insignificant proportion compared with the loss of men as the result of other engagements."

The losses of the Turks were computed at eight thousand; but they were probably much less in reality.



The Russians did not lose heart over this first check. They had made such thorough preparations, and were so confident in the superiority of their army when not entirely outnumbered, that they never doubted their eventual success. It would have been strange indeed if the great efforts of Russia, in a crisis of such supreme importance, had been unequal to the task of forcing Mukhtar Pacha back, for the failure would of course have implied the triumph of the Turks, at all events for the one campaign.

After an interval of ten days, accordingly, the attack was renewed, and this time a different strategy was adopted in order to break up the Turkish army. As it was considered almost hopeless to do this by a simple advance against the excellent positions held by Mukhtar Pacha, it was necessary to outflank him in some fashion or other, and to attack him on more than one side, so that he could not rest secure upon a broad basis of defence.

The flanking movement of the 2nd and 3rd of October had failed, as we have seen, partly through the absence of result from General Sholkovnikoff's movement on the rear of Mukhtar, and partly owing to the entire absence of water in the positions gained by the Russians, which prevented them from holding the ground after they had won it. The new plan was to send a force round the extreme left of the Turks, and, after attacking it from the rear, to take advantage of any success which might be gained in this direction by an advance with the main army against the Acolias Hill (Evliid Tepe), which now formed the pivot of the Turkish position.

On the 14th of October, General Lazareff, having by a forced march of over forty miles described a circuit round Ani, and thus reached the rear of Mukhtar Pacha's left, suddenly made his appearance over the Orlok heights, apparently taking the enemy by surprise. A sharp engagement followed, and the result was that the Turkish left was driven in and back, towards Vezinkoi, and in the direction of Kars. General Melikoff, at the Russian head-quarters, perceived that the operations of the 14th had been successful; and

early on the 15th he advanced against the centre of Mukhtar Pacha's line. The advance had been preceded, as usual, by a heavy cannonade, which was the more necessary because the Acolias Hill had been fortified by earthworks and artillery.

The fighting was desperate, and the slaughter very great. The Turks defended with great obstinacy, but the assault of the Russians was still more obstinate; and at last Mukhtar Pacha, outnumbered, and receiving no support from his left, finding also that General Lazareff was threatening his communications with Kars, fell back towards the latter town. In their retreat the Turks were attacked by Generals Lazareff and Heimann, the last named pursuing them with vigour, until the flight became a rout. Seven thousand prisoners were taken, and the carnage was immense. The Turkish right, on the Aladja Dag, was completely hemmed in, and surrendered to the Russians, with thirty-two guns, and all its provisions and ammunition.

The success of this movement was due quite as much to Turkish neglect and disorganisation as to Russian skill and gallantry. It was greatly assisted, as a correspondent at the Russian headquarters justly tells us, by "the startling fact" that a field-telegraph line had been established without interruption from the Karajal headquarters to General Lazareff's division, "following him all along his circuitous march of at least forty miles through a mountainous, hostile country, completely in the rear of the actual Turkish position." The communication was indeed interrupted, but within two hours it was re-established. "The wind, and not the malicious Turks, had thrown down some of the poles. This inference seems correct, therefore, that the pacha's hasty retreat was rather prompted by the comparatively enormous losses he had sustained, either from the relentless fighting during the week previous to his withdrawal, or from wholesale desertions, than by General Lazareff's intrepid interposition. Had his valuable Circassian scouts not disappeared, driven away in despair and disgust, they would have assuredly succeeded

in fathoming the Russian design, or at least in destroying the telegraph line, which now enables a simultaneous movement of our two columns to be carried out." It was evident that the tide of the Turkish successes in Asia Minor had turned.

The Karajal correspondent of the "Daily News" gives once more the only detailed account of this great and decisive battle, which is commonly known as the battle of Aladja Dagh. Writing on the 17th of October he declares that "Mukhtar Pacha's army has ceased to exist. I can state this truth on personal knowledge of the operations by which the dissolution of the Turkish force has been accomplished before my own eyes. The Ottoman General, who had proudly kept his position for months on the almost inaccessible mountains and hills opposite Kurukdere, has been shattered against his own rocks. I stated in my last letter from Karajal that General Lazareff, at the head of 27 battalions, 40 guns, and six regiments of cavalry, had directed a turning movement against Mukhtar Pacha's rear with the view of cutting him off from Kars and Erzeroum, and crushing him thus, once for all, between the two principal portions of our army. His march across the mountains was, of course, somewhat hampered by his cannons and military train, which compelled him to seek and follow a rather circuitous carriage road. He was at first guided by the Arpa Tchai River down to Kotchiran. From here he passed over to Dighur, where he left two battalions, and then, wheeling round to the north-west, he chose for his mark the Orlok Hill and Vezinkoi. This village, strongly entrenched, secured Mukhtar's position and his communications with Kars. I stated in my last letter that the Mushir, on hearing of General Lazareff's serious movement, detached Selim Pacha with fifteen battalions to meet him. It seems, however, that he had reinforced a few days later these troops with another division, entrusting the whole corps to the command of his lieutenant, Raschid Pacha, President of the Military Council, and now our prisoner.

"Mukhtar's obvious intent was to weigh with

all his available forces on General Lazareff, trying to crush him or to compel him to retreat whence he came, and then fall on the other fraction of our army here. That he had this idea is ascertained by the unanimous evidence of the prisoners, and it is, moreover, in accordance with common sense. General Lazareff, however, had in the meantime occupied on the 13th the Oghur Hill, after a sharp engagement. Then he telegraphed to the grand duke's headquarters that Mukhtar was before him with superior forces, and he urged, therefore, that from our side a simultaneous attack might be directed against the Turkish lines. This message reached here precisely at three o'clock on the morning of the 14th. The commander-in-chief at once complied with Lazareff's request. I have already pointed out the remarkable circumstance that a field telegraph had been established with laudable celerity and regularity throughout the length of that circuitous line of operations. Although it was only protected by Cossack picquets, it had never been interrupted but once, by a mere accident, and for two hours.

"Our whole strategic plan was suspended on that thin wire. On its strength depended the fate of this campaign in Armenia, because it alone rendered an harmonious tactical action possible which secured success, and without which we could not hope to dislodge the enemy from his strongholds. The pacha, ignoring either this state of things, or, in his Turkish prejudice against all innovations, scorning that peculiarly useful modern contrivance, laid no stress on its establishment. He found out subsequently that that wire was in fact around his neck ready to strangle him at a moment's notice. And so it did. The battle on the 2nd instant was, it seems, the most efficient practical lesson taught to our strategists. They recognised at last their former capital faults and blunders, both with regard to general conception and to tactical details. Generals Obruteneff and Gurstehin were yet experimenting on the 2nd instant, when, in reference to the available force, their plan was too complicated and extended. The visible good



effect of General Sholkovnikoff's turning movement then rendered it obvious in which direction it was best to act. So that operation was again performed, but judiciously on a larger scale, and aiming at more important points.

"We had no unnecessary trouble, bloodshed, and neutralising of our forces before the impregnable Little Yagni Hill. We had not abandoned again the Great Yagni, the guardian bastion of Mukhtar's front, but kept and fortified it. We did not rely on Mahomedan cavalry scouts for the security of our army and the watching of the enemy's doings, but closed him in with two divisions, which established a solid curtain of infantry double posts, with guards and regulars patrolling before their encampments. It was at last universally acknowledged that the Awly-Yer Hill was the enemy's centre pivot, and that the Great Yagni was doubtless the key to his position. Its possession alone enabled us to attack that all-important point. I have already stated in my last letter how stupid it was on the part of the Turks to evacuate it. General Heilmann was charged to carry the Awly-Yer at any cost, and had for that purpose the gallant division of the Caucasian Grenadiers and fifty-six cannon at his disposal. The Moscow Grenadiers, posted on his left, received orders to refrain from acting until that hill was taken. They formed the reserve, and observed the enemy's movements on the Aladja Dag. Opposite this mountain a heavy battery of twenty-four pounders had since the twelfth bombarded the enemy's camp there night and day, at intervals of fifteen minutes, in order to disturb it and harass the Turks. Our right wing was covered by the Ardahan Brigade, under General Komaroff, and some regiments of cavalry, which were intended to check the garrison of Kars, and that of the Little Yagni.

"Early in the morning of the fifteenth, at about five o'clock, his Imperial Highness the Grand Duke and General Loris Melikoff left with their staffs the Karajal camp, and proceeded to the environs of Subatan, where the Moscow Division of Grenadiers had their position. I

was not ready to accompany them, not having been informed in time of the news concerning general Lazareff's message and the subsequent intentions, thus I was only able to start about two hours later, together with the Russian Consul, Mr. Obermuller, who formerly exercised his functions in Erzeroum. We rode over the well-known plain, stretching from the Karajal hills to the Aladja Dag, towards Subatan. We had no time to spare, for sharp firing at the Awly-Yer attracted our attention. There, I well knew, the fate of the day would be decided, and therefore we were determined to reach that point as quickly as possible. Distances here, though they appear insignificant, are in fact enormous, because objects for estimating them, such as trees, houses, &c., are utterly wanting. One sees a hill before him of apparently small size, and is thus inclined to judge it only a walk of an hour from the point of observation, but on trying the distance one finds that it takes three or four hours' fast riding to reach it. Then the little hillock turns out to be a bulky cluster of plateaus and summits of some miles in extent.

"We followed the foot of the Aladja. The guns placed on its terraces flung from time to time some shells at our reserves and the heavy battery, without doing any harm. None the less they became somewhat annoying on account of their disagreeable howl and the dry crack of their bursting. The Awly-Yer, which soon stood threatening before us, had a more serious, warlike aspect than its big neighbour. It was encircled by two broad rings of white smoke—one around its basis, produced by the incessant firing of fifty-six cannons, and the other, on its summit, by the musketry and artillery of the Turks, and the bursting Russian projectiles. This time the Russian gunners behaved well. They had placed their pieces at the reasonable distance of one thousand eight hundred yards, and laying aside the inefficient shells, concentrated a shrapnel shower on that part of the enemy's front which had been selected to be assailed by the storming battalions. Balls of white smoke, waving for awhile in the calm air

like balloons, indicated that the terrible messengers of death and destruction had burst at the proper point for sending fragments and bullets among the lines of the defenders.

"I observed how at once the musketry ceased after the bursting on a certain spot, and only a few minutes afterwards it began again, when living men had replaced the dead and wounded. Three strong columns of grenadiers lay in clusters on the steepest parts on the northern side of the hill, as though riveted to it. They were waiting there for final orders, in comparative security, because the Turks behind the breastworks were unable to hit them. The latter could not venture to stoop forward for that purpose without the risk of being shot immediately by the Russian artillerymen or tirailleurs. In this manner the fighting continued for three mortal hours, and had apparently come to a standstill. Already the suspicion rose in my mind that this engagement, like the former ones which I had the opportunity of witnessing, would end without any other result than that of mere slaughter. We thought it convenient to rest awhile, and had some breakfast. Its principal ingredient was the Russian black rye bread, which is hard enough to be used instead of cannon-balls in case of need.

"The fighting on all other points than the Awly-Yer was insignificant. The Aladja and the Little Yagni continued their indifferent cannonading, aiming at random. All my attention was of course drawn to the Awly-Yer, where perhaps the future destiny of the Turkish empire was at stake. Seeing no advance, I thought that General Heimann might again have failed to understand the full importance of the task entrusted to him. Why did those grenadiers not move, although sure to be badly dealt with if they finally had to retire before the the enemy's pursuit? It was a moment of anxiety and disappointment. The idea that Mukhtar had evidently neglected to fortify and garrison that hill with the utmost care, was, however, somewhat comforting. Then, on a sudden, three Turkish cannons boomed to our left beyond the

Subatan streamlet and ravine, which separate the Awly-Yer from the Aladja. From this mountain descended, towards the Awly-Yer, a strong line of Turkish tirailleurs, coming obviously to the rescue of that hard-pressed position. But before they could even cross the ravine their advance was arrested by a Russian line which compelled them to withdraw. At the same time the three columns of Russian grenadiers told off for the assault on the Awly-Yer moved onward up that hill.

"We were in our saddles in a twinkling, and galloped ahead, with the view of witnessing this supreme achievement. A rocky ravine, however, with perpendicular borders, only visible when about ten yards off its margin, checked our speed, and compelled us to make a circuit. Finally, we found a path leading down and up again. There we discovered the naked bodies of apparently Russian soldiers in an advanced state of decay. They were not mutilated or disfigured. Unluckily, we had at that moment no leisure to ascertain whether other victims of Turkish brutality lay unburied on that dismal spot; so we hurried on. Then again, large tracts of the dry grass which uniformly covers the fields and pastures were burning before us, ignited by the Turkish shells. Our horses snorted, frightened by the approach of the flames, but we forced the animals through. The black grenadiers swarmed on all sides over the yellow hill. Steadily they climbed towards the summit, always firing, in face of the desperate resistance of the Turks, who disappeared in the smoke. Onward the Russians stormed, crowding more and more together as they approached the cone, towards the enemy, while their batteries covered the top level with shells and shrapnels. When we passed one of them, a colonel ceased firing, and said with proud satisfaction:—'Go and look at the work we have done up there. I think we have served them well.' At that moment repeated hurrahs sounded through the air, and the Grenadiers jumped in crowds over the enemy's ditches and parapets. Then the baffled Turks, relinquishing all hope, ran for



their lives, pursued by a shower of bullets and by bayonets.

"The formidable redoubt was at last taken by that gallant onslaught. When we arrived at the foot of the steep, shell after shell was still fired at the middle part by a Turkish battery on the slope of the Aladja next to the Awly-Yer, and by cannons on the top of a commanding mountain opposite it, bursting behind and before us. But when all our men had arrived at the summit, that firing stopped on a sudden, and the terrible hill which, ten minutes before, was all fire, smoke, and noise, was once more silent. To our right we saw General Heimann riding to the top with his staff. We reached it about the same time as he, and I believe I was the first to have the honour of congratulating him on so brilliant a victory. General Heimann, losing no time, paraded his soldiers, and ordered immediately a sharp pursuit, which was carried out in a clever manner. They met with only a feeble resistance on the part of the Turks, who hastily withdrew in disorder.

"The next fortified plateau to the south-west, situated just before that of Vezinkoi, was also stormed within an hour. In the meantime we saw the white smoke rise on the opposite side of that village. There General Lazareff assailed the enemy from his rear, and barred his retreat to Kars. The batteries also closed in with the scattered Turks wherever they perceived them, and covered them with a hailstorm of projectiles. The vanquished foe tried to rally and escape in all directions, but found no issue, and was soon close hedged in by infantry, artillery, and cavalry. Here it is said the Mukhtar himself was wounded in the hand, and sought for attendance and shelter in Kars, abandoning thus his doomed army. In truth, however, he had not received a scratch. He had commanded the battle from the summit of a mountain, the name of which I do not remember just now, next to the east of the Awly-Yer, from which a couple of guns still continued to molest us. I saw him there through my field-glass, together with General Kembal, if I am not mistaken. When the Awly-Yer was

conquered by the Russians, those gentlemen disappeared, and had a narrow escape to Kars, by availing themselves of the opening between us and General Lazareff.

"Another party of Turks—the bulk of the garrison of the Awly-Yer and its environs—were pursued through a pretty large valley, which is formed by the upper part of the Subatan streamlet and its tributaries. The battle had been won in a brilliant style, but yet the trophies had not been counted, and still separate Turkish brigades on the Aladja and the Little Yagni made a show of resistance. The parapets and ditches of the Awly-Yer redoubt looked indeed very much like those of the Great Yagni twelve days before, after it had just been stormed. Rows of dead Turks, some horribly disfigured by shell fragments, were to be seen upon the earthworks and at the bottom of the ditches. Some were literally torn to pieces by the shrapnels. I think most of them were killed by the artillery, which indeed had done its duty this time. An officer of high rank lay dead on his back in the ditch. He was a pacha or colonel, perhaps; but it could not be made out, because the soldiers had stripped him of his overcoat and boots. The contracted brow, and the fierce expression of his lips, proved that he had met with a sudden death. His fine Arab horse lay dead by his side. Very few wounded remained on the field.

"I don't think that the Russians have sustained great losses by that assault, because, in the first place, the shrapnels had told terribly on the Turks, and had greatly diminished their number and demoralised them before the storming began; and, in the second place, the hill itself was too steep to permit them to fire over the earthworks with good effect. Most of their rifle shots were aimed too high. The inside of the redoubt, comprising the whole natural platform of the hill, was ploughed with shells, and strewn with their fragments and bullets flattened on the stones. Three Kupp guns, with the manufacturer's name on them, together with their carriages and ammunition, were captured there. One of them had its right wheel broken by

a shell, but the other two were in a serviceable condition, so the Russian officers tried their range at the fugitives. The first shot, however, fired without the necessary elevation, nearly fell among a column of their own soldiers.

"The Turks are evidently not in want of rifle ammunition yet. About a railway truckload of cartridges, partly in their original boxes, partly in loose heaps, or strewn singly over the ground, might have afforded the means for annihilating a whole army. Some empty two-wheeled bullock-carts and tents, almost in rags, constituted the remainder of the booty. The tents were immediately cut into strips by the Russian soldiers, who wrapped them around their feet as an excellent substitute for stockings. Lines of cavalry, with their horse artillery, now trotted up between us and the Great Yagni, riding towards Kars, in order to cut off the enemy's retreat. It was now four o'clock; the weather was fine and rather hot; but notwithstanding my curiosity I resisted the temptation to follow up the advancing columns to Vezinkoi, where General Lazareff, descending from the Orlok Mountain, had begun a decisive attack. The day before he had already repulsed a reconnaissance directed against him by Raschid Pacha. To him and to General Heimann—especially to the latter—the prominent part of this day's glory is due. The emperor will perhaps create him Count of Awly-Yer—at least he has deserved such a distinction.

"On riding back to the Karajal camp, I had the good fortune to witness a sharp engagement between the Moscow Grenadiers and the Turks in the Aladja Dagh. The grand duke, who observed that attack from the heavy battery, which was now useless and silent, had ordered another regiment to the advance. The Turks answered with spasmodic cannon and rifle firing, but were gradually driven from terrace to terrace beyond their camp to the summit of the mountain. About half-past four they gave up further resistance, and retired to the opposite side, leaving everything they had in the hands of the Russians, with the exception of some of their guns.

They hovered there in the wilderness for a while without water, food, fuel, or shelter, and then despairing, surrendered at about half-past eight the same evening. They denied that they had cannons, but they had, and it is likely that they have hidden them in the recesses of the Aladja. Hitherto the Russians have had no time to seek for them, but they will do so, I hope, before the snow is likely to cover that mountain. Thus well-nigh the entire Turkish host had been swept away.

"Unfortunately, the garrison of the Little Yagni, watching their time, when everybody's attention was drawn to Vezinkoi, escaped with stores, cannons, and ammunition to Kars. This, I regret to say, was the fault of our cavalry, which did nothing to prevent the retreat, on the plea of its being dark already, else it would have been literally impossible for the Turks to slip through our lines, as the hill is surrounded on all sides by dry and level ground. Colonel Kavalinsky, chief of the staff of the cavalry, reported at nine o'clock to the grand duke that seven pachas, thirty-six cannons, and twenty-six battalions had surrendered and laid down their arms. On the following day also many prisoners and some guns were captured. The exact number of the enemy's loss has not been recorded yet, but, at all events, its total will amount to nearly three-quarters of its original strength. That is to say, his entire army has been scattered, destroyed or captured. Among the captives we had the doubtful honour of seeing here at the Karajal camp the seven pachas and some colonels. We remarked among them Raschid Pacha, lieutenant-general and president of the military council; Hussein Kyazim Pacha, chief of Mukhtar's staff; Mustafa Pacha, and the so-called Madjar Omer Pacha. The last-named, a genuine Russian by birth, educated in a military school at St. Petersburg, and a former Russian officer, took an active part in the Hungarian revolution in 1849, and, coming over to Turkey with Kossuth and the other refugees, embraced Islamism. Thenceforward he distinguished himself as a fervent adherent of the prophet. As



years have elapsed since that time he has nothing to fear from the resentment of his countrymen, and will be considered and treated like the other Turkish generals. By the grand duke's orders each of these gentlemen received a good deal of money for his travelling expenses.

"The Russian losses are about fifty officers and one thousand and six hundred men killed and wounded, numbers quite insignificant as compared with the result of the battle. The consequences are uncertain yet, but some hope that Kars may be induced to surrender is still entertained, and negotiations for that purpose are said to be going on. I do not believe, however, that the Turkish commander there is inclined to give the fortress over without fighting for it. In the meantime General Heimann is marching across the Soghanli Dagħ (Onion Mountain), towards Erzeroum, the garrison of which is exceedingly feeble. Should, as there can be little doubt, General Lazareff be sharp and lucky enough to shut out Ismail Pacha from Erzeroum, and crush him between his own force and that of Tergukasoff, that fortress cannot then be defended. Its chief source of weakness, as I have said, is its extent. It requires an army of at least fifty thousand men to garrison its numerous detached forts, and the central *enceinte*. The Russians, therefore, must make it their principal object to prevent all succour of men and material from entering the city, and then it cannot fail to succumb to a general escalade. If even Dervish Pacha should advance with the greatest imaginable despatch from Batoum *via* Trebizond, he cannot reach Erzeroum before General Heimann. It is true that the weather, which is as bad as possible, their being continuous rain, may prove a more serious hindrance to the progress of the Russians than all the Turkish forces together. The battle of Aladja Dagħ will, of course, redound to the honour of his Imperial Highness the Grand Duke Michael in the Russian annals. We hardly expected so brilliant a victory after the series of inconceivable blunders committed since the opening of the campaign.

The accounts of the same series of engagements which reached Europe from the Turkish camp were more meagre, and added little to the information which was obtained from other quarters. Nevertheless they make it evident that the Turks retained full confidence in themselves until the second week in October. Their repulse of the Russians between the 2nd and the 4th of the month, which they were inclined to attribute entirely to their own bravery and skill, had filled them with hope, and they expected that they would soon be able to advance across the Russian frontier, and march upon Alexandropol, if not upon Tiflis.

On the 8th, however, the army of Mukhtar Pasha (with whom the English General Sir Arnold Kemball was associated as military representative of this country) received orders to fall back from the Kizil Tepe. The Turkish commander had heard of the arrival of fresh Russian reinforcements, and he deemed it prudent to concentrate his forces upon the older position on the Aladja Dagħ, instead of endeavouring to maintain the extended line which the capture of the Kizil Tepe had developed.

On the dark October night, therefore, the movement was sullenly made by the Mussulman army, with its accustomed confusion and lack of order. The retreat seems to have escaped the notice of the Russian outposts; but that is the only thing which can be said on behalf of the Turkish officers. An eye-witness declared that he had rarely seen "such utter confusion. No one seemed to know where the new position was. I met battalions stumbling about in the Cimmerian darkness of the mountain side, commanding officers demanding in vain whither they should conduct the men." And again, "I rode on up the slopes of Mount Aladja, meeting everywhere parties of troops and transport waggons, every one asking every one else where they were supposed to go. After three hours of weary search I resigned myself to destiny, and, dismounting from my horse, lay down on the scanty grass, crisp with hoar frost. I tried to sleep in vain—people stumbled over me in the dark. Bewildered sol-

diers roused me a hundred times to ask the way, and camels and mules groaned and grumbled around me all the livelong night. When dawn came stealing over the ghostly summit of Ararat, I looked around. Head-quarters were established half a mile off, but as yet no tents had been pitched. I found the marshal eating his breakfast outside his tent door. The staff-officers were wandering about looking for their tents, mislaid during the night. Mine was nowhere to be found, so I camped under shelter of a rock." For the army itself, this sort of work was not the best preparation for the anticipated attacks of the following days.

On the 9th, early in the morning, the Russians advanced; their object being probably no more than to test the strength of the Turks, and to make sure that they intended to defend the position which they had occupied. It is even possible that a more determined attack had been contemplated against the weaker Kizil Tepe position, and that the sudden concentration had baffled the plan.

But the assault was sufficiently determined, and gave the Turks a great deal of trouble, though it produced no overwhelming effect upon them. Seven squadrons of Cossacks had occupied the village of Subatan soon after dawn, and on a hill in front of the Turkish centre they planted a battery of eight guns. At eleven o'clock, "the Russian line," wrote a correspondent with the Turks, "had advanced close under our positions, and the eight guns at Subatan opened fire. We sent out three battalions in skirmishing order to check the advance. A battery of Krupps took up its position on a rocky knoll and replied to the Russian fire. About an hour after twelve o'clock noon, the infantry were engaged, and five Russian batteries added their fire to that first in action. The Russian batteries are of eight guns each, and the forty-eight pieces thus brought forward, formed in semicircle, literally deluged our advanced line with projectiles, especially directed against the Turkish batteries. Fortunately for the Turkish gunners, the enemy's fire was execrable. The

vast majority of the shells burst two or three hundred yards short or over. Now and then a shell burst almost on the Turkish guns, but these formed the exceptions. The musketry fire, extending over a line of about three miles, for nearly all our force was engaged at this hour, was violent in the extreme, especially on the Turkish side, where the soldiers plied their Martini-Peabody rifles with an absurd rapidity. The enemy's fire was much more deliberate, and I noticed their officers galloping to and fro to check any excessive outbreak of musketry fire which might occur. Long after sunset the scintillations of rifle-fire continued, emphasized by the broad gleam of the artillery.

"After much reflection I am still unable to make out since what was the object of this engagement. We had abandoned deliberately certain positions, and certainly we did not try to retake them. Neither did the Russians seem disposed to push their occupation farther up the Aladja. We lost nearly one thousand *hors de combat* on that day, and it was pitiable to see the state of the wounded. In the Turkish army here there is absolutely no provision made for carrying the wounded off the field. Those who can limp away struggle on often for hours seeking help, and those more severely hit often rest forty-eight hours on the field. I had been unable to find my tent, and was obliged to bivouac a second night on the hillside. All the evening long moaning crowds of wounded came issuing out of the darkness like troubled phantoms, asking feebly for the 'basta bane' (the ambulance). No one knew where it was, and the miserable sufferers went on groaning and complaining into the darkness. I afterwards discovered that the ambulances were just three miles away on our left flank. I venture to say that not one of those poor fellows found relief that night, and all of them must have passed the long cold night, like myself, freezing amid the rocks."

The Russians had, of course, established themselves on the Kizil Tepe without losing an hour, and from that position they were now able to



bombard its former possessors. On the 10th and following days they gradually drew their forces into a curve fronting and partly surrounding the Turks, especially on the sides of the Great Yagni, the river Arpa Tchai, and the town of Ani. Mukhtar Pacha made all his dispositions for a sturdy defence, and put to the best use in his power the few days' grace which his enemy allowed him. He apparently knew by this time that the Russians had been increased to a strength superior to his own; but, though he was unable to attack, he did not lose heart.

The Aladja Dag, on which the great battle of the campaign was fought, is thus described by a correspondent of the "Daily News" at the Turkish head-quarters:—"Aladja is a mountain 8,800 feet in height, its base of an elongate oval form, running east and west. The summit, of a conical form, is towards the south-eastern extremity of the oval. At the same point it throws out a large spur to the southward. Both the summit and this spur were strongly entrenched, and occupied by about eight or ten battalions and some batteries of field artillery. The bulk of the Turkish forces occupied the lower portions of the northern slope, and numbered from thirty-five to forty thousand regular troops. On the extreme right (east) is a flat-topped hill, named Lakiridgi Tepe, and on the left a similar one, Evliatepessi (the Awlis Hill), which, as will be seen later on, played an important part in the fighting. To the north of Aladja is an immense plain, the mouth of the Kars Valley. To the east of this plain are the isolated hills of Karajal, Kizil Tepe, and Utch Tepe, all three in the possession of the enemy at the commencement of the fighting. Towards Kars, that is westward, the plain is bounded by two hills, the greater and lesser Yagni. The greater Yagni is midway between Evliatepessi and the lesser Yagni, and, as I have already stated, was occupied by the Russians after our retrograde movement of the 8th instant. The other two hills were in our hands, and strongly entrenched. Continuing the line formed by these three hills, to the south of the western extremity of Aladja

are three similar isolated hills, one exactly opposite the long end of the Aladja oval. Then comes a large plain-like valley, and beyond, at some eight miles distance, a chain of mountains, gradually lessening in height towards Kars, and slightly oblique to Aladja."

The same correspondent's description of the battles of the 14th and 15th of October, and of the terrible rout which succeeded them, is a valuable contribution to the history of the war. He describes how, on the 14th, he had spent the earlier part of the day in "comparative tranquillity," scanning the great plain on which the Russian forces were deploying. "It was half-past two in the afternoon as, field-glass in hand, I strolled leisurely on the hill-crest above the ambulance. The eye ranged far and wide over a tract of plain on either side, which it would be a long day's journey to traverse. The boom of a gun from one of the mamelons to the south of Aladja attracted my attention. 'Some stray Cossacks,' I said to myself, and I turned my glass to the northern plain. Another boom, and another, and then the long rattle of musketry. This time my accustomed eye perceived the long white line of drifting vapour which nothing but constant practice could distinguish from the mist lines of these lofty hills. Another look, and slender creeping lines were visible on the distant slopes. Here was the explanation of the disappearance of the Russian reinforcements. The enemy, having made a long detour from the camp of Karajal, turning our right flank by Ani and Dighur, had marched parallel to the rear of our position, and were actually attacking the rear of our left flank. The marshal and his staff were already on the hill whence proceeded the cannonade. The Russians had occupied a lofty hill to the north-west, where they had placed a couple of batteries. Some Turkish battalions despatched across the valley were furiously assailing the flank of the enemy's line of march, and the latter were replying from their upper positions. It was easy to distinguish the lines of fire. The Turks, as usual, plied their Martini-Peabody rifles with

a zeal that streaked the hill with one snowy line of palpitating smoke. The Russians, as usual, fired with deliberation. I could almost count the rifle shots on their side, though the force they deployed was fully equal to that of the attack. The enemy's artillery was principally engaged shelling Turkish forces further on towards what turned out to be the objective point. Till near sunset the combat continued, the Russian columns still streaming onward, apparently heedless of the serried volleys and file-firing of their adversaries. The Turks, who it seemed numbered eight battalions, together with seven despatched from Bayazid, and three squadrons of irregular cavalry, finding themselves worsted, commenced retiring towards the extremity of the hill range next Kars. The sun set redly beyond the distant summits, and with its rays the fire of the combatants died out.

"The Russians had advanced half way from the higher hill whence they had commenced to the final conical hill which terminated abruptly in the flat valley. Mukhtar Pacha, deeming the day's fighting over, turned rein and rode with his staff over the long slopes leading to his head-quarters. I, too, was tired. I turned my horse to graze, and, lying down on the scant yellow grass, gazed on the scene of conflict. A quarter of an hour passed, and streaks of fire were seen issuing from the point to which the Russians had advanced. I couldn't make it out at first. Little by little these streaks increased in number, and the terminal hill seemed all ablaze with bursting projectiles. But there was no sound of artillery. The enemy was bombarding the position with Congreve rockets. The fire was so rapid that the sky was all ablaze. At least sixty per minute were discharged. To me they seemed to burst much too high to do any execution unless the heads were charged with bullets. Then I saw long lines of flickering fire go up the hill, parallel to the crest of flame that crowned the crest. Half a dozen times these fiery lines approached and recoiled. Then they mingled; then came a pause. Rocket and musketry fire ceased. I

judged that the Russians had taken the hill. Turkish officers laughed at me; told me the position was impregnable; but I retired to my tent with sad misgivings. I ordered everything to be packed, and the horses saddled for any contingency. I said to myself, if the enemy has captured that hill, they are between us and Kars, and to-morrow's dawn must see a desperate conflict. I couldn't sleep. I went to the tent of Dr. Casson, where he watched beside his sick colleague. We talked over the immediate prospects. He was very uneasy. I told him I believed a retreat was imminent, and that should the Russians have captured the terminal hill behind us, we should have to retreat on the morrow over a slender strip of ground swept by the enemy's fire. While we were speaking two battalions went by in the dark, followed by long trains of waggons. Then came artillery fourgons and pack mules, and long lines of baggage camels succeeded. It was a procession without end. Long into the night the cavalcade passed us by. It was evident a retreat had commenced, and yet no orders for the ambulance had arrived. Dr. Casson called up the officer attached to the ambulance, and sent him with his dragoman to head-quarters to know what should be done. In half an hour the man returned to say that the head-quarters had shifted its place under the incessant shell-fire of the two heavy guns in the plain, and that it now occupied the place of the commissariat department already retiring. Mules were being waited for to bear off the baggage of the officers, and then the staff would retire. Timely notice would be given. We waited on through the dreary hours of the night. No one could sleep, for it was evident a crisis was imminent. Night hung darkly over the long weird mountain slopes. Not a star was visible in the inky expanse above. All was still, save the faint jingling of the artillery horses going by, and when from time to time the thundering roll of the Russian heavy guns followed the lightning-like flash in the plain below, and the heavy shells went screaming hoarsely to Evliatepessi, and the former site of the staff.



"I had retired to my tent and sunk into an uneasy slumber. A thundering detonation roused me. A heavy shell had burst within twenty yards of my tent. I sprang to my feet and rushed from the tent. The white smoke was still curling upwards from the frosty turf, torn into a black circle by the shell. Another projectile whistled over my head and burst against the rocks beyond. Every one in the ambulance was astir. We were being deliberately shelled. Dr. Casson, half-dressed, was having his sick and wounded carried on litters higher up the mountain, out of range of the 16-centimetre projectiles. His colleague, the young volunteer doctor, was prostrate after the reaction of a severe typhoid attack. I had leaped to horse as the second projectile burst, and never shall I forget that poor feeble young man lying among the bare, bleak rocks in the grey mountain air, as I galloped by. If the Russians fired deliberately on the ambulance, it was a piece of atrocity. I can scarce believe it was so. For four days the ambulance was in the same place, and was respected, although well in range of the heavy guns. On the morning in question the ambulances were still in the same place, but the miniature flags against which I remonstrated the day before, hung heavily against the masts. It may be that the officers and gunners of the battery were relieved, and that the new comers were unaware of the nature of our camp. If otherwise, the thing was a piece of unparalleled barbarism.

"Seeing that the projectiles continued to fall within the ambulance, I rode hurriedly away to get out of range. Mukhtar Pacha, accompanied by General Sir Arnold Kemball, came sweeping by. I rode after them, and together we mounted the steep hill at the western extremity of Aladja. A battalion already occupied the heights, sheltering behind some scanty earthworks. The marshal sat under cover of a parapet and ate his frugal breakfast. Already in the plain below, to the east towards Subatan, the enemy was swarming in thousands, and still the heavy guns fired incessantly on Evliatepessi. Twenty times the ground on the top of this unfortunate hill

was ploughed up in a manner to render it difficult to understand how any troops could exist within the crowning redoubt. It was seven o'clock when the Russian attack developed itself. Some ten battalions were seen advancing between the two deep ravines which seam the plain. In advance came two batteries of eight guns each, a third in reserve. At half-past seven the artillery opened fire on Evliatepessi, the shells falling with an accuracy which contrasted strongly with previous artillery fire. The two heavy guns near Hadji Veli continued their terrible fire, each shell falling right in the middle of the redoubt. On Evliatepessi, an isolated hill blocking the road between the two ravines, the shells rained incessantly. Behind the Russian guns the attacking force opened out, and presently took the advance of the guns. At the same time another column, with one battery, passed between the assailed position and the greater Yagni Hill, attacking at right angles to the main force. At half-past nine the first musketry fire was heard, and from that moment the dull roar of small arms was continuous. The entire plateau on the summit of Evliatepessi was one cloud of dense white smoke, which reeled and palpitated with bursting shells and the fire of the three guns of the defence. Four battalions—some two thousand men—held the trenches below the crest. The Russian columns crept nearer and nearer, and the artillery was close enough to be under musketry fire. At last came a moment when the gradually lessening fire of the defence showed how fatally the Russian fire was telling. Mukhtar Pacha ordered up a battery from the rear to sweep the front of the hill with its fire.

"The critical moment had arrived. We had at least twenty battalions in the old positions and on the summits of Aladja. The hill attacked, Evliatepessi, commanded the line of retreat: this once lost, the forces on Aladja were cut off. Seeing the gradually lessening fire of Evliatepessi, and deeming its capture inevitable, as we had not a single battalion to send to its relief, I determined to leave the hill where the general and his staff were placed, and seek safer quarters.

I rode across the stony plain towards Sivritpete, a triple hill to the rear, strongly intrenched and armed with artillery. As I rode towards this point, I noticed that the enemy, from the positions in rear of our left, where they had established themselves on the preceding evening, were already firing on the road yet cumbered with waggons and mules. I turned to the right to get out of range of the shells, and there in the plain met an enormous crowd of Bashi-Bazouks on horseback, Circassians, Kurds, and Arabs. They were brandishing their lances, whirling their matchlock guns, and otherwise conducting themselves in a seemingly warlike manner. I halted among them on the ridge which divides the Kars plain at this point. At one o'clock the Russians carried Evliatepessi by assault, after four hours and a half of infantry combat. At this juncture the marshal left the hill on which he had stood since morning. Scarce five minutes elapsed after the capture of Evliatepessi, when the Russian field batteries, covered by a cloud of Cossacks, dashed forward between the captured position and the greater Yagni Hill. The fire of the two or three batteries thus brought into action swept obliquely the only line of retreat left to the Aladja troops; and at the same moment the Russians established in rear of our left flank opened fire. The line of retreat was all but impassable. Lingered convoys still struggled over the stony surface; and a couple of battalions, with a haste scarcely dignified, were making for Sivritepe. I must here state that through all the confusion which followed Mukhtar Pacha bore himself like a true soldier, retiring only when his soldiers left him no other choice. The irregular cavalry, principally composed of Arabs from Orfa and Aleppo, fled in disorder as the first shells burst over them, retiring *pêle-mêle* behind Sivritepe.

"At this juncture the Russians made a general advance in front by Evliatepessi, and on our right flank from the positions won on the preceding evening. There was no further resistance. The battalions occupying the forts on Sivritepe fled in disorder. As I looked on them

from a distance, I could scarcely believe it was infantry I saw in such a disordered crowd. I supposed for the moment the fugitives were spectators or else Bashi-Bazouks. A few minutes undeceived me. They were Nizams, the infantry of the line. Nearer and nearer advanced the Russian batteries in front and flank. I left the commanding ridge of the plain on which I stood, and made for our last position, the hill of Vezinkoi, not far from Kars. This is an isolated hill in the plain, and takes its name from a ruined Armenian village close under its brow. Here, around a large water reservoir, were accumulated the waggons, mules, and camels of the commissariat sent off the night before from Aladja. Some four thousand irregular cavalry and panic-stricken infantry were mixed up with the ox-waggons and camels. It was a scene of utter confusion. A reserve battalion of regular troops deployed in open order with fixed bayonets, prevented the runaways from flying to Kars. Nearer and nearer thundered the Russian guns, and each detonation thrilled the disorganised mass with terror. It was only by a stratagem I got through the blocking line of infantry. The road to Kars was cumbered with ox-waggons, baggage, mules, and what was supposed to be their escort. All were running at full speed. The oxen galloped like horses. The mules careered madly; and often when their burdens slipped from their backs, the frightened conductors went on, not daring to lose time in picking up their charge. The panic was complete. A mile farther on was a line of infantry with levelled rifles, threatening all runaways; and, as I myself saw, firing repeatedly on those who sought to get off by a side movement. It was with the greatest difficulty I got through this second line.

"As I neared Kars the guns of the lower forts were firing on bands of fugitive cavalry. At first I believed it was on adventurous Cossacks, and my belief was strengthened on seeing sabres flashing in the setting sun, plied amid the hurrying crowd. The idea crossed my mind that the confused column of fugitives had been assailed by the enemy's cavalry. My field-glass, how-



ever, showed me the red fezzes of the cavaliers, and I rode on a hundred paces, and was abreast with the cavalry. A revolver was thrust into my face, and I was commanded to turn again to the field of battle. It was the Colonel Hussein Bey who thus threatened me. He is a man of considerable animal courage, if I can believe the stories which reach me; but on this occasion he seemed to have lost his head altogether. 'Colonel,' I said in French, 'don't you know me? I am an Englishman and a newspaper correspondent.' 'I don't care who you are; it is perfectly equal to me,' he said; 'turn, or I blow your brains out.' A dozen bayonets were at my breast, as many soldiers struck my horse with their musket butts. Of course I turned. It was not a time for explanation. Still, I turned again, and remembering that Hussein Bey had received English hospitality for seven years, I added, 'Colonel, you will have reason to remember this. Your coward troops are flying before the Russians, and you wish to force me back into the panic-stricken crowd.' Same answer as before—and, knowing from hearsay the temper of the man, I said no more, but went on into the dire tumult where Kurd lancer and Arab cavalry were mixed together in hopeless confusion. An officer, a major, came dashing by, carrying despatches. He was one of Mukhtar Pacha's aides-de-camp. I appealed to him. A few explanatory words followed with the colonel. 'Pass English correspondent,' he said; 'one of those people who come to earn money in our country.' Some bitter words rose to my lips, but in view of the situation I held my tongue and rode on towards Kars. At the gate there was a double guard. 'No one enters here,' was the word. 'Where is the pacha?' I demanded furiously, utterly worn out with imbecile Turkish foolery. The word pacha is enough to bring most Moslems to their knees, and I was shown into a neighbouring fort, where a half-blind old man told me I might go. Colonel Hussein Bey, five minutes after our meeting, fled for his life. When he bullied me he had no idea the Russian battalions were so near.

"The confusion within Kars was indescribable. I believe that if the enemy had assaulted at that moment the town was his without the semblance of a struggle. A heavy slumber, consequent on the weary watching of preceding nights, followed. At dawn I was on foot. Patrols lined the narrow streets, seeking to collect the scattered soldiers. The marshal dared not show himself in the streets. Some even said he was killed."

What a contrast between this scene and the one which was presented when Mukhtar Pacha entered the town in triumph a day or two after the Russian defeat at Plevna!

The correspondent adds some interesting particulars in reference to the immediate results of the battle. He quitted Kars, not wishing to be shut up during the expected siege, and found himself that night at the village of Hadja Kaleh. "The poor Kurd villagers," he observes, "who, by the way, under other circumstances would have complacently cut one's throat, swarmed round me for protection and information. I was tired to death with my fourteen hours' ride, but I managed by the light of the blazing fire logs to indite the copy from which this letter is written. The pen had dropped from my hand; I was utterly overcome with weariness, when loud noises were heard outside. Every one was afoot grasping his arms. My impression was that we were surprised by the enemy's cavalry. I rushed towards the door. Judge of my surprise—I almost upset Mukhtar Pacha himself. Behind him stalked General Sir Arnold Kemball, as grave as usual. 'What, you here?' the marshal said. 'Your excellency,' I replied, 'I am a fugitive, before the bad weather and the fortune of war.' The night was glacial. A great fire of pine logs from the Soghanli Dagħ blazed on the primitive hearth.

"How strange was that night. Some cold meat was produced and a kettle of tea was made. A general silence pervaded the *oda*. No one wished to be the first to speak. It was the respect one naturally pays to misfortune. Mukhtar Pacha turned to me abruptly and said, 'What do you think of the enemy's artillery fire during

the battle? 'Excellency,' I said, and I felt a little shy about giving my true opinion, 'I think the Russian artillery fire was very good indeed.' 'Yes,' said the marshal, 'that was the grand point where they beat us. It was the old story of France and Prussia. Two days before the battle I sent spies into the Russian camp. They told me that one hundred and thirty young officers had arrived. I don't know to what nationality they belonged, but to them I attribute the excellence of the fire which beat us.' The marshal paused, and then with a smile he said to me, 'This is the second time you have seen me beaten. You remember Verbitza?' I certainly did remember Verbitza, in Herzegovina, when the Montenegrins almost destroyed the Turkish army. 'Excellency,' I ventured to ask, 'what may be our losses in the late fight?' The marshal replied immediately, 'We have lost twelve thousand prisoners; the total loss in killed and wounded I don't know.' Since then I have learned our losses. More than twelve thousand infantry prisoners, and five thousand killed and wounded. Twenty-five guns were captured,\* with seven pachas, named as follow:—Hadji Rechid Pacha, commanding 1st Division; Hassan Pacha, Chief of Staff; Omer Pacha, General of Division, 3rd Division; Shefket Pacha, commanding 2nd Division; Nadjeb Pacha, General of Brigade; Mustapha Pacha, Division General; Omer Pacha, Hungarian Brigade General. At early dawn we continued our dreary retreat over the dark mountain slopes, where the poor wearied soldiers had slept the whole night long amid the wet grass. Two thousand eight hundred men constituted the remnant of the army of Kars. Eleven thousand men had been left at Kars, with the few field pieces remaining; and we were retiring with what was left of the army in the field, dragging ten mountain guns over the muddy ways. I left Mukhtar Pacha with his scanty force on the slopes of the Soghanli Dag. He

seemed to hope to be able to effect a junction with Ismail Pacha coming from Bayazid."

All accounts combine to prove the personal gallantry of Mukhtar Pacha. Captain Norman, who represented the "Times" in Asia Minor, and who has published an interesting volume on "The Campaign in Armenia," describes him as collecting a few men on a hill near Vezinkoi, and covering the disgraceful flight of his army. It is true that he soon joined in the flight; but not until he found himself deserted by his troops.

Mehmed Pacha withstood the Russians still longer, holding the Little Yagni until late in the night. Then, perceiving that the battle was thoroughly lost, and that he was in danger of being surrounded and captured, he withdrew into Kars. Here he found Mukhtar Pacha and the commandant, Hussein Pacha, with their staffs, consulting as to the future. It was discovered that no more than thirteen thousand men could be reckoned upon as efficient; and as these were useless for the purpose of withstanding the Russian advance upon Kars, Mukhtar determined to leave ten thousand with Hussein, and to fall back with the other three thousand on the Soghanli Dag. Here he hoped to be joined by Ismail Pacha, who had crossed the frontier near Igdyr, and was now on Russian territory. He telegraphed to the Kurdish chief to this effect; and Ismail was not much surprised by the order, if his men were. A day or two previously the Ottoman troops had heard from the Russian camp a salute of one hundred and twenty-one guns, which were really fired to celebrate the victory of the Grand Duke Michael. But the Turkish commanders had no difficulty in making their men believe that there had been an insurrection in Russia, that the czar had been dethroned, and that General Tergoukasoff was rejoicing at the accession of the czarewitch.

Nevertheless on the 19th of October Ismail Pacha had to fall back, and at Kaprikoi, on the 27th, he effected a junction with Mukhtar Pacha. Tergoukasoff came after him in hot pursuit, and General Heimann, with two divisions, was on

\* The actual number of cannon lost in the battle of Aladja Dag was forty-two, out of a total of seventy-two. Captain Norman, however, puts the number lost at fifty-six.



the heels of the Turkish generalissimo. Thus the two Ottoman commanders were compelled to retire upon Deve Boyun (the camel's neck), which lies between Hassan Kaleh and the capital. "On the morning of the 29th," wrote a correspondent from Erzeroum, "the Russians were camped in the plain at the village of Khoradjuka, within cannon-shot of the guns of position in the Turkish redoubts. Only yesterday I counted their tents, and saw the Cossacks roving over the plain within three hours' march of Erzeroum."

The same writer describes the Turkish lines of defence round Erzeroum:—"After Kars and its position further east—those of Aladja, the scene of the terrible fighting and defeat on the 15th—come three distinct positions, where an army can make head against considerably superior forces—Khorumdusi (the scene of Mukhtar's victory), a plateau adjoining the village of Zevin, and two long days' march from Erzeroum, the lines of Kuprikoi, commanding the junction of the Bayazid, Kars, and Erzeroum roads, and the Deve Boyun heights covering the last pass leading to the capital of Armenia. We were driven from Aladja; we fled past Khorumdusi, and we abandoned Kuprikoi for want of sufficient men to defend it. The enemy is at the very gates of Erzeroum. Deve Boyun once lost, Erzeroum must soon go with it. The population of the town, Mussulmans as well as Christians, say plainly they don't want a bombardment, and will make no defence. The army, such as it is, some fifteen thousand demoralised soldiers, with a crowd of motley Bashi-Bazouks from Bayazid and Toprakaleh, cannot shut itself up here. That would be to leave the whole of Armenia in the invaders' hands, and to entail its own inevitable surrender. Hence the energy with which the all important pass is being fortified. The one spare field battery has been sent from Erzeroum, and is being distributed among the different redoubts. Some batteries of mountain guns make a fair show at advanced points, and the hill-sides are being furrowed with intrenchments. The pass of Deve Boyun is a narrow

valley, leading due east from Erzeroum to the wide plain of Hassan Kaleh, the latter an old-fashioned Turkish town, near which are the fountains of the Araxes. The pass is skirted by rounded hills, and near its eastern extremity is crossed by a ridge which constitutes the second line of defence. Then comes a deep, precipitous ravine, and immediately beyond another ridge. On this is situated the headquarters of the army. It is the link between the hills which form the first and principal lines. Opposite its centre, slightly to the left, is a long hill, crowned by a steeply bounded plateau, narrow like the hill itself. It is strongly intrenched, and forms the centre of the defence. To its right are two conical hills, somewhat oblique to the front, on which are two redoubts, armed with guns of position, and occupied by several battalions. To the left of the long hill is a rounded mamelon, projecting spur-like from the lofty mountains which fringe the plain. From this mamelon long trenches extend further east, intended to secure our left flank. In front of all run two rivulets, which, uniting, form one of the tributaries of the Araxes. In case of need, a large portion of the front could be inundated by blocking the course of these streams. From every point of view the line is exceedingly strong, and, unless I am much mistaken, the Russians will not try to carry it by direct attack. But it has its weak points, which, to my mind, are fatal. To the north is the valley of Olti, parallel to the pass; to the south, another similar valley coming from the direction of Bayazid, and both debouching into the plain before Erzeroum. These valleys are separated from the plain of Hassan Kaleh by lofty mountains, at this season heavily covered with snow. By either of the valleys the enemy can turn the formidable barrier in their path; and our latest intelligence informs us that they are doing so. During my visit to the positions of Deve Boyun yesterday, I had a conversation with Faizi Pacha, chief of the staff. He admitted the danger of the situation, while informing me that both these avenues of attack were occupied by our troops. 'We hope too' he said, 'to be able to







link these forces on our flank with the centre.' I am afraid, however, that the scanty Turkish army, fronted as it is by a formidable Russian force camped within cannon-shot on the plain in front, can scarcely afford the necessary troops to guard the lateral avenues. Conscious of this weakness, we are taking measures to inundate the opening of the Olti valley at a point close to the city named Giurji Boghas, close to the village of Hindsk. The Cossacks, coming by way of Olti and Nahrman, are already reported within view of these new defences. Then again, there is the road leading from the Olti valley to Baiburt, by which, without the necessity of striking a blow, the enemy can cut our communications with Trebizond and the Black Sea coast. It is probably with a view of hindering this movement, for which a few squadrons of cavalry alone would suffice, that the long-promised reinforcements, if they really exist, have, as we are told, arrested their march at Baiburt. Meantime, with our fourteen or fifteen thousand men, the sum of the united fragments of Mukhtar's and Ismail's armies, we await our fate."

The Deve Boyun position was strongly defended by Faizi Pacha (a German renegade, originally named Kohlmann), and he succeeded in making it strong enough to give the Russians a good deal of trouble. Nevertheless General Heimann, who had been joined by the forces of General Tergoukasoff, the hero of Bayazid, attacked it on the 4th of November, and carried it by assault after nine hours' fighting.

From this time forward the record of the war assumes additional features of interest, inasmuch as most of the battles and sieges were carried on amidst the snows of winter. Most of the critics had taken it for granted that a sort of truce would be established during the severest months of the season; but this was not the idea of the Russians, as will presently appear.

The attack on Deve Boyun, and the danger of Erzeroum, are described by the correspondent already quoted. Writing from the capital on the 5th day of November, he says:—"The

third and last barrier has been passed, and at the moment I write the Russian siege guns are being pointed on the town. We have been summoned to surrender, and Mukhtar Pacha's reply, as I telegraph to-night, is that he will defend the town while a single man remains. The Russians, following up the disastrous retreat from Kars, had camped in the plain of Hassan Kaleh, at the village of Khoredjuka, about an hour and a quarter from the Turkish positions at Deve Boyun. At this last mentioned point the mountains girding the Hassan Kaleh plain on the north and south close in, forming a narrow pass leading to Erzeroum immediately beyond. From its peculiar form, and the curve which it describes, it has been named the 'Camel's Neck.' Its eastern entrance is guarded by three military positions, which on the occasion of the battle constituted our centre, right, and left. The centre is a long hill crowned by a narrow plateau strongly intrenched, and was defended by sixteen field-guns. The right, at the other side of a shallow valley, giving access to the pass, consisted of two conical hills, one dominating the other; behind them obliquely were two other mamelons occupied militarily. The right was commanded by Ismail Pacha, Vali of Erzeroum, and for some time past commanding the army corps of the right at Bayazid. The left of the position of Deve Boyun consisted of a rounded hill, a spur thrown off by the higher mountains on that side. It was crowned by a redoubt, and lines of trenches stretched further west along the slopes of the adjoining hills. Thus the position, slightly concave towards the front, commanded all access to the pass. Its entire length was some three hours' march. To defend it we had an army of about fifteen thousand men. This consisted of two thousand eight hundred men, the remnant of the army of Kars, which accompanied Mukhtar Pacha in his flight from that town; of one thousand five hundred picked up at Kuprikoi; of four thousand five hundred from Ismail Pacha's army, retiring from Bayazid; of stragglers who came up; of troops from the garrison, and of four battalions from Trebizond. Faizi Pacha,



an old Hungarian officer, and chief of the staff, worked hard at the defences.

"It was believed that the Russians would never dare attack in front the tremendous heights which fronted them. Our only care was the guarding of the valleys by which our flank could be turned. The Russians, with a rare ability, seem to have calculated on the general situation, the demoralised condition of the army, and the want of artillery which must necessarily have followed the capture of the forty-two guns at the battle of Aladja, took the bull by the horns and stormed the position. The French courier coming from Persia had passed through the Russian lines on the previous evening, and had brought word that the whole of the Russian generals were present, and with them the French military attaché, General de Courcey. This led us to imagine that something serious was pending, but all the same we never dreamt of the audacious *coup* in store for us. Bashi-Bazouks and Arabs from Orfa and Aleppo flaunted their tawdry rags in the muddy streets of Erzeroum, and universal confidence reigned throughout the town. At last the day of combat arrived. On Sunday, November 4th, the Russians launched their entire force against Deve Boyun. This consisted of forty-eight battalions. (I give the statement of Mukhtar Pacha, commanding-in-chief the Turkish army.) Between eight and nine in the morning the long dark Russian lines were seen opening out in the wide dim plain that stretches away to Hassan Kaleh. The Russians are so given to an almost perpetual military movement that not much attention was attracted by the long lines of infantry in the plain. I had seen the same thing so often from the heights of Aladja that I turned away my field glass, convinced that it was only a Sunday parade. Later on I found out my mistake. Gradually the long black parallel lines crept closer, so quietly that if one were not observing attentively, the shortening of the distance might pass for optical illusion. But the Turkish gunners had more accustomed eyes, and the long white curdled smoke-cloud that breaks from the central

battery announces that the fight has begun. Gun after gun puffs out without any apparent impression on the menacing lines. In fact, they are at long range, and at best Turkish artillery fire is far from excellent. Not so the enemy's artillery fire. Shell after shell is planted in our midst with a precision which recalls the battle of Aladja. 'I don't believe,' said one old Moslem officer at my side, 'that Russian officers direct those guns; they are English, or they are Prussian.' I had seen the changed character of the artillery fire when the Russians drove us from before Kars backwards on the Soghanli Dag. The marshal himself, Mukhtar Pacha, called my attention to this extreme accuracy of fire, as he had done on a former occasion when the Russians stormed Evliatepessi hill. An attack on the centre seems evident, but yet the Turks make no movement. Every one is at his post, and an ominous silence broods along the line, save when from the right the heavy guns thunder out at intervals. Suddenly the Russians open right and left, directing their dividing forces outside our extreme flanks; on one side towards the glens leading to the valley of Olti; on the other to the flank of the mountains south of Erzeroum. A stubborn resistance follows, for the Turks have had time to march battalions to the threatened points. All day long the dull roar of musketry reached us from the lateral valleys. On the left, Mehemet Ali Pacha, the bravest soldier in the army of Anatolia, holds his ground. At the centre, Moussa Pacha, a Circassian chief, commands; on the right, two Pachas have already fallen, Rufat Pacha and Hakif Pacha. Hussein Pacha, the old artillery commander, takes their place, and the fight goes on. It is evident the Russians are getting the worst of it, for their fire begins to recoil along the dun hill slopes on both right and left flank. I believe it was a Turkish victory, and that we were sure of at least a month's fighting before Erzeroum could be even menaced.

"It was three o'clock in the afternoon when we saw the enemy on both flanks retiring, to rally out of cannon-shot of our positions. Dur-

ing the side attacks the Russian artillery was hard pried, and of eighteen guns at our centre fourteen were dismounted or useless. Then a sudden inspiration seemed to seize the Russian general. His rallied battalions were hurled against the long hill which formed our left centre. Arrived at its base, a steep slope screens the assaulting columns from the fire of the defenders. Russian reserves are pouring steadily forward. The artillery of the attack continues its deadly fire. The Turks on the long hill waver—they fly. The Russians are already on the plateau. Mukhtar Pacha, with several battalions, dashes at once to the critical point. Too late! The officers of the battalions fall dead, and flight ensues. The centre is carried. ‘I remained there,’ said the marshal to me afterwards; ‘I wished to die.’ But people came round him, and he was carried away. Then came a hurried retreat on Erzeroum. The darkness only saved the army from annihilation or capture. We lost forty-two field-guns and pieces of position, and about four thousand five hundred men killed, wounded, and prisoners. The marshal himself admits one thousand killed. We are for the moment blocked in Erzeroum. To the Russian summons to surrender, the marshal, after demanding twenty-four hours’ grace, replied that while a stone of the fortress remained erect he would hold Erzeroum. We have twelve thousand troops in garrison, much provisions, and plenty of ammunition.”

Erzeroum, as it appeared was too hard a nut for the Russians to crack, as we shall find hereafter. It was not destined to be captured during the war; but Kars, a much stronger place, fell into the hands of its besiegers with astonishing ease. A separate chapter may be devoted to the second siege and fall of this famous fortress.

Whilst General Heimann and his colleagues had been sent in pursuit of the Turks to Erzeroum, the Grand Duke Michael had remained with the principal Russian forces at Kuruk Dere. After permitting the men to rest, and sending the sick and wounded back to the frontier, to

Alexandropol, or even to Tiflis, and having ordered up the siege train from the rear, he set himself to renew the siege of the fortress which Russia has so long and so earnestly coveted.

The attack was to be made on the fortress from the east and south. At Magardjik and Vezinkoi, General Lazareff was ordered to prepare the batteries; whilst the Grand Duke took up his quarters at Vairan Kaleh, which, as Cap-Norman reminds us,\* Mouravieff had selected in 1855. It was on the 10th of November that the Russians occupied this position; and whilst they were on the march the Turkish commander made a sudden sortie, and took them in flank.

But Melikoff, who was in charge of the Russians, rallied his men and drove Hussein Pacha back. So gallantly was this counter-charge made that the Russians were actually able to enter the Hafiz Pacha fort. If they had had support from other divisions, they might have held the place; and as it was they dismounted the guns and removed their breech-pieces. But they had not intended an assault, and were consequently not ready to follow up their unexpected advantage. They therefore withdrew; and on the following day the grand duke sent a *parlementaire* to demand the surrender of Kars. To this Hussein Pacha returned a defiant answer; and on the 12th, the batteries having been erected and the siege trains prepared, the bombardment of the fortress began.

Six months before, the Russians had attacked Kars from the north, contrary to the precedents set by Paskiewitch and Mouravieff, who had both succeeded in taking the place. They now approached it on its weakest side, directing their bombardment on the south-eastern forts. The Hafiz Pacha was soon silenced, and it was conjectured that the new guns, brought up to supply the place of those destroyed by the Russians, had quickly become unserviceable.

On the 17th of November the grand duke, assembling a council of war, resolved to deliver the assault without further delay. “The small-

\* The Campaign in Armenia, p. 410.



ness of the garrison," says Captain Norman, "the large extent of front, with scarcely a man available for every three yards of parapet, the state of demoralisation to which the men had been reduced since the recent defeats, the fact that typhoid fever was raging inside the city, and that there was dissension amongst the Turkish generals, were quite sufficient reasons to induce the grand duke to attempt an assault."

The besiegers were divided into three storming columns, numbering forty-four battalions or over twenty-six thousand men. A hundred and fifty-four field guns surrounded the fortress, and were brought into play by the assailants. There was no great difficulty about the assault, for Hussein Pacha was quite outnumbered, and could hardly have held the place if he had been a thoroughly competent general.\* General Lazareff took the Hafiz Pacha fort at once, and others were captured soon afterwards. The most formidable defence seems to have been made at the Khanli Tabia, held by Anatolian regulars. Here the young and unfortunate Count Grabbe was killed by a Turkish bullet, and "more than one attack was hurled back with heavy slaughter." Nevertheless it was taken; and by the middle of the day (Sunday, Nov. 18) the whole place was in the hands of the Russians.

Such are the bare facts. The reader will probably like to have a more detailed account from an eye-witness, both of the capture itself, and of the weeks immediately preceding it. A correspondent with the Russians, writing to the "Daily News" on the 28th of October, describes a journey which he had made to the battle-fields in the middle of the month, and to the heights of

Vezinkoi. "Here a camp was established belonging to a brigade ordered to invest Kars on this side. The plateau behind, and the rocky conical hill close by, vomited no more iron and lead from their numerous intrenchments, which one by one had been stormed with irresistible pluck on the 15th inst. On examining those formidable positions I could not help thinking that if the Turks had shown their ordinary stubbornness it would have been doubtful whether the Russians, with their comparatively small attacking forces, could have carried the day. As I am well acquainted with the environs of Plevna, I can say that there was a more difficult piece of work to be achieved than on those soft, sloping hills. Stupid pride had ruffled Ghazi Mukhtar, or he would have retired from his useless position on the Aladja, from which winter would have driven him anyhow, and would have kept the plateaux of Vezinkoi only, with a firm hold on Kars. He might still have been the Ghazi, whom he is no longer but in name. In fact, the Turks were demoralised by the belief current among them that they were surrounded by a force of one hundred thousand men. In magnifying thus their enemy's numbers they fought with a faint heart, and ran much quicker than they ought. Their wounded and dead cannot be therefore so very numerous as was at first supposed, and several of the gallant cavalry charges mentioned in the official report, especially those on the troops retreating from the Little Yagni, did not at all bear the epic character attributed to them. As to the number of prisoners, either at first gross exaggeration was indulged in by the staff officers, or most of the captured Turks ran away again, hidden by the darkness. Now it is avowed that only seven thousand were taken alive. Vezinkoi had some thirty Greek families among its population. These descendants of Xenophon's deserted or captured soldiers, perhaps, were driven away by their Turkish fellow-citizens some months ago, and their houses destroyed. We rested here but a few hours, waiting for the carts, and then moved on again over the hills and table-land

\* Capt. Norman says:—"It is worthy of note that Sabri Pacha, commandant at Ardahan, and Hami (Hussein) Pacha, commandant of Kars, both served under Mukhtar Pasha in Montenegro; that they were at his request removed from their commands for incompetence during the campaign of 1876; that when he succeeded to the charge of the fourth Army Corps, he found these two most worthless gentlemen in command of the two chief fortresses in Asia; that both should have unsuccessfully defended their trusts, and that both should have escaped scatheless!"

bordering the plains of Kars, some one thousand feet below. That fortress, looming at the foot of the opposite range of mountains, was rendered conspicuous by the sunlight, which had managed to pierce the heavy clouds. The town has a semi-amphitheatrical site between two spurs, on the slopes of which the cubiform black houses are clustered. The difficulty of attacking it in a regular way consists chiefly in the rocky ground before the forts, which does not permit sapping, unless with sandbags."

Again, the same correspondent mentioned that the commandant of Kars had been summoned to surrender, and had refused. "Before the garrison rejected the Russian proposal a Turkish colonel of artillery, a certain Hussein Bey, who had been trained for eight years at Woolwich, visited, with his aide-de-camp, our headquarters, and was politely received. His object, however, was not to sign a capitulation, but only to obtain as much information as possible about our strength and doings. The blockade of Kars is a very effective one. Some Turks tried to get through our lines, but the endeavour was frustrated by vigilant Cossacks. The day before yesterday two English doctors, too, one of whom had just recovered from typhoid fever, were escorted to our camp. On the eve of being shut up for perhaps many months in Kars, they thought it practicable to proceed under a flag of truce to Erzeroum, where they had left their *dépôt*, baggage, and two of their colleagues. The Russian outposts, of course, stopped them and conducted them to our headquarters. Here they presented their passports, and expressed the desire to return home. In compliance with this reasonable request they were guarded, and then conveyed to Tiflis at the expense of the Russian government. They were very civilly treated here by the officers. Some, however, gave expression to a certain bitterness of feeling, complaining of the English public having sent scores of Red Cross expeditions to the murderous Turks, but none to Russia. I explained that the barbarous and miserably provided Turks were more in need of medical attendance than the

well-organised and civilised Russians. The fact is, that every Cossack here is better clad, fed, paid, and attended to, than any Turkish captain. Our three long rifled 24-pounders bombard slowly the city of Kars at a very respectable distance, which renders an answer impossible."

By the beginning of November, the investment of Kars had been rendered complete, and no one was able to pass through the Russian lines. The bombardment then began, with the result which has already been described. The news of the fall of Kars was received in England, and throughout Europe generally, with considerable surprise, for the fortress was expected to hold out much longer.

The earliest account, with any approach to details, was contained in a telegram forwarded to the "Daily News" by the correspondent above quoted. In the evening of November the 18th he telegraphed as follows:—

"Kars is ours. In a single night it fell into the hands of about fifteen thousand Russians, who with irresistible courage climbed the steep rocks, the ramparts and walls, and drove an equal number of desperately fighting Turks in a headlong flight over their ditches and parapets, compelling them to die or surrender. All the nice inferences drawn as to the impossibility of storming even small intrenchments defended by breechloaders have proved to be incorrect. The nine forts of Kars, its citadel, and numerous batteries and redoubts, did not withstand a single night the onslaught of spirited young troops, for so at least were the Moscow Grenadiers and the 40th Division.

"Such an important event cannot, of course, be described at once in all its particulars, and especially by a fatigued correspondent, with his fingers as cold and stiff as icicles. The escalade had been originally fixed for the 13th instant, but was postponed owing to the bad weather until last night. In deep secrecy the columns assumed their appointed positions. General Lazereff, with the 40th Division, commanded the right wing, and attacked the Hafiz Pacha fort, crowning a steep rocky height. General Count



Grabbe, with a regiment of Moscow Grenadiers and a regiment of the 39th Division, assailed in the centre the Khanli Tabia, Suwarri Tabia, the towers, and the citadel, while the Ardahan brigade and another regiment of Moscow Grenadiers, under Generals Roop and Komaroff, assailed positions further to the left at half-past eight o'clock yesterday evening.

"The engagement began in the centre. The chivalrous Count Grabbe led the foremost of his brigade in storming Khanli Tabia, and fell dead, pierced by a bullet. Captain Kwadmicki, of the 39th regiment, jumped first on the too short ladder, and entered the terrible redoubt at 11. His sword was clean cut out of his hand, and his clothes pierced. Hoaeane, a large massive redoubt, surrendered early in the morning, then the three towers. The citadel and fort Suwarri were carried at the same time as the fort Khanli. Hafiz Pacha fort was taken, and in the morning Karadagh. The other forts, especially Tekmash and Arab Tabia resisted till eight this morning; forty battalions fled towards Erzeroum, but were overtaken by dragoons and the Orenburg Cosacks, when they laid down their arms, and were brought back as prisoners.

"The whole fortress and city, with three hundred cannons, stores, ammunition, hard cash, &c., fell almost intact into our hands. The Turks lost five thousand killed and wounded, and ten thousand prisoners, and many flags. The Russian loss was about two thousand seven hundred. The soldiers made but a trifling booty, and spared peaceful citizens, women, and children. This I state as an eye-witness. General Loris Melikoff directed the battle throughout. The Grand Duke was present also. The former entered the town at 11 o'clock to-day."

A few of the facts here mentioned require to be modified by other accounts. According to Captain Norman the whole garrison of the place numbered twelve thousand; the number of guns taken was two hundred and fifty-seven siege pieces and sixty field pieces. But the moral effect of the victory was even more important than the material. The retreat of Mukhtar Pacha under

such circumstances meant the entire failure of the campaign. Victory remained with the winner of the last round.

## CHAPTER XXXII.

### THE LAST LULL IN BULGARIA.

THE failure of Mehemet Ali to break through the lines of the czarewitch, and advance across the country to the relief of Plevna, was considered at Constantinople as a proof of his incapacity rather than an evidence of the insufficiency of his resources. He was continually urged by the Seraskierate to assume the offensive against the Russians, although it was perfectly well known that he had only forty thousand men at his command, whilst the czarewitch could at any time draw reinforcements from his rear.

The fact was that both armies on the Lom were weak, and neither general would have been justified in attacking. In the beginning of September the czarewitch had extended his line from Elena to Cairkoi, unnecessarily weakening himself. The only way in which he could safely maintain his position was by drawing off a division from the neighbourhood of Plevna; and General Shahoffsky was at one time under orders to join him. But it was thought better to countermand this movement; and the czarewitch fell back. It was then that Mehemet Ali pressed on his enemy, and quickened his retreat at Popkoi and Kaceljevo. The Turks made the most of these supposed victories; but the authorities in the capital still pressed the general to attack. Mehemet Ali had no choice between obeying and retiring; and indeed he knew that to obey meant, in all probability, failure and disgrace. However, he assumed the offensive on the 21st of September, giving battle to the Russians at Cairkoi; and, being repulsed, he himself fell back at the end of the same month. He re-crossed the river Lom, and took up his position at Kaceljevo, whilst the Russians occupied the left bank of the stream.

The Turkish loss at Cairkoi was reckoned at three thousand; and Mehemet Ali had now lost nearly ten thousand men *hors de combat* within a month. It is clear that no good general under these circumstances could have been justified in throwing away the lives of his troops by maintaining a hopeless position. Early in October he fell back still further. On the 4th of that month a correspondent with the czarewitch wrote:—"The whole Turkish army has in three days completely vanished from before us. On Monday the Cossacks found the camps about Sinankoi deserted, and the enemy completely withdrawn from the territory between the Banicka Lom and the Lom. On Tuesday morning at five o'clock, the great camps about Kaceljevo, where the enemy was discovered strongly fortified and concentrated from positions on either side held the day before, were quiet, and to all appearances no movement was meditated. Two hours later not a soldier was visible, only a few Circassian outposts and Bashi-Bazouks. In the afternoon the whole army paraded along the road leading over the hill to Kadikoi, with music playing, drums beating, and colours flying in full sight of the Russian outposts. They left strongly entrenched positions directly along the east bank of the Lom from Kadikoi southward to Popkoi, evacuating the heights still farther south around the village of Cerkovna, where the battle took place ten days ago, and leaving every foot of the ground which they have occupied during the past month. They posted themselves somewhere to the eastward, as much lost to the Russians as if they were a hundred miles away. It is a curious, if not a ridiculous system of warfare where the outpost and scouting service is conducted with so little enterprise that a force of twenty thousand of the enemy can disappear and be entirely lost for several days, when they have, in reality, only retired a few miles, and have posted themselves in new positions like the old one. This is, nevertheless, an event of very common occurrence with the Rustchuk armies, and sometimes during several days neither force will feel the other.

The conformation of the ground is well adapted to the easy concealment of small camps, and even of the movements of troops, for the country is undulating, and everywhere there are large tracts of a small growth of oak trees, crossed by frequent paths, and practicable for cavalry and light artillery.

"I have just returned to Kara Verbovka from a reconnaissance made to discover the whereabouts of the enemy. This is a village situated on the Lom, nearly opposite Kaceljevo, which occupies a narrow little valley half a mile east of the river. For two days this has been neutral ground, and small bands of Turkish marauders have been scouring the valley for meagre plunder. With a small force of cavalry under the command of Prince Manueloff and Baron Kaulbars, we left the village, where we had assembled under cover of a dense mist, and defiled into the green valley of the Lom. A cold rain, which had drenched us all night, continued at intervals as we began our march, and the fog gradually disappeared as we descended the slope, disclosing the whole landscape, the hillsides across the valley, and the dotted rows of straw huts which the Turks built wherever they pass a day. Not a living thing was visible in the valley, not a sign was there of an occupied camp. A regiment of hussars was sent along the road to Opaka and Polomarca, while Cossacks and lancers took possession of the village of Kaceljevo and surrounding heights. Two Bashi-Bazouks were captured, who reported that the enemy were thirty-five thousand strong in the immediate vicinity of Kaceljevo. Therefore we proceeded with some caution. Arriving at the summit of a hill to the east of the village, we found strong batteries, freshly made; an outpost camp just deserted, with garments and utensils left behind in hasty flight; and still farther on a large deserted camp, with artillery hid in the bushes.

"Two miles beyond the village we came out on an open field, and there lay before us a panorama of the whole Turkish encampment miles away, extending along the farther side of the valley on the east branch of the Lom, around



Solenik and Kostankza, in front of Pizanca, Tur-lak and Esirdje. We could count seven distinct camps, with great droves of cattle feeding on the adjacent hillsides, and far away on the horizon two or three isolated rows of large square tents. There seemed to be very little artillery, but considerable regular cavalry, and a force of perhaps fifteen thousand infantry, who were mostly Egyptians. From the hill, and just across a valley separating us from the Turkish camp, could be seen, lying flat in the furze, a strong detachment of infantry ready to welcome us. A few Cossacks dashed down into the valley and exchanged some shots with the outposts. The cattle were hurriedly driven away as the lances of our three squadrons bristled on the hill-top, and there was a stir of preparation visible in the camps, but we only looked on until dusk, and then retired."

It was in such desultory work as this that the army of the czarewitch spent most of its time; but before the middle of October it learned that Mehemet Ali had been recalled and Suleiman Pacha appointed in his place. The Russians now expected warmer work; for the hero of the Duga and Schipka Passes had acquired a wide fame for his impetuosity.

Various opinions were expressed about the policy of this change; and a correspondent of the "Daily News" gives us an epitome of the criticisms passed in Constantinople, both on this and on other points connected with the conduct of the war. Writing on the 7th of October, he says:—"Every one has been trying to guess the reason why Suleiman Pasha is thus honoured. That Mehemet Ali would be removed has been considered probable for several days. He has not shown himself specially active, nor displayed remarkable military ability, and no doubt failed signally in the action of the 21st ult. Above all he is of Giaour origin; and unless he could have been uniformly successful, he was pretty sure to arouse the jealousy of the generals under him. But that Suleiman should be his successor is difficult to understand.

"Suleiman is not a coward, nor is he destitute

of energy. But his previous services are not of a kind one would have thought to warrant his promotion to the most important post in the Turkish army. In Montenegro he showed himself altogether incapable of defeating an army much smaller than his own. When he was recalled, and sent to oppose General Gourko, he pushed on rapidly to the front, and made the successive attempts to force the Schipka Pass, which your readers know so well. But both in Montenegro and in the Schipka his one great rule in war seems to have been to pound away at whatever opposed him, whether an army or a stone wall. If the war between Russia and Turkey is to be conducted on the pounding principle, and each party is ready to sacrifice any number of men, provided that the enemy can be made to lose at least an equal number, there can be little doubt, I fancy, which army will soonest be exhausted. In Montenegro and at the Schipka, Suleiman can hardly have lost less than forty-thousand men, and these beyond a doubt among the best soldiers which the Sultan possesses—war, in fact, under him, has been mere butchery.

"Notwithstanding the successes of the Turks at Plevna, the depression in the capital during the past fortnight has been very great. It is noticed as a significant fact, that Turkish consolidés have fallen whenever there has been a report of a Turkish victory, and have risen when, on the contrary, the telegraph has given us news of a Turkish defeat. It is not merely that the Christians of the capital—Greeks, Armenians, and Bulgarians alike—have no stomach for the war, that was to be expected; nor is it only that the stoppage of commerce with Russia has put an end to the Black Sea trade, upon which a considerable portion of the population of the capital lives; that the increased taxes upon an impoverished people have brought thousands to the verge of starvation; that the large mass of government officials—most of whom are Turks—have been unpaid for months, and have had all of them to submit to very large reductions in their salaries; that the issue of caimé, or paper money, has reduced the earnings of boatmen,

porters, and day-labourers generally to nearly half what it was before the war; and that native merchants, as well as foreigners, can get no money out of the government for goods which they have supplied. These are the incidents, in great part the natural incidents of war; and, providing the war should be successful, would be borne usually by a people as inevitable ills worth bearing for the sake of the benefits which were to be derived from the struggle. But among the Turks themselves there is the feeling that the war, beyond preventing their immediate destruction, or causing a diminution of their territory, can only be disastrous. As one of the most thoughtful among the Turks said a few days ago:—"We know that Europe will never allow us to increase our territory, no matter what our success. Servia, Roumania, Montenegro, and Greece, can never again be added to Turkey, be our success what it may. The struggle, too, is between us and the rest of the inhabitants of the empire. We have to supply all the fighting men; and the thousands who have already been killed are a terrible drain on the fighting population of the empire."

The same correspondent quoted a letter written to a Constantinople newspaper—the "Stamboul"—by one Ali Suavi, a fanatical Turk, who subsequently, in the year 1878, attempted to set Murad on the throne again, and was killed in the disturbance.

Ali Suavi was no friend to England, and his letter will be read with amusement. "All my appreciations of European policy," wrote this madman, "may be summed up in the following words:—"The source of every political evil, of every crime, is the English government. . . . In Europe there is no policy, there is no humanity. These words I have not taken from any book, nor from the newspapers. I have studied events, and it is events themselves that have inspired me. Neither must it be believed that I thus express myself against my friends who are in Europe, and who can have no knowledge of what I write. While I was in Europe I told them, 'You don't know; you don't understand.' Many

men read, but few understand. Find me ten men able to understand, and all the difficulties will disappear. To make the English understand their ignorance would benefit everybody, but especially the Ottomans. This is why I don't give up my correspondence with Englishmen. They say, 'England ought to help us; she has not done so, and she will not do so.' What do these words mean? Where is England, and what is she? I have studied England; therefore I know well that all the evils from which the world suffers come from the English government. I believe that if England reforms herself the world will equally reform itself. If the English, cause of every ill, were really bad people, I would not trouble about them; they are good enough; but the reason why they are the tools of Russia is ignorance. England cannot make war, for she possesses nothing. England possesses altogether twelve thousand cavalry; she has only six thousand horses. England does not possess more than fifty ironclads; seven only can make war. Her mines of coal and of iron, &c., are used up. The manufactories of England are cut out by those of Brussels. England is henceforth a porter (hamal), who, in order to live, must carry goods and merchandise from one to another. Why has England fallen so low? England has plunged herself into the abyss of debt in order to aggrandise Russia. England has attempted the dismemberment of Turkey and of three other states in favour of Russia and of herself. England had undergone very material losses. The knowledge which I possess upon these attempts is drawn from English official documents. If these documents had attracted your attention you would have comprehended too. These documents are printed, but you and the English don't understand. If ignorance were blotted out from England the blood of thousands of men, leaving thousands of orphans and widows, would not have been shed, and milliards would not have been added to the national debt. . . . It is necessary to say that our conduct, if it does service to the Ottoman empire, will also render service to the rest



of the world—that is to say, with our wish to put the whole world in order. . . . There are Englishmen who work with us. In consequence, and in order to make you understand what I have said in the beginning of my letter—to wit, that every evil springs from England, and that if she does not take care she will end by ruining herself, both to the profit of Russia, and in order to show the ignorance of those who lend their ears to her declarations—I intend to give lectures, as I have already done, at Galata Serai.”

The Turks certainly had no lack of advisers throughout the war, some of whom counselled them to place their whole confidence in England, whilst some bade them trust entirely to themselves. It would have been better for them if they had adhered to one or other of these two courses.

Before we proceed to describe the capture of Plevna, we may turn aside to take another glance at the doing of the fleets—or rather at the doing of the Turkish fleet and the few Russian vessels which ventured afloat in the Black Sea.

The most noted of these last-mentioned vessels was the *Vesta*, whose encounter with the Turkish man of war *Assari Tefket*, early in the war, had created a profound impression throughout Russia, partly on account of it being the first real naval engagement of the war, and partly on account of the disparity of force between the two vessels. The *Vesta*, according to the Russian papers, as quoted at the time by the “*Globe*” newspaper, was a merchant vessel, of the Black Sea Navigation Company’s fleet, and was not more than one-eighth of an inch thick, while her assailant was a regular man-of-war, with eight inches of armour-plating, underlaid with 12 inches of teak. The *Vesta* was provided with 6-inch mortars, as compared with eight 12-ton guns carried by the *Assari Tefket*. The crew of the latter vessel was 640 men, that of the former less than 300. According to the official report, the *Vesta* was cruising 35 miles from Kustendje, when, at eight o’clock in the morning, she fell in with the Ottoman ironclad.

“An engagement took place immediately, and continued with fury till long after mid-day, when both vessels withdrew from the scene of action. By this time the *Vesta* was almost riddled with shot. Several had passed through and through her sides; two shells had penetrated her deck, and, falling near to the stern, had set fire to the store-rooms, while thirty-five of her crew were killed and wounded. Among the former were Lieut.-Colonel Tchernoff, an artillery officer of great distinction, who made himself conspicuous a short time ago by the introduction of the Davidoff guns into the Russian naval service, and whose death is considered an irreparable loss to it. The *Vesta* claims to have done great damage to her assailant by ramming, and also by dropping some shells into the turrets, which caused an explosion on board the ironclad. Barring the torpedo engagement on the Danube, this encounter is considered to be the greatest naval event of the present war, and, when fuller particulars are obtained, may throw some light upon the complex questions of naval science.”

A correspondent of the “*Daily News*” gave an interesting description of a voyage which he had made in the same vessel; and his narrative will give a fair idea of the courage and dash for which Russian sailors have already become famous.

The letter is written from Sebastopol, on September 11th:—

“I returned yesterday from the expedition which I told you the *Vesta* and *Vladimir* were about to undertake. The result has been most successful, and at the same time bloodless. Considering the danger of the voyage, and the skill with which Captain Baranoff has executed it, I think it will be allowed to equal anything in the history of blockade running.

“We left Sebastopol about midnight yesterday week, the *Vesta* leading as senior. Every light had been carefully covered, and even the port-holes of our cabins plastered over with felt, so as to exclude any possibility of a gleam of light discovering our whereabouts to the enemy. Our vessel was painted a bluish grey, so like

the colour of the sea that at a hundred yards it was barely distinguishable. In this phantom guise, on one of the darkest nights that can be imagined, we glided in silence into the open sea, the only sounds being the steady throb of our screw, and about every ten minutes the call of the officer on watch to the men stationed in the foretop. This call, which for eight days and nights has never ceased, will long remain impressed on my memory. 'Foretop, keep a good look out,' still rang in my ears, as last night, for the first time during a week, I slept for more than an hour at a time.

"When clear of the land the captain informed us of our destination, which was Kertch. This port has not been entered since the war began, and though, of course, the movements of the Turkish fleet are only to be conjectured from telegrams, the captain told me he fully expected to have a battle before arriving, for several ironclads were supposed to be in that part of the Black Sea. As the day broke the lovely south coast stood out in all its grandeur. At sunrise we were rushing past Aloupka Castle, whose towers and terraces, flooded in light, contrasted well with the surrounding scenery. Here man has exhausted his ingenuity in rearing a fabric unique and unrivalled; but even this grandest effort of human genius, situated as it is, serves only to mark how insignificant is the work of our hands when compared with that of nature. Towering in the background of the castle, Ai Petri looks down from a height of 4,500 feet, and seems in its rugged majesty to frown at the toy which the vanity of man has carved for its footstool. On past Orianda, Livadia, Yalta, and Massandra, the 'Vesta' and her consort sped. At breakfast time we were half-way on our journey, and as the sun was sinking I had the pleasure of congratulating the captain on having successfully accomplished the first step of the expedition, and on our being the first Russian steamer that had entered Kertch since the war broke out.

"As the captain told me he should only land for his orders I did not go on shore, and in a

few hours the throbbing of the screw and the call to the foretop brought me on deck to find that we were once more on the sullen Euxine. The captain now explained to me the object of the expedition. A large number of wounded men were at a place called Gagri, not far from Sukhum-Kaleh, and the admiral had asked Baranoff if he would endeavour to embark them and convey them to Novorosiska, where there was an hospital. The odds were considerably against our ever getting there, much less returning, but brave men do not calculate odds when their comrades are in want of help. If the whole Turkish fleet had been known to be at anchor in Gagri Bay, Baranoff would only have altered his plans, but not his course. His plans at present were to proceed direct to Gagri, to offer battle to any single ironclad he met; and if attacked by several, to endeavour to escape, failing which he should take to the boats and blow the Vesta up. Fortune favours the brave, and after thirty hours of excitement we dropped anchor in Gagri Bay.

" 'Heaven grant we may find all ready for us,' was the prayer of the captain as the armed boats left for the shore, a prayer which, from the desolate appearance of the place, and the fact that not a soul was visible, I feared would not be granted. As we neared the shore the sign manual of the Turk was plainly to be distinguished. Every house had been burnt to the ground, a few dogs, a cat, and a Cossack boy, inhabited or rather perambulated the ruins; the Anglo-Indian telegraph had been torn down for at least a mile on the southern side of the town, and no signs of our being expected were to be found. About half-a-mile to the north a Russian telegraph officer was engaged in arranging communication with Europe, and he told us there were neither wounded nor unwounded soldiers nearer than Gadahout, a coast village about half-way between Gagri and Sukhum-Kaleh; so, after spending some hours in the vain hope that news would arrive, our captain recalled the boats, and we steamed on to Gadahout, before which interesting village we drop-



ped anchor about half-an-hour previous to sunset.

"I will now mention two of the officers of the *Vesta*, whose names, if the war continues, will be public property. The second in command on board the *Vesta* is Prince Galitzin Galovkin. This officer, who is of immense size and strength, is the inheritor of more than one princely title and has also a large fortune. When the war broke out he rejoined the navy and was appointed to the position which he now holds. His escape from death during the late battle is almost miraculous, and his coolness and courage from beginning to end of that trying five hours were as remarkable as his escape.

"At about 10 P.M. on Thursday night lights in front of us and at sea were visible, and we prepared for action. The prince, as second in command, had determined, if an expedition with the torpedo boats became necessary, to take the command of it, and now, to all appearance, the hour was come, for even the phosphoric light, indicative of some immense body moving rapidly, was plainly visible, and the order to prepare the torpedo launches went forth. With as little noise as possible these small boats, with their heroic crews, were in the water, and, with the prince as leader, they had left for what was very probably a fatal task. As I stood on the bridge trying to make out the arrangement of the expedition, I could hear Galitzin's voice giving his orders as coolly as if he were superintending the capture of a shoal of herring or sprats, instead of conducting a forlorn hope against perhaps several monster ironclads. The boats had scarcely left the side when the sky darkened and a storm arose. The captain at once recalled the expedition, and under cover of what was now a small tempest we ploughed onward in safety, and, for ought I or any one else can tell, we may have passed within one hundred yards of the whole Turkish fleet. Next to Prince Galitzin on this expedition should be mentioned the torpedo officer, Eugene Romanovitch, a youth in years, and when off duty the leader in everything savouring of fun and

mischief. He speaks English, and we have fraternised greatly.

"As soon as we had anchored I went on shore with the prince, our crew, of course, being armed. On landing, the only signs of life were some miserable-looking curs picnicking on horse bones and sheepskins. Bullock carts, empty boxes, old clothes, &c., were strewn in every direction, but what had been the fate of their owners, or who those owners were, was left to our imagination. A few yards from the wharf, a felucca was lying at anchor, but, in our anxiety to land, we postponed to ourselves the pleasure of visiting it, more especially as we believed the village to be in Russian possession. The houses were only about one hundred yards from the shore, and to these we now approached. At the entrance to the main street we found a Russian soldier, who at first we thought was wounded, as he could not speak, and looked dreadfully ill. It happily appeared afterwards that he had only lost the use of his tongue, and not the member itself. We then proceeded to call at several of the houses, but found no one at home; and as it was now getting dark, and we had to visit the felucca, the prince gave the order to retire. As we were pulling to the felucca, we heard firing—first, a few straggling shots, and then a fusillade—but concluding it was some skirmish inland we took no notice, and boarded our prize from both sides. On going below we found it freighted with firearms, and amongst them some very nice repeating rifles of the Winchester system. As it was now nearly dark, the captain recalled us and at once put to sea, steering direct for Constantinople. I asked him his reasons, and he told me he felt sure that no ironclads would be looking for him in that direction, and that if he was seen his course would perhaps prevent his being interfered with, the Turks not having yet realised the consummate impudence of these little cruisers.

"The captain's clever plan met with complete success, and having given all the ironclads the slip, at about one A.M. he headed again for Gadhout, having determined to make a descent with

all the boats and search the place thoroughly. At six in the morning we were at anchor, and now the scene was exciting. A mitrailleuse was mounted in the launch, and about one hundred sailors, commanded by Prince Galitzin, were ready. The captain's boy, Terracuta, a fine lad of fifteen, was armed to the teeth, and giggling with joy as I tumbled into the launch alongside of him, and I verily believe there was not a man left on board who was not hoping that reinforcements would soon be needed. As we approached the shore a few men appeared, at first in rather a hostile attitude; but soon perceiving that we were Russians a wild hurrah was given, and in an instant, from behind every rock and bush men who, for the last few minutes, had been covering us with their rifles, ran down to the beach, and the scene as we landed could not easily be described. It appeared that the day before, only some hours previous to our arrival, a Turkish steamer, painted grey like ourselves, and doubtless one of the ironclads in search of us, had put into Gadahout Bay, but had left almost immediately. The small Russian detachment, seeing another grey steamer, accompanied by a black one, arriving about sunset, naturally concluded that it was the Turkish vessel returned, with a reinforcement; and consequently, when they saw we were landing, they all hid themselves. I asked one soldier to show me where he had been hidden, and he took me to a ruined house next door to one I had entered the night before with two sailors. I asked him if he had seen me before. He grinned, did that ingenuous youth, and answered 'kaki-niett,' which may be rendered 'rather.' The shots we had heard were fired at us, for it turned out that the felucca was their prize first, and their feelings became too strong for them when they saw what they thought was the Moslem boarding it. We were now informed by the officer that if we returned to Gagri we should find the troops and the wounded all ready for us; so after transferring on board their wounded—I think about half a dozen, and a Turkish prisoner, who evidently found himself in clover—we returned to Gagri, towing the felucca with

us for the purpose of utilising it for the transport of the wounded, &c.

"We anchored in Gagri Bay about noon, and now a change had indeed taken place. The martial strains of a band were heard, and on landing we found a force of about two thousand of as fine looking fellows as one could wish to see. The shore, which yesterday was desolate, to-day teemed with life; herds of oxen, bullock carts, native conveyances of every description, groups of mountaineers in their picturesque dresses and gipsy-like encampments were visible as far as the eye could reach. The commanding officer had everything ready, not only for the embarkation of about one hundred wounded men, but also for that of a battalion of about six hundred men, whom the general required transport for as far as Taopse, a march of ten days through the mountain passes, but only about twelve hours by sea. Our captain was quite alive to the danger of crowded decks, but with the usual celerity and silence boats arrive and depart, the mountains of heavy baggage melt away from the landing place, a long file of wounded are carefully accommodated in the felucca, which has been forced up against the rickety old wharf, and in about four hours from the time we anchored every man was on board, and even the commissariat department had sent the beef and other necessities for the troops. There remains now only to embark the General Shalkoonikoff, who was coming with us, and we had to proceed to a place some twelve miles further up the coast to meet him.

"The signalman on one of the highest posts on shore now announced the smoke of a steamer to the north of us, and the masts of another to the south. With the pleasant prospect of being rammed behind and before, we slipped out of Gagri Bay and were soon enveloped in our usual gloom. About ten P.M. Prince Galitzin went on shore at a place called Sandripsh for the general, and having returned shortly with his excellency, we steamed on for Taopse, arriving about six in the morning, when the disembarking of the troops was carried out with the same admir-



able ease that distinguished the embarkation. I have had a great deal of experience in embarking and disembarking troops in peace and war time, and in almost all parts of our dominion, but I never saw anything to equal the rapidity and ease with which the Russian overcomes apparently insurmountable difficulties. It must be remembered also that a Russian soldier carries a heavier weight than ours; that he is a larger man, and consequently takes up more space in a boat, and, finally, that the camp equipage of six hundred men in its lightest marching order is about as vast as that of an English division under similar circumstances. We left Taopse early in the day, and at sunset steamed into Novorosiska, where the general and the wounded were landed. After this, the work of the gallant little cruisers having been so successfully accomplished, he passed for the last time into the open sea, and challenged the blockade of the powerful navy of Turkey of sweeping it from the Caucasus to Sebastopol, and from thence to Odessa. It may be interesting to the admiral in command of the ironclads to learn that the little *Vesta* and her consort have, during the last two hundred hours, steamed over one thousand eight hundred and seven miles of the Black Sea, and during that time they have only twice entered a port—Gagri, Taopse, and Gadahout being open roadsteads."

### CHAPTER XXXIII.

#### THE INVESTMENT OF PLEVNA.

It was a long time before the Russians succeeded in thoroughly investing Plevna, and cutting off the supplies of Osman Pacha. Throughout the autumn, as we have seen, it had been impossible for them to draw the iron girdle close, even with the assistance of the Roumanians. The Turkish defences were so well planned on every side, they extended so far, and were so

skilfully and courageously employed, that the forces at the grand duke's command were unable to prevent the Ottoman generals from occasionally joining hands on the Sofia road.

At the end of September Osman Pacha received two large convoys of provisions, with reinforcements of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, as well as military stores and ammunition. One of these alone consisted of as many as two thousand waggons. Of course an attempt was made to cut them off, but it failed in both cases. General Kriloff was in command near Etrapol, and he fell upon the first convoy when it had reached Teliche. A day's engagement ended in the Russians being obliged to retire upon Dubnik, nearer to Plevna, where they made another effort on the following morning to bar the progress of the Turks. But the latter attacked him with superior force; and Osman Pacha simultaneously made a sortie, compelling Kriloff's feeble detachment to yield ground, and thus securing the whole of the supplies. The Russian general reported to his superiors that he had sustained these encounters without the loss of a man; to which the latter might well have responded, "Would you had lost a hundred!" A more obstinate and a better managed resistance would at least have done the Turks much harm.

The arrival of the Russian Guard, under General Gourko, and that of the famous military engineer, General Todleben—the same who planned the defences of Sebastopol—brought a change over the scene. Gourko immediately made the effect of his presence felt. He first captured Gorney Dubnik, on the road to Orkanieh and Sofia, by assaulting it with twenty-four battalions—twice the number of the defenders. Seven battalions of Turks surrendered whilst the remainder escaped to Plevna. The fighting was very severe, and the Russians are said to have lost more than a hundred and fifty officers and three thousand men.

It was on the same day that a division of the newly-arrived Guards attacked Teliche, on the same road, but nearer to Orkanieh. They were unsuccessful; and their loss was very great.

Some of the wounded Russians were mutilated and barbarously murdered by the Bashi-Bazouks, as was discovered a few days later, when the place was again assaulted and captured (October 29th). On the 1st of November, Dolny Dubnik, defended by five thousand Turks, was stormed by Gourko without the loss of a man.

Thus the Sofia road was closed at last, and the investment of Plevna was regarded as being complete. The arrival of the Guards had brought up the number of the allies surrounding the town to one hundred and twenty thousand; and the besiegers began to talk confidently of the capture of Osman and his army. But there was still much for them to do.

The position early in November was described by one of the correspondents as being incalculably more favourable to the Russians since they had captured the two Dubniks, and thus contracted their line of investment. This line, he wrote on the 6th of the month, had been drawn completely round the Turkish defences.

"From Grivica round to the Loftcha road the line is just where it was at the moment of giving the assault at the last attack on Plevna. The artillery occupies the ridge before Radisovo, with the guns extending down the line towards the Loftcha road to not more than a mile from Plevna. On the Loftcha road General Skobeleff is not as far advanced as he was at the time he made his assault. The Turks, taking advantage of the moment after the battle when the Russians had withdrawn, and warned that they were not invulnerable here, have constructed four new redoubts, so that Skobeleff now, instead of three redoubts, has seven before him. When Skobeleff first attacked here, when Krüdener was defeated, he found no defences at all, and he entered Plevna but with only one battalion. His line is now considerably in front of a village called Brestovec. From here the line extends to the Vid. It then crosses the Sofia road about a mile from the bridge over the Vid. From here it passes parallel to the river until just below Opanes, where it again crosses the Vid, and curves round to the Grivica redoubt, about a

mile in front of Grivica. The Russian line of investment is thirty miles long. The Turkish position measures from the Grivica redoubt to the bridge over the Vid eight miles; from the Krishine redoubt to the Bukova redoubt is about five miles. The line is of an irregular, oval shape, with a circumference of nearly twenty miles. With the force the Russians have here now, one hundred and twenty thousand men, they can fill two lines of continuous trenches around the whole line of investment as full as it is convenient for men to lie in trenches. It will be seen, therefore, that Osman Pacha is surrounded by a circle which it will not be easy to break through. As to the supply of provisions, accounts continue to be contradictory, but since my last telegram a herd of about five or six thousand head of cattle, whose existence was not known before, has been discovered, by having been driven out to feed on the hills. Other indications point to the probability that Osman may hold out thirty or forty days yet, though not longer. His army is already on short rations, however. Ten soldiers receive two and a half pounds of meat daily between them, and the supply of corn and flour is not thought to be great. At any rate, whether Osman has supplies for one month or for three, the result must be the same in the end. He will have to surrender or cut his way out."

Whilst General Todleben was laboriously studying and directing the arrangements for closing in upon the invested army, Gourko was not the only Russian general who distinguished himself by active operations. General Skobeleff, commanding the 16th division, who had been obliged to fall back from the foremost positions which he had occupied on the Loftcha road, after the failure of the third attack on Plevna, now burned to re-capture them. On the 9th of November he carried his plans into effect.

The object of his attack was a wooded height near Brestovec, about thirteen hundred yards from the Krishine redoubt, on the south-east of Plevna. It had been strengthened by the Turks after Skobeleff had abandoned it, and its



recovery was by no means an easy task. The correspondent above quoted gives us an account of this brisk engagement. "The Turks," he wrote, "have now constructed a strong redoubt on the summit of the hill between the Krishine redoubt and the Loftcha road, the very spot where Skobelev planted two batteries during the last affair. It was not the hill with the redoubt which Skobelev resolved to capture, but one between the Loftcha road and the ravine. It was defended by trenches, and held by about fourteen tabors, perhaps seven thousand men, though Todleben believed there were a great many more, as the position was most important. The combined movement was arranged with General Gourko, who was to open fire all along the line, and likewise advance and occupy the position in front of him towards the bridge over the Vid, in order to shorten his line likewise. The weather, which for several days had been very fine, became foggy last night, and a thick heavy fog hung over us all day yesterday, reminding me very much of the day we last attacked Plevna; but the fog was neither so wet nor so cold. It was so thick that one could not see more than fifty feet.

"The attack was fixed for five o'clock. By that time it was so dark that nothing could be seen more than five feet off. Skobelev reviewed his troops that were destined for the attack—the battalion of sharpshooters. He then got down from his horse, went about among the men, talked to them, told them, especially the under-officers, just what they were to do, and finished by informing them that he would lead the assault in person. This regiment, I may remark, was one which attacked and carried these same heights during the last affair of Plevna on the second day of the bombardment. The regiment, having taken these heights, slipped out of the hands of its officers, and pursued the Turks to the foot of the glacis of the redoubt afterwards captured by Skobelev, with the result that two-thirds of the regiment were destroyed. The regiment is now full again with reserves that have come up. It was the recollection of this event

that decided Skobelev to lead the attack himself. It was important that the men should be stopped at the right moment and at the right place, and that the intrenchments which he intended to throw up should be properly laid, as a little mistake easily made might end disastrously. It was not, therefore, mere bravado which made him decide to lead the assault himself.

"At half-past four he mounted his horse, put himself at the head of his troops, and disappeared in the fog. At five o'clock the fog began to turn dark, showing the near approach of night. The Turks must have thought there would be little call for further vigilance that day. On the approach of darkness the roar of eighty guns was heard that vomited splashes of flame upon the murky fog, and then were silent. Then came the scream of eighty shells seeking their destination in obscurity. Then there was a crash of the infantry fire along the whole line except on the point of the attack, for it was Skobelev's design to use the fog for cover and take the Turks by surprise. The infantry fire rolled along in front of Brestovec, where I had taken up my station, and soon the bullets began singing overhead, telling that the Turks were replying; but we could hear as yet little firing on the right wing, where the attack was to take place. Finally, after about a quarter of an hour, there were two or three volleys in this direction, followed by a Russian shout, and we knew that the position was carried.

"As it turned out, the Turks were surprised, and did not discover the approach of the Russians until they were within one hundred yards. By the time they had seized their arms and fired two rounds, the Russians were on them with the bayonet, and it was all over. In a moment those who did not fly were bayoneted. The attack was led by two companies of sharpshooters, followed closely by the 9th Battalion and the Vladimirsky regiment. Every man was provided with a shovel, and immediately began making trenches, as indicated by Skobelev. In a very few minutes they were under cover from a heavy but ill-directed fire poured into them from the

next hill, not distant more than two hundred and fifty yards. Skobelev stayed until about ten o'clock, when he thought the men had made the place secure, and returned to Brestovec to supper. He had scarcely washed when the fire broke out again with fury on the right flank. Skobelev mounted again, disappeared in the darkness and fog, and did not return till this morning. He found the Turks making a desperate attempt to recapture the position, and arrived on the ground in the nick of time, as some confusion had ensued, for the reserves, who lost their way in the fog, coming in the wrong direction, got fired into from their own side. There was also a report that Skobelev was killed, which discouraged the troops. He arrived in the middle of the Turkish assault, one fellow having leaped into the trench with a cry of "Allah!" where he was bayoneted. The attack was repulsed, but the Turks made a second and third one, and each time were driven back with ease.

"The position, if not taken within the next twenty-four hours, may be considered secure. The Russian loss was comparatively small, only two hundred and fifty killed and wounded, among whom were two or three officers, one being Captain Dombrowsky, of the sharpshooters, of whom Skobelev speaks in the highest terms. The Turkish loss, of course, was considerably heavier, as the Russians were under cover almost immediately on their obtaining possession of the hill."

On the 11th of November General Gourko obtained a still greater success, in the capture of Vratza, about forty miles to the west of Plevna, where he found a large store of provisions, and took many prisoners. Upwards of ten thousand Turks had been captured within the month, and the majority of them were at once sent northward. At Vratza a somewhat different course was pursued with a small number of those who fell into the hands of the Russians.

Thus a correspondent, after observing that a million and a half of rations were seized at this place, remarks that the families of several Bashi-

Bazouks and seamen were taken, and conducted by lancers and guards to the outskirts of Plevna, "whither they are sent as a retaliatory measure for the Bulgarians who are driven from Plevna. They were looking very miserable, but were transported in ox-waggons filled with straw. They were treated here with the greatest kindness by the officers, who took them to their quarters, and gave them food and even money, in spite of the fact that one of the women shot a Russian sergeant in the streets of Vraca some time after the occupation. It seems like a severe measure as regards the women and children, but in all such cases the measure depends for its justification on its success. The *lex talionis* is a hard law. Nevertheless it may prevent more suffering than it causes, if it stops the Turks from driving Bulgarian women and children from their homes."

The middle of November found the investment of Plevna fairly complete. It had been expected by many strategists that Osman Pacha would seize an opportunity, before the enemy had closed round him on the western side, of evacuating the town, and falling back upon Orkanieh and the western Balkans. If he had done so, it is argued, he might have so increased the forces of Mehemet Ali as to withstand the advance of the Russians beyond Etropol, and thus have compelled them to undergo a second campaign; whereas, by staying where he was, he lost a splendid army, and caused his country a great moral disaster.

On the other hand, it must be remembered that Osman Pacha, at all events up to the beginning of November, had every reason to suppose that the army of relief, which he knew to be forming on the Sofia road, would be able to keep open his communications, and at least to send him supplies. And from the moment when the Guards arrived on the scene, and General Gourko captured the towns between Plevna and Orkanieh, it is doubtful whether Osman Pacha could have escaped if he had attempted to do so. Of course it would have been to his advantage to choose, in the Balkans, a position which, as Mr.



Stanley says, "a few days would have made equally impregnable to direct attack, while it would have so lengthened the line of Russian communications that the first downpour of rain would have made it impossible to feed any considerable body of troops."

It was, however, too late. The circle was complete; and though the Turks did actually make efforts to break it in more than one quarter, they were unable to succeed. A correspondent of the "Daily News" at Dolny Dubnik wrote on the 16th of November:—"The Turks have made three attacks upon Skobelev's position on three successive nights, but were each time repulsed with heavy loss. The defence of this new position is most successful and brilliant, and the position itself is of more importance than I was at first disposed to acknowledge. Skobelev remains night after night in the trenches, and has succeeded in pushing his lines up to within one hundred yards of the Turks. They are indeed so close to each other that scarcely a night passes without heavy firing. Fire is opened all along the line upon the slightest alarm. At the same time that Skobelev advanced, the Guards pushed forward to a position immediately under the Krishine redoubt, where the outposts now are, and the line extends back over the hills to near the bridge over the Vid. The village of Krishine remains neutral ground. Two days later the Roumanians and Guards advanced to within rifle-shot of the bridge. The circle of investment is now drawn as close as can be without actually besieging the Turkish positions. Nevertheless, in only two places, at the Grivica redoubt, and on Skobelev's position, are they within speaking distance of each other. There has been very little artillery fire during the last two days, and Todleben seems to have abandoned his plan of concentrated volley firing upon specified points, and only puts it in practice once in forty-eight hours. Deserters coming in from the front of Plevna report that the soldiers receive three-quarters of a pound of bread daily, and a small

piece of meat twice a week. They complain bitterly of the privations to which they are subjected."

Thus everything pointed to the termination, within a few weeks, of the long-protracted siege of Plevna. In the meantime, public opinion in Turkey was naturally in a most excited state, and on many hands a revolution was confidently expected to break out in the capital. Great discontent had been expressed at the conduct of the war by the Seraskierate and the sultan's advisers. The Seraglio had, perhaps, less absolute control over the fortunes of the country than under many previous sultans, but there can be no doubt that the most competent statesmen and generals amongst the Turks were more than once interfered with and thwarted by the palace party. The sultan's brother-in-law, Mahmoud Damat, was especially accused of meddling with the measures taken for the national safety. A correspondent, writing on the 9th of November, in the "Daily News," mentions the growing unpopularity of this pacha, and of the frequent rumours (ominous enough in themselves) as to his having met with some evil fate. On one day it was reported that he had been poisoned; on another, that he had had a fit. "I have reason to know, however," continued the writer, "that he is well, and that if he has had any fit it must have been of a mild character. There is evidence, however, of dissension among the pachas which may lead in a few days to important events. Hitherto Mahmoud Damat's influence at the palace has been sufficiently great to keep his enemies in check, but his deserved unpopularity is, I think, at last likely to bring about his downfall. He is unpopular alike with the pachas and the people, and would no doubt have been got rid of long since but for the personal influence of the sultan. The favour of the sovereign, however, has, I believe, now been withdrawn, and Mahmoud may be considered in disgrace.

The outcry against Mahmoud is only one of the phases of the movement of which I have spoken. The party of Murad had been stirring,

\* "St. Petersburg to Plevna." By F. Stanley.

and on Friday and Saturday last the government took the precaution of surrounding the palace of Cheragan, where the late sultan is confined, with soldiers. This movement is attributed to the Young Turkey party, though it is difficult to see what they would be at. There is no doubt a party, but I believe a very small one, in favour of republicanism, of the meaning of which, except that it is government without a sultan, they probably know nothing, and it may be probable that some of the pachas who are out may have been willing to use some of the hot-brained fanatics to get rid of the sultan and the pachas who are in, and take their places. It would be absurd to suppose that there was any patriotism in wishing to return to Murad. The present sultan has done nothing which ought to make the Turks discontented with him, while Murad still continues in weak health. Another explanation attributes the movement in favour of Murad entirely to Mahmoud Damat, the theory being that it is of his creation, in order to gain the credit of himself bringing it to the notice of the sovereign, and of showing him that he, Mahmoud, is still the only man who can render his seat on the throne secure.

"It is fair to regard these signs of dissatisfaction and dissension as the result of the Turkish defeats in Asia Minor and about Plevna. The depression among the Turks of all classes is really very great, and is given expression to on every hand. Notwithstanding that telegrams have been issued by government, concealing the real facts, the truth has none the less become known. Perhaps even the constant repetition of warnings to the newspapers that they will be suspended, the last of which appeared only yesterday, if they publish 'false news,' that is, news unpleasant to the Turks, or, in the words of the communication, 'of a nature to trouble men's minds,' makes the public believe the news to be worse than it actually is. Twice a week we receive our English papers, and a large section of the community receive the newspapers of Athens. It is unnecessary to say that the lat-

ter represent nothing in a favourable light for the Turks, and yet it is from them rather than from the Turkish papers under a strict censorship that the general impression of the progress of the war is derived. Not only is the war going against the Turks, not only do they see a large amount of destitution, misery, and poverty in the capital and in the provinces, but most of them have come to understand that, in spite of the bravery of their soldiers, Turkey can gain nothing by the war which she has undertaken. I have spoken in previous letters of the enormous drain upon the Turkish population which the war has made, and I mentioned a fortnight ago that the last reserves have been called out. These men have been arriving during the last week, and yesterday I saw some hundreds of the latest arrivals drawn up in line to be marched up to the Seraskierate or War Department to obtain their uniforms and to be drilled. It was a sad sight. There could hardly have been a man among them under forty years of age, probably hardly a man who was not the father of a family, or the supporter of one. But while such a sight to the European was sad, the effect could not be otherwise than depressing to a Turk. He knows that the chances against his winning have always been great, and are perhaps now greater than ever. But the more thoughtful among them know a fact which makes them more despondent still; that every month of war, whether they win or lose, is weighting them the more heavily in their struggle with the Christian races of the empire. For Europe the Eastern question may mean a struggle simply between Russia and Turkey. The Turks know well that, when the present war is over, the silent, inevitable struggle which has been going on during the last thirty years for wealth, education, and supremacy, must be resumed, and resumed with largely diminished numbers on the side of the Turks. In short, in this war the Turks have everything to lose and nothing to win, the greatest success that they can hope for being to lessen the terms which Russia will exact. The result of this knowledge



is to increase the party in favour of peace, at the head of which is the sultan himself. In a country where one set of pachas is perpetually intriguing against another, and where defeat by the opposing party usually means banishment, there will always be a party which will encourage the outcry for prolonging the war, if the pachas who are in attempt to make peace. Still, in spite of them, the peace party is growing stronger."

It was, however, useless for the peace party to expect that Turkey would abandon the contest, in which she had so much to lose, so long as there was a chance of one more turn of the tide in her favour. And certainly no sane man could have expected that she would make peace whilst the enemy was on the other side of the Balkans.

Those who knew Turkey best did not anticipate that her spirit would fail her at this moment, however critical her case might appear. The history of the country showed many instances of her desperate power of resistance, and few, if any, of her being content to take a single adverse campaign as conclusive. The bold front which the sultans and their governments have always shown to their enemies may be accounted for by several distinct considerations. In the first place, they have not only been themselves inspired by the fanaticism and fatality peculiar to the Moslem race, but they have known that they could count upon the fighting qualities of their troops to the last extremity. The Osmanlis have never had to fear cowardice on the part of their armies. What they might reasonably have feared has been the incompetence of their generals, but here again they have been sustained by the idea that the fortune of war depends rather upon the will of Allah than upon skilful generalship. Moreover, they have naturally been impelled by vanity to conceive that, if one leader has failed, the next pacha who displayed a strong belief in himself would be able to repair the disaster.

Again, the Turkish government cannot be said to have hesitated on the same grounds which have made other governments unwilling to suffer

a long invasion of their territories by a relentless enemy. They have not spared their subjects, by accepting the decision of a few engagements on the frontier and assenting to the consequences of a few defeats. The very backwardness of the country in civilisation has prompted its rulers to regard a long war on their own soil as being little more disastrous than on the soil of their enemies. At the beginning of the Russian invasion, for instance, it would have been possible for the Turks to fight the Russians in Roumania, and, if beaten, to make the best possible terms with her before the armies of the czar had touched the soil of Turkey. Instead of that, they scarcely offered any resistance until the invader had penetrated deep into their own country, and devastated large tracts of cultivated land. Of course there was a method in this. The Porte reckoned upon the stimulating effect which an actual invasion would have upon the Mussulman populations.

Such motives as these, which had influenced the sultan and his advisers at the beginning of the war, continued to influence them to the end; and the tide of war had not turned against them so desperately in November as to break down their courage altogether. They did not dream that the invaders would be able to cross the Balkans during the depth of the winter, and reach Adrianople before the snows had melted on the plains. They looked forward to another campaign, and cherished the hope that they would have an ally by their side before the worst had come upon them. It was in this hope that they were destined to suffer their greatest disappointment.

Henceforth events were to travel more rapidly. From the fall of Plevna to the end of the war there was no further hesitation on the part of the Russians, and scarcely even the lull of a single day. Let us now proceed to witness the last act of the drama of Plevna.

## CHAPTER XXXIV.

## THE ARMY OF RELIEF.

WE have seen how the position before Plevna was changed by the arrival of the Russian Guards, and the success of General Gourko in closing the Sofia road. The extreme left of the Russian army of investment had joined hands with the extreme right of the Roumanians, and the capture of Vraca, or Vratza, on the west of Plevna, had thoroughly completed the circle of investment.

For some time past Osman Pacha's only hope of relief had been in the direction of Sofia and the west. He had ceased to expect much from the army of the Quadrilateral, where Mehemet Ali had failed to break through the lines of the czarewitch; and it soon became evident that Sulieman Pacha could do no more than his predecessor. Mehemet had indeed claimed credit for assisting in the relief of Plevna by the trouble which he gave to the Russians between that town and the Lom; and it is quite possible that the success of the convoys sent to Osman Pacha by the Orkanieh road had been rendered more certain by the fact that the Russians had been compelled to weaken themselves in order to strengthen the czarewitch. But now that the Guards had come upon the scene, such chances as these were at an end. The Russians had tightened their grip upon Plevna, and they did not hesitate to express their belief that the fate of Osman Pacha was settled at last.

They were right in one sense; but it was to be some weeks before they could make the "Lion of Plevna" admit the fact.

The general nature of the position around Plevna at this crisis may be gathered from the description of a correspondent writing on November 20th. He was not correct in every particular; but his letter will give us a fair idea of the general circumstances:—"The fighting during the last three days, although not decisive in

itself, seems to prove that the fate of Plevna is sealed. On the 17th the artillery began to make itself heard in the direction of Plevna. During the day and night the bombardment was almost incessant. On the 18th it increased in intensity, and at times it seemed as if the whole of the eight hundred guns before the fated position were in play. On the 19th the artillery fire had somewhat slackened, but it has continued at intervals up to the present. Throughout nearly sixty hours an almost ceaseless thunder of guns could be heard here, broken at intervals by a salvo that seemed to come from half-a-dozen batteries at once. Seldom in the history of war can there have been a more intense artillery fire than that before Plevna at the beginning of this week. It was evident to us when the bombardment began that the Turks were making an attempt to break through the blockading lines, and it became equally clear as the artillery fire continued that they had failed in their object. Although this is the nearest station in rear of the lines, no details of the fighting reached us until last evening, when a staff officer of General Todleben arrived. From him we learnt that Osman Pacha had made several attempts to force the Russian lines, but had nowhere succeeded in getting any part of his army through. The heaviest attack seems to have been directed against the positions held by the Roumanians—southwards from Rieben and in the direction of Trestenic. Here the Turks are said to have forced some positions, but to have been checked by the arrival of the brigade of Grenadiers of the Guard, probably the same which was sent as a reserve force to Trestenic in front of the cavalry division of General Arnoldi. The details of the fighting we have yet to learn, but it is said the Roumanians were driven from some of their advanced positions, although the terrific artillery fire carried havoc into the ranks of Osman Pacha's troops. All that is certain as yet is that the Roumanians were very roughly handled, but that the *enceinte* is unbroken, and the Turks suffered terribly in their spirited attack.

"I wrote to you after the completion of the



blockading circle that the weakest part of the line was that held by the Roumanian troops. The Turks seem to have been well aware of the fact, but the Russians, by the disposition of their reserve forces and by a system of telegraphic signals which they have organised, were able to hurry up reinforcements in time to any threatened point. The outpost duty of the blockading army has been regulated with the greatest attention since General Todleben took over the command. The night service is especially vigilant, and a telegraphic system of electric lights has been formed to guard against surprises. The chances that Osman Pacha will succeed in breaking through are now less than ever, since he has finally disclosed his hand, and the fact that he was obliged to make the attempt would seem to prove that the scarcity of provisions has begun to excite apprehensions in the Turkish camp. It is probable that within the last few days the movements of the Turks have necessitated some corresponding disposition of the blockading force, especially as the Roumanians had made some advances both from the side of Rieben and that of the Wid, but on the completion of the *enceinte* the distribution of the troops on the north and north-west flanks of Plevna was nearly as follows :—At Dolni Etropol were the 3rd division of Grenadiers of the Guard, under General Daniloſſ, a force of artillery of the Guard, and one brigade of the 4th Roumanian division, commanded by General Racovica. South-west of this position, in the neighbourhood of Gorni Etropol, which had been burnt down in the artillery engagements after the battle of the 24th of last month, was the Roumanian brigade of Boranescio belonging to the 4th division, a cavalry brigade under Colonel Formac, and two Russian brigades, one of Grenadiers and the other of Cossacks. The foremost redoubt, which commands the road to Rahova, was manned by Roumanian chasseurs, and two other redoubts which lie behind the village were taken over from the Roumanians by a Russian force, and the Roumanian garrison sent forward to Dolni Etropol to take up a position between there and

the Wid river. The troops of the 1st division of the Guard under General Rauch form the Roumanian force at Dolni Etropol, and extend to Dolni Dubnic and on the road to Gorni Dubnic, where they are joined by the 2nd Guard division. Higher up from Dolni Dubnic the sharpshooters of the Guard are stationed near the earthworks constructed by Colonel Cantilli on the day of the attack of Gorni Dubnic, under the enemy's fire. The first divisions of Roumanians occupy the position between this and Rieben, and a brigade of Grenadiers and the cavalry division of General Arnoldi remain in reserve at Trestenic. From Rieben to Grivitza extend the second and third Roumanian divisions under Colonels Cercez and Angelescu. Each of these divisions has a reserve of four regiments, besides the troops which man the front line of earthworks. The Roumanians therefore hold nearly the whole of the front line of defences between Grivitza and Dolni Dubnic, so that they would have to bear the brunt of any attack made from the northern or western side of Plevna. The information in our possession will not allow us to follow the movements of the Russian army which has been directed on Orkanieh, or of the detachments which are in movement between Yratza and the Servian frontier, where a column is said to be within hail of the troops of Horvatowitch. But the object of the Russians seems manifold. In the first place they wish to distract the attention of Mehemet Ali and oblige him to detach troops to oppose them; secondly, to interrupt the communication with Widdin, and prevent the two thousand provision carts which have been sent to Sofia from the fortress returning; and, thirdly, to surprise the convoys of provisions which the Turks had been accumulating with a view to relieve Plevna. Mehemet Ali is said to have sent a force to Brecovatz, and to have thus prevented the Russians from taking possession of the place, but a cavalry column has eluded the Turkish detachment and pressed on further westward. The Russian column which proceeded southwards is said to be much stronger than was supposed, but it is not believed here that it will

attempt to force the pass behind Orkanieh, as after the capture of Osman Pacha's force the position can easily be turned by marching on Sofia, where Mehemet Ali will not be in a condition to oppose a successful resistance to the force which will be free to march against him. It is said that another Russian column, composed of one *corps d'armee* and three divisions, will be formed at Tirnova, and the advance southward will be made both from the Schipka Pass and from the direction of Sofia. The chief difficulty will be to provision these armies in their earliest movements. A railway is said to be in contemplation as far as Tirnova from the Danube, and the eastern army will receive supplies no doubt through Servia, where they can be conveyed from Turn Severin by the high road to the frontier at Nisch and Sofia. When the investment of Widdin is complete, the Roumanians will probably destroy Ada Kaleh, the fortress which bars the passage of the Danube below Orsova, when they can utilise the river for transport as far as the Timok. Rahova is said to be completely blockaded by the column of Colonel Llaniceanu and a Russian force of about five thousand men, and the surrender of the place is expected before that of Plevna. Among the *faits d'armes* of the last few days it is worthy of mention that the Roumanian batteries at Kalafat have succeeded in sinking a Turkish monitor after seventy-seven shots."

The executive at Constantinople had no great cause to boast of its energy or ability in supplying its generals with the sinews of war; but still it had done something. It had kept Osman Pacha fairly well supplied, so long as the road remained open; and as soon as the road was closed it took measures to open it again. Mehemet Ali, recalled from the Quadrilateral, had been sent on a mission to Bosnia; but he was soon afterwards ordered to return from that useless expedition, and take command of the army which was being formed at Sofia, with the express purpose of relieving Plevna.

By the middle of the month of November it was stated that Mehemet Ali had four or five strong divisions at his disposal, and that he was

on the eve of an advance through Orkanieh, in order to attempt to raise the siege. The experienced military critic who followed the events of the war in the "Standard" newspaper, made the following observations in connection with an interview which a correspondent of that journal had had with Mehemet Ali at Sofia, about the middle of November:—

"Having made the journey into Plevna, he was able to afford the Turkish general much useful information concerning the topography of the road. Mehemet Ali's remarks led our correspondent to believe that a strong diversion will be made upon the Jantra by Suleiman Pacha, to facilitate the advance of the relieving army, by compelling the Russians to concentrate a considerable force to their left. The late Turkish movements in the neighbourhood of Elena and Tirnova all favour this conclusion. Hitherto, the army of the Lom has played a useful rather than a brilliant rôle, but it is possible that we may shortly hear of its having taken the offensive in earnest, and that, either at Tirnova itself, or at some point between that town and Gabrova, it has thrown itself upon the main line of Russian communications with the Schipka. Such a movement would oblige the Russians to reinforce the corps now at Selvie to a very large extent, as their only line of communication with the Schipka would then run through that town. This would, of course, relieve the pressure round Plevna, and would much facilitate Mehemet Ali's advance. Chakir Pacha reports that the Turkish cavalry have inflicted a severe blow upon that of the Russians, defeating them with a loss of five hundred men. We should doubt the accuracy of these figures, for to inflict a loss of five hundred men upon the Russian cavalry would imply the existence of a stronger cavalry force than the Turks can possibly possess. Cavalry is the weak arm of the Turkish army. The Circassians act as outposts and skirmishers, but the regular cavalry were deplorably weak even in the armies which first took the field, and must be proportionately weaker in the newly-raised forces, inasmuch as horses are scarce, and cavalry require



long training to become efficient. Chakir Pacha also sends a despatch stating that he has made reconnaissances in front of Orkanieh, and finds that the Russians have entirely withdrawn from the neighbourhood. Their severe repulse has no doubt proved to them that no further advance in this direction can be made until after the fall of Plevna."

Chakir Pacha's despatches, however, were not wholly to be relied upon. The Turks gained a few successes in minor engagements near Orkanieh and Etropol; but the Russians were in too great force to be beaten back; and the critic whom we have quoted was himself mistaken in his belief that the invaders would have to wait for the fall of Plevna before they could hope to make an advance. The army of Mehemet Ali was neither numerous enough nor well enough trained and equipped to withstand the enemy—far less to beat him back and raise the blockade of Plevna.

General Gourko was in no mood to wait for an attack. On the 16th of November he advanced from Dolny Dubnic towards Etropol; and at the same time another Russian force, under General Schuvaloff, was pushing southwards in the same direction. The Russian official despatches supply us with the details of their movements during the following weeks. Thus, according to one account on the 22d, a detachment consisting of two battalions of dragoons and two sotnias of Cossacks, with four guns, made a reconnaissance near Etropol. "The first skirmishing on the part of the detachment caused considerable disquietude in the ranks of the enemy, who raised almost his entire camp and began withdrawing his artillery. At the same time one special messenger after another was sent by the Turks to Orkanieh. Nevertheless, the commander of our detachment decided not to make an attack in consideration of the superior forces at the command of the enemy, the possibility of his reinforcements arriving, and the fact of dusk coming on. The Russian commander having fulfilled his task of ascertaining the position and forces of the enemy, withdrew

our detachment towards Lukowitza. Perceiving this circumstance the Turks were encouraged to advance, and with their whole force of cavalry, numbering two hundred men, they pursued our detachment. The Russian commander laid an ambush for them, composed of the 2nd and 3rd companies of the 11th Regiment, who allowed the enemy to approach within two hundred paces. The Turks losing thereby a number of men, retreated in confusion, and were almost entirely destroyed by a second volley. Our detachment then retired quietly towards Lokowitza. There were wounded on our side three officers and nine men killed and twenty-seven wounded."

Another official despatch was somewhat more circumstantial, and recorded a victory of some importance:—"On the 22nd inst. the main Russian force under General Schuvaloff, having driven the Turks out of their position opposite Provitz, occupied it, and commenced entrenching themselves, dragging up artillery to the almost inaccessible heights, with the object of inducing the Turks to believe that an attack in front was intended. Throughout the day and night of the 23rd, and during the following morning, the Russian troops kept up a perpetual skirmishing, and in the meantime the attention of the Turks at Orkanieh and Etropol was diverted by means of a feigned advance, executed by detachments from Wratza in the direction of Orkanieh, and by two columns proceeding along both banks of the Icker against Etropol. The main blow was, however, prepared against the Turkish left flank and rear. On the morning of the 21st a column, under General Rauch, crossed the mountains over steep precipitous paths, being compelled at times to make use of dynamite in order to force their way. The artillery was dragged up by the men themselves. After forty-nine hours' uninterrupted struggle with incredible difficulties the column reached the almost inaccessible position held by the Turkish left flank. At noon of the 23rd General Rauch's troops drove the enemy from his position, the Turks in their flight having to pass through a storm of shells from General

Schuvaloff's artillery. In spite of their fatigue, General Rauch's force pursued the enemy until five o'clock in the afternoon, when a fog came on which concealed the Turks from their view. The Russians thus occupied the position which they had gained with so much difficulty, and reached a point on the Orkanieh road almost as far as Laskeni. In the column under the command of General Rauch there were, besides the Semnofsk Regiment of the Guard and the rifle battalions of the Imperial family, three sotnias of Cossacks, and a platoon of mountain artillery. The Russian loss, so far as has been ascertained, consisted of two officers and seventy men wounded. According to reports received up to the present, one Turkish officer and seventy men have been taken prisoners."

These were small triumphs, but they sufficed to show that the Turks were not in a position to withstand the Russian advance. A tolerably correct estimate of Mehemet Ali's strength was given by the "Standard" correspondent already quoted. Writing a few days after his previous despatch, he declared that Mehemet was quite unable to advance until considerable reinforcements had arrived. "Indeed, with the thirty-nine battalions, actually disseminated on a line of more than sixteen hours' extension from the pass of Etropol to that of Berkofcha, and representing an effective of barely eighteen thousand men, no thought of marching to the relief of Plevna can be entertained. Some twenty battalions are said to be on the march to join these forces, but most of them are reduced to three hundred or four hundred men. The five battalions Mehemet Ali brought with him from Novi Bazar, and who entered to-day, only numbered eighteen hundred men altogether. They are Bosnian Redifs, as fine-looking men as Suleiman brought with him from Montenegro four months ago. The forces which are expected from Albania, Salonica, and Constantinople, are partly mustafiz, partly battalions of volunteers equipped by the large towns of the empire, and counting the off-scourings of the populous cities and not a few liberated prisoners in their ranks. If

my information be correct, we shall receive eleven battalions from Constantinople, and twenty-six others from Herzegovina, Bosnia, Albania, and Thessaly; altogether over twenty thousand men. This would give, taking account of the forces already in the field, and abstracting such as will be needed for the garrison of the Balkan passes, twenty-five thousand men more or less for active operations. If we consider that this army will have been hastily brought together, and must remain deficient both in cavalry and in artillery, but more especially in the latter arm, it appears impossible to me to break through the Russian lines to relieve Osman Pacha. I do not think we shall be able to muster more than two thousand regular and as much irregular cavalry. As regards artillery, we shall want nothing less than ten batteries of field-pieces to put us on anything like an equal footing with the enemy.

"On the road between Orkanieh and Plevna four very strong positions actually in the hands of the Russians are met with. The first occurs at less than two hours' distance beyond Orkanieh, and is formed by the mountains surrounding the plain of Orkanieh, and dominating the deep defile through which the torrent and the road both effect their escape towards the north. A second defile is encountered between Jablanitza and Petzeven or Bloznitza, two villages lying so very close together as to be confounded on some maps. Another position follows before we reach Lukovitcha, but it is rather one to be useful to an army advancing from Orkanieh than to one defending the approach of Plevna, as the latter would experience the disadvantage of a little river, impassable for infantry in most parts in this season, running immediately behind it. Next come the positions of Radomirce and Devenitza. These are as naturally strong as could be desired by the Russians. The Panega river, making a strong curve towards the east, encircles the plain of Lukovitcha, and runs exactly at the foot of an unbroken chain of hills traversing the road. As if nothing had been left undone by nature to favour a defending force, only a mile to the rear the road climbs a toilsome ascent of scantily



wooded hills, affording a second and dominating position. There remains the position of Telish and Dubnik, but neither of them present marked natural advantages to the Russians—the first being rather unprotected against an attack from an army bending its steps towards Plevna, the latter presenting its weak side towards an eventual sally from Plevna.

“As all depends on the force the Russians intend to concentrate between Plevna and Orkanieh on the eventful moment, it may be possible that they will defend obstinately the two first positions I have mentioned. Still, both the defiles of Karadja-Dagh and of Bloznitza may be turned by a movement from the west, as the ground is so mountainous as to afford protection to a flanking column. The real battle-ground appears, however, to be indicated at Radomirce. There the relieving army will be far enough from its basis to allow of cavalry attacks on its right flank and rear, while the position is so strong as to nearly render a direct attack hopeless. Mehemet Ali laughed at the idea of the Russians sending a *corps d’armee* of seventy thousand men across the Balkans before the winter. ‘I think they will want those seventy thousand men before Plevna,’ he said. The success of Chefket Pacha’s march to Plevna, he remarked, was due to himself having assumed such a vigorous offensive on the Lom as to force the enemy to concentrate all their available forces on the Jantira. It certainly will be interesting to watch what Suleiman Pacha will do to facilitate Mehemet Ali’s movements when the time to operate will have come for our Muchir. As regarded Servia, Mehemet Ali did not apprehend her entering on a campaign this year. Still he was prepared to meet every eventuality on that side, and had left Hafiz Pacha, who has illustrated himself a great deal by his bravery and boldness during last year’s war at Novibazar, at the head of eight battalions, with orders to assume the offensive without delay should the Servians declare war, in order to prevent them from marching on Bulgaria. The only details we possess about the fight of last Friday at Orkanieh are

the thirty wounded which have arrived at Taschkör. The favourable issue of the Russian attack, both on Etropol and Orkanieh, as stated by the official reports, cannot but be true, as in the contrary case the garrison of this town would necessarily have been forwarded without delay to the front.”

After the capture of Provitz by the Russians the Turks abandoned several other positions in the neighbourhood, including Orkanieh, and retired to advantageous ground in the Balkans between Orkanieh and Sofia. General Gourko took Etropol on the 24th, the garrison retiring to Arab Konah. According to a Russian official despatch, when the Turks withdrew from Provitz to the fortified position of Wretsesch, behind Orkanieh, and from Etropol to the Groot heights, the Russian column operating under General Ellis fortified itself in the position of Provitz, and kept up an observation of Wretsesch. Meanwhile, another column under General Dandeville was sent from Etropol against the heights of Groot, which it took on the 28th of November. “The Turks thereupon evacuated Wretsesch. On the same day General Dandeville occupied the heights opposite those of Groot. On the 30th of November and the 1st December the troops were engaged in dragging guns up the mountains. When the Turks had left the position of Wretsesch General Ellis immediately advanced along the high road in pursuit, passing Orkanieh and Wretsesch, and occupying on the 1st inst. a position on the mountains opposite the Turkish position near Arab Konak, his left flank joining hands with the forces under General Dandeville. On the 2nd of December the bringing up of guns to the mountain heights continued. The bombardment of the Turkish position of Arab Konak was to commence on the 3rd. A column under General Kurnkoff, despatched against Slatitz, occupied the mountain pass. The Russians in these operations have immense difficulties to overcome. The task of dragging guns up the steep sides of these high mountains presents the greatest difficulties, besides which the weather is most

unfavourable, snow, frost, and heavy rains alternately prevailing. General Dandeville occupies a position at an elevation of three thousand four hundred feet. The official accounts state that the loss of the Russians from the 28th of November to December 1st was three hundred and fifty men."

The fighting at Wretsesch, or Wratza, seems to have been very severe. The "Standard" correspondent telegraphed a lively account of it. "About noon," he says, "a strong Russian infantry column was observed advancing along the crest of a formidable rocky ridge which runs from the Etropol valley to the Orkanieh defile parallel to the Turkish positions on the Balkan summits. Our artillery opened fire upon them, and successively one, two, and, lastly, six Turkish battalions tried to drive the Russians back. The troops distinguished themselves greatly. The ground was so steep, and covered so deeply with snow, that the task of the Turks was a very difficult one. The fighting ceased only at sunset. The Russians must have been sorely disappointed. This morning they have thrown up many trenches on their snow-covered position. Everything is ready to resist the attack.

"A little after noon the Russians were signalled to be moving towards the garrison of our highest eastern redoubt, which at the time was enveloped in a light fog. About one o'clock masses of Russians were seen climbing the base of the same mountain. The artillery from our two neighbouring forts a little lower down on the crest of the hill, which had been armed the day before with twelve guns, immediately began playing on the Russians, who advanced steadily through the forest. On their reaching the open ground, which was covered with snow, some confusion was visible amongst them, caused by our strong flanking fire. Meanwhile a much more numerous force began an assault from the eastern side, where they only had to fear a fire from the weak artillery of the threatened redoubt. For over three hours the mountain was completely hidden from sight by the smoke of incessant musketry-fire and fog combined, tra-

versed by continuous flashes, the whole affording a strong contrast with the majestic snow-mantled mountain ranges in the distance, which enjoyed the sunshine. Towards four o'clock the attack was thoroughly repulsed, the Russians disappearing, disorderly and crestfallen, back into the forest. I have no accurate information yet as to how near the enemy's eastern assaulting column succeeded in approaching to the redoubt during the five assaults they made upon it, but on the western side they utterly failed in two tremendous efforts they made to put a stop to the havoc caused by the artillery of the lower redoubt, which completely swept the slopes of Etropol. The Balkans are covered with dead and dying Russians. Great enthusiasm prevails in the Turkish camp. Our losses are nothing compared to the Russian loss. Turkish reinforcements have arrived this afternoon, in expectation of a renewal of the assault to-morrow. The Russians made the assault splendidly, and with stubborn tenacity. They evidently brought into action their picked troops. The weather is bright, but very cold."

As we know, the gallantry of the Turks was of very little service to them. They could not withstand the Russians, who outnumbered them vastly. The entire Turkish force at Sofia and in front of it was estimated by their enemy at no more than twenty-five thousand men; and the estimate seems to have been tolerably accurate. As for the Russian forces, a correspondent who accompanied General Gourko declared it to be larger than any force he could possibly meet before reaching Kezanlik.

The net result of the fighting which had been going on to the south of Plevna finally cut off all hope of relief from that direction to Osman Pacha. There had never been much chance of help from the north; and indeed the commanders in Widdin, Nisch, Pirot, Ak Palanka, and other Turkish towns on that side, do not appear to have made great efforts to relieve the besieged army. Some effort, it is true, was made; but the Roumanians proved to be quite strong enough to hold their own. On the 21st of No-



vember a Roumanian detachment occupied the Turkish fortress of Rahova, which removed one more of the chances to which Osman may have clung. Prince Charles made this success the occasion of another high-flown address to his army in the following terms :—

“From the first day that you encountered the enemy the Emperor of Russia has been able to convince himself of your bravery. The praises passed upon you by that august sovereign were as dear to you as laurels, since his Majesty has conferred upon you a special mark of honour by his presence and participation in the heroic dangers of the field of battle. The Roumanian army will preserve an eternal remembrance of the days when Alexander went under fire before your eyes, and of the day when the august and mighty chief of the imperial army, whose allies we are, inspected our positions, braving, intrepid soldier as he is, the fire of the enemy in the fort bearing his name. His Majesty has deigned to accept at my hands our military medal. Our emblem of gallantry on the breast of that august monarch will be an eternal honour to the Roumanian army, and will stimulate it to fresh sacrifices and fresh successes.”

It was towards the end of the third week in November that the investing army of Plevna heard of the fall of Kars ; and on the 19th of the month divine service was performed in the Tutschanitz redoubt before Plevna, in the presence of the emperor, to celebrate the event. After the service all the batteries fired salvoes against Plevna. In the evening the positions were illuminated, and there was a display of fireworks. The bands of the various regiments also played during the evening. According to the Russian account, “at eleven o'clock the same night the Turks opened a musketry fire against General Skobeleff's position. Our batteries replied with shells. After a space of twenty minutes everything again became quiet. Our loss from the Turkish fire was one officer and two men wounded.” Others asserted that the Russians had fired into Plevna whilst the *Te Deum* for Kars was being sung in the camp.

Meanwhile, without waiting for the fall of Plevna, the rumours of an armistice, and of terms of peace, were renewed. There was no foundation for them ; but it is worth while to note the ideas which were industriously circulated on the subject, if only on account of the anxiety which they naturally caused in England. During the month of November, a St. Petersburg journal published an article signed by Prince Wassiltchikoff, in which the surrender of the Turkish fleet as one of the conditions upon which the Ottoman government must come to terms with the czar) was advocated. The following is the text of the article :—

“We undertook the war with an accurately-determined and clearly-expressed aim, the emancipation of the Balkan Slavs, and at the same time, in order to tranquillise the European Cabinets, we accepted the obligation not to appropriate an inch of territory in Europe. These two facts determine, on the one hand, the direction of our policy in the present war and the concessions which we ought to make to the political views of other Powers—that is to say, the positive and negative sides of the Eastern question from the point of view of Russian interest. If military fortune does not forsake us, we must realise the first part of that programme by procuring firm guarantees for the Balkan Slavs in general, and full autonomy for some provinces. That is for us a moral obligation—the *minimum* that is required for the fulfilment of our solemn promise and for redeeming those grievous sufferings which the war has imposed on the Turkish Christians. We must not annex to the Russian empire any part of the European dominions of the sultan. That is our duty—the *maximum* of those concessions which we have to make in order to secure the neutrality of the Christian governments in our struggles with Islam. With respect to the Asiatic dominions or the Black Sea, we undertook no obligations. By those chief conditions the minimum of our demands and the maximum of our concessions—is determined the area in which will move the negotiations for peace. I think that it is still too soon to discuss the com-

plicated and difficult question as to the form which the autonomy of the various regions ought to assume in the event of their liberation from the Turkish yoke. The words 'autonomy,' 'freedom,' 'self-government,' have no clearly-defined meaning, and will probably be subjected to many diplomatic interpretations and political oscillations. We doubt whether the fate of the Slavs will be suddenly decided by a stroke of the pen at the conclusion of peace. Even if the war should end favourably for us, we ought to foresee that the organisation of the Balkan peninsula will be a work of some years. In view of that inevitable delay, it is very desirable that Russia should retain, after the conclusion of peace, the influence necessary for the final solution of that Eastern question which may again start up in conditions less favourable for us than at present. It may happen, for instance, that Roumania, after consolidating her political position and receiving an accession of territory as a recompense for the services rendered in the present war, will no longer consent to act as a basis of operations for our armies, and, by observing strict neutrality, will effectually bar for us the way to the Balkan peninsula. We are therefore compelled to seek some other way, presenting fewer political obstacles and less complicated interests. Such a way is the Black Sea. On the other hand, we must raise the question, Shall we Russians content ourselves with that high aim which we placed before ourselves in the present war—the emancipation of the Turkish Christians and the amelioration of their condition? Shall we, in a moment of impulsive magnanimity, refuse all compensation for the labours and blood which the war has cost us? In general, it may be said that magnanimity and disinterestedness are high virtues in private personal relations, but have a very different signification in international affairs. We may well ask, whether a state has the right to sacrifice, without compensation, the fortune and life of its subjects in defence of interests not directly connected with its own wants and requirements? To us it seems that this question must be answered in the negative.

Russia must demand compensation for her losses; but as Turkey cannot, in her present bankrupt condition, pay the compensation in money, she must give it in some other form. The most effectual compensation of this kind would be the cession to Russia of the Turkish fleet. Thus, the chief points of a future treaty of peace might be the autonomy of the Slavonic provinces and the cession to us of the Turkish ironclads. The latter condition would be the best possible guarantee for the former, and would give us the possibility of watching over the independent development secured for our co-religionists by the treaty. Though this proposal may seem somewhat bold, it has in its favour so many just and well-founded motives that, by a little perseverance on our part and successful termination of the war, the Allied Powers would probably not refuse their co-operation in urging Turkey to consent. It has the advantage of being based on principles sanctioned by international law and precedent. After a successful war the victor always considers himself entitled to demand pecuniary compensation or cession of territory, and the amount of this compensation depends on the amount of success. When the French army was completely defeated, Prussia exacted a contribution of five milliards and annexed two provinces. France acted in like manner after the Italian war, in which the disinterested aim was the emancipation of Italy. Having gained comparatively unimportant victories, and before entering the Austrian Quadrilateral, she considered herself entitled to annex Savoy and Nice, covering the appropriation with the mask of popular suffrage. Taking this latter example as our model, we might certainly use a similar expedient and annex whole provinces of Turkey in accordance with the apparently sincere desire of the inhabitants. But, refraining from such imitation, we ought to foresee, on the one hand, that the Ottoman empire has no means of compensating us for our pecuniary expenditure, and, on the other, that territorial expansion, not at all desirable in itself, would drag us into political difficulties and complications. We ought, there-



fore, to seek some really neutral field where we may expect to meet with few opponents and find something which would serve as a material compensation, not only in the political, but also in the economic, commercial, and industrial sense. Such a field is, in my opinion, the Black Sea. Freedom of navigation, the opening of the straits, and the reconstruction of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, present such advantages for the future of Southern Russia, and for the further solution of the Eastern question, that, in comparison with them, all other conditions of peace must be regarded as secondary. We should be obliged, of course, to bear the heavy losses incurred during the war; but we should have the hope that these losses would be redeemed by the increased animation of our economic life on the whole coast of the Black Sea and in the basins of the Don and Dnieper. We may even lose all our direct roads to the Balkan peninsula if, as we ought to anticipate, at the mouth of the Danube will be formed a strong state with a German prince for the protection of German interests; but maritime communications, threatening in no way the interests of Germany, will give us the possibility of preserving our connection with the Balkan Slavs. Lastly, we shall meet here fewer antagonists than on any other field. Austria and Germany regard, if not with favour, at least with indulgence, our efforts in the East. They rightly think that the force of gravity of such a large body as Russia must be felt by adjacent countries, and will be the less dangerous for them the more we lean towards Asia. It would be best for all our allies and opponents if we acquired nothing; but if the right of victory gives us the possibility of demanding any compensation, the command of the Black Sea and the rounding of our frontier in Asiatic Turkey will probably meet with less opposition than our further interference in the affairs of the Balkan peninsula by the land route. Our principal and probably irreconcilable opponent will be England, or rather that party in the English Parliament which sees in every fleet a rival and a foe, and in every movement eastward a menace to British domi-

nion in India. That party is strong in England. It will receive with malicious anger the proposal to create anew a Russian fleet in the Black Sea, and perhaps it will offer armed resistance. We must, therefore, weigh the consequences of the hostility of the British empire, with its powerful armadas and countless financial resources. To decide that question directly in our own favour would be a light-headed act. If at the conclusion of peace we secured for ourselves the liberty of the Black Sea and of the Straits, that right would remain for many years a dead letter until we could construct a fleet. Turkey in alliance with England, might use the freedom of navigation for her own interest and our disadvantage. But the case would be very different if we obtained at once a ready-made fleet built in England for the Turkish government, and provided with all the latest improvements. We might then hope that, by disarming Turkey and by taking the necessary measures for the defence of our coasts against the English fleet, we would retain the command of that sea which is unquestionably the chief artery of our political and economic organism. Our sailors, whose bravery has survived the destruction of Sebastopol, would find a new career worthy of their heroism, and the shades of Lazareff, Nakhimoff, and Korniloff, would be avenged by the re-organisation of a fleet rendered famous by their names."

This article illustrates very fairly the drift of national opinion in Russia during the progress of the war, which of course was hostile to England. And the writer was perfectly accurate in saying that Englishmen would be suspicious of the motives of Russia in desiring to form a new armed fleet in the Black Sea. The idea that Russia might demand the Turkish fleet, or claim even a part of it in the shape of a war indemnity, gave rise to considerable discussion in this country; and there were not wanting many people who declared that any attempt to carry out such a policy would be regarded as a cause of war. The Russian government clearly perceived this, and did not venture to go so far as the advocates of an aggressive policy.

Servia had been hesitating throughout the summer and autumn as to the propriety of making common cause with the Russian invaders of Turkey. As we have already seen, public opinion was plainly expressed in many countries against the propriety of Servia engaging in hostilities with the Porte, having signed a convention with it at the beginning of the year. With the lapse of time this opinion naturally grew feebler; and at all events it was recognised on many hands that Prince Milan and his subjects could not be expected to abstain from the active prosecution of their ambitions, whether at the instigation of Russia or wholly on their own account.

The Principality waited its opportunity—that is to say, it waited until the Russian successes were sufficiently definite and assured to warrant the belief that Turkey could by no possibility turn the tables upon them. The Servians had no wish to see their hereditary enemies back across her borders, and they may be excused for declining to move until Russia had given ample evidence of her ability to conquer the Turks, and so to ensure Servia triumphs along with her own.

Meanwhile the army was being assiduously drilled and equipped, the reserves were called out, and volunteer corps were organised. Late in November it was generally expected that Servia would begin to move. The capture of Kars appears to have decided the government of Belgrade. The inhabitants on both sides of the frontier were warned to move; and the peaceable Turkish families withdrew as far as Pirot, Ak Palanka, and Nisch. The "Times" correspondent at Belgrade wrote, on the 22nd of November, that the Turks were making preparations for the expected advance of the Servians, both on the south-east, from Widdin to Nisch, and on the south-west, from Novi Bazar. It was anticipated that officers from the Russian headquarters would visit the Servian frontier, "with the view, mainly, of inspecting the Turkish works on the Timok, and it is thought they will afterwards remain with the Servian Staff. The

Porte," continued the writer, "has sent strict orders to the commandant of Ada Kaleh to stop and search every vessel passing there, and, if refractory, to fire on it. The Servian minister of war is about to distribute four thousand medals to soldiers on the frontier, in acknowledgment of gallant services rendered in the Servo-Turkish war. At Novi Bazar there were lately about thirteen thousand Irregulars, mostly Albanians and Circassians, part of whom have been sent to the Servian frontier, where they are committing horrible outrages among the inhabitants of Christian villages. A few days ago they made an incursion into Servia, driving away cattle and killing their owners."

Some of the military critics undervalued the Servian troops, judging too hastily from the results of the previous year's campaign, when the forces of Prince Milan were overwhelmed by the superiority of the Turkish regulars. Thus one of them formed the following estimate of Russia's new auxiliary—an estimate which was destined to be disproved, both by Servian valour and by want of energy on the part of the Turks. "Should Servia finally decide to take the field, she will be some time before she is able to render any efficient aid to her employers. Hafiz Pacha, one of the most able and energetic of the Turkish generals, is stationed at Novi Bazar, with instructions to take the offensive if Servia declares war. If he advances from the south with eight or ten thousand troops, Servia will have to place the main bulk of her army upon his line of march, and will not be able to do more than observe the Turkish forces at Widdin and Bazardjik. The late war afforded a fair test of Servian military power. She will, no doubt, organise raids across the frontier, burn villages, and excite the Bulgarians to murder their neighbours, as she did last year; but, as far as actual fighting in the open is concerned, a Turkish division of ten thousand men under such a general as Hafiz Pacha will be able to keep the whole army of the country in check. Even when led by Russian officers, and accompanied by Russian soldiers, they proved themselves despicable as



fighting men, and it is not probable that the continuous series of defeats which they met with last year have in any way tended to excite their courage or inflame their ardour."

The Servians did enter upon a winter's campaign against Turkey, and reaped a number of important successes; but as these did not take place until after the fall of Plevna, we may leave them for narration in a future chapter.

Meanwhile the army of relief was still anxiously hoping that Suleiman Pacha would be able to make a diversion in its favour by breaking through the Russian army of the Lom, or at least by forcing the Russians to send assistance to the czarewitch. Suleiman had been successful in this way at the Schipka Pass, where, as we have already seen, large reinforcements had to be despatched from before Plevna in the greatest haste. But the impetuous Turkish general could not repeat his achievements of the autumn. He did little more on the Lom than had been done by Mehemet Ali himself; and his countrymen were vastly disappointed by his failure.

On the 7th of November the "Standard" correspondent at Rasgrad described the position on the Lom in an interesting letter, from which we may quote the following passages:—

"Tempestuous weather and the exigencies of the army have completely upset the postal arrangements with Constantinople, so that instead of two mails a week at regular intervals we occasionally receive the two in one; the departures correspond, giving us in this way but a weekly communication with the outside world. The winter migration has not been confined to the feathered creation alone; the last batch of foreign correspondents left by the mail on Friday last for Constantinople, *en route* for their respective homes, promising to return with the spring. I think, however, the Turks would prefer being without the prospect of their company, all things considered. Yesterday the cold stormy weather I have been telegraphing capriciously broke up, and to-day was bright and warm, drying up the roads and fields, and making even the Egyptian soldiers who are inhabiting the lower part of the

house in which I have my quarters, for the moment once more cheerful and chatty. Unlike the Turks, who usually are very quiet in quarters, the Egyptians keep up one incessant jabber from early morning till late into the night, occasionally so vehement that one imagines bloodshed is inevitable; but mediation takes place and comparative quiet is restored. The guttural Arabic in which they converse, in combination with their gestures, favours immensely the idea that they are indulging in violent quarrels when it turns out to be nothing but the most ordinary conversation. About seven o'clock this morning, as I was returning from the railway station, I passed a small parade on the roadside. The officer was calling over the roll, meanwhile leaning against a post, the men industriously nibbling biscuit to counteract the effect of the dull morning air. They bear a rather indifferent reputation among the Turks, with whom they are not popular: two nights past some half-dozen of them throttled the sentry posted over one of the stores at the station, and before he could recover had decamped with two bags of biscuit. Nothing is safe from their pilfering fingers, and altogether they are as unpleasant neighbours as one need wish for. Fortunately only two battalions are left here and two at Rustchuk; all the rest being at Varna.

"Though there is nothing of special importance going on along the line of the Lom, still both sides are active. The day before yesterday a body of Cossacks, making a reconnaissance near Solenik, was surprised by the Turks, and for the first time an officer, a captain of Cossacks, was captured. He was brought before an officer of the staff to-day and could hardly convince himself that he had fallen into the hands of the Turks. He confessed he had come on without sufficient caution, but now his head was safe on his shoulders he felt less regret at his fate, for he was faring better than he had been on his own side. Throughout the Russian army he said it was universally believed that every prisoner the Turks took they beheaded immediately. I believe if it could be known among the enemy that



CONSTANTINOPLE IN ASIATIC TURKEY





such is not the case numbers of men would be taken prisoners. On Saturday last there was a brilliant reconnaissance by the Turks from Stararjeka, towards Bebrova. The Russian entrenchments were carried, and large quantities of ammunition, provisions, and stores, destroyed. A considerable sum in paper roubles was also taken. The Russians fell back to Elena, where they were reinforced, and returned, but were unable to save their supplies or to overtake the Turks, who had returned to Stararjeka. The Turkish loss was eighty-eight killed and wounded, among whom was one imam or battalion priest, and two captains of Bashi-Bazouks. These latter auxiliaries, as they are now termed, are reported to have fought very well on this occasion, and to have been well led. The great fault of these auxiliaries has been the want of organisation among them; and this fault it is, I hear, Suleiman Pacha's intention to remedy by giving them officers and forming them into battalions. There is no reason whatever why they should display less bravery than the regular troops, and they would give a very valuable addition of some thirty thousand men, in the prime of life, in the army. The Circassians one has less hope of: they submit to discipline unwillingly, can never be brought under fire in regular formation, and nothing but the hope of plunder induces them to incur any risk. They are the terror of the surrounding country, stealing horses, cattle, and everything they can lay hands on, from Turk and Bulgar alike. About Pravady they are reported to be more particularly indulging in outrages just now, the caimakam of that town being himself a Circassian and shielding his compatriots from justice. The price of wood even is affected by their doings, the people being afraid to go into the forests for fear of having their cattle stolen by them; a load of firewood, which ordinarily could be bought for fifteen piastres, now costs forty or fifty. They, however, occasionally do inflict some injury on the enemy, and deserve to have anything in their favour recorded. A few nights ago, when the weather was very stormy, a party of them sallied out from the

Turkish lines to a small village near Sadina, where the Cossacks were on outpost. The Circassians found the enemy safely sheltered and sleeping soundly, without sentries or vedettes to give any warning. Without rousing the sleeping Cossacks they laid hands on many sets of accoutrements and the whole of the horses of the outpost, with which they got away safely in the darkness. They did not attempt to kill any of the slumberers for fear of awakening them, and so running the risk of being overpowered by the Cossacks, who were superior in number to themselves.

"The positions on the Lom are now much more formidable than they were a month ago. The whole line from Kasan to Solenik has been greatly strengthened, and the heights of Sarnasufklar and Karahassankoi, which are the key of the whole position, may be said to be impregnable. Popkoi is for the moment debateable ground, being held by the Turkish cavalry pickets, the Russians occupying Karagatch, Posapina, and Kopace. At Kadikoi, Assaf still retains his position, covering the railway intact. According to reports there has been a sensible weakening of the Russian line all along our front, with the object, it is believed, of pressing operations against Plevna with all available force. From Osman nothing has been heard for many days, and rumours of every kind are flying about; still it is expected he will hold out successfully till the Russians are compelled by the severity of the weather to abandon the attempt to capture Plevna. Suleiman returns to-morrow from a tour to Osman Bazar and an inspection of the whole of his line of defence, which may result in some active movements should the fine weather with which we are favoured continue. The health of the troops has very much improved since they have gone into their new winter quarters, and the sheepskin jackets with which they are supplied, if not elegant, are warm and comfortable. The greatest sufferers are the transport animals, for which shelter has not yet been provided; but this will be done as soon as the men can be spared to construct sheds for them. Taking all things into consideration, though the Turks are



far from attaining the standard of organisation of modern western armies, they are far in advance of their own of former wars, while their adversaries appear to have made little or no progress. The Ottoman is silently learning many valuable lessons, more especially the private soldiers, who are beginning to have a very comprehensive view of their own power; they criticise very freely the conduct and capacity of their leaders, and will be found, I am quite certain, very unwilling to accept a man in whom they have no confidence. This was very noticeable when Mehemet Ali was displaced by Suleiman. This latter general has, however, very much risen in the estimation both of his men and officers; the latter fully appreciating a chief who keeps his own counsel, and is not too readily swayed by external expressions of opinion, the fault of Mehemet Ali.

"The simple loyalty of the soldiers to the sultan is their distinguishing characteristic, and is the real bond of cohesion of the Turkish army in the lower ranks; among the higher, self-interest, in its worst features, is the ruling motive. On the last occasion of a large batch of sick being sent from here to Varna they received at this station a plate of soup-stew from the kitchen of the National Aid Society, which has been established under the superintendence of Dr. Jolly. The unfortunate fellows, who had marched up from the town, three miles, in rain and cold, before beginning their meal, called down the blessing of Allah on the Padischah who had provided it. The Imam, who had accompanied them from the hospital, was better informed, and told them that they ought to thank Allah for putting it into the hearts of the English people, who had sent out money and doctors to take care of them when they were sick. This is but one of many similar instances. The gratitude of the sufferers who find relief at the hands of our medical men is unbounded and sincere, and will long live in their remembrance when years are past; it is so unlike what they experience at the hands of their own doctors, who rest quite satisfied with the most perfunctory exercise of their duty, for which in com-

parison with other services in the army they are fairly remunerated, knowing that they are indispensable and can always strike if indifferently treated. The National Aid Society officers out here have, I am glad to say, reverted to the use of the Red Cross on their brassards, instead of the Red Crescent, which they for a time adopted. In this they have acted wisely, for the real Turk is tolerant, and there was nothing to gain in pandering to the prejudices of the pseudo-Turks, not always Mussulmans, who are frequently more Turk than the Turks themselves. I have seen no sign of disrespect or fanaticism towards those wearing the cross, and those most concerned, the soldiers, look on the service rendered as much more important than any sign or distinctive mark. It was a retrograde step adopting the Crescent, and most will agree that a wholesome discretion has been exercised in returning to their own original badge. The Turk, like most other people, respects those who respect themselves, and does not always regard imitation as the sincerest flattery. The National Aid Society are placing an ambulance and hospital at Silistria, in preparation for the winter, and any possible exigencies of the campaign, as there is no other established here, and the station is sufficiently important for a separate service."

About ten days after this letter was written—that is to say, on the 18th and 19th of November—the Turks made a general advance of their whole line between the Lom and the Jantra rivers, especially on the north, between Rasgrad and the Danube. According to a Turkish account, probably derived from Suleiman Pacha himself, who was in supreme command, Selim Pacha, with seven battalions of infantry, eight guns, and three squadrons of regular cavalry, together with the Circassian cavalry commanded by Dilaver Pacha, marched in the direction of Pyrgos, with the object of reconnoitring the Russian positions on the Jantra and the headquarters of the czarewitch. "Selim Pacha carried and destroyed the first and second lines of entrenchment, driving out the enemy at the

point of the bayonet. A considerable number of Russians were killed. At the same time the second infantry regiment, under Ibrahim Pacha, carried the Russian fortifications on the Metchka heights after a desperate struggle, and destroyed seventy casemates containing ammunition, war material, and provisions. During the action Pyrgos was set on fire. The Russians lost one thousand four hundred men. The left wing, numbering four battalions, with four guns, some cavalry, belonging to the command of Ibrahim Pacha, in addition to five battalions, two batteries, and a cavalry regiment, which had arrived from Karaciena, succeeded in dislodging the Russians who were entrenched at Keurtckesle, near Jovantchifik. The right wing, with cavalry under Dilaver Pacha, successfully repulsed several attacks made by the Russian cavalry, and a Russian attack upon Kadikoi was also repulsed. During this action heavy cannonading and rifle firing was exchanged between the Turkish and Roumanian banks of the Danube, near Rustchuk."

A slightly different account of this engagement was forwarded by the correspondent of an English paper.\* On Monday, according to his telegram, "the Turks advanced from Schumla, Rustchuk, and Kadikoi, in three columns, and attacked the Russian 12th Corps in the positions of Pyrgos and Gelschesme. Osman Bey, with five battalions, twelve guns, and six squadrons from Jovantchifik, and Ibrahim Pacha, with four battalions, four guns, and two squadrons from Krasna, took Gelschesme. Simultaneously, Selim and Dilaver Pachas, with seven battalions, eight guns, and three squadrons, attacked Pyrgos. Abdullah Bey's skirmishers stormed the trenches of Pyrgos with the bayonet, and the second regiment stormed the second entrenched Russian lines on Metchka heights. The Russians left all their stores, and the Turks burnt them. The purpose of the battle was to reconnoitre the forces before Biela.

During the conflict the Russian batteries on the Roumanian shore cannonaded the Turkish right wing. The guns at Rustchuk answered this cannonade. The losses are said to amount to one thousand three hundred Russians and three hundred Turks."

The Russian official account represented that sixteen Turkish battalions from Rustchuk, Basarbowo, and Tchifik, attacked the positions in possession of our outposts at Pyrgos, Khanguel, Tschesme, and between Tchifik and Trostenik. "After a stubborn engagement, towards six o'clock in the evening, the Turks were completely repulsed at every point. Our loss is not yet precisely known, but, so far as has at present been ascertained, one officer was killed and seven were wounded. Up to yesterday evening seventy-eight wounded soldiers had been brought in. The fighting at Pyrgos was the most obstinate, two companies of the Azof and Dnieper regiments defending themselves heroically against a vastly superior Turkish force. The loss sustained by the former obliged them at last to retire in the direction of Metssetka, whereupon the whole of the first brigade of the twelfth division advanced upon Pyrgos and drove out the Turks, about half-past four in the afternoon, necessitating their retreat across the Lom. The Turks had, however, already reduced Pyrgos to ashes. At three o'clock in the afternoon of the same day the Turks attacked the outposts of the 36th Regiment of Cossacks and the Lubni Hussar Regiment, but were also repulsed. Towards six o'clock in the evening our outposts re-occupied their former positions along the whole line. . . . The Russian loss at Statarion on the 17th inst. amounted to two men wounded, and at the bombardment of General Skobelev's position by the Turks, on the 19th inst., to one officer and two men wounded. The exact loss sustained in the outpost fighting, which occurred on the 19th inst. in the neighbourhood of Pyrgos and Tschesne, is not yet known, but, so far as has at present been ascertained, one officer was killed, and seven officers, including a colonel, and seventy-eight soldiers, were wounded."

\* The "Manchester Guardian," which distinguished itself during the war by the earliness and general accuracy of its news.



A week later the Turkish advance was repeated, in a more formidable manner; but the result was more unfavourable. Of this engagement Suleiman Pacha was only able to say that he had pushed victoriously as far as Metchka, but that the Russians had subsequently "returned to the charge." The facts of the case may be gathered from the official despatches forwarded from the Russian head-quarters at Bogot. According to these, at nine o'clock in the morning of the 26th, the Turks, with a large force, attacked the Russian fortified positions at Trostenik and Metchka. After a severely contested engagement, lasting six hours, the Russian troops under the command of the Grand Duke Vladimir Alexandrowitch, "succeeded in brilliantly repulsing the enemy, and then assuming the offensive, pursued the Turks until it became quite dark, notwithstanding the long range of the Turkish artillery which covered their retreat. The affair was of a serious character, and is considered very creditable to the 12th Army Corps. The details of the fighting received by the Imperial staff state that the Turks attacked the Russians most stubbornly and suffered great loss, inasmuch as they approached to within a hundred paces of the Russian batteries. A large number of Turkish killed remained on the battle-field, and some of their wounded were taken prisoners. The Russian loss was about three hundred men, including many officers of the Ukraine regiment, which particularly distinguished itself in the pursuit of the Turks. In recognition of this affair the emperor has conferred upon the Grand Duke Vladimir the order of St. George of the third class. On the 26th instant the Turks advanced upon Polomasca, but as soon as the small Russian detachment occupying the place assumed the offensive the enemy retreated behind the Lom without accepting battle. About noon the same day a Turkish detachment of all arms advanced in the direction of Kaceljevo, but retreated after a few shots had been exchanged. In this affair the Turks were attacked by the Ataman and Ingusch regiments."

Simultaneous efforts were made by Suleiman

Pacha to break through on the south of the line near Elena; but to no purpose. It was evident that the Turkish general did his best, at all events at this juncture, to reap a triumph over the Russians; and his advance upon Metchka and Pyrgos was very nearly successful. The main object, no doubt, was to cut the communications of the invaders with the Danube; and if this could only have been done, Plevna would possibly have been relieved. Suleiman has been greatly blamed for his conduct during the whole campaign, and especially for his failures from this time forward; but it is doubtful whether any one else in his place could have done better at this moment. The army of the czarewitch performed an excellent service; and it was no light thing to have resisted so long the forces of Mehemet Ali and Suleiman Pacha.

Early in December, however, Suleiman Pacha was successful in a further attempt on Elena, on the road from Osman Bazar to Tirnova; and his capture of this place threw the Russians at Tirnova into a state of alarm. In fact, it had the result which was expected from the Turkish generalissimo, of withdrawing Russian troops from the west; but not in such quantities as to be greatly serviceable to the Turkish cause.

The Russian official account of this affair was as follows:—"At seven o'clock on the morning of the 4th inst., between twenty and thirty thousand Turks attacked the Russian position at Mahren. Prince Mirsky, with the Sieff and Orel Regiments, was compelled to return to Elena, where, though surrounded on three sides, he repelled the Turkish attacks until three P.M. He sustained relatively heavy losses, and was obliged to proceed from Elena to the position in the village of Jakowitz, which had been fortified beforehand, and is situated at the entrance to a gorge. Reinforcements are being sent to him from all sides. At half-past eight o'clock this morning (5th inst.) the Turks vigorously resumed the attack, but Prince Mirsky retained his position. The latest advices, 5.30 P.M., announce that the Turks have ceased their attack, and Prince Mirsky's reinforcements are arriving.

The Turkish account was naturally more circumstantial, and probably more trustworthy, in some particulars. The following despatch from Suleiman Pacha, dated December 4th, was received at the Turkish ministry of war:—"Today the brigades under Rechid and Renzi Pachas carried the Russian positions at Mariani, compelling the enemy to withdraw to his second line of defence behind Elena. Our infantry was compelled to await the planting of artillery on the surrounding heights before continuing the pursuit. Immediately afterwards the brigade of Hussein Pacha advanced to the left of Renzi Pacha's force, along the Tirnova road, and compelled the enemy to fall back on his third line of defence, which it is impossible for the Russians to hold. By four o'clock in the evening our victory was complete. Elena is now in our hands. We captured eleven guns, twenty ammunition waggons, and a quantity of arms, and took three hundred prisoners, amongst them a colonel and three captains. Our booty in arms and provisions was immense. The loss of the enemy is estimated at three thousand men *hors de combat*. Our losses have not yet been ascertained. The Russian forces defending Elena consisted of sixteen battalions of infantry, with twenty-four guns, while the number of our troops was greatly inferior."

Nothing came of this success for the unfortunate Turks. It was anticipated that Suleiman Pacha would have pushed on to Tirnova at all hazards; for the capture of that town would have made the Schipka Pass untenable, and might have turned the fate of the campaign. But Prince Mirsky's reinforcements sufficed to make the Russians greatly outnumber their enemy, at all events for the time. Could Suleiman Pacha have brought up an equivalent force, and pursued his advantage? His critics and accusers say that he might have done so. We may hereafter return to the general question of the pacha's conduct during the war.

Meanwhile General Gourko was holding in check the "army of relief" by a series of gallant struggles in the Balkans near Etropol. On the

3rd of December a brilliant Russian success was gained under the direction of General Ellis, who succeeded in carrying the heights to the west of the Sofia road, which dominated the Turkish position at Arab Konak. "The position," says the Russian official account, "was not won until after some hard fighting. The Russian troops, in climbing the heights, were exposed from half-past ten in the morning until three o'clock in the afternoon to the violent attacks of twelve tabors of Turkish troops, all of which were repulsed by the Russian advanced line, consisting of four battalions. At one moment the position of the Russians was critical, but in the end they triumphed. After their third attack the Turks were decisively driven back, after suffering great loss. The commanding heights were then occupied by the Russians, who were subsequently largely reinforced by troops brought up by General Schouvaloff. The position is strongly fortified. The bombardment of the Turkish positions at Arab Konak and Schandorinsk was commenced on the same day. The Russian loss is reported to have amounted to one hundred and fifty men. Some Turks who were taken prisoners declared that Mehemet Ali Pacha was at Arab Konak."

We may close the present chapter by adding a short account of the two Geshoffs, who were taken prisoners at Philippopolis by the Turks, and who were for a long time in danger of death from the fanatical conduct of the authorities, who were at this time hanging many Bulgarians in cold blood. The Geshoffs were personally known to a large number of Englishmen, and a great interest was felt in their fate. They had been accused of plotting against the Turks, and preparing for the advance of the Russians; but it is not evident that any direct crime of treason was ever brought home to them. The following particulars were supplied by a correspondent in Constantinople, writing on the 16th day of November.

"About two months ago a number of the leading Bulgarians residing at Philippopolis, among whom were two cousins, each bearing



the name of John Geshoff, were arrested, at the instance of the Turkish government, upon a charge of conspiracy. One of the two Geshoffs, a young man of six or eight and twenty, was educated in England, where, in Manchester and its vicinity, he has many friends, and, I believe, some relations. On his return to this country he set up in business as a general merchant, in which capacity he met with considerable success until the recent troubles in Bulgaria. Having established a good position at Philippopolis, he was selected by the United States Legation in Turkey as a proper person to fill the office of the United States vice-consul in Bulgaria, where American missionaries have of late years been labouring. The official documents authorising the appointment of Mr. Geshoff only reached Philippopolis a few hours after his arrest, and it is now an open question whether the appointment will stand good. Over and over again has the Porte been urged by the representative of the United States here to send the prisoners down to Constantinople; but although it has frequently been rumoured that they had been sent from Philippopolis, and even that they had arrived here, this was really not an accomplished fact until last Saturday. Hearing that they had arrived the previous evening, and being anxious to discover their whereabouts, I called on Sunday upon a member of the Diplomatic Corps to inquire about them. I found that they were with other members of the family—female as well as male—at a *locanda*, or Turkish restaurant, in Stamboul, under a guard of Zaptiehs. It appears that the day before that on which those members of the Geshoff family who were under arrest left Philippopolis, all the other members of their family residing in Philippopolis received a polite invitation from the Mutesarif, or governor, to dine with him. Such an attention astonished them, but, of course, they were obliged to accept his hospitality, although they did so in fear and trembling. Let me here mention that what followed has been related to me by a gentleman upon whose word I can absolutely rely. Upon arriving at the house of the

governor, they were received with the utmost kindness, and were treated as honoured guests, notwithstanding the fact that among the number were the fathers of the two young Geshoffs then in prison at Philippopolis. To cut matters short, everything passed off in the most felicitous manner, and, dessert having been removed and coffee and cigarettes handed round, some of those present who had business to attend to ventured to drop a hint to this effect in the hearing of their host, with a view to taking their departure. The governor, however, quietly remarked, 'No, you must be my guests for to-night.' In response to this kind invitation, a few of those present ventured to show signs of dissatisfaction; upon which one of the officers in waiting informed them that, no matter whether it might be against their will or not, they would be obliged to remain. In the circumstances, they had of course to submit, and while every possible consideration was shown to them in regard to accommodation for the night, they could entertain no doubt, from the bearing of their attendant, that they were virtually prisoners. At an early hour in the morning the governor's guests were awakened, and, without having an opportunity of bidding adieu to their host of the previous evening they were conducted by Zaptiehs to two arabas (native carts, about the size of a brewer's dray), to the drivers of which orders were given to take them to the railway station. One of the gentlemen ventured to protest against this proceeding, saying, 'There must be some mistake. I want to go to my house.' The arabadji, or driver, laconically replied, 'I have other orders,' and started for the railway station. Before arriving at their destination, the arabas, which were now surrounded by a guard of mounted Zaptiehs, were directed to pull up, and remained for several minutes in full view of a gibbet, upon which were the bodies of two Bulgarians who had been hanged that morning for taking part with the Russians against the Turkish troops. When the prisoners—for such they most undoubtedly were—arrived at the station they were placed, still under guard, in the train about to leave for Con-

stantinople. Later on the fathers of the two young Geshoffs learnt that their sons were being conveyed to Constantinople in the same train. This was in the morning of Friday, the 9th inst. They arrived at the half-way station—Adrianople—the same evening. Here, again, they were strictly guarded, and passed the night in a *locanda* adjoining the railway station. The following morning they again took the train and arrived at Constantinople, as already mentioned, on the evening of the 11th instant. The *locanda* in Stamboul to which they were conveyed, although bearing the title of ‘Hotel d’Andrinople,’ is in reality nothing but a fourth-rate Turkish restaurant, and, when it is remembered that the prisoners, among whom there are several ladies, belong to the leading and wealthy families of Philippopolis, it will easily be understood that their comforts were not numerous. On Monday a still severer trial awaited them, for a guard of Zaptiehs took the male prisoners away from the *locanda* to the prison of the Grand Zaptiehs, where, I am informed, they are still incarcerated. It seems to be the prevailing impression here that there is no longer any ground for apprehension that any of the Geshoff family will suffer the extreme penalty of the law for the course they are accused of having taken against the government. There is little doubt, however, that the two cousins will be exiled to one of the islands of the Archipelago. It is impossible to surmise the fate which awaits the rest of the family.”

Great efforts were put forth on the part of the Geshoffs by their friends; and even the English government made certain representations through their officials in Turkey. By this means the unfortunate merchants were saved from a hasty and unjust punishment; and eventually they were restored to liberty.

## CHAPTER XXXV.

## THE FALL OF PLEVNA.

NOVEMBER drew to an end at last, and with it departed the remnants of the fine weather which had so long and so greatly favoured the Russians in their enforced inactivity before the fortresses, and along their lines of defence or investment. December opened with severe frosts and heavy falls of snow; and the winter, which had already overtaken General Gourko in the Balkans, now descended into the plains, and fiercely attacked the allies before Plevna, and the soldiers on both sides who were cooped up in the redoubts and intrenchments.

The Russians felt more and more convinced that the last scene in the memorable siege was close at hand. They were never long without some information as to the condition of Osman Pacha and his gallant army. It was asserted that they had spies within the Turkish lines, who managed to keep them supplied with useful knowledge; but whether this was so or not, the prisoners and deserters who occasionally fell into the hands of the grand duke and his staff were able to make them acquainted with the ever-increasing difficulties and extremities of the besieged. A private in the trenches might not know anything of Osman Pacha’s plans or proceedings; but now and then one of the rank and file would be in possession of knowledge which it was serviceable to the Russians to acquire.

In this way the Grand Duke Nicholas heard that the defenders of Plevna were coming to the end of their provisions; that the rations served out to the men were smaller and smaller every day, and that the army, when it did capitulate, would fall into his hands at the point of starvation. He at once ordered to Bogot—or some say that the czar himself took this humane precaution—a large store of biscuits; and Prince Charles of Roumania did the same thing. Unfortunately, as it turned out, these supplies did



not come up in time, or they were not immediately available when the moment of need arrived.

Meanwhile the besiegers actively maintained their assault on the devoted town, raining shot and shell upon the redoubts and earthworks, and beyond them into the plain of Plevna itself. The Turks did not reply; and it was argued from this fact that their ammunition was failing. Others denied the truth of this conclusion, as also of the rumour that the food was falling short. But it has turned out that both ideas were approximately correct, and that Osman Pacha was really at a desperate extremity during the first week of December. If his supplies were not quite exhausted, they were so nearly so that he could not dream of holding out for another month—far less for the whole winter. He had sufficient biscuit and sufficient ammunition to provide his army for a final effort, and to give every man a slender six days' rations. Little more than this remained to him on the 7th or 8th of December; and he consequently had to face the alternative of capitulating or endeavouring to break through the Russian lines of investment.

All hope of relief from without had failed him. He knew that the Sofia road had been closed by the Russians, that Gourko was on his way to Orkanieh, if not already there, and that the Russians and Roumanians had joined hands on the west of him. He could not think of making his sortie on the south; and his best chance seemed to be in a desperate push to the north-west, in the direction of Widdin. He did not know that the Roumanians had captured Rahova, on the Danube; and he thought it possible, as he has since declared, to break past the Roumanians before the Russian Guards could come up in force, and to effect a junction with the garrison in Rahova.

On Saturday, the 8th of December, the Russians were certainly in momentary expectation of a sortie, and the men in the trenches kept eager watch, day and night, for the first symptom of activity on the part of the Turks. The time passed, however, and Sunday came, bringing along with it a heavy snow-storm, so that

the besiegers began to think that Osman Pacha would be obliged to delay any movement which he might have contemplated.

To illustrate the prevalent opinions held on the eve of the sortie with respect to the condition of Osman's army, we may cite the remarks of a correspondent in Turna Magurelle, whose letter appeared in the "Daily News" of December 12th. "The weakest part of the Russian and Roumanian lines at Plevna," he wrote, "is defended by no less than sixty-two guns, the fire of which can be concentrated on any spot the Turks may choose for a sortie; besides this there is a musketry fire that can only be called murderous. During any night attack, the allied troops have orders to fire horizontally, *raser la terre* to the ground, and owing to the configuration of the hills, which rise at about the same gradient throughout, this, if carried out, will be most deadly. With regard to the provisions, or rather the want of them, in Plevna, a subject about which everybody speaks most and knows least, and which necessarily is only a matter for conjecture, I was taken to see a Turkish non-commissioned officer on Saturday, the 1st December, who was captured by the Roumanians during the previous night, whilst trying to stalk a Roumanian horse. He was shown me by a Roumanian officer of the staff, as a proof of the starving condition the Turks were in. What I saw was a good-looking, thin, wiry man, about five feet nine inches; his clothes torn, and of much too light material for this time of year; altogether what I should call a man in hard training—fit, in racing terms, to 'run for his life,' and showing not a bit more signs of wear and tear about him than five or six weeks of hard campaigning would warrant. On Sunday 2nd, I saw here in Turna Maguerelle thirty-seven prisoners taken at Plevna by the Roumanians whilst cutting wood outside the Turkish works. I had every opportunity of looking at them as they were being photographed, and were carefully brought out one by one and examined, with a view of getting the worse points of the Turks in the best position of the photographs. Among

them were two men, both old, wanting in physique, utterly worn out, and suffering, I think, from acute dysentery, their clothes in rags, feet swathed in dirty bandages, and as they stood ankle-deep in the foul mud, leaning their weary weight against the backs of their stronger comrades who stood in front of them, one's heart sickened at what is truly the saddest picture I have seen of the war. Turning from these to the other side of the group stands prominent and unmistakable Punjabi, tall, straight as a dart, clean, a soldier every inch, and healthy and well fed to boot. Next to him, scarcely reaching his shoulder, is a light infantry sergeant, the large orange coloured chevrons standing out clean on his arm, his clothes trim, the green braid on his jacket being even fit for parade, his sharp cut features showing intelligence and health. I have given the best and worst of the thirty-seven; of the rest, some five or six were lame; they had marched thirty-two miles in two days, over very bad roads, the first day in heavy rain; some two or three were sick, and some tired, but in no case were there the tell-tale lines in the hands and neck which I have learnt in my Indian experience so surely denote want of food. Their own account is that bread is growing scarce in Plevna, only one piece being given to each soldier a day; that meat was plentiful, but no wood to cook it with. Hence they were taken prisoners in trying to procure some. All this must be taken with the greatest caution, as like true Orientals a Turk quickly divines what his questioner wishes him to say, and as quickly says it with such an air of perfect truth that it is hard to disbelieve even when you know this Eastern peculiarity of his.

"The opinion that, at the fall of Plevna, Osman Pacha will be taken prisoner with his whole army is daily growing more general. That he can break through the Russian and Roumanian works seems almost impossible. Day by day have they been strengthened till, at their weakest spot, sixty-two cannon sweep the ground. Even supposing him through the lines of the allies, without transport, without cavalry, with his troops necessarily disorganised by the per-

formance of such a splendid feat of arms, he would be impeded by Russian cavalry and horse artillery till, like the French at Sedan, the moment would come when he could fight no more. As I write, as if to point the argument, the advance guard of what I am told, on the authority of the sub-prefect here, is a Russian army corps, forty thousand strong, principally cavalry and artillery, is now passing my window, first a regiment of Cossacks, then two regiments of dragoons, then twelve light field guns, in all about two thousand men, well horsed, well turned out, and fine big fellows. To-night they sleep at Nicopolis. To-morrow two thousand more are added to the one hundred and twenty thousand Russians already round Plevna."

But Ghazi Osman did not give the Russians time to bring any greater force to Plevna; and indeed no greater force was needed for the capture of the devoted town.

Early in the morning of Monday a deserter was brought in to General Skobelev—who had been compelled to fall back about three-quarters of a mile on the Loftcha road, from the forward position which he had occupied at Brestovac. This deserter, possibly a Bulgarian by race, if not by religion, informed the general that the great redoubt which had so long resisted his efforts (though he had been in possession of it for a day in September) was abandoned by the Turks, and that the men had been withdrawn from the neighbouring earthworks. The general cautiously assured himself of the truth of this information, and then lost no time in communicating the news to head-quarters at Bogot.

Presently the boom of artillery on the other side of Plevna announced the actual progress of the sortie. The field-telegraph established by the Russians signalled the momentous news all round the circle of investment, and by daybreak the whole besieging army knew that the critical moment had arrived.

Thus it was on Monday morning, the 10th of December, 1877, that Osman Pacha had come to the determination to make a last desperate effort for his country and his army. He



had carried out his idea of breaking the lines where he imagined them to be weakest, at the point of junction between the Russians and Roumanians. This point was over against the village of Opanes, on the left or further side of the river Vid, which flows northward on the west of Plevna. The Russian guard had taken up its position between the Sofia road and Opanes; and near this place a division of grenadiers had established a powerful battery.

Osman Pacha had withdrawn all his men from the defensive works, had supplied them with a week's food and a hundred and fifty rounds of ball cartridge, and had constructed two bridges across the river on the Sunday night. Then he left the sick and wounded behind him in Plevna, carried his men and his baggage across the Vid, and instantly fell upon the battery just mentioned at Opanes. He took this line of intrenchments at the point of the bayonet; and thus it was that he began his gallant sortie.

The first news of the fall of Plevna reached Europe through Bucharest, where a telegram was received on the evening of Monday, the 10th of December. This telegram simply stated that Osman Pacha, who was wounded, had surrendered unconditionally, with the whole of his army, and that Plevna was in the hands of the Russo-Roumanian troops.

The Russian official despatch, dated the same evening, declared that in the morning, at half-past seven o'clock, the whole of Osman Pacha's army attacked the Russian Grenadier Corps holding the line of investment on the left bank of the Vid, with the object of forcing a passage; that the attack was made with desperate energy, and a portion of the Turkish troops did in fact succeed in penetrating the line of intrenchments and batteries, but that all attempts to break through the positions guarded by the grenadiers were ineffectual. "After five hours' severe fighting the Turks were defeated, and Osman Pacha, surrounded on all sides, was compelled to surrender with his whole army. Up to the present it is impossible to estimate the number of Turkish prisoners or the quantity of war ma-

terial taken. It is only known that everything in Plevna has fallen into the hands of the Russians. The Russian losses are stated to have been inconsiderable compared with the result obtained. The Astrachan, Siberian, and Samogitian grenadier regiments lost most heavily in the fighting."

A subsequent telegram from Prince Gortschakoff to the Russian embassies stated that the capture of Plevna had cost two superior officers, 8 officers, and 182 soldiers killed; 5 superior officers, 40 officers, and 1,207 soldiers wounded. "The Turks have lost 4,000 men. We have taken 10 pachas, 128 superior officers, 2,000 officers, 30,000 soldiers, 1,200 cavalry, and 77 guns. The pachas have been sent to Bogot. Military honours are paid to Osman Pacha; a guard of honour is before his tent."

A fuller Russian official account, based partly on information supplied by Tefik, reckoned the captured army at sixty tabors, or about forty thousand men, with sixty pieces of artillery, and a small force of cavalry, and the number of pachas taken at seven. The official account continues:—"Osman Pacha's attempt to break through our lines was heroic, and worthy of the whole of his previous defence. The Turks fought like lions, but met with an obstinate resistance. Throwing themselves with all their force upon the left flank of the grenadier corps, composed of the Siberian regiments, they rushed into our entrenchments, in spite of a murderous volley of rifle shot and shells. The grenadiers defended their position with desperate valour, and, when the Astrachan and Samogat regiments hastened to the spot they, jointly with the latter, drove the Turks out of the entrenchments, and took from them a flag and three guns. Thereupon the whole corps of grenadiers assumed the offensive, and drove the Turks back across the river Vid; but our other troops and the Roumanian forces here took the Turks in rear and flank, whereupon the valiant defender of Plevna was compelled to lay down his arms and give himself up as prisoner with the whole of his army."

On the 11th a thanksgiving service was held in presence of the Emperor Alexander in a Turkish redoubt on the road between Plevna and Grivitza, where Osman Pacha had his head-quarters during the siege. After the ceremony his Majesty had a friendly interview with Osman Pacha, entered into conversation with him, and returned him his sword as a mark of respect.

The first public announcement of the disaster made in Constantinople was by an official statement on Wednesday evening, which simply declared that Osman Pacha made a sortie from Plevna on the 10th, and, after five hours' heroic fighting, was compelled to fall back, but found his original positions occupied by the enemy.

It was natural that the earlier accounts of this momentous event should differ very considerably. Several days passed before the general public knew exactly what had taken place on the 10th of December. One of the earliest accounts, in the "Standard" newspaper, informed us—with only approximate correctness, as it afterwards turned out—that Osman Pacha's attempt was "principally directed against Gorny Metropol, where three Russian regiments were decimated, and Dolny Metropol, where the Roumanian troops, to whom had been assigned the task of frustrating a sortie at this place, had been stationed. They had prepared a kind of dam, by means of which they intended to inundate the valley when Osman Pacha should determine to make a sortie from the besieged town. It is not known whether their works were brought into operation at any time during the disastrous struggle which has taken place. Osman not only left his position in the interior of Plevna, but also his entrenched camp, evidently with the hope that he would be successful in penetrating the Russian line. After a fruitless combat of six hours' duration the Turks were obliged to retire. But it was now found to be too late for them to retrieve their former positions. The Roumanians from the Grivitza redoubt, and the Russians from other points, had occupied the Turkish forts, and Osman found himself immediately attacked on the flank, and very soon afterwards

on all sides. The Turks made a very brave resistance, during which their gallant commander was wounded."

The wound was declared to be in the arm. Others named the leg, and others the ankle.

But the palm amongst the correspondents fell once more to the representative of the "Daily News" at the Russian head-quarters. It would be impossible to attempt a narrative of the Russian invasion without continually falling back upon the materials supplied by this enterprising paper; and as we have adopted the plan of allowing eye-witnesses to speak for themselves, in preference to merely repeating their facts in fresh words, we may now quote from this correspondent's description of the fall of Plevna. Three days had barely passed from the entry of the Russians when the "Daily News" had given a full and most interesting account of all that had taken place.

On the Sunday night, the spies were busy over their sorry work. The correspondent was at General Skobelev's head-quarters at night-fall.

"A spy had just come in with the news that Osman had issued three days' rations to the troops, one hundred and fifty cartridges, a new pair of sandals to each man, and that to all appearances the concentration would begin at once. A curious detail which he cited was, that each soldier received a small portion of oil for keeping his gun in order. At ten o'clock another spy came in, who reported that Osman was concentrating near the bridge over the Vid. The spy had come direct from Plevna, and having given this information he disappeared again in the darkness. A few minutes later there was a telegram stating that from the other side a great many lights were seen moving about in Plevna, an unusual thing. Evidently there was some movement on foot, and the spies were right."

A third spy informed the general that the Krishine redoubt had been deserted. It was still dark, between three and four on Monday morning; but the Russians found their way to the abandoned positions, and occupied them without resistance.



"The gray light of morning came. It was cloudy, and threatened more snow. Suddenly there was the booming of thirty or forty guns speaking almost together, followed instantly by that steady, crashing roll we have learned to know so well. The battle had begun. The giant, after defending himself four months, hurling thunderbolt after thunderbolt upon his enemies, was now struggling through the meshes he had allowed to be thrown around him, and was in his turn attacking the trenches and earthworks which he had taught his enemies so well how to defend. We mounted our horses and rode towards the battle. It was in the direction of the bridge over the Vid, on the Sofia road, and half an hour's ride brought us in sight of the conflict.

"A terrible and sublime spectacle presented itself to our view. The country behind Plevna is a wide open plain, into which the gorge leading up to Plevna opens out like a tunnel. The plain is bounded on the Plevna side by steep rocky bluffs, or cliffs, along whose foot flows the Vid. From these cliffs, for a distance of two miles, burst here and there, in quick, irregular succession, angry spurts of flame, that flashed and disappeared and flashed out again. It was the artillery fire of the Turks and Russians, which from our point of view appeared intermingled. The smoke, running round in a circle towards the Vid, rose against the heavy clouds that hung right up on the horizon, while low on the ground burst forth continuous balls of flame that rent the blackness of the clouds like flashes of lightning. Through the covering of smoke could be seen angry spits of fire thick as fireflies on a tropical night. Now and then through an irregular curving stream of fire we had indistinct glimpses of bodies of men hurrying to and fro, horses, cattle, carriages running across the plain, and above all the infernal crashing roll of the infantry fire, and deep booming of more than a hundred guns.

"This is what had happened. Osman Pacha had during the night abandoned all his positions from Grivica to the Green Hill, and concentrated the greater part of his army across the Vid, over

which he passed on two bridges, one the old and the other the new one lately constructed. He took part of his artillery, some three batteries, and a train of about five or six hundred carriages drawn by bullocks. He succeeded in getting his army, the artillery, and part of the train over by daybreak. The Russians say that to have started with so large a train is a proof that he was deceived with regard to the number of the Russian forces, and that he believed the Russian line, owing to the absence of General Gourko, was very weak on the Sofia road, and thought another road along the Vid was virtually open. It does not seem possible that he could have been so badly informed, and I am inclined to think the train was taken to serve a special purpose in the flight. Indeed, the first thing the Russians perceived when daylight broke was a line of waggons, drawn by bullocks, advancing upon them in close order across the plain. The smooth open level offered every facility for such a manœuvre. The Turks were behind these waggons, which, piled full of baggage and effects of various kinds, afforded very fair protection from bullets.

"The attack was directed against the positions held by the grenadiers, north of the Sofia road, whose lines extended from the road to a point opposite Opanes, where they were joined by the Roumanian curving line through Susurla. It is said the attack was made with twenty thousand men, but I doubt this, as there was really not room for so many to deploy unless they had descended from the heights of Opanes, and taken the Roumanian positions, and I have not heard that they did this. Nor did they even attack the Russian positions south of the road, as they would probably have done had they attacked in such force. At any rate, the attack was a most brilliant and daring one.

"The Turks advanced as far as they could under cover of their waggons, while the Russians poured in a terrible fire on them from their Berdan breechloaders, scarcely less destructive than the Peabody, and opened on the advancing line with shell and shrapnel. The Turks then did a splendid deed of bravery, only equalled by

Skobelev's capture of the two famous redoubts. Probably finding their cover beginning to fail them, owing to the cattle being killed or getting frightened and running away, they dashed forward with a shout upon the line of trenches held by the Sibirsky or Siberian Regiment, swept over them like a tornado, poured into the battery, bayoneted the artillerymen, officers, and men, who with desperate valour stood to their pieces to nearly a man, and seized the whole battery. The Sibirsky Regiment had been overthrown and nearly annihilated. The Turks had broken the first circle that held them in. Had they gone on they would have found two more; but they did not have time to go on. The Russians rallied almost immediately.

"General Strukoff, of the emperor's staff, brought up the first brigade of Grenadiers, who, led by their general—I forget his name, but the Russians will remember it—flung themselves on the Turks with fury. A hand-to-hand fight ensued, man to man, bayonet to bayonet, which is said to have lasted several minutes, for the Turks clung to the captured guns with dogged obstinacy. They seem to have forgotten, in the fury of battle, that they had come out to escape from Plevna, and not to take and hold a battery, and they held on to the guns with almost the same desperation which the Russian dead around them had shown a few minutes before. Nearly all the Turks in the flanking trenches open to the Russian fire had of course very little shelter and were soon overpowered, and began a retreat which, under the murderous fire sent after them, instantly became a flight. Some took shelter behind the broken waggons, and returned the fire for a time, but the majority made for the deep banks of the Vid, where they found ample shelter from the Russian shells and bullets. They formed here behind the banks, and instantly began to return the Russian fire. It was now about half-past eight, and the Turkish sortie was virtually repulsed, but the battle raged for four hours longer. The losses inflicted from this time forward were not great on either side, for both armies were under cover. The Turks were evi-

dently apprehensive that the Russians would charge and drive them back into the gorge. The Russians were resolved to prevent another sortie, and so both sides kept it up. Indeed, there seemed at first every probability that the Turks would try it again, though it was evident to any one who knew the strength of the Russian lines and had seen this affair, that escape was hopeless from the first, even though Osman Pacha had had twice the number of men.

"For four hours the storm of lead swept on, as one hundred guns sent forth flame and smoke and iron. During all this time we were in momentary expectation of seeing one side or the other rush to the charge. We could hardly yet realise that this was to be the last fight we should ever see around Plevna, and that when the guns ceased firing it was the last time we should hear them here. It was a strangely impressive spectacle. Behind us the plain, stretching away to the horizon, dark and sombre, under the dull lead-coloured clouds of the black November day. Before us the gorge leading up to Plevna, flanked on either side by steep high cliffs, and between us and them the smoke, and roar, and fire of battle filling the air with its mighty thunder, a battle on which hung the fate, not of Plevna, for the long-beleaguered town was already in the hands of the Russians, but of Osman Pacha and his army.

"About twelve o'clock the firing began to diminish on both sides, as if by mutual agreement. Then it stopped entirely. The rolling crash of the infantry, and the deep-toned bellowing of the artillery, were heard no more. The smoke lifted, and there was silence—a silence that will not be broken here for many a long year, perhaps never again, by the sounds of battle.

"The firing had not ceased more than half an hour when a white flag was seen waving from the road leading around the cliffs beyond the bridge. Plevna had fallen, and Osman Pacha was going to surrender."

Graphic as this description is, the narrative of the actual surrender, and of the events which



immediately succeeded it, is given by the same correspondent in a particularly striking and dramatic manner. It may be mentioned that the whole of his account is dated Monday night, and it bears evidence of having been written on the spot.

"A long, loud shout went up from the Russian army when the white flag was seen and its significance was understood—a joyous shout that swept over that dreary plain, and was echoed back sonorously by the sullen, rugged cliffs overhanging the scene. The thrill of gladness in the shout showed how deeply the Russian soldiers had dreaded the long, weary waiting through the winter months among snow and mud round this impregnable stronghold. It was clear that a load had been lifted from every heart.

"A moment later a Turkish officer was seen riding over the bridge with a white flag in his hand. He rode forward to General Ganetsky, in command of the grenadiers, halted a moment, and then rode back. As it turned out, he was an officer of inferior rank, and returned because General Ganetsky instructed him to send an officer with the rank of pacha to negotiate the terms of capitulation. Then thirty or forty of us, headed by General Skobelev, who had been this morning placed on the Sofia road, rode down the road toward the bridge, within point-blank range of the Turkish rifles, if the Turkish soldiers grouped in masses on the road behind the bridge on the cliffs overlooking the Vid had chosen to open on us. About fifty yards from the bridge, and seventy-five from some masses of Turks on the other side, we halted. General Skobelev and two or three other officers waved white handkerchiefs. This signal of amity was answered by the waving of a piece of white muslin, about two yards square, attached to a flag-staff. Then two horsemen came forward, each carrying a white flag. They rode across the bridge and approached us. There was a moment's conversation with General Skobelev's interpreter, and then it was announced that Osman himself was coming out, and the two horsemen galloped back.

"'Osman himself coming out!' exclaimed all of us with surprise. This was indeed an unlooked-for incident.

"'At any rate we will give him a respectful reception,' exclaimed one Russian officer, in the gallant spirit of true chivalry.

"'That we will,' said another. 'We must all salute him, and the soldiers must present arms.'

"'He is certainly a great soldier,' exclaimed another, 'and he has made a heroic defence.'

"'He is the greatest general of the age,' said General Skobelev, 'for he has saved the honour of his country. I will proffer him my hand and tell him so.'

"All were unanimous in his praise, and the butcheries of Russian wounded committed by the Turkish army of Plevna were forgotten.

"All around me the ground was covered with grim relics of battle. Here and there the earth was upturned by the explosion of shells. Near me lay a horse groaning and struggling in death. Close by, an ox, silently bleeding to death; his great, round, patient eyes looking mournfully at us. Just before me was a cart with a dead horse lying in yoke as he had fallen, and a Turkish soldier lying alongside, whose head had been carried away. Another man was lying under the waggon, and around were four wounded men, lying gazing up at the murky sky, or covered with the hood of their ragged grey overcoat drawn over their faces. Not one of them uttered a sound. They lay there, and bore their suffering with a calm, stolid fortitude, which brought tears to my eyes. Just behind the waggon the ground was ripped to pieces by shell-fire, telling how these unfortunates had met their fate. The road and its edges were dotted here and there with dead and wounded Turkish soldiers, oxen, horses, and shattered carts; and a few hundred yards north of the road, the ground over which Osman Pacha's sallying column had made that heroic charge, was literally covered with dead and wounded. Russian doctors were already going about on the field looking after the wounded, and giving

them temporary dressing, while waiting for the ambulances to come up.

"All these things I observed during the pause, which was broken at last by shouts of 'There he is! He is coming!' and I rode forward again to the point of main interest. Two horsemen were again approaching with a white flag, the bearer of which was apparently merely a common soldier. He wore a fez, a long dirty brown cloak, and very ragged footgear. The other horseman wore a bright red fez, which set off the officer's blue cloak. He was clean and natty, and had on fresh gloves. He was comparatively young: with a round rosy face; clean shaved, light moustache, straight nose, and blue eyes. He did not seem over thirty-five years old.

"'This cannot be Osman Pacha,' was the general exclamation. In fact it was not he, but Tefik Bey, his chief of staff. Was it possible that this boyish-looking face belonged to Osman's right hand man, who must have played so great a part in the organization and maintenance of Osman's mighty defence? It seemed strange, but it was true. The Turks have the merit at least of not being afraid of young men. I saw no tottering grey-bearded officers in this captive host. Every one on our side saluted as Tefik Bey rode up. He halted for a moment, and was silent. He then spoke in French with good accent, but slowly, as if choosing his words.

"He said, 'Osman Pacha'—then stopped fully ten seconds before he proceeded—'is wounded.'

Tefik Bey impressed every one with an idea of power. His dignified bearing won both respect and sympathy; but for the moment the thoughts of all were directed on the one important question of the surrender. Tefik did not seem to have received full power of action from Osman Pacha, and it was necessary for him to return to the wounded general. Meanwhile the scene upon the little bridge was a strange and memorable one.

A few of the Turks came forward, and pressed curiously upon the Russians. "Thousands of

them are on the cliffs, not more than fifty yards distant, looking down on us with composure, all with arms in their hands. One well-directed volley would thin our Russian cadres this side of the Vid very appreciably, for by this time there must have been a hundred officers gathered here, and the capitulation was by no means arranged as yet. On the heights to our right we see the Russians moving up to the redoubt on one side, while the Turks were leaving it on the other. Presently General Ganetsky arrives, and then the way is blocked with waggons, dead horses, and oxen. The men have all been carried off, but beside the waggon near the bridge I see one young fellow lying wounded. He has laid himself carefully down there, with his cloak wrapped around him, and his rifle and knapsack under his head. He evidently takes pride in his gun, a Peabody, for it is very bright and clean, and he has put it carefully under him, so that it may not be taken away. He did not think to part with it so soon. He is scarcely seventeen, and the doctor who has dressed his wound says he will not live till night. We thread our way cautiously over the bridge, through broken carriages and dead bodies of horses and cattle, and find ourselves among the Turks. There are several dead lying in the ditch beside the road. Some wounded are limping along with us, going Heaven knows whither, and there are two sentinels standing in a trench overlooking the river, keeping their watch as though they were looking for an attack at any moment.

"As we advance the crowd gets thicker. The Turkish soldiers, with guns and bayonets in their hands, men at whom we have been shooting, and who were shooting at us two hours ago, gaze at us with a scowl, some with a savage expression; but there are pleasant, intelligent faces also, which look at us with steady, clear, inquisitive eyes. General Skobeleff, sen., recalled an episode of the Hungarian insurrection resembling this, where there was an armistice, and a great number of Austrian officers crossed over the bridge to the Hungarians as we did here, when the Hungarian commanding officer opened his



ranks and fired his cannon, charged to the muzzle with mitraille, on the Austrians. Let us hope the two incidents will not resemble each other in all respects. When the general is about a hundred yards from the bridge the crush is so great that we can advance no further, and indeed we do not wish, for it is in this little house overlooking the road that Osman Ghazi lies wounded. Generals Ganetsky, Strukoff, and some others have gone to see him. . . .

"The terms of capitulation were easily arranged. The surrender is unconditional. Osman consented at once. If surprise be expressed that he should have so suddenly agreed, it is only necessary to state that he could do nothing else. In order to attempt a sortie, he had to abandon all the positions in which he had defied the Russians so long, and to concentrate his army down on the Vid. These positions once lost were lost for ever, because the Russians occupied them almost as soon as he left them. He was down in the valley; they on the surrounding hills, with an army three times as large as his. He had to surrender without delay, for they were drawing the circle tighter every moment. His position was like Napoleon III's at Sedan. The disparity in numbers was greater, and he had not even the shelter of the village. So Osman Ghazi, the victorious, surrendered unconditionally the gallant army with which he had held this now famous stronghold for so long, with which he upset the whole Russian plan of campaign, and with which he defeated, in three pitched battles, Russia's finest armies."

After a few words about the Turkish soldiers, and the laying down of arms by forty thousand men, the correspondent ends thus:—"There was another halt in our slow onward progress, and the cry was heard, 'Osman.' I pushed forward to find that it was indeed Osman Pacha, who, having heard that the grand duke was coming in this direction, had turned back in his carriage to meet him. Osman Pacha was escorted by fifty Cossacks, and there followed him twenty-five or thirty Turkish officers, all mounted on

diminutive Turkish ponies. They were all, or nearly all, young men. Scarcely one among them seemed over thirty. Most had the faces of mere boy students. 'Are these the lads,' I inwardly exclaimed, 'with whom Osman Pacha has accomplished such wonders?' The grand duke rode up to the carriage, and for some seconds the two chiefs gazed into each other's faces without the utterance of a word. Then the grand duke stretched out his hand, and shook the hand of Osman Pacha heartily and said—

"'I compliment you on your defence of Plevna. It is one of the most splendid military feats in history.' Osman Pacha smiled sadly, rose painfully to his feet in spite of his wound, said something which I could not hear, and then re-seated himself. The Russian officers all cried, 'Bravo!' 'Bravo!' repeatedly, and all saluted respectfully. There was not one among them who did not gaze on the Hero of Plevna with the greatest admiration and sympathy. Prince Charles, who had arrived, rode up, and repeated unwittingly almost every word of the grand duke, and likewise shook hands. Osman Pacha again rose and bowed, this time in grim silence.

"He wore a loose blue cloak, with no apparent mark on it to designate his rank, and a red fez. He is a large, strongly-built man, the lower part of whose face is covered with a short black beard, without a streak of grey. He has a large Roman nose, and black eyes. The face is a strong face, with energy and determination stamped on every feature—yet a tired, wan face also, with lines on it that hardly were graven so deep I fancy five months ago; and with a sad, enduring, thoughtful look out of the black eyes.

"'It is a grand face,' exclaimed Colonel Gailard, the French military attaché. 'I was almost afraid of seeing him, lest my expectation should be disappointed, but he more than fulfils my ideal.'

"'It is the face of a great military chieftain,' said young Skobelev. I am glad to have seen him. Osman Ghazi he is, and Osman the Victorious he will remain, in spite of his surrender.'

"There may perhaps be exaggeration in the Russian estimate of Osman Pacha. History will judge. But thrilling with the impression of the great military event just accomplished, the magnificent defence ending in a halo of disastrous glory, there was not one of us who did not echo Skobeleff's words. Be it remembered that Osman Pacha cannot be judged on ordinary military rules, for the reason that he had not a regular army; technically speaking, not an army at all, but a mob of armed men, with scarcely any organisation, with no discipline, save the natural and passive obedience of the Turkish peasant, and only such military education and experience as were gained in the trenches and on the battle-field. This is the highest form of generalship, to accomplish mighty results with means which most military men would have regarded as hopelessly inadequate. Osman Pacha had scarcely any officers of talent and experience with him. He has borne the weight of this stupendous defence on his own shoulders, a very Titan, defying, with his untrained and scanty levies, the serried legions of one of the greatest military powers of Europe.

"I rode through the Turkish troops after the surrender, when I had time to examine them closely. There were bad, vile faces among the horde, but there were also many bright faces, in whose eyes were no murderous glare. I shall never forget the face of one young officer who, with folded arms, stood a prisoner among his men, gazing at us with a look of fierce defiant hate, that was softened by profound despair. The men all wore dirty brown cloaks, with hoods pulled down over their heads and very ragged foot gear. They seemed ill-fed, and were mostly miserably bedraggled and tattered, yet withal each man was a hero in our eyes when we thought of the successive episodes of the long protracted defence of Plevna, from the repulse of Schilder-Schuldner to the final desperate struggle."

Thus fell Plevna, after four months of as gallant a resistance as any recorded in the history of warfare. The town, as we have already pointed out, was not in itself capable of defence. It

had no walls, no forts, no citadel, and indeed it could not have withstood the attack of a large army for a single week. And, accordingly, Plevna itself was not defended, but only a line surrounding it, which was in several parts one or two miles distant from the town. Now this line was drawn along the crest of hills, approached from the open country by broken acclivities; but even these natural positions were not specially formidable. The access to Plevna is not by deep ravines, gorges, or defiles, which could be lined with sharpshooters, and in which an enemy could be caught as in a trap. There was nothing here like the famous Khyber Pass in Afghanistan, or even like the Duga and Schipka Passes, or the difficult country of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The strength of the position had been made by Osman Pacha and his staff, and by the thorough gallantry, devotion and tenacity of the Turkish regulars. The earthworks and redoubts had been thrown up in a most skilful manner, and they had been held by men armed with the best repeating breechloading rifles, and supplied with abundance of ammunition.

Few generals ever had better troops than Osman Pacha, so far as regards their devotion, spirit, and obstinacy. For four months together they made themselves like a strong wall in front of the brave armies of Russia; and they yielded only at the command of their leader, when the alternative of starvation or escape stared him in the face.

All men were unanimous in praising the conduct of Osman Pacha, and in sympathising with him in his misfortune. A day or two after the last sortie, when the general was on his way to his Russian captivity, a baseless rumour of his death was spread abroad, and caused a great sensation. It was at once contradicted, but not before it had proved how high an opinion had been formed of the "Lion of Plevna."

The enthusiasm created in Russia by the capture of Plevna, and of the whole defending army, was naturally very great. The czar at once returned to St. Petersburg, amidst the acclamations of his subjects; and solemn *Te Deums* were



sung in all the cathedrals and churches. But these triumphs were moderated and saddened by the great cost of the victory in human life. It was computed that the losses sustained by the Russian armies in Europe between the 29th of November and the 13th of December were two thousand one hundred and sixty-three men, including four officers and forty-six men killed, and twenty-seven officers and sixty-three men wounded. The remaining two thousand and twenty-three officers and men were placed *hors de combat* from various causes. The total Russian losses since the outbreak of the war were seventy-seven thousand six hundred and fifty-eight. This was a dear price to pay, even for the successes which had been purchased by so much blood and treasure.

## CHAPTER XXXVI.

### THE HORRORS OF WAR.

THE fall of Plevna was marked by certain horrible occurrences which it is impossible to pass over in silence ; and no picture of war would be complete which did not represent the darker as well as the brighter aspects of events on the battlefield. It seems necessary at this point to return to a subject which has already been touched upon. The cruelties incidental to war in almost every shape and form were especially deplorable during the Russian invasion of Turkey ; and as neither side can claim to be entirely acquitted of inhumanity, it is just that the whole truth should be spoken.

The fate of the Russian prisoners taken by the Turks during the earlier attacks on Plevna will always remain more or less of a mystery. Different accounts have been given of them by the Turks themselves. They were said to have been sent out of the town under escort, and to have died a natural death inside. Others again admit that they were massacred by the populace, or by the irregular soldiery, to whose care

they were intrusted. The only certain thing is that none were found alive when the Russians entered the town.

With regard to some, indeed, the fate of these unfortunate men was only too clearly ascertained. They were murdered in cold blood, on the field of battle, by the most savage and unruly of Osman Pacha's troops, who gave no quarter to their enemies, even when they lay wounded and helpless. Shocking instances of this barbarity were furnished in August and September, on the repulse of Schuldner's and Shahoffsky's assaults ; and since then the Russian soldiers felt the greatest terror at the idea of falling into the hands of the Turks. Not many prisoners were subsequently made at Plevna ; though of course there were a few captures from time to time. But in the first attack on Telish, which was repulsed by the Ottoman army, the Russians were obliged to leave their wounded behind them. The fate of these wretches has been told us by an eye-witness.

The following letter was written to his relatives in England by Mr. Douglas, a young surgeon who had been with the Turks in Telish, and who was taken prisoner after the second successful attack on Hakki Pacha early in November. Whilst he was at Orkanieh, wrote Mr. Douglas, volunteers were asked for to go up to the fighting line, little more than a day's journey from Orkanieh. "Of the few volunteers, myself, and a fellow named Vachell, were selected, and we were accompanied by Colonel Coope, of the Gendarmerie, who came with us to organise a corps of stretcher-bearers, and a Frenchman named Lorando, who speaks Turkish, and was given us as a sort of dragoman and to assist in the dressing of the wounded. We set out early in the morning on horseback, and in the afternoon reached a village named Tukovitcha, from where we could distinctly hear the firing. But the Turkish officer in charge here refused to let us go on that day, for what reason I do not know, so there was nothing for it but to stop where we were. However, the next morning we started early, and soon reached Telish, a village on the road to

Plevna. Just through this village, which was entirely deserted, we found the Turks in a fortified camp on the top of a hill. It was here that the attack of the previous day had taken place. The pacha (Hakki Pacha) in command was very civil to us, gave us a very good dinner (for a Turkish dinner), &c., but refused to let Coope carry out his scheme of bringing in the wounded from the field. This rather disgusted us, but as he told us that he expected another attack soon and we had got positive orders to stop where there were likely to be any wounded, we returned to the village and selected a house for our headquarters, which, you can imagine, was not very difficult, for, as I said before, the village was entirely uninhabited. After getting the horses comfortably housed, we returned to the camp and asked permission from an officer to visit the battle-field. The pacha was asleep in his hut at the time, so we could not ask his permission, and, as it afterwards turned out, this was rather a good job, as I expected he would have refused us permission. On going out on the battle-field, what a sight met our eyes. Imagine two hundred or three hundred naked Russian bodies lying bloated in the blazing sun, stripped of everything valuable except the little crosses which they wear round their necks. Imagine many of these same bodies with their heads cut off, others with their noses and ears cut, and nearly all mutilated in some way or other. Two bodies that I saw had evidently had fires lighted upon their stomachs. I had heard and read of such atrocities, but had treated them rather as the exaggerations of newspaper correspondents, but now there is no doubt about it. And remember that this is not done after the men are dead, but while they lie wounded and dying. For I noticed that those bodies whose wounds received in action were evidently from their position fatal ones were not mutilated, but only those whose wounds were not necessarily fatal. Many also had three or four revolver wounds, inflicted at close quarters, as the bodies were blackened by the powder. Now, up to this time no one could have admired the Turkish soldier more than I did. No one could possibly

be more patient, enduring, respectful, and grateful for any little thing done for him. And I have had some opportunity of judging even in the short time I have been out here, as I suppose some thousands of wounded have passed through my hands. Mind, I speak of the common Turkish soldier, not the officer, the latter being, as a rule, foolish, uneducated, grasping and selfish. But enough of the horrors. The following day I dressed the wounded, performed any necessary operation, and got the slighter cases taken in carts to the rear. These were about one hundred and nine in number.

"On the fourth morning from my arrival at Telish I was awoke by the unpleasant sound of a cannon fired at no great distance, and on getting up we were told by our servant that the Russians were commencing an artillery attack upon the place. We soon had our horses saddled, and the baggage packed ready for a retreat, if necessary. On going out into the road we found the shells beginning to fall pretty thickly, and soon we were hard at work dressing the wounded soldiers. You can get some idea of the sort of fire we were under when I tell you that the Russians had about sixty guns concentrated upon one point, and this bombardment was kept up continuously for five hours. We had several hairbreadth escapes. Vachell's horse was struck by a splinter of a shell on the leg, and as I was going across an open space to the hospital to get some more bandages a shell passed so close to my head that I felt the wind of it, and it pitched just three yards in front of me, for I measured the distance afterwards. This shell luckily did not explode, or I should not have been here to have written the account of it. Another narrow escape we had was when we were all crouching under a mud wall for some sort of protection while dressing the wounded, and a ball hit the wall just above our heads and sent it showering all over us. The Turks having only three guns, all of which were soon silenced of course, were obliged to give in in the end. And soon they began to pour down the road in their hasty retreat. As we had our hands full



of work, and the wounded still continued to come in, we did not feel justified in leaving them and beating a retreat; so thus I fell into the hands of the Russians. That evening we were taken to a place called Gorny Djubnik, where I spent one of the most uncomfortable nights since I have been in Turkey, and that is saying a good deal, I can assure you. The following morning we started for this place, and arrived the same evening. I had the misfortune to lose the whole of my kit, so that I am in the unpleasant position of having to carry the whole of my personal luggage on my person. I recounted the whole of the atrocities that I saw at Telish to his highness the grand duke, and have thus, I am afraid, spoilt any chance I may have had of a Turkish decoration; but my position in this world as a Christian would not justify my ignoring such awful cruelties. You are at liberty to use this letter in any way you may consider fit, as I think the more these atrocities are exposed the better."

Clearly no evidence could be had which would be stronger than this; and it proves beyond all question that the least disciplined auxiliaries of the Ottoman troops committed the most terrible barbarities, and that they were beyond the control of their officers.

Whatever could be said in palliation of these crimes, or at all events in explanation of them, was urged by a writer in the "Standard" newspaper, about the time of which we have spoken. His remarks deserve attention, if only that we may have both sides of the question before us in judging of the matter in dispute.

After mentioning the cruelties committed by the Kaffirs, he continues in this strain:—"No one is surprised that Kaffirs should act after their kind. They were named 'the Infidels,' or savages, *par excellence*, by Mahomedan travellers, and the title has been accepted by us. But amongst the European Moslems themselves, even at this day, there are beings as ferocious. After making every allowance for exaggeration, and subtracting a great deal of downright falsehood, it remains, unhappily, certain that acts of

infamous cruelty have been performed upon the wounded by the Turkish soldiers in the Bulgarian districts. The evidence of eye-witnesses is conclusive. I saw the bodies of Ghourko's men laid out for burial, headless, gashed, and mutilated. Other cases are not so well substantiated; but one proved atrocity makes others probable. The gentleman who lately saw 'crowds of Bashi-Bazouks' swarming out of Plevna behind the regulars, for no purpose apparently but to massacre the wounded, had extraordinary luck and wonderful field-glasses. The other correspondent who heard screams and yells all night after the second battle could not be actually sure that they were caused by fresh pangs. As for the terrible deeds reported from the other side of the Balkans, after the retreat of Ghourko's army, there is no good evidence that they were committed by the soldiers. Supposing that they were, if ever atrocities could be extenuated that was the case. The very air was poisoned with the carcasses of murdered Turks. They lay in festering heaps upon the road itself by which the pursuing columns marched. Violated women and tortured children were there, burnt in the fire of their own houses. The worst crimes of the Indian mutiny were outdone, and the victims were not tens but thousands. The offence lies with those who begin inhuman deeds. Had the advancing Turks massacred every Bulgar on their road, they would have done no more—seeing the unparalleled measure of atrocities for which vengeance was due—than the most humane of armies have done. What was the treachery of Bazeilles to this, or even the horrors of Cawnpore? What Arab *razzia* in the French colony caused one-thousandth part of the suffering and shame? But it is not certain that the Turkish soldiers requited cruelty for cruelty. Many Bulgars were shot and many hanged, but the tortures, if such there were, may well have been inflicted by the maddened peasantry which returned in the army's wake. By that code of war upon which Russian generals act, any Moslem carrying arms, but wearing no uniform, is a Bashi-

Bazouk, and therefore a ravisher of women and a murderer, to be killed like a dog or handed over to the Bulgars for their ghastly sport. He might be a native of Bolwan, or a survivor from the thousand villages burnt, wandering back at the peril of his life to claim Russian protection. He might be a man from whom everything had been reft, his wife and children massacred, his home destroyed, driven to arms by starvation. This matters nothing. The behaviour of the Moslem army, when it began to move, certainly favours the idea that the devastation of the Tunja valley was not the work of soldiers. Nothing was heard at that time but rumours of death and outrage. The Bashi-Bazouk was alleged to be at his deadly work about Tirnova, and I and other correspondents reported them upon evidence which seemed trustworthy. But wherever we ourselves went, east or west, the Bashi-Bazouk vanished like the rainbow, to appear again a little farther off. When the Turkish army got into actual motion Tirnova was flooded with fugitives. They reached the town in misery and despair most real, parents without their children, children without parents, the most dismal cavalcade to be imagined. And they all reported terrible events. Forty thousand souls of Plevna and Lovcha were said to have been murdered with every possible shape of cruelty. The narratives of the survivors were circumstantial, and the telegraph carried them through all Europe. But they were false—the inventions of blind panic. When Lovcha fell again into Russian hands the people alleged to have perished all reappeared; and so it will be doubtless at the retaking of Plevna. Already it is known that in the villages round, Grivitza, Tucenitza, Ralisovo, Bogot, and the rest, the inhabitants were not only uninjured but unplundered. If the Bashi-Bazouks ‘swarm in Plevna,’ and occupy themselves in torturing the helpless, it is incredible that those who have lain in their power for months past should have against them not so much as a complaint.

“But negative evidence cannot be set against positive, and if the Turks tortured the wounded

once, as beyond question they did, it is probable that they have done the same on other occasions. It was insisted by the grand duke that there had been no irregulars or Bashi-Bazouks in the army defending the Schipka Pass, and we have no proof to the contrary. But there were negroes there. Amongst the Turks lying dead upon the hill side two negroes were conspicuous, and there may have been scores. It was insisted also that officers must have seen the heads of the dead every time they looked through the door of their tents, since one at least was lying in the very middle of the slope. But there is no evidence that the officers approved. They had business enough in hand, and it was no time for courts-martial or lessons in humanity. For aught we know to the contrary, indeed, there may have been an inquiry afoot, and the severest measures contemplated to punish these deeds. If the argument from facts be applied severely, it must be put forward, on the other hand, that the mutilated bodies were all hidden, though one of the heads was displayed. For that matter, an advocate might plead that this very object had been brought as evidence by the shocked discoverer, and no one could refute him. The facts, therefore, must not be made too much of. *Qui trop embrasse, embrasse mal*, is an old proverb. It is enough, and more, to prove that in the Turkish army there are savages as vile as the Bulgar. Russians are not even suspected of these crimes. They often refuse quarter, as might be looked for in a war of this class; but to sever heads and deliberately torture are acts not in their disposition, nor does their hate go so far. There are two objects which may be gained by mutilating the wounded, to put aside the mere impulse of gratifying rage. It may be hoped to frighten the enemy by adding a new terror to battle, and to repress his enterprise. Both of these expectations have been fulfilled in the present case. Russian soldiers are filled with a nameless dread of their foe, which does not quell their courage in attack, but transforms repulse into rout. The man who would not shrink from bullets in advancing is



not to be depended on in retreat when he knows that death is not the worst to befall him if he should drop. And the service of reconnoitring suffers gravely. The solitary vedette or the little group of Cossacks tremble at a shadow. Bulgars dread a Russian advance, unless it be made in force for a permanent occupation, and they are apt to shield themselves beforehand by giving information of the movement. They believe themselves doomed if the Russians, having once come, shall go away again. When General Skobelev occupied Trojan the people all ran to the woods, only sending him a deputation to ask if he meant to remain; praying him, if not, for Heaven's sake to leave."

These were the special and most lamentable features of the Turko-Russian war; but it is impossible to go with the last writer in his apparent slur upon the veracity of the accounts which were given us of the behaviour of the Bashi-Bazouks and Circassians. As we have said, no better evidence could be desired than the candid letter of Mr. Douglas; but we may add to it the testimony of a "Times" correspondent on the same circumstances. After describing the battle on the Telish heights, he says:—"Up to this time it was all fair fighting, but now those execrable savages, whose deeds have thrown so dark a slur on Turkish arms—the Circassians and the Bashi-Bazouks—were let loose on the field, and acted there after their own instincts. I have had a description of the scene from an eye-witness, whose statements are admitted by the Turks themselves to be perfectly accurate. Nobody, even among the regulars, seems to think it worth while to deny the facts. Every wounded Russian lying on the field was butchered after the close of the battle by the Turkish irregulars. Every dead body was stripped stark naked and left on the field unburied, and a great majority of the bodies were mutilated. Many were absolutely beheaded; others lay with their throats cut clean to the vertebrae; others had been made targets of, and were literally riddled with bullets. That they were fired upon after the action was easily proved by the nature and aspect of

their wounds. The revolvers or small-bore rifles from which the bullets had been discharged had been placed so close to the bodies as to scorch them, and, from the closeness of the discharge, certain places were evidently chosen to be aimed at, of these the left breast being the most common. The wounds which had disabled these wounded men were distinguishable from those which had been inflicted after the battle. My informant is a well-known and able English surgeon, and I learnt from him that comparatively few of the four hundred or five hundred dead whose bodies he examined bore traces of wounds received in battle which could possibly have resulted in immediate death. A fractured thigh would effectually disable a man from escaping from the butchers who assailed the wounded, but it would not be immediately fatal. Men suffering from such wounds lay stripped and dead upon the field, with their skulls clubbed in, with their faces disfigured by a dozen sword cuts, with their throats cut, or with half-a-dozen charred bullet-holes about their bodies. The commonest form of mutilation seemed to be to cut off the nose or to slit the ears; occasionally hands and fingers had been chopped off, probably for the sake of rings, and nobody on this side seems disposed to dispute these facts, or even to take the trouble to explain them away. A French-speaking Circassian officer with whom I talked at Telis a few days ago told me how he had shot a wounded Russian through the head, and was evidently of opinion that the deed was meritorious. He stated that five of his family had been killed in battle by the Moscov, and that it was his business to avenge them by killing a Russian apiece for them. He was one to the good now, and anything extra he could continue to do went down to his own account in the ledger. He, however, thought any mutilation of the dead savage and cowardly."

There were, of course, honourable exceptions in every rank, and amongst every body of men; but we have overwhelming proof of the characteristic cruelty and savagery of the worst elements of the Turkish army. It is

useless to deny the fact; but, on the other hand, it would be useless to deny that the Russians themselves were guilty of great inhumanities throughout the campaign. Some of their brutalities may be regarded in the light of reprisals; for it would be absolutely impracticable to restrain the comrades of men slaughtered and mutilated like the victims at Telish. But perhaps the worst crimes of the Russians in this respect, at least during the war, were crimes of omission rather than of commission. The commonest principles of humanity dictate that every possible provision shall be made for preserving the life of prisoners taken in battle, and for supplying them with the ordinary necessities of existence. The Russian authorities were not particularly careful of their own men, and it was not to be expected that they would be more so of their prisoners. And accordingly we find that the most serious neglect was allowed to discredit the treatment of the Turkish prisoners.

Russian peculations in every branch of the service, from the lowest to the highest rank, have much to answer for. The neglect of which we now speak was one of the gravest consequences of this dishonesty.

It was particularly lamentable that the prisoners of Plevna should be made victims to this shameful greed on the part of highly-placed individuals. Europe was thrilled with horror when it heard of the sufferings undergone by the brave troops of Osman Pacha.

The testimony of Colonel Wellesley, English military representative at the Russian headquarters, who was in Plevna after its capture, is concise and significant. A correspondent met him in Bucharest, a few days later, and reported his statements at the time. "Colonel Wellesley," he wrote, "arrived here last night direct from Plevna, not having even yet recovered from several successive attacks of fever he had in Bulgaria. He has been all over the Russian positions and the battle-field, which he has been carefully studying. He estimates the whole of Osman Pacha's forces at under thirty thousand

men, and his loss in the desperate sortie at the enormous figure of six thousand in killed alone. Besides this, four thousand wounded have presented themselves at the Russian ambulances to have their wounds dressed. If we take, in addition, the wounded who were unable to move, and who had not then been counted, which should be at least a thousand more, we shall have a loss of twelve thousand men out of thirty thousand, which shows the desperate character of the fight. The Russian estimate of the Turkish loss was only four thousand twenty-four hours after the fight. Great numbers of wounded are still uncared for. Colonel Wellesley speaks with the greatest admiration of the fortitude of the wounded, whom he saw dragging themselves through the streets and along the roads to the ambulances, without a groan or word of complaint, only the lowly muttered word 'Allah, Allah,' oft repeated."

These are bare and simple facts. Let us hear the more elaborate and sensational evidence of another eye-witness—the special correspondent of the "Daily News" with General Gourko, who visited Plevna after its fall, and then returned to his post. The telegram was written just before a terrible snow-storm, which must have increased the misery here depicted. This misery, as the "Daily News" admits, may be in part attributed to the Russians, who might have made greater efforts during the first few days to relieve it, but most of it "must be ascribed to Osman's neglect in not leaving people to look after the sick and wounded at first when the Russian ambulance service had not yet had time to take charge of them."

"Plevna is full of horrors, and after the turmoil of the past four months the complete silence now seems strange and oppressive. As I rode into the town along the Lovatz road the other evening just after sunset, not a sound broke the dead quiet, and the only living thing I met was here and there a stray dog, which slunk away to his horrible meal among the shallow graves in front of the redoubts on the hills. The deserted breastworks that crossed the road at frequent inter-




vals seemed quite purposeless. It was utterly impossible to realise that here, on the very spot, only a few days before we had scurried across the open places, and dodged behind the mounds of earth, while the rattle of the rifles went on continually, and the air was filled with the singing of the bullets that just here had swept, again and again, the lines of the assailing forces, and that many thousands had fallen within a stone's throw.

"From the shoulder of the hill called Aroden, where the road winds around under the embrasures of the redoubts which were stormed by General Skobelev with such fearful loss, Plevna was seen lying low down in the valley, and only one or two twinkling lights showed that it was inhabited. All around on every side the whole landscape was quiet as the desert. No lines of blue smoke and little camp fires now marked the trenches. Not a single tent broke the bare surface of the hillsides, and only the great square redoubts and the zig-zag line of breast-works proved that this was the Plevna of a week ago. With all the vivid recollections of the various incidents of the siege, the most active imagination could not picture the thousandth part of the frightful suffering, the awful misery and wretchedness, that are found within the narrow limits of the town, nor draw the faintest outline of the sickening spectacle, the panorama of ghastly horrors, that is almost unparalleled since the terrible plagues of past centuries. Human beings lying like sheep in the streets, houses filled with dead; hundreds stretching their hands feebly heavenward for a morsel of bread or a drop of water, and no help that could be commanded to alleviate their suffering or save the wretched creatures from their painful death. Even in the midst of these scenes, which the pen of Dante alone could render with all the terrible rhythm of the poem attracting every ear with its irresistible force—even after days of constant contact with human suffering in every form, with death in every aspect, I can scarcely bring myself to repeat the story of what has passed in Plevna since the surrender. I have become in a mea-

sure callous now to what I see every hour in the day, yet the horror of the first few momentary impressions is still so vividly impressed upon me that I cannot refer to it without pain.

"When the Turks made the sortie they left the sick and wounded, of whom there were thousands, entirely without attendants. There was never a regular hospital in Plevna, the sick being transported to Sofia, and the small ambulance corps was at all times insufficient to care for the wounded, even before the town was surrounded. Of course the attendants at the hospitals thought only of their own safety when the sortie was made, and they joined their lot with those who tried to break through the Russian lines. The day and night of the battle passed, and the sufferers received no food or water, and their festering wounds were undressed. The following morning the Russians entered and took possession, and made the day one of rejoicing with the visit of the czar and the imperial staff; but this celebration of the event, however short it may have seemed to the victors, was a long season of horrible suffering for the wretched helpless captives, who stretched their skeleton hands in vain towards heaven, praying for a bit of bread or a drop of water. Neither friend nor foe was there to alleviate their sufferings, or to give the trifle needed to save them from a painful death, and they died by hundreds; and before the morning of the third day the dead crowded the living in every one of those dirty, dimly-lighted rooms which served to shelter the wounded from the cold and wet, but confined them in a foul and fetid atmosphere of disease and death.

"It was only on the morning of the third day after these wretched, tortured creatures had been left to their fate, that the Russians found opportunity and means to begin, first, the separation of the living from the dead, and then the care of the former. The mosques, the largest houses, and many of the small dwellings, had been filled with sick and wounded. Overcrowded in every case, and, as I have before said, from the first without proper attention, these temporary hospitals were, at the best, more filthy and pestilen-



INSIDE PLEVNA,— REMOVING THE DEAD.





tial, and the air was tainted with the stench of undressed wounds, and the corpses which lay unburied in the churchyards.

"The first room entered in one of these charnel-houses contained ninety odd Turks. Of these thirty-seven were dead, and many others on the point of death. Piteous groans came from between rigid lips, and painful cries for water, and some made feeble signs for food. One or two of the strongest raised themselves, and fixed their hideous, sunken eyes with such a beseeching stare on those who had come to free them from the company of the dead, that it would have softened the hardest heart. The small room, dimly lighted by a high window with one pane of glass, was crowded with the forms of thirty or forty ragged, filthy, human beings. Many of these forms were motionless, and scarcely audible groans were heard from one or two who raised with difficulty their bony hands to their lips to signify their need of food. There were faint whispers of 'Some water!' 'Some water!' piteous to hear. The dim light was concentrated on the half-naked body of an old man stretched across the entrance, whither he had dragged himself in the last hours of his agony in hope of succour, or at least of a breath of fresh air, for in the unventilated room the air was thick with putrid odours, which burst out when the door was opened, overpowering strong men, and causing them to turn sick and faint. The old man's hands were clutched in the rigour of painful death on his nude and meagre breast, and his head lay against the very crack of the door, so that it was opened only by rude force. Living and dead were lying together undistinguishable along the walls behind the door and under the window. This room is one of fifty where a similar spectacle is presented. The pavement of the mosques is covered with crouching forms, some moving at intervals, others motionless and silent. Here and there the faces of the dead come out in ghastly relief, with a fixed expression of great agony.

"Nothing can be done but to drag the dead from among the living, let in the light and air,

and give water and nourishment in the hope of saving some of those who remain alive. Small enough was the force of the men who set about this painful task, and meagre enough their means. Three open peasants' ox-carts were all that were available for the removal of the dead, and fifty soldiers to carry the bodies from the rooms to the carts, and bury them in the ditches. As fast as possible bread and water were distributed, and the feeble wretches fought each other with their last breath in their greed for the nourishment. Some propped up against the wall slowly ate until the unmistakable pallor came over their faces, and their eyes were fixed in death. Even the effort of eating the long-needed food was too great for their waning strength. The living clutch at the remaining morsel in the dead man's hand, struggle for it with all their feeble power, and curse each other and wrangle over the spoil, perhaps to fall dead themselves before they can eat the bread.

"The three open oxen-carts began the removal of the dead at once, and as I write the work still goes on. The hospitals daily supply more freight of this kind than the slow moving teams can carry away to the ditches outside. The disinfection of the hospitals was promptly effected. As fast as possible with the small force of men at hand the rooms were emptied one after another. After a day or two some of the Bulgarians were compelled to serve in place of the soldiers, and they set themselves about the hated task with a brutality terrible to witness. They drag the bodies down the stairs by the legs, the heads bumping from step to step with sickening thuds, then out into the court through the filthy mud, where they sling them into the cart with the heads or legs hanging over the side, and so continue to pile up the load with a score of half-naked corpses.

"It is horrible to hear the conversation of the men who do this work. They perhaps bring out a body still warm, the heart still beating, and the flush of life on the cheek. One says, 'He is still alive,' and proposes to leave him without stopping to decide the question. The



others cry, 'Devil take him! He will die before to-morrow, any way. In with him.' And so the living goes in with the dead, and is tumbled into the grave. I have seen this myself, and the man who has charge of the disinfection of the hospitals and burial of the dead told me that he doubted not that such cases occurred several times daily. When the three carts are full they start away through the streets towards the ditches outside the town. The horrible load jolts and shakes, and now and then a body falls out into the mud and is dragged into the cart again, and jammed in solidly, so as to prevent a recurrence of the accident. This heartless proceeding goes on in the public streets, crowded with men, women, and children of the place, the soldiers, the wounded, and the sick; and after so many days of the same spectacle no one any longer pays any attention to the transport of the dead. Over a thousand have been already carted away, and from the hospitals come about one hundred daily.

"The care of the sick and wounded is now rapidly being systematised. A few Russian doctors that are detailed for the service are working very hard, and also the Turkish surgeons who remain here; but the corps is not one quarter large enough to properly attend to the patients. Some of the hospitals are light, airy, and well purified; but the mosques are still dark, foul-smelling, and crowded. The dead lie for many hours unattended, and the horrible sights and sounds defy description. In the midst of this the few Russian Sisters of Charity move about quickly, busy from daybreak till dark, bringing comfort to hundreds whose wounds they dress, and whose pains they alleviate.

"I have given but a slight outline of the scenes that have passed before my eyes since I came here. A long detailed account alone could give anything like an idea of the climax and final act of the drama of Plevna. The town is full of similar pictures. Along the streets are frequently seen one or two wounded, who have crawled out from the hospital and lie dying in the mud. There is no valid excuse for this wilful disregard

of human life. The cause is evident, namely, lack of system. The Russians knew that Plevna must fall, and they expected to find thousands of starving men there, and thousands of badly-attended wounded. The surrender must have been, as it probably was, a surprise, but the day before the expected event was not the time to prepare for it. There should have been detailed a month ago proper officers to prepare everything for the care of the surrendered troops. There can be no excuse for the fact that only three open ox-carts can be found to transport the dead, and only a score of Bulgarians, who run away at every opportunity, can be detailed to perform the duty of burying the dead. Out on the plain near the bridge over the Vid are bivouacked fifteen thousand or twenty thousand prisoners, fighting for bread, miserable beyond description, in the cold, with hundreds of unburied dead covering the ground near the spot where the first attempt was made to break through; and day after day passes, and their condition does not change, simply because there can be nothing like prompt attention in similar cases where there is no idea of system. The story of the hospitals, of the prisoners, and of the Russian disasters, all hang on one thread.

"But the horrors of Plevna are not all in the town. Some are in the valley of the Vid. In the redoubts which the Russians stormed, hundreds on hundreds of still unburied bodies lie; the whole ridge of the wooded mountain, the valley beyond, and the hill further on, where stand the two redoubts overlooking the town, taken with terrible loss by General Skobelev on September 30th, are strewn thickly with the corpses of the Russians who fell on those days. Some of these bodies have been partly covered with four spadefull of dirt, but most of them lie as they fell. Not all as they fell, for the dogs have torn away the limbs of many, and the birds of prey have pecked at the skulls. In the pools of waters lie corpses half decayed; pale, withered hands and feet stick out of the soil on all sides, and horrible dead, mummified faces stare at one from every little hollow in the ground, and from

among every clump of bushes. Some of these bodies have been put in graves within a day or two, but still the whole region is strewn thickly with these dreadful mementoes of the fight there nearly three months ago.

"Around the redoubts the ground is furrowed and dug with thousands of shells, and tons of pieces cover the earth. It is interesting to observe how few shells went into the redoubts, or struck the edge of the redoubts. The majority plunged into the ground just in front. The Turks built great traverses across the redoubts, and under these deep bomb-proof shelters, where they were as safe from harm from the shells as in Constantinople; but the whole of the hills are literally riddled with holes large enough to bury horses in, and all about lie great unexploded shells. Even away back in the ravine, where the soldiers' huts are, bullets, fragments of clothing, and equipments, cover the ground; and one frequently finds, in the most unexpected spots, long-unburied bodies, or, sodden in the path, one sees the limbs of human beings who fell and were left there until many feet passing trod hard the thin layer of earth over them. Plevna is one vast charnel-house, surpassing in horror anything that can be imagined."

It has been said that Osman Pacha was himself, in the first instance, responsible for a great deal of this misery; and it is necessary to add a few facts confirming that statement. It would not be just to allow the Russians to rest under such a terrible stigma as would attach to them if the whole suffering of the garrison of Plevna could be laid to their charge. Their principal crime was culpable neglect. From the Turks themselves came much of the actual misconduct which resulted in all this cruelty. The following letter is from a correspondent of the "Times," writing early in the month of November.

The writer, who accompanied Drs. Bond Moore, Mackellar, and Goodrich, for the express purpose of relieving the Turkish wounded in Plevna, says:—

"When we reached the main hospital we encountered a scene of horror which went quite

unspeakably beyond all our previous experiences. I am authorised by the gentlemen I accompanied to say that it is quite beyond the power of language to exaggerate their opinion of the deplorable and hideous condition of the wounded. If I could present you with an adequate picture of this dreadful place I should produce a record which would dwarf De Foe's description of the lazaret-houses of the plague. But to attempt such a picture would be to shock decency by every line. I venture to believe the horrors of this home of filth and agony unique and singular. The chambers were large and lofty, and there were reasonable facilities for ventilation, but the odours which filled every one of them were sickening past all words. Wounded men in every state of disease and filth and pain littered the floors. The stagnant miseries had overflowed into the corridors and on to the very stairs, and men with fractures forty days' old lay untended and helpless, side by side with cases of raging fever and confluent small pox. If the reader will pain himself by thinking into what foul abandonment of nastiness one wounded man might fall if left absolutely untended for a week, and will then multiply that imagination by a thousand, he may begin to conceive the state of things which so horrified men accustomed to the sights of war and the ravages of disease. . . . There were scores of fractures there which had remained unset, and had united of their own accord in such distorted attitudes that, in Dr. Moore's phrase, 'limbs were twisted like a ram's horn.' There were filth, and famine, and fever, and gangrene, and every conceivable horror of pain and sickness, and the men, of course, were dying literally like rotten sheep. Outside, in the hospital square, lay forty-three corpses, death's harvest for the day. These, I was told, represented the daily average for the building I have described, and a smaller one which stood next door. It was a piece of careless cruelty, and a part of the wicked stupidities of the place, that these dead bodies should be stripped and laid out within sight of every sick or wounded man who was able to crawl into the square for



exercise, or who was carried through it from the field to the hospital. The total tale of wounded reached four thousand five hundred."

The reception met with by the doctors at the hands of Osman Pacha is told in the words of another eye-witness :—

"On the morning following that of which I have just written, Dr. Bond Moore and Captain Morisot waited upon Osman Pacha at the camp, and made a formal tender of the services of the Stafford House Society's volunteers and stores. A similar proffer was made by Dr. Mackellar in behalf of the Red Crescent Society. To the utter amazement of everybody concerned, the doctors were told that they were not wanted, and were ordered to return. Dr. Moore informed the pacha that he had inspected the hospitals, and gave him a description of the condition of the wounded. The answer to his application was repeated, and the pacha stated that he intended immediately to transport his men to Sofia. Dr. Moore responded that a six days' journey for men in the condition of those he had seen in his excellency's hospital, would inevitably result fatally in hundreds of cases. The pacha's manner had from the first been useless and discouraging. He became angry at this persistence, and again repeated that the services of the English surgeons were not needed at Plevna, and that if they wished to do anything they must go to Sofia. I do not think that many Englishmen will be disposed to quarrel with Dr. Moore because he answered that the immediate transport of the wounded would be a barbarity shocking to Europe. Osman Pacha returned no answer to that statement, and the deputation retired. Dr. Moore was so eager to be of service, and so anxious not to retire from duty, that he made another appeal to the commander-in-chief on the following day. The general's answer was a little modified. The men should be sent to Lukovitza, Avlanitza, and Orkanieh, instead of Sofia, if the doctors wished it, and a part of the pain and fatigue of the journey might thereby be saved. But about their going at once he was inexor-

able, and the doctors finding him inaccessible to appeal again retired. Dr. Bond Moore's last act in Plevna was to write and despatch the following letter to Osman Pacha :—

"I had yesterday the honour to receive through my secretary, Captain Morisot, your excellency's reply, declining to accept the assistance of myself and my little staff of volunteers in the cause of your wounded soldiers. Your excellency will permit me to point out that, previous to my personal application for permission to serve, I had inspected the various houses full of wounded Ottoman subjects in Plevna, and had convinced myself of the urgent need of immediate help. I saw among those wounded men fever, famine, and gangrene, feeding side by side with small-pox on your crippled soldiers.

"In accordance with your excellency's command, I leave your camp to-morrow. I take with me the mules kindly lent me by his excellency Kaisun Pacha for the transport of my *cacolets*, and the escorts from Chevket Pacha which has guarded the Stafford House stores from Orkanieh. Humanity will not allow me to deprive your excellency's unfortunate men of the comforts sent out for them from England, and I therefore have given over to your excellency's chief Turkish surgeon, Colonel Assib Bey, the whole of the medicines, bandages, stretchers, appliances, soups, &c., which I brought with me, since it is your excellency's wish that an English surgeon should not administer them. I should not be doing my duty as the only Stafford House surgeon here, were I not urgently to protest in my professional capacity against the unnecessary transport of the wounded to Sofia. The villages of Lukavitza and Avlanitza, and the town of Orkanieh, are all ready to receive them; and to transport to Sofia men in the deplorable condition in which I have found them will result only in sowing the Orkanieh Pass with corpses."

"Osman Pacha held to his purpose, and the wounded were transported. I was riding down the street when the first convoy of a thousand

started from the town, and I trust it may never again be my fortune to witness such a miserable crowd as I saw there. The wretched soldiers stretched out their hands for pity and assistance as I rode by, and, though I understand but little Turkish, the pitiful '*Amaan !*' shrieked or groaned, and the appealing hands and writhing faces, were more than eloquent. Osman Pacha will find his apologists and his judges. For myself, I have no business but to relate facts. I have related the truth, and nothing but the truth. To relate the whole truth was beyond my power."

These are amongst the regular accompaniments of war, which is cruel enough without the active misconduct of any one engaged in it. Osman Pacha no doubt conceived that he was only performing his strict duty in thus despatching the wounded from the besieged town, where he evidently had no proper accommodation for them.

The sufferings of the prisoners on the way to their destination in Roumania and Russia were very great. A number of these were wounded, more or less seriously, and their fate was aggravated by the intense cold of a bitter winter, as well as by the neglect of necessary precautions. It will be interesting to have the testimony of a correspondent who travelled by the same route, at the time when these unfortunate men were being transported from Plevna.

Writing from Putenieu, a small town in Roumania, on the 3rd of January, he describes his journey from Fratesti. "The morning," he says, "was bitterly cold, and before us was one vast plain of snow, only broken by the bleak telegraph poles and the fluttering of carrion crows. Soon these birds of prey increased in numbers, making almost black the leaden sky. Then afar off, breaking the horizon, a long dark line came slowly, moving in caterpillar-fashion along the road towards us. It was a column of men marching. Not Russian soldiers or Roumanian, or ere this we should have heard some cheerful song borne over the snow. They must be the Turkish prisoners, for in front waver the bay-

onets of their Dorobantz guards, as they plod slowly forward under the weight of their miscellaneous kit. Following are a few Turkish officers, either on ponies or on foot. Behind them come the men who once kept the flower of the Russian army at bay round Plevna. How spiritless and broken they look as they trudge wearily along the road to their captivity. Half-starved, almost dead with fatigue and the severe cold, many with fever burning in their eyes—mere stalking bones and foul rags—come the brave troops who made the fame of Osman Pacha. We get well to the windward of these poor creatures, for typhus and small-pox linger round them on the frosty air. Many are even now falling out of the ranks to lie down and die. One poor fellow has thrown himself on the snow by the roadside; he can go no further. A comrade, loth to leave him, follows and tries to persuade him to struggle once more to join the line. There is no response. He has swooned or is dead. A soldier of the rearguard now comes up and roughly pushes the living man back to the ranks. Then he kicks with his foot the bundle of rags on the ground. There is no sign. With the butt-end of his gun he turns the head over from the snow. The eyes glare at him with a fixed stare. He is dead. The soldier brutally pushes the body deeper into the snow, shoulders his rifle, and joins his guard.

"Thousands of birds of prey whirl round and settle in front and rear, always following this grim procession like sharks around a doomed ship. A few yards further on lies, half-covered with snow, a nude body of another dead Turk, stripped by his companions for the little warmth of the rags he wore. A crow has just settled on his clenched hand, and the dogs are slinking round their victim. A few paces more brings us to another miserable, lying as he died with upturned face, staring on heaven through the fast-falling snow. We must now be near a village, for there are pigs about, and we have just seen a skirmish between these swine and the dogs, to see which shall be first at this horrible carrion. It is the village of Putenieu, almost lost in the



snow and ice. How different the place looked from what it was when I first passed through its streets in the early summer! The Russian advance guard had then only just gone by, and I was in search of Dragimiroff to know where the great crossing of the Danube was to take place. We were then suffering from mosquitoes, intense heat, and blinding dust. Now we were shivering in our furs with cold. Putenieu has become a place of great importance since those days. It is now one of the resting-places for sick and wounded soldiers on the road from the Danube to Fratesti, or to the hospitals at Bucharest and in Russia.

"It is in Putenieu that Dr. Humphry Sandwith has erected, with funds from the England-Russian Sick and Wounded Society, an Etape or Hospice to shelter one thousand men. Hundreds of the Turkish sick passing through to Russia also find shelter and comfort within its walls from the severe cold weather. The director, M. le Baron de Benckendorff, and for the while our good host, is full of work. Not only do his own sick and wounded appeal to his sympathy, but also the miserable Turks, and they pass through in thousands daily, dead beat, and weary from their long march. 'Four thousand passed through to-day,' said the baron to me the morning I arrived. Our little village is over-crowded with the sick they had left behind. This evening four thousand more are expected. A loaf of bread and a pound of meat are given to each prisoner just before entering the town. Then they are billeted for the night on the inhabitants, choking up their little hovels, breeding vermin and pestilence wherever they go. It is indeed hard on the villagers of Putenieu, for there is a continuous stream of prisoners. No sooner has one column left than another enters the village.

"Unfortunately, through this bad arrangement on the part of the Russian and Roumanian authorities, the inhabitants expend their annoyance on the poor prisoners, and the Roumanian peasants are very cruel and brutal. They beat these poor wretches, ill-treat the sick, and

after the darkness hides their cruelty from the Russian eyes they turn them out into the cold night, which means in their plight, half-starved and semi-nude, certain death, for the thermometer registers sometimes twenty degrees Reaumur below zero. The consequence is, that the miniature dead-house opposite my lodgment is well tenanted the next morning with frozen corpses. Dr. Sandwith and myself visited this charnel-house. There are two rooms. In one, ten or twelve bodies were lying as they had been pitched in dead, and others must still have had some life left by their expression and the position of their bodies. In the other room four Turks had sought shelter from the bitterness of the night, and had cleared a space in the mass of dead, and with scraps of rags from the bodies and some sticks of straw had lighted a fire, and were crowded round the wretched smoulder for warmth. One poor shivering wretch, nearly naked, crawled from where he was thought to be lying dead towards the group, and feebly struggled with the rest for a place at the fire. Dr. Sandwith remonstrated with them in Turkish for their unkindness to their miserable comrade, and so the poor creature was allowed to huddle in with the cheerless circle. We asked them what we could do for them. They were very hungry, some not having eaten for three days. Major Baker and the doctor, who were with me, sought in the village for food, but nothing for love or money could be got but onions and bread. The Russians or Roumanians profess to give them bread and meat for daily rations, but there is no doubt that many in some way get none, and there are hundreds who, through sickness, cannot eat this rough fare. Soup is dealt out to many by order of the kindly baron, but only the stronger who struggle for it receive it. The weaker go to the wall, and die neglected from sheer starvation, as their poor emaciated bodies will testify in the little dead-house. The weather has been more than usually severe for the last two days, and the mortuary is crowded with dead Turks piled up several feet high, and crowding the passage leading into

the street. Every morning waggons cart them, unwashed, uncovered, to the huge pit outside the village, and there these brave and long-suffering men find a last resting-place.

"*January 4th.*—To-day I have made the acquaintance of a little sister of mercy, the most fearless and energetic of them all. She hates the horrible Turks and the English, too, but does not mind me, and tells me what perfidious creatures my countrymen are to sympathise and assist those cruel men. Nevertheless, I have seen her go into the most foul fever dens, with the good-natured baron by her side, and dispense cigarettes and refreshing drinks to the wretched, suffering Turks. She is an old campaigner in the work of attending the sick, though very young in years. She is always bright and cheerful, and is the life and soul of the hospice at Putenieu; wears the whitest of caps, the snowiest of aprons, and the reddest of red crosses on her breast. Even Turks cheer up when they see her, though she bears the hated symbol. To-day is even colder than usual. The telegraph wires running through the main road of the village are encased in more than an inch of frost, and the hospice glitters with frosted ice and snow in the last rays of the blood-red sun sinking over the white plains far away to the west. I have just met the little sister returning to her hut from some act of mercy in the village. I call her attention to the lovely evening. A star and the crescent moon, the only signs in the clear sky, shine brilliantly. My companion stops, pulls my arm, and points towards the right. There is the ominous black line wending up the valley. More wretched prisoners, footsore and weary, with their cadaverous faces and ice-laden beards. A halt is made at the little bridge, to dole out to each their frozen loaf of bread. A few poor fellows throw themselves down on the snow and fervently pray after their fashion. How the heavens this night, with the bright symbols of their faith glittering on the frosted snow and on their misery, seem to mock these poor men!"\*

\* "Daily News,"

Another correspondent of the same paper came across Edhem Pacha, one of the generals captured in Plevna, and from him he heard certain details of the last days of the siege which may evidently be accepted as authentic.

Shortly before the sortie, he explained, a council of war was held, and Osman Pacha told his colleagues that the bread was coming to an end, and that the heavy ammunition was nearly exhausted. He therefore put it to the seven pachas and the civil authorities whether they should lay down their arms, or attempt a sortie. They decided on the latter. "On the night of the 9th, thirty-two thousand Turks, all the available force except a skeleton garrison for some of the redoubts, assembled in the valley of Plevna—twenty-six thousand infantry, and six thousand artillery. At two o'clock this army commenced crossing the Vid by five bridges, the permanent stone one and four temporary ones. The temporary were placed one just up stream to the south of the stone bridge, the other three dividing the distance between the stone bridge and a line drawn from Opanesk fort straight to the river. As the regiments crossed the Vid they deployed into line, and they did this in so orderly a manner that the Cossack videttes, who were about three hundred yards away, were not aware of their vicinity till the skirmishers of the Turks advanced to within one hundred yards of them. The Cossacks then retired firing.

"At this time the position of the Turkish forces was as follows:—1st, a line of skirmishers; 2nd, a line of battalions in line; 3rd, three guns in rear of right of line of infantry; three ditto centre ditto; three ditto left ditto. These guns were not used till after passing the first Russian line. The Turks depended on one gun in the small bastion below Opanesk redoubt, five on the south slope of the Opanesk redoubt, these constituting the right of the Turkish attack; eleven guns in two batteries on the high ground on the Plevna side of the permanent bridge, these constituting the left of the Turkish attack. The positions of the Turkish generals were as follow: Commencing from the rear of the army,



one pacha was on the high ground above the bridge, with the eleven guns I have mentioned; one on the right, with the six guns on the slope of Opanesk; two in plain below, superintending the crossing. On the right of the attacking line was one pacha; in the centre, one; on the left were two and Osman Pacha. As the attacking line advanced, carts containing ammunition and necessary baggage crossed the permanent bridge, and, with them, numbers of carts belonging to the inhabitants of Plevna, and containing their wives, children, and household goods, in all to the number of four thousand, pressed forward, and crossed as fast as possible. These latter Osman Pacha was powerless to prevent crossing, for as soon as his troops were withdrawn from Plevna they insisted on following. At daybreak, a little before eight, the fighting began. The bridge was swept by the Russian artillery, killing men, women, and children, and horses and oxen. At nine, No. 2 bridge, counting the bridge below Opanesk as No. 1, was broken by the Roumanian battery of five guns, situated to the right of the Turkish attack. The Turks steadily advanced, and carried the first Russian lines. Again they advanced, and carried two batteries of six guns each in the second line. For two hours the fight raged between the second and third line of the Russians, in favour of neither side. At this critical time the Turkish shells ran short; this enabled the Roumanians to turn their left flank, to get possession of Opanesk; and the hard-fought day was decided against the Turks. Osman Pacha was wounded in the leg, the same bullet killing his horse, a present from the sultan. Ten thousand Turks had not crossed the Vid when they laid down their arms."

Let us now pass on to consider the effects of the capture of Plevna, and the change which it brought about in the general situation.

## CHAPTER XXXVII.

### THE RESULTS OF PLEVNA.

SCARCELY had Plevna fallen when it became known that the Porte had shown signs of a desire for peace, and that it had actually suggested mediation on the part of the Great Powers. The spirit in which it made this suggestion, and the qualified manner of its submission to the fortune of war, rendered it almost hopeless that its appeal should be responded to.

The following is the text of the circular addressed by the Porte to the Powers:—"Every one knows the origin of the unhappy events which have befallen recently in the empire. The imperial government feels the consciousness of not having in any way provoked the war which we are carrying on against Russia, and of having, on the contrary, done everything to avoid it. At the summons of their sovereign the inhabitants of the empire have flocked together to fulfil simply and heroically a great duty—that of defending their menaced soil. But on their own side they have threatened and they threaten no one. It is difficult to discover the motives which Russia can have had to justify her aggression. Is it that she wished to see founded and developed, for the benefit of certain populations who form the object of her solicitude, institutions and reforms fitted to ameliorate their lot? The Sublime Porte has anticipated such a desire by deciding to reorganise its system, and to establish in the country useful and practical reforms designed to satisfy the wishes of all its subjects without distinction of race or religion. This work of reorganisation, governmental and administrative, has for its base the constitution granted by his Imperial Majesty the Sultan. The country has received with satisfaction and gratitude this charter, the application of which, free from all hindrances, is destined to produce all those effects which would have been in vain expected from incomplete measures and reforma-

tions wanting in sanction. A partial reform, which only applied to certain provinces, to the exclusion of the rest of the empire, would present grave inconveniences. For instance, as regards matters of administration, exceptional favours accorded to separate provinces could not but inevitably have, for their consequence, to set in opposition one against another the inhabitants of different races who live under the sceptre of his Imperial Majesty and Sultan, and would constitute, in fact, a premium offered to rebellion. If any doubt could still exist as to the rigorous fulfilment of the new constitution, and of the reforms that we have promised in the Conference of Constantinople, this doubt should disappear in presence of the formal and solemn declaration of the sincerity of our resolutions. We proffer in this regard a guarantee of which we invite Europe to take note. The true and only cause of hindrances which might slacken our efforts in this path would be found in the continuation of a state of war. Such a situation is not only disastrous with reference to reforms, but equally calamitous in regard to the general prosperity of the country. It kills agriculture and industry by keeping under arms the flower of the labouring class; it imposes heavy charges upon the public treasury, and thus places obstacles in the way of every amelioration of the economical and financial condition of the empire, to the great prejudice of the general prosperity of the country and the special interests of the creditors of the state. It results, then, from what has gone before—the question of reforms being outside the matter—that a reason must still be sought for the continuation of the war. The desire of conquest has been loudly and publicly repudiated from the commencement of hostilities by his Majesty the Emperor Alexander. The military honour of the great empire which he governs remains intact, notwithstanding the various fortunes of the campaign, and the armies which confront each other have equally covered themselves with glory on the fields of battle. With what object should they, then, prolong desolation and ruin for their respective countries? We, on

our part, think that the moment has come when both belligerents might accept peace without forfeiture of their dignity, and when Europe might usefully interpose its good offices. As for the imperial government, it is ready to ask this; not that the country has reached the end of its resources. There are no sacrifices which the entire Ottoman nation is not willing to face to maintain the independence and integrity of the Fatherland. But the duty of the imperial government is to avert, if possible, any further effusion of blood. It is, therefore, in the name of humanity that we make this appeal to the sentiments of justice in the Great Powers, and that we hope they will be inclined to receive our advances favourably."

The replies of the various Powers were such as might have been expected under the circumstances. Germany and Austria saw no hope of successful mediation, at all events until Turkey accepted the resolutions of the Conference of Constantinople. Italy and France expressed a general desire to see peace re-established, and declared their willingness to promote such a result in concert with the other Powers. England, specially appealed to by the Porte, went so far as to undertake to sound Russia with respect to her views and wishes.

It was manifest to every one that the English government was the only one in Europe which was disposed to go out of its way to espouse the cause of Turkey; and, greatly as the country had been divided on many aspects of the Eastern question, the majority of Englishmen were not prepared to interfere with Lord Beaconsfield and his colleagues so far as to stay their hands in their advocacy of the Porte's interests. The nation was, indeed, overwhelmingly hostile to Russia, whose disinterestedness it was unable to believe in. It began to be admitted, more generally than at the outset of the war, that the progress of the Russian arms was likely to be injurious to England, and that Russian ambition was tending to set aside the authority of Europe. Englishmen, therefore, of every party, virtually made up their minds to acquiesce in



the policy of the government so long as it was simply directed towards coping with England's old enemy. Whatever other issue was in doubt, this at least was clear; but it did not follow that the country as a whole had changed its mind since, in the autumn of 1876, it so plainly declared that it would not enter into any further alliance with Turkey.

No surprise could reasonably be felt that England should undertake an informal mediation on behalf of the Porte; though some of the more intemperate Russian papers wrote in heroic strains about the partiality displayed by this country. The "*Agence Russe*," a semi-official organ, which played a prominent part throughout the crisis, discussed the question more calmly. On the second day of the new year it had an article in which it sought to prove that the English government had no sufficient reason for offering its mediation. This it maintained on the following grounds:—First, in principle, and by the rules of international law, mediation is impracticable when it is not demanded by one of the belligerents. Secondly, both principle and international law require the impartiality of the state acting as mediator to be assured by the absence of any interest in the questions at issue, but England, by the declaration of her own government, does not possess that quality. Her interests render the transition from mediation to intervention all the more easy for herself and dangerous to all. Thirdly, in principle and in law, wars are made for belligerents, and not for neutrals. If war is made by two parties, peace will also be made by two parties. The individual right of belligerents is only superseded by the superior right of all when the former prejudices the latter. Now, the attitude of the Powers proves the impossibility of applying this argument to the present war, carried on by Russia with scrupulous respect for her duties towards third parties. Fourthly, mediation, without benefiting Turkey or the intervening power, would only encourage the resistance of the Porte, still further prejudice its position, and prolong or even complicate the war. Thus,

on grounds of justice as well as from regard for peace and the localisation of the war, mediation is neither desirable nor acceptable. The article maintained that these considerations must influence most statesmen; and it concluded—"These views are shared also by the laborious English public, who do not favour certain tendencies, and ask themselves why two powerful nations like England and Russia should not study mutually to benefit each other and the whole world as much as they might, instead of persisting in suspicion and jealousy, and in striving to harm each other. The same question is asked in Russia by all statesmen and the majority of the public."

The English government, however, did not shrink from its task; and, though the mediation came to nothing, it still maintained its diplomatic activity in quiet opposition to the more adventurous policy of the Russian generals and statesmen.

Meanwhile it began to be felt in Europe that this country was prepared to uphold the general principles of international concert and authority; and, as men are usually gratified when they see their interests voluntarily undertaken by others, many Continental writers spoke of England as the chivalrous defender of treaty rights and obligations.

Thus the Paris "*Constitutionnel*" had an article under the title of "*An appeal to England*," in which it declared that "England is at the present hour the only Power which can attempt to save what remains of the European equilibrium, and she can undertake it with great prospect of success, if, instead of confining herself within the narrow frame of British interests, she would raise her voice in defence of right and justice." It had happened that, whenever the West wished to encroach upon the East, or when the East wanted to predominate over the West, there was a conflagration, and the equilibrium was destroyed. "The first case occurred under Napoleon I., the second under Nicholas I.; England and France have, by the Crimean war, restored the true equilibrium, which the

Prussian wars of 1866 and 1860 have broken afresh, to the detriment of the West, and which the alliance of the three emperors, the result of those wars, is about to completely destroy, unless England, as we ask her to-day, restores by a vigorous effort the general order of the Old World." The article next insisted (to quote a summary printed at the time of its appearance) that the respect for international treaties is the fundamental basis of all modern civilisation. "Al-luding to Count Andrassy's recent statement that treaties have only a value so long as there is the necessary force to defend them," the *Constitutionnel* observed that "England is the only power which disposes of that force. Her government has only to declare that if she defends the Ottoman empire she does so, not for the protection of private interests, but because she is bound to do it by treaties which, in 1871, were recognised by the Powers agreeing that they could only be modified by the unanimous consent of the signatories. Such a step on the part of England would encourage the timid to follow her. Apart from the treaties it is also necessary to restore to the group of Western States the place which belongs to them in the general equilibrium. Germany, Austria, and Russia, represent, it is true, the numerical majority in the European system; but in point of material riches, intellectual development, and advanced state of their political institutions, England, France, and Italy, without counting the secondary states of that region, have the same importance as the group of the triple alliance, if they do not exceed it in several respects." In conclusion, the article exhorted England not to disdain the moral support which the Western States would at first give to her energetic attitude. "This movement of opinion will not fail to have its effect, and will make a first breach in a system which, contrary to its pompous promises, has hitherto only brought Europe the religious conflict in the West and bloodshed in the East."

Englishmen were naturally flattered by these appeals to and recognitions of their influence on the Continent; the more so because it had re-

cently been supposed (however wrongly) that the prestige of the country had been weakened abroad.

One of the immediate effects of the fall of Plevna on the Turkish government had been to revive a suggestion, not previously acted upon, for the enrolment of Christians in the Ottoman armies—a measure which had never yet been taken in the Mahomedan empire. The older sultans had, indeed, recruited their armies from their Christian subjects; but they had done this only by taking the sons of their victims by force, at a tender age, and training them for their corps of Janis-saries. This tax of tribute children, as they were called, had been abolished more than a century; and Sultan Mahmoud had slaughtered the Janis-saries themselves in 1826. It had been his policy to convert the whole Mahomedan race once more into a race of warriors. He bade his subjects take to the life of the camp, and emulate the prowess of their ancestors; but the war with Russia in 1828 proved that he had reckoned in vain upon the spirit of the nation. The old martial ardour of the fifteenth century had passed away for ever, and it was clear that the Turks were no longer a match even for a single European Power.

Nevertheless it was a startling innovation to propose that Christians and Mahomedans should fight side by side; and, as may be easily imagined, the idea was received with much disfavour on both sides. The Mussulmans could not get the better of their prejudices; and the Christians flatly refused to be enrolled against their co-religionists. Great indignation was expressed on the subject by the Armenians and Greeks in particular. The Sheik ul Islam, the religious head of the Turks, was not slow in denouncing the scheme; but the Greek Patriarch at Constantinople was more time-serving, and he was said to have lent himself to the proposal. But it was found impossible to proceed with it.

A grand council of the American Church was held at Constantinople, in order to discuss the question. Mgr. Nerses, American Patriarch of Constantinople, presided, and was supported by



ten archbishops and bishops, forty prelates, sixty of the secular clergy, and twenty-eight of the administrative and civil council of the community. The meeting was held with closed doors. The clergy were disposed to meet the proposals of the Porte with a negative reply. The principal resolutions discussed were these:—"As there has existed actually no equality between Christian and Mahometan to this day, notwithstanding every promise made, we hesitate to accept this equality in a moment of certain danger. Equality exists nowhere between the races, and Christians may not dwell in the same quarter of a town with Mussulmans; even the very water of the fountains in a Christian quarter is looked upon as impure." "In virtue of the liberty of conscience proclaimed by various Hatts, we cannot counsel our co-religionists to participate in a war proclaimed a holy war, and in the name of the Mahometan religion." "The Armenian Church forbids us to draw the sword in defence of a religion opposed to its own, and of a country the possession of which is contested with us, and whose soil we only occupy under the *régime* of the *Vakouf*; that is to say, as Christians we are simple tenants." The resolution finally passed was as follows:—"The enrolment of the Armenians for the present war is inopportune." A committee was appointed to draw up a report in the sense of the resolution, and to submit it to the Porte.

Thus the whole project fell through, although the Porte and the Patriarchs had narrowed it down to the suggestion that the Christians should merely constitute a sort of national guard, for the preservation of order in their own localities.

The correspondent of the "Daily News" in the Turkish capital gives us a clear idea of the feelings entertained on this subject, both by Armenians and by Greeks. Speaking of the Grand Council (at which he declares that no resolution was come to) he continues:—"Outside the room where the meeting was being held, a large crowd, estimated at not less than two thousand Armenians, had assembled, and did

their best to intimate to their representatives in the religious assembly of the community that they were opposed to the proposed measure. I am told that it never had much chance of being adopted, but if it had, there were those outside who were prepared to take what might have proved very rough measures to show their dissatisfaction. I am informed that the decision finally arrived at was that no official answer should be sent, but it was left understood that the reply to the Porte should be given by certain priests rather than by the official heads of the community. The latter might lose place or position with the Turks. The priests, who live with and by the people, and who are as much identified with their flocks, and as little bound up with the interests of their caste as any priests in the world, will have no objection to state their grievances and their objections to the change.

"The Greek Patriarch has submitted to the Porte a summary of the regulations which he considers necessary before the decree in question shall be carried into effect. For him the question is one of enormous importance. There are in Constantinople and its vicinity not less than four hundred thousand Greeks. Of these sixty thousand belong to the kingdom of Greece, are Hellenes, as they call themselves, while the remaining three hundred and forty thousand are Christian subjects of the Porte. For most purposes there is no difference between the Greek rayahs and the subjects of King George. All speak the same language, and, above all, with an insignificant exception, all belong to the same church. During the last few months, while Greece has been arming, the excitement among the Hellenes has been very great. This has, of course, communicated itself to their fellow Greeks here. Their newspapers—here, in the mild way which just kept them out of the range of the Press law, in Greece in the most open way—have spoken of the abominations committed in enslaved Greece, that is in Thessaly and Epirus, and in Crete. There is not a Greek any more than there is an Armenian who has not a rough and

fairly accurate idea of what the Ghegas and Bashi-Bazouks have been doing in Europe, and the Kurds in Asia. Now, the order goes forth that they are to be enrolled for the defence of the various localities where they reside. Defence, of course, in their eyes means fighting for the Turks, and they don't like it. The patriarch and the better educated Greeks, though I believe hardly one could be found who would be willing to fight against the traditions of their race, take what seems to me, on the whole, a more sensible view.

"Armament of the Christians throughout European Turkey is, of course, from a Turkish point of view, too absurd an idea to be entertained by anybody who knows the country. There is not a single province where the authorities would venture for a week to place arms in the hands of the Christians. Whoever suggested the idea, if he were not a Turk, had an eye to what would be thought in Europe, and probably talked about arming the Christians exactly as certain people talked about arming the slaves to fight on the side of the Confederacy. If he were a Turk, he was probably thinking mainly of extracting further substitution money from the Christians. But to arm the Christians in Constantinople need not, either from a Turkish or a Christian point of view, be absurd. There is always a possibility of a fanatical mob in the capital. There are elements in this, as in all large cities, which would only be too glad to join in a row. The distress which the war has caused has been felt by all classes, but especially by the poorer Turks, and hunger and fanaticism might give the orderly part of the community a bad time. Moreover, should the Russians advance, we should have the Bashi-Bazouks, who have had a year's free play, to say nothing of the possibility of fragments of a retreating army falling back upon, or driven into, Constantinople. In any of these cases it would be an advantage that the guard, whose duty it should be to keep order, should be composed of Christians and Moslems alike. If, therefore, the Greek Patriarch should give his consent to the

proposal, it does not seem to me that he can fairly be blamed. I repeat, however, my impression, that all the discussion which has been aroused by the suggestion to enrol Christians is needless, because neither in the provinces, nor even in the capital, do I believe that there will be any serious attempt to enrol them. Europe will be shown that there is a united people, a further sum of money will have been obtained, and the scheme will quietly glide into oblivion. The one hundred and fifty thousand bayonets, which the officially-inspired newspapers inform us will be added to the Turkish army, will never be seen.

"It may be admitted that one of the objects in admitting the Christians to military service is to conciliate them. Such a measure adopted two or three years ago might have avoided the war, and have been productive of the happiest results. Now, however, the conviction on nearly all sides is, that the attempt comes too late. Among the bankers and the wealthier classes of Greeks and Armenians alike, conciliation might even now be acceptable. But, as one of the clearest-headed among them, and one, too, who would prefer the continuation of the rule of the Turk, if reasonable terms of conciliation could be obtained, explained to me a day or two ago, the lower and less educated classes, who have preserved among them the traditions of their four centuries of misgovernment more clearly, and whose religious feeling is stronger than among the wealthier, cannot at this hour be thus persuaded. Too late for the purpose of using the muscles and sinews of Greek, Bulgarian, and Armenian in this way, will be any attempt made by the sultan to grant this reform. Too late, when the enemy is thundering at the gates, because, however strange it may appear to those who have forgotten their instincts as Englishmen, the oppressed of four centuries cannot be persuaded that the invader is an enemy."

The following is a careful estimate of the prospects of the war, as they appeared to an experienced critic after the fall of Plevna. It was printed



in the "Standard" a week after the surrender of Osman Pacha; and it will serve to reproduce the opinions of many Englishmen at that critical moment.

"The Porte having appealed to the Great Powers under the Treaty of Paris, the first step has been taken towards either the conclusion of peace, or the entry of the war upon a new and more serious phase than that which has concluded. The fall of Plevna was the natural end of the first campaign. It left Northern Bulgaria in the hands of the Russians, with the exception of the Quadrilateral, which, greatly strengthened, remains intact in Turkish possession. The line of the Balkans is still held by the Turks, but the efforts which they have made, and the loss which they have sustained in the capture of the army of Plevna, leave them too weak to successfully maintain their line, and if the new campaign begins, and the Russians force the Balkans, nothing remains for them, as we showed in our last article, but a rapid and general concentration on Adrianople, there to make a final stand previous to falling back upon the capital. It being thus pretty clear that, if the combatants are left to themselves, two months may see the Russians in front of Constantinople, it now remains to be seen what is the prospect before us if the Russian demands turn out to be of a nature to which Turkey cannot assent, and which England cannot stand by and see extorted from her. It will be useful to do this, as the friends of Russia in England are already occupied in endeavouring to prove that, even if England wished to interfere, she would be unable to do so. It is difficult to imagine an assumption more absolutely unfounded, or betraying a grosser ignorance of the military position and the power of this country. There would be three courses open to England, demanding, indeed, various degrees of effort and energy, the least of which would enable her to have an absolutely controlling voice in the final terms of peace. The first course is the occupation of Gallipoli and the isthmus on which it stands. The second is the despatch of a fleet and army to Constantinople, to hold that city as well as

Gallipoli. The third is to take an active part in the war; undertake the defence of Constantinople, and so allow the Turks to concentrate all their forces in the Quadrilateral; to send the fleet into the Black Sea, and a force to Batoum, and to transport an army from India to the Persian Gulf, and thence up the valley of the Euphrates.

"As regards the first course, it has the advantage at least of simplicity and ease; but it would lay us, and justly, open to the charge of selfishness. Too much has already been said about the interests of England, too little about her honour. As far as our interests are concerned, the occupation of Gallipoli would secure them. An army of thirty thousand men landed here, supported by the fleet on either side, could hold their position, when carefully fortified, against the armies of the three allied emperors. We should simply have to say, 'We are here and we stay here until our interests are no longer threatened. We bar the Dardanelles against Russian ships of war, and blockade all waters beyond us, and we intend to make this a Gibraltar and remain here permanently, or until the last Russian soldier has crossed the Danube, and evacuated Armenia.' This would not be an honourable position; it would not be a position which would be approved by Turkey, or by Europe in general; but it would be at least a position unassailable on the ground of British interests; it could be undertaken with a minimum of expense and risk. It would also be at least as honourable as the course which some are advising—namely, that Great Britain should imitate the example offered by Russia, and take advantage of the distress of Turkey to snatch Egypt from her. The second course, that of the despatch of a fleet and army to Constantinople, is also an easy one. Forty thousand British troops in the positions at Checkmedje, aided by the fleet, could hold Constantinople against any force whatever. It is urged that Russia might continue to occupy Bulgaria and Roumelia in spite of this, and to administer those provinces as part of the Russian empire. This assumption is almost ridiculous. If Con-

stantinople is held by us the Turks would be able to greatly strengthen their army in the Quadrilateral, and the Russians would have to maintain an army of occupation as large as that which they now have in the field. No resources could be drawn from the conquered country, in which, indeed, the Russians could scarcely find even food for the troops. The expense of this army of occupation would be enormous, and might finally compel Russia to sue for peace even on the terms of the abandonment of every foot of land taken in Europe and Asia. As long as Russia made no great advance from Armenia it would be unnecessary to go beyond the second course, but if Russia, finding herself checkmated at Constantinople, concentrated all her efforts in Asia, and collected an army there for an advance upon Scutari, we should be compelled to extend our operations and to enter upon the third of the courses which are set before us. We should have to send an expeditionary force to Batoum or Trebizond, and to bring an army from India by way of the Persian Gulf. If it were necessary we could transport one hundred and fifty thousand men from India, and half that number of men landed at Bussora and advanced to Bagdad, would effectually stop the Russians from sending a man west from Armenia. These are our powers of defence. Those of offence are even greater. The landing of six thousand Turks at Soukhoun Kali raised an insurrection in the Caucasus which all the power of Russia has not been able to put down. Fifty thousand British troops at Batoum, in alliance with the Turks, with money and arms to distribute, would raise a storm which would drive the Russians out of the Trans-Caucasus as well as out of Armenia. From India an advance would be even more decisive. An army advancing through Herat against Russia would raise the Khanates, and for the first time unite the Mussulman tribes of Central Asia in a common movement, and it is not too much to say that we are very much more likely to drive Russia out of Asia than she is to drive us from India. If it be urged that even the smallest of these schemes of attack would cost a good deal

of money, the only reply is, that if Russia forces the terms she chooses upon Turkey, opens the Dardanelles to her fleet, and reduces Turkey to almost the condition of a vassal state, so enormous an annual expense would be entailed upon us by the necessity of keeping a great fleet in the Mediterranean, and in largely augmenting our Indian army, that any expenditure we could now make in meeting the contingency would be a good investment of capital. This is not the place to consider whether Russia is or is not likely to demand such terms, but we have endeavoured to show that England, if she should be forced into this war, is in a position to protect her interests, and to insist on a peace in accordance with right and justice, against all the strength of Russia, or of that of Russia supported by any other Power. The enormous increase of European armaments has diminished the influence and power of England in matters settled by huge armies, but on the fringe of the seaboard we are as great as ever, and by taking up strong defensible positions, and by blockading an enemy's seaports, we can, at a comparatively slight expenditure of money and life, tire out the most powerful empire in Europe."

These estimates of the comparative force of England and other nations were frequently indulged in at the time, for it was felt, on all hands, that a war between England and Russia was not impossible, even if it might be, on a careful consideration, improbable. There was at all events a powerful party in England who strove very hard to force the government into arresting the progress of Russia, even if that should necessitate our making common cause with the Turks. The position of the Conservative Cabinet was a difficult one between the two influential extremes of opinion in England.

The immense military power of Russia sufficed to convince most persons that it would be impossible for us to cope with her by land; and this impossibility doubtless did much to modify the eagerness of those who were inclined to take a hostile course. The journal last quoted contained, at the same juncture, an estimate of the



strength of the Russian army, and a description of the new Russian military organisation, which the reader will probably peruse with interest. "After the Crimean War," says the writer (whose letter is dated from Bucharest on the 11th of December, 1877), "the army fell into great disrepute in Russia, the imperial policy being essentially a peaceful one. The emperor himself (having disgusted the army by the peace of 1856, and its opinions being by no means hidden as to what it thought of so inglorious a *finale* to the Crimean war) retaliated by ignoring the army, obliging, in consequence, the aristocratic party, and all such as would be in favour, to retire from that service, or take to the more peaceful vocations of diplomacy, civil service, governorships, &c., leaving the army to be officered by a new class just then springing up in Russia—viz., a class composed of the sons of traders, it being at that time very easy to obtain a commission in the Russian army by any one who had served for one year as a volunteer, and had a sufficient amount of education to enable him to pass the by no means elevated standard required. Great numbers of the class above mentioned, desirous of obtaining a step in the social scale, availed themselves of the facility offered. Twelve years after, in 1871, the results of the Franco-German war clearly demonstrated to the world the necessity of having a thoroughly well-educated and trained class of men to officer regiments engaged in active operations. Russia, wakening from the peaceful and industrious courses that it had been pursuing for nearly fifteen years, revived its slumbering ambitious ideas, and turned its attention to its army. It found it in the hands of a body of officers hardly distinguished by social rank from the men they were commanding, deficient in education, entirely without any *esprit de corps* as a body, and hopeless of favour, being, as they were, disregarded and contemned by their imperial master. The czar himself was just beginning to see the mistake he had made in so neglecting his army, and was looking round to endeavour to restore it, by a thorough reorganisa-

tion, to the position it had held in Europe after the memorable Peninsular war. It was for this, therefore, that he enacted laws in 1872 which thoroughly changed the whole systems both of recruitment and officering. The army, previous to that date, was drawn by voluntary enlistment from the peasant and artisan class of the population of all the Russias, excepting Finland and the Cossack tribes. The new law laid the whole country open to conscription, prohibiting immunity by purchase, and fixing the period of service at fifteen years, six in active service and nine in reserve: the men were not kept continually with the flag even for the first period, being sent, after a short time, on furlough, and not again liable to active service in peace time. Having completed their six years' service, whether on furlough or with the colours, indifferently, they had not to serve further except in case of war, when they were liable for their balance of nine years—the younger ones in the field, the older on garrison duty. During peace time the reserve men were merely called out twice a-year for short drill.

"In order that this conscription should not press too heavily on the educated class and the trading community, it was provided that a year's service as volunteer should free for the time, and during peace, from further military duty, subject, of course, to the yearly reserve drills. From these volunteers were also chosen the future officers, who, having duly qualified, were allowed to become at their choice either army officers or reserve officers. The new law divided the whole standing armies of Russia into two classes in time of peace—viz., the field force and the garrison force, in addition to which were the reserves and the militia, the latter only to be made to serve in the case of an actual invasion. The object proposed in the creating of a garrison force was the doing of ordinary garrison duty, the instruction of recruits, the breaking in of horses, the providing of non-commissioned officers for the drilling of the men on furlough and the reserves, and the supplying of *cadres* for the formation of regiments. The reserve forces act also as a field force, being brigaded

together, have their own artillery, and supply trains, supply garrison fortresses and fort artillery, and fill up the gaps in the field forces.

"The Guards alone have special reserve battalions attached to them, for the purpose of keeping that corps always at its full strength. The rate is one battalion of reserve to every regiment, and one battery to each brigade of artillery. The advantages offered by this system of a garrison force, further supported by an actual reserve, was made apparent very lately, for after the last serious check at Plevna, when it was proved that the numbers of the army actually in Bulgaria were totally insufficient to carry out the work required of them, and in consequence the whole of the Guards were despatched from St. Petersburg, as well as the Grenadiers of Moscow, numbering some twelve thousand from that city, it was the very simplest matter to raise a whole new corps of Guards from the reserves attached to each regiment, and replace those reserves by picked men drawn from the garrison force.

"When military critics were so very severe on Russia after her losses at Plevna, prophesied a collapse, and insisted on the loss of her military prestige, they forgot that it was a mere corps of observation that was then in Bulgaria—not the whole, or even a greater part, of the Russian army. They forgot that at that time there was not, including the army of the Dobrudscha and the Roumanians, more than two hundred and ten thousand of all arms, whilst the actual returns of the infantry alone of the czar on the peace footing during the year 1877 was three hundred and eighty-two thousand odd. It is a campaign, and a campaign only, which finds out the advantages or disadvantages of the different plans of organisation of armies determined on in peace time; so that, bearing in mind the rapidity with which Russia succeeded, owing to its system of reserve and supply, in building up again the army round Plevna, so completely dismembered after the battle of the 11th September, it must be admitted that the Russian government appears to have found a

system which enables it to utilise with rapidity the mass of raw material the population of the country places at its disposal. In addition to the Guards being sent to the front, large bodies of infantry of the line have also been sent, yet there still remain in Russia the same number of men under arms, perhaps even a few more, than were there at the declaration of war. Now, in every battle, it is the quantity of the reserves which enables a general to foresee the issue of a combat, and enables him to deal with the mass actually at his disposition. Has he many, he may act hardily; has he few, he must act cautiously. So it is with a nation and its government.

"In England you have an enormous raw material to draw upon, should war overtake you, but you have never given a thought to its utilisation. Your system of reserve would never give you sufficient men to replace the losses incident to a great campaign. This war counts up to the present time but five months of actual fighting; yet in that short time some one hundred and sixty-two thousand Russians are killed or *hors de combat*. Say that England has to fight again some time—as it will not be against the Turk it will be, in all probability, against some nation of heavier *calibre*. If the Turk has inflicted such loss in so short a time, what would a nation able to bring larger forces be able to do in the same space? Are we in a position to replace once and a half again the present army of England every five months under our present system of reserves? I think not. But the Russians under their system keep every able-bodied citizen liable to active military service from the ages of seventeen to thirty-six, and in case of emergency from fifteen to sixty, though of course such an emergency is not likely to arise, as, taking the population at eighty millions, the levy of two on every five hundred males produces a supply of from ninety thousand to one hundred thousand recruits every year."

The excitement produced in England by Russia's victories at Kars and Plevna, and by her subsequent rapid advance into Roumelia, of



which one effect was to raise a discussion over the comparative fighting power of the two countries, led to a corresponding excitement in Russia. The Russian people thought that there was a real danger lest England should step in and challenge the further progress of their armies, and thus menace them with the loss of all they had gained by their enormous sacrifices. It is probable that the czar and his ministers, Prince Gortschakoff, General Ignatieff, and all who were in a position to see the full bearing of the question, never had much cause to imagine that the English government would go to such a length as this. But there can be no doubt that the majority of the nation supposed it possible, and even probable; and the natural patriotism of a country engaged in a great and successful war displayed itself in preparations to meet a new enemy.

An "Imperial Society for the Encouragement of Maritime Commerce" was started, under the presidency of Count Kameroffsky, and supported by voluntary contributions, the real object of which was to buy and fit out privateers which might prey upon English commerce in the event of a war. Vessels were actually bought, in the United States and elsewhere; and subscriptions flowed in very plentifully from all parts of Russia. For some weeks we heard a great deal of these cruisers; and the Russians, doubtless, intended that we should do so.

An interesting question was raised in connection with this movement—that, namely, of the effect of the article in the Treaty of Paris which abolished privateering. Englishmen, as the reader is doubtless aware, have often counselled the abrogation of this article, which appears at first sight to tell most injuriously against the country with the strongest naval force; but the English government has always steadily adhered to its engagement. Count Kameroffsky desired, on behalf of his society, to have a clear definition of the rights and privileges of private vessels, armoured or not, in time of war. For this purpose he applied to Dr. Bluntschli, the Professor of International Law at Heidelberg, for his opinion; and

the professor gave an answer which was thus summarised by a St. Petersburg correspondent:—

"Professor Bluntschli's letter begins with an historical dissertation on the customs of war by sea and by land for the last three thousand years. These customs were originally of the most simple kind, and they involved the forfeiture of all rights both of person and of property on the part of the vanquished. With the abolition of slavery the practice ceased of treating prisoners of war as slaves. In modern times, too, says the professor, the ancient right of destroying the enemy's property, or of depriving him of it for the benefit of his conquerors, has been abandoned in war on land; and it is very unjust, he argues, and quite contrary to the humanitarian spirit of the present time, that so cruel a right, based on nothing but tradition, and the supposed interests of the stronger naval powers, should still be maintained in connection with maritime warfare. This right, however, is still exercised, and Professor Bluntschli is convinced that England will never give it up until she has learnt, to her own cost, that she also—with her widely-developed maritime commerce, too vast to be defended at all points—may suffer by it. By the treaty of eighteen hundred and fifty six England surrenders the right she formerly claimed of seizing enemy's property on neutral ships; and the flag is now held to cover the merchandise. In regard to privateering Professor Bluntschli's opinion is particularly valuable, as representing not only his own view, but also that of the German government, by which he is constantly consulted on international questions. Privateering is abolished, he says, in this sense—that a private shipowner may no longer fit out a vessel for operations against the enemy under cover of 'letters of marque' alone. The crew of every vessel intended to act against the enemy must be 'militarily organised,' the men acting under commissioned officers, who are themselves responsible to the higher officers of the regular naval service."

Fortunately for both nations, the need did not arise for applying this advice in action. The question of war or peace continued to be

anxiously discussed for many weeks ; but it did not seem necessary to either government to decide their quarrel by the sword.

If the war party was eager in England, so also was the party of peace. The Eastern Question Association may be mentioned as having taken a very active part in the agitation which, at various times throughout the crisis, was directed against the alleged tendency of the Conservative government to take up the quarrel of Turkey. A fortnight after the fall of Plevna, on the eve of Christmas Day, the association published a document which will serve to illustrate the opinions of this party.

The immediate cause of the renewed agitation, of which this address formed a part, was the announcement by government, that her Majesty had summoned Parliament to meet three weeks earlier than usual—on the 17th of January, 1878, instead of, as usual, about the 7th of February. Many men fancied that the Cabinet had already decided on a declaration of war. Others concluded, more accurately, that it was intended to apply to the nation for a grant of money, in order that measures of precaution might be taken. In either case the opposition objected to this special policy on the part of Ministers ; and the Eastern Question Association issued the following address :—

*“December 24, 1877.*—The course taken by her Majesty's government in summoning Parliament to meet three weeks before the usual period is one which, in the present disturbed state of Europe, has given rise to much anxiety and apprehension, both at home and abroad. The announcement of that step has been accompanied by no authoritative declaration of the nature and objects of such an unusual proceeding. The public mind is left in an uninformed condition, at the mercy of the sinister interpretations which are placed upon the intentions of the government by persons who, for more than a twelve-month, have exhausted every resource to goad or to beguile the country into a war for the maintenance of the Turkish empire. This mischievous party has already seized upon an act

which may possibly be innocent enough in itself, and employ it to create the belief that the object to which their incessant efforts are directed is at length on the point of fulfilment. Their purpose is not doubtful ; it is to induce Europe to believe, and to lead English people to suppose that a resolution is already taken, and preparations are about to be made, to embark this country in war. The effect of this conduct will be equally disastrous at home and abroad. The government of Turkey will be dissuaded from making peace by the hopes held out of English intervention, and thus the sanguinary war which is now being waged will be indefinitely prolonged. At home the condition of uncertainty and alarm thus inspired will produce—indeed, has already produced—many of the evils inherent to a state of actual war. The Chambers of Commerce at Manchester and elsewhere have already raised a voice of warning and protest against the injury which the present state of affairs inflicts upon industry and commerce. The resources on which the employment of the people depends are threatened with a depression even greater than that which already weighs so heavily on the mass of the population. We are menaced (possibly without just cause) with increased taxes, dearer food, and lower wages. It may be that the policy and intentions of the government are now, as they have been so often before, misrepresented by those who pretend, without authority, to speak on its behalf. But if it be so, no time should be lost in dispelling a false and mischievous delusion. The government have pledged themselves to Parliament and to the country to observe a policy of neutrality, subject to the necessary safeguard of British interests. There is no ground whatever for assuming that those interests, as defined by the government, are in any greater or more immediate peril than at the time when these official declarations were made. From the first the government have proclaimed that it was not their intention to defend the Turks against the attack of Russia. Are we, then, at this moment, in the presence of an altered state of facts, or of a change of policy ? If the facts



are altered wherein consists the alteration? When Lord Derby last declared the neutrality of the government Kars had fallen, and the surrender of Plevna was imminent and foreseen. But, if the policy of the government is changed, what are the new principles on which it is based? These are questions on which it is not tolerable that the nation should be left in doubt even for three weeks.

"The country had rested tranquil and satisfied with the declaration made by Lord Derby to the most recent deputation. What has occurred since that date to call for or to justify an unusual and unexplained proceeding, which inevitably begets a suspicion of a change of purpose? In the absence of any official explanation of this transaction, and in presence of the interpretations placed upon it by the enemies of peace, it seems necessary that the government should be strengthened if they adhere to their policy of neutrality, and deterred, if it be possible that they contemplate war, by a clear and decisive expression of the mind of the nation. It cannot be alleged that such an expression of opinion can weaken or embarrass the administration. As Lord Derby stated last year, 'the first object of a minister is to know the will of his employers.' The country has accepted a policy of neutrality, and they will resist a policy of war. No matter by what specious or plausible pretexts such a policy may be recommended, it is necessary to take a firm stand, and to declare that upon no pretence whatever shall England be embroiled in a war for the maintenance of the Turkish empire. Such a war is one in which it is notorious we should engage without an ally. It is a war which would kindle hostilities throughout the length and breadth of Europe. It is a war in which, if we were even successful, we should render ourselves hereafter responsible for the good government of Turkey—a responsibility which recent events have sufficiently shown we have no power to discharge. If British interests are to be protected, they must be protected in some other way than by or through the Turks.

"It is not necessary to re-open old controversies, or enlarge on well-worn themes. The issue is a simple one, but it is one of the most momentous nature. Is England to be involved in the war between Russia and Turkey? No such war can be undertaken by any government in the face of a divided nation. In order to avert it, all those who believe such a war to be at once unjust and unnecessary should take all lawful means to convince the government that a policy of war is one which the English people do not desire and will not support. For that purpose every method should be employed by which the public opinion of a free people can be uttered in order to counteract the machinations of those who are labouring to force the administration into so fatal a course.

"With that object we venture to urge upon you the expediency of obtaining from all sections of the community to which your influence may extend a clear declaration in favour of neutrality, and a decisive protest against a war for the support of the Turkish Empire, since nothing seems to have yet occurred to alter the wise declaration of the Foreign Secretary, that of all British interests the greatest is that of peace.

WESTMINSTER, President.

SHAFTESBURY, Vice-President.

A. J. MUNDELLA, Chairman of Committee.

WILLIAM MORRIS, Treasurer.

GEO. HOWARD, }

F. W. CHESSON, } Honorary Secretaries.

J. W. PROBYN, }

EDWARD S. PRYCE, Secretary."

The agitation was maintained up to the meeting of Parliament; and it was not without its effect. No one can say whether or not the English government, if left entirely to its own course, and to the pressure of the war party, would have cut the knot by declaring war against Russia; but at the same time it would be idle to deny that the "peace party," or those who were most resolute against any kind of association with the Turks, did much to render a war between Eng-

land and Russia impossible. The agitation was not so strong or so influential as had been the great popular demonstrations of 1876; but it was sufficiently vigorous to destroy the hopes of those who had thought that a war would be most advantageous to the country.

For good or for ill, Russia perceived that the peace party in England was too strong for the war party; and eventually the war fever in both nations happily subsided.

## CHAPTER XXXVIII.

### THE ADVANCE ON THE BALKANS.

THE strategical effect of the capture of Plevna may be described in a few words. The victory at once relieved the Russians from the chief obstacle which had delayed their advance; and by permitting them to hope that the war might be finished without another long campaign, it gave them every inducement to press forward. The surrender of Osman Pacha practically ended the war in Bulgaria; and we shall have little further concern with the north of the Balkans. And, indeed, it had been plain that for several months past, almost from the beginning of the campaign, it was Plevna in particular, if we may not say Plevna entirely, which had held the armies of the czar in check.

The Quadrilateral alone would have had comparatively little part in blocking the path of the Russians. The employment of fortresses for defensive purposes has never been thoroughly understood by the Turks; their use requires more correct knowledge of the science of war than Mahomedan generals are wont to possess. No doubt, if there had been an Osman Pacha in Rustchuk and Shumla, as well as in Plevna, the fate of the campaign would have been different; but there had not been. The Russians had not dared to leave the "Lion of Plevna" in their rear, as they would possibly have dared to leave the commanders of the western Quadrilateral for-

tresses. Nor could they be content to mask Plevna with a large army, and pour the remainder of their troops across the Balkans in the autumn; partly because it was necessary to make Sofia their next objective, and Osman Pacha was within easy reach of Sofia, and partly because, even with their immense numerical strength, they could not afford to make a double wall of troops through the whole breadth of Bulgaria. The risk would have been far too great in leaving their line of communications exposed to the chances of war over so vast a distance. Thus, although the grand duke had never confidently reckoned on being able to withdraw his nephew's army from the Lom, he certainly could not contemplate an advance so long as both his flanks were menaced.

Plevna had been worth to the Turks a good three months; and in honour and consideration at the close of the war it was worth to them a province, if not an empire. To the Russians it had cost perhaps thirty thousand men, and a vast amount of treasure. But at last it had been cleared out of the way; and from that moment, as just observed, Bulgaria was virtually without terrors for the invader.

The fact was not long in being illustrated. The Turks admitted it at once, perhaps too readily. Scarcely had the commanders in the Quadrilateral heard that Osman Pacha was on his way to captivity in Russia when their hold began to relax on all the most advanced positions which they had held throughout the summer and autumn. Even before that crowning disaster to the Turkish arms had taken place, the game was being thrown up in the valley of the Jantra. Personal jealousy and intrigue had been at work again in Constantinople, and orders had been despatched to remove Mehemet Ali from the command of the army in Sofia, and to bring Suleiman Pacha from Bulgaria to Roumelia.

On the 12th of December the Turks in the front line made their last strong demonstration against the army of the czarewitch, which was thus reported from the Russian head-quarters at Bogot:—"An attack was made by the Turks



yesterday upon the Russian forces under the Grand Duke Vladimir. The Ottoman forces, which were at least sixty battalions strong, directed their attacks principally against the Russian left flank and centre, merely making a feeble demonstration against the right flank. The Turks attacked Metchka six times, but were thrown back on each occasion with great loss. At one o'clock in the afternoon a brigade of the 35th division of the 12th Army Corps appeared upon the scene of the conflict, and was immediately ordered to take the Turkish line of attack in flank. Upon the brigade opening fire, the whole 12th Army Corps also at once assumed the offensive, and beat the enemy back in the direction of Krasnoe. The Turks were compelled to retire upon that place, the road to Tchiflik having been cut off. The loss of the Turks is believed to have been very great. That of the Russians has not yet been ascertained, but it was less than that suffered in the battle of the 26th November, although more troops were this time under fire. The grand duke had a narrow escape of being hit by a ball which struck close by him. The official account reports the conduct of the Russians in the affair to have been beyond all praise."

A somewhat different complexion was put upon this affair by Suleiman Pacha, who, in a despatch to the Seraskierate, dated the 13th, said:—"Yesterday we attacked the enemy in the direction of Biela and Pyrgos with three brigades of infantry, a regiment of cavalry, and four batteries of artillery. The brigades constituting our left wing forced the Russians to retreat to Metchka and carried their entrenchments, but the Russians receiving reinforcements from Biela, resumed the offensive on our left wing. The resistance offered by Fazli Pacha and a successful diversion made by Sabit Pacha, who was posted at the Tchaouch bridge, paralysed the enemy's efforts. We were, however, unable to hold the entrenchments, on account of a cross fire from the Metchka heights. At the same time a Russian ironclad on the Danube cannonaded our right flank, but she was obliged to retire on the arrival of our monitors. Dark-

ness coming on, our troops re-occupied their original positions. The battle lasted over seven hours, over an extent of country requiring six hours' march. Three thousand Russians were killed, and a gunpowder store at Metchka was blown up. The enemy's forces consisted of sixty battalions and eighty guns. Our losses were comparatively small."

Probably a more correct estimate of the losses sustained on either side was given in a telegram from Bogot on the day following the date of the two last quoted, which also adds a few details of the movement. "On the 11th inst., the eve of the attack made by the Turks upon the positions of the twelfth Russian Army Corps, several reconnaissances were made on the entire eastern front of the Russian line. One of these ascertained that the Turks had commenced crossing the Lom near Krasna, another pushed to within a short distance of Omurkioi and Karagatch, and ended in an engagement which resulted in a success to the Russian arms. The reconnoitring detachment consisted of thirteen companies of the Kursk regiment, the Lubni regiment of hussars, and two batteries, under General Gortschakoff. Towards nine o'clock in the morning the detachment encountered fourteen tabors of Turkish infantry, with four guns. As soon as the engagement commenced General Gortschakoff gave orders to prepare an ambuscade near Kassabin, and, to decoy the Turks towards it, he began to retire. The Turks immediately followed in pursuit of General Gortschakoff, and soon came upon the ambuscade, which suddenly assumed the offensive, turned the pursuing Turks and drove them as far as Omurkisi. The enemy left upwards of two hundred dead upon the battle-field. The Russian loss in this engagement is officially stated to have been four officers and two hundred and thirty men wounded, and thirty-four men killed.

"The loss of the Russians on the 12th inst., in the fighting near Trestenik and Metchka, has not yet been definitely ascertained, but it is estimated at twenty-five officers killed and wounded, and about ninety men killed and six hundred

wounded. The Turks sustained very considerable loss in recrossing the Lom. Up to the present more than six hundred Turkish dead have been taken up in front of the Russian positions, but the work of collecting the corpses is still very far from being concluded. On the 13th inst. only unimportant outpost skirmishes occurred on the Russian eastern front. On that day the batteries at Giurgevo bombarded Rustchuk, a gun and one battery being injured."

On the 14th of December a more important and significant event took place in the abandonment of Elena, on the road from Osman Bazar to Tirnova, which the troops of Suleiman Pacha had so gallantly captured ten days before. As they quitted the town the Turks set fire to it; but the Russians quickly advanced and took possession of the place. This was, in fact, the beginning of the reaction produced by the fall of Plevna throughout Bulgaria. Elena was serviceable chiefly as a station on the Tirnova road, when the hope of effecting a junction with Osman Pacha had not yet been given up. Now that the prospect of such an achievement was destroyed, it was almost impossible, as well as being comparatively useless, to retain this unfortified town. Nevertheless, its hasty evacuation showed that the Turks were beginning to be discouraged, and that their offensive was being finally exchanged for the defensive.

The affair at Metchka was the last effort of the army with which Abdul Kerim, Mehemet Ali, and Suleiman Pacha, had vainly attempted to break through the Russian lines. The brave men under the command of the czarewitch had been amongst the first to cross the Danube in June; and they had nobly stood on guard, for five weary months, almost without changing their position.

Meanwhile, gladly turning their backs on Plevna, strong reinforcements had gone to the assistance of General Gourko, who was still persisting in his attempt to force the Sofia road. On the 7th of December he had moved forward from Etropol to Orkanieh. In spite of the abandonment of the last-named town, the Ottoman

troops appear to have held their own in the Etropol Balkans for some time. On the 12th, according to an account emanating from the Russian side, a Russian detachment posted on the roads leading from Slatitza to Sofia and Etropol was attacked by a Turkish force from Slatitza, which was subsequently reinforced to about three thousand men. The engagement lasted from morning until dusk. "All the attacks of the Turks were repulsed, but as the Turks remained during the night on the heights commanding the foremost Russian positions at Torhelopetschein and Klissa, these positions were evacuated by the Russian troops. The Russian loss is not yet known, but is said to have been large. The rest of the Russian troops still occupy their previous positions in sight of Arab-konah, and are watching Lutikows. The Turks continue fortifying their positions, and are bringing up reinforcements from Sofia." The Constantinople account claimed a more brilliant success; but here, as on previous occasions, the true significance of a military bulletin is to be gathered from the events which immediately followed.

The nature of these events, which resulted in the capture of Sofia, may be judged from a letter of the "Daily News" correspondent at General Gourko's head-quarters, written on the 14th of December, and interesting on more than one score. "A week ago," he says, "the head-quarters were moved from Etropol to Orkanieh, not without previous notice of a day or two, so we got over the narrow and difficult passage behind Pravca at our leisure. The road leaves the valley of the Mali Isker about three kilometres below Etropol, and mounts rapidly the range that forms the watershed of this river and the Pravecka. As Orkanieh lies about seven hundred feet lower than Etropol, the descent into the valley of the Pravecka is longer than the climb on the other side; and the road comes out along the river, leaving the village of Pravca on the left, and meets the chaussée just at the entrance of the Pravca Pass, and at the foot of the mountain which was held by the Turks the day of the battle there. From here it is a ride of an



hour and a half to Orkanieh, which lies very near the mountains where the *chaussée* enters them and climbs the Baba Konak Pass, where the two armies now lie. The Sofia road has, in this valley, as indeed for the greater part of the distance between Plevna and this point, a row of small cherry trees on each side, which are not yet large enough to be very tempting for fuel, and therefore are nearly all standing. The telegraph posts are, on the contrary, all cut down and burned.

"The little village of Lazan was entirely deserted as we passed through it, and the houses bore marks of bullets and shells on either side the highway. Just beyond here two or three rifle-pits, now filled with water, showed where the Turkish outposts were, and on a range of low hills north of Orkanieh, and only about a half-mile distant, were the great square redoubts, left of the road, that looked so formidable on the day we watched them from the mountain, when the tents dotted the valley all about the town, and the ramparts were black with Turkish soldiers. Now the rains had already filled the ditches of the long breastworks that cut across the slope among the trimmed trunks of the oak trees and washed away the sharp angles of the parapets. These works were constructed with a skill and care that would put to shame the finest Russian fortifications about Plevna, and proved for the thousandth time the superiority of the Turks in this respect. They always fortify at once; if they did not the war would long ago have been ended. The Russians generally put it off till the next day, and then throw up an apology for a breastwork, too often with the remark that it is good enough against the Turks. They began the war with this idea, and it is not entirely beaten out of them yet. In this remark there is a whole history of positions not held, of hardly-won ground lost, and of precious lives sacrificed. The fortifications in the neighbourhood of Orkanieh were not intended as a defence of that town, but of the entrance to the pass at the back, and the strongest of the works are on the mountain slopes near the vil-

lage of Vracesi, which lies at the entrance to the pass, about a mile south-west of Orkanieh. There are no works on the plain north-west of Orkanieh, and it was from this side that the Russian cavalry made dashes into the town and annoyed the enemy previous to his departure. The nearest Turkish position in this direction is at the village of Lutikova, seven miles distant, just below the summit of the range which separates the plain of Orkanieh from the valley of the Isker. It would be possible for the Turks from this point to make a dash occasionally across the line of communication if they are not driven out of that place before the army crosses the Baba Konak Pass.

"As I rode into Orkanieh in the cold rain on the afternoon of the day the head-quarters were changed, I was soon on the alert to find as good quarters as possible, for something like a comfortable shelter is now a necessity for both men and horses. In the principal street of the town, opposite a great khan, stands a little isolated house of two storeys, newly built, high in the walls, and with a large court-yard. It was apparently waiting for me, and I took possession, as a matter of course. The interior, perfectly fresh and clean, with whitewashed walls, did not offer anything attractive to the eye, but, in spite of broken glass, it had a comfortable, spacious look about it, that was a relief after the low ceilings, latticed windows, and curious mud stoves of the houses I had been occupying, in which there was much picturesqueness but little comfort. I was surveying the walls of one of the rooms with the view to the possible decoration of a great blank whitewashed space with bridles and equipments, when some writing in lead pencil caught my eye, and attracted my attention from its characteristic English swing, that was unmistakable even when seen from a distance. With mixed feelings I read these words:— 'My dear Forbes, if you enter with head-quarters, requisition this house—the best in the place. Give an eye to the surgeons you took prisoners the other day. I am returning to England. All well.' Signed 'A. O. Mackaller,' and addressed, 'Archibald Forbes,

Esq., 'Daily News,' with no date. It seems almost like a communication from another world, although at the time I read it both the writer and the one to whom it was addressed might have been together in London. In regard to the surgeons, those who were captured at Telish were the ones referred to, without any doubt. They were treated with every consideration, and when I saw them in Bogot a few days after they were made prisoners they were in comfortable quarters, and were taking their meals daily at the table of the grand duke. They, however, seemed to be possessed with the idea that they were quite as badly off as common prisoners, because a soldier followed them about everywhere they went, an attention which, under the circumstances, was surely not superfluous. But personal liberty is so dear to some of us that a mere kind of an invasion of its rights may not be balanced by the hospitality of even grand dukes and princes.

"The news of the attempted sortie from Plevna came to us about daybreak on the morning after, and three hours of suspense ended in the reception of the news of the surrender of the army of Osman Pacha. The great joy that this news brought may be imagined. It was as if every one had a weight lifted off his heart—a weight that had been lying there four long months. Officers embraced each other, soldiers cheered, and cheered and cheered again, and everybody felt free to give way to the wildest expressions of delight. General Gourko went to the positions with his staff to tell the great news to the troops in the bivouac there. He remained with Count Schouvaloff, and his aides-de-camp went up into the entrenchments with the tidings. The cheers in the bivouacs had announced long before the aides-de-camp arrived an event of more than usual importance, and all the soldiers were curious to know what had happened. When they were told the news they jumped upon the parapets and waved their caps at the astonished Turks, who were close by on the opposite ridge, and gave round after round of hurrahs. The sun, which has been veiled for

days, just at this time shone out brightly, and the mist dissipates, giving the opposing lines, for the first time for a week, a fair sight at each other. In the batteries the members were ordered to their post, and then, while parapets were lined with men, all waving their caps and cheering frantically, volley after volley of shell was thrown into the enemy's fortification, for once a joyous and triumphant cannonade. The cheers spread like a wave from one end to the other of the line, down in the ravines, back in the woods—away on the summits went the sound until it became a faint hum in the far distance, and died away, and was renewed again with repeated energy for a long while. This was the beginning of the fête, and that day nothing that could be eaten or drunk to celebrate the tidings was spared. Since that the weather has been growing fine, and, as may be supposed, the rise in the barometer of every one's spirits, from the general to the last soldier, is immense."

The following scene has nothing to do with the actual advance of the Russian forces, but it is so characteristic that the reader would be sorry to miss it. "In my last letter," the correspondent continues, "I spoke of the sugar famine at Etropol, and the difficulty of obtaining any of the small luxuries of life there. The famine did not last long, for the day after we came to Orkanieh a sutler arrived with an immense train of wagons laden with all kinds of groceries, delicacies, and small wares, and began at once to unpack his goods in an empty shop opposite the general's head-quarters. The news of this arrival spread quicker than even the report of the fall of Plevna, if one may judge by the crowd of officers of every rank that besieged the entrances to the shop long before the proprietor had any intention of opening the establishment. The covers were off some of the cases, disclosing sugar, preserves, bottles, and stationery, and the attraction was too great to be resisted, so the crowd entered the shop with good-natured shouldering and hustling, and began to pile up the articles they wanted with a recklessness that would have broken the heart of a methodical shopkeeper.



They dived into the great cases, bringing out, with shouts of delight, all kinds of bon-bons and candies, jams and jellies, which they laid hold of with the eagerness of children, and began to eat on the spot. The sutler and his assistants could do nothing but make spasmodic attempts to regulate the distribution of the stores, which only made the confusion greater, and the happy crowd elbowed and pushed, and continued to help themselves in abundance. As each one gathered his stock of plunder, he was as impatient to pay for it as he had been to get hold of it, and although the sutler calmly took four times the price of the goods at Bucharest, the tariff was never questioned, and bright new gold pieces rattled into his canvas bag in a stream, making music that would have delighted a miser. Doubtless the glitter of the gold blinded his eyes to the scene of indescribable confusion in his shop. It was really an interesting and ludicrous spectacle, this merry attack on the sutler's shop. Colonels and captains, staff-officers and surgeons, all jostling one another like so many children at a table full of bon-bons, burying their arms deep in the cases where the sweets were, loading themselves with bottles and parcels, laughing and talking and joking all the time. Officers splashed with mud, their faces tanned and roughened with exposure, dipped into the pots of jam and broke open boxes of bon-bons with laughable earnestness, as if they had been denied sweets since their childhood, and their early taste had only grown the stronger from long abstinence. From the bivouac in the snow on the mountain, where black hard bread and sugarless tea had, perhaps, been for days their chief diet, to a shop piled full of delicacies—this was a change which must be experienced to be realised in its entire extent, and, notwithstanding the ludicrous aspect of the performance, it had a serious side, which no one could fail to remark at the moment."

The same writer gives a graphic account of the hardships endured by the Bulgarians during the progress of the war through their country. "Between the Turks and the Russians," he says, "the Bulgarian, who is found in the track of the

armies, naturally enough fares rather badly. It is my firm belief that he now considers the Russian quite as much his oppressor as the Turk, for as long as the Turks had possession here the peasant still had some cattle, and some of his harvest. When the Russians came they requisitioned his cattle for beef, his harvest for fodder, and now he stands with only the roof that covers his head, a few napoleons in his pocket, which have been paid for his crops and his cattle, and he is helpless, because he can buy nothing even with the money he has. The Cossacks, who receive nothing from the government for their rations, and are allowed to forage, do not always stop to discuss whether anything they want is Bulgarian or Turkish, nor can they be expected to do so. The Moldavians who drive the supply waggons are as lawless as brigands, and being badly off, themselves forage when there is an opportunity, so there is an advance guard and a rear guard of foragers wherever the army goes. It is only the enormous size of the crops that has enabled the country to stand so long the drain on its resources for the nourishment of such a multitude of horses as accompany the Russian army.

"The experience of the inhabitants of Orkanieh when the Turks retreated was quite dramatic. They were ordered to pack up all their effects, and leave with the troops, which they did the day before the Russians took possession of the town. That night the slow procession of heavily-laden ox-carts, with its escort of men, women, and children of all ages, from the babies in arms to the tottering old people, numbering several hundred families, made its way through the snow and mud as far as the gorge in the mountains beyond Vraceni. Here a halt was made for the night, and the people, finding that the Turks kept careless guard over them, began to stroll away into the mountains towards Pravca. The night was dark and cold, and motion in any direction was preferable to a bivouac in the ravine, where the wind from the mountain whistled down upon the shivering multitude and threatened to freeze them in their fireless camp.

One by one the families strayed off, carrying such of their household goods as they could in the darkness lay their hands upon, but leaving, of course, the greater part of their effects and all their live stock in the hands of the Turks. A few mountaineers who knew the paths led the way, and along the track made by them in the damp snow followed the rest, at first hopelessly, and then urged on by fear of pursuit until the flight became a panic. Some threw away their burdens and outer garments, mothers grown wild with the terrors of the darkness and the dreaded Turks dropped their children, and dragged themselves along half-dead with exhaustion and fear. The mountain paths, difficult in the light of day, were full of pitfalls and dangerous places, and some in the darkness fell over the precipices and were killed or badly injured. But the Turks, probably occupied too much with their own safety, did not pursue even after the flight was discovered, and the fugitives suffered only from imaginary terrors. All night long the painful flight continued and at morning the majority of the families had reached Pravca.

"A more miserable band of human beings was never assembled than the multitude which, having left Orkanieh on one day with their piled-up ox-carts, dragged themselves back into the town the next day, wet, exhausted, completely stripped of everything valuable they possessed in the way of household effects and implements of trade or cultivation. The town which, when they left was half sacked, was now completely gutted, and Russian soldiers were scouring every nook and corner for plunder. Broken doors and windows, a fireless hearth, rooms emptied of furniture and strewn with the *débris* of shattered pottery and broken glass, welcomed them to their only home; and even this shelter was a grateful one after the exposure of the night. This is the story that has been related to me by several of those who lived through the trials of that day and night. The present condition of these people is an all-sufficient witness to the truth of their statements in the main, and although a few of the inhabitants of Orkanieh

have managed to save some pieces of furniture and their kitchen utensils and bedding, there are many other families who have scarcely the clothing to keep them warm, or dishes to cook their food. They cannot starve or freeze while the Russians are here, for the soldiers who are quartered in the houses keep up a good fire, and are generous enough with their food, and there is plenty of corn and other rations captured from the Turks. But misery which seems endurable in summer has quite a different aspect when the snow is on the ground; and the poverty of cold is the hardest to bear."

As for the military position, the same correspondent wrote on the 15th:—"The positions of the two armies on the mountains have not changed for the past ten days. Both lines have been strengthened, and more guns put in place, but neither side has made any serious offensive movement. The fogs have been almost continuous until within a day or two, causing complete cessation of the cannonade, which went on constantly as long as fine weather lasted, with no apparent result, it is true, but doubtless to the discomfort of the Turks who were labouring on the earthworks. The Russian batteries are so much lower than those of the enemy that it is impossible to see the effect of shelling; while, on the other hand, the Turkish guns have a short, easy range, almost down upon the heads of the Russian gunners, and the shells frequently hit their mark. The weakest point of the Turkish line is just where it is by nature best intended for defence, namely, the summit of the mountain.

"The great redoubt here was taken by three companies of the line two weeks ago, and given up again for want of support, as I have previously described. West of this redoubt, on the middle one of the three knolls on the summit is a line of breastworks, but the third knoll, after having been for some days debatable ground, was at last occupied by the Russians, who immediately planted two cannon there. As this is the natural bastion of the principal Turkish position—the commanding position in fact—it was



a great mistake on their part to permit it to come into Russian hands, for here the latter have a foothold within five hundred yards of the Turkish line, and in a position whence an assault is practicable. At almost every other point along the lines the opposing fortifications are separated by the valley, narrow but deep, and while the troops are within easy range of each other, they are nevertheless a considerable distance apart by the paths they would be obliged to take to assault each other. At Count Schouvaloff's position the entrenchments are not over one hundred yards apart, and the conversation of the Turks can be easily heard. When the thick curtain of opaque mist hides the enemy, the effect of the talking and bustle in their lines, as it is magnified by the fog, is surprising. It seems as if one could almost touch them with a sword's point. The Turkish fortifications are now so much strengthened and perfected, that I am inclined to believe that the day when they could be carried by direct assault—as indeed the largest or part of the largest redoubt was taken on November 29—is now past, and that the pass can only be freed by some movement which will make the positions defending it untenable. How the problem will be solved will doubtless be decided before the end of the month. There is little question but that General Gourko must soon advance or soon retire from the positions he has gained with so much skill and energy. Bleak mountain tops are not favourable spots for bivouacs, and although the cold has not yet been very intense, we have had a sufficient degree to give a good idea of what life on the mountains will be when the winter settles down in earnest, and the snow lies three feet or more deep. Even now the mountain landscape has quite an Arctic aspect, peak on peak, as white and unbroken as the summits of the highest Alps, and the plain of Sofia in the distance completely snow carpeted. The soldiers accommodate themselves to the snow and cold very well. They have plenty of fresh meat and soup, are warmly clad, and, considering the difficulties of the campaign, as well off as could be expected."

Gourko had no idea of retiring from the positions which he had won, and he certainly did not contemplate remaining on the mountain tops. As for retiring, he was by no means in the situation in which he had found himself after his first experience in the Balkans. Then he had been vastly outnumbered, his enemy was being continually recruited, he himself received no reinforcements, but, on the contrary, he was in imminent danger of having his retreat cut off. Now it was altogether different. His numbers were constantly increased, everything behind him was secure, the enemy, though every effort was made to show a bold front, had been demoralised by his frequent defeats. It was necessary for General Gourko to be cautious, in the face of leaders like Suleiman Pacha, with his Turkish and English subordinates,\* but he had no cause to think of retreating.

There was, however, a reason why the Russian general should not hurry forward from Orkanieh as soon as he had heard of the capture of Plevna. He had to wait for something besides reinforcements; and he felt this necessity in common with all the other Russian generals in Europe and Asia. After so important an event as the removal of Osman Pacha from the military chess-board, it behoved the Russian authorities to pause and consider the new state of things, and to modify their plans in view of the changes which had been effected. Gourko had to wait for the result of these deliberations.

More than one programme seems to have been discussed at the Russian head-quarters, or rather by the czar and his council, who took the supreme direction of affairs. The grand duke and the staff advised that Gourko, instead of forcing his way to Sofia, should double round the Etropol Balkans, and pick his way to the rear of Reouf Pacha, his old enemy of the summer, who now occupied the southern end of the Schipka Pass, whilst Radetzky forged forward

\* At this time, or immediately afterwards, ex-Colonel Valentine Baker, now Baker Pacha, was attached to the army of relief, as also were Colonel Maitland and other Englishmen.

through the same pass, and took Reouf in front. By this means it was estimated that a numerous army, of a hundred thousand men or more, might enter Roumelia and advance upon Adrianople without loss of time. This plan had the objection that it would leave a formidable body of the enemy at Sofia, who might very possibly become troublesome, and who would have to be watched, if not attacked, by a considerable force.

General Todleben was more cautious, and favoured a more deliberate mode of advance. That is to say, he recommended that the fortresses of Rustchuk and Silistria should be besieged in an adequate manner, and that the further progress of the invasion southwards should be delayed till the spring. This, it may be observed, was the course which the great majority of persons in every country expected the Russians to take. Very few, indeed, were prepared to witness such a brilliant winter campaign as actually took place.

Something between these two plans was what the Russians decided upon. A "Daily News" correspondent at Bucharest, writing on the 17th of December, expressed his belief that "the *mot d'ordre* of the Russians is for the present to remain quiescent, and let the situation simmer in the hearts and minds of the Turks. General Ignatieff, I am informed, is the leading advocate of this inaction, his advice, arising, no doubt, from knowledge of the Turkish character, if, indeed, he did not bring something more definite with him when he came to head-quarters the other day. The elaborate courtesy to Osman Pacha, and the good treatment of the Turkish army of Plevna, are full of significance; and as if by signal, the tone of the Russians, both civil and military, is quite altered in relation to the Turks, whose atrocities are wholly forgotten in favour of their prowess. I have spoken with many Russians of position, who do not disguise their opinion that the moment is eminently favourable for the approach to negotiations direct between Russia and Turkey, as the parties most interested, and on a basis of individual or rather common personal interests, rather than with

regard to complications of what are known as European interests; but such a view is purely a Russian one. In more general circles the opinion prevails that a vigorous effort will be made to settle the Eastern question by the three emperors, to the exclusion of England from a voice in the settlement, and with the introduction of provisions which will scarcely meet her approval, while they will fail to present a cause for active remonstrance. Many people know perfectly well that in August a last intimation, or rather, indeed, a warning, was given to the Russian emperor, that England could not be restrained from hostile action in the event of Russia persevering so far as to engage in a second campaign, and so prolong the disturbed condition of Eastern Europe. That notice was not indeed official, or even ministerial, but the peculiar and delicately personal character of it gave it at least equal weight, and probably this was intended, as it certainly was felt. One result of it has been so far satisfactory that the Russians have prosecuted the war vigorously until now, instead of going into winter quarters; but, I venture to ask, suppose events so shape themselves that now the victorious Russians, disregarding this warning, harden their hearts for a second campaign, what then?"

The suggestion was, that grave difficulties would be created with England if the Russians should press their triumph too hard, and especially if they should develop a desire for territorial aggrandisement. The fear was a natural one; but there was scarcely any greater reason for it at this moment than there had been at the beginning of the war. Whether the Russians were simply and exclusively bent on rescuing the Christian subjects of the Porte, or whether they were actuated by mixed motives, selfish as well as unselfish, it was evident that they were bound to defeat the Turks utterly and to the last extremity; and could they do this without going to the very gates of Constantinople?



## CHAPTER XXXIX.

## END OF THE ASIAN CAMPAIGN.

AFTER the defeat of Mukhtar Pacha between Kars and the frontier, he retreated, as we have already seen, upon Erzeroum, effecting a junction with Ismail Pacha, the Kurdish general, who had for some weeks occupied Russian soil, near Igdyr. The two commanders met on the 27th of October at Koprikoi; but they did not stay long in this town. The generalissimo, hearing from Ismail that General Tergukasoff was in hot pursuit, and knowing that he himself was being followed by the Russians under General Heimann, resolved to fall back still further to Hassan Kaleh, and the commanding Deve Boyun, or Camel's Neck range, on the south-east of Erzeroum.

It was on the afternoon of the 28th that the Turks evacuated Koprikoi; and they had scarcely done so when the Russian advance guard made their appearance. Immense stores of grain and other valuables fell into the hands of the pursuers, having been overlooked by the Turkish generals. No better proof could be required of their demoralisation; for it was clearly most unwise of them to assist in provisioning their enemy, at the moment when his rapid advance, the difficult nature of the country, and the approach of a severe winter, rendered it no light task to provision the Russian troops.

Mukhtar Pacha hastened forward to the town of Erzeroum, leaving Ismail with about thirteen thousand men on the plain south of Hassan Kaleh. But the Russians gave them no rest. The Kurd, thinking himself safe for the night, took no measures to place himself on his guard against surprise; and the consequence was, that, whilst the Turks slept in security, General Heimann's scouts approached and discovered their defenceless position. The Russian commander lost no time. He attacked the place by night; and so sudden was the assault that the thirteen thousand

troops of Ismail were seized with a panic, and fled in the utmost disorder. Many were slain, and many more captured, whilst the pursuers obtained a fresh booty of provisions and ammunition.

At Kurujuk, on the road to the Deve Boyun, a body of Turkish troops met the fugitives, and somewhat restored their confidence; and on the same day the united force fell back upon the entrenched positions in front of Erzeroum.

The commander of the few Ottoman troops in the Armenian capital was a Hungarian, named Faizi Pacha. He had foreseen the defeat of Mukhtar Pacha, and had prepared for it by planting forty Krupp guns on the Deve Boyun heights, by improving the entrenchments, and by occupying them with three thousand men, the best he could muster in the city.\* Meanwhile urgent messages were sent to Constantinople, soliciting further assistance. The gallant Dervisch Pacha was able to spare five thousand of the troops with which he had held Batoum against repeated assaults. These came by way of Trebizond; and through the same seaport reinforcements presently arrived from Constantinople. The utmost energy was now displayed by the Turkish commanders in preparing to give the Russians a suitable reception. Mukhtar and Ismail Pachas, ably seconded by the foreigners Faizi and Mehmed, made their dispositions with no little skill, and did their best to rally the spirits of their men, who were greatly discouraged by the events of the past month, succeeding, as they had done, a long period of overweening confidence.

The Ottoman force, including an instalment of two thousand men from Trebizond, only amounted to sixteen thousand; and there were in all sixty cannon on the heights, which commanded the road by which General Heimann would have to approach from Kurujuk. The latter had as many as forty-eight battalions, comprising his own and Tergukasoff's contingents. In addition to these, he had twelve regiments of

\* Captain Norman, "Armenia and the Campaign of 1877."

cavalry and ninety-six guns. Captain Norman asserts that Mukhtar Pacha believed himself to have the numerical majority. This was far from being the case, as he discovered to his cost; but his position was a strong one, and if he could have made his men stand as they had stood so long on the Aladja Dag, he might at least have held the Russians in check until further aid arrived. The winter fought for him, perhaps even better than his troops; but the Russians possessed indomitable energy, and overcame both troops and weather.

On the night of the 3rd of November, General Heimann prepared for an attack by sending detachments on either flank of the Turks, resolving to attempt a turning movement at the same time that he endeavoured to take the enemy in a trap.

Next morning the Russian right attacked the strong position of Mehmed Pacha; but, after a desperate engagement, it was repulsed. Meanwhile, General Heimann sent a body of horse towards the Turkish centre, which was commanded by Mukhtar Pacha in person. The Turks, well placed behind entrenchments, received the apparently rash cavalry with a steady fire, and, as the latter showed signs of hesitation, a column of Turkish infantry advanced to meet them at close quarters. The Russians fell back; and then the doomed Turks left their earthworks and rushed upon their enemy. They had pressed some distance down the road when suddenly, at a given signal, the ambush on both sides poured a deadly volley upon them. Not only so, but when the Ottoman troops, taken by surprise, attempted to fall back in their turn, they found their retreat cut off by the Russians, who had closed in behind them, and now began to ply them with the bayonet. Many were slain in the trap into which they had fallen, and a considerable number threw down their arms.

Mukhtar Pacha, perceiving what had happened, put himself at the head of his men, who had not yet been actively engaged, and tried to lead them to the rescue of their fellows. But a

panic once more seized them, and they refused to advance. The centre of the Ottoman army took to flight, and never rested till they were under the walls of Erzeroum. The wings, however, under Faizi and Mehmed Pachas, were comparatively firm, and managed to check the pursuit of the Russians. To these generals, in fact, Captain Norman attributes the safety of Erzeroum for the day. "Had the panic spread to their men," he says, "there is no doubt that Heimann could have passed over the Deve Boyun, reached and entered the capital of Armenia that night. The governor, hearing of the defeat, closed the gates of the city in order to prevent the fugitives rushing in, and, as he feared, pillaging the town; but at about midnight, the excitement having, to a certain extent, calmed down, strong guards were placed at the gates, and the men allowed to file slowly in. All the barracks in the place were filled with sick and wounded men, so that there was no accommodation for the fugitives, whilst, to add to their other horrors, a heavy sleet commenced at about 11 P.M. The streets were crowded with famished, panic-stricken soldiers, who, wearied with the hardships they had recently undergone, sank exhausted into the mud, and endeavoured to seek comfort in sleep. Where Mukhtar Pacha went that night, no one knows. Shortly after midnight, Faizi and Mehmed Pachas arrived at the city; the former drew off his guns, and managed to escape without being seen by the enemy. Mehmed Pacha, however, was not so fortunate; he was followed up in his retreat by a Russian brigade, and obliged to contest every inch of the way from the Deve Boyun to the Pacha Panar, some three miles from the walls. The following morning the Russians could be distinctly distinguished on the crest of the Deve Dag mountains, busily engaged in throwing up redoubts, and preparing for the bombardment of the city. It is very difficult to estimate what the Turkish losses were, but it may safely be assumed that three thousand prisoners and forty-two guns were left in the hands of the enemy, while between two thousand five hundred and



three thousand men were either killed or wounded.”\*

A few hours later, on the 5th of November, the Russian general sent a *parlementaire* into Erzeroum to demand the surrender of the town; and he was brought before Mukhtar Pacha, who had already determined to do his best to prolong the resistance. “I have received orders from my government,” was the Turk’s reply, “to defend the town, and I shall do so as long as I have a soldier to serve the guns of the forts.” “Then,” rejoined the messenger, “we are about to bombard the town.”

Preparations were accordingly made on both sides. The Russians placed their guns, now amounting, with those captured on the previous day, to a hundred and forty, and selected the most favourable positions on the east and south, at the same time pushing slowly round the walls, with a view to completing the investment. The Turks put everything in order for the siege, as well as their means, and the unwilling disposition of many of the inhabitants, would allow. “The consuls,” wrote one who was on the spot, “the ambulance and hospital authorities, and the American missionaries, have displayed their flags over their respective buildings and habitations; the government functionaries have retired, either on Baibourt or Erzinghan—no one seems to know exactly which; there is no postal service; the telegraph, although still working, is closed to private despatches; General Sir Arnold Kemball, his three aides-de-camp, and some newspaper correspondents, have retired to Baibourt; nine-tenths of the shops are closed; and the Armenians are dying of fright, and are doing their best to persuade every one who will take the trouble to listen to them, that the proper course to follow would be to surrender the town at once. In the meanwhile the marshal is at the Kischlah or cavalry barracks, looking very care-worn and very sad, and declares to every one who is suf-

ficiently familiar with him to question him as to his intentions that he will not surrender. And so we are waiting for the bombardment, which may commence at any moment, although no one seems to be perfectly certain whether the guns which the Russians have with them will be able to reach us. Another thing that we fear is an assault from the plain, but, as the enemy has not yet cut our communications with Trebizond, there does not seem to be an immediate danger in that quarter.”

The correspondent of the “Standard” in Erzeroum, writing on the 7th of November, recapitulates the occurrences of the past month, up to the battle of Deve Boyun, in a succinct and apparently trustworthy manner. “Our troubles,” he says, “commenced early in October, a day or two after the fighting on the 2d, 3d, and 4th of the month, when the Russians made a desperate attempt to force the road to Kars by way of the Yanilah Hills, and were repulsed with heavy loss, our artillery pursuing them, and cannonading their flank until they reached their fortified position at the Carrayal Hill. These three days’ fighting, although advantageous to us, showed us beyond a doubt that the enemy had received the reinforcements which Loris Melikoff had asked for, and had been expecting for so long a time. They attacked us vigorously on our left flank, storming the lesser Yani five or seven times; they attacked us in the centre, and made an attempt, which cost them somewhat dearly, to take us in the rear. Their Cossacks and dragoons were cantering all over the place, as the expression goes, destroying our telegraph and interrupting our communication with Kars for an entire day. Still we drove them back, and drove them back with loss, but the boldness of their movements showed us that they were strong, and that they were resolved, *comme que c’est*, to force us to retire upon Kars. Besides, the thirty or forty prisoners that we captured on these days told us that they had received reinforcements amounting to at least one division, which would mean something like twelve thousand men, and we had reason to believe that others were on the

\* Mukhtar Pacha admitted that he had a thousand men killed in this engagement.

road, if not already at Alexandropol. So on the night of the 8th the marshal secretly raised his camp, evacuating Kizil Tepé—to the intense dissatisfaction of his soldiers and officers—and the villages he held in the plain, abandoning the lower road to Kars, which passes between the two Yanis, and entrenching himself in very strong positions on the slope of the Aladja hills. Early on the morning of the 9th the Russians occupied the ground we had abandoned, and from that date until October 13th they were engaged in sending an army round by Ani and Natchivan to the rear of our positions, while they also lodged troops on the Great Yani, which we had not thought it worth while to defend. On Sunday 14th, in the course of the afternoon, the army which had gone round by Natchivan, and which Mukhtar Pacha had personally reconnoitred on two or three occasions, reached our left flank, and by the time the sun set on the same day it had captured one of our positions. Mukhtar Pacha now began to comprehend that the reinforcements received by the enemy were far more numerous than he had previously supposed, and he immediately commenced to despatch the baggage and provisions of the army to Kars, along with our spare ammunition. These defiled all night on the backs of mules, camels, and ponies, and when morning broke the long uninterrupted line of retreating animals was still proceeding in the direction of the fortress.

“In the meanwhile, the Russian army, which had shown itself to the rear of our left flank on Sunday evening, massed itself on the slope of the hills, and at the same time the enemy advanced upon Eoliah Tepessé from the plain. This position was captured by assault, after resisting the combined fire of three batteries of field pieces and one siege gun, coupled with several assaults, for four or five hours. The enemy then advanced upon Civris Tepé, shelling it crossways, and capturing it with very little difficulty, owing to its being between two fires, and the defending force being seized with panic, and finally upon Vezinkeui, which is only three hours from Kars. At sunset the Turkish army entered

Kars in the greatest confusion, the men in charge of the baggage and ammunition throwing the loads off their horses and mounting them themselves, in order to reach the city more rapidly. That night the lesser Yani was evacuated without incident, while Vezinkeui was abandoned on the following day. On Wednesday Ahmet Mukhtar Pacha left Kars, taking with him two thousand eight hundred men and ten mountain guns, and leaving behind him twelve thousand men, and all the artillery he had managed to save from the disaster of October 15th. The marshal's account of his losses, which I heard from his own lips, was twelve thousand men captured, as well as seven pachas and twenty-five pieces of cannon. I believe these figures below the mark, especially as all the troops occupying the Aladja were made prisoners, and I think I may safely say that the battle of October 15th cost Turkey twenty thousand men, and from thirty to forty pieces of cannon. The road to Erzeroum by the valley being occupied by the Russians, the marshal was forced to take a road running through the hills by way of Hadji Kaleh, to Yenikeui, which he reached without incident on October 19th, and which shows that the Russians were very dilatory in their advance upon Erzeroum. Had their movements been more rapid, as would have been those of a Prussian general, the marshal might have been shut up in Kars, and Ismail Pacha encountered and defeated before reaching Koprikoi, where he succeeded in effecting a junction with Ahmet Mukhtar Pacha, and in retreating upon Erzeroum. Ismail reached Koprikoi on October 27th, after a slight skirmish at Delli Baba, and on October 28th Mukhtar Pacha, hearing that Russians were advancing from the plateau of Khorundusi, started for Erzeroum, taking with him the three battalions that were at Koprikoi, commanding the head of the road to Bayazid. He halted at Hassan Kaleh, which lies three hours from Koprikoi and six hours from Erzeroum, and there, on the night of the 28th to 29th of October, the rear guard, commanded by Mehmed Ali, the Capitan Pacha, was attacked by General Heimann in its



camp slightly on this side of Hassan Kaleh. There was a somewhat fierce combat during the night, but it ended in both parties retreating, the Russians upon Hassan Kaleh and the Turks upon the village of Kurujuk, which is three hours from Erzeroum. On the following day, that is to say on the 29th of October, the Russians received reinforcements, and followed up their attack of the previous night, and Mukhtar Pacha, who had gone to reconnoitre personally at Giurdjeboghis, at the entrance to the Olti valley, hearing the cannon in the plain of Hassan Kaleh, returned hurriedly and found the Russians advancing towards the village of Kurujuk, behind which they encamped. Thus the Russians took fourteen days to march from Kars to within three hours of Erzeroum, a distance which the Turks calculate as thirty-three hours' march—that is to say, supposing a man on horseback to set out on the journey, and supposing his horse able to go thirty-three hours without stopping, it would take him that time to get over the distance at a smart walk. I have ridden from Erzeroum to Kars myself on the same horse in three days, and I have sent footmen from Kars to Erzeroum, who invariably got over the ground in three days and a half.

“So soon as it was known in Erzeroum that the Russians were in the plain of Hassan Kaleh, and that they were engaged with the rear guard of what remained of the right and left wings and the centre of Ahmet Mukhtar Pacha's army combined, as it of course was on the afternoon of October 29th, the Armenian and Greek, and subsequently the Turkish, shopkeepers commenced hurriedly packing up their goods and transporting them to their houses, for fear lest the irregulars should pillage the town; and by three o'clock P.M. there was not a single shop open in the place. The bakers let down their shutters and refused to bake, and towards sunset the streets were full of soldiers in search of bread. The troops, both regular and irregular, behaved admirably, and at last an officer came down from the government building and forced the bakers to open their shops and bake, which

they only consented to do when three or four of their number had been marched off to prison by a file of soldiers. Even then the loaves which they offered for sale were only half the proper size. Still there was no disturbance, and hardly a murmur among the hungry soldiers, who, moreover, paid for every loaf they bought. I doubt very much if English soldiers under similar circumstances would have shown as much forbearance. The panic continued for a couple of days, but on November 2nd all the shops were open again. On Sunday, November 4th, General Sir Arthur Kemball rode out, accompanied by his three aides-de-camp, to the camp at the Pass of Deve Boyun, at seven o'clock in the morning, having observed on the previous night that he did not think the two parties could remain much longer without fighting. Early in the afternoon there was a second panic in the town, and the few shops that remained open were hurriedly closed. It was then whispered from ear to ear that the Russians and Turks had been fighting at the Deve Boyun Pass since the morning. Then came the report that the Russians had retreated upon Hassan Kaleh, and about three o'clock in the afternoon four battalions arrived from Trebizond and were immediately marched forward headed by a band. Every one seemed to think that the Russians had withdrawn from their camp behind the village of Kurujuk and had retired to Hassan Kaleh, and it was only at ten or eleven o'clock at night, when the town became full of soldiers in search of bread and lodging, that the inhabitants learned that the Turkish troops had been defeated, and that the town itself was in danger of being captured by the enemy. General Kemball, accompanied by his aides-de-camp, set out the same night for Baibourt, whither he had despatched his baggage two or three days previous.

“In the meanwhile a great battle had been fought in front of the Deve Boyun Pass, or the Pass of the Camel's Neck, as it is called from its long-curved form, which, for the time being, had settled the fate of Erzeroum, and, indeed, that of

the Turkish arms in Asia. In order to describe this battle, which will be of considerable importance in the history of the campaign in Asia, I must commence by a description of the ground. The Deve Boyun Pass is the last line of defence between Kars and Erzeroum, and it was the only place where the marshal could hope to make a stand after his defeat of October 15th before Alexandropol. With his little army of two thousand eight hundred men and ten mountain guns drawn by mules he had left Kars by the road running through the hills parallel with the valley, and notwithstanding the bad weather and the emaciated condition of his men, many of whom fell down by the roadside from sheer exhaustion, had reached Yenikoi before the Russians. The irregulars rallied at Koprikoi, and there the marshal was also joined by Ismail Pacha and some eight thousand infantry, besides about three battalions encamped at Koprikoi, and with these troops he retreated upon Erzeroum, in the hope of being able to keep the Russians at bay at the Deve Boyun Pass until reinforcements reached him from Constantinople. The mouth of this pass is distant only about two hours from the gates of Erzeroum. Supposing us to be standing at the entrance to it, with our face towards Hassan Kaleh, we have at our feet a rectangular plain, shut in on each side by a chain of accidented hills. The road from Hassan Kaleh to Erzeroum stretches through the plain towards us, and when it has covered about two-thirds of the distance which separates us from Hassan Kaleh it passes through the village of Kurujuk, and then continues towards the hills upon which we are standing, which it proceeds to mount. At the point where the road commences to ascend we have on the right two conical hills standing one before the other, the back one rising to the greatest altitude, and behind them two other hills. To our left is a long hill with a flat top, with its long side facing the plain, and beyond that a circular hill rising slightly out of the chain which runs across the plain. At the extreme left hand of this chain runs a road passing to the Olti valley, which

joins the Erzeroum plain away to the left and at no very great distance from the town. The road from Hassan Kaleh to Erzeroum, after ascending some rising ground at the entrance to the pass, dips down into a ravine, then crosses a spur of ground, and finally enters a rugged gorge, which only ends at the gates of the town. Such were the positions which the Russians had to capture, and I must say that I, and a great many others, considered them almost impregnable if properly defended. The two conical hills on the right of the road, and the two hills behind them, formed the right flank, commanded by Ismail Pacha, the long hill with a flat top formed the centre, commanded by Moussa Pacha, the Circassian general; and the circular hill to the left of it, from which breastworks ran out still further to the left, so as to prevent the enemy from turning the position by the Olti valley, formed the left flank, and was commanded by Mehmed Ali Pacha, surnamed the *Capitan*, who captured Kizil Tepé, and defended the lesser Yani. The head-quarters and the reserve stood on that portion of the spur of ground which is almost immediately behind the two conical hills, always supposing us to be facing Hassan Kaleh, and the reserve was commanded by the marshal himself, who besides exercised a general supervision over everything. The Russians were encamped in the plain just behind the village of Kurujuk."

We add the correspondent's account of the battle of Deve Boyun, though it needs to be read in connexion with the information supplied by Captain Norman, already referred to:—"On the morning of Sunday, November 4th, at about 8.30, the Russian army, preceded by artillery, advanced upon our centre, the enemy bringing as many as fifty-six field pieces into action. Behind the artillery came column after column of infantry in open order, advancing just as they advanced upon Evliah Tepessi on the 15th October. When the infantry had got to within a few thousand yards of us they opened in the centre, and divided themselves into two divisions, one of which marched towards our right and the other towards our left flank, but wide of both, as with



a view to turning our positions, while the artillery continued a most violent fire upon our centre. Troops were despatched to meet the advancing columns, and by two P.M. they were driven back. They retreated beyond the range of our guns, and rallied close to the village. In the meanwhile the artillery continued its fire upon our centre, and with such violence that by three P.M. fourteen of our guns were dismounted. The enemy considered this a favourable moment to make a desperate attack, and they did so in front. The troops defending the centre, harassed without intermission by the enemy's artillery, and having lost nearly all their commanding officers, commenced to give way, when the marshal, perceiving the disorder, advanced to their support with three battalions from the reserve. He dashed forward on horseback and met the retreating troops, but they would no longer obey him. He brought up the three fresh battalions, who opened fire upon the enemy, and for a moment arrested their progress; but their commander was almost immediately killed by the marshal's side, and soon afterwards the disorder commenced to set in. 'Then,' said the marshal, almost with tears in his eyes, when I found him yesterday with a wrinkled and careworn countenance pacing an almost bare room in the Kischlah, 'then I made a superhuman effort to rally my troops, but I was surrounded by my officers, who hurried me away.' Our central position being lost it was of no use attempting to hold the two flanks, so the marshal immediately sent orders to the commanders to retire. When night set in the Russians were masters of the entrance to the pass. Fortunately, the descent at the back of the central hill is very steep and the Russians were unable to get down in time to pursue the retreating army. Rufat Pacha and Hakif Pacha, both of whom commanded at the conical hills on the right, were wounded in the thigh, and replaced by Hussein Pacha, the old artillery general who served in the Crimean war.

"I have no need to dwell upon the effects of this defeat. It of course places Armenia, for the time being, at the mercy of the Russians, for we

have no longer an army to stop their advance. We have plenty of food here, and shall probably hold out for some time, although we fear both bombardment and assault. On November 4th, the Russians had forty-eight battalions, making in all about thirty-five thousand men, and about sixty pieces of artillery in action. I have tried to calculate our forces, and have arrived at the following figures:—The marshal brought from Kars two thousand eight hundred men; he found at Koprikoi one thousand five hundred men; Ismail Pacha brought from Bayazid eight thousand men; about one thousand rallied from Kars; Erzeroum gave about one thousand convalescents and reservists; four battalions arrived on the afternoon of the combat, two thousand; total sixteen thousand three hundred men, which I think is above the actual number. Thus the Russians, if my estimation of thirty-five thousand men is correct, must have had more than double the force we could dispose of. In regard to the artillery, Mukhtar Pacha brought from Karsten mountain guns; three battalions destined to the left wing returned from Olti, eighteen guns; Ismail Pacha had four battalions, twenty-four guns; there were, say four guns of position; total, forty-six guns; and ten small mountain guns. Our losses are estimated by the Turks as follows:—Fourteen guns, one thousand killed, two thousand wounded, and eight hundred prisoners; but I think they may be fairly fixed at five thousand men and thirty pieces of cannon. The French Consul says the number of cannon lost was forty-two pieces, while the English consul declares that the Turks lost as many as eighty-three guns, which seems to me utterly impossible."

Erzeroum had not long to wait for the first attack of the Russians. General Heimann was persuaded by Colonel Tarniaeff, who had formerly resided in the Armenian capital, to allow him to attempt the capture of the works connected with the Azizieh fort, on the east of the town. Permission granted, Tarniaeff advanced, on the morning of the 10th, with three battalions, supported by a brigade of infantry; the remainder of the army being ready to take ad-

vantage of whatever success he might gain. His plan was to throw himself, at the head of three battalions, on the Medjidieh lunette, and assault it, before dawn, by means of scaling ladders; whilst a simultaneous attack was to be made on the Kremedli redoubt, at the south-western corner of Erzeroum, so as to divide the attention of the garrison.

The gallant Tarnaieff (who was an Armenian) was entirely successful in his own part of this hazardous adventure. Dawn was just breaking when the Russians sprang up the walls of the lunette; and the Turks, completely taken by surprise, were unable to prevent the capture. Twenty officers and five hundred men fell into the hands of the Russians, and were forthwith hurried off to the Deve camp. This was, as Tarnaieff had assured General Heimann, the first indispensable step towards the capture of Erzeroum; and if the arrangements made overnight had been well carried out, and the small available force of the Turks had divided between the Medjidieh and Kremedli positions, there can be little doubt that the fate of Erzeroum would have been practically decided. The Russian army might have wintered in Erzeroum, instead of in earthworks surrounding it, and their success would have been more striking than it actually was.

What really happened was this. Barely had the Medjidieh fort fallen into the hands of Colonel Tarnaieff, when Mehmed Pacha, commanding in the Azizieh fort, heard of the occurrence, and came up with half a battalion of fresh troops. The Turks fought so desperately, hand to hand, that they succeeded in driving the enemy out of the lunette; and the sanguinary struggle was continued outside, the Russian reserves coming up to the rescue. If, all this time, an equally severe attack had been made at Kremedli, the Turks would not have been able to resist the overwhelming numbers of the Russians, who would never have lost the position, or would have managed to re-capture it. But the attack on the south had miscarried. So far from surprising the redoubt, the Russians waited till day-

light, and then approached it along an exposed plain, where they were received by a raking fire from two forts. They kept a respectful distance, and at two o'clock in the afternoon General Heimann recalled them. They had been entirely useless, so far as regards the plan of Tarnaieff. They had not drawn a single man from the eastern side; and long before they withdrew to the Dagh their unfortunate comrades had encountered the whole force of the Ottoman garrison, as well as of the armed inhabitants of Erzeroum.

The Russians whom Tarnaieff had led forward to his brilliant but hazardous assault on the lunette had been beaten back, with very serious loss; the Turks had once more triumphed over their enemy, and the spirit of Mukhtar's troops had been fully restored. The hope of securing Erzeroum by surprise or storm was destroyed, and that by the very engagement which was so nearly a definitive success.

Captain Norman adds a few particulars on a painful subject, which are necessary to complete the story of this unfortunate affair. "Directly it became known," he says, "in the city of Erzeroum, that the fortunes of the day rested with the Osmanli, bands of women trooped up to the field armed with knives, hatchets, choppers, whatever household weapons came first to their hands; and then commenced a system of mutilation which it does not do to dwell on. Suffice it to say that from Englishmen who visited the battle-field on the following day I learn that nearly every Russian found lying on the ground was decapitated and subjected to nameless outrage, and that the appearance of the wounds proved that many of them were inflicted on still living men."

The fate of the unhappy Armenian, Colonel Tarnaieff, was melancholy in the extreme. He had been wounded early in the engagement, and was compelled to surrender to a Turkish officer. When General Heimann heard of this, from one who had seen him a prisoner, he sent to Mukhtar Pacha offering to restore any two Turkish officers who might be named in ex-



change for the colonel. Mukhtar replied that the latter was not to be found amongst the prisoners; and from this the Russians knew what had been the lot of their comrade. Amongst the heap of dead in the Medjidieh lunette, the doctors found Tarnaieff's body, stripped to his silk shirt, which was crimson with his blood.

The Russians did not make another assault upon the fortifications of Erzeroum, but continued to bombard it almost every day, firing an immense number of shells and Congreve rockets into the city. After the fall of Kars, the army of General Heimann was largely reinforced, and additional siege guns were brought up and planted on the surrounding heights. The garrison was daily expecting a closer attack; and all accounts combine to bear witness to the gallantry of the Turkish troops, and to the spirit of the Mussulman inhabitants. Nevertheless active preparations were made for a withdrawal from the town; and everything possible was done to keep the lines of retreat open—especially the road leading to Trebizond. The correspondent of the "Daily News," who was shut up in the city, declares that Erzeroum alone had saved the Turks from utter disaster after the capture of Kars. "In the 1828-9 campaign," he adds, "it fell at once after the taking of Kars. It is true that since the Crimean war it has in one sense been strongly fortified—very strongly for these days. But Erzeroum is within easy shelling range of modern artillery from many a surrounding hill-side, and its position can be turned north and south. An enemy holding the Deve-Boyun Pass can march at will on Trebizond or Ersingan, leaving a couple of divisions to masque the town. A general-in-chief, with what is left to him of an army, cannot afford to shut himself up here. That would be to leave Armenia in the hands of the enemy, and to ensure the certain surrender of himself and his army, unless, like Hussein Hami Pacha, he could elude the vigilance of the beleaguers, and escape into the hills like the ex-commander of Kars, whose advent is hourly expected here. We have a line of ramparts

which, in the olden times, required at least forty thousand men to guarantee them against a general attack. To-day there are not twenty thousand within the walls. Suppose the marshal retires in time on the Kop Dag with part of his force, Erzeroum is inevitably lost within three days. Honour and orders from Constantinople forbid a total evacuation. A victorious enemy's army launched across the plain would inevitably sweep, like one of its own avalanches, over the Kop Dag, half-garrisoned, in any case; so that, whatever way we look at the situation, I consider it a lost one for the Turks. Some people talk about the winter interrupting Russian operations. They said the same about the line of communications between this and Kars; they said the Soghanli mountains were impassable a month ago, and yet the Russians are now at our very doors. Mukhtar Pacha, then, finds himself in the very disagreeable position of being forced to retire before the enemy, leaving an insufficient garrison. It is hard to say how matters will eventually turn out, but, on the whole, they look uncommonly bad for Mukhtar Pacha and his army. Even though we be not assaulted on all sides; even though the Russians spare the large Christian population of the town the horrors of a bombardment, there is another possible and very probable contingency. The Russian troops set free by the capture of Kars are already on the march to Deve-Boyun.

"Another three days will find them joined to the force which menaces us. We all believe that this force of over twenty-five thousand men will not limit itself to sitting down idly in company with an army already sufficiently formidable to defy any aggression on our part, but will, by a turning movement, occupy the way that leads to Trebizond, at a few leagues from this, cutting our communications and reducing us to a fatal condition of isolation. I myself think this will be effected, and before long. Accordingly, with a view of keeping up my postal communications, I intend, *inch Allah*, as the Turks say, speedily to move my quarters to a point outside the possible lines of investment.

"The latest fugitive from Kars brings us a tale of terror. He says that every one, Christian as well as Mussulman, was put to the sword when the Russians surprised the town. The bearer of the tidings was a Mussulman, and no doubt was not unduly charitable to the foe. What he says, duly embellished, had succeeded in throwing the timid Armenian inhabitants into a paroxysm of ecstatic terror. In my capacity of correspondent—a being supposed here to be endowed with an all but supernatural knowledge on current events, and a prescience of no mean order as to the future, I have had crowds of people invading my *oda*, and tremulously asking what they should do in view of the impending catastrophe. It is really pitiable to witness the mental condition of the Christian population. Men are divided between the double fear of a massacre of Christians by irate Turks, and a massacre of everybody by excited Russians in the course of a night attack."

The same correspondent adds some particulars with regard to Colonel Tarnaieff, whom he calls Captain Temayeff—the leader of the assault on the 10th. "During the fight, a certain Captain Temayeff, after a single combat with a Turkish officer, was severely wounded. The latter, too, was so roughly handled that he is now in hospital. Evidence showed that the Russian had not died of his wounds, but been done to death by subsequent maltreatment as he lay wounded outside the fort he assailed with his men. Somehow—and we do not know how—the Russians got wind of the affair. Turkish officials tell me there is some one within the town who, under cover of other business, keeps the enemy informed of what goes on. Anyhow, the Russians sent in a flag of truce with a demand to investigate the particular case I refer to. The French Consul, M. Gilbert, being the person authorised to protect Russian interests during the abnormal existing state of things, took the matter up. Then it appeared that Captain Temayeff came by his end owing to gross maltreatment while he was lying wounded and helpless on the field of battle. The man who first struck him down,

and who was himself severely wounded in return, was called as a witness. He is a Turkish captain, then in hospital. He stated that during the fight he incidentally met with Captain Temayeff, and thereupon entered into combat with him, that he struck at him with his sabre, and that the captain, parrying the blow with his revolver, struck in return, wounding the deponent severely; whereupon deponent did strike again, putting Captain Temayeff *hors de combat*. This he declares is all he knows about the matter. Other witnesses say they saw people jumping upon the wounded body of the Russian captain, and declare they believe that by these acts of violence he was killed, or at least his death hastened in an unseemly manner. The investigation is still pending. The great matter of curiosity is how the Russians came to know what passed within our lines so long after they had withdrawn to theirs. The thing only shows that something wrong is going on within the town; it is not the first time it has been suspected."

November passed, and December advanced, without producing any incident of special importance. The winter was severe, and snow covered the ground, not only causing great suffering to the soldiers on both sides, but entirely preventing any serious movements across the open country. The Russians, however, completed their investment of Erzeroum, occupying all the surrounding villages. Amongst other results of this action upon the Turkish garrison, which now numbered as many as thirty-three thousand men, such indispensable articles as firewood, and forage for the horses, ran short, and became extremely dear.

The correspondent last quoted graphically describes the condition of the town towards the close of the year. Writing on December 20th, he speaks of the reviving animation of the inhabitants, who had come to hope that the place might hold out until the spring, and even be relieved by a Turkish army from without. The shops were re-opened, trade was resumed, and the people seemed "to forget that the enemy was less than an hour's march from the gates."



Moreover, the authorities saw fit to propagate rumours about the retreat of the enemy, so as to keep the population in a state of confidence.

"Still," the writer continues, "the storm may burst on us at any moment. I, who for so long have looked at the Russians from Achmet Mukhtar's camp on the Aladja Dag, and seen them, week after week, so inactive, and apparently so impotent to effect aught against us, and who so shortly after witnessed the complete rout of the Turkish army on the same ground, do not share the confidence which a month's Russian inaction at Deve-Boyun seems to have created here, even among officers of considerable experience. They have not been inactive along the rest of their line, and, from a distance of two days' journey, have gradually crept up to within six hours of the forts along the Olti valley. Behind the southern hills of our semicircle they are equally close; and one evening's march may see them joined at Illidge or Pernacaban, between us and Trebizond. Some explain the present Russian inaction by stating that transport of war material being impossible in this truly Siberian weather, they are preparing to winter in the valleys, and in the plain of Hassan-Kalé. Under this belief the Turkish soldiers have commenced burning the villages in the direction of Tortum, hoping thereby, on one flank at least, to deprive the enemy of ready-prepared lodgings, and compel them to retire to Olti. Moussa Pacha and his men are engaged in destroying all the forage in that direction they cannot carry off. The inhabitants of the destroyed villages have been forced to retire to others nearer Erzeroum, or to emigrate towards Trebizond.

"This theory of the impassability of the roads in rear of the Russian position is untenable. The road is by no means as difficult as the road over the Kop Dag and Zigana Dag, on the way to Trebizond, and yet Turkish supplies arrive every day from the latter town. In all likelihood the increased difficulty of transport has a good deal to do with the tardiness of the Russian operations against Erzeroum; but it certainly is not its primary or most important cause. I believe

that, in view of the difficulties a strongly fortified point like Erzeroum presents, the magnitude of the turning movements, and the necessity of following up a first success with promptitude, large reinforcements are required; and though the extra forces from Kars have arrived, a still further addition of strength will be necessary before the Russian army can commence its final operations for the total conquest of Armenia. Even after the fighting on the 18th and 25th of August the Russians were forced to allow more than a month to elapse before they could recommence their attacks on the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th of October, and, subsequently, ten days more had to pass by before the arrival of still further reinforcements enabled them to strike the final blow at Aladja. Then came a rapid advance, the siege of Kars, and the battle of Deve-Boyun, which must have cost the victors dear. Finally, there were the attacks of the 9th and 12th of November on Erzeroum itself. All this must have drawn seriously on the strength of the Russian army; so much so, that in all likelihood it is unable, for the moment, to recommence operations on a scale of the necessary magnitude.

"From the date of the last fighting till to-day is little over a month, and in view of the increased distance to be marched over, and the increased difficulty of transport, I do not think it likely anything like a serious attempt will be made before the end of December, or perhaps middle of January. Meanwhile anything like an offensive movement on the part of the Turks is out of the question. The regular troops are few in number, between twelve and fifteen thousand, and the local volunteers are of but little use, even for defensive purposes. A very considerable number of these latter are Armenian Christians, almost to a man anxious to see the Russians in Erzeroum, and at present going through their couple of hours' daily drill merely as a matter of policy, in order to stand well with the authorities.

"As regards the power of Erzeroum, to hold out against a mere passive blockade, I think it

quite possible that the population and troops have ample provision of breadstuffs to last well into the spring. At present meat is plentiful and cheap; but the moment the Trebizond road is held by the Russians, animal food will be impossible to get at. Owing to the occupation of the Deve-Boyun pass and Olti valley, and consequent cutting off of the usual wood supply from the forests of the Soghanli Dag, fuel is scarce and dear. Some does reach us from the direction of Erzingan, but it is very little; and the distance from which it has to be conveyed renders its price so high as to put it beyond the reach of ordinary purses. In its place the peculiar dung fuel, *thessele*, as it is called, composed of cattle droppings kneaded with earth and dried in the sun, and the only fuel of the peasants, is being largely brought in from the neighbouring villages. Some old houses, too, are being demolished, and a very considerable amount of wood used in their construction distributed to the troops.

"Without fuel of some kind, existence in Erzeroum at this season is impossible; and not a day passes that dozens of soldiers coming off night guards are not carried to the hospitals with frost-bitten extremities. Apropos of hospitals, notwithstanding that four thousand sick have been despatched to Erzingan, close on seven thousand now crowd the wards of the extemporised infirmaries, and the number is hourly increasing. There is no means of transport to convey them to milder and less crowded quarters elsewhere. Even if such means existed, it would be fatal to send sick or even convalescent men on a six or seven days' journey at such an inclement season. The Russians have not sent in the sick and wounded Turks from Kars, as it was currently reported here they would do. In my last I ventured to doubt the authenticity of the rumour.

"An event occurred six days ago which puzzled and alarmed the population. The British consul was suddenly and peremptorily ordered to leave Erzeroum, taking with him all the archives of the Consulate, and that without loss

of an hour. In fact, so suddenly did he take his departure, that he was obliged to leave a large portion of his furniture behind. The Konah, or Consulate, is now in the occupation of the doctors sent by Lord Blantyre and the Stafford-House Committee. What the meaning of this sudden recall is, no one here has the slightest idea, and the consul, even if he himself knew the reason, took care not to impart his knowledge to any one else. Looking at the event from every possible point of view, it is to us here inexplicable, and up to the moment of writing no information whatever on the subject has reached Erzeroum. The French and Persian consuls are now the only foreign representatives remaining.

"Should this somewhat curious event indicate a knowledge of the imminence of the capture or bombardment of the town, or of its blockade, I am more and more astonished at Mukhtar Pacha remaining here with his army. Once the town completely surrounded, the Turkish forces here degenerate into the position of a mere garrison. As there is no other Turkish army in Armenia, the whole province would lie at the mercy of the enemy, and Mukhtar and his men be ultimately forced to surrender. In fact, our situation here is extremely interesting; and I am very curious to see how it will end. Nearly every European here believes in the ultimate capture of the town, and that, too, within a short space of time. The whole surrounding country is one howling wilderness of driving snow, into which it is even dangerous to venture, and the cold passes all belief. Real Christmas weather—too much so!"

On Christmas day, the same correspondent wrote:—"We are blockaded. For the last two days the Russians have been showing unusual activity in the Olti valley. The Turks tried to destroy the villages at the mouth of the valley, but were beaten back by a superior cavalry force. Muhir Ali, a celebrated guerilla chief on the Turkish side, was shot through the thigh in a cavalry fight near the village of Kirsk the day before yesterday. The Russians are now in the immediate vicinity of Erzeroum, about two hours' distant, in the plain between this and the Trebi-



zond road. Probably the telegraph will be cut to-day."

Two days later we read that "Mukhtar Pacha left Erzeroum on Christmas night with an escort of four thousand men, leaving Ismail Pacha to command the town. . . . The general belief here is, that he went away from Erzeroum to organise a new army to raise the siege in the spring. Some eight thousand men are at Baiburt, to intercept the Russian turning movement by the Ispir Dag, to the right of the road to Trebizond. Most serious dispositions are being made for the defence of the place. It is believed that Erzeroum will hold out till the relieving army comes to help it. I do not believe this. The Armenians are already speculating on the favourable change the Russian occupation will bring about. I have been often invited to visit the town, only one year after the Russians may be in possession, in order to witness the wonderful change for the better which will take place. The Russians occupy the village of Henzig. General Heimann is in the village of Shafta. Several battalions are in the Olti valley. Tergukasoff is in the village of Henzig, with a large force of cavalry. We can see the enemy's troops manœuvring from the ramparts. Yesterday the entire telegraph wires and apparatus were despatched from Erzeroum to Baiburt, with the view of repairing the breaks. The chief danger seems to be the closing movement of the Russians in the immediate vicinity of Erzeroum, a movement *en masse*. I believe that Erzeroum practically is lost; but think it will probably make a better defence than Kars. Captain Mehmed Pacha, virtually in command, is the bravest soldier in the army of Anatolia."

Mukhtar Pacha had been recalled to Constantinople; not, apparently, as many supposed at the time, in consequence of any fresh division of councils in the capital, or as the result of jealousy amongst the pachas, but in order that he might take part in the anxious discussions which had arisen on the question of concluding a peace with the Russians. It was on the 3rd of January that he arrived; and on the 8th the Porte

had entered into an agreement on the terms of an armistice.

The command of the forces in Erzeroum now devolved upon the Kurdish General Ismail Pacha, a fanatical Mussulman, who was described as spending his time in praying and reading the Koran, instead of devoting every minute to the cares of the defence. Good judges believed the fate of Erzeroum to be sealed, considering Ismail far less likely to make a successful resistance than Mukhtar. Nevertheless the Turks maintained themselves with commendable energy, and it was not until January was well advanced that the Russian investment could be regarded as even approaching to completeness. By the first of that month the road between Erzeroum and Trebizond was in the hands of the invaders; and the escape of the Turkish army was thenceforth impossible. A few companies in Trebizond and Baiburt, with the gallant force in Batoum under Dervisch Pacha, were the only troops of the sultan who remained free in Armenia.

A few concluding details of the investment of Erzeroum may be quoted from the correspondent of the "Daily News," formerly with Mukhtar Pacha, and now at Illidge, a village in the neighbourhood. Writing on the 2nd of January, he says:—"Though within cannon shot of the town since the battle of Deve-Boyun, the Russians, with the exception of the two attempts to storm Erzeroum, have remained almost entirely inactive, at least as far as hostilities are concerned. Still they have been steadily pushing their way down the Olti valley and behind the Palantoken mountain south-east of the town, both columns gradually converging to a point of union in the neighbourhood of the village from which I write. Both forces are now in alarming proximity to the Trebizond road, and it is a matter of a few days at the furthest, it may be a few hours, that the town of Erzeroum be completely blockaded. For some days past we have been accustomed to see from the ramparts of the town the Cossacks leisurely marching from one village to another, requisitioning corn and forage. Two days ago,

as I telegraphed, they entered the Mohammedan village of Souyouk Chernik, only three quarters of an hour's march from the Olti gate of Erzeroum. The guns on the Kop Dagħ opened fire, and succeeded in forcing the Cossacks to retire. I went out with a troop of Turkish cavalry, and entered the village twenty minutes after the departure of the Russians. The head man of the place told me the latter simply asked about forage, and whether any Turkish troops were concealed in the village. He further asked me to request the artillery commander not to fire any more, as the shells had done considerable damage in the place.

"Yesterday, learning that an unusual movement was noticeable among the Russians, and not wishing to be shut up in Erzeroum, I started for this place, where I shall remain till the last moment. Yesterday, shortly after my arrival, I thought that moment had already come. A force of some seven hundred Turkish horse, under the command of Edhem Pacha, usually occupies Illidge, to watch the fords and bridges of the Kara Su, the western branch of the Euphrates, and which has hitherto constituted the main barrier between the enemy and the Trebizond road, which passes through the village.

"The pacha and his men started on a patrolling expedition towards Pernacaban early in the afternoon, and the Cossacks who occupy the village of Usni, an hour and a half's march distant, took advantage of the circumstance to try and surprise the village. At half-past four o'clock they were already, to the number of some eight or nine hundred, so close to us that we could count the advanced guard without the aid of a glass. At this juncture the Turkish cavalry, warned of the danger, were seen hurriedly returning to Illidge, and only just in time to prevent its capture. The Russians advanced up to the banks of the river, but, finding they could not arrive at the village before the Turks, after reconnoitring us for half an hour they drew off to their camp at Usni. The situation has become critical in the extreme, and should the Turks desire to maintain their communications

with Trebizond open, a much larger force than that at present here must be drawn from the garrison at Erzeroum. The Kara Su at this point runs nearly east and west, and half-way between Illidge and Erzeroum expands into an elongated sheet of water, known as the Illidje Su. It is here crossed by two bridges, its depth rendering it unfordable. While these bridges were held, a formidable obstacle intervened between the Russians and the Trebizond road, which runs more or less parallel to the stream; and some flying columns of cavalry amply sufficed to prevent parties of the enemy from molesting the traffic. At the present season, however, matters are greatly changed. The intense cold has frozen the river to a depth of 18 inches; and not only cavalry but ox-waggons pass across it. It has practically ceased to be an obstacle; and it is pretty certain we shall shortly see the Russians take advantage of the circumstance to possess themselves of the road on its southern bank.

"I understand that Mehmed Pacha, the fighting man *par excellence* of the army here, is charged with resisting such an attempt. To do so successfully, however, he should draw off from the Erzeroum garrison more men than it would be safe to bring outside the ramparts at this juncture. Besides, he will have to make head, not only against the assailants crossing the river in front, but also against those arriving on his rear from behind the Palantoken mountains, whence the second Russian turning column is about to debouch into the plain. A sortie of the kind may possibly do much to impede the establishment of a strict blockade as promptly as might otherwise be effected; prevent it ultimately it cannot. There are some who consider the Russian demonstrations of cavalry in the plain as a mere blind to cover a serious one by the Ispir mountains, turning the tremendous passes of the Kop Dagħ, and menacing Baiburt.

"Some colour is given to this theory by the fact that the Turks have posted ten battalions and some guns at this last-named point, which, after Erzeroum and the Deve-Boyun pass, is the



only position where a stand can be made to cover Trebizond. Should the Russians succeed in occupying Baiburt, the campaign may be considered at an end, until spring allows their commencement of operations, as during this winter the enemy would scarcely think of operating against Trebizond. The great distance from their base of operations, and the exceedingly difficult nature of the road, would render such an undertaking inexpedient. Meantime, the Turks will probably organise a new army for the defence of Trebizond, and this, aided by the co-operation of the fleet, may prove the most obstinate which has yet been made in Armenia.

"I do not know whether the Sublime Porte is really aware of the true state of affairs here; or whether the government entertains any hope of being able to save Erzeroum. The only chance is in the place being able to hold out till late in the spring, when a victorious Ottoman army, having defeated the Russian troops, might march to its relief. Both contingencies are, however, sadly improbable. That reinforcements will be thrown into Trebizond to dispute the road thither is possible, and likely enough. That the same should be able to cut their way to Erzeroum is a contingency by no means probable. Again, within the walls of Erzeroum disease and the severity of the climate are working sad havoc. A typhus epidemic is decimating the garrison. Notwithstanding the despatch of nearly one thousand invalids to Erzingan, over eight thousand now crowd the hospitals. Even the doctors are not exempt from the general fate. Many have died; still more are ill with typhus, and several have resigned and fled. Of the ten English doctors sent out by the Sutherland House Committee and Lord Blantyre, two, Drs. Casson and Buckby, the latter ill with typhoid, were taken prisoners at Kars; one, Dr. Guppy, is dead; two more, Drs. Morrisot and Pinkerton, are attacked by typhus; and three, Drs. Featherstonehaugh, Woods, and Hughes, have left for Trebizond invalided. Only two, Drs. Denniston and Ryan, are capa-

ble of doing duty; these may at any moment be struck down. Among the German and Hungarian doctors sickness and mortality have been at work too, and the director of the medical service is daily worried with applications for leaves of absence and proffers of resignation. A strict blockade once established, and the meat supply cut off, there is no saying to what degree mortality and demoralisation may arrive. The Armenian population all ardently desire the advent of the Russians, and even now speculate freely on the changed state of affairs which will supervene when a Russian governor replaces Ismail Pacha. Even the Turks themselves are unwilling to undergo the privations and losses of a prolonged siege. Looking at the situation from any point of view, I think it probable Erzeroum will not hold out till the ensuing spring.

"The weather is bitterly cold; mountain and plain alike deeply covered with snow. It would be hard to find a more Laplandlike scene than that which spreads around me—the vast plain of Erzeroum blinding white with the dazzle of snow; the ghostly white hills scarcely distinguishable from the snow-fraught clouds around and above them, and far off the domes and minarets of Erzeroum, looking as if chiselled from Parian marble. Men and women, looking like animated bundles of dirty sheepskins, plod about ankle-deep in snow, dragging after them the little wooden sledges which at this season replace the block wheeled ox-carts of summer. Before one has been five minutes in the open air, his beard and hair are frozen stiff, and in point of colour assume a most reverend appearance. Stand still for two minutes, and you are literally frozen to the ground. Notwithstanding the voluminous sheepskin coats served out to the soldiers, especially the cavalry, cases of frost-bite needing amputation are exceedingly frequent.

"It is not easy to write under such circumstances as those in which I find myself at this moment. For want of anything even bordering on a table or chair, I am compelled to lie flat on the bass matting which covers the damp earthen floor of the wretched Armenian *oda* I inhabit.

I write by the light of an iron lamp of antique and primitive form. Melted butter takes the place of oil, and the rude cotton wick leans slantingly in the spout of the sauce-jug-shaped utensil. Cattle groan and mutter at my elbow, and some industrious rats, burrowing in the thick flat earthen roof above, are kicking down whole handfuls of sand and dirt into my ink-bottle and over my paper. A block of dung-fuel smoulders in a hole in the wall beside me, and from time to time a storm-gust, whirling down the low chimney, sends the gray impalpably-powdered ash into my eyes."

Two days later the same correspondent wrote from Aschkale (nine hours from Erzeroum):—"I was chased out of Illidge last night by the Cossacks, and had to make my way here in the dark, my horse sinking mid-leg deep in the snow at every step. The entire Turkish cavalry force retired at the same time, and are now watching the passes of the Iskr mountains which open towards this village. The post, which was unable to leave Erzeroum yesterday, has managed to come through this opening. It will in all likelihood be the last, unless the sortie about to be made from Erzeroum succeeds in forcing the Russians out of range of the Trebizond road. This, however, appears to be very unlikely, as the Russian converging movement would take their assailants in front and rear. To-morrow the action is expected to take place, and I will telegraph the result, unless the Russians push on and destroy the wires. The cold passes all belief. In the *oda* where I passed the night, a cavalry soldier was frozen to death, and horses and baggage mules strew the way. The number of carcasses of these animals are so great, as to have attracted an immense number of wolves and foxes to the plain, and their footprints mark the snow in every direction. My servant, whom I despatched with letters to a neighbouring village, was attacked by two wolves, and had to gallop for his life.

"The critical moment for Erzeroum seems to have arrived, its fate, in fact, depending on the issue of the coming combat. In case the Russians

succeed, we shall all have to decamp to Baiburt, which will then become the great centre of interest, as Erzeroum will, I believe, undergo a simple blockade. In any case, I believe the town to be practically lost."

Once more the correspondent had to change his dwelling. He wrote on the 5th from Pernacaban:—"As I finished the preceding paragraph, and was about to despatch my letter, the sudden arrival, pell-mell, of Edhem Pacha and his one thousand six hundred horse from the vicinity of Illidge, announced the occupation of that village by a strong Russian force, and I retained my letter to add further particulars. Yesterday, about ten o'clock in the forenoon, six battalions of Russian infantry, preceded by two regiments of cavalry, boldly crossed the Kara Su, and took possession of Illidge. Their first act was to cut the telegraph wires, and to throw out vedettes in this direction. Edhem Pacha, supposing that he saw only the advanced guard of a whole army corps, immediately fell back rather hurriedly in this direction.

"I was quietly reclining on the floor of my *oda* at Aschkalé, the best in the miserable village, that of the local magnate or Bey, as they style him. Edhem Pacha, looking like King Christmas, white from head to foot with hoar frost, rushed hurriedly in, and divesting himself of his numerous fur coats and head and face wrappers, threw himself on a mattress at the fire opposite that which I occupied. He seemed greatly perturbed in spirit. He gave several orders in rapid succession about outposts and vedettes, and then his servant produced a large wicker-covered gallon bottle of rhaki.

"He turned abruptly to me and asked what my countrymen were about. England seemed going to sleep, he said. 'There is Erzeroum completely blocked; its last avenue of communication with the outer world cut off—all the same as lost.' And he continued pouring out his dissatisfaction in the same strain for about an hour. I felt glad that I had taken the rather emphatic hint of the Cossacks on the previous evening, and left Illidge there and then. Edhem Pacha seemed divided



in opinion as to whether he should retreat on Ersingan, or merely push on to Pernacaban. 'You'll have the Russian cavalry here to-morrow,' he said, 'and there is no knowing how we may be cut off.' He asked me if I believed that General Kemball was still at Pernacaban. I said that I believed so. 'Then,' he said 'we will go up there together to-morrow if you like.'

"The evening wore on; orderlies and officers coming and going continually on one business or another. It was about half-past nine in the evening when an orderly rushed in with a despatch, to the effect that the same afternoon Mehmed Pacha had made a sortie from Erzeroum in connection with a flank movement led by Ismail Pacha, and that the Russians, after a brief cannonade, had evacuated the village, and retired across the river again. The Pacha immediately issued orders for the entire force to be ready to march on Illidge within an hour. Then followed a scene of confusion such as I have rarely witnessed. Bugles sounded and re-sounded in vain. There was no response save on the part of the local guard, and a couple of dozen Karapabaks or irregular horsemen. The pacha stormed and raved, despatched his second in command and his aides-de-camp hither and thither, but all in vain.

"Where are the officers? where are the men?"

"In the different villages," was the reply.

"In fact the thing was only reasonable, inasmuch as no orders had been given on the subject. Aschkalé is a miserable tumble-down hamlet of a few dozen cabins crowded by an excessive population. It was impossible to find quarters for sixteen hundred men and horses there; and the subordinate officers had given *carte blanche* to their men to find lodgings where and when they could.

"The night was bitterly cold, and a kind of smothering smoke like frozen mist filled the air, rendering a man invisible at fifty yards. Just the sort of weather for a surprise, had the Russians been in a position to effect one. The soldiers accordingly went off in scattered parties to

different villages, some two, three, and four, and even ten miles distant. This may seem incredible, but it is positively true. Some came as far as Pernacaban, three hours' ride from Aschkalé. Orderlies were at once sent off to the surrounding villages to order the men in; but notwithstanding every effort not more than five or six hundred could be got together by midnight. There were fragmentary squadrons without officers, and officers without men. I dare say this scattering of the troops was the only available means of finding the cover so imperatively necessary, for it was almost certain death to attempt bivouacking on such a night, but with the enemy in such supposed dangerous proximity, it was courting certain destruction. I don't believe the entire force has been yet got together. Some of them are here even as I write late in the evening.

"The pacha having seen this fraction of his command on their way back to Illidge went to bed, but started himself long before daylight in the same direction. Knowing, as I did, that the telegraph wires had been cut, it was useless to undertake a seven hours' ride to Erzeroum for the purpose of sending a despatch. They had told me at the central office in that town that there was a telegraph station at Pernacaban, whence I could send French or English messages. Accordingly, early this morning, I rode over here, climbing the first slopes of the Kop Dag. The journey, which is ordinarily one of three hours, owing to the deep snow is now one of at least four hours. On reaching this village, hid away up in a snowed-up mountain gorge, I discovered to my disgust that the operator was a Turk, and could forward only Turkish messages. It was too late to return to Aschkalé, so I made up my mind to camp here for the night. I got lodgings in a wretched hovel, where I write these lines. To-morrow I despatch my letters by special foot courier to Trebizond; for across these tremendous mountains from seven to eight thousand feet high, and of rude ascent, a man on foot moves quicker than a horseman.

"Among the officers and men I spoke to at

Erzeroum, and along the way here, a profound want of confidence exists in their new commander, Ismail Pacha, now raised to the grade of Mushir. Indeed, his conduct of affairs at Bayazid was not that to inspire confidence. All, too, seem to despair of being able to hold Erzeroum, and seem to consider it as already lost. Baibourt is the next point at which to make a stand, and, if that be taken or turned, the Russians are masters of Armenia. The fact that the deep snow and bitter weather have not prevented the enemy's operations, at best only slightly retarding them, seems to have completely upset Turkish defence plans. It now appears evident that the Russians will have worked their will in Armenia before either the weather or their resources permit the Turks to resume the offensive. And yet, as far as I have seen, the latter stand the cold remarkably well.

"On my way from Aschkalé to-day I passed numerous groups of invalids, mostly soldiers convalescent after typhus and typhoid. They were being sent on from Erzeroum to Baiburt, a distance of about one hundred miles, for more than half the way over snow-clad mountains. They were on foot, and each man carried his own pack. When sick men are capable of such a journey on foot over the snowy wolf-haunted wastes and tremendous precipices of a mountain range twice as high as Snowdon or Ben Nevis, and in such weather, surely their companions who are well in health should be able to march and counter-march through the snow quite as well as the Russians."

From Baiburt, on the 11th, this correspondent wrote:—"When I reached Pernacaban, on the slopes of the Kop Dag, in my somewhat precipitate retreat from the neighbourhood of Ilidge, I thought that a few days at least of repose would be permitted me. I could not imagine that the situation was so hopeless, and that Armenia was so completely abandoned to the Russians as to all appearances it is at this moment. I had supposed that, though Erzeroum was besieged, and a colossal invading army menacing the roads leading to the coast, a stout

stand would be made in the passes of the Kop Dag. This has not been done, and for a very good reason. Save a few scattered battalions there are now no Turkish soldiers in Armenia who are not hopelessly blocked at Erzeroum and Batoum.

"On the 8th I noticed a suspicious movement in the village of Pernacaban. Sick soldiers were being sent off across the mountains in the direction of Baiburt, and mules laden with ammunition and flour followed them at intervals. Still I held on in the hope of seeing a force of some kind appear, to make at least a show of resistance, if nothing more, but all the men, principally cavalry, who appeared were marching in the wrong direction, away from the enemy and towards the sea coast. Still, I remained at my post; and it was only about eleven o'clock on the 9th that, for my personal safety, I found it necessary to move off. Edhem Pacha and his cavalry came hurriedly in, announcing that the Russians had occupied Aschkalé with a considerable force, he himself narrowly escaping being made prisoner.

"He owed his escape to the timely warning of his host, who informed him that the Russian cavalry was advancing its flanks to surround the village. The bulk of his Zaptieh cavalry and Karapabaks were stationed at Karabuyouk Khan, two hours and a-half distant along the Erzeroum road. The Cossacks, moving stealthily along the opposite bank of the frozen Kara Su, under cover of the dense snow fog, and crossing on the ice, succeeded in surprising the Turks, some six hundred strong. There was no fighting. The Ottomans fled in disorder. Those who were well mounted fled across the plain, scattering in every direction; and those whose horses failed them were either cut down, or made prisoners. The Russians then immediately advanced, occupying Aschkalé, and pushing a force towards Pernacaban, three hours' march further on. It was at this juncture I started.

"General Kemball, who for some time past had vegetated in an *oda* in the village, deeming



Erzeroum too unsafe since the battle of Deveboinou, rode out along the Aschkalé road to reconnoitre the enemy. He had scarcely turned the angle of the road a quarter of a mile from the village, when he was fired on by the leading Cossacks. A general stampede followed. The General, Edhem Pacha, the remnant of the cavalry, and all the inhabitants who could afford to leave, started at once into the entrance of the Kop Pass, fleeing before the redoubtable Cossacks, who in this campaign have achieved as great a celebrity for ubiquity and daring as the Uhlans in the Franco-Prussian war. My last recollection of Pernacaban was seeing an unfortunate man, near whose semi-subterranean hovel a telegraph post had been erected, cutting this latter down hurriedly, lest its proximity to his dwelling might call down on him the wrath of the Russian horsemen.

"It is not child's play at any season to face a mountain range twelve thousand feet high; still less so in midwinter in a climate like this. As I left the village on my way to the frozen steeps beyond, half seen amid the long cloud streaks that marked the cliffs above, I had serious misgivings whether any of us would effect the passage with impunity. Up we went along a zigzag path, where the snow banks rose high on either side. The uninitiated stranger would have said that our path was an abandoned colliery tramway from which the rails and sleepers had been torn. The way was marked in the beaten snow by sharply-cut trenches separated by intervals of eighteen inches. I have seen the same peculiarity in Herzegovina and Montenegro during wet weather. It is due to the mule convoys. Each animal steps exactly in the place of that which precedes him, and thus this parallel lining is produced.

"We passed many and many a group of way-worn invalids, toiling painfully along, making the best of their way to Baiburt, the nearest haven of refuge for those *hors de combat*. Apropos of these Turkish invalid soldiers, it is really remarkable how the Ottoman warrior changes his skin when passed by the doctor. Your ordi-

nary Turkish belligerent is a cheerful, obedient, long-suffering individual. He may be clothed in rags, be bootless, and his rations not the most regular. He may have some outpost duty to perform in a temperature where the beard and moustache represent as many icicles as there are hairs. He doesn't complain. Allah and the Padischah are for him all-sufficing reasons why he should set his own personality at naught. But let the doctor once touch his wrist, let him give but the slightest hint that the patient is not in a condition to pursue his ordinary avocation as a soldier, and a fearful and wonderful change comes over the man. The robust cheerful warrior shrinks to a shadow of himself. His shoulders bow down, his eyes become dim, his legs totter under him, and his voice shrinks to a feeble treble. I have seen many phases of warlike life, but never have I seen so sudden and complete a metamorphosis as that which overtakes the Mussulman soldier when the doctor justifies him in the idea that he is sick.

"With a train of such persons I commenced the arduous and even dangerous ascent of the mountain. Some toiled wearily on; others sat by the roadside and called on Allah; and I saw forms stretched on a snowy couch that was to be their last. On an occasion like this it is 'every one for himself.' There is no use halting beside some wretched sufferer. You can do but little to prolong his agony; you can't take him with you. And to remain is to perish. On, on, up the steep slope, where the blinding glare of the snow makes all the colours of the rainbow dance before your eyes. 'Have I a chance of getting over?' was more than once asked of me by less experienced travellers, as our horses sank to the girths in the snowdrift. When the higher regions of the mountain are reached, the snow becomes firmer, and a kind of track is visible in the blinding waste. At an elevation of ten thousand feet, before entering into the dense white cloud that girds the summit, the view is magnificent. For leagues and leagues Eastern Armenia stretches at your feet. It is blank and white as death, with sable dottings here and

there—the villages and rock masses. From unseen openings in distant clouds—for overhead all is leaden grey—patches of sunlight fall below, like golden spangles on an ermine mantle. Another ten minutes and our horses, wading amid snow four feet deep, enter the cloud region. Then all is blank. A circle of fifty yards limits the visible horizon. Living thing there is not, save the irrepressible magpie and a description of stone-chat. Even the eagles and vultures have departed to lower levels. At intervals of two hours there are houses of refuge: blank empty tenements, where the ribs of mules and oxen grin around in the snow, half protruding, like the wreck of some barque above shifting sands. Gradually the track disappears in the staring white expanse, and it is only by means of obelisk-like guide marks, and mile-stones barely protruding above the snow, that we keep in the road. This lasts for some five hours, when a slight downward sloping of the way is noticed. Then the mountain side becomes dangerously precipitous, and horse and man slide ten feet at a time, pursued by great masses of detached snow, which ultimately disappear over some tremendous precipice. For an hour we scramble on, slipping and sliding as we go, and at length begin to make out the sun struggling palely through the snow fog.

“A little later and we leave the wall-like mist bank behind us, and emerge into the full blaze of daylight. The change is really remarkable. But a couple of minutes previously and we were moving amid Arctic surroundings; now, clear blue sky, golden sunlight, and the vegetation of the lower valleys. Still, however, the snow is six feet deep, and we pass a train of mules conveying the harem and house furniture of a local magnate, two of the animals lying half buried in the drift and struggling vainly to regain their feet. As we go on, wood pigeons and an occasional eagle or hawk appear, and six hours after leaving Pernacaban we are on level ground, and at the expiration of the seventh reach the large well-built Armenian village of Evrek. An excellent *oda* is placed at my dis-

posal by the head man of the village, a reverend Judaic-looking elder, who supplied me with weak tea sweetened with honey and fried eggs, served with a sauce compounded of treacle and lemon juice.

“At Evrek that night gathered the remnant of what was once a mobilised Turkish army—some sixty horsemen in all, with their chief, Edhem Pacha. General Sir Arnold Kemball, two of my brother correspondents, and myself, were the only strangers in the place. Next morning we started for Baiburt, wishing to put a respectable distance between us and the lancers behind. Three hours ride from Baiburt we encountered a major and a Greek military doctor, the latter speaking French. He informed us that a suspension of arms had been telegraphed to Baiburt, and that he and the major were *en route* for Erzeroum.

“In the hurry of the moment I forgot to tell him that the Russians were at Pernacaban, and would scarce allow even a flag of truce to penetrate ten hours' march behind the advanced posts. Since my arrival here I have tried to discover the origin of this armistice rumour, but in vain. General Kemball knows nothing whatever on the matter, but has heard the thing spoken of. Edhem Pacha has also heard the report, but knows nothing officially. This latter officer gave me the intelligence, which I at once telegraphed, that the Russian cavalry and mountain artillery had made their way at our heels over the Kop Dag, and were at the moment menacing Baiburt. Their force, it seems, consists of four battalions of infantry, three sotnias of Cossacks, and a battery of mountain guns. They are now in undisputed possession of the formidable Kop range of mountains. Baiburt is at their mercy, and once there they can radiate freely over defenceless Armenia. This letter is in all likelihood the last I shall write from Baiburt. I expect to have to move on to-morrow morning, for we have no force here worth speaking of. Two battalions are pushed three hours' march from this to watch the road beside the wooden bridge over the Churuk Su. This



force is merely doing sentinel duty. Serious resistance to the enemy it cannot offer. Baiburt may be considered as already in Russian hands, and with it the entire province up to the walls of Trebizond.

"The military situation may be summarised as follows. The last Turkish army in Armenia is blocked within Erzeroum, hopelessly so; not even the chance of a prolonged resistance. The Russians dominate the plains far and wide. The resources of the country are in their power. Erzeroum, Trebizond, and Batoum alone represent Ottoman rule. There is not even the shadow of a relieving force which could co-operate with the beleaguered garrisons; nor do I think that anything of the kind is being prepared for the coming spring. Even if armies were being organised, their advent would be far too late to arrest the tide of conquest. Armenia is already conquered."

The Russians were not destined to make any further progress in Asia Minor by mere force of arms. They did not enter Erzeroum until the 22nd of February, and then it was under the terms of the armistice concluded in Europe. At Batoum they were even less successful, being repulsed with considerable loss in a renewed attack upon the strong positions of Dervisch.

Thus ended the campaign in Armenia, which, though it was eventually favourable to Russia, had not been without great glory for both the combatants. The Turks had at one time flattered themselves, not without reason, that they had won the campaign, making up in Asia Minor for such reverses as they had suffered in Europe. Indeed, in the autumn, when Mukhtar Pacha held the Russians at bay on the frontier, and Osman Pacha defied the efforts of the Grand Duke Nicholas to occupy Plevna, there were many who thought that the honours of the first year's fighting rested with the Ottoman arms. It was the perseverance of the invaders in continuing their efforts into the winter months, and thus practically opening a second campaign when they were expected to leave off, that turned the tide of victory.

As for the results of the Armenian campaign upon the inhabitants of the country, we may cite the words of an eye-witness, who had come to the conclusion that the people of Anatolia would be happier under the rule of the conquerors than under that of the Turks. The Kars correspondent of the "Daily News," referring, in a letter of February 8th, to the alleged refusal of Ismail Pacha to observe the terms of the armistice, says:—

"The pacha's conduct seems to be rather strange, and cannot be accounted for but by the secret desire of gaining time at any cost. The Turks still cherish the hope that an unexpected political incident may give things a favourable turn, and, therefore, they cling with teeth and nails to every drifting straw. It can hardly be believed that a place of the importance of Erzeroum has been wiped out of the memory of the Stamboul rulers in their recent troubles. It is true that the Armenian capital has been of late closely blockaded, and the telegraph wires have been cut all round; but, nevertheless, it would have been a comparatively easy task to forward a message from Constantinople to Trebizond and even Baiburt. Thence a courier would have brought it, with Russian permission, in three days to Erzeroum. Either the necessary orders were withheld by the Porte on purpose, or Ismail Pacha, guided by secret instructions, feigned to ignore them, ostensibly on his own responsibility, thinking it expedient to delude and hamper the Russians as long as possible. All sorts of misgivings are justified in negotiations with such Asiatics as the Turks have proved to be.

"In the meanwhile the prospects of the Russian army cannot be very promising. If the troops had been called out of their cantonments, and massed with the view of entering Erzeroum on a fixed day in the present frightful weather, not only their disappointment must have been deep, but also their physical sufferings might have brought many men to their graves. Typhoid, moreover, has settled permanently among them. The natives, if surprised when travelling

by a whirling snow-drift, relinquish all hope of reaching the next underground village, however near they may guess it to be. If on horseback, they dismount quickly and leave the animal to his fate. Then squatting down on the road, and wrapping themselves in their large felt cloaks, with their faces turned to leeward of the gale, they resign themselves to whatever may be in store for them. Protected thus by the snow, a bad conductor of caloric, from the fierceness of the icy blast, they await patiently in their awkward position the end of the storm, or the end of all their worldly miseries. Whether the Russians in their light and narrow capotes are able to adopt similar measures of precaution, is questionable.

"However this may be, it is certain that Ismail Pacha by his procrastination annoys his victors very much in a quite unexpected manner, inflicting upon them at the last moment heavy losses with Parthian arrows. His motives for persevering in this suspicious policy may have been strengthened by hearing of the severe defeat which the Russians lately suffered in an unsuccessful attack on a Turkish position before Batoum. It is said that they sustained there the loss of a general, sixteen officers, and seven hundred rank and file. We are here only acquainted with that event through mere rumours. The Russian discomfiture, however insignificant it appears in comparison with the results in Roumelia, caused here considerable anxiety. As it is magnified by the glowing fancy of the Turks into a momentous victory, it may have influenced the pacha's counsellors and actuated his own strange conduct. The prospect of seeing the whole of the vilayet of Erzeroum and a portion of the province of Trebizond, with Batoum, handed over to Russia, is filling the Turks with horror and dismay. They refuse obstinately to believe that such disadvantageous conditions of peace have been entered into by the Porte. Moreover, their project of emigration next summer to pure Moslem districts has been seriously interfered with by that vast cession of territory. They expected

to quit themselves of the infidel by simply crossing the Soghanli Mountains, and settling beyond them in a genial country, familiar to them all. Now, unfortunately, the question is widened. Should they insist on their scheme of stubborn defiance, they would see themselves compelled to carry their household gods hundreds of miles away from their former homes, into a country filled with savage ruthless Kurds. Under these circumstances it is not astonishing that many turbaned grumblers mean to think twice, and are likely to prefer ultimately the lenient administration of the Moscow Giaours to the cruel exactions of hungry pachas and murderous thieves in distant Kurdistan.

"In contradiction of what has been reported about Russian cruelty, it must be said that if there be injustice it is rather attributable to an excess of forbearance in the application of the law than to its infringement by the officials. There can be no doubt that the Mahomedans in Russia, be they Caucasians, Tartars, Kurds, Turcomen, or Kirghis, are by far more comfortable, and give less trouble, than their brethren under the sultan's anarchical sway. In Turkey, only the pacha tribe or caste, their subordinates, and their retinue of servants, bankers, and contractors, have little to complain of. They are neither overtaxed nor ill-treated. They always take and never give. Russia, on the contrary, is following now a wise and genuine Roman policy. The subjected populations enjoy full civil and religious rights. No functionary has the power, or is disposed to meddle with their mode of living, whether as agriculturists, merchants, and tradesmen, or as ever-shifting nomads. The taxes are very moderate indeed, and, moreover, nearly all the Moslems are exempted from the conscription. In time of war they are simply bound to raise, if necessary, a well-remunerated volunteer cavalry force. The system, however, is different if the conquered or incorporated nationality should enter into open insurrection. Then little mercy is shown. Every village is burnt to the ground, every household article is destroyed, and the rebels are shot down where-



ever they are found until they come to terms of agreement.

"Our Turks here, however, do not now dream of trying the fortune of arms with their conquerors. They have opened their shops, and follow their trade and vocations with the stoical tranquillity peculiar to their race. Some are even honest enough to avow that they have never in their life enjoyed such perfect calm and security as at present. When their countrymen were in power, they were robbed shamelessly of every horse and bullock, and of every bushel of wheat and barley within sight. Never a farthing was paid for what was taken away. Now, to their great astonishment, they see themselves crushed under a shower of paper roubles, which the generous-hearted and free-living Russian officers lavish upon them. Turks and Armenians charge tenfold prices for their inferior goods, especially provisions. My landlord, an ex-Softa, told me that ten of his best milch cows had been transferred, without permission, into the fire-kettles of the sultan's soldiers. On denouncing the thieves he met only with a shrugging of official shoulders. Now he is taking his revenge on me. The rural population is almost reduced to mendicity. The drain of young men by reckless conscription was terribly destructive.

"Well-informed people assure me that Armenia has already lost one-half of her original male population. Some thirteen thousand soldiers, prisoners, and inhabitants, most of them the victims of neglect and typhus, have been buried near Kars alone since its occupation by Russia! One shudders to think of the rate of mortality under the Turkish rule. The villages are the abodes of misery, starvation, and typhoid. Many houses had in the summer-time the beams of their roofs taken off by the Ottoman soldiery for culinary purposes, and were rendered thus utterly uninhabitable for the returning fugitive families. With my own eyes I saw five deserted hamlets entirely demolished in this manner. It is true that the example set has been followed in many instances by the Russians. The soldiers in some cantonments and bivouacs are placed in

the alternative of either freezing to death, or of unroofing some of the neighbouring empty huts. For all that, there is little complaint, and cries for assistance in distress are as unusual as begging is among the destitute. The merciless tyranny of pachas and effendis has accustomed the people to suffer and die in silent resignation. It is not easy to extort from an obese pacha a penny of his ill-gotten wealth, without presenting him with more than adequate compensation. Begging dervishes and lunatics are sometimes the objects of his liberalities, because they are supposed to be connected with a demoniacal world, enjoying the privilege of the evil eye, and other supernatural gifts.

"In reference to the impending incorporation of Armenia-Major by Russia, I can only repeat that the idea is so new and startling to the people here that they deem its realisation impossible. They contend that the military situation here is not so hopeless as to justify the cession of an enormous territory, nearly equal in extent to the kingdom of the Netherlands and Belgium put together. They do not take into account what is going on before the very gates of Stamboul, and they do not attach credence to the Russian official statements. One fine morning, however, they are likely to become fully aware that the Porte has paid the penalty of its scandalous misconduct and obstinacy.

"It does not need much penetration to understand that this new Asiatic acquisition is of the highest value to Russia. From the Armenian highlands she can easily command the roads to Mossul through Bitlis, to Diarbekir through Harput, and to Siwas and Tokat through Erzingan and Kara Hissar. That is to say, Mesopotamia as well as Anatolia is at her mercy. Even more so is Persia. The exclusive outlets for the all-important northern provinces of that sunburnt kingdom lead by Tiflis or Erzeroum to the Black Sea. The traders, however, prefer invariably the latter road, because the journey is shorter, more convenient, and cheaper. Russia, therefore, once in possession of Erzeroum, is mistress of the Shah's chief revenue, and can starve him in-

to submission, should he ever dream of freeing himself from her powerful influence. Very soon, and without much entreating, the Shah will be glad to grant the construction of a railway from Tiflis to Teheran, a scheme which has been already under the consideration of the Russian Council of State.

"At Vladikawkas the Russian railway system ends in the south-east, arrested by the formidable barrier of the Caucasus, which separates it from Tiflis, the capital of Transcaucasia. The distance between the two towns on either slope of the mountain range is a little above one hundred miles measured on the metalled road. A railway parallel to the latter would require an enormous outlay for tunnels, bridges, and viaducts, and is therefore, in the present state of the Russian Financial Department, out of the question. This project having been finally discarded, another plan has been prepared and studied, and, if I am not mistaken, approved by the Emperor and the Council of State. From Vladikawkas, the terminus of the completed Russian railways, the new line follows first the northern foot of the spurs of the Caucasian mountain range through the valley of the Terek, and thence the western shore of the Caspian Sea to Baku, the most important town and harbour on that gigantic lake. From this place one line is intended to branch off to Tiflis, while another is to run to the Persian frontier and thence to Teheran. The Russian portion of these railways, namely, the sections from Vladikawkas to Baku, and from Baku to Tiflis, has been traced and prepared for construction, and, but for the war, the works would have been now in full execution. With regard to a future prolongation of the line through Persia, little doubt can be entertained as to the Shah's assent. He will be a mere tool in the emperor's hands in future.

"Once firmly established in Teheran, the Russian company, being of course only the mouthpiece and instrument of the government, will be at liberty to push slowly onward to Herat through fertile and well-irrigated Khorassan. As long as Armenia was in Turkish hands, as long as

Kars and Erzeroum threatened and outflanked the Russian political and military advance through Persia, the railroad schemes were unsafe. It was not so much an Ottoman army as the fear of a general revolt excited by its presence among the Caucasian Mahomedan population, which troubled Russian views on the northern provinces of Persia. General Loris Melikoff, when neutralised last summer at Kurukdere, cared much less for Mukhtar's position on the Aladja than for a Moslem rebellion, and subsequent wholesale massacre of the Armenians on the first Turkish battalion crossing the Arpa Sou. A vast conspiracy with that object had been discovered, but was prudently disregarded. Now the obstacle is on the point of being finally removed. Without claiming the gift of prophecy, I venture to predict that, before two years from the conclusion of peace, the Russian portion of the above-mentioned railways will be in full construction, while the other on Persian territory is likely to be diligently studied and traced out."

The prognostications of this correspondent were not all realised; but for some of them the time of fulfilment has not yet arrived. The settlement which followed the close of the Turko-Russian war did not leave Erzeroum in Russian hands; and thus the trade route to Persia was not placed at their mercy. England took good care that the influence of her rival in the East should not remain predominant in Asia Minor; and if the Russian government endeavoured to utilise its victory over the Porte as a means of extending its prestige in Asia, our own statesmen were quite equal to the task of counteracting these intrigues, and proving to the shah and to the other Mahomedan potentates that England was determined to hold her own.

The Turkish Parliament was called together for a second session in December; and its deliberations were naturally confined to the recent disasters of the country. The session was not destined to be a long one, but it was very noisy and stormy whilst it lasted. It was opened by a speech from the throne, delivered on the 13th



of December, and commencing in the following terms:—

"GENTLEMEN OF THE SENATE, GENTLEMEN OF THE CHAMBER—I am happy to open Parliament, and to see assembled round me the deputies of the nation. Russia, as you are aware, last year declared war against us, and our government was constrained to defend itself, and repel the aggression. This war still continues. Two years and a half ago disturbances broke out in Herzegovina, and spread into other localities. In spite of the equality in the eyes of the law which all our subjects enjoy, and the immunities which secure their nationality and their language, a part of our population suffered itself to be drawn, without any known motive, into the path of illegality. These misguided men not only injured their fatherland and their fellow-citizens, but they also brought upon themselves the gravest prejudice. The united principalities which had the fortune to possess an independent internal administration, assumed an attitude of hostility towards our government, without any legitimate reason. All these grave events, unprecedented in our history, have considerably increased the difficulties of the war, but the country, in order to make head against them, has made it its duty to put forth all the power of resistance of which it is capable. All Ottomans, by the abnegation of which they have given proof in this war, have shown that they were prompted by the highest sentiments of patriotism. The courage and valour of our soldiers have been the admiration of the whole world. I continue to appeal to the aid and patriotism of all of you, in order to protect our sacred rights. The formation of the civic guard, which is daily perfecting and completing itself, and the eagerness with which our non-Mussulman subjects present themselves to take part in this patriotic service, are matters of real satisfaction to our government."

As we have already seen, the enrolment of the Christians had not been effected to any considerable extent; and if the sultan or his ministers ever expected much aid from their non-Mussulman subjects, they were doomed to disappoint-

ment. The possibility of having to defend the capital against attack induced a certain number of the Greeks to take up arms; but most of these were doubtless influenced by the fear of their fanatical fellow-subjects rather than of the Russians.

After certain complaints of the treatment of Turkish prisoners by the Russians, which do not seem to have been altogether justified, the speech goes on to suggest a programme of domestic legislation, which sounds strange enough when the unhappy circumstances of the empire are taken into account. The concluding sentences are as follow:—"Last year the municipal bill for the capital as well as for the provinces was submitted to the chamber and adopted, and the minor regulations of the senate and the chamber of deputies were sanctioned and carried into effect. Important bills, elaborated by the council of state, will likewise be submitted to your deliberations this year, such as bills relative to civil procedure, to general elections, to the powers of ministers and the council of ministers, and to the high court of justice, and the court of accounts. You will have to devote your mature deliberation to these projects, and to decide certain questions relative to the laws on the vilayets, the press, taxation, and the state of siege, which were discussed in the first session. I call your especial attention to the law regarding the next budget. We believe that we have given you a manifest proof of our firm intention to persist in the path of progress, by directing our attention to internal reforms, even at a time when the government is engaged in a great war.

"GENTLEMEN OF THE CHAMBER—It is by means of complete liberty of discussion that one can arrive at the truth in legislative and political questions, and thus protect the public interest. The constitution renders this a duty on your part, and I do not think I have to give you any other order or encouragement in this respect. Our relations with the friendly Powers are most cordial. May the Most High bless our common efforts."

The promise of free speech was kept, up to a certain point; but the eventual dismissal of the deputies was no doubt due to the manner in which they insisted on speaking out, whether their candour pleased the government or not. There was a decided opposition in the Turkish Parliament, and we cannot be surprised if the government was unable to do, without previous experience, what has been found so difficult by the governments of the most civilised nations.

A correspondent, writing from Constantinople on the 4th of January,\* gave a clear idea of the relations existing between the government and the deputies. Speaking of the former session, he observed that the Parliament had shown that it might become an important element in the state. "Many of the members had spoken out boldly against the abuses which existed in the places they represented. Moslem and Christian alike complained of the bad government which afflicted all classes of the community, and of the centralisation which sacrificed the provinces to support the oligarchy of pachas in Constantinople. It was found that, without entering upon the special grievances of the Christians, there was an abundant crop which injured alike Mahomedans and Christians. Towards the end of the session the Christian members, emboldened by the courage with which the Moslems spoke, complained of the injustice with which they were treated, and one member in particular dared to state what the Kurds had been doing to the Christians in Armenia. The great defect of the new Parliament was, however, that it was absolutely powerless. The pachas were perfectly willing to let the members say what they liked, on condition that the members would allow the pachas to do what they liked. For the purpose of finding out what a number of men belonging to various parts of the empire thought about the government, the chamber was of use. For the practical purposes of legislation it was useless. Many resolutions were adopted, but, as Midhat Pacha has pointed out, no-

thing whatever has been done to give them the force of law.

"In one respect, indeed, and in this respect only, the Turkish Parliament has been and is an unmitigated nuisance. Whenever a minister during the last few months has wished to get rid of responsibility, his plea has always been that now there is a chamber everything must be brought before it. In administration the government of Turkey has often been described as a weak despotism, and this reputation has been gained to a considerable extent by the extreme difficulty in finding a responsible person. One department shifts the burden of responsibility upon another. The other refers it to somebody else, and suitors of every kind find difficulty in getting hold of anybody who will take the trouble to hold himself responsible. There are no permanent heads of departments, and the whims of the palace have so often changed the various ministers, and rendered the future of office so uncertain, that each minister is unwilling either to put himself out of the way to do anything or to accept responsibility. The result is, that for years past one of the standing complaints against the government has been, that it is difficult to get anything done. There is probably not an ambassador here whose work would not be lessened by three-fourths if the departments of the government could be made to accept responsibility as similar departments do in Western Europe. The matter, however, has become worse since the establishment of the constitution. When a Turkish minister is now pressed by an ambassador, his answer is that the matter must be referred to the chamber, or that the constitution forbids him to decide without sending it before the council of state. While, therefore, on the one hand, the chamber is not allowed to advance any matter by legislation, it is made a plea for delay on the other. The Parliament will probably assist the ministers by ridding them of the responsibility of accepting terms of peace. There are, of course, a number of pachas who are out, who will be ready to make as much capital as possible out of the ac-

\* "Daily News."



ceptance of the terms which may be obtained from Russia. Those who are in know this, and will equally, of course, be glad to have the burden of responsibility put upon the shoulders of the chamber.

"The first business of the new Parliament was to elect its president. Last session Achmet Vevik Pacha was the president. Subsequently he was made governor of Adrianople, but a few weeks ago was dismissed. It is generally believed that the government is very desirous to keep him out of the chamber. He was himself unwilling to be re-elected as president, and addressed a letter to the 'Stamboul,' in which he stated that he did not wish to hold that position. He did, however, wish to be a deputy, and whatever his faults may be there is no doubt that he would make a very useful deputy. He is probably the most learned Turk living; and though his ability is not nearly so great as he himself estimates it, yet he could often give useful advice and add light to questions under discussion. He was nominated in several places, but nowhere elected, and his non-election is attributed to the opposition, if not to the direct orders or manipulation of the government. The chamber selected three nominees for the president's chair, and out of these the sultan chose Hassan Fechmi Effendi. Hassan has hitherto acted as a Turkish advocate. At one time he was a judge in the courts for the trial of commercial cases, but resigned his position, probably because he could not afford to retain it. He is an able, and, I believe, altogether honest man, one who belongs to the very salt of his race, and who showed by his conduct last session that he is among the few who are willing to make the concessions which justice requires for granting equality to the Christian races, and to urge on the reforms which are needed to lift the country out of the depths of its commercial stagnation.

"The chamber has been occupied up to yesterday in discussing the answer to the speech by the sultan. To judge by the three days' debates which have taken place, the present house is not likely to be less tractable than the last. The five

bureaux or committees of the house were not at all disposed to make the answer a mere echo of the speech. On Tuesday the house divided on the question of the wording of a passage expressing disapprobation of the conduct of political and military affairs by the cabinet. Sadyk Pacha produced the draft of a new answer, which was taken to come from the ministers, but this was rejected, and forty-one members voted for, and forty against, the obnoxious phrase censuring the cabinet. Again, an attempt was made to get the obnoxious phrase altered, but the attempt was met by another modification on the part of the opposition, which, instead of the cabinet, condemned 'those who hold the executive power.' The passage thus made more comprehensive, and expressing the opinion that the military and political situation of the country would have been different if it had been more wisely dealt with by those who hold the executive power, was then carried by a majority of twenty-four votes, the numbers being fifty-six against thirty-two.

"It is said that this majority was obtained in consequence of a rumour which was widely spread for a day or two that Midhat would be recalled. There can be no doubt that this ex-grand vizier has still a considerable number of followers in Constantinople, and that the belief is held by not a few that he will be recalled. I do not give this as my own opinion, because, remembering the circumstances under which he was banished, I am inclined to doubt whether his return would not be regarded as dangerous to too many of those now in power, but the existence of the desire to see him recalled by a good many of the Young Turkey party is a fact to be taken note of.

"At the sitting held yesterday, when the address was again taken into consideration, there was, if anything, a heightening of the tone of the opposition, notwithstanding all the means which had been brought into play in the interval to provoke a reaction in favour of the ministry. In reply to the stereotyped argument equivalent to Mr. Lincoln's phrase of swopping horses while

crossing a stream, several deputies, and especially the representative of Beyrout—the late secretary of several grand viziers—whom I have already mentioned, rejoined that that was a worn-out excuse, as the country had always been in difficulties, and that consequently there had always been a pretext for putting off reforms, and probably always would be. One of the sorest points raised during the discussion, which was somewhat excited, tending, as the president judiciously remarked, to wander into a discussion of measures to be taken rather than of the terms of the address in reply, was in consequence of an observation with regard to a demand for a certain sum in *caimé* or paper money, and a suggestion as to the advisability of verifying the employment of the fifteen million of *caimés* already issued. The minister of finance will have to appear before the chamber to answer this question. He is not the only member of the government who is already subject to an interpellation, the minister of marine at the present moment, Said Pacha, *ferik* of the palace, being obliged to give explanations as to how it happened that the ‘*Mersina*,’ with the much vaunted blockade and ironclad fleet of the Black Sea, fell so quietly into the hands of the Russians with over seven hundred troops on board.”

The present volume may fitly be brought to a close with some account of the triumph of the Russians, in St. Petersburg especially, on the successful termination of the year’s fighting. The news of the investment of Erzeroum and the capture of Plevna arrived in the Russian capital about the same time; and it was not long before the czar himself, returning by way of Odessa, came to add brilliancy to the triumph. He returned on the 22nd of December, more than six months after his departure for Roumania. During the whole of this period he had passed through great anxieties, and no inconsiderable personal hardship; and he was received with all the more loyalty and enthusiasm on this account.

An ovation was prepared for the emperor in his capital. He was welcomed home by vast

crowds of people, by the entire garrison of St. Petersburg, and by many of the civil authorities. The mayor presented an address as he alighted from the train; and then a procession was formed to escort him to the cathedral. This procession was headed by the Minister of Police, General Trepoff—the same who was assassinated, some eight months later, by members of a secret society.

The scene within the cathedral was described by a correspondent as very impressive. “One passed the massive doors to find the semi-darkness of a gloomy morning relieved by the radiance of multitudinous candles, from which the light flashed on the polished sparkling surface of huge pillars of Finland granite, and on the gold frames of the sacred pictures. The soft light gleamed on the chased surface of the holy door, behind which lies the high altar, and on the precious stones with which are so profusely adorned the sacred effigies which break the glistening silvern surface of the Iconostas. The gorgeousness of a worship which appeals to the soul through the senses, was visible everywhere; in the massive candelabra of solid silver; in the name of the Almighty, rendered in precious stones in the centre of the screen, with dazzling rays of glory encircling it; in the glitter of innumerable gems, and in the polished beauty of rare marbles.

“Worship and war mingle strangely together in this cathedral. An inscription testifies that the silver of the Iconostas was the offering of the Don Cossacks after the campaign of 1812. Another sense than that of religion is appealed to by the trophy and banners which depend from every column, like palm leaves drooping from a central stem. Here are the visible tokens and sign of Russia’s military prowess in past wars. Not yet are here the trophies won at Gorny Dubnik, Telish, and Plevna. These are yet to come, but the war prizes of Diebitch, Wittgenstein, and Paskiewitch, shot-torn and faded, hang from the brackets fixed in the marble pillars. The triumph of earlier warfare with the Turks are commemorated by standards taken by Suva-



roff, when he led his own storming party against the ramparts of Ismail. The eagles of France, trophies of the collapse of the great invasion, are alternated with the standards tipped by the crescent. Over the tomb of Kutosoff hang the banners his army won, when blood dyed the snow on the banks of the Breresina. Under the flag-staffs hang the massive keys of cities which have surrendered to Russian arms. That black staff there, studded with golden bees, is the marshal's baton of the ruthless Davoust.

"The waiting throng in the noble cathedral is a microcosm of the Russian nation. People had spent the night sleeping on the marble floor, that they might be secure of a place for the morning. There has been no respect of persons in the admissions. The Mujik in his sheepskins stands next to the high officer, whose bosom glitters with decorations. The lady of the nobility and the woman of the people rub shoulders. The old peasant woman and the princess bend together at the shrine. A clear space is preserved along the centre of the aisle. Elsewhere the eager earnest throng is massed. Order and quiet prevail. The duty of the police functionaries in keeping clear the central passage is very light. Ladies are passing along this pathway, carrying boxes in which they are collecting contributions for the relief of the wounded, and the copecks of the peasant jingle against the gold imperials contributed by the noble, for all are liberal in this cause according to their means. Tall priests, in their lofty hats, their long hair falling on the collars of their gorgeous robes, move to and fro, arranging the preliminaries of the religious ceremony. The great chandeliers hanging from the roof are lighted, and now the cathedral is in a blaze of light.

"As the hour for the arrival of the emperor draws nigh, the high officers of police finally marshal the orderly throng to come up to the front. Alas, that so many of them should wear these all too significant mourning garments on such an occasion as that of to-day ! There always seems to be the undertone of a sob in the loud-sounding clamour of the joyous cheering, and

here and there in the corners of the great cathedral were to be noticed weeping women, poor souls who have given hostages to Russia and the czar, in the lives of those nearest and dearest to them.

"Suddenly the tinkle of a bell is heard ; the great doors of the cathedral are flung wide open ; there surges in a great gust of cold air, on the wings of which is borne a great throbbing volume of sound, the roar of the cheering of vast multitudes, the booming of artillery, the clashing of the pealing joy-bells. Descending from the altar-place, the clergy, headed by the metropolitan, resplendent in gorgeous robes, and wearing a mitre, which is one mass of glittering precious stones, advance in stately procession towards the door. There is a brief pause, during which the cheering outside peals louder and louder. From the front of the Iconostas a stream of melody diffuses itself over the cathedral as choristers raise the chant of thanksgiving. Now the procession is returning from the door where the metropolitan has received the emperor. The throng cannot be restrained. It closes in with irresistible impulse, for here comes their czar back among them after sharing with his gallant soldiers the dangers and hardships of the campaign. His son, Grand Duke Sergius, the youngest member of the imperial family who has made the campaign, is by his side. The throng is silent, as befits the sacred edifice, but the eager joy of glowing faces testifies to the all-absorbing emotion.

"The emperor passes on towards the altar, preceded by the metropolitan. He ascends the steps, and his lips touch the glittering image of the Holy Virgin of Kasan. There has followed him the czarevna, whose fair face recalls the features so vividly of one honoured and beloved by every Briton. Count Adlerberg, alone of the members of the suite, has followed his imperial master into the cathedral.

"The simple ceremony is of brief duration, and in a few moments the emperor is returning towards the doors. The loyalty of the throng is no longer to be restrained. Men and women

all but block the path of his majesty, eager to kiss the hem of his garment. The procession struggles on through the dense masses, and the door is finally reached. Then we in the cathedral hear the cheering of the crowd outside break forth again as the emperor drives away towards the Winter Palace.

"A few thousand persons would make but a very small show in the huge area of the Alexander Platz, but now it was so densely thronged that circulation was wholly impossible. The clamour of the cheering rent the very sky as the emperor drove through the crowd up to the door of the palace, and, alighting there, stood for a few moments on the terrace acknowledging the welcome of his subjects, before entering the palace to take up for the time quarters very different to those he occupied at Biela, Gorny Studen, and Poradim. Even after his majesty had entered, the cheering continued so long and so persistently that he had to gratify the people by showing himself again and again at the window of the palace. All day long the huzzaing crowd continued gathered in front of the palace, and late into the night the cheering of the soldiers from the barracks fell upon the ear. From seven until nearly midnight the streets of the capital were brilliantly illuminated. . . .

"One of the principal reasons which caused the Emperor Alexander to journey with all speed to his capital after the fall of Plevna was that he might be able to preside in person at the ceremonial commemorating the centenary of the birth of his illustrious ancestor, Alexander I. That monarch's name is identified with some of the most critical and most glorious episodes of Russian national history, and his memory is still green in the hearts of the Russian people.

"Alexander lies buried among the dead of the imperial family in the cathedral of St. Peter and St. Paul, in the fortress. Under white marble tombs sleep those whose names in life filled the world. Peter the Great, who evolved Russia from barbarism; Catherine II.; Alexander, whose reign saw a conquering hostile army in the Russian capital, and the conquering of the

foe who had wrought her this despite; and Nicholas of the iron soul.

"Beneath the gorgeous roof of this imperial mausoleum cathedral there gathered this morning to listen to a requiem service all those of the nobles, courtiers, and soldiers of Russia who are not engaged in the campaign. The standards won by Russian prowess in the wars of two centuries hung from the pillars above the veterans who had been instrumental in the capture of some of them. Medals and decorations, rewards of conduct and valour, bedecked almost every breast. The St. George hung at the throat of the pale lad, whose arm in a sling told of a wound received at the crossing of the Danube in June. High over the throng towered the yet unbent form of the venerable Suvaroff, who campaigned with Diebitch in 1828.

"The emperor entered the cathedral, followed in single file by the male members of the imperial family now in St. Petersburg, and strode up the aisle with a truly noble port. He wore a splendid hussar dress, with fur pelisse dangling from the shoulder, and acknowledged with imperial dignity the obeisances paid him by all. The metropolitan conducted in person the solemn funeral service before the tomb of Alexander, the emperor standing or kneeling in the open space in front of the metropolitan, with his family, the court, and his officers behind him. The strains of the solemn requiem rose from the serried tiers of the choir. White-bearded priests, standing around the tombs of the dead emperors, were visible through the foliage of the grove of exotic shrubs in which the marble monuments were embowered.

"As the pealing strains of the anthem wailed through the cathedral the emperor took from one of his ministers a commemorative medal, struck for the occasion, and approaching the tomb of Alexander, laid the medal upon it, among the floral wreaths and crosses which flushed the pale marble with their colours. At this moment all present knelt, with a lighted taper in every hand, and as the requiem hushed there rose the sonorous accents of the metropolitan pronounc-



ing the benediction. The emperor visited in succession the tomb of each member of his race, bending and kissing the marble. He lingered a moment over the tomb of his first-born, the late czarewitch, on which loving hands keep the flowers perpetually fresh, and with final, stately bows to the illustrious congregation, quitted the cathedral at noon.

"There was afterwards marshalled in the state apartments of the Winter Palace a magnificent gathering. Diamonds sparkled, and rich trains swept the parquettèd floors. All who had been present at the funeral service in the fortress cathedral had reunited in the palace, and the presence of noble ladies added to the brilliancy of the spectacle. At a signal the imperial procession set forth in stately march through the noble halls and galleries, lined by splendid soldiers, on its way to the chapel of the palace, at

the entrance to which their majesties and the imperial family were received by the metropolitan and his clergy. The procession having been marshalled into the chapel, a solemn *Te Deum* was celebrated, with a prayer for the emperor and the imperial family, and prayers for the welfare of all Russia. The strains of the *Te Deum* were accentuated by the thunder of a salute of one hundred and one guns, fired from the cannon of the fortress."

It was indeed a proud moment for Russia ; but her work was by no means concluded. She had yet to conquer Roumelia ; she had yet to exact her terms from Turkey ; she had yet to satisfy England, and to submit to the will of Europe. We must leave for another volume the task of recording how all this was accomplished, and how the ruins of the Ottoman power were reconstructed.







BASHI-BAZOUKS IN AMBUSH

HISTORICAL NARRATIVE  
OF THE  
TURKO-RUSSIAN WAR.

A HISTORY OF THE WAR COMMENCED IN APRIL, 1877, BETWEEN RUSSIA AND TURKEY; PRECEDED BY A SUMMARY OF  
THE EVENTS WHICH LED UP TO THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES, INCLUDING THE

SERVIAN AND MONTENEGRIN CAMPAIGNS OF 1876.


WITH CHAPTERS UPON THE CONSTITUTION AND RESOURCES OF THE TWO EMPIRES, THEIR NATIONAL HABITS AND  
CUSTOMS, AND THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE REMAINING STATES OF EUROPE.

VOLUME II.

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# CONTENTS.

CHAP.	PAGE
I. THE MONTENEGRIN CONQUESTS	1
II. THE SERVIAN CAMPAIGN	12
III. THE ADVANCE ON SOFIA	20
IV. THE OCCUPATION OF PHILIPPOLIS	31
V. RADEZKY'S ADVANCE	43
VI. TURKEY'S APPEAL TO EUROPE	58
VII. THE RUSSIANS IN ADRIANOPLE	71
VIII. THE MAHOMEDAN REFUGEES	80
IX. THE POLICY OF ENGLAND	89
X. THE BASES OF PEACE	123
XI. THE ATTITUDE OF GREECE	131
XII. THE LAST RUSSIAN ADVANCE	169
XIII. THE TREATY OF SAN STEFANO	175
XIV. EUROPE AND RUSSIA.	187
XV. PREPARATIONS FOR CONGRESS	205
XVI. THE MEETING OF THE CONGRESS	219
XVII. GREECE AND THE CONGRESS	229
XVIII. BULGARIA AND THE CONGRESS	241
XIX. THE CONGRESS AND THE DANUBIAN PRINCIPALITIES	253
XX. THE TREATY OF BERLIN	266
XXI. THE RE-SETTLEMENT	277
XXII. THE AUSTRIANS IN BOSNIA	303
XXIII. TURKEY'S PROSPECTS	326
XXIV. THE ENGLISH IN CYPRUS	340
XXV. RUSSIA AND INDIA	375
XXVI. THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER	385
XXVII. THE AFGHAN WAR	423
XXVIII. THE RUSSIAN REPULSE	457





# HISTORY OF THE TURKO-RUSSIAN WAR.

## CHAPTER. I.

### THE MONTENEGRIN CONQUESTS.

IN the first volume of the present work we have traced the progress of the Turko-Russian war from its outbreak to the capture of Plevna, and to the close of the campaign in Armenia. The leading events of the Russian invasion of Turkey were presented to the reader in a series of word-pictures from eye-witnesses; and we may proceed to carry on the record of the war to its final issue. We have seen how the quarrel began, and what were the foreign interests involved in it. We shall now see the practical results of the struggle, and the changes which it brought about in the constitution of European Turkey.

With the rapid progress of the Russians in Europe and Asia, during the last two months of 1877, it was natural that her allies in Montenegro and Servia should redouble their energy and audacity. It may be useful to take a brief retrospect at the conduct of these two states, since the armies of the czar had gained their first victories in Bulgaria.

It was on June 28th, 1877, that the Turks, under Suleiman and Mehemet Ali Pachas, after relieving Nicsics, and penetrating into the country of Prince Nikita, being suddenly recalled by the Porte, evacuated Montenegrin soil. Seventeen days later, Suleiman embarked at Antivari with the bulk of his army, some twenty thousand men.

No sooner had he and Mehemet Ali retired

than the prince renewed his operations against Nicsics; and, after a siege of six or seven weeks, the coveted fortress fell into the hands of the brave mountaineers, on September 8th.\* Mr. Evans gives a most interesting description of the rejoicings which took place in Cettinge, the capital of Montenegro, when the princess announced the fall of this town. The Montenegrins were wild with delight, and expressed their joy in their own characteristic fashion. "In the evening," says Mr. Evans, "the dance is renewed before the palace. Little Cettinge illuminates itself, and the palace walls and entrance are brilliant with long rows of stearine candles. It is here, before the palace-gate, that the people form a large circle, the front rank of the spectators holding lighted tapers to illuminate the arena. On the palace steps sits the princess amidst her ladies, and little Danilo, the 'Hope of Montenegro,' stands in the gateway, almost among the other bystanders. Two old senators, whose

\* Mr. A. J. Evans, in one of his pleasant "Illyrian Letters," mentions that the prince sent news of this victory to the princess in four lines of poetry, whereof he adds the original and the translation, as follows:—

"Na bielu Onogostu zastava se moja bije,  
A Plamenac Voievoda pod njim ruino vino pije;  
Oko njega barjaktari zagraktase ka' Orlovi;  
A Nicsici sjetni, Tuzni sad su meni sve robovi."

That is—

"Mine is the standard that floats to-day above Onogost's castle,

Plamenatz, leader in war, quaffs the red wine-cup below;  
Shrieking, like mountain eagles, the standard-bearers  
around him

Gather; but Nicsic mourns, captive to-day of my arms."

Onogost was the ancient Servian name of Nicsics.



dancing days were over, one would have thought, a generation since, step forth into the ring, and open the ball amidst a storm of cheers. Younger warriors take up the dance—the ‘dance,’ but how describe it? Of this I am sure, that a traveller might cross Central Africa without meeting with anything more wild, more genuinely primitive.

“The warriors dance in pairs, but several pairs at a time. In turns they are warriors, wild beasts, clowns, jack-o’-lanterns, morris-dancers, teetotums, madmen! They dance to one another and with one another, now on one leg, then on the other. They bounce into the air, they stamp upon the ground, they pirouette, they snatch lighted tapers from the bystanders and whirl them hither and thither in the air, like so many will-o’-the-wisps. In a Berserker fury they draw from their sashes their silver-mounted pistols, and take flying shots at the stars; their motions slacken; they follow each other; they are on the war-path now—they step stealthily as a panther before it springs—they have leaped! but are they bears or wild cats? They are hugging one another now; they are kissing one another with effusion.”

Equally effective, in another way, was the dance of the women. “One at a time, in light white Montenegrin dress—in delicate raiment for Cettinge—step forth from the palace-gate a bevy of fair damsels. These are the relations of the prince himself, among them his sister, the wife of Voivode Plamenatz, the new governor of Nicsic; and the beautiful young wife of his cousin Bozo Petrovic, the hero and saviour of Montenegro, come to honour the people’s representatives by dancing with them. Nothing can exceed the tender majesty of these princesses among princesses; their dainty tripping forms a pleasing contrast to the more uncouth performance of the men. Nothing is lost in this light natural attire; their every motion is instinct with grace; they have flung aside their sombre kerchiefs, and the long black tresses of their hair are caught in wavelets by the breeze. The scene is of Homeric times, and these are the

pure, true forms of antiquity! ‘Horo’ their dance is called, and it might have been a ‘choros’ of some Hellenic festival divine.”

The prince used his triumph with the utmost moderation. He gave the garrison honourable terms, and his first act was to reassure the Mahomedan inhabitants that they were quite safe if they remained, and pledging himself that they should receive equal rights with their Christian fellow-subjects. But the Turks were too bigoted, and too much accustomed to rule, to submit to this arrangement. Some of them, it may be, were in terror lest their conquerors should put them to a cruel death. However this may be, Nicsics was immediately evacuated by the Mahomedans, who left, with all their moveable property, under Montenegrin escort, and even, in some instances, through Montenegrin territory.

After staying a few days in Nicsics, Prince Nikita directed his army, numbering about eight thousand five hundred men, to Bilek, on the road to Trebinje, the chief town of Herzegovina. He took Bilek, but did not proceed, as had been anticipated, to the capital of the country which he was now invading. He was accompanied by a Russian and an Austrian attaché, who probably dissuaded him from any intention which he may have had to attack a place so near the Austrian frontier in Dalmatia. He turned northwards, and took, with very little difficulty, the Turkish fortress of Gatschko, which had been for some time the headquarters of Suleiman Pacha before his attack on the Duga Pass. The ease with which these two fortresses were captured surprised everybody. It had been declared by many military authorities that both Bilek and Gatschko would be able to hold out for weeks, if not months, against the troops of Prince Nikita, who had had such scanty experience of sieges, and who were but scantily provided with artillery. The Turkish garrisons were accused of surrendering with undue haste; but there is no doubt that the capitulation of Nicsics, and the honourable terms granted to its defenders by the prince,

influenced the commandants of all the other fortresses in that angle of Herzegovina.

At Bilek, indeed, the inhabitants were punished for certain cruelties which had been committed against the Montenegrins during their earlier reverses. The houses of the Turkish residents were burnt to the ground, and the fortress itself was razed. Nevertheless, as Mr. Evans records, "all plundering was so absolutely prohibited that, in the case of a single detected culprit, the prince inflicted personal chastisement with his own hands. One of the Voievodos had, it appears, purchased some stolen articles from one of his troop; the prince getting wind of it, taxed his officer with the offence, and the Montenegrin answering in the free and easy manner of his race, his highness flew into a passion, and drubbed him then and there with his stick in the presence of his troops. Such is paternal government in Montenegro!"

After Bilek fell Gatschko, Goransko, with Presieka, and the other almost inaccessible forts of the Duga Pass, which from that period became a portion of the Montenegrin principality. The prince took up his quarters at Nicsics; and here he had the pleasure of receiving the news of an important success gained over Hafiz Pacha by the Voievodas Lazar Socica and Peio-vics. Mr. Evans, writing from Nicsics on the 30th of September, gives a spirited account of this brief campaign. "Having been reinforced," he says, "by two battalions from before Nicsics, the forces at the disposal of Voievoda Socica amounted in all to eight battalions, or about five thousand men, with which he had to hold in check Hafiz Pacha, who, with about ten thousand troops, largely Irregulars, drawn from Bosnia and Herzegovina, had crossed the Tara river, and having entered the district of Jezero, had already ravaged parts of Herzegovina in Montenegrin possession, and was threatening an invasion of the north-eastern cantons of the principality.

"It was by Jezero that the two armies came into conflict with one another. The Turks, with their back to the Tara river, were posted on the

edge of a rocky plateau which juts forward in three promontories overlooking a small plain, if so can be called a depression broken by a hundred rocky knolls, and strewn with blocks of limestone, which made advance over such ground almost an impossibility to any but mountaineers. The three divisions of the Turkish forces, the centre and two wings, were posted respectively on the three promontories indicated, and faced, beyond the narrow plain, nothing but a wall of mountain, so steep that even the Montenegrins could not attack on this side. This was the main blunder committed by the Turkish commander—his army was posted facing nothing. But the blundering of Hafiz Pacha did not end here. The rocky knoll on which he had stationed his centre was at least an hour in the rear of any possible line of battle; the position held by his right wing was good in itself, but cut off by an intervening ravine from all co-operation with the centre. The point at which the Montenegrins must debouch, if desirous of attacking, lay on the left of Hafiz Pacha's position. It was therefore certain that his left wing must bear the brunt of the action, and at least half of his forces should have been concentrated on this side; but instead of this the left Turkish wing was the weaker.

"At 9.30 A.M. on September 12th, the Montenegrins advanced to the attack along a mountain saddle-path that conducted them to Hafiz's left, and which, indeed, was the only avenue of attack open to them. The commander, Socica, at once perceived the errors of his adversary, and concentrated his whole attack on the Turkish left, which was quickly turned, almost surrounded, and hurled back in confusion. The Turkish division was already routed when Hafiz perceived his blunder, and ordered the centre to advance to the relief of his left. But it was already too late. The centre, struggling forward among the rocks, got inextricably entangled with the division which was now hurled back upon them. Fighting among the limestone boulders in confused order, the mingled left and centre of Hafiz became an easy prey to the sure-



footed mountaineers who now swept down upon them. By mid-day the whole Turkish force was in full retreat, and the Montenegrins found four hundred and eighty dead and wounded on the field of battle, to which must be added the great number of bodies undetected amidst the rocks and gullies, what wounded the Turks carried with them, thirty-two prisoners, two flags, and large convoys of horses, cattle, and provisions. The Montenegrin loss was not more than thirteen killed and twenty-three wounded."

Hafiz Pacha had had enough of the brave mountaineers. A few days following this defeat he fell back before a little army of half his own numbers, crossed the Tara, and abandoned a large tract of Herzegovina to the enemy.

The same writer records a notable incident of the fight. "The battle of Jezero," he says, "was signalled, on the part of the Montenegrins, by a splendid instance of individual valour which certainly deserves chronicling. A Montenegrin of the tribe of Piperi, Luka Philipov by name, had distinguished himself at the battle of Vucidol by taking Osman Pacha alive, and carrying him bodily to Prince Nikola, who presented the gallant fellow with five hundred ducats for his prize, and jestingly bade him bear him another Turk in the same fashion. Now for a Montenegrin to be told by 'the Master'—'the Gospodar,' as the prince is generally called here—to do a thing is for him to do it or die. Accordingly, our hero of Piperi being present at the battle of Jezero, and mindful of 'the master's order, seized the moment of attack to rush into the Turkish lines, hug a true believer round the waist in a bear-like embrace, and hug him off bodily through flashing arms and leaden storm, disarming him by the way. To carry his prize safely to the rear the Montenegrin made a slight *detour*, but he had not got half way to the Montenegrin position to which he was making when a bullet struck him, passing through both his thigh-bones, and, letting go his captive, he fell heavily to the ground. The Turk, with a shout of triumph, sprang upon his fallen captor; but, despite the agony

in which he lay, the sturdy mountaineer retained strength of body and firmness of mind sufficient for the occasion. He laid one heavy hand upon the Turk, who had sprung at his throat, and with the other pointed his revolver at his adversary's head, quietly remarking, 'Now then, Turk, if you don't want to be blown into another world, just lift me on your back. And now, my fine horse, as the cowed and astonished Turk complied, 'just trot me over to my friends out there!' Kismet obviously against him, our Moslem obeyed his driver, and stumbled on over the rocks, groaning under the weight of the burly Montenegrin, to where the men of Piperi stood marvelling at the approach of what they believed to be a Turkish Goliath, ten feet tall! But the warriors burst into a roar of laughter when, on the apparition approaching nearer, they perceived a Turk bearing, as it appeared, in the most humane manner, their wounded Luka to the lines. My readers will be glad to learn that Luka Philipov is recovering from his wound. He was almost senseless when his captive delivered him to his friends."\*

Summing up the results of the brief campaign in Herzegovina, extending over barely three weeks from the capture of Nicsics, the same writer says:—"The Montenegrins have gained one pitched battle against forces double their own; they have taken two important towns, eight fortresses, twenty-seven cannon, supplies of food and military stores sufficient to support the whole principality for say half a year; in Nicsics alone ten thousand horse-loads of provisions were captured; they have put about one thousand five hundred Turks *hors de combat*, and taken three thousand prisoners; they hold in their occupation one third of Herzegovina, and possess the keys of half that province; and all this with infinitesimal losses to themselves. The road to Mostar, the capital of the Herzegovina, lies open. Would the prince march there? This has been the question of the last few days. His highness himself, elated by the recent conquests, was de-

\* "Illyrian Letters," by Arthur J. Evans.

sirous of doing so, but his great political tact rendered him averse to acting without the consent of the Austrian government. Add to this that the strenuous efforts made by the Turks to collect troops in Bosnia, sufficient to check the Montenegrin advance, made it possible that, by the time the prince's troops arrived before Mostar, the coast might not be so clear, that the autumn rains are already down upon us with a vengeance, and that winter is already closing in among the Herzegovina Alps, and it will be seen that all prudential considerations conspired with the recommendations of diplomatists.

"In a council of war held September 28th, it was decided to close the campaign in the Herzegovina, and, maintaining a strictly defensive attitude on this side, to transfer active hostilities to the milder region of the Moraca Valley and the Albanian littoral, where even a winter campaign is possible. The three chief fortresses to be reduced in the Moraca valley are Spuz and the towns of Podgoritza and Zabljak. The territory to be acquired is at least as valuable to Montenegro as the plain of Nicsic; it is not only fertile and well watered, but it commands access to a large part of the coast of the lake of Scutari, with its prolific fisheries; while its potential importance is best shown by the fact, that in ancient days this district supported the great city of Dioclea, according to one account the birth-place and name-giver of Diocletian. In early Serbian days this favoured champaign between lake and mountains had not lost its importance. It was the very kernel of the renowned principality of Zenta, of which Montenegro is the modern representative, and gave emperors to the Serbs, as it had done before to the Romans. The narrow strip of sea-coast lying between the lake of Scutari and the Adriatic, and extending from the Austrian frontier to the river Bojava, is of equal importance to the principality, as giving it access to the sea, from which it has hitherto been cut off by European diplomacy. The possession of the town and port of Antivari, and the free navigation of the river Bojana, are vital questions for Montenegro."

This was the settled theory of the Montenegrins, and of their foreign friends; but the matter was not to be determined by the sword alone. Montenegro proved herself quite able to seize from Turkey the territory which seemed necessary to her rational development, but Austrian interests interposed to prevent her from reaping the full harvest of her prowess. This will appear when we come to consider the general settlement after the close of the war; but in the meantime it was evident that Austria had her own designs upon this quarter of the doomed Turkish empire. The Austrian attaché with Prince Nikita gave him to understand that the Court of Vienna would be ill pleased with any great advance made by the Montenegrins towards the Adriatic. The prince was crippled by these intimations, which he could not afford to despise; but he nevertheless persevered with his operations on the Albanian side until he had achieved very brilliant and substantial successes.

A lull of some weeks now took place in the military operations of the Montenegrins. The autumn planting season had arrived, and the mountaineers could not safely have ventured to neglect this important work. In the middle of October almost unbroken tranquillity was reported from the principality and its frontiers. The Turks on the north were making some show of resuming hostilities near Gatschko, where they had gathered a few regular troops under the late commander of Nicsics; but the Montenegrin garrisons were strong enough to await their threatened advance in confidence.

Prince Nikita was quietly collecting such a force as he could maintain under arms in front of Podgoritza and Spuz; but so little was he expected to take offensive measures, that he was reported by some correspondents as being about to proceed to San Remo, with the princess, for the winter months. He did, in fact, return to Cettinge on the 15th of October, and made a short stay with his family; but he was disturbed by news from the southern frontier. Moufetieh Pacha, commanding in Albania, had got together some twenty tabors of regular Turkish



troops, and was apparently contemplating an offensive movement against Montenegro. The Bashi-Bazouks of the neighbourhood, and the more warlike of the Mussulman population capable of bearing arms, were gathering strength with every day's delay. A large force was reported on the borders of Lake Scutari, and it became evident that the Montenegrins would have to choose between carrying the war into their enemy's country and once more defending their own.

Meanwhile the Turks themselves seemed to hesitate, and considerable difficulty was experienced in rousing the border tribes to the pitch of enthusiasm necessary to make them enter on a war with Montenegro. The authorities at Scutari put forth great efforts to recruit the army from these tribes; but in many cases it seemed more probable that the latter would make common cause with their Montenegrin neighbours. Both sides began to look forward to the fall of Plevna, as destined to bring matters to a crisis.

The prince, however, had no idea of waiting for this event, or of sitting idle whilst his enemies grew stronger and stronger. After a fortnight's rest in the capital he returned to Orailuk, and made the necessary dispositions for the siege of Podgoritzza, which he determined to attack without further delay. The Turks also prepared for active work. Reinforcements were sent to the garrison from Scutari, and by the end of October the bombardment of Podgoritzza and Spuz was daily expected.

It was at the same time that Mehemet Ali, after his recall from the Quadrilateral, received his appointment as commander-in-chief in the Herzegovina and Bosnia; and he actually set out from Constantinople on his short-lived mission. He turned aside to Sofia almost immediately, in order to attempt the relief of Plevna; but for the moment it was thought that the Turkish government had determined on a more vigorous policy in the north-west. The Vienna correspondent of the "*Times*," writing of this abortive effort of the Turks, in a letter dated November 1st, said:—"From Constantinople

it is announced that Mehemet Ali has left to assume his new command in Herzegovina, going to Salonica, thence by rail to Metrovitzza, and on to Novi Bazar, where he is to establish his head-quarters. The late commander-in-chief of the army of Bulgaria will thus return to his old ground, where he first brought himself into notice by his skilful management last year. The position of Novi Bazar is certainly well chosen for operating, according to circumstances, either in the direction of Servia or of Montenegro; besides, it is an important point for defending the line of communication between Bosnia and the rest of the Turkish empire through that narrow tract of land which separates Servia and Montenegro. Mehemet Ali seems to have succeeded in persuading the ruling powers in Constantinople of the necessity of increasing the forces on that point for a season, and the Mustahafiz, or National Militia of Constantinople, is to be sent up to him by way of Salonica. His demand for reinforcements may have been well grounded, but the granting of it rather looks as if the war council in Constantinople, which, unfortunately for Turkey, directs her military operations, is even now not sufficiently impressed with the necessity of massing its whole strength at the point where the decisive battle must be fought, and of putting a stop to that fatal system, or rather of want of system, by which the Imperial forces have been scattered about in all directions according to the whims and fancies of the war council and the private influence which the friends of one or other of the commanders could exert in the capital."

The Ragusa correspondent of the same paper wrote on the same day:—"From Scutari I hear that all the efforts of the Turkish authorities have thus far not succeeded in enrolling a considerable force of Albanians against Montenegro, but that, on the contrary, several disturbances have occurred, owing to the attempt to do so. A Bonlak-Bashi, administrative head of the community, sent by the Vali to the Fulati, was so maltreated by the mountaineers that he was obliged to take refuge with the bishop to save his life. The

house which he occupied was destroyed. An officer of Zaptiehs, who was sent to induce a certain tribe to go to the war, has not been heard of since. The efforts of some chiefs of the Pulati to bring up their men resulted in two serious fights, in which three of the chiefs, partisans of Turkey, were killed, and five of their men, while several women were wounded in the endeavour to separate the combatants. Of the Stolli, six hundred men have promised to join the army, and these, with the small contingent of the Mussulmans which have obeyed the call, amounting to two hundred men, under the command of a noted robber chief, Isuf Aga, are all that have hitherto responded to all the later efforts of the authorities. There are in upper Albania at present eleven battalions of Regulars and four of Mustahafiz, of which about three are *hors de combat* from wounds and illness, while seven battalions are required for garrison duty, leaving a force utterly insufficient for any offensive operations against Montenegro. At Morice, on the lake of Scutari, are four hundred Irregulars, and a battalion and a half of Regulars, to hold the road between Tchernnitsa and Scutari. Another attack is expected on that side, and is indicated by the transport of ammunition and guns from Podgoritza to Scutari."

Amongst the Albanian Christian tribes who made common cause with the Montenegrins were the Mirdites, and the inhabitants of the districts of Skreli, Castrati, and other places on the southern frontier of the principality.

The bombardment of Podgoritza began on the 8th of November; and simultaneously the prince moved westward, with a large portion of the army, in the direction of Lake Scutari, bent on pushing his way to Antivari. It was not long before success crowned the efforts of the Montenegrins in both quarters. Thus, on the 13th of November, the "Times" correspondent at Cettinge was able to send the following telegram:—

"Besides the fort at Suturmans taken by the bombardment yesterday, four towers have surrendered towards Scutari, with the garrisons.

Two guns and many arms were taken. The Albanian tribes of Hotti, Elementi, Skreli, and Castrati, have decided to send one hundred men each to Podgoritza, the governor of Scutari promising maize and flour to each member of the family of those who go to fight. The Franciscan friars among the Hotti have been called to Podgoritza, in the hope that they might be induced to give their influence to the government, and a considerable pecuniary compensation has been offered them if they consent.

"Petty hostilities continue in Miriditia. Reports from Scutari say that Spuz has suffered great damage from the bombardment. Telegraphic communication between Podgoritza and Scutari has been interrupted, probably as a protection to the operations on the western side of the lake. From the prince's army no news is allowed to be sent. The weather has changed for the worse, and the country is deluged. Any movement of troops from Podgoritza to Scutari is at present impossible. It is probable that the Dukagini will co-operate with the Montenegrins, in which case any movement between the two cities will become impracticable in any circumstances, unless the force in Albania is largely increased, the present total being eighteen battalions of Regulars and Mustahafizs, with a few hundred Irregulars. If the prince should make a rapid movement on either Scutari or Antivari, there is no force to oppose him, and Scutari will only be protected by Cattino, the bridge which forms the only communication with Antivari. Diplomatic influence probably has arrested all movement on the Herzegovinian side, as nothing more is heard from Clobuk, and operations on that side are limited to reconnaissances towards Gatschko. The high mountain country is now covered with snow."

The jealousy of Prince Nikita and his advisers, or the excess of their precaution, which caused the exclusion of the correspondents from the headquarters, prevented our receiving circumstantial accounts of the military operations in Albania. Little is therefore known of the prince's proceedings, or of the sieges of the Turkish for-



tresses, beyond the bare results. One after another, the strong places fell into the hands of the Montenegrins. The bombardment of Antivari began on the 14th of November, and the siege was protracted for exactly eight weeks. The incidents which have been recorded of it are very characteristic of the Montenegrin mode of fighting. Both bombardments and investments of fortified towns were comparatively new to the mountaineers, who had had little experience of artillery, and who had rarely fought successfully in the open country, or away from their native rocks. Yet they handled their Krupp guns, with which the Russians had supplied them, skilfully enough.

After more than a month's siege the garrison of Antivari, who were not strong, and whose provisions were nearly exhausted, offered to deliver the town into the possession of the Austrian authorities, but they steadily refused to capitulate to the Montenegrins. A day or two later we find the latter actually selling food to the besieged. It will be remembered that they had captured a large supply of rations in Nicics and other Herzegovinian towns; and it seems that they now conceived the ingenuous idea of converting some of these rations into cash, probably anticipating that they should recover at least a portion of the food for nothing, as soon as the fortress should be compelled to surrender.

The Turks were assisted in this short campaign by vessels on Lake Scutari, in the Boyana river, and in the harbour of Antivari; but the Montenegrins were not long in securing the northern banks of the river and lake, as well as establishing batteries on the sea shore, from which they managed to keep the ships at a distance.

On the 25th of December, the invaders carried by storm an entrenched Turkish camp between the seaport of Dulcigno and the mouth of the river Bojana, and drove out the Turks, who fled in disorder from their positions. The Montenegrins "took many prisoners, and captured a quantity of provisions and ammunition, as well

as two flags, of which one was taken from a Turkish entrenchment, and the other from a ship. They also set fire to two Turkish ships in the roads." Minor successes of this kind were gained in rapid succession; and at length, on the 10th of January, 1878, the garrison of the coveted seaport were obliged to strike their flag.

The Montenegrins captured in Antivari, in addition to one thousand four hundred nizams, a large quantity of arms, ammunition, and provisions, fifteen guns, and eight hundred barrels of gunpowder, together with other valuable stores. The Mussulman inhabitants were allowed to retire; and their example was followed by the Turkish squadron, which promptly left for safer quarters. At the same time the whole line of the Boyana was abandoned, and the Ottoman troops fell back on Scutari, where they entrenched themselves, as though expecting a further advance of the enemy.

Six days later the Montenegrins captured Dulcigno, near Antivari; and they were now masters of the whole tract of country on which they had set their minds. It is questionable whether they would have cared to push their advantage further; but, if so, they would have been brought to a standstill by the rapid development of the war in Roumelia.

The "Times" correspondent with the Montenegrin army, writing from Cettinge on the 17th of November, after a few observations on the first rapid stages of the Albanian campaign, drew some just conclusions as to the attitude of Austria in respect of the Montenegrin advance, which are worth reproducing. "The winter campaign," he said, "if it may be so called, the limit of which is likely to be a few days, has been inaugurated with a movement much more judicious, and quite within the Montenegrin resources, than that which was so ostentatiously and misleadingly announced. The prince had collected the more considerable part of his artillery around Podgoritza and Spuz, with battalions enough to secure his position against an attack. He went himself to Rogami, apparently

to superintend the bombardment announced, while he gave orders to the Montenegrin battalions—viz., those of the western cantons—to concentrate at Vir; but so well was the secret kept that when he moved from Rogami across to Vir in a single day to take the direction of the movement, he surprised even his own officials here, his own staff, and the Russian representatives, including General Faceyeff, being the only persons who were informed of the plan.

“Ali Saib must have been more than any one surprised, as all the pachas and most of the troops were at Podgoritza. The telegraph between Podgoritza and Scutari was cut, and the movement, executed with great rapidity, was followed by abundant rains, which for two or three days after deluged the plain of the Zeta. The fort of Suturmans, the key of the Kraina, fell after a few hours’ bombardment, and four minor blockhouses followed suit without any delay; and the army was able, on the third day, to menace Antivari, where the last advices left them encamped. The news from there, so far as telegraphing is concerned, is so strictly controlled that there is no probability of getting anything except from returned soldiers bringing the wounded. No correspondent was invited to accompany the army, and as the telegrams will only come from official sources, we shall probably be only permitted to know by that means of *faits accomplis*. I have never believed in the practicability of a winter campaign in Upper Albania east of the lake, for the double reason of want of means of communication and transport and of food to maintain the army on an expedition. Even an effective siege of Podgoritza was, in my opinion, beyond the organisation and self-imposed conditions of the Montenegrin army. A bombardment is most easy, as there are commanding positions in the hands of the Montenegrins from which the city may be destroyed. But this will accomplish nothing, as the place is surrounded by a very complete system of earthworks, most of which would have to be taken by storm. The forts on the Veli Brdo are connected by a continuous fortification, and

the past two months, since the fall of Niesic, have been diligently employed by the Turks in multiplying earthworks and repairing the walls, which, however, have no value against artillery. I regard Podgoritza as practically impregnable, or as only to be taken after heavy losses, which the prince will never incur, or through insufficiency of garrison. Indeed, so far as any direct object of the campaign is concerned, the provisions at Antivari are of more importance than the port itself, which cannot be held if the fleet comes to retake it. The road to Scutari cannot be held unless a considerable force is sent by sea to clear it, and the city and the citadel lie about an hour’s march back from the shore.

“There is no doubt that Austria will regard with a very unfriendly eye any such conquest as that of Antivari; but, strictly speaking, the possession of this point, or, at least, the communication between Scutari (and the interior) and the sea, is an all-important step towards the investment of Podgoritza, and one which demands less force, and incurs less risk, than would an attempt to cut the road between that city and Scutari, which could only be done by the employment of a large force with great resources, or a general rising of the Albanians, a measure against which the Austrian agents in Albania are opposing all their influence. The holding of this road is so clearly a military precaution against relief to the Albanian cities, that it is very difficult to see how Austria can oppose it. The question will become a serious one if the conquest is maintained until the armistice or truce comes, as the claim of Montenegro to what it has conquered can hardly be set aside by merely diplomatic considerations. The consequences to Austria would simply be the putting a bar to her extension of territory to the south, and cutting her off from what she unquestionably regards as eventually hers—Upper Albania with Dulcigno, Allessio, and Durazzo, if not, indeed, all the coast down to Durazzo. Possession of Antivari, or even Spitzba, by Montenegro, would cut the line of continuity, and would not only make ulterior annexation doubtful, but



would make the retention of the Bocche di Cattaro objectless and more difficult; for, with the exception of the possession of the harbour of Cattaro, the Bocche proper, the province is a profitless holding, costing much more to the empire than it returns, and, except the city of Cattaro, the population is a refractory one, far more in sympathy with Montenegro than with Austria. Indeed, I am satisfied that an immense majority of the mountaineers of the Bocche would elect to be united to Montenegro, with the people of which they are, in fact, identical, large portions of the territory between the Cattaro and the Albanian Primorie having, at no distant period, been included in Montenegro. This question, of capital importance to the principality, is thus brought to a critical point; and if a report which comes in as I am writing, that the city and citadel of Antivari have been taken, should prove true, it will be difficult for the Austrian government, without good state reasons, to deprive the prince of his conquest.

"I am satisfied that Austria can assign no other good reason than that she herself has a better title to the country. Of course, a great deal will be said about the incapacity of Montenegro to control an additional population, and there are people who insist on classing the population among the brigand tribes, which are not to be considered in studying the interests of civilisation. Now, it is a curious fact, in this connexion, that the provinces which were separated from Montenegro under Vladikas, and annexed to the Bocchel, retain the barbarisms of that epoch, which have entirely disappeared from Montenegro. In the Bocche, under Austrian rule, murder and robbery are frequent, the vendetta still exists as a national custom, as it does in the neighbouring Turkish territory, while in Montenegro the vendetta has long disappeared, and though, since the war has broken out, the country along the route between Cattaro and Cettinge has been, from causes which the history of civilisation makes clear, sinking in its ancient regard for *meum* and *tuum*; and though the rule of Prince Nikita has, in the section of the coun-

try more immediately under the influence of his court, developed a laxity of general morality which never existed before, there is still a greater security for life and property than in any country I have ever lived in—even in those most demoralised parts. I have now been in the country more than two years and travelled through most of the provinces, and have a right to speak with some positiveness on the subject. I have followed two campaigns; and though a camp is not exactly the place to look for security of property, the total of my losses is a horse-blanket and the girth for it, and a pair of carrying-straps, and this without any guard over my tent or any other precaution than I should take in my own walled-in grounds, with camp-following of Dalmatians, Bocchese, Albanians, and battalions from all the borders of Montenegro and Herzegovina. My field-glass, revolver, camp-traps of all kinds, were scattered always about my tent, and my stock of money in silver coin in a courier bag, of which I had lost the key, hung on the tent-pole, which was often entirely abandoned for hours. Yet my losses in the two campaigns did not exceed what I have stated. Murder from any cause is almost, and anything approaching robbery by violence, is absolutely unknown. Of the former I have heard of three cases in more than two years; of the latter not one.

"The contrast between this state of things and that which exists in the kindred Bocche under Austrian rule is instructive. The Crivoscians have a proverbial reputation for thievery of all kinds, and when I was going from Budua the other day, I saw a new stone cross by the roadside and asked a passer-by what it meant. He replied that the people of two villages near by had a quarrel and seven were killed in the course of it. The Austrian government is unable to do what Montenegro long ago did—repress the vendetta, while, from the account of Bocchese whom I know, robbery with violence, and even murder, is far from unknown. So much for the principality as compared with the empire. State reasons may justify the suppression of the prin-

cipality, but it is ridiculous to allege bad government as an excuse for it.

"The principality must either be quite suppressed or given such an extension as to allow it material independence. The freedom of the sea and tillable land, with winter pasture grounds, are necessary to this independence, and though, for generations, Montenegro has struggled unsuccessfully for it, its present position and gains, and its hold on the sympathies of the Slav world, are such that Austria, in taking up the restrictive policy of Turkey against Montenegro, will also take up the danger which has accompanied it. If the prince is able to maintain his conquests as against the Turks, it may be that an attempt to deprive him of them, on the part of Austria, will be the beginning of the Slavonic agitation which will one day rend her in pieces. The present juncture is, in this sense, the most important that has arisen in Montenegrin affairs since the beginning of the insurrection, and the Austrian government will make a very grave mistake if she treats the Montenegro of to-day as she would have treated that of three years ago. The prince has been stopped twice in his advance northward by the veto of Austria; if he is now to be dispossessed of what he has taken, or may take, in the south, it must be by collective Europe, and not merely by Austria; and Europe will not willingly consent to keep up this source of just grievance and irrepressible agitation for any constructive interest of Austria. All the Powers besides, except, perhaps, Russia, which has never cared really to remove the grievances of Montenegro, lest it should settle down into a peaceful and prosperous community, are interested in the enlargement and maritime liberty of the principality, and the interests of England in the paramount pacification of it are not less than those of Italy in its establishment as a solid ethnical barrier to the appropriation of the ports and shores of Central Albania by Austria, which would be an unendurable menace to the Italian power in the Adriatic."

The miseries of war, in the intervals of actual fighting, were felt in Montenegro no less severely

than in the other districts where this terrible struggle raged. The same correspondent gave some very affecting details of the sufferings endured by the brave mountaineers and their families. "The misery in the further provinces of Montenegro is increasing, and, in consequence, the refugees and inhabitants are coming down in increasing numbers. In the last few days two thousand five hundred more Kutchi and Wassoivichi have come to the neighbourhood of Cettinge and Tchernnitz, and they will be followed by thousands more when the snow falls on the planinas. As several inquiries have reached us here from England as to the best means of sending relief, I must repeat that all the Montenegrin administration is overcharged with the administrative needs of the country, and whatever is done well must be done under outside direction. The prince desires it to be known that he prefers that those who are generous enough to contribute to the relief of his people should, if possible, direct the application of their charity, and he will provide any assistance in his power. It is proposed to combine the contributions from all private sources, and to put them under the general direction and disposition of the Russian Red Cross, with the co-operation of any agents whom the English contributors may delegate; and all funds sent will be distributed in money to the poorest of the population and the refugees indifferently, after a sum has been set aside to provide corn depôts at the nearest available points at which the people may buy corn without being exposed to the speculation of the local dealers, avoiding in this way the abuses of the present Russian Relief Administration, with a *minimum* of labour in the distribution. The private contributions from Russia are coming in generously, considering the immense drain on the resources of the nation; but I assure the benevolent that the existence of the majority of the Montenegrins and refugees depends for this winter on foreign charity. It is hoped that the Russian government will transfer the administration of the relief funds to the agents of the Russian committee, whose opera-



tions, as far as they extend, are unexceptionable."

It is to be feared that Montenegro received less than its due share of European charity, though such men as Mr. E. A. Freeman and Mr. Furley were not likely to neglect the Czer-nagortzi, in so far as they had the means of ministering to their wants.

## CHAPTER II.

### THE SERVIAN CAMPAIGN.

IT was only after much hesitation and delay, necessitated partly by the unprepared condition of the army, and partly by the uncertain disposition of the Powers, that Serbia declared war against Turkey. The small principality, it will be remembered, had been thoroughly exhausted by its efforts in 1876, when the overwhelming force of the Turks under Abdul Kerim Pacha had carried all before it, and when the army of the prince had been utterly beaten and demoralised.

It would have been impossible for Prince Milan to put a strong contingent in the field early in 1877. The convention with Turkey had been forced upon him by circumstances against which it would have been vain to struggle; but it is probably a fact that little hope was entertained on either side that the suspension of hostilities would be lasting. Serbia's cause was indissolubly bound up with that of Montenegro, and more closely still with that of Russia; and no one can have expected that the Servians would remain quiet throughout the invasion. The convention was signed under the belief that Turkey would give satisfactory terms to Montenegro, and would satisfy the demands of Russia and of Europe. From the moment when both these expectations were disappointed, it was manifest to all that the principality would simply wait its opportunity, or the directions of its

powerful ally, in order to renew the war with its hereditary enemy.

Nevertheless the year had almost passed away before Serbia came upon the field. Preparations had been openly made, and Turkish forces were sent to watch the frontier; but still no decisive step was taken at Belgrade. For weeks past the crisis was looked for day by day; and it had seemed uncertain whether Turks or Servians would be the first to take an irrevocable step. Russian money had been sent to Belgrade in large sums, and had been employed in training the army, equipping it for the field, and maintaining corps of observation on the frontiers. General Horvatovics, writing to the government from the east, reported that the Turks were continually throwing up works in front of Nisch, Ak Patanka and Pirot, and pressed for immediate action. On the west, large bodies of Albanians and Circassians were collected at Novibazar, and committed frequent outrages on the Christians, making almost daily raids across the borders of Serbia. This continued throughout November and the first half of December.

It was on the 14th of this month that the declaration of war against Turkey was made at Belgrade. A correspondent telegraphed from that capital on the 14th:—"To-day salvoes of artillery announced Serbia's declaration of war against Turkey. M. Christics, the Servian diplomatic agent in Constantinople, has received instructions to notify the declaration of war to-day to Sirver Pacha, the Turkish Foreign Minister, and to leave the Turkish capital. At the same time the Servian army was ordered to cross the frontier. Last night Prince Milan's headquarters' staff left for Alexinatz, and to-morrow the prince himself sets out thither, accompanied by the president of the council of ministers and the metropolitan of Serbia . . . Prince Milan has issued a series of decrees proclaiming a state of siege and a state of war, instituting military tribunals and military laws for volunteers, as well as courts-martial, requiring the employment of officials and the clergy in military service, announcing that public functionaries will be dis-

missed if they infringe the laws or promote agitation against the war, suspending the local self-government of the communes, providing state help for the indigent families of soldiers and volunteers who are killed, ordering a *moratorium* for the benefit only of men serving at the seat of war, and issuing regulations for the field post system and telegraph system throughout Serbia."

On the 15th the Servian army, commanded by Leschjanin and Benitzki, crossed the frontier opposite Mramor, and occupied a convenient position over against those of the Turks, in the valley of the Morava. The preparations of the past few months had borne excellent fruit, having entirely reconstructed the Servian army, which had been decimated and demoralised under the Russian General Tchernaeff. Something like a hundred and fifty thousand men composed the cadres of the different forces, and recruits were being actively drilled and equipped, including the students and professors of the colleges. The whole principality made a vigorous and patriotic effort, being determined to wipe out the disgrace of 1876.

It was commonly believed and stated that Serbia had prudently delayed her declaration of war until Plevna was captured, and the Russians were prepared to roll the tide of war across the Balkans. This would have been reasonable enough, no doubt; but the fact seems to have been that the date was chosen several weeks before Plevna fell. Many days previously, the 12th or 14th of December had been named in well-informed quarters as the time fixed for the declaration of Servian independence, and the crossing of the frontier.

The correspondent who had represented the "Times" with the Turkish army in the Quadrilateral, and who was now on his way home, described the condition of the country through which he passed. Writing on the 17th of the month, he declared that the whole of Western Turkey, excepting Widin and Nisch, appeared in imminent danger of falling into Russian hands. "Widin may continue to resist for some time; but Nisch, through which I passed on Thursday,

can hardly be held against an enemy in force. On my arrival at Nisch the governor, Raschid Pacha, requested to see me, to obtain news from Kamarli. He seemed prepared to expect the fall of Plevna; but he impressed upon me that Turkey's recent disasters were occasioned by her generals' incapacity, and that her army was still strong. He regretted England had not come to their assistance at the beginning of the war. He expected Serbia would assume the offensive immediately. Leaving Nisch I arrived on the Servian frontier on Friday morning, and the declaration of war was made that day. Directly on crossing I met one division of the Servian army under General Horvatovich on their way to the front. They were fine young troops well equipped, their artillery being large bronze Krupp guns, with capital horses. Alexovitz was full of troops passing through. I was detained there until permission could be obtained from Belgrade to follow the movements of the Servian army.

"The force now operating consists of four army corps—the first, under General Horvatovich, operating in the east; the second, under General Leschjanin, operating on the Morava; the third, under General Belimarcovich, operating at Shumadia; and the fourth, under General Rancoalimpic, operating on the Drina. The entire Servian army is said to consist of one hundred and forty thousand men. Large bodies of recruits are drilling at Alexovitz and all the chief towns. All the way to Semendria I constantly met corps passing to the front. Four hours from Semendria on Sunday afternoon the Prince of Servia passed me travelling post haste to Alexovitz to assume the command in chief and afterwards to join General Leschjanin, operating at Nisch."

Few people anticipated that Serbia would be able to give the Russians much assistance, or to do anything valuable for themselves. The fortresses of Nisch, Pirot, Ak Palanka, and others near the frontier, were considered quite strong enough to resist the efforts of Prince Milan's armies, and some even conceived that the Turks



would punish the temerity of their new enemies by invading their country. Such a feeling was not unknown in Servia itself, where there was a party which openly deprecated the renewal of hostilities. But it is certain that the bulk of the population was favourable to the war.

As a sample of the opinions freely expressed in England adverse to the Servian cause, we may take a short article from the "Standard" newspaper, written by an experienced war-critic, which, though it was in some respects justified by events, was still proved to have been conceived in a spirit too depreciatory of the strength and valour of the army.

"Servia has formally declared war. Now that the fall of Plevna has assured her that there is no longer a possibility of reprisals this heroic little state has taken the resolution to march against the Power which spared her last year. Once again we have an illustration of the fable of the ass and the dead lion. But Servia's entry upon the war will have but a slight effect upon the present position of affairs. The thirty thousand available peasants whom she will put in the field are too distant from the scene of operations to take an active part in them for some time, except in so far as they will spread over the frontier, burn, destroy, and ravish, and inflict incalculable misery and privations upon the Moslem population. It is questionable, however, whether they will be permitted to do even this amount of mischief altogether without molestation. There are altogether four bodies of Turkish troops at present watching the Servian frontier; the garrison of Widdin, the garrison of Bazardchik, among whom we include the Irregular troops on the Servian frontier near Zaichar, the garrison of Nisch, and an unknown force in Bosnia. Of these the troops at Widdin will be neutralised by the approach of the Roumanian army destined to besiege that town. The Irregulars and the garrison of Bazardchik are likely to take the offensive, and to commence, at least, by carrying the war across the Servian frontier. The Turkish force at these points is supposed to number some seven or eight thou-

sand men, a force which, if composed of Regulars, and well posted, would be sufficient to hold the Servian army in check. Even with its present composition it would probably suffice to render the Servian advance a slow and cautious one, but that the Roumanian army in front of Widdin would be able to render them material assistance. Hence north of the Balkans the Servian advance is likely to be attended with success. At Nisch the Turks will, as far as we know, only be able to post Hafiz Pacha with some seven or eight battalions under his command. These would be augmented by the whole Mahomedan population capable of carrying arms. With this force, however, it does not appear that Hafiz Pacha could sustain himself at Nisch, for the town lies in a plain, is dominated by hills in its rear, and is defended only by an old and crumbling wall. But although the invaders might take Nisch they could gain but little further advantage, for the country is mountainous, and on all the roads are positions which Hafiz could easily defend against the whole Servian army. On the eastern road, however, the Turks are in the same position in which they will be placed at Bazardchik—that is, they will be attacked on two sides. The Russian advance on Sofia will cut Hafiz Pacha off from the road to Adrianople and will enclose him between two forces. He has, however, the option of falling back from Nisch towards Novibazar, and we may consider it certain that this will be the line which he will select. Every mile he retires will take him so much further from the Russians, as well as from Servia. He would, too, become stronger as he retired, for the Turks would be able to bring up reinforcements from Salonica by rail, and it is improbable that he would have to fall back beyond Novibazar. In Bosnia there is also a Turkish force, but we are altogether ignorant as to its strength. We may assume that it would be strong enough to keep some ten thousand Servians in check. If a like number of Servians operate on the Timok line, this would leave only some ten or fifteen thousand men available for action against Hafiz

Pacha, and it is certain that this general, who is certainly one of the best and bravest of the Turkish commanders, will not consider it necessary to fall back very far before such a force as this. The Turks would act wisely if, before they yield the passes of the Etropol Balkans to General Gourko, they send ten thousand men from Sofia to Nisch. This force will make no very great difference in the future plans of the campaign against the Russians, while it will enable Hafiz Pacha to take the offensive with a vigour which may make Serbia regret that she did not wait until the Turkish troops were all annihilated before she declared war against their women and children. The position of Serbia, geographically, is more favourable for attack than for defence. She can threaten Turkey on three sides, but she is open on three sides to Turkish attacks. In the hands of a brave people these advantages of a ready means of attack more than counterbalance the defects of an extensive frontier; but with a timorous people the danger of being attacked at any point of an extended line outweighs the advantages which the power of concentrated attack at one point of the enemy's frontier affords. The weather must be taken into consideration in estimating the probable course of the war here as in Bulgaria. The winter in these mountainous regions is very severe, and will check any ardour which may reign in the minds of Prince Milan and his officers; as to the soldiers, we know that they have not a vestige of military ardour among them, but that they are dragged away from their homes against their will to satisfy the ambition of the foreign prince who reigns over them. When the winter sets in in earnest all movements will be next to impossible in these regions, and if the Porte can but reinforce Hafiz Pacha at Nisch we may safely assume that the Servian declaration of war will have but slight effect beyond leading to pillaging expeditions in Bulgaria and Bosnia."

The prince's army, however, soon showed that it would reckon as something better than a swarm of pillagers; and it may be well to note a little more fully what was the constitution of the

various forces which had taken the field. The following account of the *ordre de bataille*, given at the time, if read with the assistance of a map, will convey a good idea of the position of affairs. It occurs in a letter from the Vienna correspondent of the "Times," written on the 23rd of December.

"Under Horvatovich, thirty-six battalions of infantry, twelve field batteries, and ten squadrons of horse from the Timok army, which is advancing from Veliki Izvor, the head-quarters last year of Osman Pacha, towards Belgradtchik, and, according to the Servian bulletin, has succeeded in taking the Turkish position on the Sveti Nichola Pass over which runs the road from Widdin to Nisch and Pirot or Sharkoi. To the right of this force is the Shumadia Corps, under Belimarcovich, which is likewise to consist to thirty-six battalions of infantry, ten batteries of field artillery, and ten squadrons of horse. This corps, however, has not as yet received its full complement, the second-class militia not having all joined. But, in spite of this, it has already taken part in the operations, and come up in a line with the corps of Horvatovich, having crossed at Pandiralo, and succeeded, by a turning movement, in forcing the Turks to abandon Babina Glava, south of the Sveti Nicholas Pass, near the parting of the road to Ak Palanka and Nisch on one hand, and to Pirot or Sharkoi on the other. To the right of this, again, is the Morava corps, under Leschjanin, composed of twenty-seven battalions of infantry, eight batteries of field artillery, three batteries of mountain guns, and eight squadrons of cavalry. Its special destination is Nisch. In all, therefore, according to this calculation, there would be ninety-nine battalions of infantry, thirty batteries of field artillery, and twenty-eight squadrons of cavalry operating eastward in the rear of the Sofia position. The Javor army, under Nikolich, destined to act in Old Serbia against Sienitzza and Novibazar, is said to consist of twenty-one battalions of infantry, four batteries of field artillery, and four of mountain guns. The Drina corps, under Alimpich, is said to consist only of



sixteen battalions of infantry, three batteries of artillery, and four squadrons of horse.

"From this method of distribution it appears that by far the largest portion of the Servian forces is, as last year, engaged on the east side, and will co-operate with the Russian armies. Both the Javor and Drina corps, it is said, have the strictest orders to keep on the defensive, which is directly attributed to Austria's declaration that she would not tolerate any movement on that side. As regards the Javor army, moreover, the considerable concentration of Albanian and other Irregulars, said to amount to some forty battalions, may have something to do with the order to maintain for the present a passive attitude. Although probably some reductions must be made in the number of battalions and batteries enumerated above, the additional forces thus at the disposal of the Russian generals in Bulgaria, and consequently in Roumelia, are very considerable."

The Servians advanced rapidly upon Nisch, and on the 19th they occupied the Pass of St. Nicholas, after a sharp engagement. Next day they turned the position of the Turks at Babina Glava, and, wheeling round to the south of Nisch, took the fortifications at Tsetchine, near the bridge which there spans the river Morava.

The accounts given of these engagements by the Turks and their enemies differed considerably, as on previous occasions. But the Servians themselves do not seem to have exaggerated their victories in any special degree. Their report of the capture of the St. Nicholas Pass represented the Turkish force as consisting of one battalion of Nizams and thirty Circassians, reckoning the Turkish loss at "five killed and several wounded," and their own loss at sixteen men.

Before investing Nisch, the Servians pushed along the road to Sofia, with a view to occupying the less formidable towns of Ak Palanka and Pirot, in the meantime effecting a junction with a Russian force under General Arnoldi. A brief account of the operation is given in two telegrams from the Russian head-quarters,

still at Bogot, under dates of December 26th and 31st.

"Details have reached here of the movements of the Servian forces investing Nisch, Pirot, and Ak Palanka (the last-named place has since been captured), of their having stationed a detachment on the road from Belgradskik to Berkowatz in the direction of Tschrupren, and of their having effected a junction with the Russian troops, in the same way as the Russians established communication with the Servians at Pirot . . . Details have now reached the Russian head-quarters of the capture of Pirot by the Servian troops. After the occupation of Babina Glava and the capture of the St. Nicholas Pass, a strong detachment was sent against the Turkish entrenched camp at Budindol, which covers Pirot from the north. The camp, which consisted of several lines of entrenchments, lies on both banks of the Nissava, between the villages of Stanetschno, Nischar, and Sapat. As it was strongly defended, and almost unassailable in front, it was decided, first of all, to attack Ak Palanka and then Pirot. This plan was carried into execution on the 24th of December, when Ak Palanka was attacked and captured by the right column of the operating detachment, the left column meanwhile diverting the attention of the Turks at Budindol by a cannonade and feigned attacks upon the fortified camp at that place. The whole of the reserve force remained at Babina Glava. On the 26th, the right column advanced from Ak Palanka upon Pirot, and at eight o'clock the following morning attacked the left flank of the Turkish position. By four o'clock in the afternoon the villages of Blatu and Belaieva had been captured, and at the latter place the right column passed the night. In the meantime the left column had not been idle. At the first shot fired by the right they attacked Pirot in front, and succeeded in capturing the village of Stanetska, thus joining hands with the co-operating column. At break of day on the 28th the battle was renewed on the whole line, and at eleven o'clock the right column entered Pirot, where they were received

by the inhabitants, headed by the clergy. It was not, however, until the Turks had learned that they were taken in the rear that the left column succeeded in overcoming the stubborn resistance of the Ottoman forces opposed to them. The Servian loss was upwards of fifty killed and about one hundred and fifty wounded. The Turkish force, which consisted of six tabors, suffered severely, and the whole position was covered with corpses. The Servians captured twenty-three guns."

Meanwhile, Leschjanin gained successes at Leskovitza and Kurchumli, on the 26th of December. Several battalions of Servians, supported by artillery, having attacked Kurchumli, defended by four hundred regular and two thousand irregular Turkish soldiers, a fierce struggle ensued, in which the Turks were defeated and fled in disorder, leaving ammunition, arms, and horses, in the hands of the Servians, who had fifteen killed and forty wounded. The Turkish loss was one hundred killed.

The "Times" correspondent wrote of this engagement, and of the results to which it led:—"The Servians, after the fight at Kurchumli, which lasted one day and a half, proceeded to fortify the place, destroying the bridge over the Morava, thus cutting the line of communication between Leskovitza and Nisch. They now find themselves in an almost entirely Christian district, Kurchumli being the only town where the Mussulman element predominates. Everywhere the Christian villages hail the Servians as brethren, clearing away the snow for their entrance, and rendering them all the service in their power. The Servians are in the best of spirits."

The position of affairs at the end of the year, and the beginning of 1878, may be briefly stated. Pirot, which the Turks had set on fire before quitting it, blowing up a powder magazine, and doing much damage, was now garrisoned by the Servians, who were well received by the inhabitants. The valour which they had displayed in capturing the town, sustaining a loss of some seven hundred men, had earned them a high repute, effacing the memory of their de-

feats of the previous year; and they gained favour with the Christians by at once hanging bells in the churches—an act which had produced the best effect in many of the Bulgarian towns and villages captured by the Russians. Prince Milan made haste to congratulate General Belimarcovich and his troops on the gallantry which had been displayed by them. Captains Karanovich and Zivko Jovanovich were mentioned as having specially distinguished themselves, but, unfortunately, neither of them survived to reap the honour which they had earned. A considerable number of prisoners were taken, including Hassan Halil, the governor of the fortress.

On the south-western frontier the Servians had not been so successful. The Albanian Mussulmans were very numerous, warlike, and fanatical, and they worsted their opponents at Sienitza and elsewhere. Colonel Nikolich occupied Kladnitza, but was soon compelled to abandon it. No progress was made on the road to Novibazar, which commands the neck of land between Montenegro and Servia; and the movements of the prince's troops were somewhat hampered by the vast number of Bosnian refugees, who fled before the severities of the Turks, and threw themselves on the charity of the Servians. In addition to these disadvantages, the winter was a bitter one, and snow began to fall in great quantities.

In Old Servia the invasion was more fortunate. The families which had migrated into the principality mustered courage to return to their homes, and the Christians of these districts petitioned Prince Charles for arms and ammunition, in order that they might take their share in the struggle for freedom.

Writing on January 1st, 1878, the Belgrade correspondent of the "Times" reported that, on Christmas Day, and on the day following, the Turks, with five tabors of infantry, attacked a Servian corps on the lower part of the river Ibar, but were repulsed. "The Turks," he goes on to say, "have hitherto all along been unsuccessful in their contests with the Servians. They do not, however, abate their cruelties. When



forced to retreat they burnt all the Christian villages as far as Golitzza, killing, at the same time, all the young and old who did not effect an escape to the woods. The Servians, on the other hand, make no reprisals on Turkish, Albanian, or Circassian villages, but approach the inhabitants in a conciliatory spirit, and treat them with humanity.

"Many Turks attempted to escape from Nisch and Ak Palanka, making for Leskovitza and Ofania, but pursued by a flying corps of Servians, assisted by some Christian natives, the most of them were taken prisoners, among whom are Major Osman Hadji and Captain Ahmed Redjir. The prisoners are well treated. From Nisch one squadron of cavalry tried unsuccessfully to force its way out, when four Turks fell. A Turkish convoy, carrying provisions from Vinika to Nisch, has also been captured. On the 27th ult. there were again skirmishes near Mali Zvornik, resulting in the retreat of the Turks. Engagements also occurred the same day near Pirot, Budina, Dela, Nisch, Sopot, and Stanikhanse. The number of killed and wounded has not yet been ascertained, but I learn from a trustworthy source that the losses, on the Servian side, in the fight at Pirot, amounted to seven hundred killed. These events demonstrate how the Servians can fight when led by their countrymen. According to reports emanating from the headquarters of General Alimpich, the Turks are preparing to cross the Drina river, but the Servians are sharply watching every movement, and have concentrated large bodies of troops at the most likely places. General Belimarcovich, leaving a sufficient garrison in Pirot, is marching towards the Czarskibrod defile, which forms the key to the Sofia plain. The corps which took Kurshumlia is also advancing in the direction of Pristina."

The representative of the "Daily News" with General Gourko's army in Sofia contributes his testimony to the gallantry of the Servians, and records the steps taken by the Russians to utilise their new allies in the Balkans. He differs from the correspondent last quoted as to the

Servian loss at Pirot; and perhaps his estimate on this point may be accepted as nearest to the truth. "The capture of Pirot by the Servians, and the near approach of the advanced guard of Prince Milan's army to the Russian lines, decided General Gourko to open communications with them, and Prince Tzereteleff, escorted by a sotnia of Cossacks, rode to meet the Servian army the night preceding the occupation of Sofia. He has just returned (January 9th), and gives a most flattering account of the condition of the troops, their conduct, and general spirits. He found the main body of the detachment, the Timok corps, under the command of Colonel Horvatovitch, still at Pirot, but about to move southward upon Radomir. The capture of Pirot had been attended with little or no disorder; the Turkish property had been confiscated, and the army was now living on captured provisions, and had plenty for a number of weeks. Pirot was taken after a fight of a whole day, with the loss of two hundred men; twelve cannon were captured. The assassination of Colonel Horvatovitch was attempted while he was making his triumphal entry into the town, but failed. The Cossacks returned delighted with their visit to their cousins, for they could understand their language, and received unlimited hospitality. The understanding was that the Servians were to garrison Sofia, but this is not the fact. The Servian soldiers have already made their appearance in the streets here, but the main force will move southward *via* Radomir. The Bulgarian volunteers, who have been parading here, have been sent to join the Servians."

General Belimarcovich commanded the Servians who joined the Russians in Sofia. But the prince's army was never largely drawn upon, and its exploits in actual warfare were confined to the frontiers of the principality, and to the Sofia road.

The assault on the fortress of Nisch began on the 5th of January, and continued during six days. On the 10th the town was taken, and the garrison capitulated on the following day. This

was the crowning event of the short Serbian campaign, which had been highly creditable throughout. Europe was astonished at the success of Prince Milan's army, not only because the Servians had effected very little in 1876, under the command of Tchernaeff, but also because the Turks had given such good evidence of their prowess in the field when opposed to the best soldiers of Russia. Of course it is to be remembered that the Mahomedans on the frontier, and on the Sofia and Novibazar roads, were unable to bring large forces against their enemy, and that the majority of these were irregular troops. But the Turks have fought very well, both before and since, even in a desultory fashion; and it says a good deal for the effectiveness of the Serbian army that it should have been able to do so much in so short a time.

The Belgrade correspondent of the "Times" mentioned the principal circumstances of the siege and capitulation, in a letter written a few days after the event. "After difficult passages over apparently impassable mountains, the Serbian flag now waves over the walls of Nisch. The Servians had their first encounter with the Turks on the 4th instant at Chichela, Brozbrod, Barbanovatz, and Belotina. The Turks attacked them twice on that day, but were repulsed. On the 5th the Servians captured several positions before Nisch. On the 6th the Turks attempted to make a sortie with superior forces, but they were not successful. On the 8th the Serbian left wing took by assault Markovo Kalek, which was bravely defended by the Turkish infantry, supported by artillery; while, on the very same day, the right wing captured the fortification of Vlasko Ordo. From this position, on which the Servians placed their cannon during the night, they bombarded Goritz Tabia, from where the Turks made repeated sorties, in the hope of regaining their positions, but they were repulsed. On the 9th inst. the heavy guns were got into position and brought into action. During this time the Schumadia and Morava corps, with the Branitchievo Brigade, were engaged before Vinika and Abdi Pacha Tabias, both of which

positions were taken after a desperate fight on the part of the Turks.

"The terms for the capitulation of Nisch have been concluded between Colonel Leshaian, the representative of Prince Milan, and Halil and Rashid Pachas, the commanders of Nisch. They are as follow:—1. The ammunition, buildings, and other government material, will remain in the same condition as when the convention was signed. 2. The soldiers will lay down their arms; they will not be treated like prisoners of war, but will be sent out of the region now occupied by the Servians. 3. All citizens, whether Mussulman or Christian, must lay down their arms; but if they own property, it will be returned to them when the normal state is again established. 4. The Serbian regent vouchsafes to every one perfect security of property, honour, and life. All inhabitants who desire to leave the town are permitted to do so, if their removal is made as quickly as possible. 5. All officers and citizens may retain their swords in recognition of their bravery. When the convention is signed, the Ottoman troops will at once evacuate all the fortifications of Goritz and Vinika, which the Serbian troops will enter. The Turks will then lay down their arms by battalions, and place themselves under the command of their officers at places appointed for the purpose.

"The whole of Belgrade is illuminated. There is universal rejoicing. A torchlight procession, with a military band, has been parading before the palace of the prince and the Russian consulate, singing the Russian and Serbian national hymns. Great sympathy has been shown by the Serbian inhabitants of Semlin. They have sent to the Metropolitan Michael, the President of the Red Cross Society, a large amount of money, being the profits of a concert given there for this purpose."

It is worthy of remark that the Serbian capture of Nisch occurred just one day after the capture of Antivari by the Montenegrins. Both campaigns were brought to a climax within twenty-four hours of each other; and thus the



two princes were able at the same moment to establish their claims to consideration in the councils of Europe. We may at least admit that it was not their fault if the barbarous expedient of war was necessary in order to assure them a favourable hearing in the forthcoming settlement.

### CHAPTER III.

#### THE ADVANCE ON SOFIA.

GENERAL Gourko did not lose much time, as soon as the release of the Plevna army had provided him with sufficient reinforcements to prosecute his march across the Etropol Balkans. He had originally been despatched southwards with a force of thirty thousand men, chiefly with a view to secure the Orkanieh road, and to prevent the Turks from coming to the relief of Plevna in that direction. He had done excellent service by capturing the fortified places on this road, and by defeating the attempts of Mehemet Ali and his colleagues to repeat the achievement of Chefket Pacha, who had carried a large convoy of provisions to Osman Pacha. He might have made more progress still, and have precipitated the flight of the Turks, if it had not been for the severity of the winter, which made all operations on the Balkan range a matter of extreme difficulty. Nevertheless, as has already been seen, he did quite enough to astonish every military critic in Europe, and even to eclipse his summer expedition over the central passes of the Balkans.

But, with the fall of Plevna, Gourko found himself considerably strengthened, both in numbers and in equipment; and he was now in the van of a victorious and enthusiastic army, bent on hastening into the plains of Roumelia, and too eager for the final triumph to be checked by the immense difficulties of a winter's march over lofty and trackless mountains.

What the difficulties of the march were at

this time, even on comparatively level ground, may be judged from a description given by the "Daily News" correspondent with the Russian army, writing from Orkanieh on December 24th, after making a journey to Plevna and back again.

"When I first came up the Sofia road," he says, my horses stood at night knee-deep in unthrashed barley straw, where the Cossacks had picketed their horses in the court-yards of the Turkish houses, and Indian corn in the ear lay about the ground all around the bins. There were also abundance of good, clean, comfortable quarters in every village. On my way back from Plevna this time I found the greatest difficulty in obtaining even straw for the horses to eat. The troops I passed on the road bivouacked in the snow between the walls which a few weeks ago supported warm, tight roofs, and they had to thank those who had passed over the road before them for the waste of forage, destruction of the houses, and general exhaustion of the resources of the country, which, if they had been managed with anything like a provident system, would have served to supply the passing troops and the transport trains for months.

"For my own part, the only way I avoided sleeping in the snow was by hurrying on past the troops I overtook on the road, reaching the village of Lukovitza, where they were to pass the night, only a few moments before the advance guard, and establishing myself and horses in a cellar just large enough to hold us. I had scarcely put a billet of wood across the door when the place was besieged by officers and men, who kept up at intervals all night long a tattoo on the door, accompanied with demands for admission, which, of course, I did not grant, for every inch of room was taken. They had marched the fifty-five versts from Plevna in two days, bivouacking the first night at Telish. The snow fell all night long, and those who found no roof to shelter them wandered about until morning, trying to find a hole to crawl into to sleep. About a month ago the village

would have furnished comfortable quarters for the whole detachment, now it would barely shelter a battalion.

"At daybreak I was on the road again, and the storm had not yet ceased, but was somewhat diminished in violence; the highway was almost knee-deep with mingled mud and snow. Turkish families, stowed away in their miserable arabas, were shivering by the roadside, where the exhausted oxen had stopped during the night. Bulgarians, also on their way from Plevna to their villages, advanced along the road in painful procession, toiling through the mud, laden with great bundles of kitchen utensils and bedding, and scarcely moving half a mile an hour. How and where they had passed the night was a question which I did not stop to ask, because knowing that I should arrive at the Pravca Pass only at the end of the day, for it was forty versts distant, the question of the coming night was to me a far more important and interesting one.

"The whole day without a pause, except to water the horses, I pushed on past artillery supply waggons, transport carts with wounded in almost inextricable confusion, and at dark came to the narrow defile of the Pravca Pass, and the road was so jammed with troops and artillery that it was impossible to proceed further, and it seemed as if I was nailed there for the night in the storm, with no village within two hours' ride, and even there every house was overcrowded with soldiers. The only alternative to passing the night in the snow was to push on over the mountains by the goat-paths that had served at the time of the battle there to move small detachments of troops towards the flanks of the enemy. There was no little risk of losing my way in the storm, but remembering distinctly the conformation of the ground, I struck out through the woods to the left of the road, and after a couple of hours' hard work through the snow, climbing over the crags which, in fine weather, were difficult enough to scale, I came out into the plain of Orkanieh, and my tired horses made their own way along to their stable.

The snow was then eighteen inches deep on a level, and since that time several inches more have fallen. For the last week or so the cold has been steadily increasing, and to-day as I write the Reaumur thermometer marks seventeen degrees of cold. There is no means of heating the room except by a fire under a stone canopy, which has so fallen to pieces and gone to ruin that the smoke comes out into the room and does not find its way up the chimney. But even warm smoke would be preferable to the cold which freezes the ink on my table as I am writing, and the only reason why I don't indulge in that luxury is because it is impossible to find wood to burn. The Bulgarian sledges are all employed in bringing wood for the ovens and kitchens. The hedges and wicker fences have all been burned long ago. Very many houses were torn to pieces when the army first came here, and now a handful of wood is worth its weight in silver almost, and quite impossible to get at all in any quantity. The sufferings of the soldiers in the bivouacs on the mountains are simply terrible. Hundreds have their feet and hands frozen every night, and the amount of illness resulting from exposure is alarming. Very few of the men are provided with any clothing in addition to that which they brought with them for the full campaign. They have good boots and whole overcoats, it is true, but many of them discard the former, and substitute sandals and leggings of raw hide, and a single thickness of coarse cloth is a miserable protection in this cold."

Gourko had had plenty of time in which to form his plans for the crossing of the mountains, and the descent upon Sofia. All necessary preparations had been made; and on Christmas day the forward march was begun, after being delayed only until the promised reinforcements had come up from Plevna. These did not make their appearance until the 24th, and the general immediately gave orders to start on the following morning. It was, indeed, high time that he should do so, for almost every hour was adding to the number of the men who were frost-bitten



in one extremity or another. No fewer than two thousand were reckoned to be suffering more or less seriously from the effects of exposure; and during a severe storm, lasting over four days, thirty soldiers were frozen to death. Even the officers had to endure the greatest misery from inadequate shelter, combined with actual want of food.

On the 25th of December, therefore, the army moved forward with alacrity. According to the writer last quoted, the plan of the projected advance was due to the chief of General Gourko's staff, General Naglovsky. "The plan was as precise as a mathematical problem, and the work was laid out as explicitly for each detachment. The physical difficulties of crossing the high range that separates the valleys of Orkanieh and Sofia, in fact, the great Balkan range, were so much increased by the formation of ice, that it was altogether impossible to carry out the details of the plan. Therefore I will only give the general outline. The army was divided into nine detachments. Three of these were to form a column, which was to cross to the west of Araba Konak and come down into the villages of Curiak, Potok, and Stolnik. The command of the advance guard of this column, consisting of two battalions of the rifle brigade, the Praobrajenski and Simionovsky regiments, one brigade of Kuban Cossacks, and sixteen guns, was entrusted to General Rauch. The entire column numbered thirty-one battalions and forty guns, the Kuban Cossacks, one squadron of Cossacks of the Caucasus, and five squadrons of Dragoons. The second column, commanded by General Weliaminoff, composed of a brigade of the 31st division of infantry of the line, two brigades of cavalry of the Guard, one battery of field pieces, and one horse battery, was directed to cross the range by the point marked on the Austrian map as Urmagas. The third column, led by General Dondeville, was to turn the Turkish position on the summits east of the pass, crossing the range where the word Bata is found on the map, debouching into the valley at Mierkovo. The fourth column, headed by General Schildener-

Schuldner was to demonstrate against Lutikova. The fifth column, comprising a regiment of Grenadiers, one and a half battalions of a regiment of the line, two sotnias of Cossacks, and two guns, was to remain in position near Slatica to watch Kamarli."

The actual passage of the Balkans by the Russian Guards is narrated in a most graphic manner; and an achievement so notable deserves to be told over and over again.

"The bivouac of the Dragoons, the place of rendezvous, was situated at a point where the stream, flowing eastward from the Etropol Balkans, meets the river at the chaussée. It is here where the road turns off to cross the mountains to Curiak, not where the dotted line is on the map. This road is called the old Sofia road, and was the principal thoroughfare towards Etropol before the chaussée was made. It was totally disused for a number of years, and was never more than a narrow neglected bridle-path. It was almost lost among the trees, and was gullied with the rain and grown over with bushes. A few days ago two battalions of the Praybrajensky regiment began to work on the path, graded it somewhat, widened it nearly the whole extent, and cut steps in the ice in the steepest place up to the summit. A portion of the way was in full sight of the Turkish redoubts east of Araba-Konak. Therefore work could be undertaken only at night, and when the advance was made the path was so good that it was believed that cannon could be brought up with horses. When we arrived at the bivouac of the Dragoons part of the advance guard had already moved through the defile towards the west. The weather had grown cold again, and waiting in the snow was disagreeable. At this point the Princess Imperial section of the Red Cross Society had established its head-quarters and erected six kikitkas, which began already to be filled with men injured by falling on the ice. Nearly the whole day we stood there, and the column did not move a rod an hour.

"I finally determined to make my way to the top and started off two hours before sunset. The

way was completely blocked with artillery and infantry. The soldiers had made fires along the path and were cooking their suppers, and everybody seemed to be taking matters very easy. Hard climbing brought me to the first difficult place in the path, and here I discovered the cause of the delay. Four guns and their caissons were being hauled up by hand. The ropes were short, permitting not more than sixty men to take hold, and even this number worked with exasperating deliberation. It was soldiers of the line that were detailed to bring up the first cannon. They were small men, unused to such work, and after a long march from Plevna did not enter with any enthusiasm into the novel and exhausting labour.

"General Rauch stood half-way up the first steep incline, encouraging the men to pull, and spurring up the officers. Long after dark I worked my way up from one crowd of soldiers to another. The intervals between the cannon grew longer and longer, and when I reached the first one I found the men all lying about resting as calmly as if it were not an important part of the plan of the enterprise that all the troops should get up the mountain. The officers lay down and slept. The men made fires. Others scooped a hole in the snow, and were soon snoring peacefully. The choruses which had sounded along the path as the soldiers hauled the heavy caissons up, inch by inch, finally ceased altogether, and apparently everybody slept.

"On the mountain, however, there was one man fully awake and alive to the importance of energetic efforts, and that man was General Rauch. The whole night long he climbed up and down that slippery path, endeavouring to communicate some of his activity to the officers and men. The distance up the mountain was, perhaps, four miles, and the entire route was lined with soldiers sleeping on the ice or gathered around small fires in the snow. When they were awakened and ordered to move on, they never showed any impatience, but with their inimitable *sang froid* got up and walked a few paces and then slept again, dropping down like dead men.

"Towards midnight General Gourko came up the path, followed by his staff. He could no longer endure the delay, and his sleepless energy would not permit him to remain inactive in the rear. A Cossack post was found on the summit of the watershed, and here the general and his staff lay down on the snow around two fires, which were kept low that the enemy might not notice them, and slept like the soldiers. The Pravbrajensky regiment had advanced into the village of Curiak, already for some days occupied by the Dragoon outposts, and with them part of the train of packhorses had descended in the early part of the night, so that there was little to eat and meagre comfort in the snow bivouac. Officers and soldiers lay around indiscriminately as near the fires as they could get, for the icy wind was blowing across the peak, and the snow was freezing hard.

"The sun rose on a scene of wonderful picturesqueness and a landscape of serene beauty. Generals and aides-de-camp, some wrapped in bourkas and furs, some in overcoats alone, without additional covering, lay there in the snow huddled together about the fires. Cossacks and dragoons were already busy with their cooking, and hundreds of horses tied to the trees about the bivouac stamped impatiently in the snow. Southward lay the great plain of Sofia, its pure white face only broken by little dark lines where the villages were, and beyond, half veiled in dense clouds, were the mountains further south, and the great peak Vitos that towers over Sofia. Through the trees eastward was clearly visible the great bare peak near the Bilia-Konak Pass, and the lines of the Turkish works were drawn on the snow as plainly as pencil marks on white paper. General Rauch, always on foot, clambered up to the bivouac for a few moments' rest, and to consult with General Gourko, the motive power, and General Naglovsky, the soul of the enterprise. Then both General Rauch and General Gourko were off again to hasten the movements.

"I must pause to say one word in unqualified praise of the general who has taken upon him-



self the awful responsibility of the passage of the Balkans in the dead of winter with the flower of the Russian army, the choice corps of the Guard. Never for a moment have I seen him lose his presence of mind, or show the slightest signal of discouragement. Always giving a personal example of energy and endurance, always exceeding in activity any of his officers, determined and courageous, he has the rare qualities which make him a thorough soldier and inspire the confidence of the men he leads. With all the weight of responsibility upon his shoulders he laboured physically more than his officers, and his enthusiasm and energy, brought out clearly in this difficult passage of the mountains, are simply sublime.

"Perhaps it is not altogether fair to criticise the work of the soldiers, whose task is never too easy, and whose life in the cold and snow has little except physical discomfort in it; but I cannot help believing that, if the men had worked in reliefs, and had conceived the importance of haste, the entire column would have passed up the mountain in the time planned. To be sure allowance had not been made for the slippery state of the roads; but the active brains that had planned the movement had counted on an echo of their enthusiasm. At all events, by noon on the 26th, only four four-pounders with caissons were placed on the watershed. News had come from the column on the right that the road was well nigh impassable, and nothing whatever was heard from Dondeville on the left; but the Guards had started up the mountains near Etropol, and worked with a will, singing and joking all the time during the long day we waited there, chafing with impatience. The road down to Curiak being in sight of the Turkish positions was closed by patrols, and no movement permitted in that direction. Everywhere, all over the mountain-top, soldiers bivouacked in the snow in picturesque groups, cooking their food, and drying their clothing, under little shelters constructed of snow and branches.

"When the twilight came on we all started

down the mountain, everybody on foot, for the path was so steep and slippery that no horse could carry a rider down. A snow-storm began before we had gone far and doubled the difficulty of the descent. Part of the way we slid down like so many school-boys, and afterwards let ourselves down through the undergrowth, for the road was one solid sheet of ice. Two or three miles of this work brought us to the head of the valley, and we were over the Balkans, breathless with the exertion of the descent. We paused a moment, and shook hands in the darkness, and then pushed on to the village, where we slept under a roof as peacefully as if the Turks were twenty miles instead of one mile away. How the cannon came down this side it is almost impossible to tell, for the road was, for a long distance, only a gully made by the rain, and the incline was so steep and slippery that it was almost impossible to stand upon the road. However, the four-pounders were in the village at daybreak, and the regiment of the line filed through in the forenoon.

"Curiak is a small village hidden away in a gorge, and a narrow valley winds through the hills to the plain beyond, a couple of hours' distant. At daybreak, on the 27th, the Circassian outposts were standing on a little hill scarcely a mile away, and we saw an officer with his staff come up and take a look, then gallop away. The brigade of Kuban Cossacks was sent down the valley with one regiment of infantry to the left, one up on the height to the right. There was a little popping in the valley. The Turks in a little rifle-pit on the hill fired four rounds and then retired.

"The enterprising Kubans pushed on ahead, and saw out on the plain a long transport train, slowly moving towards Baba-Konah. They received orders to try and capture it. About three o'clock two squadrons—scarcely more than a hundred horsemen—dashed down into the plain and cut off half the train, more than two hundred waggons laden with provisions and forage. The two squadrons of Turkish regular cavalry and Circassians retired immediately, when the

Kubans came down ; but finding they were not outnumbered, returned and gave battle. After a short sharp fight, in which ten Turks were killed and two Cossacks wounded, the waggons were left in the Russians' hands. The Cossacks cut the telegraph wires, the infantry took up positions on the hills near the plain, past the village of Potop, and the passage of the Balkans was an accomplished fact."

The columns of Weliaminoff were not long in making their appearance ; and the advanced divisions waited at Curiak for the arrival of the infantry and heavy artillery, the advance of which was necessarily slower. Four days passed before the bulk of the army was collected ; and the interval was employed by the cavalry in scouring the plains, feeling the way towards Sofia, and making raids upon the Turkish convoys of provisions.

Dondeville's column had failed to get across the mountains, and had been obliged to retire to Etropol, losing eight hundred men *hors de combat*. This was a great disappointment ; but it was almost the only drawback to the complete success of the movement.

On the last day of the year the Russians attacked and captured Taskosen, after a stubborn engagement with the Turks, who were outnumbered and almost cut off. At this place was discovered a despatch from Baker Pacha, addressed to Chakir Pacha, the successor to Mehemet Ali, commanding at Araba Konak, informing the general-in-chief that eighteen battalions of Russians had crossed the Balkans, and that twelve of them were attacking him.

On New Year's day, the Turkish army abandoned their positions at Araba Konak and withdrew rapidly, pursued by a Russian column. On the same day General Weliaminoff, who had occupied Gorny Bugaroff, was attacked by eight battalions from Sofia, whom he managed to disperse with great loss, dealing a final charge which the Moslems found it impossible to withstand. This left Sofia practically open to the Russians. The ancient city was not a fortress of much strength or importance, and it was not

strategically of great value to the Turks, except as a base of operations on the flank of the invaders. It did not form a link in the defences of Constantinople, or even of Roumelia ; for, in addition to the Balkan passes, it was always practicable for the hostile army to turn round the western slopes of the mountain range, and double upon Kezanlik, or Philippopolis, without touching Sofia. Suleiman, Chakir, and Baker Pachas, were fully alive to this fact, and they consequently made no vigorous effort to defend the city. They fell back, in retiring, upon Philippopolis and the Rhodope mountains ; and if Gourko had been so foolish as to make a long delay at Sofia it is probable that another protracted campaign would have been imposed upon Russia and her allies.

At the same time it was necessary to secure Sofia, so as at least to prevent it from becoming a source of trouble or danger to the columns in pursuit of the Turks, who were pushing vigorously along the Adrianople road. Therefore, on the 2nd of January, General Gourko moved his head-quarters to Gorny Bugaroff. The position of affairs was recorded in an official telegram from Bagot, dated this day. "After a severe struggle of eight days against frost, snow, and storm, and the difficulties of mountainous country, General Gourko has crossed the Balkans and descended into the plain of Sofia. On the 31st ultimo, after a severely contested engagement at Taskosen, lasting until six o'clock in the evening, General Gourko succeeded in occupying the Turkish entrenchments at that place, with the exception of one redoubt near the guard-house. During the night the Turks abandoned all their positions, and early on the following morning the Russians commenced pursuing the enemy, and occupied Arab Konak, Schandernik, and Dolny Comarzi. A portion of the infantry pursued the enemy in the direction of Petrikioi, and the cavalry of the Guard also took part in the pursuit in the same direction by way of Bolowo and Tscherkesskioi. General Gourko afterwards ordered a halt, to allow the troops to recover from their fatigue. He is now



advancing upon Sofia. On the 1st instant the Etropol detachment was ordered to join the detachment commanded by General Brock, in order to cut off the Turkish communications with Petrichewo as far as possible. The Russian loss on the 31st ultimo was about seven hundred men killed and wounded. General Mirkowitz, the commander of the Volhynian regiment, was wounded."

Every one expected that the Turks would make more or less of a stand at Sofia, and that the capture of the city would cost a few more lives. But the actual occupation turned out to be a rather tame affair. The correspondent whose narrative we have lately been following records that, on the 3rd of January, the attack was ordered for the following day; and he was sitting down to write a letter to England when a Cossack came trotting up and announced that Sofia was evacuated. "No one believed it, and I inscribed the date on the sheet, but did not get any further before an officer came with the news that General Rauch's column was entering the city. It was then nearly two o'clock in the afternoon, and the advance guard had been in the town since ten, and we had had no word of it, although we were not over an hour's ride away. We saddled and started on a quick trot, and passed the covered bridge just after the last detachment of General Rauch's column had gone over it. From here to the city the road was a solid column of infantry marching slowly along with unfurled flags, stepping to the time of the ringing songs of the platoons in front of each battalion. They were not quite as trim as when they crossed the Sistova bridge, their caps were warped out of shape, their overcoats occasionally tattered and burned, and their faces brown and roughened with the constant exposure, but they were as tidy as could be expected, and marched with a swing and regularity that was refreshing to see after the forced disorder of the mountain marches. A total stranger could not have failed to notice how perfectly General Gourko had his troops in hand, for the tone in which they answered his customary salutation,

the expression of the individual countenances as he passed, and the way in which they received the caution not to pillage the city, were proof of this. He has a thrilling sternness in his voice when he chooses, and he gives orders sometimes with a tone that is almost terrible in its severity. And I never heard him give an order with more earnestness than the charge to the soldiers not to dare to touch a single article in the town, and they had understood, even before he shook his finger at them, that plundering was not to be permitted.

"The fact is that when we came into the place there was perfect quiet, a large patrol was in the streets even before the troops halted, and all pillage was stopped. The entrance of General Gourko was rather a tame affair compared with his entry into Tirnova, for example, and there was not enough enthusiasm among the people to raise a cheer or a good round of applause. It was rather a cold afternoon and the citizens were shivering about, many of them thinly dressed, for all who could had discarded their waving garments of the Turkish cut and put on odd pieces of European dress. Full suits of light summer stuffs were not uncommon, and their endeavours to Europeanise themselves were almost pitiable. The fez, however, was the most common head-gear. They had no other covering for the heads, the most of them, and they even forgot to take these off when the general passed. They couldn't, of course, learn in a half-day that it was the custom of their deliverers to doff the hat, when they had been brought up all their lives accustomed to see the fez worn on all occasions, and the lesson was taught them in rather a rude way sometimes. The soldiers considered that the fez indicated the Turks, and often threw them to the ground, but I couldn't excuse the action of some officers, who must have been aware that this article of clothing has as little significance, in the mixed population of the Turkish cities, as the rosary that is never out of the hands of the majority of the people in the Levant. The next day there were hats enough of all shapes and all dates to satisfy the most

unreasonable of the fez-haters, and it was rather ludicrous to see a full Turkish costume surmounted by a silk hat of date '50, or a fur cloak and a straw hat, worn by the same person. The style is gradually reverting again, however, to that of the period of the Turkish occupation, and the fez, which on the first afternoon was as provoking to the soldiers as a red rag to a bull, can now be worn without danger of insult.

"The retreating troops did not get out of the city until three o'clock in the morning of the day General Gourko entered, and the battalions formed in the streets and began to march away at seven o'clock in the evening before the waggon trains had been moving off. For forty-eight hours the wounded, or such of them as could walk, were ordered away by Kirkor Bey, the medical director of the town, on the 3rd, and five or six thousand of them limped away, urged on by fear of the Russians. Of their fate there is little doubt, although we have had no news of them. Like the straggling wounded at Taskosen, the majority of them will die from cold and hunger, and the whole route of retreat is in all probability paved with their corpses before this. From what I can judge of the hospitals here they were once very well arranged, perfectly clean and comfortable. There are between seventy and eighty houses in the town, which were used as hospitals, the konak, the mosques, school-houses, and other public buildings among the number.

"In these buildings the patients were all on beds raised eighteen inches from the floor, the mattresses are well made and still in good condition, and the abundance of bedding and necessary furniture of every kind shows that they were arranged with great care. But these hospitals, when General Gourko visited them, were great tombs for dead and living, filthy to the last degree, with an atmosphere so heavy with horrible and disgusting odours that it seemed as if it was impossible for human beings to live there. The dead outnumbered the living in many wards. Some had been murdered by the Bulgarians, probably because they had not strength enough to resist being robbed, for the survivors in the

deserted wards state that the Bulgarians made a tour of robbery among them, which the loss of their money tends to prove, and the action of the Bulgarian attendants in Lady Strangford's hospital, who first plundered the patients and then ran away and deserted them in the night, makes it seem probable. Certain it is that many Turks were murdered, if any reliance is to be placed on the word of the doctors, American, English, and Turkish, who attended them; some died from sheer fright, and many were unable to support life on the meagre rations that were served to them during the Russian occupation, for when the Turks stopped issuing rations there was no one to step in."

After some critical remarks on the want of system in the Russian arrangements, the correspondent continues:—"When the troops first entered the town some Cossacks presented themselves at the door of Lady Strangford's hospital and demanded admission, throwing the cap from Lady Strangford's head, because it was ornamented with the Red Crescent, but saw their mistake, and apologised before they were allowed to enter. A guard was immediately placed at all the entrances, and no one was permitted to pass except with the Red Cross or Crescent upon their arm, and the work in the hospital went on as usual, excepting the interruptions caused by the desertions of the Bulgarians who were employed in the different wards. The patients number nearly one hundred and fifty; the hospital occupies a large school-house, and I need not pause to praise the internal arrangements, for this will be readily understood. During the evacuation many of the patients left their beds and followed the army, and Dr. Stephenson, Lady Strangford's surgeon, worked all night and the forenoon following in transporting to the hospital as many of the deserted wounded as there was room for, bringing some on his back and dragging others by hand in arabas with the aid of one or two other surgeons. Besides Dr. Stephenson, Drs. Wattie and Busby (of the Stafford House detachment), Drs. Ruddock, Macpherson, King, and Jennings (of the Red Cross),



and their assistants, together with one other Englishman, one American, and several German doctors (all the latter in the Turkish service), remained in the town. I have only one word to say for the Englishmen who remained here, and that is, that they have done their duty cheerfully, promptly, and with a great deal of self-denial. Can any more just praise be given them than that they have done what was to be expected of them as men, as surgeons, and as Englishmen? The fact that Lady Strangford remained at her post at a time when her sex and her position were not the least protection, need only to be recorded to be appreciated.

"Sofia has already so often been described that anything that I can write about that city at this time, when its principal shops are deserted, some of the best houses burned, and half its population fugitives, will have little value as a true picture of the place. There are a great many foreigners in the town, many of them formerly in the employment of the railway companies. Three consuls remain—the French, Italian, and Austrian. Italian was the first language I heard in the street, and the little Bulgarian boy who held my horse answered me with a clear Italian accent. There are French and Italian restaurants, where they charge now three hundred piastres for what a week ago was readily given for thirty. Wine which sold for two francs now brings sixteen, and every other article has risen in like proportion, even to bread, a piastre loaf being readily sold for three and four piastres. Turkish paper money is worthless, and Russian roubles are now in general circulation. It is surprising to see how quickly the Russian money supplants that of the country. Gold rings upon every counter, roubles cram every till, for the few shops that are open are besieged with purchasers, who crowd and elbow for a place at the counter, and buy provisions in great quantities regardless of price. It does not take long for the Levantine traders to understand how to treat the Russians, and they quadruple their prices, and cling to the new tariff without yielding. These same fellows, who a week ago would gracefully come down in

the price of their goods one-third the sum originally demanded, now never drop a piastre, for they are sure to sell at any price.

"It is curious to observe how apathetic the people are. A fire does not bring together a crowd, no one pays any attention to a wounded man in the streets, and the great multitude of Turkish refugees who were brought into the town, the most miserable, wretched-looking beings that were ever seen, half-frozen, half-starved, and quite done up, did not attract a passing glance. The wave of war has swept over these people, and has brought in its current new vices and increase of crime. There has been some firing in the streets at night, but although I have heard several shots, I have found no one who could confirm the reports that murders have been committed since the patrols have been in the streets. Very few or no Turkish families remained in the town. I have found one old Turk who, unable to flee, sits in his house and reads his Koran all day long, and receives the visits of the Russian officers with rare grace and a sympathetic manner that are most charming.

"With the partial stagnation of business, which was never very lively here, the consumption of provisions, and the presence of a large floating population, Sofia will not be a pleasant place to winter in, so I am not sorry we are soon to move. Besides, the great plain beyond the next range of mountains is full of possibilities and promise, and there we hope for milder weather. It is disagreeable riding with the thermometer at five degrees below zero, and a constant fight with the cold is wearing to the constitution and trying to the patience."

A few details follow respecting the events of the occupation, in a letter dated from the headquarters of General Gourko, Sofia, January 9:—"The evacuation of Sofia was as unexpected as the fall of Plevna. From all indications, it seemed probable that the Turks would make a stand with sufficient force to prevent easy occupation of the town, and would defend the place with at least as much vigour as they had resisted the approach to its immediate neighbourhood. On



THE TURKS IN ASIA  
(Praying at Sunset)





New Year's day the detachment commanded by General Wilhelminof was attacked near Gorny Bugaroff with great desperation, and it was only after a fierce fight of some hours, and with a loss of two hundred and fifty, that the enemy was repulsed. Although the Russian positions were well chosen and commanded the road and the level ground near it, the Turks manœuvred so well, and advanced with such recklessness, that they very nearly gained the day. In killed alone they lost upwards of five hundred: in wounded one thousand five hundred. The region in the vicinity of the village is thickly strewn with corpses, and even to this day the Bulgarians continue their horrible task of stripping the dead. The greater part of the dead lie within one hundred feet of the shallow Russian rifle-pits, testifying to the heroism of the Turks, who after advancing across an open cornfield for half a mile ran straight up the slope within bayonetting distance of their foe, and held their ground until thinned out by the terrible fire, and at last turned back with the Russians upon their heels, and left half their number on the snow before they formed again on the road. After the fight there was an armistice, during which the wounded on both sides were carried off the field, but only the Russian dead were buried.

"This brilliant little fight was going on while we were watching near Araba Konak the army of Chakir Pacha file up the hills beyond Dolni Kamarli in its hasty retreat southward. The following afternoon General Gourko was at Gorny Bugaroff, having left Taskosen at noon. He reached the village just in time to hear the first few shots of a sharp little skirmish going on near the covered bridge over the Isker. The enemy had thrown up a short line of low earthworks on either side the road beyond the bridge, and with a detachment of two or three tabors in the trenches and three times this number in reserve, they attempted to prevent the passage of the river. The Praobrajensky regiment crossed on the ice, turning the Turks by either flank, and they retired, after brief resistance, setting

fire to the bridge and the village of Razdimne as they left. The soldiers reached the bridge before the flames had gained great headway, and began to throw water and snow upon the burning timbers with their copper pots, and extinguished the fire before the structure was damaged to any great extent.

"General Gourko crossed while the fire was at its height, making his way with his accustomed coolness through the flame and smoke, the first one to pass over the bridge on horseback, and his staff followed in momentary expectation that the flooring would give way. If the bridge had been blown up, the passage of the river would have caused no little delay and trouble, and the attempt to burn it at the last moment shows that its destruction was not long premeditated. I was not present at this skirmish, having hurried off to Strigli to ascertain the truth of the report which has been sent to the grand duke that Baker Pacha had been wounded and taken prisoner, but the scene is described to me as wonderfully dramatic and picturesque. It was almost midnight when I found the headquarters in the village of Gorny Bugarof, having satisfied myself that the captured Englishman was not Baker Pacha but a colonel of the same name, chief of the Turkish gendarmerie. It was a cold night, and the road was so slippery that the horses could scarcely stand, and it seemed as if the long, straight, monotonous road would never end. As I approached the village, the dead Turks, sabred by the Kuban Cossacks in their raid a few days ago, began to strew the ground thickly, thrown into the ditches to clear the way, or stretched out naked in the snow in the fields alongside, and when I rode up the hill to the town the soldiers were still at work carrying their dead of the day before to the graves in the cornfield.

"The next day, as the enemy still continued to show a bold front, a strong column was sent around to the north of Sofia, and General Gourko made a personal reconnaissance in that direction, approaching within a mile of the city. Great camps were plainly visible near the road, the



black lines of a dozen earthworks crowned the summits of the hills near the city on either side, and we could plainly see that the fortifications were manned. The attack was decided upon for the morning of the 5th, and I think General Gourko expected to lose three or four thousand men in the assault, for although he had so disposed his forces as to attack on three sides at once, the storming of the earthworks would have cost many lives. On the 3rd we moved our quarters again, this time to the establishment of some Turkish nabob near the covered bridge, and prepared to await the arrival of the troops at their designated positions ready for the attack.

"I have detailed our movements in order to show the deliberation with which we approached the city, and to give an idea of how little we knew of what was passing almost within hearing distance of us. On the evening of the 3rd there were some lights visible in the direction of Sofia, but there was so much haze that we could not distinguish whether they were camp fires or burning houses. It was an hour after mid-day on the 4th that a Cossack came riding in with a report that Bulgarians had arrived at the foreposts with the news that Sofia was evacuated. . . .

"Suleiman Pacha had made a flying visit here about Christmas time, but no one knew he was here until he was gone. From the day the road was cut there was no longer any idea of defending the town, and the troops formed their battalions in the streets on the evening of the 3rd, and left quietly. The signal of the evacuation of the troops was also a signal for the flight of those Turkish families who had not yet departed, and the clumsy arabas, laden with human beings and household goods, piled in promiscuously, creaked over the frosty snow towards the line of retreat, which took the direction of Radomir. There were few enough transports for provisions and ammunition, so the wounded were ordered to quit the town the day of the retreat, and such of the poor wretches who could crawl away left the hospitals and dragged themselves towards the hills. Terrors inspired by the tales that the Russians would massacre all their pri-

soners gave them strength to begin their journey. Between five thousand and six thousand thus fled, the majority of them probably to die in the snow before the next day.

"There were less than a thousand wounded left in the town after this wholesale evacuation, so the surgeons in the Turkish service drew lots to decide which ten of their number should remain. This was a large proportion, as there had been but about thirty in charge of the thousands here. Among the ten who remained are one Englishman, one American, and two or three Germans. It is said on all sides that the order had been received from Constantinople to burn the town and blow up the mosques which were stored with powder. I do not know whether this is true or not, I only am sure that printed instructions were issued to each Bulgarian family to leave the town, accompanied with the verbal message that they took upon themselves the responsibility of remaining. There was no systematic attempt made, however, to burn the place, and although the Bashi-Bazouks set it on fire in several places but few houses were burned. Some of the shops had been deserted long ago by their proprietors, and the rest of them were gutted and the loot distributed during the withdrawal of the troops."

Turning our backs on Sofia, we must now follow the Russians on the road running south of the Balkans, towards Ichtiman, Bazardjik, Philipopolis and Adrianople. Ichtiman, the first place of importance on this road, was occupied soon after Sofia; and here the Bashi-Bazouks had been more successful in their evil practices, having set fire to the place, and murdered some of the inhabitants. An example was made of a few of these, caught red-handed, when the Russians made their appearance.

## CHAPTER IV.

## THE OCCUPATION OF PHILIPPOLIS.

As we have already seen, General Gourko was not the man to consume a single day in unnecessary rest or hesitation; and there were good reasons why he should not linger long in Sofia. Not only the dictates of military strategy, not only the flight of the Turks, the eagerness of the Russians, and their desire to finish the campaign with all possible haste, impelled them to press upon the heels of the retreating army, but also the diplomatic relations between Russia and the great Powers, and the unsettled condition of the public mind in Europe, made it important for Russia that she should press her advantage to the utmost. Both England and Austria were becoming greatly alarmed by the triumphs of their rival in the East, and it would have been very galling to the czar and his ministers if they had been suddenly confronted by a definite alliance of two hostile Powers.

The grand duke and his staff, therefore, strained every nerve to push into Roumelia before it might be necessary for them to arrest their progress; and urgent instructions to this effect were sent to the various commanders at the front. Gourko at Sofia, Radetzky in the Schipka Pass, even the Roumanians at Widdin, and the Servians and Montenegrins, were made to understand that a zealous prosecution of the war was of the utmost importance.

Some idea of the pressure under which Russia was now acting may be gained from the correspondence issued by the English government,\* which had taken place between London and St. Petersburg, consequent on Turkey's appeal to the Powers after the fall of Plevna. This appeal was made to ourselves in a telegram from Server Pacha to Musurus Pacha, which the latter communicated to the Earl of Derby on De-

cember 14th, in which the former repudiated Turkish responsibility for the war, pointed to the establishment of the constitution and to the promised reforms which were impeded by the continuance of the war, and appealed to the great Powers for their good services, with a view to bringing the war to an end.

Lord Derby informed Mr Layard of the substance of this telegram. Lord Odo Russell informed the foreign secretary on the 16th of the German emperor's refusal of the sultan's request for mediation; and Italy about the same time intimated that she would not separate herself from the other Powers. On the 21st Lord Derby, in a letter to Mr. Layard, said—

"The Turkish ambassador called upon me to-day, and entered into a general conversation upon the subject of the war. I took the opportunity to express to Musurus Pacha, but in an unofficial manner, the wish that it were possible to form some clear idea of the general conditions of peace which the Porte would be prepared to accept. In answer, his excellency dwelt strongly on the impossibility of the Porte conceding exceptional privileges to any of the provinces of the empire, or allowing the interference of the Powers in its independent administration."

On the 24th December Lord Derby inquired, through Mr. Layard, whether the sultan was willing that her Majesty's government should inquire of the Russian government if the emperor would entertain overtures for peace, the British government considering themselves not justified in abstaining from making an effort to initiate such negotiations, seeing that joint mediation was impracticable. Mr. Layard telegraphed on Christmas-day that the sultan was willing that such an inquiry should be made by England.

Thereupon our ambassador at St. Petersburg was desired to make the inquiry accordingly, and Lord A. Loftus sent the following account of his interview with Prince Gortschakoff, which took place on the 29th December:—

"I informed his highness that her Majesty's government considered that the time had arrived when it has become their duty to make an

\* Blue Book, Turkey, No. 2.



effort to bring to a close the war unhappily existing between Russia and Turkey. I stated that, in a communication made to her Majesty's government on the 26th instant, the Turkish government had signified their readiness to ask for peace, and her Majesty's government felt that it was incumbent on them to make the Russian government acquainted with this intimation from the Porte. That, with this view, I had been instructed by your lordship to inquire of the Russian government if the emperor will entertain overtures for peace. I added, in the terms of your lordship's instructions, that her Majesty's government were confident that his Imperial Majesty will see, in this initiative on their part, a proof of their sincere desire to second the wishes, which they cannot doubt that his Majesty feels strongly, for the prevention of further bloodshed. Prince Gortschakoff received this communication in a courteous and friendly spirit, and charged me to reply to the inquiry of her Majesty's government that Russia desired nothing better than to arrive at peace ('d'arriver à la paix'), but that, for this purpose, the Porte must address itself to the Imperial commanders-in-chief in Europe and Asia, who will state the conditions on which an armistice can be granted. Prince Gortschakoff promised to inform Count Schouvaloff of the communication I had made by your lordship's instructions, and of the reply he had given."

Lord Derby replied on the 4th of January:—

"Her Majesty's government have received with satisfaction Prince Gortschakoff's declaration that Russia desired nothing better than to arrive at peace. With regard to his highness's further statement, that to accomplish this purpose it is desirable that there should be an armistice, and that this temporary cessation of hostilities should be effected through the instrumentality of the commanders-in-chief of the Russian armies in Europe and Asia, her Majesty's ministers have to remark that, though the Porte has not made any application for an armistice, they would not be unwilling to convey the suggestion of the government of Russia

to Turkey, provided the communication were framed in a manner which, in the opinion of her Majesty's government, might lead to a practical result. It is evident that the projected armistice, if it is to be effectual, must include operations in Asia as well as in Europe, and would not be complete without the concurrence of Servia and Montenegro. But in this case it is clearly indispensable that the conditions on which it is to be granted should be discussed between the two governments, and not merely between generals commanding a portion of the contending forces. Her Majesty's government invite the consideration of Prince Gortschakoff to this modification of his highness's views. They fully appreciate the distinction recognised by him between an armistice, which may well be arranged between the immediate belligerents, and the conditions of peace, in which other powers also are interested."

Lord A. Loftus acknowledged the receipt of Lord Derby's telegram, and said that when he communicated its substance to Prince Gortschakoff, the Prince stated that "the military commanders were instructed to state conditions on which an armistice would be agreed to." Lord Derby, upon the 8th, wrote to Lord A. Loftus, that his understanding of this reply was, "that the Russian commanders-in-chief have received from the central government the instructions necessary to enable them to discuss the terms on which an armistice can be concluded," and that he had advised the Porte to send delegates to the Russian head-quarters with the same powers to negotiate an armistice as had been given to the Russian commanders-in-chief, the advice being despatched to Constantinople simultaneously with the intimation concerning it to St. Petersburg. Our ambassador to the czar reported upon this (January 9th) that having given a *précis* of the despatch to Prince Gortschakoff—

"His highness expressed his satisfaction, and his hope that the instructions to the Turkish plenipotentiaries would be such as to lead to a favourable result. He stated that instructions

were sent to Russian commanders-in-chief some days ago. He observed that there could be no doubt that the armistice would apply equally to Servia and Montenegro. The Servian troops were now acting with the Russian troops, and consequently could not advance without them, and the Prince of Montenegro would undoubtedly act in unison with Russia. He considered that peace could be attained on two conditions, namely, that the Russian army should advance, and that the Turks should be convinced that they would receive no aid from England. The Porte would then accept conditions on which peace could be made."

At midnight the same day Mr. Layard informed our government that no answer had been received from the Russian grand duke; that the Russian generals in Roumania had replied that they knew nothing of an armistice, and that they were still advancing. Lord Derby immediately transmitted this information to Lord A. Loftus, with instructions to remind Prince Gortschakoff that her Majesty's government had, "upon his authority, informed the Porte that the Russian commanders had received the necessary instructions in regard to the armistice." On January 10th, the answers of the two grand dukes were received. The Grand Duke Nicholas wrote, "There cannot be any question of an armistice at this moment without bases of peace," his brother Michael merely acknowledged the receipt of the telegram. Lord Derby informed Lord A. Loftus that the British government were "unable to reconcile the terms in which this reply is couched" with the message from Prince Gortschakoff given above, and instructed him "to request Prince Gortschakoff to furnish explanations on this point."

To this Lord A. Loftus replied on January 11th:—"On my communicating to-day to Prince Gortschakoff your telegram of yesterday his highness replied that the necessary instructions were sent about a week ago by the minister of war to the Imperial commanders-in-chief in Europe and Asia by messenger, being of too serious importance to confide to the telegraph. They may

reach the former in eight or ten, the latter in fifteen days, dating from the 3rd or 4th instant, Prince Gortschakoff said that no separate instructions can be given to Russian generals to treat with Turkish delegates. The sole power to do so is vested in the commanders-in-chief. No instructions, therefore, will be sent to the Russian generals at Ichtiman, as requested by the sultan. Prince Gortschakoff observed that he had not stated that the instructions had been received by the Russian commanders-in-chief, but that they had been sent to them."

Whereupon Lord Derby rejoined in these terms:—"Her Majesty's government are of opinion that it is to be regretted that, when Prince Gortschakoff informed you that instructions had been sent to the Russian military commanders to state the conditions on which an armistice would be agreed to, he did not explain the delay that would be caused by sending the instructions by special messenger instead of by telegraph."

On the 13th Mr. Layard telegraphed—

"A telegram has been received at the Porte from the Grand Duke Nicholas stating that the bases of peace will be communicated to a person sent to him furnished with full powers to accept them and to conclude thereupon the principles of an armistice which will afterwards be carried out. The grand duke requests to be informed of the name of the plenipotentiary, and of the time of his arrival at Kezanlik, to which place he requests that he may be sent to meet him. A prolonged council of ministers was held to-day, and it was decided to send Server Pacha and Namyk Pacha to-morrow to Kezanlik to meet the Grand Duke Nicholas, for the purpose of accepting bases of peace and concluding an armistice."

And on the following day Mr. Layard again telegraphed to Lord Derby, saying that he had received information from the Turkish minister of war that a Russian officer of the rank of colonel appeared at Turkish posts near Sarnasouflar, in front of Osman Bazar, with flag of truce, and announced the suspension of hostilities in Bulgaria.



This last information, however, was premature, or else based upon a misunderstanding; for the fighting was not even then at an end. We may now return to the military operations in Roumelia, and accompany General Gourko in his eastward march, bearing in mind the very pressing nature of the inducements which stimulated the Russians to expedite their movements.

Gourko was safe in concluding, from the sudden flight of the Turks from Araba Konak, as well as from their abandonment of Sofia and the neighbourhood, that they had retreated rapidly towards Adrianople, or at least as far as Philippopolis, where they might be inclined to make a stand. The experience of previous wars rendered it most probable that they would attempt to stay his progress at Adrianople; but, on the other hand, Philippopolis is a fairly strong town, and it was not likely, unless the Mahomedans were already utterly demoralised, that they would permit him to enter that place as easily as he had entered Sofia. In any case it was manifestly to his advantage to push on with the utmost speed, and challenge them before they had had time to recover from the effects of his unexpected passage of the Balkans. He knew well that men like Suleiman and Baker Pachas would do all that was possible to create a strong and formidable barrier; and under these circumstances he would perceive that every day which he could gain would be worth hundreds of lives to him. And at the same time he would know that Radetzky and Skobelev had orders to co-operate with him by way of the Schipka Pass; so that he would have a friend upon his flank in any case.

He therefore made his dispositions as soon as he had reached Sofia, and there was little further delay in carrying out the plans which he had formed. We have very scant information of the gallant and notable march of the Russians from Sofia to Philippopolis except that which we meet with in the accounts of the war correspondents; and we must turn to the narrative of the "Daily News" representative with Gene-

ral Gourko for an accurate and comprehensive diary of this famous achievement.

Writing from Philippopolis on the 18th of January, he justly says that this march from Sofia to Philippopolis in the space of six days, "crossing the great Balkan range in severe winter weather, driving the scattered forces of Suleiman Pacha before it in every direction, occupying the city after a series of bloody engagements," is one of the most brilliant feats of the war. "Although the dispositions of the troops were known at the date of my despatch from Sofia, it was evidently imprudent to speak of them, because we expected a stout resistance at four points in the mountains, namely, north of Samakova, at Trajan's Gate beyond Ichtiman, in the valley of the river Topolnica below Petricevo, and at Otlukkoi. General Gourko divided his force into four detachments. The column on the right, which started from Sofia the 7th of the month, was under command of General Weliaminoff, and was instructed to advance rapidly upon Samakova, in order to cut off the retreat of the Turks who left Sofia *via* Radomir. The main column, commanded by Count Schouvaloff, marched from Sofia on the morning of the 9th by the Ichtiman road, and was expected to advance upon Tatar Bazardjik only after the Turkish positions in the Trajan's Gate had been rendered untenable by the forward movement of the flanking columns east of the Ichtiman road. The detachment of General Schilden-Schuldner was to follow the river Topolnica; and on the extreme left a strong column, led by General Krudener, was ordered to proceed by way of Otlukkoi, following the line of retreat of Chakir Pacha's army from Kamarli, uniting with the other columns before Tatar Bazardjik. The small detachment under Count Komaroffsky, which had occupied Slatica, was to proceed to join the column of General Karzoff, to which it belonged, and which was advancing *via* Karlovo, to complete the connection with the army which crossed the Schipka Pass.

"The success of this complex movement de-

pendent entirely on the timely arrival of the separate columns at their destinations, and as the weather gave signs of breaking up, and the communications were at the best extremely difficult and uncertain, it seemed very much like a leap in the dark to cut loose from the base of supplies and strike away into the heart of the great range of white peaks that formed a serrated wall along the southern horizon. Six days' rations of hard bread were distributed to the soldiers, who, though somewhat recovered from the exhausting labours of the first passage, were still far from fresh. Every piece of artillery had a double quota of horses. The limbers and caissons were piled up with extra ammunition, and the columns went away as merrily as if they were on the homeward trip. General Gourko and staff accompanied the main column, but did not leave Sofia until noon on the 9th.

"While we were fighting our way along, a courier came up, bringing the news that a *parlementaire* had come into the lines of General Weliaminoff, bringing a telegram from the minister of war at Constantinople that an armistice had been accepted by the Russians, and that peace was imminent. General Gourko sent a telegram to the grand duke announcing the fact, and we pushed on, forgetting the snow and the cold in the exhilaration of the moment, discussing the probabilities of peace, and congratulating ourselves on the prospect of a speedy conclusion of the war. The proposition of an armistice was additional proof that the enemy had lost heart.

"The village of Vakarel on the road was burned. We found miserable shelter from the storm in a small village near, but the infantry was obliged to bivouac in the snow by the roadside. In the morning everything was frozen solid, the road was one sheet of ice, a strong wind was blowing, and as we rode through the bivouacs before daybreak and found the soldiers huddled together around the fires, half-buried in the drifting snow, it seemed impossible for human beings to live in the extreme cold, without even the protection of shelter tents.

"At Ichtiman we received the most gratifying report that the Turks had evacuated their positions in the Trajan's Gate, and that Samakova was also in our hands, and the appearance of Major Zeki, an aide-de-camp of Suleiman Pacha, who had come into the lines with a message for the grand duke, seemed a confirmation of the news of the preceding evening. However, during the day a despatch from head-quarters arrived with instructions to continue the advance, notwithstanding the reports of an armistice, and the cavalry pushed on over the pass, and occupied Vejtrenova. No reports reached us from Banja, whither it was supposed that Weliaminoff's column was driving the enemy, but we hurried, on the morning of the 11th, over the pass known as the Trajan's Gate to Vejtrenova, arriving just in time to see the black lines of the Turkish column filing along the road near Simcina.

"The situation of the Turks was now comprehensible. The plan of retreat arranged by Suleiman Pacha was to withdraw the forces from Samakova and Ichtiman in sufficient time to concentrate them at Tatar-Bazardjik, and follow the army of Chakir Pacha to Adrianople. The plan evidently counted on a delay of some days on account of the reported armistice, for the Samakova detachment under Fuad Pacha had a longer and more difficult road than the Russian to Tatar-Bazardjik, and not a day ahead of them. Thus, when this stratagem failed, the Samakova force found itself obliged to march day and night in order to debouch into the plain before its pursuers. Fuad Pacha had perhaps twenty-five thousand men in all, and he manœuvred with no little skill.

"It was indeed an uncomfortable position to be in, retreating shoulder to shoulder with the advance of the pursuers, threatened constantly in the rear, in battle array from sunrise till dark, and marching all night. It would have tried the pluck and endurance of any army. Fuad, by placing the Maritza between him and the Russians, which he did at the first opportunity, protected his line of march to some extent, and although there was no road on the south



side of the river so good as the high road, he moved with great rapidity, especially after he lost the bulk of his waggon train.

"Of course the detachment that occupied Trajan's Gate had plenty of time to get away, and the army under Chakir Pacha had passed through Otlukkoi a week ago, so that the Samakova force was menaced with complete isolation from the rest of the army, and they retreated with the celerity that their situation demanded. Trajan's Gate, a pass of great height, and difficult even in summer, was a solid sheet of ice when we crossed. The smooth-shod horses fell at every second step, the infantry moved only with the greatest difficulty, and were obliged to bivouac in the mountains because the road was blocked by cannon, which were slid down the steep places with great risk and toil, and we had the doubtful satisfaction of watching from Vejtrenova the rear-guard of the Turkish army disappear on its way towards Tatar-Bazardjik, unable to pursue it, because the infantry did not get over the pass. Nevertheless, during the night the Moscow regiment captured a train of nearly three hundred waggons, and dispersed three battalions of the enemy.

"Next day, New Year's day, old style, the four columns joined, in the vicinity of Tatar-Bazardjik, the detachment of Weliaminoff, being somewhat behind its assigned position, having delayed one day on account of the rumoured armistice. Tatar-Bazardjik was already on fire in several places as we came in sight of it from the pass, and as we reached the summit of the last hill bordering the great plain of Philippopolis early in the morning, nine distinct columns of smoke were rising from the town. Half-a-dozen battalions of the enemy, Baker Pacha's division, were drawn up across the road a mile in front of the town, with two lines of skirmishers and a strong rear-guard of cavalry posted on the road, and a large detachment on the right and left. Evidently nothing was to be gained by attacking them, for they were manœuvring to cover their retreat, which we hoped to block the next day, so there was only a little artillery practice and

several slight skirmishes between the outposts.

"The next morning we rode through Tatar-Bazardjik, completely pillaged and half burned, with scarcely an inhabitant left, and pushed on until sunset. We were then opposite the rear of the Turkish column, separated from it by the river Maritza, fordable only at long distances. The line of march of both armies was parallel, the one hurrying along the railway to reach Philippopolis, the other pushing forward on the road to head off the retreat. The troops on both sides were nearly exhausted; but there was this notable difference between them—the Turkish stragglers were almost always cut off, while the Russians, after a rest of a few hours in some village, rejoined their regiments; and while the Turkish force was gradually dribbling away, the Russian columns kept full.

"Part of Schouvaloff's detachment, after a march of thirty miles without halt, forded the river on the evening of the 13th, with the thermometer at zero, and pushed on rapidly after the Turks, who were still running, but, finding them too strong to risk an attack with the small force across the river, the detachment was quartered in the village. At daybreak Count Schouvaloff, with a dozen battalions, found himself within one thousand five hundred yards of the enemy, who were so worn out that they had been unable to retreat further, and he began a demonstration to delay, if, possible, further retreat until General Schilden-Schuldner's brigade could ford the Maritza near Philippopolis, and turn their right.

"It will be evident that Schouvaloff's column, which was expected to be the last in order of the four, was really the first, and on this devolved the duty of arresting the retreat of the enemy, while this rôle was to have been filled by Weliaminoff's detachment. The Turks, some forty battalions strong, occupied a position across the railway, their left resting on the village of Kavatair, their right on the village of Airanli, and their centre on a small mountain behind Kadi-koi, Schouvaloff's demonstration being made

against their left and centre. The fight lasted all day long, and as the rice fields afforded little shelter the losses were considerable on both sides, the Russians counting more than three hundred. While this affair was going on, the column of General Krudener marched along the road towards Philippopolis, while Schilden-Schuldner was ordered to push on to turn the enemy's right.

"At sunrise on the day of the battle General Gourko and his staff were on the road at the point where it is nearest the river. The road was crowded with artillery, infantry, and pack-horses, when suddenly the right of the Turkish force appeared within rifle range on the other side of the stream. Three battalions were immediately sent across the river, part wading, part carried on the horse of the staff-officers and escort, and soon the firing, which had already begun on the right, spread along to our neighbourhood. Batteries unlimbered right and left of us, and went to work. Turkish shell began to burst near the road, and bullets dropped on all sides, wounding men and horses. Fortunately we were sheltered somewhat by a small mound of earth, and there we stood all day, the battle raging without intermission.

"For hours we watched for the advance guard of Schilden-Schuldner's column, which had long been ordered up, but it did not come along until late in the afternoon, having halted in a village, while the general rode slowly up to consult with General Gourko. Thus the turning movement failed, for the men did not get across until sunset, and during the night the enemy quietly slipped past Schilden-Schuldner between him and the mountains, and took new positions between Stanimaka and Derbendere. Krudener's detachment during the day occupied that part of Philippopolis north of the Maritza, but the bridge was burnt, and no attempt was made to ford the stream. A couple of cannon in position on the rocky height in the centre of the town shelled Krudener's force the whole day, inflicting only trifling loss.

"During the evening the squadron of eighty

Dragoons of the guard which had carried the advance battalions of Schilden-Schuldner across the river, led by Captain Bourago, raided into the city and found it evacuated, but a force of the enemy, probably one thousand five hundred, assembled in some disorder near the railway station, which was burning. Dismounting, and leaving their horses in shelter, this small company advanced quietly along the road to the station, and finding cover in a ditch within short range of the Turks, opened fire on them suddenly, cheering and making all the noise possible. The Turks at first returned the fire vigorously, but soon retired, evidently believing they were attacked by a large force, and the city was left in possession of Captain Bourago and his small squadron."

"Early in the forenoon of the 16th, when we rode out upon the left bank of the Maritza, opposite the city, a whole army corps was waiting there by the burnt bridge, while an immense crowd of Bulgarians were gathered on the further shore, shouting and gesticulating that the river was too deep to ford at that place. The bridge was completely destroyed, and no one seemed to have been master enough of the situation to look for a fording-place or arrange a ferry. Prince Tzereteleff crossed in a small boat immediately after the arrival of General Gourko, and in a few moments a rope ferry was rigged. Several natives were ferried across to point out the fords, and in an hour General Gourko and his staff entered the town. There was no ceremonious welcome, merely a service in the church.

"General Gourko took up his quarters in the Russian consulate. The officers found luxurious lodgings in the houses of the chief citizens of the town. Good order was the rule, and although the cannon were still roaring on the mountain sides south of the city, we forgot everything in the enjoyment of the first hours of comfort since Sofia. All the night of the 16th, and the whole of the following day, the battle went on in the mountain. When Fuad had withdrawn his force through the narrow gap left between Schouvaloff and the mountains, he took up position a few



miles south of Philippopolis, in the vineyards, obliged to defend himself from Weliaminoff, who began to hammer away at the rear-guard, and also compelled to face Schouvaloff and Schilden-Schuldner, who threatened his advance.

"How many thousands of the Turkish force had been placed *hors de combat*, captured, dispersed, or had escaped to Suleiman Pacha, it is difficult to say, but when they made their stand in the mountains, with their backs toward the snow-covered slopes, they counted not more than fifteen thousand men. General Dondeville, along with the third division of the Guard, forded the Maritza below Philippopolis, marched up the Stanimka road, that by which Suleiman with a reported force of thirty thousand to forty thousand men had escaped, occupied the town, and thus completed the semicircle of thirty thousand Russians around half the number of Turks. The latter has lost all their baggage, had open to them no way of retreat for their artillery, were without food and probably short of ammunition, and had been marching and fighting for the previous week day and night; but once at bay they fought like lions.

"On the morning of the 17th they charged down the slope with the bayonet in a mad endeavour to recapture the eighteen cannon left in Dondeville's hands the day before. One of the commanders, generally believed to be Fuad himself, rushed into the thick of the fight with Dondeville's troops, was surrounded, and is reported to have killed and wounded seventeen Russians with his own sword before he was finally cut down. But this headlong assault was stoutly resisted, General Krasnoff especially distinguishing himself at the head of the brigade of the third division, and that day twelve additional cannon were abandoned by the Turks as they retreated sullenly from one terrace to another; and when, after a most heroic but hopeless resistance, the disorganised, exhausted, famished, half-frozen remnant of an army could hold a bold front no longer, it broke up into small bands, and dispersed back in the mountains, leaving the remaining twenty cannon on the field.

"After nine days' marching, with three successive days' fighting in severe weather, all this on six days' rations of hard bread, the Russian troops were unable to continue the pursuit, and must now rest for some days. The total loss is about one thousand. The prisoners amount to over that number. Fifty-six cannon have been taken, and a great army completely broken up, smashed entirely to pieces. It is possible that the majority of the routed force will try and find its way to Adrianople, following the river Arda, but the road may be cut long before they come out into the valley of the Maritza.

"Meantime, we hear very little of the movements of the other armies. Part of the Schipka force made a detour by way of Cirpan, not being aware that Gourko was so near Philippopolis, and has now swung to the eastward again. Three days ago there was a small fight at Tirnova, the junction of the Yamboli railway. The place was occupied at the date of this despatch. A large force of cavalry under General Skobelev, the elder, is supposed to be near Haskioi, and Hermanli must be occupied before this. It is not likely that Gourko's force will form the reserve of the armies marching upon Adrianople. A much more congenial duty would be to act as a flanking column against the latter city, crossing the range of mountains south-east of Philippopolis, which is probably the part it will play in the campaign. The prospect of the passage of the third mountain range is not agreeable.

"Philippopolis has suffered both from fire and the yataghan, and although the order in the town is to all appearance perfect, there are still occasional murders. The Bulgarians are all armed, the majority with improved rifles, which they seek occasion to use, for there are men enough of the Bashi-Bazouk order among them. Although no special cases have come under my notice, I do not doubt that the soldiers have plundered to some extent and that unarmed Turks have been killed, and also I must make the same observation that I did at Sofia, that there is very little system in the regulation of affairs in Philip-

popolis; but as the gallows which ornamented many street corners have been taken down only within a day or two, having been in use since last summer, it is no wonder that the Bulgarians are tempted to easy revenge.

"We entered the city when the bazaar was already burned, and all the shops in its vicinity gutted, and the goods scattered in the streets or carried away. That portion of the city near the bridge on both banks of the river has been partially burned. The Turkish quarter is entirely deserted, but the rest of the city wears very much its usual aspect. To-day several shops have been opened. Prices have quadrupled at once, as they did in Sofia, and the few merchants who have been so fortunate as to save their stock are in a fair way to become millionaires. The great fear of the inhabitants now is, not that the Turkish army will return, but that the Moslem population in the mountains between here and the sea, which is notoriously vindictive, will take advantage of the absence of the Russians to revenge themselves for the capture of the city. A strong force of occupation will be left, however, and little danger from unorganised depredation is to be anticipated.

". . . The departure of my courier having been delayed on account of the insecurity of the roads, I am able to give an account of the capture of forty additional Krupp guns by the detachment under General Skobelev the elder. The force of Suleiman Pacha, when it left this city on the evening of the 15th, took the road to Stanimaka, thence proceeded toward Hermanli by the mountain road south of the main highway to Haskioi, where the route is indicated on the Austrian map by a spotted line. Prisoners report that he had the larger portion of his infantry in front, followed by his artillery, with a rear-guard of five battalions. The road over the watershed was so difficult that the artillery was delayed for a long time there. Meanwhile six squadrons of Skobelev's cavalry came up, and finding the enemy in a blocked road charged upon them, routing the rear-guard, and capturing the cannon, forty in number.

"It is doubtless the endeavour of Suleiman to reach Adrianople, but he will have to travel fast in order to get ahead of the Russians, for Skobelev the younger was at Tirnova, the junction of the Philippopolis and Yamboli railway, on the 17th. While Suleiman must now make his way towards Adrianople through the mountains the whole distance, Skobelev's force has a good road along the valley of the Maritza. The loss of Suleiman's artillery will also greatly diminish the effectiveness of his army if he reaches Adrianople, for it is said to be guns that are needed in the extensive fortifications there, even more than men, and the loss of upwards of two hundred cannon within a month on this side of the Balkans cannot be counterbalanced by even the most desperate resistance.

"To sum up the work of the past three weeks accomplished by General Gourko's command: it has forced two great Balkan passes; occupied Sofia and Philippopolis; entirely smashed the whole Turkish army of this department, reinforced by twenty battalions from the Rasgrad army, with the exception of a few thousand men who are accompanying Suleiman Pacha; taken thirteen guns at Araba Konak, four at Sofia, and ninety-four Krupps and three muzzle-loaders near Philippopolis, and all this with a probable loss of one thousand five hundred men, all told."

The authorities at Constantinople meanwhile displayed more and more the symptoms of thorough demoralisation and discouragement; and they had recourse to the most desperate expedients of an invaded country. They deemed it best to desolate the land as much as possible, so as to deprive the advancing Russians of shelter and provisions. So far, indeed, the invaders had found plenty of valuable booty in the track of the retreating Turks, and, as we have seen, had occasionally been dependent on what their enemy left behind them for the sustenance of their own troops, officers and men. In 1813 the Russians themselves had known how to convert their land into a wilderness, and had not hesitated to reduce Moscow to ashes, in order that Napoleon and his grand army might not derive



assistance from what they could not defend against him. Those tactics defeated the conqueror, and caused the destruction of his power; but the Turks were not so thorough. The government sent instructions to Philippopolis, as they had to Tatar-Bazardjik and even Sofia, that the town should be burnt; and several smaller towns, such as Aidos and Karnabad, were actually committed to the flames. The same order was given at Bourgas, but not obeyed.

At Philippopolis Suleiman Pacha seems to have contemplated this desperate course. When he fell back after the fighting of the 14th, and halted near the town, he ordered all the inhabitants to leave it, preparatory to its destruction; but the Russian advance was too rapid. Captain Bourago did find the barbarous work begun. The railway station and other public buildings had been fired, and there was great difficulty in saving them; but the inhabitants who had not fled seem to have been amongst the first to prevent the spread of the conflagration. They also sent a deputation to the Russian head-quarters, composed of Christian and Mussulmans, to declare that no resistance would be offered by the townspeople, and to beg that the place should not be handed over to pillage; and this petition was readily granted.

Meanwhile negotiations had already been opened by the Turks for an armistice; and it was expected at Constantinople, as well as by the friends of the Porte abroad, that no delay would occur in carrying it into effect. The Russians postponed their answer, as mentioned above, being resolved to secure as much as possible by conquest before sheathing the sword. As a consequence of this sharp practice, a number of unfortunate misunderstandings arose, hostilities taking place in some quarters after the Turks had laid down their arms. Thus at Samakoff, where Weliaminoff had been driving the enemy before him, he was suddenly visited by a flag of truce, and informed that a despatch had come from Constantinople announcing the actual conclusion of an armistice. The Turks had ceased firing, and the Russian soldiers had ap-

proached the outposts, and shaken hands with the men. Suleiman Pacha's chief of the staff had come to General Gourko, announcing the same thing, and bearing a sealed despatch for the Grand Duke Nicholas. But orders were soon received to continue the forward march to Adrianople; and it was then perceived that the Russian authorities were disposed to push their advantage to the utmost.

At Philippopolis, as in other towns entered by the Russians, their entry was the signal for the return of large numbers of Bulgarian fugitives, who had been driven out by the Mussulmans, and who now came back to their homes in the wake of their deliverers. From that time forward they found themselves masters where they had formerly been subject to more or less oppression; and a bad use some of them made of their new power.

An amusing story is told of the occupation of this town, which is worth repeating. "A priest of one of the regiments went into a house and had a fire lighted to make some tea. As the house was not entirely plundered he thought he might find some sugar in a cupboard near the fireplace, but instead of sugar he found a Turk, with his rifle across his knees, curled up in the intervening space between the door and the wall. Mutual surprise and mutual fear! But the priest recovered first, and ordered the Turk to give himself up; which he promptly did. While he was drinking his sugarless tea, it occurred to the priest to look in another cupboard, and an exactly similar result followed, and he had the honour of turning over two prisoners to the guard."

Here is another anecdote from the same source:—"We were watching the smoke rise from Philippopolis, and the troops as they marched along the road, when three horsemen rode out of the grove upon the opposite bank of the river; one of them drew his revolver and deliberately fired it three times in our direction, and then turned and quietly trotted away, followed by the second, while the third remained there looking at us. He was dressed in the

Circassian costume, and there was a brief moment of doubt whether he was not after all one of the scouts of Schouvaloff's column; but in an instant the Kuban Cossacks, who have an instinct for distinguishing the enemy, were kneeling along the bank and banging away at the Circassian. When the fire began he saluted, wheeled his horse round, and slowly retired, evidently caring no more for the buzzing of bullets than for the singing of so many mosquitoes. I imagined him chuckling all the time at the wild firing of the Russians, who certainly did not distinguish themselves on that occasion, although the mark was not half rifle shot away."

The adventure of Captain Bourago and his squadron of dragoons at Philippopolis is told in a diverting manner by the writer from whom we have borrowed the last anecdote. After crossing the River Maritza on horseback, the captain came to General Gourko and reported that his men were "wet, hungry, and cold, the horses fatigued and without food, and asked for further orders.

"Go and join your regiment,' said General Gourko.

"It is impossible to find the bivouac in the night, your excellency,' was the reply.

"Then, suppose you go in and occupy Philippopolis; you will find good lodgings,' suggested the general, more than half in jest.

"Is that your order? eagerly asked the captain.

"It is!" came promptly back in reply, and the captain saluted, mounted quickly, and, forgetting fatigue and cold, led his squadron towards the zone of the enemy's bivouac fires all along the plain between the river and the mountains, and went away at a trot.

"The adventures of this little band are worth relating. When they came within half a mile of the fires they halted, and scouts were sent forward to report on the probable number of the enemy, but they returned in the course of an hour with the news that the bivouac was empty, and that the fires were left burning to deceive the Russians. Then the squadron trot-

ted away in the darkness towards the black mass of the smaller one of the two rocky hills that tower over Philippopolis—landmarks in the unbroken plain for many miles.

"Near the town another bivouac barred the path—this time in a field enclosed by a ditch and bank of earth. Leaving the horses to be led in groups of six to a single man, Captain Bourago and the rest of his force reconnoitred on foot up to the bivouac, and peered over the wall to hear the last of the Turks go away in the distance. The fires were only deserted a few moments before the dragoons arrived. Mounting again, the dragoons, with the platoon of singers at their head, marched into the streets of Philippopolis, waking the inhabitants with the unaccustomed music. Everybody was of course surprised and delighted at the arrival of the Russians, and half the population turned out in their night-dresses.

"One of the consuls met Captain Bourago, and begged him to enter his house and take a cup of tea. Over the tea he put the natural question,

"How many men are here?"

"Oh, very many—in fact, an immense force,' was the reply.

"But I mean here in the city,' repeated the consul.

"Why, we have got a whole squadron of dragoons!"

"Then, if you value your lives,' said the consul, 'you will lose no time in trying to escape, for you are surrounded on all sides.'

"With only a moment of hesitation, Bourago ordered his men to mount, and marched towards the station, where the enemy was reported to be strongest. It was now past midnight; the great piles of stores and several houses were burning at the station, and just beyond could be plainly distinguished by the light of the fires a great mass of Turkish soldiers in some disorder. In the same formation as before, the dragoons advanced with great precaution, and reached a ditch within short range, concealed themselves in it, and opened a scattering fire, cheering and



shouting with all their might. Volley after volley answered their fire, but the bullets passed over their heads, and they began to shoot with all possible rapidity, taking careful aim. The terrific fire of the Turks grew weaker and weaker, and finally melted away, and sounded further and further off. Now was the moment to charge, and the squadron mounted and went away at a gallop after one thousand five hundred retreating Turks, sabreing those who did not immediately give themselves up, and capturing over fifty prisoners. Surrounding the burning station with a guard, Captain Bourago entered it, and found three consuls there, with several of the railway *employes*, and learned that only a short quarter of an hour before three pachas were standing there, waiting for a supper to be prepared. I hardly need remark that the officers of the squadron enjoyed that supper. Count Rebender, who, with Lieutenant Pijoff, had been very active through the whole affair, was given a platoon to clear out the nest on the hill, which he did in short order, and the squadron slept in the town."

This is how Philippopolis was captured; and nothing could better prove the demoralisation which had overtaken the Turks.

## CHAPTER V.

### RADETZKY'S ADVANCE.

AS we have already seen, the fall of Plevna produced an instant relief for the Russians, over the whole theatre of war. The Turks made a general rally for Constantinople, especially from the moment when Gourko had crossed the Etropol Balkans, and emerged into the Sofia plain. Thus Suleiman Pacha immediately drew back his outposts in the Quadrilateral, and embarked at Varna for the capital, with ten thousand troops. Other portions of the Ottoman force in Bulgaria followed, and the Russian front in that direction was at once advanced. Prince Mirsky

re-occupied Elena, on the Osman Bazar road, and after that, Slataritzta; whilst Todleben himself proceeded to the siege of Rustchuk, which was eventually surrendered by its commander before the signature of the treaty of peace.

It was on the 9th of January that the fate of the Schipka Pass was finally decided, in a way so unexpectedly favourable for the Russians. Vesoul Pacha, who was in command of the Turks, and who must have perceived the great strategical value of his position on the southern slopes of the Balkans, was either very incompetent or very unfortunate in his operations. The condition of affairs, at all events at the beginning of the new year, was plain enough for any discerning general to see. It was evident that the Russians were not to be deterred by the severe winter from pushing their advantage as much as possible. This being the case, it was also clear that the first efforts of the enemy were being directed towards the crossing at Etropol, where Gourko and Suleiman Pacha were already face to face. Now Vesoul Pacha would see that his own particular share in the defence of his country was of a twofold character. On the one hand, it was necessary for him to hold the pass to the last moment, as he had held it for several months past. On the other hand, it was at least very possible that a large Russian force would presently be advancing along the Philippopolis road; in which case he would himself be holding the key of the position, commanding the left flank of the enemy. A day's notice would suffice to put him in communication with the Turkish force covering Adrianople; and in this way the latter city might have been defended for a considerable time.

Thus Vesoul Pacha had to keep himself on the alert, both in his front and in his rear; he had to hold Radetzky at arm's length, and to watch for the first symptoms of danger south of the Balkans, along the routes leading from the western passes. He must have known, or his superiors must have known, that the Russians had more than one means of throwing a force over the mountains on the west of Schipka; and,

if it was in the last degree improbable that such a force could, in mid-winter, and with such brief delay, make its appearance on Vesoul's rear, it was at least matter for consideration and precaution by a careful general.

As it was, a Russian force under General Karzoff, part of which had come by way of the Trajan Pass, and part from Etropol, surprised Vesoul Pacha by way of Kezanlik at the same moment that Radetzky and Prince Mirsky advanced against him through the Schipka Pass; and thus the Turkish army was taken in a trap, and captured entire. This it was, almost as much as the rapidity of Gourko, which rendered Adrianople indefensible, and shortened the whole campaign.

There were, of course, several reasons which the Turks might urge in excuse of this fatal mistake. That which actually happened could scarcely have been expected by any general. The experience of former wars on the same ground, the severe winter weather, all the probabilities of the case were opposed to such an achievement on the part of the Russian army. Moreover, the Turks alleged, not without justice, that they were entitled to consider the armistice as having virtually begun. It is true that a conqueror is not obliged to grant the cessation of hostilities at the precise moment selected by the losing side; and the Grand Duke Nicholas had not actually agreed to the Porte's proposals. No orders had been given to the commanders to hold their hands; in fact, directions had been issued of a precisely opposite nature. But the Turks undoubtedly lost much ground after they had demanded an armistice, and as a consequence of their too hasty abandonment of the defence.

The measures taken by the Russian authorities with a view to the capture of the Schipka Pass are explained in the following semi-official account, telegraphed from St. Petersburg a few days after the success of the movement had become known: "Immediately after the fall of Plevna the Grand Duke Nicholas sent the Third Infantry Division of the Guard and the Ninth

Corps to reinforce General Gourko, so that he might debouch beyond the Balkans with a sure prospect of success. At the same time Generals Karzow and Radetzky were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to advance. In order to strengthen General Radetzky, General Skobelev was sent to him with the Sixteenth Division, three battalions of the 3rd Rifle Brigade, and the 9th regiment of Cossacks; while General Karzow was only reinforced by the 10th battalion of Rifles. General Gourko had scarcely crossed the Balkans when Generals Radetzky and Karzow were ordered to prepare to march. General Dellinghausen was instructed to divert the attention of a portion of the Turkish forces by demonstrations against Achmedli Twarditza and Hainkioi. General Radetzky subsequently received as an additional reinforcement the Thirtieth Infantry Division and three regiments of cavalry. It was then decided that General Karzow should commence a movement over the Trajan Pass on the 2nd inst. General Radetzky's march in the direction of the Schipka Pass was completed on the 5th. General Karzow made his descent from the mountains with five battalions of his division, the 10th Rifle battalion, two sotnias of Cossacks, and three batteries of artillery. The remainder of his division then joined him from Slatitza, whither it had made the descent from Etropol. Two columns were sent towards the village of Schipka to take the Turks in the rear. The right wing, under General Skobelev, consisting of the Sixteenth Division, the 9th, 11th, and 12th Rifle battalions, the Bulgarian Militia, two companies of the 4th battalion of Sappers, and the 9th Don Cossack regiment, marched by way of Selensdarwo, Karadli, and Hemedi. The left wing under Prince Swiatopolk-Mirsky, composed of the Ninth and Thirtieth Divisions, the 4th Rifle Brigade, and portions of the 21st and 23rd Don Cossack regiments, proceeded through Krestaz, Seltzo, Gusowo, and Janina. General Radetzky himself remained on the Nicholas height. Three regiments of the 1st Cavalry Division were brought forward on the 7th from Gabrowo.



The troops took with them eight days' rations of biscuits, peeled corn, salt, tea, sugar, spirits, and barley, half being carried by the men and half by beasts of burden. Besides this they had with them a considerable number of cattle, sufficient for eight days' rations of meat. Ninety-six cartridges were carried by each man and seventy-six by each animal, and there was also a quantity of medical and surgical stores. On the 6th inst., during a severe frost, Prince Mirsky arrived at Seltzo and General Skobelev at Karadli. The artillery was dragged along on sledges, and all difficulties were surmounted notwithstanding the frightful masses of snow, which in many places was a fathom and a half deep. The troops marched forward with great courage. On the 7th Prince Mirsky advanced from Seltzo against Gujowo, and General Skobelev occupied Hemedi. On the 8th both corps marched upon the village of Schipka, and arrived fighting within three kilometres of that place. At six o'clock on the morning of the 9th, General Skobelev and Prince Mirsky began the battle in a thick fog and a snow storm. Towards eleven A. M., General Radetzky advanced from the Nicholas height to the attack with the 15th Division. He telegraphed at seven o'clock in the evening as follows:—

"The whole Schipka army is a prisoner; there are no Balkans left to oppose us. In the depth of winter the Russian troops overcame this obstacle, broke down the desperate resistance of the enemy along the whole line from Sofia to Twarditza, and are now everywhere marching forward."

Vesoul Pacha had not yielded without a severe struggle. The fighting, of which we have no very circumstantial details, was even more sanguinary and obstinate than that which took place between Gourko and Suleiman Pacha. The Russian loss was put by Radetzky at nineteen officers killed and one hundred and sixteen wounded; one thousand one hundred and three men killed, and four thousand two hundred and forty-six wounded; or, in all, five thousand four hundred and eighty-four *hors de combat*. The number of Turkish prisoners was computed at

thirty-two thousand, including four pachas; and the number of captured guns was ninety-two. Fifty-four of these were taken on the heights of Schipka, and amongst them were eighteen mortars.

As late as November 2nd, 1878, the "Daily News" contained a detailed account of the decisive battle which ended in the capitulation of Vesoul Pacha. This is the only full narrative of the battle of Senova, and the most interesting portions of it may be quoted here.

Senova is a village about four miles south of Schipka, and it was in the woods surrounding this place that Vesoul Pacha had collected the army on which the safety of Adrianople depended. The last-named city, as the account in question declares, if deprived of support from the troops at Schipka, would be at the mercy of the invaders, and the Russians once there would be able, without much difficulty, to strike heavily at Suleiman. "As events showed, Suleiman never seems to have entertained the idea that so daring a plan as the latter would have been adopted, though Baker Pacha, with a higher opinion of Russian daring, was of a contrary opinion. As a fact, it was the one decided upon during the first four days of the present year."

The Turkish army, under Vesoul Pacha, consisted of two portions. "Its base was at a large entrenched redoubt at Senova, covering the road to Kezanlik, and containing upwards of thirty thousand men. From this base the Turkish army had entrenched itself at various points on the heights commanding the village and the zig-zag pass of Schipka, as far as St. Nicholas, which, though in the hands of the Russians, was thus commanded by Turkish positions to the right and left of it. In the pass and on the heights there were about ten thousand Turkish troops. The positions occupied, both at Senova and round about Fort St. Nicholas, were well chosen and very strong, and the Turks had succeeded in bringing into service in these positions one hundred and fourteen Krupp guns. The pass of Schipka was held by the Russians at Fort St.

Nicholas. Thence to the camp at Senova, on the plain, the whole of the pass was commanded by the Turks, including the village of Schipka, at the southern end of the pass. The entrenchments which had been made about Senova were on the Schipka side of a wood about three miles in circumference, within which was the village of Senova itself. The occupation of this wood cut the Kezanlik road. These were the two armies which blocked the passage of the Balkans. No serious attempt had been made to drive them away for many weeks, and while the army on the heights had the confidence which springs from the knowledge that they had been slowly but surely gaining ground, that at Senova had had time to strengthen its position, while exempt from all fear of attack. The general command of the expedition intended to strike at these two armies—one in the plain, and the other on the heights—was committed to Radetzky. The troops under this general had been concentrated in the neighbourhood of Gabrova, and consisted of the 8th Army Corps, about twelve thousand strong, with artillery, which, however, could not be moved, and without cavalry; of the 30th Division of Infantry, consisting of about eight thousand men, which had been brought from Plevna; of the 4th Brigade of Rifles, consisting of about three thousand men; of the 16th Infantry Division, from Plevna, nine thousand strong; of the 3rd Rifle Brigade; and also twelve battalions of Bulgarian Volunteer Militia.

“The undertaking which the Russians had determined upon was a terribly serious one. To cross the Balkans in the depths of winter at any time in the face of an enemy would be a hard task, but last winter it was peculiarly difficult. The snow was from four feet to six feet deep on the mountain highlands. It was well known that in Gourko’s army many men were being frozen to death every day. The 24th Division of Infantry had had hundreds of men frozen to death in the trenches at Fort St. Nicholas. They had numbered eleven thousand men. They were now reduced to below three thousand effective men. The snow had in places drifted so

as to make it all but impossible to find where the track was. Two out of the three roads which it was proposed to make use of had hardly been known to exist, and could not have been found out without the aid of the friendly Bulgarians. Any offensive movement that was to be made could only be made along tracks from which it was necessary to be constantly shovelling a way through the snow. The shortest way through the Balkans was by the Schipka Pass, and it had the great advantage of having something like a road; but though the Russians had possession of Fort St. Nicholas, the Turkish entrenchments and batteries blocked the descent, and the enemy held such strong positions in the neighbourhood that General Radetzky probably considered that it would be madness to attempt to take them in the situation in which he found himself at the end of December. To strike at the Turkish army at Senova it was necessary to strike quickly and to hit hard, and this evidently could not be done if the army were delayed weeks in pushing its way, with probably a large sacrifice of men, through the Schipka. Moreover, the proposal was to meet an enemy who was known to possess very heavy artillery. From St. Nicholas the Russians had seen during four months the growth of the camp and its fortification with artillery in the plain of Senova, below them. The Russians believed that this camp not only contained a large Turkish army, but that Suleiman with his forces was near Slivno, and would be ready if need were to fall back on Adrianople and make of it a second Plevna. They did not credit him with the blunder of having led a considerable portion of his forces to Sofia.”

It was therefore determined to divide the Russian forces, and attack the Turks simultaneously in front and rear. “In order to understand the plan of attack which was finally decided upon, it is worth studying the position. Roughly speaking, the Balkans are crossed in this part of the country by three passes parallel to each other. The western one terminates at the village of Imitli. The central pass, about five miles distant from that of Imitli, terminates



at Schipka. The eastern pass, parallel to the two others, and about nine miles from the Schipka, ends at Guzova. The Russian army was at the northern extremity of the Schipka Pass, near Gabrova. The village of Schipka was at the southern extremity, in the plain, with Fort St. Nicholas, still in the possession of the Russians, about the middle of the pass. Due south of the village of Schipka, and at the distance, as already stated, of about four miles from it, were the forest and village of Senova, where the Turks had strongly entrenched themselves. The country through which these passes run is mountainous, abounding in deep ravines and precipitous sides. The proposal of General Radetzky was that his army should advance in three columns, marching simultaneously. General Skobelev was to be in charge of that on the right, marching through the Imitli Pass. Prince Mirsky was to command that on the left; while Radetzky himself held the Schipka Pass with the third. Probably the idea was that Radetzky was not to strike his blow in the Schipka until he knew that Skobelev and Mirsky had either united their forces or were striking at the enemy in his front. It was possible, also, that on the approach of the Russian armies from Imitli and Guzova the Turks would fall back out of the pass, and that then the right, left, and centre of the Russians, having united, would make a combined attack on the united Turkish armies at Senova.

"General Skobelev's army consisted of the 16th Infantry Division, ten battalions of Bulgarian Militia, and four regiments of cavalry, in all making up a total of twenty-five battalions of infantry and twenty squadrons of cavalry, or a little under twenty thousand men. The only artillery that he was able to get across consisted of one mountain battery of eight three-pounders. He had tried to take with him a light battery of four guns, but these had to be left in the snow. The centre column, under Radetzky, consisted of the 14th Division of Infantry, a regiment of the 9th Division, and two battalions of Bulgarian Militia. The left column

under Mirsky, consisted of twelve battalions of the 30th Division of Infantry, nine battalions of the 9th Division, four battalions of the Rifles, and a Cossack regiment of cavalry—in all, twenty-five battalions of infantry and six squadrons of cavalry. He also had only eight mountain cannon. On the 5th of January an order of the day was issued by General Skobelev, which is interesting as showing what was the impression which was intended to be conveyed to the Russian troops. In full consciousness of the difficulties of the task before them, the Russian leader, concealing nothing, but trusting to the bravery of his troops and the soldiers' belief in the righteousness of the cause they were fighting for, thus addressed them:—

" 'Soldiers—We have a hard task to accomplish, and one worthy of the renown of the Russian flag. To-day we begin the passage of the Balkans. Without artillery, without roads, we shall have to push our way through the snow, and to do this in the presence of the enemy. Once over the Balkans, a large and powerful Turkish army, commanded by the best generals of the enemy, is awaiting you. This army ventures to stop your advance. Remember, soldiers, that at this moment the honour of the fatherland is in your keeping; that at this moment the liberator and all Russia are beseeching God for you. Russia expects you to be victorious. Do not be frightened either at the number or at the well-known bravery of the Turks, or at their hatred of you; because the cause you defend is a holy one, and God will be with you.

" 'Bulgarians! you know that by the will of the emperor, the liberator, Russian troops have come into Bulgaria. From the day you began to form legions you have shown yourselves worthy of a great sovereign and of a great people. Since the unhappy days of the battles of last July you have earned the confidence of your Russian comrades. We ask you to behave as bravely in the battles you are about to engage in. You are fighting for the liberation of your country and your religion, for the inviolability

of your families, for the honour of your mothers, wives, and sisters ; in a word, for all that on this earth is holy and worth living for.'

"As the distance to be traversed by the left column under Mirsky was a little greater than that which Skobelev was to go over, Mirsky started on the 5th of January, and Skobelev on the 6th. The intention was to get across the Imitli and Guzova passes unobserved if possible, and then, each arriving on the plain south of the Balkans about the same time, to make a joint attack upon the enemy. The difficulties which were encountered by both armies were not less than they had anticipated. Skobelev's troops had to march in Indian file through a trench dug all the way across the mountain. The troops which left Toplich to the north of the Imitli Pass on the morning of the 6th marched on uninterruptedly through the night, during the whole of the day of the 7th, and only reached Imitli in the early morning of the 8th of January. At daylight, on the 8th, Skobelev had showed only the head of his column at Imitli. Prince Mirsky had been successful in getting the whole of his force down to the plain at Guzova. All idea of stealing a march upon the Turks in coming through these passes was gone, because the enemy had seen and had fired at Skobelev's long thin line from the heights to the west of Fort St. Nicholas. On the morning of the 8th, six battalions of Skobelev's division had arrived near Imitli. With these he stormed the village, and took it with a loss of two hundred men. Then and there he entrenched himself, waiting for the arrival of the rest of his men, for the massing into one body of a long line of men which had stretched from Toplich to Imitli. When the head of the column reached the plain, the last men had not begun the passage of the Balkans. Moreover, as the men trickled rather than poured in, they were tired and worn out with their hardships. They had been allowed to sleep but for a few hours in the snow, and they had had nothing hot to eat or drink since leaving Toplich. Rest, therefore, was absolutely necessary, if only for a few hours.

"On the morning of the 8th of January Prince Mirsky's troops started from Guzova to the village of Schipka. In so doing this leader was probably following the letter of his orders, but could hardly have been acting in accordance with their spirit. To march into Schipka was to get into a position with a strong army in his front, and a strong entrenched camp in his rear. Moreover, to get himself even between the mountains and the camp was to place his men in a most hazardous position—a position where he was liable to have all his communications cut off, and where the enemy would fight from his strongest side. Still, without waiting for the arrival of Skobelev, he committed the blunder of neglecting the army upon his left. Almost immediately after his march began—that is, at sunrise on the 8th—the Turks attacked him. The battle raged all day, and until eleven at night. After a slight success on the part of the Russians, the Turks began steadily to gain ground, and at the end of the day Mirsky had lost nearly four thousand men. The enemy was steadily harassing him and driving him into a position where he would be inevitably cut off from his communications with the Guzova pass, and where a surrender was only a matter of a few hours. The troops under Mirsky, however, behaved splendidly, especially the 4th Brigade of Rifles, under Krok ; and a regiment of infantry, under Arloffsky. The men under these officers bore the whole brunt of the fight, and were not driven out of the trenches which they captured from the Turks. In the afternoon Mirsky sent in hot haste to inform Radetzky of the critical position in which he was placed, and that he had heard nothing of Skobelev. Radetzky, on hearing of the failure of Mirsky's attempt, decided, with the determination of a soldier to help another out of a scrape, to attack the enemy in front with all his force. The desire to help the prince in difficulties had no doubt more to do with the attack which he determined to make than his deliberate judgment on the likelihood of success. It is unlikely that he would be able to succeed in one day's attack where he had



failed before in attacks continued during several days, and with a larger number of men. To help a soldier in difficulties, however, Radetzky, with the chivalry which is part of his nature, determined to attempt the impossible. Accordingly, at seven o'clock on the morning of the 9th January, Radetzky made an attempt upon the strong positions in his front, and, as might have been expected, considering the small number of men at his disposal, was repulsed with heavy loss.

"The centre and left of the attacking force had thus entirely failed. It remained to be seen whether Skobelev could be thus easily disposed of. On the morning of the 8th Skobelev had seen from the heights about Imitli that a battle was raging between Shikerli and the road from Guzova to Schipka, and became aware that Mirsky was striking his blow; but Skobelev was quite unable to give any assistance. Whether even it was going for or against Mirsky, he was unable to learn. All through the day his men came trickling over the mountain, and by evening the 61st, 63rd, and 64th regiments of Infantry, and two regiments of Cossacks, had come up. To be aware that fighting was going on, and that Mirsky was probably in need of assistance, and yet to be unable to render it, was no doubt one of the most trying situations in which Skobelev had been placed. He had, however, too few men, and those too tired with the terrible march through the snow, to justify the attempt to go at once to the aid of Mirsky. He determined, therefore, to wait until the morning of the 9th, and then attack with the whole of his force. During the night of the 8th-9th troops came slowly in. Otherwise the night passed quietly. Skobelev entrenched himself, but was not attacked. At three in the morning the Turks opened fire upon Mirsky again. It became evident that they had taken the offensive, that they had been much elated with their success on the previous day, and were confident of an easy victory over Mirsky in the dangerous position he had placed himself. The impression in Skobelev's camp was that Suleiman had come up with reinforce-

ment. It was evident to everybody that this second passage of the Balkans was about to end in greater disaster than the first unless Skobelev was able to make up for the failure of Mirsky. The time had come when a decisive blow must be struck, and if Skobelev did not succeed in striking it, the endeavour to reach Adrianople and finish the campaign in one dashing attempt would fail. The original plan had indeed so far proved a failure through the mistake of Mirsky. It remained to be seen whether Skobelev could, with his own army alone, save the attempt from absolute disaster. When day broke, Skobelev decided not to march on Schipka, in accordance with the original plan, but to march so as to bring himself to the south of Senova. An hour after, he gave orders to carry out this movement. His small body of cavalry was pushed forward still further towards the east, so as to cut off all retreat upon the Kezanlik road, and to be ready to harass the enemy during the fight. Before him was the entrenched camp under the command of Vesoul Pacha, between Senova Wood and the village of Schipka. Vesoul had forty Krupp cannons to oppose to any attack upon him. The small mountain guns which Skobelev had brought over were practically of no use to him. Skobelev endeavoured to compensate for the want of artillery by opening an attack with rifles; his battalions were formed one behind the other, after the fashion often adopted by Wellington in the Peninsular war, the object being to carry the Turkish position by bringing the whole force of his troops to bear on one particular point. The day was cold but bright and clear. At ten A.M. the attack began. It commenced with a march over the crisp snow as if on parade. Bands were playing and flags flying. The army had confidence in its leader and he in his army. For four hours a continuous cannonade was kept up by the Turks and answered by the fire of the infantry under Skobelev's command. At noon the order to charge was given, and before two o'clock all the artillery on the west and south of the Turkish camp had been captured. Then there began a scene which

is almost without parallel in the annals of war. The Turkish guns had been silenced. The Russians ceased firing and took to their bayonets. The two human masses came together in the wood of Senova in one of the longest bayonet attacks on record. For ten minutes there was silence, except for an occasional shot, or where steel struck steel, or where men shrieked as the murderous weapon pierced them. In ten minutes, however, the Turks began to waver, and, pressed forward by Skobelev's men, some made a rush for the Kezanlik road, abandoning everything in wild confusion, only to be met and driven back by the cavalry whom Skobelev had stationed there, while the great mass were driven forward towards the north-east, where they were met by Mirsky's men, who had advanced to the attack of the Turkish position when that made upon theirs had ceased. Throughout the fight the Turkish soldiers fought with the same bravery and the same natural instinct for fighting which distinguished them throughout the war. The blundering and incapacity was, as throughout the campaign, among the officers. While the disorder before which they were utterly powerless was at its height, and just before Mirsky's men came upon the scene, Said Bey came as a *parlementaire* from Vesoul Pacha and proposed the surrender of the army. Skobelev consented, provided that it was unconditional. No time was to be lost, and Vesoul immediately afterwards coming up accepted the unconditional surrender of the whole of his army.

"The rest of the day was occupied in completing the surrender. Twenty-six thousand men and two hundred and eighty officers were prisoners before sunset. Forty Krupp guns had changed ownership, and seven flags fell into the hands of Skobelev. The Russians, in return for this great capture, had lost about two thousand men, while the Turkish loss was estimated at eight thousand in killed and wounded. The success, however, was by no means yet complete. There were still ten thousand men in front and on the flank of Fort St. Nicholas, and if these men chose to hold out it would probably take

the Russians many days before they could be dislodged from their strong positions. Mahmoud Shamsi Bey was in command on the heights, and had already proved himself an obstinate fighter. But if the Russians were to push on for Adrianople and find it undefended it became of vital importance that time should not be lost, that Radetzky's forces should be brought through the Schipka, and the three united armies should advance with no enemy in their rear. Skobelev therefore claimed that orders should be sent to the heights by Vesoul, demanding an immediate surrender, and made the terms he was ready to grant Vesoul and the captured army dependent upon the unconditional surrender of the whole of the Turkish army in the pass. At the same time, as soon as the captured army had been disarmed and placed in safety, he prepared, if need be, to attack the heights in the rear. An attack, however, proved unnecessary. The defeat of the main body of the Turkish army around Senova had no doubt been witnessed by Mahmoud Shamsi; and when the messenger of Vesoul arrived, stating that everything was lost, Mahmoud gave in without opposition, and consented to surrender the whole of the position and the men under his command. General Radetzky pushed forward. The surrender was completed. Nearly ten thousand men and thirty-three guns were added to those already taken. Late in the evening, Radetzky's own men made their way through the Schipka to congratulate those of Skobelev on their success.

"That success was complete, and virtually brought the campaign to an end. Four days were spent in waiting for the whole of Radetzky's force, in arranging to send the prisoners over the Balkans, and in preparing for the great rush to Adrianople. On the evening after the battle, Mirsky took possession of Kezanlik. On the 10th or 11th the Turkish government learned the great disaster which had befallen them, as well as the failure of Suleiman before the advance of General Gourko. It had become evident to them that fighting was henceforth hopeless, and on the 14th Server and Namyk Pachas



were ordered to proceed to Kezanlik to negotiate terms of peace with the grand duke. Meanwhile Radetzky and Skobelev were pushing on with the utmost activity. Their object was to take Suleiman's army in the rear, and prevent him from falling back on Adrianople, and making of it a second Plevna. Already Suleiman was in full retreat—a retreat with which we have little to do, but which was only saved from being a huge disaster by the ability of Baker Pacha—and had telegraphed as early as the 8th an order to evacuate Philippopolis. Suleiman's army left that town on the evening of the 15th, burning a large portion of it as they went. As they left it the Russians entered. On the next day the great body of Skobelev's men were at Tirnova, the juncture of the Philippopolis and Yamboli railway. Suleiman's route to Adrianople was long and through the plain of the Maritza and to the south of it. Skobelev's was along a comparatively good and much shorter road. Skobelev had cut off the Turks from the chance of arriving at Adrianople before him. Their only means of escape was by the Rhodope mountains. . . .

"Skobelev's general's flag has inscribed upon it only two names—Kharkand and Senova. If he had never engaged in any other battles, these would have been sufficient to have ensured his fame. That of Senova, as the Sedan of the late war, will, however, be longest remembered, and is of the greatest importance. Whenever its history is recorded, the main credit due to the conquerors must be given to Skobelev for the successful manner in which his part of the plan was carried out, the failure of Prince Mirsky redeemed, and the most brilliant success of the war achieved."

The news of this engagement, and of the complete triumph of the Russians, came upon Europe as one of a series of extraordinary and sensational events, happening within a brief period; so brief, indeed, that the lookers on were hardly able at the time to realise their full significance. It will not be uninteresting to add here a short chronology of the first half of January.

*Jan. 1, 1878.* The Russians reach Taskosen, in the plain of Sofia.

*Jan. 3.* Sofia abandoned by the Turks.

*Jan. 4.* Sofia entered by General Gourko, without resistance. Detachments immediately sent forward in pursuit of Suleiman, Fuad, and Baker Pachas.

*Jan. 2-6.* General Karzoff advances upon the Trajan Pass, defeats the Turks, and reaches the Kezanlik road.

*Jan. 5.* General Radetzky brings a large force in front of the enemy in the Schipka Pass.

*Jan. 8.* Slatitza taken by General Dondeville, from Etropol, who then joins General Karzoff. Radetzky forces the Schipka Pass.

*Jan. 9.* Skobelev takes the village of Schipka and Prince Mirsky takes Kezanlik.

*Jan. 10.* Vesoul Pacha, with thirty-two thousand troops, being surrounded by Russian forces, capitulates.—(On the same day the Montenegrins take Antivari; and on the next day the Servians take Nisch.)

*Jan. 12-16.* Rapid advance of the Russians from Sofia to Philippopolis, and from Schipka to Adrianople.

*Jan. 14.* Capture of Tatar-Bazardjik, and of Veitrenova.—The Turkish plenipotentiaries, Server Pacha and Namyk Pacha, proceed to the Russian head-quarters to sue for an armistice.

*Jan. 15-18.* Sharp engagements between Gourko and Suleiman Pacha. Baker Pacha covers the Turkish retreat.

*Jan. 16.* Philippopolis occupied by Captain Bourago's dragoons. Capture of Slivno.

To this it may be added that Adrianople was occupied on the 20th of the month, just three weeks after the descent of Gourko into the Sofia plain.

Before we follow the course of events after the middle of January, we may glance at the naval operations on both sides. We have already done this for an earlier period; and the history of the

war up to the fall of Plevna showed clearly that the fleets had very little influence upon the operations of invader or invaded. On the Danube, indeed, much was done by the small craft of the Russians, and by their use of torpedoes, and much was left undone by the Turks which might have made the crossing infinitely more disastrous. The Russians gained full command of the river; but in the Black Sea the Turks had practically held the supremacy. They owed this to their powerful men-of-war, for which Abdul Aziz had paid such enormous sums, as well as to the provisions of the treaty of Paris, which excluded the Russian navy from the Euxine.

But great ships alone are not sufficient to render their owners complete masters of the sea. Great skill, daring, watchfulness and energy, are indispensable — especially for the maintenance of a blockade over a wide coast, which was what the Turks had to do in the Black Sea. These qualities were not conspicuous in the Turkish admirals and other officers; and the consequence was that the blockade of the Russian ports was not thoroughly effective.

The commercial community of nations soon finds reason to complain of anything like a fictitious blockade; and this was the case during the Turko-Russian war. A correspondent of the "Daily News" described the state of affairs at the close of 1877 in a letter written from Constantinople, entering both into the general question, and into one particular case. "At the beginning of the war," he said, "the Turkish government issued an official notification stating that the whole line of the Russian coast on the Black Sea was to be blockaded, and that the blockade would be maintained by an Ottoman fleet in sufficient force. A proposal was made to station a vessel in the Bosphorus, but the representatives of the Powers, with Mr. Layard at their head, refused to allow any such violation of the treaties by which the waters of the Bosphorus are made neutral. For some time no vessels attempted to run the blockade. Obviously it was a great risk for any vessel to

do so, because three miles from the Black Sea end of the Bosphorus, the Ottoman government could station a vessel or two, and count almost with certainty on a capture. Presently, however, as I reported in your columns several weeks ago, it got whispered about that vessels had come in from the Black Sea without molestation, and though it was perfectly known in Constantinople that they had come from Russian ports, they were allowed to pass through to their respective destinations. It was openly stated at the time that permission was given to these vessels by the Ottoman authorities, and I believe there can be no reasonable doubt whatever of the fact. In at least one case, which was brought under my own knowledge, a vessel left here avowedly with permission to go to Russia, and returned without hindrance. How many more went I am unable to say. It began, indeed, to be considered as quite a regular and permitted traffic. Probably backsheesh had to go somewhere, but that was nobody's business except of the givers and receivers.

"A prize court was instituted, and ruled in all the cases brought before it until the 17th of November, that if a vessel had escaped the line of the blockading squadron she could not be captured. It is no secret, indeed, that the legal advisers of the Porte were of this opinion. They held as certain, though by no means with all, of the continental authorities on the law of blockade, that the line of the blockading squadron once broken through, there was no right to capture a blockade runner during the further continuance of the voyage, or, at least, unless the chase had been begun and was continued till capture. Suddenly, however, a change was made in the opinion of the prize court, and the curious part about it is that the change was exactly contemporaneous with certain representations made to the Porte by Mr. Layard.

"The truth is, that when everybody in Constantinople knew that vessels were allowed to come from Russia, Italians, Germans, and others, began to ask why they should not be allowed to bring away some of the grain of Russia. More-



over, their ambassadors agreed with their view of the case, and openly stated that, in their view, the blockade ought to be considered as null. Null, either because it was not effective, or because privileges were given to certain vessels and not to others. If the Turks could stop ingress or egress to Russian ports and would not, then the rule which international law lays down, that a blockade which is not applied equally to all, is illegal. If the Turks, on the other hand, could not stop ingress and egress, then the blockade was ineffective, and by the fourth article of the declaration of Paris was illegal.

"Representations of this kind were, I believe, made to Mr. Layard. No one among the representatives of foreign powers had the opportunity of knowing so well as he that vessels were leaving Russian ports for Turkey and elsewhere, because, by an arrangement between England and Turkey, our government takes charge in Russia of the interest of Turkish subjects during the war, just as in Constantinople the German government protects the interests of Russian subjects. Accordingly many, perhaps most of these vessels, would have to get their papers in Russian ports from the English consul. Representations, as I have said, were made to Mr. Layard, and he, in return, made representations to the Porte, and very properly protested against what could only be regarded as either an ineffectual or a not impartial blockade. These representations exactly coincide with a change in view in the ruling of the prize court.

"On the 17th of last month, a vessel which had been arrested in the Bosphorus was condemned as a blockade runner, and avowedly on the ground that the court had now adopted the English and American view, the reading of international law supported by Lushington and Wheaton: that the blockading squadron has the right to arrest a blockade runner until she has completed her voyage. The consternation which this decision caused among a large class of merchants in the place, who had evidently made up their minds that the government intended, for a consideration, to allow blockade running, was

very great. That the court was right according to English law there can, I believe, be no doubt. But there were other considerations which the court overlooked, but which the representatives of the nations to which the arrested ships belong will not overlook.

"A considerable number of vessels, nearly thirty, I believe, have since been arrested at anchor in the Bosphorus. The embassies are at present much occupied by the course which they will adopt; but I think it probable that the Italian and Greek will distinctly protest against the arrests as illegal. I believe that no vessel under the British flag has even endeavoured to run the blockade, although some of the cargoes under the flags of Greece and Italy belong to British subjects. Count Corti, the Italian minister, ought to be, and is probably, one of the first of living authorities on the question of blockade, from the fact of his long experience in the decision of the British claims arising out of the American war; and he does not hesitate to express a strong opinion on the illegality of the arrests in question. The grounds for declaring the arrests illegal are principally that they were made in neutral waters, and that there can be no arrest where the government was granting permission to many ships to pass through from Russia, and even to go to Russia and to return again.

"The waters of the Bosphorus were neutralised by the Treaty of Adrianople, and by the capitulations have been made the waters of each nationality which had a ship anchored in them. European nations have never admitted Turkey within the circle of civilised nations, and Turkey has, by the treaties, divested herself of so much of the sovereign power as by these treaties or capitulations she has conceded to other nations. It is upon this condition of things that we have in Constantinople, and throughout Turkey, a series of national jurisdictions, or true *imperia in imperio*. A Frenchman here is in France, an Englishman in England, and so on, within certain well-defined limits. The Turkish government cannot arrest in the port of Constantinople

even one of its own subjects on board an English or other foreign merchant vessel. When it wants to make such an arrest, it sends to the consular authority to which the ship belongs and obtains police from thence. Nor is this state of things affected by the war between Russia and Turkey, because the capitulations expressly provide that, in case of war between Turkey and any other Power, the rights as fixed by the capitulations of other Powers are not to be in anywise affected. Such a condition of jurisdiction is a remarkable one, but it exists, and its existence is, indeed, absolutely necessary for the safety and protection of the foreign communities here. No one, so far as I know, who has had any knowledge of the subject, however much he may have been in love with the Turks, has ever thought of suggesting that the foreign communities should be handed over to Turkish jurisdiction. Foreigners have a belief, that in the last resort they can obtain justice in a law court, and therefore conduct their trade on that hypothesis. The native merchants, Greeks, Armenians, and Bulgarians, have long since lost any belief in the possibility of obtaining justice in the place where once Justinian's jurisprudents established legal principles for all time, and they conduct their business accordingly.

"I know of no instance where the Turks have ever claimed the right to arrest a vessel in the Bosphorus before the arrests in question. I imagine, however, that for certain police purposes they could do so, as, for example, if a vessel were smuggling. In such case, however, they would at once hand over the vessel to the authority to which she belonged, with a request that she would be detained until the charges were examined. The arrest of the blockade-runners was made by the Turks while they were at anchor, and in most cases after they had been in the Bosphorus for some days. There was of course no pretence of capture. They had run the blockade and had come to an anchorage in neutral waters—in waters where the Powers had refused to allow the government to place a ship for the purpose of capture.

"The affair has now become a diplomatic one, and unless some means be found of avoiding the difficulty, may lead to lively correspondence at least. There can be little doubt that the Turkish government gave their notice of blockade, and conducted their court of prize, under the impression that when a vessel had once escaped beyond the line of the blockading squadrons she had escaped altogether. They have now changed their opinion—have adopted what is probably the right rule, but, in avoiding one error, they have fallen into another. Having failed to capture the vessels before entering the Bosphorus, and while the voyage was in existence, they quietly arrest them while at anchor in neutral waters. Having also allowed a number of vessels to pass—some by connivance, some by neglect, some undoubtedly by express permission, and some by the decision of their court that they could not be lawfully detained—they need not be surprised that governments to which blockade-running ships belong claim the same right for their subjects which has been granted to those of other Powers. Two of the ambassadors openly state that they will not allow their vessels to be condemned, and it is pretty clear that they have international law on their side."

A notable illustration of the weakness of the Turkish fleet, in comparison with what it might have been, was given by the capture of a large Turkish transport, the "Mersine," near Odessa, by the "Russia." An Englishman who was the guest of Captain Baranoff, on board the last-named vessel, gives some interesting details of its movements in the last few months of 1877. We quote a portion of his diary from the "Daily News."

"*Sebastopol, December, 20th.*—Since October I have been roaming about the Crimea, visiting friends, and anxiously waiting for the arrival of the new cargo steamer that has been prepared for my friend, Captain Baranoff (the 'Russia'), and in which he has most kindly offered me a cabin. As it is now hourly expected here, I have returned to be in readiness to embark. Concerning our plans, of course I am in ignor-



ance, nor should I feel justified in publishing them if it were otherwise. When we have carried them out you may be sure I will lose no time in sending you an account of our cruise, and I sincerely hope it will not be an unfortunate one, for I am sure every Englishman must feel rather inclined to admire the plucky manner in which the Black Sea 'fleet' of Russia has bearded the Moslem's powerful navy. Whereabouts the ironclads are, or what they are doing, of course I do not know, but I can inform you that the 'Constantine,' the 'Vesta,' and the 'Vladimir,' have been for the last two months steaming about the Black Sea on whatever business they are engaged in, without apparently troubling themselves as to whether there is a blockade or not. About six weeks ago an ironclad and a corvette made their appearance, and endeavoured to capture another salt barge off Eupatoria. The proprietor managed, however, to sink it before they could get hold of it, and the Turks ran away after getting a shot or two from the shore.

"If the Turkish navy were not more or less under the influence of Admiral Hobart Pacha, I should say it deserves a great deal of credit for not having bombarded villages, villas, &c., on the Russian coast. As, however, such work could have gained it nothing, it has wisely abstained from doing so. In the beginning of the war the sultan was apparently deluded by some wag at Constantinople to publish an invitation to the Crimean Tartars, 'groaning under Russian tyranny,' to revolt. The Crimean Tartars, who are the happiest set of lazy rascals, perhaps, under the sun, responded by offering up prayers to Allah in their mosques for the success of the Russian army; and I have not the slightest hesitation in saying that unless the Sultan of all the Ottomans can send at least one hundred thousand troops to the Crimea, the hoisting of the green banner of the Prophet will affect the Crimean Tartars about as much as it will me.

"We have had, and are still having, the most lovely weather: the sun was so hot to-day that

I had, almost in self-defence, to wear my Indian solar topee. I have passed many winters here, but this is certainly the finest. There has not been a vestige of frost as yet, but perhaps we shall have to pay for it in January and February. At Aloupha Castle, the seat of Prince Woronzow, where I was on a visit about ten days ago, we had raspberries and strawberries frequently at dessert, and his gardener expects even to have them for Christmas. These are not in any way forced, but grow in the kitchen-gardens as ours do. So very warm has been this winter that on the south coast, when I left, even Russian ladies were still enjoying sea-bathing. Greek schooners constantly arrive with lemons, for which we are grateful, but not to the extent of granting them cargoes of grain. Consequently ten or a dozen of them are at anchor here disconsolate. The buildings I spoke of in my last are finished, and, I hear, crammed with grain. The oyster fishery, owing to their being only chance occasions for sending to Odessa, is at a discount. Excellent oysters are now to be bought for twenty kopecks a hundred. As the rouble is now worth two shillings, and there are one hundred kopecks in the rouble, I fancy we have a slight advantage over the London market in the purchase of this luxury.

"*December 29th.*—On Wednesday, at about 9 A.M., all Sebastopol was assembled at the Graffskoia landing-place to again welcome the hero of the 'Vesta,' who, in command of his new steamer, was signalled as approaching. In rear of the 'Russia,' at a distance of about half a mile, a strange three-masted screw steamer was observed, apparently of about eight hundred or one thousand tons. That it was a prize we had little doubt, though it was not till she was passing within almost a hundred yards of me that I distinguished two very small flags, indicating by their position that success had again followed the career of Captain Baranoff.

"The landing and reception of this favourite of fortune were thoroughly Russian. As soon as I could manage to shake hands with him he told me my cabin was ready, and that he pur-

posed leaving in a few hours. Accordingly I hurried to my quarters to pack up and write you a few lines, and later on I forwarded you a telegram. I have now little more to say about the capture. The 'Russia' left Odessa on the 22nd inst., and the following day, when off Penderekli, she encountered the 'Mersine,' carrying seven hundred and ninety-three soldiers and Bashi-Bazouks, twenty officers, including a lieutenant of the sultan's yacht, 'Izzedin,' with a few women and children, making, with the crew, a total of eight hundred and ninety-seven.

"It appears that the 'Mersine' had mistaken the character of the 'Russia,' and thinking she would prove an easy capture for the troops, allowed her to approach and get between them and the coast, which was about five miles off. When too late she discovered that she had made a mistake, and at the third shot she hauled down her flag. Captain Baranoff, having put an officer and twenty-six men on board, and removed the Turkish officers to the 'Russia,' at once made for this port, where she arrived with the prize as I have described.

"To return to the movements of the 'Russia.' The captain purposed leaving at once for Odessa with the prisoners, but in the afternoon a storm that had been gradually brewing all day burst upon us, and by midnight, even in this landlocked harbour, the motion of the steamer might have deranged the digestion of landsmen. At daybreak yesterday, the gale having abated, we put to sea, but had not got a dozen miles from shore when the captain told me he should put back, as the roll further on was too heavy for him to risk. Accordingly we returned to our moorings and landed the prisoners here. The colonel of the troops and his two servants were despatched by rail to Simpheropol. The colonel, who dined, &c., with the captain, had a melancholy expression of countenance, but I observed his appetite was healthy and his religious scruples concerning liquids by no means severe. His officers, who messed in the ward-room, were also not bigoted in this respect. To judge from the empty bottles on the table,

I think most of them approved of the sherbet of the infidel.

"About one o'clock yesterday the commander-in-chief, his Highness the Prince Woronzow, paid us a visit, and after lunch we all proceeded to visit the prize, which is lying at the custom-house wharf. The 'Mersine' was formerly the 'Sheriff,' and was a passenger and cargo steamer between Constantinople and Batoum, taken for this occasion by the government as a transport. She is a very strongly-built and handsomely-fitted screw steamer of one thousand four hundred tons, worth, I should say, about twenty-five thousand pounds sterling. I cannot say she was clean; but seven hundred and ninety-three Turkish soldiers and Bashi-Bazouks are not the most cleanly cargo, and and from what I saw of the prisoners I think, if I were forced to take a trip either with them or with a cargo of slaves from the African coast, I should cast my lot in with my black brethren."

The loss of this transport vessel under such circumstances caused great indignation amongst the Turks, as well as amongst their friends; and this, with other misfortunes to the Ottoman arms up to the first few days of 1878, gave rise to warm debates in the Turkish Parliament. A correspondent of the "Globe" gave the following account of one of the last meetings of the deputies, previous to their dismissal by the sultan. Writing on the 9th of January, he said:—

"The capture of the 'Mersine' has been strongly taken up in the Turkish Parliament. The Minister of Marine having received due notice at a previous sitting, Nefy Effendi, one of the deputies for Aleppo, on Saturday last, brought the matter before the Chambers. In a speech of no mean ability, Nefy Effendi complained of the inefficiency of the Ottoman fleet, citing the case of the appearance of a Russian cruiser before Kilia at the entrance to the Bosphorus, the capture of the 'Mersine,' and various incidents, in support of his assertion. With regard to the 'Mersine,' he stated there could be little doubt but that she had been de-



livered over by her captain, who was a Slav, to the enemy. The expectations of the nation had been disappointed in the Ottoman navy. Many millions had been expended on the purchase and equipment of ships of war. The Turks were avowedly the superiors of the Russians in this respect, and yet the enemy's cruisers steamed almost within sight of the capital with impunity, and treated the blockade of the Black Sea coast with a contempt which reflected but small credit upon the Turkish navy. Said Pacha, in reply, repudiated the conclusions arrived at, and stated that a few isolated facts by no means proved the entire naval administration to be blameworthy. He called the Chamber's attention to the great services which had been rendered by the fleet during the present war, the number of troops which it had safely conveyed, the successful evacuation of Soukhum when fifty thousand Abaze families were transported to Asia Minor in an incredibly short time. With regard to the capture of the 'Mersine,' the minister remarked that it was purely a piratical act, and that the most vigilant navy can never wholly prevent such occurrences. He further informed the house that the material loss occasioned by the capture of the 'Mersine' was insignificant, inasmuch as she was old and of small value. Nafy Effendi, however, expressed himself dissatisfied with Said Pacha's explanations, and complained that his excellency had not answered the questions propounded with sufficient directness. The majority of the house agreeing with the deputy for Aleppo, it was decided that the Chambers should address to Said Pacha the three following questions in writing:—1st. Why is the blockade of the Black Sea ports not more effectual? 2nd. What are the details and circumstances of the capture of the 'Mersine,' and who is responsible for the disaster? 3rd. Can the Minister of Marine guarantee that no such disaster will occur again? The Minister of Marine then withdrew. At the sitting of the 3rd January, Emin Effendi, the deputy for Smyrna, in a long and able speech, animadverted upon the negligent and careless

administration of military affairs. The orator reviewed events since the beginning of the war, and while making due allowance for the difficult and embarrassing position in which the government has been placed, he severely blamed those in power for not listening to the advice of those entitled to a hearing; for not sending reinforcements in time to prevent the capitulations of Plevna and Kars, having thereby brought about the capture of one of their best generals and the defeat of another. He referred to the speech from the throne on the declaration of war, in which it was distinctly stated that Turkey had six hundred thousand men under arms. If this number were exact, continued Emin Effendi, how came it that there were, when hostilities began, only three hundred and ten battalions in Europe and Asia? What had become of the rest? He further demanded that the name of the person who had been bold enough to deceive his Majesty and the nation in this respect should be made known to the Chambers. Why, he asked, 'when we saw that Russia was making such formidable preparations to attack us, did we not set to work to increase the number of our troops? Why was an expeditionary corps sent to Soukhum Kalé in direct opposition to the decision of the Grand National Council, in whose opinion we were not in a position to carry on offensive warfare. Why did the government, having once confided the supreme command of the army of the Danube to the ex-Sirdar Ekrem Abdul Kerim Pacha, interfere with his arrangements? Why, since the recall and disgrace of that general, has the Porte continued to hamper the movements of his successors by issuing orders from Constantinople? Why did not the military authorities have a supply of warm clothing ready for the troops, instead of leaving this duty until too late, when the snow had covered the ground? The sufferings of the troops were entirely due to their neglect.' After alluding in strong terms to the shameful inactivity of the navy, Emin Effendi concluded his speech by demanding the trial and punishment of Hussein Sabri Pacha, the commander of Ardahan, for having given

up that fortress to the enemy without attempting to defend it. He blamed the government for allowing such acts of cowardice to go unpunished, and pointed out the pernicious influence it would have upon the army. The Minister of War, Raouf Pacha, stated that he would appear at the sitting of the Chambers of the 7th January to answer Emin Effendi. On Monday, accordingly, his excellency was seen early on the benches of the ministers, but, before the sitting was opened, the minister was hurriedly called to the palace to see the sultan on important business, with whom he remained the greater part of the day. It is now reported that this interview with his Majesty was on the subject of an armistice. Raouf Pacha, it is stated, is to be named Imperial Commissioner, and to proceed to the camp to open negotiations with the Russian generals as to the conditions. The Sultan could hardly have chosen a fitter person for this duty, for the Minister of War is a zealous patriot, and at the same time an apt negotiator. On Saturday last it appears that some telegrams, reporting to the London press the proceedings of the sitting of the 5th of January, when the ministers were interpellated, were refused at the Telegraph Office. The question will be put to the Director-General of Telegrams at the next sitting of the Chambers whether this be true, and if so, for what reason information so well calculated to convince Europe of the sincerity of the Chambers, which for want of such testimony had not been fairly recognised, had thus been interrupted.

"On the whole, the meeting was as stormy and tumultuous as any which has yet been held in the Turkish Parliament, and we are hardly astonished to hear on the following morning that the ministers, in view of the hostile feeling towards them evinced by the Chambers, had tendered their resignation. The hopes of the peace party rose high, and it was confidently anticipated that the sultan would not hesitate to avail himself of such a favourable opportunity to get rid of the baneful influence of Mahmoud Damat, whose papers, as a matter of course, had gone

in with his colleagues'. Their hopes, however, were destined to be of short duration, for his Majesty, in direct contradiction to his own expressed opinions, saw fit to make no exception in his refusal to accept the Cabinet's resignation. They were one and all therefore retained in their original posts, and Mahmoud Damat would appear to be higher in the imperial favour, and consequent power, than ever."

Said Pacha had assured the Chamber that the capture of the 'Mersine' would soon be avenged; and his prediction was speedily fulfilled. In the middle of the month of January, the Russian ports of Anapa, Yalta, and Quesleve, were bombarded by a squadron under Manthorpe Bey, an English naval officer, who had taken service in the Turkish navy. The forts and towns were shelled, and the inhabitants were driven inland until the vessels had taken their departure. A few shots also were fired at Sebastopol, but without doing any damage; and the torpedoes which the Russians had laid down there kept the Turkish ships at a respectable distance.

Eupatoria and Theodosia were also bombarded by the Turks. The following telegram from Odessa, on the 13th of January, described the attack on the last-named port. "The commander of the 10th Army Corps announces that, at a quarter-past ten this morning, two large three-masted Turkish monitors approached Theodosia, and began bombarding the place. They were, however, compelled to withdraw by the well-directed fire of a Russian field-battery. While moving off, the enemy's vessels continued firing, and only ceased at half-past twelve o'clock, when they remained stationary. One hundred and thirty-two shots were fired against the town, in which ten houses were destroyed, one infantry soldier was killed, and five artillerymen and seven inhabitants were wounded. At four o'clock in the afternoon one of the monitors bore off in a westerly direction, the other remaining in the roadstead, apparently in order to repair. The Grand Duke Michael telegraphs, on the 14th inst., that on that date a Turkish monitor bombarded Anapa for more than two hours, damag-



ing a church and some other buildings. One man was killed. A Russian field battery returned the enemy's fire by a few shots."

This was the most notable exploit of the Turkish fleet since the series of operations connected with Soukhum Kalé, and it only serves to emphasize the small value of the naval armament which has cost Turkey so large a sum.

## CHAPTER VI.

### TURKEY'S APPEAL TO EUROPE.

As we have seen, the Turkish envoys, Server and Namyk Pachas, who were accompanied by Tarin Effendi, the legal counsel to the Porte, left Constantinople for the Russian head-quarters at the end of the second week in January, for the purpose of soliciting an armistice. After some little delay they reached Kezanlik on the 19th, and found the Grand Duke Nicholas on the eve of departure for Philippopolis, which had, in the meanwhile, been captured by the Russians.

It was understood that the czar's brother had full power to treat on behalf of the government; and the like authority was given to the Turkish envoys.

Server Pacha was greatly respected by his fellow countrymen. He had more than once been employed on delicate and difficult missions, and was distinguished for his pleasant and conciliatory manners, combined with firmness. One of his last public services had been to attempt the pacification of Bosnia, by examining into the complaints of the Christian insurgents. He had failed in a work which was beyond the range of possibility; and he was scarcely a fit man to employ on the business which brought him to Kezanlik. He fell into disgrace through an excess of candour in giving vent to his opinions under the pressure of his country's great misfortunes; for having unbosomed himself to a newspaper correspondent on the manner in

which he conceived England to have misled the Porte, his indiscreet words were repeated, and he was compelled to resign his post as a minister.

Namyk Pacha had had still more diplomatic training than his colleague, having spent most of his life in the various Ottoman embassies in Europe. He had thus represented his country in St. Petersburg and in Paris, being in the latter capital during the reign of Louis Philippe, before 1848. Tarin Effendi was a French lawyer, whose reputation stood high, and who rendered great services to his government in the negotiations which now took place.

The Grand Duke Nicholas delayed for a short time his departure from Kezanlik, until he had had a couple of interviews with his visitors. He at once told them, as the Porte had already given them to understand, that an armistice could only be granted on the acceptance of the bases for a definite peace. In making this demand the Russians were justified by precedents; but the effect naturally was to protract the negotiations. The envoys requested to be informed what bases of peace were proposed by the Russians; and this, in fact, was the great object of their journey to Kezanlik.

Throughout Europe, at this moment, the deepest interest was felt in the result of this interchange of views. Neither the governments nor the public press waited to be informed of the intentions of Russia. Numerous apocryphal versions of the terms of peace were circulated, and both alarm and indignation were expressed on the subject before anything definite was known. In England, especially, many hard things were said of Russia, on account of the continuance of active hostilities as well as the apprehended severity of her demands. No opportunity was lost of giving Russia to understand that Europe at large would claim to have a voice in settling the final treaty; though no country except England appeared likely to take any strong measures to insist upon what was unquestionably an international right.

Austria, however, did at this time assume a

somewhat firmer tone. It was generally believed that the Courts of Berlin and Vienna, by virtue of the Three Emperors' Alliance, had been acquainted beforehand with the leading points in the Russian programme; but, at the same time, it was evident that the Austro-Hungarian government thought it necessary to define its claims, and to incline in some degree towards a parallel course of action with the English government. Thus, when the Porte sent its circular note to the Powers, expressing its willingness to come to an understanding with Russia, Count Andrassy replied to the effect, that his government could not see its way to offer mediation; but at the same time he laid stress on the fact, that Austria was one of the guaranteeing Powers who signed the Treaty of Paris in 1856—which treaty not only arranged the affairs of South-Eastern Europe in general, but also guaranteed the integrity of the Ottoman empire.

Before the departure of Server and Namyk Pachas on their journey to Kezanlik, the English and Austrian representatives in Constantinople had taken occasion to warn the Porte that they could not recognise any convention between Turkey and Russia which did not take due care of the interests of their respective countries; and the governments also intimated to the Russian government, that they could recognise no modification of the Treaty of Paris in which the Powers who signed that treaty should not have a voice.

Whilst the negotiations were pending, of course Europe at large was kept in a state of the deepest anxiety, inasmuch as the general public could not be aware of the precise character of the notes exchanged between the several Powers. We know, however, that the Russian government gave fairly satisfactory assurances to the English and Austrian governments, to the effect that the interests of the latter should be respected, and that they should be consulted in all that rightly concerned them. The press in the various countries was more acrimonious than the governments themselves; but it need hardly

be said that the utterances of the press were often of the greatest consequence, being either inspired by those who shaped the course of events, or else of sufficient weight to influence the deliberations of statesmen.

A few illustrations of the tone of the press at this juncture will therefore be appropriate in this place.

As early as the 5th of January, after the despatch of the Turkish circular note, the Russian journals were writing with great heat on the subject of the armistice negotiations, and of the supposed inclination of England to interfere between the combatants. Thus, in regard to a statement that the British government had resolved to ask the St. Petersburg Cabinet upon what conditions the Russian commanders were authorised to grant an armistice to the Porte, several Russian journals observed that, if the report of this interference were well founded, it could only be a pretext for exciting English public opinion against Russia, as she would be compelled to refuse giving the information required.

Referring to the assertion of some newspapers, that Russia might conclude an armistice direct with Turkey, but could not conclude peace in the same manner, the "Agence Russe" maintained that an armistice is never possible without a previous acceptance of the preliminaries of peace. It added that Turkey herself, on the same principle, refused to grant an armistice to Servia and Montenegro, and that Russia would not deviate from this principle of the common law of nations.

Ten days later a semi-official Russian journal stated that, with regard to the negotiations with Turkey, there were no data to hand, excepting the Porte's request for an armistice. Nothing was even known respecting the views of the Turkish government, but instructions respecting the armistice had been sent to the commanders at the Russian head-quarters. It added:—"Turkey's request may be easily explained by her recent defeats, but after the great sacrifices made by our brave army, it is, of course, due to it that the results of its devotion should be carefully secured, and that a suspension of hostilities




should not be agreed to until our stubborn adversary has given all necessary military guarantees, and the certainty has been obtained that the armistice will not jeopardise our success. Among the public there is but one opinion upon this point, and Turkey will evidently have to dismiss from the sphere of her calculations the thought that by England, whose Parliament is about to open, any support can be extended to her."

On the 16th January the "Agence Russe" published an article on the question of the moment, which, it said, appeared perplexed, because it was not elucidated. Examining it from the points of view of facts, rights, and interests, the article recalled the origin of the war, which was commenced by Russia in spite of herself, in consequence of the obstinate refusal of Turkey to listen to the counsels and decisions of the Powers assembled at the Conference. "The Powers warned Turkey of the consequences which might result from her obstinacy, and left her to her fate. From that moment the Powers had no further concern in the question but their own private interests. It was, therefore, incumbent upon Russia to consider, at the outset of the war, three kinds of interests, namely, those of humanity and Russia (which constituted the chief cause of the war); those of the frontier states; and those of the other Powers, and principally those of England, who, prompted by a laudable intention, which was received by Russia in a friendly spirit, explained, at the commencement, the British interests which might eventually be involved in the war, and which Russia promised to respect, and has respected. In effect, the route to India, by way of the Suez Canal and Egypt, remains now, as heretofore, the exclusive domain of England, and in regard to this point there is not even the shadow of a Russian menace. Touching Constantinople, Russia is now, as she has been hitherto, of opinion, that that is a question reserved to Europe, and she still maintains that Constantinople ought, under no circumstances, to belong to any of the Great Powers. As to the interests of the

frontier states, Russia respected them so well during the war, and will defend them so well at the conclusion of peace, that Austria, who is the most directly interested, has resisted the most urgent appeals to action both from at home and abroad. There remain, then, Russia's interests, which consist, firstly, in the Bulgarian humanitarian question, which was legitimised by the European Conference, and which has become a Russian question, because Russia alone, on the grounds of her kinship in race and religion, resolved to expend her blood and treasure in the cause. Next, there is the war indemnity due to every victorious belligerent for the sacrifices incurred. As to a peace which would insure these interests and be adequate to prevent a renewal of the war, Russia, as a belligerent, and in virtue of public right, usage, and equity, has the right to conclude it directly, while, at the same time, taking care to secure the interests of the frontier states, as well as those of the other Powers, particularly those of England, whose special interest it is that any change in the state of things in the East does not injure her route to India or her influence in the East. Although the Porte has voluntarily withdrawn from the European concert, it has failed in the fulfilment of obligations in exchange for which it enjoyed certain advantages. Any preliminary convention which may be entered upon might be submitted to a congress, and would then be finally included in the category of international treaties. The question being so simple, a misunderstanding can only be explained by distrust or a strained feeling of *amour propre*, which is always dissipated by explanations when they are as frankly accepted as they are loyally given."

Three days later, the same semi-official organ, which at this time was very industrious in its attempts to justify the action of Russia, published an article, in which it pointed out the contradiction in the statements of journals, which asserted that the British Cabinet denied to the belligerents the right of arranging between themselves the preliminaries of peace,





STORMING A TURKISH REDOUBT





while, at the same time, it was awaiting those very preliminary conditions in order to fix its demand for supplies. This fact showed how indispensable it was for the two belligerents to come to an understanding, which might serve as a basis for European discussions of a definitive treaty. The article added :—"The reports that some of the Cabinets have declared that they will recognise no preliminaries to which they have not been parties, are propagated by journals which seek, by a foregone conclusion, to give the stamp of truth to the view that Russia's claim to arrange the preliminaries of peace with the Porte signifies a fixed intention on her part to refuse European intervention." This, the "Agence" declared, was by no means the sentiment of the imperial government.

Again, the same organ protested strongly against the insinuations of certain journals, that the fact of the Russian commanders-in-chief not having received instructions proved a secret intention on the part of the Russian government to delay the meeting of the plenipotentiaries. The "Agence" declared that the armistice could not have been discussed sooner, seeing that the Turkish plenipotentiaries, in consequence of the difficulties of transport, had not arrived at Kezanlik at the time of the despatch of the last telegrams thence. The Russian government was sincerely desirous of peace; but the act of the Porte, in notifying to the Ottoman troops that an armistice was signed, in Europe proved its desire to impute to Russia designs of bad faith, and, moreover, showed that the Porte, in asking for an armistice, did not aim at procuring peace, but the means of prolonging its resistance.

On the other hand, English, French, and other journals, did not desist from expressing their opinion that Russian diplomacy would be much the same in 1878 as it had been in former years, and that candid straightforwardness was the last virtue to be expected from St. Petersburg or Kezanlik. The "République Française" took this view, and it may be interesting to quote here the substance of an article published by M. Gambetta's paper on the subject of Russia's previous treat-

ies with Turkey. The article drew a parallel between the present state of the Turkish empire and the circumstances under which the Treaty of Adrianople was concluded in 1829. In 1828 the cause, or rather the pretext of the aggression of Russia, was the independence of Greek subjects of the Porte; in 1877 the pretext was the independence of the southern Slavs. In 1828 the Great Powers interfered by force of arms in favour of the Greeks, because wars of Liberalism happened just then to be the fashion, because Philhellenism was all the rage, because Byron had invested the Greeks with a halo of romance, because of most people's classic recollections, and also, perhaps, because they were really the victims of oppression. In 1877 the Great Powers intervened only diplomatically in favour of the Bosnians and Bulgarians, because the public had grown somewhat *blasé* about wars of liberation, because Pan Slavism did not exist out of Russia, because the Eastern Christians were the victims of bad administration rather than actual oppression, and, above all, because these Slavs are in themselves neither romantic nor interesting. In 1829, after a campaign marked at its outset by serious defeats, General Diebitch crossed the Balkans and marched to Adrianople. In 1878 the campaign was more severe, if possible, for both belligerents, and Adrianople was once more the objective of the Russian army. In 1829, in spite of the intervention of England and France, which prevented the Russian advance on Constantinople, Russia negotiated with the Porte, without the participation of the other Powers. In 1878 France would not interfere; England did not appear willing to be more than an intermediary, and Russia would once more negotiate directly with the Porte. The result of the first Treaty of Adrianople was the foundation of the kingdom of Greece, the placing of the Danubian principalities under the protectorate of Russia, and the establishment of Russian supremacy at Constantinople. It was most likely that similar consequences would arise from the negotiations now about to commence. Although there was no precise information as yet as to the



exigencies of Russia, the "République Française" expected that the second Treaty of Adrianople would be to the first what the first was to the Treaty of Bucharest. It spoke of the constant preying of Russia on the East, which was interrupted only for a period of fifteen years by the treaty. In 1812, at the very time when Napoleon was marching his army to Moscow, the czar entered into direct negotiations with the sultan, and on the 28th of May the Treaty of Bucharest was signed by General Katasow and Demetrius Morasi. That treaty specified that the Pruth should henceforth be the boundary of the two empires; the navigation of the Black Sea was proclaimed to be free; a national "Divan" was granted to the Moldo-Wallachian principalities; Servia was evacuated, with the exception of her fortified towns; and Kara-George was recognised by the Porte as Prince of Servia. It was in this way that Russia first secured a footing in Turkey, and having thus got an inch Russia soon proceeded to take an ell. In spite of the terrible preoccupations caused by the approach of winter, Napoleon, then still at Moscow, as soon as he heard of this Treaty of Bucharest, did not fail to see its ominous character, and he wrote to his minister of foreign affairs to express his "deep discontent" at what had occurred. Another advantage was gained by Russia in 1826, when Milosch Obrenowitch threatened to join the Greeks under Ypsilanti. Conferences took place at Ackerman, at which the clauses of the Treaty of Bucharest were construed in favour of the pretensions of Russia and her *protégés*; by the Treaty of Adrianople Russia drove her knife still further into Turkey. It stipulated for the renewal of the old treaties; the payment by the Porte of an indemnity of one hundred and fifty-three million francs; the cession to Russia of the Delta of the Danube; the recognition of Greece as a free state; and the constitution of Servia, Moldavia, and Wallachia, as independent principalities, paying tribute to the Porte, but protected by the czar. It was only reasonable to suppose that now Russia would insist on further advantages, and the "République" an-

ticipated nothing but evil from the negotiations about to open at Kezanlik. It was probable that the sultan would be called upon to recognise the absolute independence of Roumania, Servia, and Montenegro. And as in 1829 Servia was placed under the Russian protectorate, it was probable that she would now shelter the new Bulgarian state "under her eagles' pinions." As to the moral consequences of Russia's success, they were, according to M. Gambetta's organ, even more serious than its material consequences. The Porte was almost a vassal of Russia, who undertook to defend Turkey against Egypt, France, and England—any one that might attack her—and the will of the czar was law in Constantinople. If that was the case in 1829, what was likely to be the case now, when Turkey had been more completely defeated than she ever was before, and all the Powers of Europe seemed disposed to leave her in the lurch? Perhaps the debates about to take place in the English Parliament would throw light on the subject, and the tone of the queen's speech seemed to indicate that her Majesty's government would not shrink from taking steps to prevent the sultan becoming the vassal of the czar.

This article was written in the melancholy vein which has for some time past distinguished the "République Française." It was justified, in great measure, by what subsequently took place; though the re-establishment of Russian influence at Constantinople was, at all events, not destined to follow as an immediate result of the war.

Meanwhile the Russian government had been invited to explain the reason for the long delay in the conclusion of an armistice; and it was understood that, replying to Lord Derby's representations, Prince Gortschakoff had affirmed that "the Russian government had kept its promise, by instructing the Russian commanders to negotiate for an armistice. The delay that had arisen was due to the fact that the instructions had been sent by post, and this took a week to deliver. In consequence of further representa-

tions from Lord Derby, Prince Gortschakoff promised that an armistice should be conceded without the preliminary imposition of conditions of peace, which would be discussed later in concert with the other Powers. A despatch from the Grand Duke Nicholas was, however, subsequently received declaring it impossible for him to negotiate an armistice without previously laying down the conditions of peace." This is what was stated to have happened at the time; and the statement was confirmed later on.

Under the pressure of the misfortunes which had overwhelmed his country, the sultan sent to Queen Victoria, through our ambassador at Constantinople, an appeal for her personal intercession. A despatch was forwarded by Lord Derby to Mr. Layard, expressing the sympathy of the queen with his Imperial Majesty, and constitutionally declaring that her Majesty would follow the counsels of the government in the matter.

The excitement of the moment was increased by a report from Mr. Layard—which was, however, premature—that the Russians were marching rapidly upon Gallipoli.

Under all these circumstances, it may be easily understood with what suspense and impatience the negotiations of the Grand Duke Nicholas with the Turkish envoys were regarded. The discussions proceeded between the grand duke and the pachas; and it was idle to suppose that they would be concluded within a few hours, or even days. The demands of the Russians were so high, and the patriotic obstinacy of the Turkish plenipotentiaries so great, that an immediate agreement was out of the question. Both sides had to play a waiting game, and Europe was perforce obliged to exercise its patience as it best might. The difficulty was one almost without precedent. Conquerors have often exacted the transference of a slip of territory as the reward of their victories, but the cases in which one government has demanded that another shall resign all authority over the larger part of its most valuable empire are few and far between.

The matter had been barely opened at Kezanlik, when the Grand Duke Nicholas learned the true state of matters from a military point of view, and perceived that Adrianople itself was undefended by the Turks. This of course threw a different complexion over everything. If the Porte had been in a position to threaten a second year's campaign, he might have been compelled to abate his terms. But it was now evident that his enemy was absolutely and definitely at his mercy, and that Constantinople itself would scarcely be able to make a long resistance. The Turks might have sued for an armistice, and yet have been in a position to refuse his terms at the last moment, and to menace him with a desperate resistance. As things had turned out, they were practically powerless, and he had nothing to think of except the full exaction of all that his government could desire.

He had, indeed, Europe, and above all, England to consider; but it was no longer necessary for him to think of Turkey as a formidable obstacle to the accomplishment of his designs.

He therefore resolved to move forward to Adrianople without delay; and the Turkish envoys were invited to accompany him. They reached the city on the 27th of January. Server and Namyk Pachas had thus far steadily declined to accept the proposals of the grand duke. The latter, and his colleague, M. Nelidoff, instructed by General Ignatieff, declared that they were unable to discuss the conditions. They were simply commissioned to state the terms of the Russian government. The Turks might accept or refuse them; and in the latter case the army had orders to push on without a moment's pause, even to Constantinople. It was pointed out to the pachas that the whole country, from Sofia to Adrianople, was in the hands of the Russians, and that the army of Suleiman Pacha no longer existed. The threat of an advance upon the capital must have been very potent with the unfortunate Turks, who knew the excitable mood of the populace, and even of the sultan and his ministers. But they adhered to their refusal. Namyk Pacha is said to have ex-



claimed, on hearing of the reverse of Suleiman Pacha,

"If the Ottoman Empire must perish, let it perish by force. We will never sign our death-warrant."

It was immediately after this that the Grand Duke Nicholas gave orders for his head-quarters to be moved to Adrianople. Writing from that city on the 27th, a "Daily News" correspondent mentioned what he had been able to gather as to the gist of the Russian terms, and the manner in which the pachas regarded them.

"Although the Turks object more or less to all the conditions, the one which prevented the agreement was the Bulgarian autonomy. They were ready to yield every other point but this, which they consider equivalent to the destruction of the Turkish power in Europe. They were willing to grant autonomy, as provided for in the programme of the Conference. The Russians replied to this that the programme of the Conference was the minimum reduced to the most slender proportions in order to avoid war. As this object was not obtained, they must now demand a far more efficient kind of autonomy, something like that of Servia and Roumania, with Bulgaria extending very near Constantinople on one side, and to Salonica on the other. This is, of course, the extinction of Turkish power everywhere in Europe, except merely Constantinople. This they would not accept. They were willing to cede Kars and Erzeroum, willing to grant the complete independence of Roumania and Servia, the free passage of the straits to the Russian fleet, and a war indemnity, but not the autonomy of Bulgaria.

"It was just on this point the Russians were the most rigid. They left all the other questions for ulterior discussion, apparently recognising the fact that all those questions concerned Europe, and not Russia and Turkey alone. On the one question of Bulgarian autonomy only were they inflexible. There was no question of the cession of the Turkish fleet, though of course that might arise in ulterior discussions on the question of a war indemnity. The whole

course of the negotiations shows that, although Russia wishes to conclude direct peace with Turkey, she considers that part of the conditions of that peace are to be afterwards discussed, and may be modified by Europe. These conditions are evidently a cession of territory in Asia, the question of the straits, and a war indemnity. Although she means to force the Turks to consent to these things in principle, she expects to refer to Europe for their confirmation and application. In this way Russian diplomacy offers no hold to the English government to seize as a pretext for war. Even Lord Beaconsfield will hardly attempt to go to war to prevent Bulgarian autonomy, the only question on which the Russians are inflexible."

Another correspondent, writing from the capital on the 5th of February, describes the great anxiety which had been caused by the delay, and the relief produced by the conclusion of the armistice, and the cessation of hostilities. "The anxiety during the last three days has been intense to learn whether the armistice and the conditions of peace had been accepted. There was an announcement in the journals, even on Saturday, of the most positive kind, that peace had already been signed. It was not, however, until Tuesday that it became known that nothing whatever had been heard of the delegates. Complete instructions were only sent on the 24th. The telegraph was interrupted, and there was no news until yesterday. Everybody was waiting with increasing anxiety for news. It was reported that the Russians were advancing on all sides. A long council was held on Wednesday, and the sultan decided to send two aides-de-camp, under flags of truce, conveying a renewal of the orders to the delegates to sign the armistice on the conditions already submitted and agreed upon. The sultan on the same day telegraphed personally and direct to the Emperor of Russia, informing him that instructions had been sent, and urging the earliest possible conclusion of peace. Yesterday the emperor replied, and at four in the afternoon the expected news arrived.

"The satisfaction was universal, especially among the Turks, who had been harassed by the double fear of the advancing Russians and the pillage of the capital. An official announcement stated that the plenipotentiaries had telegraphed that the protocol, which had been framed relative to the bases of peace, and the armistice, had been signed. Owing to the destruction of the telegraph the message was brought by special train to Cherkessken, twenty miles beyond Choulou. The same train had brought the plenipotentiaries and the Russian officers to Adrianople. The despatches of the plenipotentiaries were then transmitted by messenger to Hademkoi, whence they were telegraphed to Constantinople. Immediately they were received the ministers went in a body to the sultan, and a counsel was held. It is said that certain modifications, made by the Grand Duke Nicholas in the original propositions concerning the evacuation of Silistria, are inserted in the propositions already forwarded. Nothing, however, is certainly known.

"Orders have been sent to both armies to cease hostilities. Most people regard the war as entirely ended, beyond the possibility of revival, unless Austria and England intervene. Telegrams which arrived last night lead to the impression that such intervention would occur, but they will probably turn out, like previous ones, to be grossly exaggerated. Certainly neither the German nor the Austrian Embassy acknowledges that there is any difference of opinion between them or Russia. Hundreds of Turkish houses are filled with refugees. There is great dread of a Russian advance. Turks are receiving protection from Europeans. I have known cases where the former have asked that they should be protected, not only from the Russians, but the Circassians and other rabble now crowding the streets, mosques, and other buildings. It is a great relief to all that Constantinople is not to be besieged, the fear of internal troubles greatly exceeding that of the Russians.

"Baker Pacha arrived from Gallipoli on Wednesday quite well. After leaving a division of Suleiman's remnant of an army near Dedogach,

he placed troops in position at Gallipoli. Mehemet Ali has been appointed commandant at Constantinople. It is believed that he will make attempts to disarm the Circassians, who are still pouring in with plunder from Roumelia, creating great alarm."

The writer adds details of one of the last scenes of the Ottoman Parliament. "In the Turkish Chamber, the Greek members for Mytelene and Smyrna called attention to the massacre of the population of a Christian village near Bourgas, and presented official depositions, stating the fact. The village was called Stathopulo. During the panic caused by the Circassians and Bashi-Bazouks the governor of Bourgas confined the care of Stathopulo to an Albanian detachment of regular troops. When the Albanians were thus constituted the guardians of the village, they demanded a ransom of two thousand pounds from the Greek inhabitants. It being impossible to pay, the villagers sent messengers to the governor of Bourgas. When the Albanians heard this they became furious, and began the attack. Then commenced, says the Mytelene deputy, supporting himself by official documents, the suffering, or rather the martyrdom, of the unfortunate population. The troops pursued the inhabitants with fire-arms and yataghans, and the terrified people took refuge in the church. The Albanians besieged the building for three days, during which they constantly fired upon the occupants. Only two hundred out of eight hundred were successful in escaping. The rest were cruelly massacred. All the women were dishonoured. Even little girls of ten years were not spared. The Chamber decided that urgent measures should be adopted. The information given in Constantinople by the refugees from Rodosto and Bourgas has had an excellent effect in bringing the truth to light respecting the doings of the Bashi-Bazouks, Albanians, and Circassians."

In less than a fortnight after this the short-lived Ottoman Parliament was dissolved. The independence of many of the members had given not a little trouble to the Porte, and it is not surprising, under the circumstances, that



the sultan and the divan should have desired to be rid of such an embarrassment. On the 17th of February, the delegates were suddenly dismissed. Four days previously the English fleet had made its appearance in the Sea of Marmora, and within twenty days the Treaty of San Stefano had been signed.

The present chapter may be concluded by a few illustrations of the sufferings endured by the Bulgarians at the hands of the Turks during the Russian advance, and especially during the panic which ensued upon the sudden crossing of the Balkans. Reference has been made in a former chapter to the case of the Geshoffs, but what follows has a more general bearing, and deals with the wholesale cruelties practised on the Christian populations of Macedonia and Thrace by the Mahomedan authorities. Much has been said of the miseries subsequently inflicted upon the Mussulmans; and the details which follow are necessary in order to give a fair idea of the crimes committed on both sides.

Ever since the first occupation of Kezanlik by General Gourko, in July 1877, the Christian inhabitants of the surrounding country had been treated with much barbarity. It is only fair to add that their persecutors justified much of their severity by pointing to the outrages committed by the Bulgarians themselves during that brief period of Russian predominance. Into these Bulgarian crimes Mr. Layard, our ambassador at Constantinople, directed an inquiry to be made by persons whom he appointed for that purpose; and we may quote, from a Blue-book, the results of this inquiry, so far as regards the alleged persecution of Turks and Jews.

"The town having capitulated, permission was given by the Russian general to both Russians and Bulgarians to plunder houses belonging to Turks and Jews. The Bulgarians continued their work of pillage, murder, and rape, for several days. On the 20th July, three Bulgarians, led by a person who seemed to be a Russian, broke into the house of Aaron Caneti, who hid himself. They, however, succeeded in finding his partners, Isaac and Judas Assa, and

called upon them to disclose the place where Aaron Caneti kept his money. Finding resistance impossible, the Asas gave up a portion of the money, which, however, did not satisfy the Bulgarians, who stabbed to death Isaac Assa, Judas succeeding in making his escape. This outrage was at once brought to the notice of the Russian commander, who placed sentries in the streets in order to stop the pillage and arrest marauders. But, notwithstanding this step, the Bulgarians continued their work of pillage, and the town remained in their hands for eight days. On the ninth day news arrived that the Turks had re-occupied Zaghra, and the Russians, of whom a small force only remained at Kezanlik, at once retired to Schipka, leaving the Turkish and Jewish families at the mercy of the Bulgarians, who, from that time, set no bounds to their excesses. A proclamation was issued by the Bulgarian government to the effect that any Turk or Jew who left his house would be immediately put to death, and some Turks who went out notwithstanding this prohibition were killed. The object of this order was to facilitate the plunder of the shops and houses, defended, as they would be by the proprietors alone. It was at first obeyed by the Jews, but seeing that the plunder of their houses nevertheless continued, they quitted them, on the 4th August, in order to repair to the synagogue and determine on what steps they should take under the circumstances. On Saturday, the 5th of August, the Bulgarians penetrated into the court of the synagogue, uttering threats of death against those who had set their orders at defiance. They were guided by a Christian, whose employment had been to light the fires on Saturdays in the synagogue, and in most of the Jewish houses in Kezanlik. This wretch, who had lived on the bounty of the Jews, was now foremost to betray and denounce them. Some of the Jews, among whom was the grand rabbi, managed to conceal themselves in the garrets and cellars of their houses, but those who remained were seized by the Bulgarians, who selected from their number, at the instigation of their guide, Samuel

Caneti, Jacob Levi, Moses Catava, and Behor Joseph Levi, and conducted them to the other extremity of the town. While on their way, these poor men were most inhumanly maltreated by the Bulgarians, with a view to extort money from them. Finding that they had none they killed a dog, and, in order to revenge themselves, forced their Jewish prisoners to drink its blood. They subsequently released their prisoners, with the exception of Samuel Caneti, in order that they might take steps to ransom him. The Jews having no money, the Jewish women gave up their jewels, and the amount of the ransom was handed over to the Bulgarians, who, however, did not release their prisoner.

"On Saturday night the Bulgarians tried by various means to provoke a fresh conflict with the Jews. Keeping themselves out of sight, they sent a boy to fire a pistol into the Jewish houses, hoping that the Jews would resent the insult, and, by chastising the boy, give them an excuse for falling upon them. The Jews, however, contented themselves with giving the young rascal some money, and he then left them alone. On Sunday the Bulgarians broke into all the Jewish houses and searched everywhere for money. On Monday the situation became altogether desperate. They had lost everything, and were in momentary expectation of being put to death. The corpses of eleven victims had already lain forty-eight hours in the court of the synagogue. In this extremity the Jews decided to go to Schipka and give themselves up to the Russians. This same day the Bulgarians broke into the house of the grand rabbi, laid hold of his grand-daughter Mazalton, seventeen years old, and carried her off to the Bulgarian quarter, declaring that they would not give her up until they received a large ransom. The ransom was paid, but the girl was not sent back. It was only by means of money that permission was obtained to bury the eleven Jews who had been murdered in the court of the synagogue, and the same means were employed to enable the survivors to leave Kezanlik and proceed to Schipka.

"No sight could be imagined more distressing than this emigration *en masse* of the Jewish families, deprived of everything, penniless, almost clothesless, to escape this intolerable persecution. It was heart-rending to hear the lamentations of these poor people hurrying away with their children to avoid certain death. They left Kezanlik at about nine o'clock Turkish. In a ditch by the wayside they discovered the body of Samuel Caneti, who had been murdered by the Bulgarians, but, being pressed for time, they had to continue their flight, leaving it unburied. At one o'clock at night, Turkish, the fugitives arrived near Schipka, and halted until daylight. On the following day a deputation, consisting of the grand rabbi and some others, went to the Russians to inform them of their arrival and make their submission. During the absence of the deputation some Cossacks appeared. They picked out seventy-two men from among the fugitives, separated them from their families, and drove them into a ravine through which flows a stream called the Bidjerali, about two hours distant from Schipka. Here they were stripped of their clothes and of the small sum of money they still possessed, and were then formed into line preparatory to being put to the sword. They were, however, saved from death by the arrival of two Russian horsemen, conveying an order to bring them back immediately. The Cossacks at once took to flight, and these seventy-two unfortunate men, naked and barefooted, were compelled to walk to Schipka, where their families had been temporarily settled. The Russian general gave orders that the Jews should be established in the court of a church, where they were supplied with bread and water for some days. About three days after their arrival at Schipka the grand-daughter of the grand rabbi was sent back by the Bulgarians. She had been dishonoured, and was in a pitiable state; nevertheless her parents were delighted at her return. For thirteen days and nights the Jews remained encamped in this court. At night the Bulgarian soldiers used to enter the court, and, with threats of death and by the faint light of candles,



select those young girls and young women whose appearance most pleased them, and carry them off to their houses, without regard to their cries and lamentations. At daybreak they were restored, dishonoured, to their parents. These excesses continued until the health of those poor creatures suffered frightfully. With a refinement of cruelty the Bulgarians fastened the door of the court inhabited by the Jews and left them twenty-four hours without water. It was fearful to hear the children, suffering from the heat of summer and crying for water, which their parents were unable to give them. On the 20th August this state of suffering was at its height. On that day the funeral of a Russian officer took place in the church in the court of which the Jews were confined. A large number of Russians and Bulgarians attended it, and the groans of the unhappy Jews were overheard by some Russian officers, who ordered the door of the court to be opened, and great was their astonishment at the sight of these miserable creatures dying of thirst. They ordered water to be immediately brought, stipulating only that those of the women who had infants at the breast should also give suck to some Bulgarian children who had been found abandoned in the Balkans. These officers promised their protection to the Jewish sufferers, and were loud in their abuse of the Bulgarians, who had not scrupled to thus torture inoffensive persons who had submitted of their own accord. They even went so far as to procure four cows for their support.

"Meanwhile it was reported that the Turkish army was approaching Schipka, and the Bulgarians were much exercised lest on the return of the Turks the Jews should be able to give them an account of the exploits of their persecutors and the cruelties those latter had perpetrated. On the other hand, one of the Russian officers, a Jew himself, was doing his utmost to save the fugitives. He managed to get them sent to Tirnova, by way of Gatrova, with an escort of Bulgarian soldiers, and a letter addressed to the authorities, stating that the Jews were not prisoners, but peaceable citizens, who had submitted of their

own free will. Unfortunately, the soldiers of the escort, joined by other Bulgarians, animated by the vilest intentions, proceeded to the worst excesses. They caused the Jews to march slowly, so that they arrived at night before Gatrova. Once there their licence had no bounds. The nocturnal scenes of Schipka recommenced, and the unhappy girls were once more violated by these wretches in the open fields, and in the presence of the whole caravan.

"On the 22nd August they entered Gatrova, amidst the hooting and the abuses of the inhabitants, who had assembled to see them pass. They were compelled to march all through the town and exposed to the execration of the public, their escort giving out that they had poisoned the water at Zaghra and thereby caused the death of a great number of Russians. Owing to this atrocious calumny the people fell upon them, and they were subjected to much ill-treatment. This martyrdom only ceased when they were handed over to the Russian police, and the letter read which established their innocence; and even then they were confined in a place where they were exposed on the bare ground to the burning heat of the sun by day and the wet dew by night. They were constantly watched. Their only food consisted of mouldy bread, and water was given them in just sufficient quantities to keep them alive. After remaining six days at Sistova they were sent to Bucharest, where thirty-five of the fugitives died, and thence to Trieste."

For cruelties such as the foregoing, assuming the story to be true, it was natural that a sanguinary revenge should be taken on the earliest opportunity; and no doubt the persecution of the Bulgarians was very general throughout the districts on the southern slopes of the Balkans, from July to the following January. Many Bulgarians of every rank, age and sex, were put to death by the authorities, often with the direct sanction of the central government, without pretence of trial. A "Daily News" correspondent at Constantinople wrote home on the 11th of January that the Turks had "begun their

old game," and that they had been "ruthlessly hanging dozens of people because they were Bulgarians." He adds a letter, addressed to him from Slivno, which is so conclusive, and at the same time so striking, that we will quote the larger portion of it.

"*Slivno, December 24th.*—The town presents a lamentable spectacle. More than five thousand Bulgarian women and children from the devastated villages in the neighbourhood, naked and barefooted, and wandering through the town, begging alms, and dying from hunger and from cold. The prisons are full of innocent Bulgarians, from the town as well as from the neighbouring villages, and almost every day about half a dozen of them are hanged. Since Suleiman Pacha passed through Slivno (toward the end of September), nearly one thousand persons have been hanged in the midst of the town. When this general arrived there were many Bulgarians imprisoned for slight causes, who would have been kept for a short time in prison and set at liberty. But Suleiman, not satisfied with this, after he had hanged a great number of innocent villagers, commanded these Bulgarians prisoners to be hanged also. On the same day on which he had to leave the town, in order to make his departure as triumphant as possible, he commanded to be hanged, in the street through which he had to pass, thirty-five Bulgarians at once. Such was the triumphant gate through which the famous general thought he ought to pass.

"Suleiman Pacha departed, but with this the hangings did not cease. He found an able successor in the person of Sadyk Bey, the President of the Council of War in Slivno. This man, invested with unlimited power, perpetrates the most arbitrary acts; he hangs and arrests whomsoever he pleases. Among the imprisoned there are many natives of the town, honest and rich merchants, who never, during their life, have been imprisoned, and who, although innocent, only by giving large sums of money to Sadyk Bey have been able to save themselves from the gallows. The majority of the imprisoned Bulgarians are from the devastated villages in the

neighbourhood, and though almost every day a number of them are hanged, new persons replace them, so that the prisons remain always full. Those who are condemned to be hanged are neither asked nor told their crime (because, in fact, they are innocent). They are simply told—'To-day you will be hanged,' and the unjust and inhuman sentence is immediately executed.

"I heard many of these innocent villagers, while being conveyed to the gallows, exclaim—'Is there no God to protect me from these butchers, who, without asking me a word, without telling me my fault, wish to kill me so unmercifully?' . . . Taking in view that the majority of the persons daily hanged are villagers from the villages devastated by the Bashi-Bazouks—viz., from Yeni-Zagra, Omartchevo, Bouhalieh, Courodjeh, &c., the real cause of their hanging seems to be this—The government, which knows perfectly well the barbarous manner in which these villages were destroyed, and the greater part of their inhabitants massacred by the Bashi-Bazouks, does not wish to leave living witnesses to tell in future the horrible tale of rapine, murder, and death.

"Last week our Metropolitan, Monseigneur Seraphim, touched, it seems, by the lamentation and weeping of women and children whose husbands and fathers were imprisoned, and before whom death was impending, resolved to go before the President of the Council of War, and to implore him to stop the hanging of the innocent people. This venerable old man presents himself before Sadyk Bey, falls on his knees before him, and with tears begs him to have mercy upon the innocent, and to put an end to the hangings. Sadyk Bey promises that he will not hang any more. This message, like an electric spark, was spread throughout the whole town, and cheered the hearts of the disappointed Christian population. But alas for him who believes the promise of the Turk! On the next day, in spite of the solemn promise of Sadyk Bey, ten persons were hanged in the midst of the town!



"On the 12th instant the notable Bulgarians from the town, in number twenty-four persons, were arrested and thrown into prison, where they were kept three days, and then sent to Constantinople, chained together two by two by their hands, being told only that they had been called by the Sublime Porte, and from that time no one here knows what has happened to them. This incident has embittered still more the feelings of the people, because they say, and justly, when such men, who enjoy the confidence of the whole population of the Sandjak, and of whom some are officers under the government—when such men are imprisoned in the damp prisons, what hope remains for us? As will be seen from the catalogue of their names, the majority of them have passed the age of sixty, and are men grown old in the service of the government. Almost all of them, on several occasions, and especially lately, have contributed largely for the support of the Turkish army, and to many of them the government owes considerable sums of money. Such has been their zeal for the interests of the government, that the young Bulgarian party of Slivno often used to call them Conservatives, and even Turkophiles. These men the government ought to reward for the services they have done to it; but instead of this, it imprisons them in the damp prisons, and prepares them for the gallows. No one here positively knows the motive which has induced the Turkish government to treat in so unjust a manner these notable Bulgarians (although many suppose it is for money); but that which is well known is, that they cannot be guilty of any other crime, except that they are Bulgarians, and, moreover, Bulgarian notables."

To this the same correspondent adds :—"The above-mentioned notable Bulgarians arrived in Constantinople on the 18th of December, and were confined in the damp prison of the Metirhaneh, where many of them became ill. As soon as the Bulgarian Exarch, Monseigneur Joseph, received the intelligence of their arrival, he went to the Grand Vizier, Edhem Pacha, to

explain to him the position of these persons, and to beg him to set them at liberty. The grand vizier promised to do so. When thus their friends in Constantinople had been assured of their deliverance, the prisoners were immediately exiled to Boli (Asia Minor).

"I saw these persons on the very day of their departure for Boli (December 25), and learned from them the contents of the *teskere* (or official order) with which they were sent from the Council of War at Adrianople to the Musteshar of the Zaptieh in Constantinople. It was to this effect—viz., 'As these persons are the principal and influential Bulgarians of Slivno, and as they are capable, by virtue of the influence which they exercise, to originate in future an insurrection, we send them to you to do with them what you know.' It is not necessary to add, that the conclusion of this *teskere* is a pure falsehood on the part of the Council of War, since it is impossible for it not to know that these parties are incapable of originating an insurrection, or being influenced by insurrectional ideas; but, on the contrary, it is quite sure they would employ all their influence for the suppression of such schemes. Even supposing, for a moment, that the government had really any suspicion that they were capable of originating an insurrection in future in that town, was it just to treat them in such a manner? Was it humane, on that ground, to send them to die in the prisons of the interior of Asia Minor? Was there any danger for the government, if it allowed them to live at least in Constantinople under sure guarantee? This proceeding cannot surprise those who know the programme of the Turkish government. That programme is the annihilation of all intelligent, rich, learned, and influential Bulgarians. Whether it will attain its aim I doubt very much."

The chief result of these cruelties, as we have since been able to perceive, was to perpetuate a feeling of bitter hatred between the inhabitants of Roumelia, which was only to be assuaged by continual bloodshed, and which must prevent indefinitely the final pacification of the country.

## CHAPTER VII.

## THE RUSSIANS IN ADRIANOPLE.

WHILST the Turks were delivered over to the wildest panic, and thousands upon thousands of the wretched Mahomedan refugees poured madly into Constantinople, the Russians were steadily advancing. The troops of Skobeleff, Radetzky, and Mirsky, were the first to occupy the roads in the eastern valley of the Maritza, and to push onward to Adrianople. As we have seen, the city was taken possession of without a struggle, and the Grand Duke Nicholas immediately followed with his suite, as soon as the news was brought to him at Kezanlik.

It had been thought that the Turks would have made a more effective resistance south of the Balkans; and so, no doubt, they had intended to do. Their misfortunes had come upon them in rapid succession, and were well calculated to confirm their superstitious idea that their reverses had been decreed by fate, against which it was idle to contend. They did, indeed, blame the English government, as well as *kismet*, alleging that they had been led to anticipate assistance from us, and that they had been deceived into protracting their resistance longer than they would otherwise have done. It is impossible to deny that at one time there was a probability that England might give more material aid to the Porte, even if it were only by demanding that the Russian advance should be stayed at Adrianople. If any such idea were ever contemplated, it was rendered futile by the sudden collapse of the Turkish defence in the month of January, which took every one by surprise, and enabled the Russians to hasten forward before diplomacy could arrest their progress.

If actual intervention had been intended by any foreign Power, the time for setting about it was when the invading armies were held at bay before Plevna, Rustchuk, Osman Bazar, Schipka, and Kars. In January the chance was gone,

and the only thing left to do was to keep the conqueror out of the Turkish capital.

There must have been, amongst the sultan's advisers, men sufficiently shrewd and well informed, to perceive that the intervention of England, however much it might be desired by some Englishmen, was opposed to the general sentiment of the English nation. But at the same time it is beyond question, that a few officious persons in Constantinople had given the Porte reason to feel sanguine about English aid. Mr. Layard may not have acted so indiscreetly as he was accused of having acted; but at all events he had made no secret of his sympathy with Turkey. After the armistice had been signed, Server Pacha was rash enough to declare to an English correspondent that he had been personally deceived by our ambassador; that his country had been betrayed by England, and that the Porte would henceforth prefer the Russian alliance to the English. This grave accusation may have been no more than the result of excessive disappointment; and the indiscretion led to the speedy retirement of the pacha from his position as a minister. No man could pretend to be a diplomatist after speaking so openly and candidly. Server Pacha's disgrace was inevitable; but there were many who persisted in believing that what he had stated was based on a foundation of fact.

However this may have been, there were certainly many Englishmen in Turkey who had done their utmost to persuade themselves and the Porte that England would do no less for the Ottoman empire in 1878 than she had done in 1854. Perhaps in some cases the wish was father to the thought, even in the selfish sense that England's participation in the war would bring vast pecuniary gains to merchants, agents, contractors, and speculators of all kinds.

Nevertheless, it is only just to our fellow-countrymen in Turkey to say that the bulk of them were too patriotic to desire such a great calamity for their country on such selfish grounds. A "Daily News" correspondent wrote home some pertinent observations on the English



colony in Constantinople, dealing with this aspect of the question. "The number of Englishmen," he said, "who are really independent, in the sense of having no interest in the maintenance of the empire, and especially in its solvency, is exceedingly small. Bearing in mind this fact, it is astonishing how little philo-Turkism there is among this portion of the colony. Looking to their own interests alone, there is scarcely a man among them who would not be directly benefited by a war in which England should fight on the side of Turkey. For the English colony in Constantinople, the traditions of the Crimean war are traditions of lavish expenditure, of reckless expenditure of English money, and of glorious opportunities of making fortunes. In case of such a war there would be contracts to be made by the hundred, which, of course, Englishmen on the spot would have the best chance of getting; there would be speculations of various kinds, with a certainty of profit to those who have local knowledge; ships to be chartered at high rates; money to be lent to the Turks to be squandered even more wildly than an English war department can squander money in time of war, and plenty of jobbery and backsheesh, where the money would slide into English banking accounts. It would be difficult to point out an English resident in Constantinople to whom a war with England on the side of Turkey would not be, or appear to be, a certain source of additional gain. It would not be very surprising, therefore, if the English colony were rabid philo-Turks. The fact, however, is, that the great majority of them are not. A thermometer might be made of philo-Turkism, at the warmest end of which the officials in Turkish employ would naturally figure, though it must be said, to the credit of one or two of them, that they would be very far down on the scale; and at the other end, below zero, would be those who have absolutely no interest, one way or the other, in the result of the present war. Among the non-officials an impartial observer would, I think, be struck with the absence of strong partisanship for the Turks. Not-

withstanding that each of them would, in the event of England's intervention, be pretty certain of having what the Americans term a good time, the desire for English interference does not belong to the non-official members of the community.

"If the hard-headed Scotchmen and North-countrymen, who would inevitably, in case of English interference, make that little pile which they are waiting to make before they return to their native land, were asked why they are not in the number of philo-Turks, their answer would be something like this: 'Putting aside the oppression which we know the Christians of the empire have to undergo, the whole community, Moslem and Christian alike, is suffering, and has been suffering for years past, from intolerably bad government; there is crushing extortion, there are harassing exactions, entire want of security for property, and even of life. Land is going out of cultivation, whole villages have disappeared within the last twenty years, large tracts of land, which once sent valuable crops to the market, have ceased to be profitable. The roads in the country have not been improved, the condition of the people has become desperate. We, merchants, see our interest in a change of government forced upon the Turks which shall enable the large resources of the country to be developed, and certainly know too much of the sufferings of the people to sympathise with the selfish knot of pachas, called the government, which exists mainly to wring the utmost from all classes of the sultan's subjects. In doing injury to Turkey, they have done and are doing injury to us. To support the Turks, means to support the oppression of the Turkish government, and we,' some of them would have a good right to add, 'while we are, and have been good friends to the poorer Turks, we have every interest to sympathise with any change which will rid the territory, or any part of it, of this oppression.'

"Let it be said also that there are not a few in the English colony who would adopt the absurdly sentimental and narrow-minded view that

in the Eastern question right is on one side, and wrong on the other, and would put this question of right and wrong above the consideration of even British interests, or possibly their own fortunes. Such men are not philo-Turks, and not having Lord Beaconsfield's regard for British interests, or even their own interests, so closely at heart as they ought to have, can only be mentioned apologetically. But it is obviously with the Englishmen in the Turkish service, and certainly the officials in the English service, that the Turks belonging to the governing class come mostly in contact. These, beyond a doubt, are as a rule more Turkish than the Turks, and their influence in representing English public opinion has been and is simply and purely mischievous. They wish that England should help Turkey. They lead themselves to believe that England means to help Turkey. They tell the Turks that England is going to help Turkey. As a rule, officials who have been in a foreign service for a long time have forgotten the traditions of their native land, and those in Turkey have tried to believe, until quite recently, and still cling fondly to their faith, that we are in the period of the Crimean War. Englishmen who have been absent from their country for a number of years too often become Conservative in a sense which would be as offensive to Sir Stafford Northcote as to Mr. Gladstone, and it becomes unfortunate for the Turks that their information as to English opinion has to come from men who, in spite of facts, cannot be brought to believe that England has changed her mind since the Crimean days. It must be remembered also that the whole traditions of our consular service in Turkey are absolutely vicious.

"It appears to be an article of belief with the provincial consuls that, as the first duty of the English ambassador is to protect Turkey, nothing against the Turks will be acceptable at the embassy. There wanted no inducement of this kind in Constantinople to make the consuls pro-Turkish. Other causes help to do that in far too great a degree to be satisfactory. The con-

sul or vice-consul, in his own jurisdiction, is a considerable personage. A consul in France or in Spain holds a greatly inferior position in popular estimation. In a Turkish province the consul is on an equality with the governor of the town, has official relations with him and the other Turkish officials, is a sort of king over the subjects of the district in which he reigns, and has willingly granted to him a position which, to a considerable extent, cuts him off from association with the Christians. Of course, it is to the interest of the governor and other officials to make everything pleasant to the English consul, and equally of course the consul is delighted with the gentlemanly Turk, and objects to the Greek or the Armenian, who is always giving him trouble.

"If I were asked to name the most unreasonable and unreasonable philo-Turk whom it has been my lot to meet, I should probably name an English consul in European Turkey. Without mentioning his name, I may take him as a specimen of the influences which surround a man in an official position in this country. I have never heard anything unfavourable of this particular consul. On the contrary, I believe him to be possessed of a good deal of kindness of heart. But he believes that it is a sin to say anything against the Turks. It is a crime to say anything in favour of the Christians. The name of Bulgarian, and probably of Greek too, stinks in his nostrils, and I should be surprised if he did not regard any one who rose against Turkish rule as rather worse than a communist. Yet the opinions thus held are, to a great extent, the result of circumstances, are prejudices rather than opinions deliberately formed. Take a very young man, possibly of Levantine origin, and therefore with an education almost necessarily defective, send him as assistant to some out-of-the-way place in Syria or Armenia, and change him to some other place, say every five years—at the age of forty what kind of man is he likely to have become? The prejudices of the service will be exclusively philo-Turk; his pleasant experiences will be mostly derived from the Turks; his troubles, where he has had to inquire into



some wearisome and stupid complaint of a Christian who has been injured in some way or other, will have come from the Christians. He will probably at forty have lost the habit of reading English newspapers, and will be more completely ignorant of English politics than hundreds of agricultural labourers in Devonshire; but in exchange will have got a firmly-rooted belief that English policy stands where it did when he began life, and will tell his Turkish friends that, come what may, England, in spite of what the ambassador may say in his official despatches, is quite sure to come to their aid.

"The firm faith of the Turks in English intervention, in so far as it is due to English opinion in Constantinople, is derived also from the opinions of English visitors. The Turks have certainly great reason to complain of the assurances which have been held out to them by certain English visitors. One man in particular, who spends a considerable time here, and whose great wealth enabled him to command access to all the Turks, is believed to have had a very large share in inducing the government to reject the proposals of the Conference. It was openly stated at the time that he was using his utmost endeavours in this direction, and his exertions were strongly condemned by other Englishmen here of every shade of political opinion. Two visitors, both men of considerable position, were, a few weeks ago, at the Imperial Ministry of Marine, and similarly did their utmost to persuade Said Pacha that England would certainly come to the help of Turkey. It would seem that a number of men who come here think it polite to talk this kind of nonsense to the Turks, and that they cannot or will not see that, to endeavour to persuade the Turks to continue the war, is not merely mischievous, but is to lure them on to their destruction.

"And now, while on the causes of the belief in English intervention, let me mention one more. The telegrams which have been sent from Europe during the last six months have almost always had a Turkish bias. In numberless instances the telegrams have turned out to be more

favourable to the Turks than the facts warranted. Poor Turk! He has been lured into the war, and to its continuance, to his own dire injury, by those who were foolish enough to call themselves his friends."

No doubt it was a bitter awakening to many misguided Englishmen, both in Turkey and at home, to find that the Russian invasion was achieving a complete success, and that still the expected aid was not forthcoming. But it was a still more bitter awakening for such of the Turks as had relied upon external help.

The abandonment of Adrianople without a struggle was a great surprise. Opinions had differed as to the capacity of the place for a protracted defence; but it was known that preparations had been made, and it was generally expected that an attempt would be put forth to repeat the glorious achievement of Plevna on the south of the Balkans. A German estimate of the strength of Adrianople, published immediately after the crossing of the mountain chain, may be transferred with advantage to our own pages.

"It is forty-nine years ago since the last Russian army entered Adrianople, whereas the sister city, situated further to the west, has not seen an enemy's army for nine centuries. At this epoch the Russians, that is to say the Pagan Wares, under their Prince Svesofslaf, the first conqueror of Silistria, took the town by assault. At the present time Philippopolis, which has no fortifications of any importance, is probably not in a position to offer any serious resistance, but it is expected that the remains of the Turkish army will concentrate at Adrianople for a last struggle, where Murad I., the Ottoman conqueror, established his residence five hundred years ago. Latterly much has been said of the defensive works at Adrianople. Those who have seen the ancient residence of the sultans will probably shake their heads on seeing the confidence reposed by the Porte in their fortress. In the first place the town, like all Eastern towns, is very extended; generally speaking, the houses are composed only of one storey,

and between them are numerous gardens. The extent of the town is not at all in proportion to the number of its inhabitants, which are not less than one hundred thousand, and of which about half only are Mussulmans. The town is situated around and upon a hill, which is crowned by the most magnificent temple in Turkey, namely, the mosque of Selim I. Beyond this magnificent monument, with its four gigantic minarets, the mosque of Murad I., and a few other edifices, the buildings are miserable huts, situated in dirty, unpaved, irregular streets. The whole town might be put in flames by a bombardment of two or three hours. Surrounding the town and at some distance from it are some plateaus, rather elevated, and upon these plateaus some entrenchments have been constructed, and it is pretended that thus Adrianople has been converted into a fortified camp. It may be easily conceived that there are still wanting many things, if not everything, to make it a fortified town. But its position may be still more easily understood, when we add that, in this immense space, there are scarcely any more troops than Osman Pacha had to defend Plevna. Adrianople is naturally more favoured, it is true, and it is stronger by the three rivers—the Maritza, the Arda, and the Toundja—which render a complete investment very difficult. But it must be remembered that the attack will not only be made from the west, where this topographical feature is of great importance, but also from the north and north-west, where there is no river to form an obstacle.”

The attack, however, was not made. The interception of Suleiman Pacha's army rendered the defence an impossibility, and useless bloodshed was avoided by the sudden evacuation of the city.

Eyoub Pacha had been in command at Adrianople, having some twenty thousand men, mostly nizams, though there was a large infusion of recruits, the latest importation from Asia. Before he left for the lines of Tchataldja he had blown up the powder magazines, and ordered several buildings to be fired, with the

apparent intention of burning the city. But the work had not been thoroughly done, and it is doubtful whether much harm would have resulted even if Skobelev had delayed his entry. The inhabitants, demoralised by the sudden flight of the garrison, were in a panic when the Russians made their appearance; but order was at once established by the hero of Senova, who maintained a very strict discipline amongst his troops, and re-assured the population, who were principally Christians. Some of the Mahomedans had remained, and they were safe from molestation, at all events for a time.

Even before Skobelev's approach, the city had been comparatively quiet, thanks to the energetic action of the foreign consuls, who had asked Eyoub Pacha for a small guard of soldiers. These patrolled the streets, and easily overawed such as were inclined for rapine and violence. When the Russians came, these nizams were permitted to follow their comrades on the Constantinople road.

It was on the 20th of January that General Skobelev, who had pressed forward with the utmost despatch, entered the abandoned city. He instantly sent word to the Grand Duke Nicholas at Kezanlik, and on the 24th, as we have already seen, the Russian commander-in-chief transferred himself and his staff to the ancient capital.

During the next few weeks, whilst the armistice and peace negotiations were proceeding, and the chances of a second war were being gravely discussed day after day, the condition of affairs in the wake of the Russian army was no less terrible than war itself. It began to seem probable that the fighting was at an end, at all events between Russians and Turks; but the wounds which had been inflicted were not such as could be easily healed. A correspondent in Adrianople, writing in the second week of February, gives us a graphic picture of the city under Russian military rule. Speaking, first, of the miseries caused by the complete overthrow of the former government, and by the lamentable flight of the Mahomedan families, he says:—



"Only those who, as spectators, have so identified themselves with the drama as to fully appreciate the character of the action, can now conceive the strength of the sense of relief that possesses every actor, as the curtain falls on the last of the terrible scenes of the war. It is not so much the incidents of battle, the hardships of the soldiers in the cold, or the wholesale destruction of property, which have made the experience of the past month exceedingly exhausting to the nervous force; but it is rather the extreme misery and wretchedness of the thousands of non-combatants that have daily met our eyes since we crossed the Balkans and approached Sofia. The most sensitive nature gets hardened to the scenes of a battle-field. Though one may at first regret that a peasant's house should burn, one soon warms himself at the flames, without a thought of the owner; but the sufferings of the innocent and helpless appeal to human sympathy with a force which time and experience do not entirely neutralise, and one finds himself turning with a sick heart from freezing and starving women and children, while his horse tramples underfoot, unnoticed, the shapeless body of a soldier. I have seen the dragoons, whose sabres were still coloured with Turkish blood, dismount and share their rations with half-famished fugitives; and infantrymen, who with great difficulty had made a fire to dry their feet, yield it to the shivering refugees, and with touching tenderness bring the exhausted Turkish women to the fire and give them food and drink. It is the sense of utter helplessness in the presence of all this suffering, the certainty that the majority of these innocent people will perish for the lack of the commonest necessities of existence, the consciousness that this useless waste of human life might have been easily prevented, that is exhausting to the last degree; and I remember nothing of the whole war so inhuman, so fiendish, as the tragedy on the road between Philippopolis and Hermanli, of which we were in part spectators.

"I mentioned the fact, that we met on the road perhaps ten thousand refugees returning to

their homes, and spoke also of the attack of the Bulgarians on a train of these unfortunates, almost under the eyes of General Gourko. News has now reached us that hundreds of these refugees have been despoiled, and many have been killed, or have died on the road before reaching Philippopolis. Although there is no official proof of the truth of this statement, this is no argument against the correctness of the report, because there is no high official who, to my knowledge, would interest himself to take pains to inquire into the matter. Then, too, the testimony of one of my couriers, who has just come in from Sistova *via* Philippopolis, confirms part of the rumour, for he says that there was a great deal of plundering along the highway in the vicinity of the latter town. From what I saw myself, it appeared to me almost certain that these fugitives would never reach their homes.

"When the Bulgarians began plundering them in the presence of part of General Gourko's staff it was only with the greatest difficulty that the brigands were dispersed by the officers and soldiers, who attempted to protect the Turks, and every one knew that, when we were out of sight, the game would commence anew. The villagers were like madmen; the small children caught the contagious spirit, and set upon the Turkish children and pulled the bundles away from them; old hags clawed at the veiled women with all the ferocity of witches, and great hearty men mobbed helpless fugitives, and took from them their last covering, their only food. When we charged among them with the whip they sullenly retired, appearing again on the scene at a new point, and even the strong arm of military authority, wielded without system and spasmodically, was insufficient to prevent effectually the plunder. The thought came to me at the time, that, if these people have been so oppressed, they have learned arrogance and self-assertion with astonishing readiness; and this in the presence of superior physical force and indisputable authority.

"It is clear that it was the duty of the general officer who sent these fugitives back to their

villages to provide a proper escort to protect them on their journey. This has not, to my certain knowledge, been done in a single case, and General Kartzoff, who accompanied the detachment in advance of the main body of General Gourko's troops, sent the immense waggon trains of refugees to the rear, without any visible escort to ensure their safe conduct through a district where, it was well known, existed a strong feeling of hostility between the two races. To begin with, it was a colossal mistake on the part of the Turks to leave such a small escort with the great bivouac of refugees; they should have either given them no escort at all, or else a sufficient body of troops to protect them or to cover their retreat. As it was, there was just enough infantry to begin the fight and to excite the people to defend themselves. It is difficult to say which of the two divisions of that great multitude of peasants are better off—those who fled into the mountains, leaving all their property behind them, or those who fell into the hands of the Russians, and were sent back to their villages. It seems quite probable that complete extermination will be the fate of these refugees, and between exposure, famine, and the Bulgarians, they have little hope.

"Perhaps it is too much to expect of the Russians to secure good order in the hundreds of villages where Turks and Bulgarians live as neighbours; but it seems a little inconsistent, to put it very mildly, that the result of a war, made ostensibly to prevent massacres, should be to excite these wholesale slaughters, and that the Russian military government should be less effective than the lax and irregular system which it has superseded. Of course, the Turkish peasants are now in great fear of the Bulgarians, for the latter are all armed, many of them with weapons taken by the Russians from the Turks and given to the Bulgarians, and the former are without means of defence. The spirit of brigandage and vendetta that is excited in the Bulgarians is proved by what I have described along the Philipopolis-Hermanli road. They have even gone so far as to exchange shots with a force of Rus-

sian dragoons, in a village in this neighbourhood, and several of them were killed. The lessons they have learnt in the war have not benefited them much. It is plain to see that the large and constantly increasing corps of *venguers* have found work enough for their yataghans.

"The occupation of Adrianople was not, by any means, a dramatic *finale* of the trans-Balkan campaign. When the Turks evacuated the city on the 18th ultimo, the troops and most of the munitions were sent to Constantinople, and the government of the city was left in the hands of the consuls—namely, Messrs. J. E. Blunt, her Majesty's consul; Ghennadil, consul for Greece; Saxe, for the Austro-Hungarian empire; and Flèche, for France. At the suggestion of Mr. Blunt, the Turkish authorities had wisely ordered away all the irregular troops before the evacuation, and they left, for the protection of the consuls, and for the good order of the town, a detachment of seventy-two regular soldiers, with several officers. On the 19th, Fasso Efendi was appointed telegraph-governor of the town *ad interim*, and in this capacity he presented himself, along with the consular body and the Greek archbishop, to General Stroukoff, who, on the 20th, occupied a village very near the city.

"The general, however, refused to recognise any municipal authority, saying there was no longer any sultan or any governor, and announced to the consuls that he would appoint a committee of safety, to be composed of one member of every race or sect in the town, saying that he should hold each individual member of committee responsible for the acts of the portion of the inhabitants he represented, and finishing his declaration of the plan proposed for the government of the town in somewhat these words:—'This, gentlemen, I conceive to be the only means of insuring good order in the city, because the Armenians hate the Germans, the Germans the French, the French the Italians, the Italians the Greeks, the Greeks the Bulgarians, and the Bulgarians—they hate everybody.'

"This committee was accordingly appointed, and a native police force relieved the patrol or-



ganised by the consuls and personally conducted by them during the interim between the departure of the Turks and the arrival of the Russians. General Skobeleff came by rail on the 21st, General Gourko four days later, and the grand duke on the 26th. The triumphal entry of the commander-in-chief was not a remarkably brilliant spectacle, nor was there noticeable enthusiasm in the crowds that assembled on the way; which was partly due, doubtless, to the rain, which fell heavily at the time, and partly to the nature of the people, who are not disposed to any visible expression of emotion.

"With the occupation of Adrianople the rapid forward movement did not cease, and Skobeleff's troops were on the road again after a pause of a day or two, forming the central column of the advance towards Constantinople. General Gourko's infantry had come in with empty haversacks; marching from twenty to forty-five kilometres a day, they had long since left far behind the provision trains, and had been living for some days as only a Russian soldier knows how to live. Bread is to them a necessity, and how they have managed to eke out six days of two-thirds regular ration during ten days of marching and fighting, as they did between Sofia and Philippopolis, is a problem I have not yet been able to solve. Between Philippopolis and Adrianople the bread ration was short in a like proportion, but the soldiers managed to live.

"Of course, General Gourko could not keep on any further without resting his men and awaiting the transport trains, so his advance *via* Lulé Burgas to Rodosto was postponed until the first day of February, and the peace negotiations having fallen through, I expected to bask in warm sunlight on the shores of the Sea of Marmora, and after two months of cold and snow should have cried 'Thalassa, Thalassa,' with all the ardour of Xenophon's soldiers, when the delightful blue horizon line should have met my eye. But during the forenoon of January 31st there were vague rumours that the preliminaries of peace were to be signed that afternoon, and

all the diplomats keeping a discreet silence on the subject, nothing further was made public until about dark in the evening, when a mass was celebrated in the Konak, where the grand duke has his head-quarters, and the bands played, and a tide-wave of joyous cheering spread all over the city. To state that everybody, from commanders to cooks, was heartily delighted by this proof that peace was imminent, is to give the faintest possible idea of the general joy that prevailed. It was a most welcome surprise, and a complete surprise, for the pachas had sent a messenger to Constantinople, asking for new instructions, more than a week before, and no answer had been received.

"The grand duke insisted that they should give their final decision about the propositions for a basis of peace on the 31st, and on the very morning of the day the same aide-de-camp of Suleiman Pacha who came to General Gourko at Ichtiman with the news of an armistice, Zeki Bey, appeared, bringing a message from the Sublime Porte asking why the movements had not ceased, and declaring that the document consenting to the conditions had been sent a week before. The interruption of the communications was the reason why the message had not reached head-quarters before this, a delay which changed materially the aspect of the affairs in general, and gave opportunity for the occupation of considerable territory. However, the basis of peace was signed without further hesitation, painful as it was for the pachas to put their names to a demand which meant to them the death of Turkey. The scene was extremely touching when the venerable Namyk Pacha could not refrain from shedding tears at the thought of the future of the country he loved so much, and had served so well. On the evening of the 6th the pachas, who had received a telegram from Constantinople informing them that their mission was a special one, and was now finished, took the train for that city, and no news has since been received from them. . . .

"Adrianople has probably never had in her entire history such crowded streets. The main

thoroughfare is almost impassable at times. Hundreds of soldiers buying shirts, officers chaffering for relics and souvenirs, and crowds of Bulgarians from the neighbouring villages watching for bargains, make up a busy crowd, in which a wonderful trade in all small articles is carried on by scores of enterprising natives. The hotels and restaurants are all crowded to overflowing, every empty house has been filled with soldiers, and officers have been billeted about promiscuously. Notwithstanding the thousands of soldiers in the streets, the native element predominates so strongly everywhere as to give a characteristic tone to the scenes of unique picturesqueness and exceptional interest that one sees at every turn. Such gorgeous masses of blazing hues are food and drink after the bleak and barren landscapes of the Balkans in their winter dress, and the eyes feed on the rich tones with eagerness and satisfaction, after long abstinence from any luxury of colour.

"It seemed strange enough, at first, to see Turkish soldiers—the Consular guard—with arms in hand, circulating freely among the Russians, but it has long since got to be such a common sight as to cease to attract attention. Day by day, scores of Turkish stragglers come in, ragged and dirty, but easily recognisable as soldiers, and now hundreds of them are met in the streets. Unarmed, they found it dangerous to stay in the villages where they had taken refuge, and so they have come into Adrianople. Such is indeed their story. What language the Russian and Turkish soldiers use in conversation is known only to them, for it is quite unintelligible to any one else; but they manage to hold lively chats on amusing subjects, and fraternise in a very jolly manner. The Russian soldier is, first of all, a good-natured fellow, and he looks upon the Turks and Frenchmen as a kind of comical animals. Why this is so, no one can say; and especially it is hard to see why the Frenchmen should be particularly amusing to him, but anything that is French he considers funny; and the Turks, their manners, dress, and faces, all excite his mirth. The English-

man and German he cannot endure—possibly because they appear too serious to him, and he has an unmistakable, ingrained dislike for both those nations. Of course, I speak only of the men in the ranks, as one meets them everywhere, and overhears their conversation. Now they are, of course, in high spirits, because they have made themselves very little at home in Bulgaria, and are glad to return to their steppes again. From my own observation, I am convinced that they fraternise with the Turks much more than with the Bulgarians.

"In the great bazaar the mixture of races is curious enough; every variety of type of man, from the coal-black Nubian to the mild-eyed blonde Russian, shoulder one another good-naturedly there. Cossacks handle the rich draperies and haggle about the price of calico shirts; the infantrymen, for the first time in their lives let loose in such a museum of wonderful articles, walk about at first quite dazed, and then join in the lively shirt trade with the rest; while the officers, everywhere on the look-out for relics and interesting souvenirs, pay out their shining pol-imperials with a recklessness that has spoiled the market for any other purchasers. These bright new gold pieces will open almost any door; even the mosque of Sultan Selim has been illuminated and a service conducted to satisfy the curiosity of the officers. I thought it was rather an undignified proceeding on the part of the Turks to go through their service of chanting and prayer with an audience of a thousand Muscovites, and many of the officers present shared my opinion. Whatever orders the sentries at the door of Sultan Selim may have received they certainly execute their duty most capriciously. A few Turks coming in at the door the other day, and observing several Russian officers walking about with their boots on, did not stop to take off their shoes, as the custom is, whereupon the sentry followed them into the church, ordered them back, and obliged them to take off the muddy foot-gear. They looked at the soldier as if to say, 'I wonder if this fellow is going to oblige us to pray too,' and half pleased,



half angry, they obeyed the guard and went to their worship."

Thus did the ancient city fare in the hands of the northern invaders, gradually becoming accustomed to their presence, and even thankful that the reign of panic and disorder was practically at an end for itself, however the storm might continue to rage outside. The stern rule of the Russian generals was infinitely better than any *régime* which could have been established by the inhabitants if left to their own devices.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### THE MAHOMEDAN REFUGEES.

It seems advisable to turn back at this point in order to take a more comprehensive view of what was, all things considered, perhaps the most striking and painful phase of the whole of this memorable campaign. We have already witnessed many barbarous scenes, and have marked how the track of the invaders became the theatre of cruelties almost incredible in their bitterness and extent. The last chapters of this record are inexpressibly sadder than all the rest.

No account of the terrible Turko-Russian war would be complete without a narrative of the unprecedented sufferings of the Mussulman population, of their flight in mid-winter, of their massacre by the Bulgarians, and of the death of many thousands of the refugees. A ghastly picture of all this is furnished by the correspondent of the "Daily News" accompanying Général Gourko. Writing from Adrianople on the 27th of January, he says:—"Seventy miles of utter desolation, seventy long miles strewn with the household effects of many thousand families, seventy weary miles of a continuous, ghastly, sickening panorama of death in every form, and in its most terrible aspect—such is the road from Philippopolis to Hermanli. This route has been for many weeks the theatre of scenes, and here has been enacted a tragedy, of such colossal proportions and horrible character

that it is quite impossible for any one who has not witnessed part of it to conceive, in the most moderate degree, the nature of the diabolical drama.

"It was here that was assembled the great mass of the Turkish families that fled from the villages at the approach of the Russians. Fugitives from the entire territory from Plevna to Philippopolis were for weeks, and even months, endeavouring to make their way to Constantinople, the haven safe from the pursuit of the Muscovite. How many thousand families already gained the vicinity of Stamboul before the recent rapid advance of the Russians it is impossible to estimate. It is certain that the long trains of fugitives blocked all the roads, of the Turkish retreat, and seriously hindered, and even stopped the march of the troops. Ever since the investment of Plevna, and even before, there was a general exodus to the southward from all the towns threatened by Russia, and hundreds of trains concentrated by converging routes in the valley of the Maritza, the tide being naturally directed towards Constantinople. Never having found any Turkish families in any of the villages, it had been a long unanswered question what had become of the population; and now for the first time do we appreciate in part the sufferings of these people, and form some adequate idea of the multitude of Mussulman inhabitants who have fled panic-stricken before the Russians.

"As we left behind us the rocky hills and picturesque city of Philippopolis on the morning of the 23rd, and rode eastward along the road, the first thing that met our eyes was a number of bodies of Turkish soldiers lying in the road, crushed by the wheels of passing artillery, and trampled into the mud by the feet of many horses. Before we had gone half a dozen kilometres the corpses of peasants, both Turkish and Bulgarian, were to be seen lying in the snow, and some of them had already been exposed to the weather for two or three weeks. Some had blood-stains still fresh on their garments. Dead horses and cattle blocked the path at every few

steps, averaging two to the distance between the telegraph posts; and as we went further and further away from the city the number rapidly increased, and hundreds of abandoned arabas stood in the road, and choked the ditches alongside. The road, too narrow for the immense trains that had passed over it in hasty flight, was now supplemented by beaten tracks through the rice-fields on each side, and there were traces of bivouacs in the snow, which became more and more frequent as we proceeded, until these side paths were almost literally carpeted with the debris of camps, and our route lay between rows of dead animals, broken arabas, piles of rags and cast-off clothing, and human bodies, for thirty-five miles of the whole of the first day's ride.

"Our mystification increased with every hour. We saw the bodies of Bulgarian peasants, with terrible wounds in the head and neck, sometimes mutilated and disfigured; women and infants, children and old men, both Turkish and Bulgarian, fallen in the fields by the roadside, half buried in the snow, or lying in the pools of water. It seemed to have been one long battle between the peasants of both races, in which the dead were counted equally for each; but while many of the bodies bore marks of violence and showed ghastly wounds, great numbers of the women and children were evidently frozen to death, for they lay on the snow as if asleep, with the flush of life still on their faces, and the pink skin of their feet and hands still unblanched. Side by side with these, many corpses of old men, full of dignity even in death, lay stark by the roadside, their white beards clotted with blood, and their helpless hands fallen upon their breasts. From the muddy water of the ditches tiny hands and feet stretched out, and baby-faces half-covered with snow looked out innocently and peacefully, with scarcely a sign of suffering on their features. Frozen at their mothers' breasts they were thrown down into the snow to lighten the burden of the poor creatures who were struggling along in mortal terror.

"I say the mystification increased as we ad-

vanced, because it was impossible to see why Bulgarian and Turk should be frozen side by side, or why there had been such slaughter of both races. That peasants should be frozen to death was no more than could be expected in the severe weather, for they were travelling in miserable arabas, without food or shelter, and with half-starved oxen. Miles of these araba trains we passed on the road, human beings and household effects jumbled in promiscuously. Upon the jolting carts bedding and utensils were piled. Women and children upon donkeys and cattle followed alongside, and behind for miles was a long trail of wretched, weary, half-dead stragglers; old men and women bent double, crawling along with the aid of crutches or sticks; mothers with infants at their breasts, scarcely moving one foot before the other—all this after long months of flight, constant exposure, continuous dread of marauders and the hated Muscovites. Never did I feel so utterly helpless as in the presence of this supreme misery. I watched a mother leading along a sick child of perhaps ten years, a mile or more behind one of these trains. The poor girl could with difficulty balance herself on her naked, half-frozen feet. Night was coming on, and the cold wind that chilled us in our warm clothing blew about the rags from the suffering creature, disclosing emaciated limbs and skeleton body. The mother was in quite as pitiable a condition. Her face and head alone were well wrapped up. The araba train was moving slowly out of sight on the distant hills. A night on the road meant death to both these unfortunates, and their straggling friends could give them no assistance, because they were for the most part in a similar state of misery. The mother dragged her little one along, fast losing patience as the darkness came on, and finally pushed the sick child into the snow by the roadside, and hurried on without looking behind her. This was one of a series of similar scenes that were enacted before our eyes.

"Money would do them no good. Extra clothing we had none. Our food was on the pack-horses far behind, and what we had with



us were scanty rations for the journey. Does it seem strange that at this time, together with an exhausting sense of hopelessness and complete helplessness that took possession of me, came conflicting emotions of keen sympathy with the Turks, both soldiers and peasants, as the weaker and losing party, and a certain hard-heartedness at the same time against them for what I knew them to be responsible for in the Bulgarian horrors? Here they were murdered, Turks and Bulgarians side by side, and while my liveliest sympathies went easily with the refugees, whose sufferings were presented so dramatically in the cold and snow, yet I had an accurate recollection of the long trains of Bulgarian refugees, that I had seen in the intense heat of summer in the region north of the Balkans and on the barren hill-sides of the Dobrudscha; and shutting my eyes on the scenes before me, I could easily see vivid pictures of Bulgarians under similar conditions of misery and suffering. I had not answered the self-imposed question, which people most deserve sympathy? when we arrived at the village of Kurucesme, where we were to pass the night.

"This town, as well as the three others we had passed on the road, was nothing but a collection of empty buildings and barn-yards. Like the rest it had suffered first from the exodus of the fugitives, who had pillaged on all sides; next from the Bashi-Bazouks and Circassians, who had plundered and murdered; and last from the Russian cavalry, who had had pretty well eaten the place bare. Few inhabitants remained in the village. All was despoiled. Even the priest, who always has something, if there is anything in the town, lived between bare walls, had no carpets, rugs, bedding, or provisions.

"The next morning, just as we were going away, the head of a long train of returning Turkish refugee families appeared in the main street of the village. Then followed a scene which is painful in the last degree to describe. The Bulgarians gathered on the street in knots of three or four, and waited calmly until the miserable train had got well into the village, when from

every direction the inhabitants pounced upon the exhausted, defenceless Turks, and began to carry off their household effects, and even the cattle from the carts. One poor woman, leading an ass piled up with bedding, and a child on the top, found her property distributed among half a dozen stalwart ruffians in a twinkling, and the little infant on the ground in the mud. The old men and women clung to their only treasures, while the Bulgarians dragged them away. Children yelled with fright, and panic reigned, which started the slowly-moving caravan into a quick march. All this went on before General Gourko was out of sight of the town.

I happened to linger behind with Captain Soukhanoff, of the Hussars, and we formed ourselves into a special police force in an instant, and the captain knocked one Bulgarian through the hedge, while I settled the business with another who was escaping with his plunder round the corner of a house. Several officers joined us, and the whips were plied with effect, scattering the crowds, and recovering a great quantity of the stolen property. I must confess, however, that I could not, after the heat of indignation was past, blame the villagers so very much for their attack on the Turks; for the refugees, when they had passed through the village, had plundered on all sides, and as I rode out of the town I saw several bodies of Bulgarians in the rice fields, where they had been cut down in the recent massacre, which numbered one hundred and thirty-six victims.

"From this village to Haskioi the corpses were more numerous, if anything, than on the route of the day before. The village we passed was full of dead Turkish peasants, and on asking the Bulgarians who killed them, they replied with a great deal of effusion and fiendish pride—'We did it. We and our friends did it.'

"In Haskioi there were bodies of Turkish soldiers in the streets nearly buried under heaps of stones and bricks, suggesting that, after being wounded and unable to move away, they had been stoned to death by the peasants; and here also were hundreds of Turkish families who,

without arabas or beasts of burden, had taken shelter in the deserted houses. I inquired of one of these families where they had come from, and they said that they left Plevna five months ago, and since that time they had been on the road, and for the past few weeks in a great camp, which we should find further on towards Hermanli. For many days they had been entirely without bread or even Indian corn, and had existed solely on the flesh of the cattle that fell on the road. I gave them all the bread I could get hold of, and they ate it like starved creatures, crying for joy. The grandmother, father, and mother, with an infant at the breast, and a small boy of ten years, had not a single shoe between them, and their only baggage consisted of a few old torn bed-quilts, and a kettle to boil meat in. They were in great distress of mind, because the house they occupied did not belong to them, and not having any means of transport they were unable to proceed further until fine weather should begin. The only consolation I could give them was the assurance that they would receive nothing but kindness from the Russians, and would probably find their house in Plevna unburned.

"At every step beyond Haskioi we met new and more horrifying scenes; man and wife lying side by side on the same blanket, with two children curled upon the snow near, all frozen dead; old men with their heads half cut off; some Bulgarians mutilated as only the Turks know how to mutilate, and on each side of the road, broad continuous bivouacs deserted in haste, strewn with household effects. For many miles, we had been trampling in the mud carpets, bedding, and clothing. Now the highway was literally covered with bundles, cushions, blankets, and every imaginable article of household use. Broken arabas, too, began to multiply, and as we approached the little village of Tirali we saw, in the distance, on either side of the road, a perfect forest of wheels, reaching to the river on the right, and spreading away up the hillsides on the left. Several dead Turkish soldiers, and one or two Russians, showed that

there had been a little skirmish there; and we rode into the midst of the great deserted bivouac, the horses walking on rich carpets and soft draperies, all crushed and trampled in the mud.

"The scene was at once so unique in its general aspect, so terribly impressive, so eloquent of suffering and disaster to innocent people, that I hesitate to attempt a description of it. Hundreds of acres were covered with household goods. All along the river bank, following the windings of the road, over the hill, and across the fields where the road makes a sharp turn, reached this bivouac, at least three miles in extent, and of varying width. Over this great tract the arabas were standing as closely as they could, with their oxen placed together. The frames of the carts were in most cases broken to pieces. Sick cattle wandered listlessly about among the wheels. Corpses of men, women, and children, lay about near every araba, and the whole ground was carpeted with clothing, kitchen utensils, books, and bedding.

"It was a pitiable sight to see an old, grey-bearded Turk lying with his open Koran beside him, splashed with blood from ghastly gashes in his bared throat. Bundles of rags and clothes nearly all held dead babies. Crowds of Bulgarians swarmed in this great avenue of death and desolation, choosing the best of the carts, and carrying away great loads of copper vessels, which lay about in profusion, and mud-soiled bedding, with no more respect for the dead than for the rags they lay on. These scavengers would drive their carts across the heads of dead women and old men without even a glance of curiosity at the bodies.

"I had given up counting the dead non-combatants early on the previous day, having reached the sum of two hundred, so I did not continue the enumeration on the day in question, but I should say that at least five hundred lay in the bivouac; certainly no less than fifteen thousand carts had halted there, large as the number may seem, and at least seventy-five thousand people had deserted the whole of



their possessions and had run away, with only what they could carry in their hands. Sickened by the continuation of the ghastly panorama for so many hours, we rode on to Hermanli, not leaving the last of the horribly mutilated corpses until we reached the very edge of the village.

"At Hermanli we learned for the first time the story of the bivouac. It seems that the advance of the cavalry had been checked at different villages on the roads by the very determined resistance of the armed population, who fought with fury. There were seven repetitions of the little scene which occurred near Philippopolis, where the inhabitants fled with the Turkish soldiers, and men and women fired volleys upon the Russians. At Derbent, a short distance on the road between Philippopolis and Hermanli, when the Russian cavalry entered after a sharp little skirmish, they were fired upon, and several killed and wounded, from a little stone house. All efforts to parley with the Turks concealed there resulted in loss of life, and at last, after several peasants had been shot in the attempt to persuade the inmates to surrender, cannon were brought to bear upon the house, and shells exploded inside, which set it on fire. The defenders were driven out, and advanced upon the mass of soldiers, firing as they came. Of course they were shot immediately. There were only three peasants in all who made this desperate resistance in their fortress. This incident shows the spirit that animated the Turks to resist the advance of the Russians, and the history of the great bivouac proves the extent and force of the panic which seized those who ran away.

"When the Russian cavalry came in sight of the bivouac there were one or two battalions of Turkish infantry stationed there, as rear-guard, but they dispersed and retired with little attempt at resistance, and a squadron was sent into the great assembly of waggons to find out what it was. They rode on without receiving a single shot until they were right alongside, and within a very few paces of the train of arabas occupying the road, when from behind

these waggons, out from under the rude coverings, and from all sides came a rattling volley, which emptied some saddles. Then it became evident that ferocious resistance was to be made, so this squadron retired, and preparations were made to attack the collection of waggons, for it sheltered not only the rear-guard, but also no one knew how many armed peasants; but before the attack began in earnest the panic caught in the bivouac and spread like wildfire. The immense band of refugees ran away with the soldiers to the mountains, leaving cattle, carts, and all their movables which they could not seize upon at the moment.

"The cause of the panic was the appearance of Skobelev's cavalry in the valley of the Maritza, in front of the bivouac. The result of it was doubtless the death of thousands of Turkish peasants, who are now in the mountains without clothing or food. Still, another result of the flight is the enrichment of all the Bulgarians in the neighbourhood, for the smoke of the first firing had not cleared away when these ever-watchful individuals pounced down upon all the cattle the soldiers did not drive off, and carried away hundreds of carts laden with plunder.

"This complete catastrophe is bewildering in its dimensions. Of the seventy-five thousand people, only a few thousands with their arabas were turned back towards their homes by the Russians. I have told how we met them on the road. The rest escaped with foolish precipitation, following the impulses of unreasonable fear, easily comprehensible under the circumstances. Their fate is not yet known, but it may easily be conjectured. The route between Philippopolis and Hermanli should bear for all time the name of the Road of the Dead.

"It is discouraging to believe that the scenes I have described may be repeated as we proceed towards Constantinople, for a short time ago long waggon trains of refugees passed through Adrianople on their way towards Stamboul, and filled the street here for weeks, day and night, with a slowly-moving caravan. When asked where they were going, very few of these people



SOLDIERS IN CAMP GRINDING CORN





could answer. They only knew that they must get away as fast as possible, and they were so distracted with terror, that when their arabas broke down even in the streets of Adrianople, they left their baggage and hurried away without it. Many of these fugitives have been turned back by the Russian cavalry, and as I write the street is filled with arabas still moving along through the cold rain and darkness, most of the women on foot without shoes, every one completely drenched, half-starved, and exhausted.

"The howling of the storm makes a wild accompaniment to the cries of infants and the screeching of the wheels as they pass. There is no hope of any succour for these unfortunates. The small fund which remained in the hands of the committee here charged with the relief of the suffering Turks has, I believe, been all distributed, either in money or in food and clothing, and there is nothing to do but to let these people struggle on to their villages as best they may. It is safe to prophesy that but a small proportion will ever reach their homes in this severe winter weather, and against the tide of the advancing army trains; and once in their villages they have neither food, nor money to buy any, if there be any to sell after the Russian army has passed. If peace be soon declared, and the present panic cease, there is still a gloomy future for these fugitives in a land where there is certain to be a scarcity of crops for lack of men and cattle to cultivate, and a promise of pestilence when the warm weather comes. The peculiar nature of the war has made it impossible to avert the partial ruin of the people where the armies have passed, but I believe the exodus of the Turkish population, which has resulted so disastrously, might have been easily prevented. The refugees might have been stopped as far back as Sofia if Suleiman Pacha had not ordered them on in advance of his army."

"It may be that Suleiman had in his mind such memorable examples as that which had been given by the Russians themselves in 1813, when they devastated their country during the French

invasion, and thus contributed to the destruction of Napoleon's "grand army." If this was his motive in ordering the general flight of the Mahomedan population, he had miscalculated the effect of his advice in the most lamentable manner. Even if he could have entirely stripped the country of supplies for an army, he would not have done the enemy much harm. With the Balkans perfectly open, the Russians were in constant and rapid communication with their base, and would have had little difficulty in drawing every ration from their own resources. Moreover, with a mixed population in the invaded districts of Mussulmans, Greeks, and Bulgarians, it was impossible (as proved in many instances) to ensure the devastation of the country. It is therefore hardly conceivable that Suleiman Pacha, and the other advisers of the Porte who counselled the same desperate course, could have expected that it would be strategically successful. The alternative supposition is that they were actuated by fanaticism, blind hatred and revenge, combined with an unjustifiable fear that the sufferings of the Mussulmans if they remained in their homes would be worse than if they fled in the depths of the severe winter. In this case there can be no excuse for the conduct of the Turkish authorities, who must be held largely responsible for the miseries of the refugees."

The terrible sufferings described above were repeated all along the road to Constantinople, whither the Mussulman hordes crowded in their terror. The civilised world will not forget the sad revelations of January and February, 1878, as day after day brought sickening details of the flight. Charity, indeed, came to the aid of the suffering multitude. English ladies, like Lady Strangford, Lady Burdett Coutts, and Mrs. Layard, exerted themselves to relieve the sick and starving, and were well seconded by volunteer workers and benevolent contributors. But it was impossible to minister to every case, and thousands of victims perished in this mad and wicked exodus, which can only be accounted for by the gregarious instincts of an Asiatic race,



still semi-barbarous, and therefore inclined to act by instinct, panic, and imitation.

The rigour of winter, the animosity of creed and race, the dire work of revenge, did not find their victims entirely amongst the Mahomedans. Many districts not yet occupied by the Russians were overrun by Bashi-Bazouks and Circassians, chiefly deserters from the defeated and demoralised armies of the czar; and these, wherever the Turkish authorities were too weak to hold them in check, fell upon the peaceable Christians. Terrible massacres took place, the worst of them all being at Viza, between Adrianople and the Black Sea. One of the last proceedings of the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies was to discuss the circumstances of this black crime; and it must be mentioned as creditable to the deputies that the great majority of them, Christians as well as Mahomedans, demanded that strict justice should be done in the matter.

The circumstances of the massacre are described in an account, written by an eye-witness, and forwarded to the "Daily News" by its correspondent at Constantinople. "I might," says this writer, "give a more faithful description of the terrible scenes which occurred at Viza—scenes, in the contemplation of which one feels his hair standing on end, and at which Satan and Hell must certainly have been filled with envy, were I to hold in my hand, instead of a pen, a lighted torch, and trace letters of fire, such as would resound to the utmost ends of the earth on layers of gunpowder. On the 22nd of January, the commander-in-chief, Mehemet Ali Pacha, coming from the localities north of Adrianople, passed through Viza at the head of an army of thirty-two thousand men, and stayed one night in the town. The inhabitants spared no pains or money in providing for the comfort of the general and his army.

"Before taking his departure on the following day the pacha gave orders to the civil governor of the town to remain constantly there, protecting the life, honour, and property of the population, and not to leave the place unless such circumstances should arise as would render

it impossible for him to stay. The inhabitants, labouring under great agitation, owing to certain rumours which had reached them of attacks and raids committed elsewhere by Circassians, earnestly begged the pacha to leave in the town a small detachment of his forces to guard the country, and, in case of need, be there to repulse any possible attacks on the part of marauders. The pacha, however, refused this request, on the ground that any such detachment left behind might ultimately have its line of retreat cut off, adding that there were other detachments coming after him which had orders to halt wherever their presence might be required, and to which he requested the inhabitants to show the same courtesy that they had shown to himself and his army, and prepare the provisions they would necessarily require. The same things were repeated to them by the officers who passed through on the following day. The inhabitants, exclusively Greeks, immediately set to work and prepared such a quantity of bread and provisions as would have sufficed for the requirements of double the number of the forces expected, and having got everything for their reception ready, waited for their coming, like hospitable innkeepers, at the very doors of their houses.

"In the midst of the refugees following in the wake of Mehemet Ali Pacha, and who since the day before had been constantly passing through the town, there suddenly appeared, coming towards Viza, a large body of armed men, consisting entirely of Bashi-Bazouks, Zeibecks, and Circassians. Not the slightest suspicion of them entered into the minds of the population. On the contrary, some of the townspeople, in obedience to the orders received from the commander-in-chief, and confiding in the assurances given by him and his officers, went fearlessly forward to meet the new-comers, and offer the provisions they had prepared. It is at this point that the curtain is drawn up, and a sight presented to the world so ghastly that the understanding fails to comprehend it, and before which imagination itself becomes distracted with horror and wonder. No sooner were they in the town than

these savage hordes of marauders, without a single word of explanation or warning, fell like hungry wolves upon the unprepared and peaceful inhabitants, seized almost all of them, and, after plundering them of what they happened to have about their persons, obliged them, by pointing their guns at their heads, to say whether and where they had any money hidden. There is no torture which they did not invent in order to extract from the mouths of their victims such a confession. Massacres, murders, tortures, mutilations, rapine, pillage, and fire; such was their infernal programme. Priests were seized, insulted, and ultimately tied on piles of wood and burnt alive. Many a parent would have preferred, had the option been left to him, to put his own eyes out, like *Œdipus*, rather than see his daughters, innocent young girls, sacrificed before his very sight at the altar of dishonour, and trodden under the heels of shame, he being expressly made to stand by and witness, with tied hands and feet, the dreadful sight, God only knows with what unspeakable agony. . . . The daughters of the greater number of families, as also many married women, upon whom the savages had satiated their most brutal passions, have been carried off, and nothing has been ascertained as yet as to their fate.

"Until late at night the firing of musketry continued with unabated fury, and the number of corpses lying about in the streets and within the houses increased every moment. In the meantime the pillage of houses and shops went on most savagely. The plunder was being continually brought out and laden on carts and horses, and so bent did the savage marauders seem to be upon destruction that the goods that the carts would no longer hold, being already overladen, they threw under the wheels, and, passing the carts over them, broke them to pieces. The roofs of the houses were pierced through or pulled down, so that nothing that might by chance be hidden there should escape their greedy grasp. Thus many people who, in the hope of escaping the general massacre, had fled to the tops of their houses, met there with

their deaths after being submitted to the most horrible tortures. Corn, barley, Indian corn, and other cereals, were scattered about in immense quantities in the streets. The holy vessels of the Greek church were taken out and put up to a mock auction, while the sacred edifice itself was profaned by being turned into a stable in which these monsters tied up their horses. The cathedral church and buildings, after having been pillaged, were set fire to and burnt. Owing to the frenzy with which they broke into the cathedral and the bishop's palace, we had come to think that they must have also laid murderous hands upon our respected pastor, and that, in addition to the numberless other victims, we should also have to mourn for the loss of one of the most virtuous and distinguished metropolitans of the orthodox church. Fortunately, however, his eminence happened at the time to be staying at *Medea*, one of the three cathedral towns of the see of *Viza*, and was thus, by the will, undoubtedly, of Divine Providence, saved from that hurricane of murder and pillage.

"The scenes that were being enacted in the streets and houses are beyond description. The atrocities committed here are, I am afraid, without a parallel. Respectable and peaceful citizens, women, children, none were spared, but either put to death by torture, shot, or mutilated. The hands of a sick and dying person, who was being carried to a Mussulman house by a Turk, were cut off, and the porter had his skull broken. Succeeding the bands of *Zeibecks*, *Bashi-Bazouks*, and *Circassians*, came the gipsies, seizing upon everything that the others did not consider worth carrying off, and completing the work of plunder and devastation. Even the very mats of the houses were carried away. On the following day, from early dawn until night set in, musketry fire was continually heard, from which it appeared that the savages must have returned to *Viza* for the purpose of completing the work of the preceding day. They plundered again the houses and shops, seized upon everything that could be carried away, mercilessly put to



death all the inhabitants, men, women, and children, that they could lay their hands upon, and finally ended by setting fire to the town, which soon became a whirlpool of flames and smoke, while they rushed towards the mountains, whither a few of the inhabitants had managed to escape, and whom they now sought out, their thirst for blood not being yet satiated. About one-half of the population of Viza, consisting entirely of Greeks, some at the point of death, others already dead, are lying about in the streets and houses unburied and rotting, while those who managed to effect their escape to the mountains are still wandering there, in the very depth of winter, almost naked, with bare feet, without a roof over their heads, without food of any kind, trembling with cold, hunger, and fear. The father, the mother, the children of one and the same family, no longer recognising one another, are, in a sepulchral voice, and with blood-shot eyes, asking each other whether they know what has become of their fathers, their husbands, their mothers, their children? if any one has seen or heard of them? whether they are alive or dead?

"From Viza the predatory bands betook themselves to the neighbouring villages of St. George, St. John Pinaca, Tchakli, Karaki, Serai, Yorali, Mukriatissa, Asranyo, Toprika, Ahmet Bey, Mes-sina, Tsfikoi, and Tchogara. New atrocities, new scenes of pillage, rapine, murder, and devastation, occurred at each of these places. The same terrible fate seems to have befallen not only the villages belonging to the 'caza,' or circumference of Viza, numbering a population of some twelve thousand souls, exclusively Greeks, but also those belonging to the 'cazas' of Medea, Pyrgos, and other cazas appertaining to the 'sandjak' of Rodosto; and furthermore, according to information received thence, those belonging to the 'sandjak' of Adrianople. About these, however, I can give no details, as the telegraphic communication has been lately interrupted on all sides, and not one of the affrighted inhabitants durst come out of the lair into which he has crawled seeking refuge.

"About the following, however, most horri-

ble, abominable, and unheard-of crime, in itself a colossus of savageness, a whole abyss of atrocity, I have most authentic and reliable information, though, for the sake of humanity, I should have been glad were it otherwise. It appears that the inhabitants of the village of St. George, eight hundred souls in all, Greeks entirely, flying before the Circassians, who had attacked and destroyed their village, managed to hide themselves in a large cave near Kara Déré. The Circassians, thirsting for Christian blood, were scouring the country in search of victims, and finally fell upon and discovered the place of refuge of these unfortunate people, and immediately tried to effect an entrance into the cave. In this, however, they were baffled, the entrance to the cave being well guarded and bravely defended by the refugees. This show of resistance on the part of the people, and the fact, perhaps, that three of their number were mortally wounded by the shots fired from within, seemed to exasperate them the more, and, after two or three further attempts to effect an entrance but without success, they determined by any possible means to put immediately to death those within. They accordingly set to their infernal work, and by means of crowbars they ultimately succeeded in opening a hole on the roof of the cave, through which, without loss of time, they proceeded to pour a large quantity of brimstone and asphalte, to which they set fire by firing their guns through the hole. As a consequence, the inside of the cave was, in a few minutes, filled with smoke so dense that the poor people dropped down one by one, dying of suffocation . . . and the souls of eight hundred martyrs fled almost simultaneously towards the foot of the throne of their Creator, the Almighty. Out of the eight hundred who entered the cave only eighteen were saved, almost by a miracle, having on first entering the cave taken their stand at the furthest end of it, and having, after the Circassians had taken themselves off, exulting no doubt in their abominable work, come out of that immense grave by dragging themselves over the dead bodies of their fellow villagers of yesterday.

"We here at Medea experienced a close blockade. Thrice did the Circassians and Bashi-Bazouks attempt to enter the town; but each time they were most effectually repulsed, thanks to the measures taken and the courage displayed by the population, which, like those of all the surrounding districts, is entirely composed of Greeks. We hardly, however, consider ourselves safe as yet. The sword of the Circassians seems to be hanging over our heads like that of Damocles. We greet to-day's sun in doubt whether we shall live to see that of the morrow. We are, so to speak, wavering between life and death. I was on the point of closing this letter when I heard of the unexpected arrival in the town of one of the most respectable inhabitants of Viza, a Greek, who had managed to effect his escape to the mountains. I went to see him, and found him barefooted, almost naked, blood-stained, and trembling with cold and hunger. He gives a full confirmation of the reports which reached us here with regard to the dreadful occurrences there. He came on here to report the same by telegraph, but he found the wires cut. Such atrocious crimes are committed, at only a few hours' distance from the capital of the Ottoman empire, and that towards the end of the 19th century, which really, in cruel mockery only, must have been denominated the century of light and civilisation. Let civilisation now come forward, pull up its sleeves, dip its hands up to the elbows in blood, and exult over the sight of rotting corpses and broken skulls."

One can easily understand the fervid indignation with which this writer expresses himself; and there would be no cause for surprise if it were established that his statement was exaggerated. But there is only too much reason to fear that the facts, as he describes them, actually occurred. Nothing horrible or dastardly which the heart could conceive was omitted during the years of blood through which the Turkish empire passed to its ruin.

## CHAPTER IX.

## THE POLICY OF ENGLAND.

It would be impossible to exaggerate the excitement created in England by the rapid advance of the Russians south of the Balkans. The dislike and suspicion of Russia, which are inherited feelings amongst Englishmen, and which had been steadily growing for a long time past, were inflamed in the highest degree by the approach of the Muscovite army to the southern sea, by the imminent danger of a complete Turkish collapse, and also, indirectly, by the terrible sufferings of the refugees, for which the Russian commanders were held to be partly responsible.

About the close of 1877, and the beginning of 1878, the unfortunate controversy which had been raised in England concerning the foreign policy of the government, and the general merits of the campaign between Russia and Turkey, had been waged with incessant animation, and not a little bitterness. The hostility to Turkey expressed throughout the country in 1876, on our hearing of the Bulgarian atrocities, had been much qualified by the gallant struggle made by the Turks, as well as by the suspicion, based on evidence which was quite trustworthy up to a certain point, that Russian intrigue had created an insurrection for the express purpose of bringing on the war. It had, at all events, become manifest that there was no longer such an overwhelming majority against giving assistance of any kind to Turkey as there was a year previously. This fact was illustrated on several occasions by the interruption of meetings called to protest against the attitude of the government, as well as by the success of meetings for an opposite purpose.

It was no secret that a very powerful section of the Conservative party was constantly urging the English Cabinet to espouse the cause of Turkey in an open and active manner, or at



least to throw down a challenge to Russia, and compel her to stay her hand. Russia, it will be remembered, had given England certain distinct pledges before entering on the war; and up to this point she had fairly kept her word. Her opponents declared that in certain respects she had contravened the spirit, whilst observing the letter of her promises; and they urged further, that the conduct of the invasion had opened up new dangers for England, not contemplated at the time when the pledges had been given, and not covered by them.

Undoubtedly, a strong desire to go to war with Russia was felt by a large number of Englishmen, some of whom gave vent to their opinions in a vehement and unguarded manner. It is needless to say that the desire was, in many instances, founded upon conscientious motives, and patriotism of the most genuine kind; but there were thousands of rash, unthinking, and irresponsible advocates of war who failed to see the question in its true light. The clamour of these extravagant persons, which expressed itself by rough disturbances at public meetings, by violence in the streets and parks, and by noisy enthusiasm at the music halls, gave just cause for ridicule to their fellow-countrymen. A somewhat coarsely worded song at one of the metropolitan singing halls, the chorus of which was caught up by the populace outside, and constantly sung without much consideration of its meaning, gave occasion to the satirists to describe the noisy section as "Jingoes"—a term of contempt which was not altogether undeserved.

But of the more prudent and responsible advocates of active measures, there were many amongst the worthiest classes in England; and the feeling was known to be strongly reflected in the Cabinet itself, as well as in our embassy at Constantinople. The knowledge of this fact naturally caused the utmost anxiety throughout the country, and fears were entertained lest the premier and his colleagues should commit the nation to some definite course, in an irretrievable manner, before the people at large had had an

opportunity of declaring their mind on the subject. The fear was justified by the well-known disposition of Lord Beaconsfield to take decisive steps before consulting Parliament—as he had done by purchasing the Suez Canal shares, and by inviting the queen to assume the title of empress.

In this condition of the public mind it was thought that the Houses of Parliament ought to be summoned for deliberation at an earlier time than usual. The Cabinet was the more disposed to follow this course because it had resolved upon more energetic action in Turkey, and upon one measure in particular, which could not possibly be taken without the consent of Parliament. It might have made use of the fleet without summoning the two houses, but it could not expend a large sum of money in strengthening the army and navy until it had received a vote for the necessary money from the representatives of the people.

Therefore the constituencies were taken by surprise, on the eve of Christmas day, by the sudden convocation of Parliament—an act which had not been anticipated with any great confidence, however much it might have been desired. The announcement increased the general anxiety in a remarkable degree. It was manifest that the Cabinet had adopted some definite resolution, which was to be submitted to the consideration of Parliament and of the country; and from all that had gone before it was reasonable to conclude that this resolution would be one which might not improbably lead us into war.

When the Cabinet decided on calling the houses together three weeks before the ordinary date of meeting, the Russians had not crossed the Balkans. Plevna had, indeed, been taken, and there was reason to conclude that a winter campaign was about to be entered upon; but Gourko had not yet set out on his memorable march to Sofia. As time passed, and the 17th of January drew nearer, the astounding news arrived of the capture of Sofia and Philippopolis, and the rapid advance into the Maritza valley.

Some of the government's friends began to lose their calmness, and to call for war more urgently than ever; and the excitement became very great when it leaked out that the House of Commons was likely to be asked for the means of making military preparations. Nor was the suspense of the public mind in any degree lessened by the frequent Cabinet Councils, the visits of the premier to Windsor, and the more significant visit paid by the queen to Lord Beaconsfield's mansion at Hughenden.

The situation, as it appeared in its most gloomy aspects, and to the minds of those who had consistently opposed the policy of government, was very fairly described in an address issued by the Eastern Question Association on the morrow of Christmas day:—"The course taken by her Majesty's government, in summoning Parliament to meet three weeks before the usual period, is one which, in the present disturbed condition of Europe, has given rise to much anxiety and apprehension both at home and abroad. The announcement of that step has been accompanied by no authoritative declaration of the nature and objects of such an unusual proceeding. The public mind is left in an uninformed condition, at the mercy of the sinister interpretations which are placed upon the intentions of the government by persons who, for more than a twelvemonth, have exhausted every resource to goad or to beguile the country into a war for the maintenance of the Turkish empire. This mischievous party has already seized upon an act which may possibly be innocent enough in itself, and employ it to create the belief that the object to which their incessant efforts are directed is at length on the point of fulfilment. Their purpose is not doubtful; it is to induce Europe to believe, and to lead the English people to suppose, that a resolution is already taken, and preparations are about to be made, to embark this country in war. The effect of this conduct will be equally disastrous at home and abroad. The government of Turkey will be dissuaded from making peace by the hopes held out of English intervention, and thus the sanguinary war which is now

being waged will be indefinitely prolonged. At home the condition of uncertainty and alarm thus inspired will produce—indeed, has already produced—many of the evils inherent to a state of actual war. The Chambers of Commerce at Manchester and elsewhere have already raised a voice of warning and protest against the injury which the present state of affairs inflicts upon industry and commerce. The resources on which the employment of the people depends are threatened with a depression even greater than that which already weighs so heavily on the mass of the population. We are menaced (possibly without just cause) with increased taxes, dearer food, and lower wages. It may be that the policy and intentions of the government are now, as they have been so often before, misrepresented by those who pretend, without authority, to speak on its behalf. But, if it be so, no time should be lost in dispelling a false and mischievous delusion. The government have pledged themselves to Parliament and to the country to observe a policy of neutrality, subject to the necessary safeguard of British interests. There is no ground whatever for assuming that those interests, as defined by the government, are in any greater or more immediate peril than at the time when these official declarations were made. From the first the government have proclaimed that it was not their intention to defend the Turks against the attack of Russia. Are we, then, at this moment, in the presence of an altered state of facts, or of a change of policy? If the facts are altered, wherein consists the alteration? When Lord Derby last declared the neutrality of the government, Kars had fallen, and the surrender of Plevna was imminent and foreseen. But if the policy of the government is changed, what are the new principles on which it is based? These are questions on which it is not tolerable that the nation should be left in doubt even for three weeks.

"The country had rested tranquil and satisfied with the declaration made by Lord Derby to the most recent deputation. What has occurred since that date to call for or to justify



an unusual and unexplained proceeding, which inevitably begets a suspicion of a change of purpose? In the absence of any official explanation of this transaction, and in presence of the interpretations placed upon it by the enemies of peace, it seems necessary that the government should be strengthened if they adhere to their policy of neutrality, and deterred, if it be possible that they contemplate war, by a clear and decisive expression of the mind of the nation. It cannot be alleged that such an expression of opinion can weaken or embarrass the administration. As Lord Derby stated last year, 'the first object of a minister is to know the will of his employers.' The country has accepted a policy of neutrality, and they will resist a policy of war. No matter by what specious or plausible pretexts such a policy may be recommended, it is necessary to take a firm stand, and to declare that, upon no pretence whatever, shall England be embroiled in a war for the maintenance of the Turkish empire! Such a war is one in which it is notorious we should engage without an ally. It is a war which would enkindle hostilities throughout the length and breadth of Europe. It is a war in which, if we were even successful, we should render ourselves hereafter responsible for the good government of Turkey—a responsibility which recent events have sufficiently shown we have no power to discharge. If British interests are to be protected they must be protected in some other way than by or through the Turks.

"It is not necessary to re-open old controversies, or enlarge on well-worn themes. The issue is a simple one, but it is one of the most momentous nature. Is England to be involved in the war between Russia and Turkey? No such war can be undertaken by any government in the face of a divided nation. In order to avert it, all those who believe such a war to be at once unjust and unnecessary should take all lawful means to convince the government that a policy of war is one which the English people do not desire and will not support. For that purpose, every method should be employed by

which the public opinion of a free people can be uttered in order to counteract the machinations of those who are labouring to force the administration into so fatal a course.

"With that object, we venture to urge upon you the expediency of obtaining from all sections of the community to which your influence may extend a clear declaration in favour of neutrality, and a decisive protest against a war for the support of the Turkish empire, since nothing seems to have yet occurred to alter the wise declaration of the Foreign Secretary, that of all British interests the greatest is that of peace."

The address was signed by the Duke of Westminster, President, the Earl of Shaftesbury, Vice-President, Mr. A. J. Mundella, Chairman of Committee, Mr. William Morris, &c., &c.

It will enable us to form a better idea of the subsequent events at the seat of war, and to comprehend the action of England in the matter, if we follow the proceedings of Parliament during the first few weeks of the session of 1878, until it had become manifest that the majority of the country approved, on the whole, the present policy of the Cabinet.

The session was opened, on the 17th of January, by a queen's speech, of which the larger portion was devoted to the great question of the day. The wording of the passages relating to the war, and to the relations between England and the belligerent Powers, was as follows:—

"My Lords and Gentlemen—I have thought fit to assemble you before the usual period of your meeting, in order that you might become acquainted with the efforts I have made to terminate the war now devastating Eastern Europe and Armenia, and that I might have the advice and assistance of my Parliament in the present state of public affairs. You are aware that, after having unsuccessfully striven to avert that war, I declared my intention to observe neutrality in a contest which I lamented, but had failed to prevent, so long as the interests of my empire, as defined by my government, were not threatened. I expressed, at the same time, my ear-

nest desire to avail myself of any opportunity which might present itself for promoting a peaceful settlement of the questions at issue between the belligerent Powers.

"The successes obtained by the Russian arms, both in Europe and Asia, convinced the Porte that it should endeavour to bring to a close hostilities which were causing immense sufferings to its subjects. The government of the sultan accordingly addressed to the neutral Powers, parties to the treaties relating to the Turkish empire, an appeal for their good offices. It did not, however, appear to the majority of the Powers thus addressed that they could usefully comply with the request, and they communicated this opinion to the Porte.

"The Porte then determined on making a separate appeal to my government, and I at once agreed to make an inquiry of the Emperor of Russia whether his Imperial Majesty would entertain overtures for peace. The emperor expressed, in reply, his earnest desire for peace, and stated, at the same time, his opinion as to the course which should be pursued for its attainment. Upon this subject communications have taken place between the governments of Russia and Turkey through my good offices, and I earnestly trust that they may lead to a pacific solution of the points at issue, and to a termination of the war. No efforts on my part will be wanting to promote that result.

"Hitherto, so far as the war has proceeded, neither of the belligerents has infringed the conditions on which my neutrality is founded, and I willingly believe that both parties are desirous to respect them, so far as it may be in their power. So long as these conditions are not infringed, my attitude will continue the same. But I cannot conceal from myself that, should hostilities be unfortunately prolonged, some unexpected occurrence may render it incumbent on me to adopt measures of precaution. Such measures could not be effectually taken without adequate preparation, and I trust to the liberality of my Parliament to supply the means which may be required for that purpose. Papers

on these affairs will be forthwith laid before you. My relations with all foreign Powers continue to be friendly."

The intimation that Parliament might be applied to for the means of "adopting measures of precaution," caused much sensation, although it had been expected beforehand. No doubt the necessity for the appeal was made contingent upon "some unexpected occurrence," but it was very generally understood that the occurrences already recorded were sufficiently grave, at all events in the opinion of her Majesty's ministers, to render precaution advisable. The vote of credit, therefore, though not actually mentioned in the speech, was clearly foreshadowed by it, and every one took it for granted.

In the debates which followed, on the usual motion for an address to the crown, the opposition leaders in both houses applied themselves directly to this point. In the House of Lords, the Earl of Granville criticised the wording of the speech at considerable length, and spoke in the following terms on the "precaution" to which allusion had been made. "The point of greatest importance in this speech is this—it demands that Parliament should give assistance to her Majesty's government to take precautions in the interests of this country:—'I declared my intention to observe neutrality in a contest which I lamented but had failed to prevent, so long as the *interests* of my empire, as defined by my government, were not threatened.' Now, I presume that the definition of 'interests' was contained in the despatch of Lord Derby in May last. If I am not mistaken, in answer to her Majesty's government, Prince Gortschakoff sent certain assurances. Now, either those assurances were satisfactory or they were not. As far as I am aware, her Majesty's government did not show the slightest sign of dissatisfaction at the character of the assurances which they received. If they were satisfactory, in what way have those assurances become invalidated since? If they were not satisfactory, and if her Majesty's government thought they were not to be relied upon, why did not her Majesty's government



at that time take the precautions which they thought necessary instead of deferring them—I will not say to the eleventh hour, but to the twelfth hour, of this question, when the affair is virtually settled? I really shall be glad to hear what is the answer of her Majesty's government to that question. The noble lord who moved the address, I think, very accurately stated what he believed to be the feeling of the country on this matter. He observed that there was very great jealousy of Russia, which I quite admit; he observed that there was great admiration of the qualities of the Turkish soldiers, which I quite admit, and he said that, coupled with this, there was a strong desire for neutrality, and to avoid war. It is perfectly clear that the demand now made to Parliament will run counter to this feeling, and will excite a great deal of feeling, in the country; and I would even put it on broader ground than that. Is it advisable, even if you are able—as undoubtedly you can, by the majority you have in both houses—to obtain the means of some material increase of your strength? How far is that increase of strength neutralised by the moral loss that will accrue by the excitement that you will find aroused in minds who are quite uninfluenced by party considerations in this matter? My lords, I believe there is not a man in this house who is in the slightest degree indifferent to the interests of this country. It is impossible that any of us could be too watchful in caring for British interests. I think it is possible to talk a little too much about them. Like her Majesty's possessions, and like the industry of this country, British interests extend all over the world, and there are few instances indeed in which those interests are not a part of the interests of some other country. Lord Derby stated, with the greatest truth, that the principal interest of this country was peace. It is a mere truism to say so. But is this an interest which exclusively belongs to us? Is peace not desirable for Germany? Is peace not desirable for France? Is peace not desirable for Austria? Is peace not desirable for Italy—still more for the smaller

kingdoms of Europe? Is it not absolutely necessary for Turkey? And is it not of the greatest possible importance to victorious, but bleeding and impoverished, Russia? I say, therefore, that the interest of peace is one of which we cannot claim a monopoly. British interests may be divided into three classes. There is a very large number of British interests, which are of the utmost importance and ought to be watched by the government, which ought to be maintained by diplomatic persuasion, and even pressure, but in support of which it would be madness for us to go to war. There is another class of British interests, in our affairs with other countries, which might lead us to go to war in case we were supported by the moral and material assistance of other countries, which have an equal or greater share in them. I think nobody spoke more truly than Sir Stafford Northcote did some little time ago—I think in the House of Commons last session—when he said it was not the interest of this country to take burdens upon itself to the exclusion of other countries that are equally interested. There is a third class of interests which are of a vital character, for which I believe it is the duty of this country at all hazards to call upon its great, though latent power, and to make war to the bitter end. I believe it would be unwise of any country whatever, however great its military resources, to treat with contempt a country really united amongst themselves, and bound in a cause which they really believe dictated by sound policy, by justice, and by safety. Now, my lords, there is one point with reference to the interests of this country which may, perhaps, be satisfactorily explained. We have been confidently told that, since the beginning of this war, there has been an understanding between Russia and Germany and Austria as to the limits of the terms beyond which Russia would not attempt to go. Now we are told that her Majesty's government continue in cordial relations with all the Powers. But is it possible that during the last six months our diplomacy has been so helpless, that we are so completely isolated from Austria and Ger-

many that we have never been made acquainted with the limit which they have agreed that the terms of Russia should not exceed? Surely this is a most important question. I should like her Majesty's government to tell us whether they know it or not, though I do not ask them to tell us one word which they may think it right not to divulge. If they do not know it, they certainly ought not to have summoned Parliament, to make demands upon it of the character proposed. A month ago, it was decided that Parliament should meet at this time. If the circumstances were urgent, why did you delay a whole month to ask for the necessary means to take precautions? You ought at once to have summoned Parliament in a week or ten days. But if the circumstances were not urgent, why did you excite a state of things which has alarmed the country, which has depressed trade, already bad, which I believe must have damaged your own revenue, which has created a feeling of great insecurity, when by the ordinary means you might have called Parliament together in a week or ten days, and accomplished your object without any of these evils?"

The Marquis of Hartington spoke in somewhat similar terms in the House of Commons, and elicited a reply from Sir Stafford Northcote, which was considered to be in the highest degree reassuring for the country, and which, in fact, caused Mr. Gladstone to rise immediately after him, and declare that he had listened to the debate with the utmost satisfaction. We may add the concluding passage of the Chancellor's eloquent speech. "From the information which I received half an hour before coming down to the house, I learn that the two Turkish envoys are still on their way to the Russian head-quarters, and it does not seem probable, from circumstances mentioned, that they will succeed in reaching head-quarters for another day or two. Under these circumstances, it is obvious that the papers only show how the negotiations had opened, and how far they had advanced—that the transaction is not complete. We do not at present know what the Russian

demands may be, and what the conditions may be. Of course, until we know what course Russia will take we have no proposals to make. It would be obviously improper to assume what the answer will be, and that it will be of such a character as to be satisfactory to the Porte and to the other Powers of Europe. But it must be borne in mind that any arrangement of peace can only be made with the consent of the other European Powers. We trust and believe that the proposals made by the Russians will be in accordance with the declaration which they made before they began the war. But it is impossible to say what will be the result of the recent successes upon the Russian demands—what effect they may have on the view which Russia may take; and it is, therefore, necessary that we should keep ourselves in reserve until we know what their answer is. At present no answer has been received, and, therefore, it is not possible that we should make any immediate proposals. But we think it right to warn and to remind the house that it may very well become our duty to take steps to put ourselves in a position to take precautions. We have maintained, and we desire to see a proper and a reasonable settlement, and we have done what we could, by reason, persuasion, and argument, to bring about such a settlement. We have told the Porte that if she refuses our advice, and the advice of the European Powers, we could not save her from the consequences. It is true that we have entered into treaty arrangements, and of those arrangements there was one which was binding upon us and upon the other Powers. Turkey was not a party to that treaty; but the position in which Turkey has placed herself is that she had refused all the recommendations that were made by those Powers, and these Powers are, therefore, in a very different position to that at which they were at first. The Eastern question had long interested, not England alone, but the whole of Europe, and the question being as difficult now as it was at any previous time, it behoves the government to be cautious and prudent in dealing with it. We



are all as well aware of the horrors of war as hon. gentlemen on the other side ; we are as anxious as you are of saving this country and Europe the horrors of war, and to put an end to a war which has led to so much horrible suffering ; but we must be careful not to allow the question to get into such a position as to attain greater scope and involve vaster issues. We believe that the present period is the proper time to localise the war ; we have had no secret intention and no secret desire to play either Russia or Turkey false. The policy which we have initiated is a policy which we believe has been adopted by the country, and a policy which the country is prepared to approve. We are in a position of difficulty, and it is one which we shall not be able to follow with success if we have not the fullest confidence and support of Parliament. If we are to be continually met, at every step, and every declaration that we make, by insinuations that we are playing false, and that we do not mean what we say, we shall be weakened, and our efforts will be stultified. I venture to say that the question is one which is for the general interest, not of this country alone, but of all Europe. We are not desirous of prosecuting a selfish policy, of obtaining advantages for ourselves at the expense of others ; the great objects which England desires to promote are those of freedom, liberty, and peace. England represents, in the European system, an element which is most important, and if England will be true to herself it will be a blessing, not only to the country, but to the whole of Europe."

The assurance that the government would not make any proposals for a vote of money for war preparations until they knew the terms demanded by Russia from the Porte was welcomed with general satisfaction. The country understood from it that the government saw no cause for anything like a menace or a hostile attitude towards Russia, up to that date, even if it found reason to anticipate that the Russian terms of peace might trench upon English interests, and so require that England should take steps to vindicate her rights.

Exactly a week later, however, Sir Stafford Northcote gave notice of his intention to move, on the following Monday (January 29th) for a supplementary estimate, in order to enable the government to make provision for the future. The rapidity with which this notice followed upon Sir Stafford Northcote's former statement caused some surprise, and a little adverse criticism from the opposition ; but the apparent inconsistency was justified, both in the House of Lords and in the Commons, on the ground that the statement in question had been made under the idea that the Russian government would declare itself without delay. The week had passed without any definite information reaching our foreign office, and accordingly the Cabinet had felt itself bound to ask Parliament for its support.

In answer to the Marquis of Hartington in the House of Commons, the Chancellor of the Exchequer explained the course which he had taken. The marquis had inquired, in the speech which he made on the address, whether it was proposed to ask immediately for the vote which had been shadowed forth in her Majesty's gracious speech. In reply to that question, the Chancellor stated that communications were going on with regard to terms of peace, and that, as the government had then heard, that it was likely that within a day or two days those communications would have led to the terms being proposed, it was not their intention to make any immediate proposal to the house. "It might very well happen," said Sir Stafford Northcote, "that when those terms, which were expected to be disclosed in the course of a day or two, came to be known, they would appear to be such as would be accepted by the Porte and were also acceptable to the Powers of Europe, and under those circumstances I said that there would be no necessity for any proposal being made. Subsequently my right hon. friend the member for Greenwich put to me across the table a question whether he was rightly understanding me to say that no proposal would be made until the terms of peace had been received, and I nodded assent.

But I must ask the house clearly to understand that when I did that I did it in the anticipation that what I had contemplated at the time I was speaking would take place—that is, that within a few days we should be in possession of the terms of peace. At all events, the position was such that I think the house will consider that I could have no other expectation than that, within a very few days, we should be in possession of those terms of peace. Since that period a week has elapsed, and not only have the terms of peace not been received, but we have observed that a rapid and very considerable advance has taken place on the part of the forces of Russia. Under these circumstances, her Majesty's government have felt it necessary not to delay any longer that which her Majesty intimated in her gracious speech from the throne, of the necessity of asking Parliament to enable them to make provision for any circumstances that might arise."

The importance and significance of this question of the vote of credit were greatly enhanced by an event which took place at the same time. This was nothing less than the retirement from the Cabinet, on Thursday, the 24th, of Lord Carnarvon, Secretary of State for the Colonies. The reason for Lord Carnarvon's retirement—a most grave and unfortunate step at that particular moment, and yet doubtless one which he felt himself bound in conscience to take—was a resolution come to by his colleagues, in which he could not bring himself to concur, to send the English fleet into the Sea of Marmora.

The fleet was actually ordered to enter the Dardanelles on the following day; but, as we have already seen, Admiral Hornby was recalled before he had passed through the straits. The English public heard of both these occurrences simultaneously, before the debate on the vote of credit came on; and the general anxiety was in consequence raised to fever-heat. We had reached what was, in fact, the crisis of the whole matter. Who can say what would have happened, or how things would have fallen out, if Lord Carnarvon had not, at this very moment, revealed the want of unanimity in the Cabinet,

and if the government had not repented of the order to the fleet almost as soon as it had been given?

It is worth while to have a clear notion of the state of things in England during the last week in January; and we will therefore quote Lord Carnarvon's speech in the House of Lords, when announcing his withdrawal from the government.

Before he rose to speak, Lord Beaconsfield was questioned as to the orders sent to the fleet, and his statement was to the effect that, as the government had received information as to negotiations between the belligerents, and had been informed that the Russian forces had made considerable advances "in the direction where British interests are deeply involved"—as, moreover, they had been informed by the sultan that there was no security for life or property in the capital from the state of disorder and disorganisation that existed, they had thought it fit to order the fleet from the Bay of Smyrna to the Dardanelles, and, if it did not receive other orders there, to proceed through the Dardanelles to Constantinople. "At the same time that we came to this resolution," continued his lordship, "we prepared a diplomatic despatch to the Powers, including Russia and also the Porte, stating that, in the course that we were following, there was not the slightest deviation from the policy of neutrality that we had from the first maintained; and that our fleet went there to protect British subjects and British property, and to take care of British interests. Since we came to the resolution to take that step we have become acquainted with the proposed conditions of peace, and we are of opinion that they furnish a basis for an armistice, and, therefore, we have given directions, through the Admiralty, for the navy to remain at Besika Bay, and not to enter into the straits. We have also thought it our duty to circulate throughout Europe a telegraphic despatch in reference to the circumstances to which I have referred."

Lord Carnarvon's speech was a chapter of history. "I have found it my duty," he began,



"to tender my humble resignation of the office with which her Majesty has honoured me, and that resignation has this afternoon been accepted, and I hold the seals of office only until my successor has been appointed, and such being the case, I deliver my speech from the place which I have been accustomed to occupy in this house. What the noble earl has just said affects, of course, the explanations with which I shall trouble your lordships, and I do not conceal that it might have considerably modified the course which I now take. The explanation which I have to make is very painful to me; and I may state that it is necessary, on the one hand, for a minister in these circumstances to say enough to justify himself in the course which he feels it his duty to adopt, and, on the other hand, it is equally his duty to avoid saying anything that can embarrass the government at a time of critical negotiations; and it will be my anxious desire to say nothing that will give the least annoyance, or place blame on those who have been my colleagues, and still are my friends. I feel peculiarly that, in making this statement, I am precluded from one part of the subject, and I will not say one word as to the communications of a confidential nature that have passed between her Majesty's government and foreign ministers. If, therefore, the course of my conduct should appear imperfectly, I must be content to receive the observations and to incur the responsibility of that omission. There are two things that have induced me to take the step to which I now revert—one, something that has occurred personally to myself, and the other the notice of the motion of which the Chancellor of the Exchequer has given notice to move in the House of Commons on Monday. I will not anticipate anything that my right honourable friend may have to say. It is not my object to controvert any of his arguments, and I will only observe this much, that I understood it to be stated, a few days ago, that there would not be made any money proposals on the part of the government until the conditions of peace were received, or unless the conditions which should be received

should turn out to be unsatisfactory. At the time that my right honourable friend gave notice of the motion the conditions of peace were not in the hands of the government, and it was impossible to say whether they were or were not satisfactory. I rejoice to hear from the prime minister the expression of his opinion that the proposals indicate satisfaction, at all events in reference to the prospect of peace. I shall perhaps best make my own position clear by referring to one or two matters that passed with regard to myself. I have no desire to go back into past differences, which may have existed on the subject of this Eastern war. In every Cabinet there must have been differences; it is impossible to select a Cabinet without having varied traits of opinion; but it is necessary to refer to two matters in which I was personally concerned. On the 2nd January inst., as some of your lordships may remember, I addressed a reply to a deputation, in which reply, in answering certain questions which they put to me, I spoke upon the general subject of the war, and upon the attitude of the government. I do not desire now to go into what I stated upon that occasion; it is sufficient for me now to observe that, upon the following day, in the Cabinet—and it is by her Majesty's gracious permission that I make the statement—the noble earl, the prime minister, thought it his duty, to condemn very severely the words that I had used. I took time to consider the course that it was my duty to take, and then, in a paper which I drew up upon the subject, I recapitulated what had passed and vindicated as far as I could the position which I had taken, and I affirmed the propositions that I had then laid down. The noble earl, the prime minister, was good enough to ask me for a copy of that document, and there the matter for a time ended. No public disavowal was ever made with regard to what I had said; and I felt myself justified then, and I feel myself justified now, in believing that, when no such disavowal was uttered, I had not unjustly represented the opinion of the government at that time."

Lord Carnarvon then referred to the despatch of the fleet. He observed that the desirability of this course had been discussed in the Cabinet as early as the 12th of January, when he "expressed a very decided opinion against it." On the 15th, however, the step was virtually resolved upon; and then his lordship had written the following letter to the premier:—

"My Dear Lord—On Monday last, the 14th inst., I wrote to you, requesting you to be good enough to submit my resignation to the queen as soon as the order for moving the fleet to the Dardanelles should be given. I afterwards received a message from you, through Mr. M. Corry, to the effect that subsequent telegrams had induced you to change your mind, and on attending the Cabinet on Tuesday—the following day—as I did to prevent any rumours, which might be injurious to the government, arising, I understand that they, as well as you, saw reason to abandon the course which had been agreed upon. I am very glad that so sound a decision has been come to, whatever the reasons upon which it may have been founded; but, looking to the fact that my resignation, though provisional, is in your hands, and to the serious nature of such a fact, I think it is my duty to state, in a manner that cannot be mistaken, what I conceive to be my position. When at the last Cabinet held I stated the course which I had taken in placing my conditional resignation in your hands, no opinion was expressed or comment made by you, or, so far as I remember, by any other member of the Cabinet; and, therefore, it is the more necessary that there should be no room for misapprehension. As to my past or present action, I have no desire to separate myself from colleagues with whom I have acted on terms of great personal regard and goodwill. I am sensible of the inconvenience which would arise from discord or open difference of opinion at this moment, and I am ready now, as I hope I have been on former occasions, to modify or concede my views on points of detail, in order to secure a general harmony of action among the members of the govern-

ment. But I have been led to consider carefully the events of the last few weeks in the differences of opinion which have unfortunately developed themselves amongst us, and I cannot conceal from myself that our differences have been very considerable on a question where it is of the utmost importance to the country that the government should be one and undivided. Taking, therefore, all this into account, I avail myself of this opportunity to place clearly on paper the opinion—even although you and my colleagues are already familiar with it—that I am not prepared in present circumstances, or in circumstances similar to these, to agree to any armed intervention, or any other course of a similar nature, and I see no reason as yet why the question at issue should pass out of the phase of diplomacy. Further, the vote of credit, or increase in the army and navy estimates, whichever it may be, is a measure which I consider useful as a means of strengthening our diplomacy at this juncture, but I do not contemplate the application of any aid granted by Parliament for the purpose of a foreign expedition, unless circumstances should change in a manner and to a degree wholly beyond my present anticipations. The anxieties which I own to have felt on this subject have been greatly relieved by the explicit language of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in which he explained that the government would not, until it was clear that the Russian conditions were unsatisfactory, make any proposals for the increase of armaments. Relying, therefore, upon this as a trustworthy exposition of the views of the government, I feel that I may, for the present, content myself with the statement which I have endeavoured to express as clearly as possible in reference to my own position. But it remains for you to consider whether this view, which is satisfactory to me, and on which my continuance in office depends, is also satisfactory to you and my colleagues. I shall be glad to hear from you at your convenience, and in the meanwhile I remain, my dear lord, yours faithfully,

"CARNARVON,"



A few days after that a proposal was again made to send the fleet to the Dardanelles, and after a discussion it was decided that the fleet should be sent. Upon this second determination the following correspondence took place between Lord Carnarvon and the prime minister :—

"16, Bruton-street, Jan. 24, 1878.

"Dear Lord Beaconsfield—The Cabinet, yesterday afternoon, decided to give immediate instructions to the admiral to take the fleet up to Constantinople, and to invite the House of Commons to grant a large sum to the government for the increase of armaments. My objections to such a course were fully stated a short time since in reference to a similar proposal, and my resignation was tendered if, as seemed then probable, the proposal should be definitely adopted. For various reasons it was not adopted, but now, that it has been renewed and accepted by the Cabinet, believing, as I do, that circumstances have not so changed in the interval as to render it necessary, I see no alternative, though with deepest personal regret in separating myself from my colleagues, but to request you to submit to the government my humble resignation of the office with which her Majesty has been pleased to honour me.—I remain, dear Lord Beaconsfield, yours faithfully,

"CARNARVON.

"Lord Beaconsfield."

"10, Downing-street, Jan. 25, 1878.

"Dear Lord Carnarvon—I have the honour to inform you that the government has accepted your resignation of the office of Secretary of State, and has been graciously pleased to grant to you her Majesty's permission to make any statement of what passed in the Privy Council which you may think necessary to elucidate your conduct."

After reading these letters to the house, Lord Carnarvon went on to justify his resignation, concluding in the following terms :—"It has

been stated this evening that instructions have been sent to the Admiralty to order the fleet to sail to Turkish waters, and your lordships will therefore see that three times in three weeks it has been my misfortune to seem at serious variance upon matters of the highest possible importance, and twice during that period I have felt constrained to place my resignation in the hands of the prime minister in connection with this subject. No doubt the order to the fleet has been cancelled, but I cannot conceal from myself that it has been cancelled, not because we had come to an agreement upon the principle, but because some accident has interposed at the last moment. No one can rejoice more than I do at the change that has taken place. I cannot but regret the misfortune of separating myself from my colleagues, though I rejoice that this has arisen rather from difference of feeling upon this matter than from any doubtful act done. What I have stated to your lordships shows that there is, and has been for some time, a wide divergence of opinion between us as to the principle upon which our policy should be conducted; and my object in making this statement has been twofold—first, to show that I have not been guilty of presumption in tendering my resignation, and, on the other hand, to acquit the prime minister of having hastily snatched at my resignation, when it was offered. I am quite aware that he has treated my opinions with great forbearance, and that he has only done that which any man would have a right to expect from him. The letters that I have read show sufficiently the views that I have taken; and I only would, therefore, now say that my objection to the moving of the fleet, no matter what the declaration of neutrality which accompanied it, was based upon the prime minister's reply to the question. If it were to be a mere demonstration, it did not seem to me to be a very worthy demonstration; and if, on the other hand, it was to be followed by active measures, I felt that it would be a wide departure from that neutrality we had pledged ourselves to, and as to which no circumstances had arisen to call for a reversal of our

conduct. I also thought that the time at which this movement was proposed was unfortunately chosen. It was a time in the midst of negotiations, when they had reached their most critical point, when an intervention on our part was liable to every sort of misconstruction, when it might encourage Turkey to continue the struggle, when it might be considered as a menace by Russia, and might even embarrass the Porte itself in their negotiations. I also thought that it was a dangerous position in which to place the British fleet, a position where matters at any moment might provoke collision, and lead to difficulties that could not be foreseen. It seemed to me that, in adopting such a course, we were changing our former attitude of observation in favour of an attitude of menace. I believe that the policy that has been adopted up to this time upon foreign affairs has been a wise policy. I think that it has been consistent; we have avoided the use of threats, on the one hand, and of being too obsequious on the other. We have spoken plainly to both belligerents—firmly to Russia, on the one hand, and plainly to Turkey on the other. We have endeavoured to define those British interests that were at stake, and we have, above all, declared our intention of observing strictly our conditional neutrality. I do not swerve in the slightest degree from that statement; but until I saw reason to think that there was any intention of questioning or disputing that right, I should be very slow to assume that intention on the part of any of the belligerent parties, who have over and over again declared that it is not their intention to do this. I have trespassed long upon your lordships' time, but I should like still to refer to a matter that has given rise to a great deal of misconstruction. In my reply to the deputation that I spoke of, and in reference to what I said as to the Crimean war, there has been a singular misconception. It has been supposed that I said that that war was, in my opinion, an insane war. I never said, nor could I have said, anything so foolish. What I said was, that it was a war into which England drifted; that

I did not think that any one could look back with satisfaction on that war, and that I did not think that there was any man who was foolish enough to desire a repetition of that war. This was wholly different to what was imputed to me, but to the statement that I did make, I adhere to the fullest extent of my words. It was my fate to go over the battle-fields of the Crimea with Lord Lyons; I heard every detail from him, and I felt then, as I feel now, even after the interval of so many years, that there was never any event in English history that more nobly illustrated British courage than it did, from the British soldier that fought at Inkerman to the British lady who spent her time with the sick at Scutari. After twenty years, however, we may reasonably ask what was the political value and result of that war? I confess, though perhaps I am in a minority, that I fail to see its political value and result. It is with regret that I have come to the decision to separate myself from my colleagues; for, to some among the government, there are those to whom I am bound, not merely by the ties of political alliance, but by the bonds of a long—almost a life-long friendship; and your lordships will perceive that it is not without very acute feeling that I have brought myself to such a separation at the present time. I know very well that there are many questions upon which there must be differences; I know that there are numerous questions upon which members of a Cabinet must agree to differ, and any one who insisted upon his individual view of the case would show himself impracticable and useless; but there are also questions in which are involved the welfare and the lives of others, and upon which one who has strong convictions cannot bring himself to waive those convictions. This has been my case. I shall not say whether I have been right or wrong; I must leave that to the judgment of others. I do not blame any one of my colleagues for entertaining their views. I am too sensible of the forbearance which I have received at their hands, and I trust I have never pressed my own unwelcome doctrines upon them with greater force and



vehemence than should have been the case. I have seen for long that this issue must come. We have been travelling along a road which at length diverges into two paths, and I venture to think, with all deference, that I hold the right path, though others will think that I have turned aside wrongly. It is of much consequence that at this moment the government should be united, and if my retirement should remove any obstacle to this I should be glad. As to my office, I cannot say that I do not regret leaving it; many questions remain unsettled, and especially I should be glad to see dispersed those clouds which are gathering over one of our great dependencies. I have confidence in the issue, but I could well have wished to remain to meet the difficulties and try to overcome them. On the other hand, I look back with thankfulness for much that has occurred within the last four years. I have friends who have assisted me, and have frequently received generous support from those who are on the Opposition benches. The least that I can do is, as far as possible, to place at the disposal of my successor any little experience that I may have gathered; and if I can remove any difficulty I shall think myself fortunate, and any assistance that I can give to the government I shall willingly give."

Lord Beaconsfield's observations to the house after Lord Carnarvon had made his statement were vigorous and dignified; and his speech may be cited as laying down, in general terms, the policy of the government in the East, as clearly as any other utterance during the whole crisis. The premier began by saying that he was at a loss to understand, or rather to recognise a sufficient reason for which Lord Carnarvon quitted the council. "The noble lord has informed the house that this is not the first occasion on which he has offered his resignation, and he has done me no more than justice when he declared that there was no eagerness on my part to accept it. He has told us that he is prepared to support an increase of our armaments, naval and military; but he says that, in proposing that the fleet—for purposes which I do not wish to conceal—should

change its place, we have deviated from the policy that we have hitherto pursued, and though that action was accompanied by a renewed declaration of our neutrality, he could not accept it. Now, this is a matter of simplicity. The character of our policy—the sovereign policy—is the declaration that our neutrality is conditional on the due observance of British interests; and that was chiefly, though not entirely, understood in that dispatch. Among those points to which our particular attention was mainly directed was the condition of Constantinople; the treaties respecting the straits and the possession of the Dardanelles were specifically mentioned; and we then declared that the occupation of that city would not be viewed by us with indifference; that the existing treaty regulations as to the navigation of the straits were what we wished to maintain; and that, with regard to the Dardanelles and Constantinople, the conditions under which they were were of the highest interest to this country. What is the object we have had before us in recommending the queen to send her fleet, under certain circumstances, into Turkish waters? It has been to guard over those interests so specifically mentioned in Lord Derby's dispatch. That dispatch did not consist only of words; it was well considered, and I thought that all my colleagues were determined that we should maintain the policy that we had laid down so distinctly. But there are other points in that dispatch. I can only repeat what I have said before in this house—what I said upon the first night of the session, and which was expressed with equal precision by the noble marquis near me—that our policy has never changed from the first. There has never been the slightest difference of opinion—I am speaking with reference to the politics of Eastern Europe—in the councils of the Cabinet; there has never been any single occasion on which any member of the government has expressed it as his belief that we should deviate from that policy. How that policy was to be carried into effect was of course open to discussion, and in reference to this there naturally might be differences

of opinion ; but as to the great principle of our policy—namely, the neutrality of this country, a neutrality which was to be strictly observed, provided the observance did not injure the important interests it was our duty to guard—I say there was no deviation of opinion, and that from that policy there has been no deviation at any time or under any circumstances. I deeply regret that my noble friend should think that the mode in which we intended to vindicate the policy laid down in that dispatch, with respect to Constantinople and the Straits of the Dardanelles, was a sufficient cause for him to deprive us of his faithful services and companionship ; but I must vindicate myself and my colleagues, when I say that we are not conscious that, in the advice we gave to the sovereign to send up her fleet to the Turkish waters, we were doing anything but carrying into effect the policy which we frankly expressed to the house, which the house has adopted frankly, and which the country has contentedly supported us in maintaining. My lords, it is a source of great disappointment to us that the noble lord should have considered it his duty to make the statement which he has made ; and I candidly put it to the house if we have not entered into an engagement with Parliament and the country that we would defend British interests, and among those the change of occupation of Constantinople into other hands. The present position respecting the straits and the present position of the Dardanelles is this, I believe—that they are accepted by the country as interests of the highest importance to this country. Will the country be satisfied if, in the present state of affairs, they find her Majesty's government doing nothing ? There may be occasions, very fair occasions, for maintaining that the measures we took may not have been adequate, may not have been those most adapted to the circumstances ; but, so far as I understand my noble friend, he objects to any action whatsoever. I shall be prepared to vindicate those measures. I believe that, under the circumstances, they were the best we could adopt. I believe they

would have had the most salutary effect, and may have had the most salutary effect ; and although I deeply regret that the proposing of such measures should have deprived me of a colleague such as my noble friend who has just addressed you, yet I maintain those measures form part of the consistent policy of her Majesty's government that we are resolved to pursue—the policy that we originally announced—that we are prepared to preserve the neutrality that we have loudly proclaimed, and which has been generally accepted. But if that neutrality is dependent on our allowing the great interests of this country not to be defended and vindicated, then, I say, I am no longer in favour of neutrality, but I am in favour of the interests of this country and the honour of the sovereign."

The excitement caused by Lord Carnarvon's resignation was increased by rumours to the effect that the Earl of Derby, the Foreign Secretary, had tendered his resignation at the same time, and that, though he had consented to remain at his post, in order to avoid embarrassing his colleagues, he was not at one with the premier on the policy which ought to be pursued. In fact, Lord Derby admitted in the House of Lords that he had been opposed to the despatch of the fleet, and had tendered his resignation ; but he withdrew it on the recall of Admiral Hornby from the Dardanelles.

It was under the influence of these startling events that the House of Commons entered on its protracted debate on the vote of credit.

On the Friday before the debate began, that is, on the 25th of January, Lord Derby had received from Count Schouvaloff an outline of the terms which Russia had demanded from Turkey. Sir Stafford Northcote repeated them at the beginning of his speech ; and the manner in which they were received by the house was so remarkable that it is worth quoting this passage from the Parliamentary report, without omitting the indications of the intense excitement of the house, on learning what it had so long desired to know.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said :—"These are the terms :—First, Bulgaria within



the limits of the Bulgarian nationality not less than that of the Conference to be an autonomous tributary principality, with a national Christian governor, a native militia, and no Turkish troops except at some points to be determined. (Opposition cheers.) Secondly, The independence of Montenegro—(Opposition cheers)—with increase of territory—(cheers)—equivalent to the military *status quo* frontier to be decided hereafter. Thirdly, Independence of Roumania—(Opposition cheers)—with sufficient territorial indemnity. Fourthly, Independence of Servia—(renewed cheers from the Opposition)—with rectification of frontiers. ('Oh,' from some Ministerialists.) Fifthly, Autonomous administration, to be sufficiently guaranteed to Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Renewed Opposition cheers.) Sixthly, Similar reforms for the other Christian provinces. (Opposition cheers.) Seventhly, Indemnity to Russia for the expenses of the war in a pecuniary, territorial, or other form. ('Hear, hear,' and some Ministerial laughter.) Lastly, Utterior understanding for safe-guarding the rights and interests of Russia in the Straits. Now, be those conditions good or bad, they are at all events conditions of a very sweeping character. (Hear.) With regard to the first, it is right that honourable members should bear in mind what the extension given to the term Bulgaria is. It is described as Bulgaria within the limits of the Bulgarian nationality, not less than that of the Conference—(Opposition cheers); and on being referred to the Conference—this is Mr. Layard's opinion—(an ironical cheer)—I understand the limits proposed for a new Bulgarian limit are those mentioned at page 123 of the correspondence respecting the Conference in Turkey No. 2 of last year. They do not include Salonica or Kavala, but it can scarcely be doubted that they will extend to the Ægean seaboard. (Opposition cheers.) Bulgaria, as defined in that part of the correspondence, takes in the whole, or nearly the whole, of the great centre of European Turkey—(Opposition cheers)—and it extends south of the Balkans down almost to the Ægean Sea—almost to the port of Salonica.

It may be illustrated roughly in this way—by supposing that from the whole of England you were to set apart a portion beginning, say, with Northumberland and Durham, coming right down to Devonshire, cutting off Wales, Cornwall, and perhaps Middlesex, and the eastern angle of England—(hear, hear)—and erect that into an autonomous tributary principality." (Hear, hear.)

The house being now in possession of the Russian terms, it was able to discuss the motion of the government on a more satisfactory basis. The motion of the Chancellor of the Exchequer was for a vote of credit for the sum required beyond the ordinary grants of Parliament towards defraying the expenses which may be incurred in increasing the efficiency of the naval and military services at the present crisis of the war between Russia and Turkey, during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1878.

Sir Stafford Northcote spent some time in criticising the Russian terms of peace, and in showing that it would at least be necessary, before they could be embodied in a definitive treaty, that Europe as a whole should consider them in Conference. He then went on to justify the demand for money, after the fleet had been recalled. "The two cases," said the chancellor, "rest upon different grounds. The question of sending up the fleet for the purpose of keeping the way, or to preserve life and protect property at a particular juncture, was a question of the moment; the question of the attitude which England is to take in the council of nations which must shortly meet, is a question which is not of the moment. It is a question whether we are, or are not, to go into that Conference armed with the strength of a united nation, a people speaking with the voice of England, as that voice ought to be heard. We hear a great deal that is very painful to hear about the position, as many will have you believe it, the humiliating and the degraded position of England. I believe myself that all this language is as false—is as mischievous as it is false. England is not a weak country. I would chal-

lenge a comparison between the strength of England and the strength of any other country you like to name, tried by whatever tests you please, and England will come out second to none. There are points of weakness, no doubt. We have great wealth, we have a great and well appointed navy, and we have a small but very well appointed army, capable of quick and easy increase; we have positions which are of the utmost importance; but, above all, we have the confidence of a people, by constitution and by temperament, the lovers of freedom, the supporters of all that is noble, who are ready at any time to shed their blood and expend their treasure in any cause they think just. It is not because England frankly desires peace rather than war; it is not because England is slow to draw the sword, and is quick to discover any other means of advancing the interests which she has at heart; it is not on that account that any one should be allowed to suppose, either that England is not strong, or is afraid to use the strength which she has. My belief is that, put to the test, and roused as we might be, our strength would be as great, and greater in proportion, than it has been in former times. But, sir, there are certain sources of weakness which we must not conceal. It is a great source of weakness that we should have amongst us those who perpetually go about decrying and making light of the power and spirit of the country. I am not one of those who attach great importance to what is called prestige, or would engage in the expenditure of blood and treasure for the mere purpose of keeping up the glory of the country; but what I think is even worse than the attempt, by such means, to increase and maintain false prestige, is the deliberate attempt to destroy the proper prestige of your country."

After further remarks in a similar strain, reflecting severely upon the conduct of the Opposition, and of their supporters outside the house, the chancellor continued:—

"There may be differences of opinion as to whether this cause or that cause is a right one to fight for, as to whether this or that interest is

worthy the expenditure of blood and treasure; but of this I will venture to say there is no difference, there is no difference of opinion among Englishmen that, when they are satisfied as to the cause, and when they are satisfied as to its importance, the hand of England is not shortened, and the heart of England is not grown cold. I do not desire, sir, to pursue language of this kind, but I am glad I have strayed for a few moments into the few sentences which seem to have evoked so general an expression of opinion, an expression which I venture to say will be heard and do good far beyond the walls of this house. I will resume my argument only to say that, if this is the position of England, and if this is the real feeling and mind of England, let us, when we go into the council of the nations, be in a position to show that it is so. It is said, then, Why do you ask for this vote? what is the object to which you are going to apply the money? where are these millions to be expended? Sir, we ask for these millions, not necessarily that the money or the greater part of it should be expended at all, provided you gave us free leave and authority and sanction to spend it if we think necessary. We have shown, I think, by our conduct that we have not been prepared, though the accusation has from time to time been made against us, to lead the country into a war from which the country would have shrunk—not from the fear of the danger it might have led to, but because it would have been a war on which they could not have entered with a clear conscience. We desire, if you believe the sincerity with which we make our assurances, that you should show your confidence in us by enabling us to use the force of England if the force of England it should be necessary to use. I have said that the force and strength of England is as great as ever it was, and that it would challenge comparison with the strength of any other Power; but you must bear in mind that the strength of England can only be measured by the power of making use of it. Where the weakness of England does no doubt lie, is in the great extent of her dominions. If the great



British empire were concentrated as the empire of France or Germany or Russia is concentrated, every one would see the immense strength and power which that empire would possess. We have to look after our interests; and in guarding our communications, especially with our largest colonies, it is rather upon our fleet than our army that we must rely; it is upon our naval authority, upon our maritime ascendancy, that we must place our trust, and it is because of our great anxiety lest the changes which are taking place or may take place in Eastern Europe may inconvenience our maritime communications, and render it necessary for this country to expend larger sums in the maintenance and protection of our line of communications—it is because we feel all this that we are desirous of taking precautions for the proper security of these communications. We have, as I have said, a well-appointed, though a small force; but that force would never be of use unless there were also the means of moving it if it should be required. Everybody knows that as well as we do. Everybody knows you may be able to say we have brave men at home who can act in concert with our navy, and take part in operations if they are required; yet everybody knows perfectly well that, unless you are permitted to move that force where it may be required, the force itself would be of no avail. Every one knows also that, unless you have the support of Parliament and the country, you have no means of speaking with energy, or of fulfilling anything that you may undertake. We are shortly, no doubt, to be parties to the great settlement that must be made ere long. It is desirable, we consider that it is essential, that in entering into these councils we should be able to speak with the firm voice that will belong to those who not only represent a free and great and wealthy nation, but represent a nation that has confidence in them, and which will support them in whatever steps it might be necessary for them to take—we desire that we shall be armed by you with the means of so going into these negotiations. We go, we should propose to go, with no desire whatever of using force;

it is not for that we ask it at all, but we desire to go armed with this, which would be, not a vote of credit, but a vote of confidence, entitling us to speak as we should wish to speak in the councils of Europe. If you decline to place that confidence in us, well and good. It is for us to accept your decision; but, under these circumstances, it would be impossible we could administer matters of such importance any longer. We ask you to give us this which we now demand, with full confidence that we will not make a bad use of that trust which you may repose in us, and we ask you to give it us in the full assurance that that step on your part will not lead to the danger of war, but, on the contrary, will be the wisest and most efficient safeguard that is to be devised for the maintenance of peace. I am tempted to repeat in this house a few words I heard this morning from a foreigner of distinction—one who was not likely to take an anti-Russian view in this matter. ‘I think what you are about to do this evening is a wise action, and is one that will be advantageous to the interests of Europe. We all want to be taught the lesson of prudence, and no one will be listened to unless he is strong.’”

At the close of the chancellor's speech, the debate was adjourned until the following Thursday, on the request of the Marquis of Hartington and other leaders of the Opposition, in order that time might be given to consider the papers which had been issued, including the communication of the Russian terms of peace.

On the following Thursday the debate was resumed by Mr. Forster, who endeavoured to show that there was no need for the expenditure of the six millions now demanded. He represented the vote as intended, not so much for practical purposes as for a demonstration, and to elicit a vote of confidence from the majority of the government. Mr. Cross, the Home Secretary, warmly objected to this interpretation. “Not content,” said Mr. Cross, “with holding up the government in the light in which he wants to make us appear so extremely warlike, he has gone out of his way to make accusations against

my noble friend at the head of the government, such as I, during the considerable time I have sat in this house, have never heard from any member yet, and which I, for one, hope never to hear again. What the right hon. gentleman means by what, I have no doubt, he thought would be picked up as a catch-word throughout the country, was, that this was a sham estimate, and what he meant was, I presume, this: that the prime minister would ask his government, and that they would consent, to come down to this house and make such a proposal as we have made, and that we meant nothing by it. It was held up as a piece of show, simply as a thing to dazzle the eye, and he compares it with a measure upon which he also attacked the prime minister, which was carried by a large majority of this house—viz., the measure relating to the crown of India, but which is no part of the question before us. I hope, when the house comes to consider this question rather more seriously, that they will then be able to judge how far these observations of the right hon. gentleman are borne out, or how far, in their opinion, they ought to be denied. The right hon. gentleman fixes upon a word which was made use of by my right hon. friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer the other evening, although it was explained within five minutes afterwards, and comes down to the house to try to persuade the house that we had asked for a general vote of confidence. I leave it to the house to judge whether that is true or not."

Mr. Forster here observed—"I think you will admit that I said I understood the Chancellor of the Exchequer to state that it was not as a vote of confidence, but that I did think it was a vote asking for a meed of confidence in the government."

Whereupon Mr. Cross continued:—"I put it again in this way: that, after the explanation that was made, that it was not a vote of general confidence, it ought not to have been brought forward in this way. A time will come, but not when great national subjects are before us, when that question may be put before the house

by the right hon. gentleman, and an answer will then be given. That is not the question now. The question placed before us by the Chancellor of the Exchequer was as clear as it could be. We asked for this money, and in our opinion it is necessary for the purposes of the country. We should not come down and ask it at your hands if we had not deliberately come to that conclusion as responsible ministers of the crown; and all the confidence we asked is this: that, having asked it in that way, and for that purpose, you would place it in our hands, and rely upon it that we should not use it unnecessarily and for purposes for which it is not required. That is, I believe, the extent of the confidence we required. Well, but that being so, I must ask for a few moments while I try and explain what I mean by saying that there has been a general wish on the part of right honourable gentlemen sitting opposite, and of persons in the country, to hold us up as a war party. Now, I must go back as far as the 6th of May last, when Lord Derby wrote the dispatch which has practically been the charter of the policy of the government from that time. Let me remind the house of the terms of that dispatch. It stated that her Majesty's government did not propose to enter upon the question of the justice or the necessity of the present war. Now, here is their landmark, as I ventured to call it, when speaking of it at the time. They stated from the first that the Porte must not look to them for assistance. The second landmark was this. They stated that there must be no misunderstanding or wrong impression, for, should the war unfortunately spread, and English interests be imperilled, England would be equally bound to protect them. Guided by these two landmarks, from the 6th of May to the present time, her Majesty's government have always acted. They have never swerved either from the one or the other, and they are still of the same opinion, that so long as the war lasts that is the policy they are bound to follow."

Mr. Cross's speech was somewhat acrimonious, and contrasted with the quiet and re-assuring one



which he had delivered in the previous session. But the whole debate on the vote of credit was conducted in a heated manner, and showed how greatly the country had been moved by what had recently taken place. The Opposition could not divest themselves of the idea that this money was asked for simply to promote an ambitious, a warlike, an aggressive policy. They absolutely denied its necessity for the strict purpose of defence and precaution. Mr. Forster had pointed out, as an additional corroboration of the belief that Russia in no way menaced any English interest, that there was, amongst the papers presented to the house, a despatch of Lord Derby to Lord A. Loftus on the 28th of January, stating that the Russian ambassador called on Lord Derby that afternoon to read an extract from a telegram from Prince Gortschakoff, authorising him to affirm categorically that the Russian government considered the passage of ships of war through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles as a European question, which they did not intend to settle by themselves. Sir Stafford Northcote admitted that he had overlooked this despatch in making his opening statement on the preceding Monday.

The debate was continued by Mr. Bright, whose speech comprised an eloquent protest against the menace of unnecessary war. With regard to the suggested Conference, Mr. Bright spoke as follows:—"It is generally understood, I believe, that the parties to a war are and ought to be the parties to fix the terms of peace. When France and Sardinia were at war with Austria the terms of peace were fixed by them, and Europe did not interfere. Lombardy was annexed to Sardinia, and, by arrangement between the Emperor of the French and the King of Sardinia—the man who, the other day, descended from his throne to his tomb—Savoy and Nice were annexed to France. I recollect that Lord John Russell—he was at that time the Foreign Secretary—was represented as going to all the Courts of Europe, and entreating the Powers not to allow the transfer of Savoy and Nice from one country to another. The Powers

paid no attention to him. He went back to the Foreign Office, and that arrangement was made, and, so far as I know, there has been no reason to regret it. And when Prussia and France were at war seven years ago, what happened? Then we had—I believe, all Europe had—a considerable ground of complaint, and that was, that, at the conclusion of the war, certain provinces were taken from France and annexed to Germany. I do not see that France had any right to complain. If she had conquered Prussia and captured Berlin, she would have taken provinces from Prussia, and therefore she had no right to complain of that which Prussia did. But I think that all Europe had a right to complain that terms of peace were insisted upon by Prussia which left a burning resentment in the minds of Frenchmen which may—but I hope not—lay the foundations of future great and desolating wars. At that time Europe might have complained, and at a Congress insisted upon other terms. But Europe did not, but allowed the belligerents to make their own terms of peace. I wish to call the attention of the house to a very curious paragraph in a work of great interest, which I have lately read. I mean the volume which her Majesty the Queen has permitted Mr. Theodore Martin to compile for the instruction—I will not say amusement—of all; for the instruction and advantage of the people. I have read no book for a long time of greater interest; but there is a paragraph in it which refers to the then approaching Conference at Paris, held for the purpose of settling the terms of peace at the end of the Crimean War. The King of Prussia wished very much that he should have a delegate at that Conference, and the Prince Consort—I think in writing to the King of Belgium, his uncle—said (I do not quote the exact words): 'It would be a mischievous principle and a bad precedent to allow any Power or any person to be represented in the Conference to take part in the game who had not laid down his stake'—and therefore he objected strongly, though his objection was not persisted in, that Prussia should come to the

Conference at Paris. I merely mention these things for the purpose of showing that, in the main, it is historically true that, in late years, in our own experience, the parties to a war must be permitted to arrange their own differences in their own manner, and fix such terms of peace as suits them both, of course always allowing that any other Power, if anything is done which is adverse to its interests, or which is in molestation of its territory, has a right to complain, and, if it thinks its case grievous enough, I presume it has a right to declare war. I am not about to argue that there is any impropriety in the sitting of an European Council or Conference, or in this country taking any share in that Conference. It seems to me quite probable, and I have no objection to admit, that there are points in the settlement of the now-terminating war on which it is necessary for the good of Europe in future, for the good of Russia, and for the good of Turkey, that the Powers of Europe should consult, and settle that which seems most likely to produce a just and durable peace."

After speeches from Messrs. Trevelyan, Lowe, Goschen, and others, Mr. Gladstone resumed the debate on the following Monday. He had spoken at a public meeting at Oxford, during the course of the discussion in Parliament; but his speech in the house was studiously moderate, and even conciliatory. With regard to the vote of credit, Mr. Gladstone naturally had some very strong objections to it. He vindicated his policy in 1870, when he had himself asked for two millions of money during the Franco-German war, by saying that the purpose for which that money had been required was plainly and fully known to every one; it was to repel a menace against Belgium. In the present case, however, the object of the vote was wrapped in obscurity. In 1870, he said, "the vote of credit was asked in order that we might spend it for the purpose we proposed. Here it is asked for purposes in the air, purposes in the dark, purposes that are still behind the screen, and with an engagement from her Majesty's government that probably the vote, or the bulk of the vote, will not be wanted, and

that the real aim is to make us strong in the Council that is to be held. Now, I think after all these points of contrast on every single head of the subject, it is hardly worth while to notice the one remaining point, namely, that the magnanimous resolution of 1878 is to provide the money, or such of it as is to be wanted, by addition to the National Debt, whereas the vote of two millions asked for in 1870 was paid for out of the revenue of the year. Now, I think we shall hear no more of the matter of the precedent. I have given you the objections that this proceeding is totally unreal, and, as an unreal proceeding, is not agreeable to the dignity of Parliament and of the country; and that it is entirely without precedent, in any shape or form, as to every special point involved in the case. Now, I come to a matter which is not totally unconnected with foreign politics, but in my opinion it goes deeper than any of these. This vote, if I understand anything of finance at all, or anything about the functions of the house which refer to British finance, is contrary to all the rules which determine our duty in laying charges upon the people. I won't say it is beyond the competence of the House of Commons—it is within the competence of the House of Commons, if they think fit, not only to vote six millions, but six thousand millions—everything is in the competence of the House of Commons; but it is not within the spirit of that ancient unwritten charter under which the House of Commons acts towards the people. This is the matter in which the first foundations of the power of the House of Commons, as a historical assembly, were laid. This is the field upon which has been fought all its greatest and noblest battles for freedom. This is a matter for which your ancestors—and I hope we still have, all of us, some respect for our ancestors—entertained the greatest and the strictest jealousy, and upon which nothing would induce them to deviate one foot or one inch for one hour or one moment from the rigid line of their duty; and my proposition is this, that it is the duty of the House of Commons to refuse sternly to lay this charge upon the people, ex-



cept after sufficient proof that it is required. And, so far as I know, we should not in this way tamper with the great subject of charging and taxing the people for any political aim or end whatever, however innocent or honourable that end might be in itself. In morality the means are not justified by the end, nor are they justified in constitutional law and usage. Confidence is very well, but cannot you express confidence in the government without charging the people? Is our vocabulary so poor, are our resources so narrow, that if we want to support the government we can do it in no other way than by placing at their absolute disposal—for it is an absolute disposal—an enormous charge upon the people, to the nature of which the people will be in some degree blinded by the careful avoidance of all taxes to meet it, but with respect to which there is no proof given that the charge is needed?—for one minister tells us that he thinks the vote will not be wanted, and another minister, more liberal still, says that if we only vote the money it will be the greatest security that it will never be wanted at all. Now it is said, and I have no doubt it is said with perfect truth, that the object of this money is, in the words used by the government, to strengthen their hands in negotiations. Well, sir, I now pass from the financial question, and I am very thankful to the house for hearing me with patience and kindness, but I think they will perceive before I sit down that the purposes for which I speak are not controversial purposes, though I cannot well avoid that tone, but that the object is to strengthen the hands of the government in the councils of Europe. Now this is a subject quite distinct from that which I have endeavoured to convey to the mind of the house, and which dwells in my own mind. It is really an attempt to associate arms with negotiation. Now permit me to say that such an attempt, by whomsoever made, is radically bad. Let me not make my proposition too broad. I do not pretend to say that it is under all circumstances wrong when two Powers have a difference, and are still in negotiation upon it—I do not mean

to say it is always wrong for them to strengthen themselves for an issue of force which they see coming upon them, but what I do venture to state almost in the nature of a general proposition—though I know the danger of general propositions in politics—is this, that it is wrong as to precedent, and that it is bad as to practical interests, when a Conference of European Powers is about to sit, for any one of these Powers to make a prelude by a clash of arms—not intending to spend the money in the anticipation of a clash of arms, but showing that which naturally introduces a clang of arms. This is really a very grave subject, and I beseech honourable gentlemen to consider what they are about. I have never been one of those who have taught in unlimited forms the doctrine of peace. I have been one of those who, in one instance at any rate, have been responsible for a serious war; but we shall all be agreed in recognising the general mischief of war, and admitting it to be our most sacred duty to choose wheresoever we can, in the settlement of international or European differences, those methods which are peaceful methods. Now, I venture to urge on the house, that during this nineteenth century, in which our lot has been cast, some real progress in civilisation has been made in the general recognition of the principle, that the leading Powers of Europe, acting together in the face of day, exercise, and ought to exercise, a great moral authority. It is to our interest not to depreciate but to magnify this authority. It is to our interest not to make little but to make much of Conferences; but if, before going into a Conference, we are to take votes for military and naval establishments, we are doing our best to destroy the character of that Conference. If we take these votes other Powers may take them. If we alter our peace establishment other Powers will also alter their peace establishments. If peace is best preserved by preparing for war, that doctrine which is good for us is good for them. They take what is necessary for them in time of peace, as we take what we think is necessary for us in time of peace. In the present tension of Europe, it may

be that the expenditure of France is greater than ours. I am not sure that the expenditure of Germany is greater than ours. The expenditure of Austria is much less than ours; the expenditure of Italy is, I believe, not more than half of ours. and yet many seem to think that our peace establishment is no sufficient establishment; that the twenty-five millions expended upon it is no burden on the people; and that this is a kind of beginning, all that which has gone before not being worthy to be taken into account. I cannot agree with those who take that view; but I do hold that there is no case in which, when a Conference of the Powers of Europe has been called together, any one of those Powers has, as a prelude to that step, increased its naval and military establishments, or taken power to increase them. Such a step is at variance with the principle of taking from war as much as you can, and giving as much as you can to peace. It is a backward step, a step in the direction of violence instead of peace; it is a step in the opposite direction to that in which we have been endeavouring to march, and ought to be regarded with the utmost aversion by all who are attached to the interests of peace.

“Now, sir, there appear to me to be very strong objections to the proposal of her Majesty’s government; but I want to know whether, on their own showing, her Majesty’s government can by this proposal attain the end which they have told us they have in view, and which, without doubt, they have in view. My right hon. friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer used a striking expression in his speech. He said, ‘Our object is to go into the council of Europe armed with the strength of a united nation.’ Does he think that this vote is likely to exhibit us in the character of a united nation! I am coming near tender ground when I speak of the state of public opinion on this subject. My opinion is, that of many transactions which have happened within the last few days we shall hear a good deal more. What has happened at Sheffield? It is one of the most Radical towns in this country, and I do not wonder at your look-

ing at that meeting as the dawn of better days. But Sheffield had a town meeting in 1863, at the time of the war in America, and at that time a similar large meeting carried a resolution in favour, to all intents and purposes, of war with America; that is, a resolution in favour of the immediate recognition of the Confederate government. That was the resolution of 1863; and if you reflect upon it, it may assist you a little in appreciating the value of the triumph obtained at Sheffield. But what I wish, hon. gentlemen opposite, to say is this. I have, as far as my means allowed, read the resolutions passed at different meetings. I have seen a great many resolutions passed at large open public meetings against the vote proposed by the government. Have they seen any in its favour, for I have not been so fortunate? But the meeting at Sheffield said nothing in favour of this vote. I do not believe that even the Guildhall meeting rose to such a height of sublimity and sacrifice as to vote that this six millions ought to be added to the national burdens. But I will be very liberal with hon. gentlemen. I am very anxious, if I can, to avoid giving offence. I will make every possible concession to them. Take your meeting at Sheffield if you like, and your meeting at the Guildhall, and if you like forget all about Edinburgh, and Glasgow, and Leeds, and Manchester, and Birmingham, take them all out, and it remains not the less true that the effect of this vote which the Chancellor of the Exchequer proposes in order to exhibit us as a united nation, can be nothing except to exhibit us as a divided nation. It is true you have a majority in the House of Commons; but is majority unanimity? Do you think the nation is united in favour of this vote? You know perfectly well—I speak of that which is not doubtful—that the Nonconformists of this country, who are a large fraction, I do not say a large proportion; but, at any rate, a large fraction of the nation—you know that they are nearly to a man opposed to this vote. Is it not a great misfortune—I make an appeal, not a party appeal, to the government—is it not a



great misfortune that you ought not to incur, except under an over-ruling necessity, to exhibit this picture of a divided nation? Is it not worth while to consider whether there is any path along which we can walk with some kind of union and concert?"

After some consideration of the objects which England would have to pursue in the Conference of the great Powers, Mr. Gladstone concluded by suggesting an alternative course to that which the government had proposed. Of course it was not probable that his suggestion would be adopted; but he had so frequently been reproached with blaming the policy of the government, and offering no counsel of his own, that he was quite justified in the course which he now took. "Supposing," he said, "the two houses of Parliament, an interval being given them, and this proposal of six millions standing for future consideration, were to present to the crown a humble and loyal address, setting forth that they were desirous unitedly of supporting the action of her Majesty's government in the councils of Europe, that would do something to bury the controversies of the past. Supposing they said it was their desire and determination to aid her Majesty on all occasions in defending the interests of this empire with the strength of this empire, and that it was their desire to pursue European objects and purposes by means of concert among the Powers of Europe; supposing they recognised and adopted the engagement which has been given by the executive, that they would endeavour by friendly means to obtain for Turkey the most favourable arrangement that circumstances would permit in all matters that might arise as between the belligerents or between the powers of Europe, I hope you would not grudge, and would not refuse, in this great crisis—in this great day, when the future fortunes of twelve or fourteen millions of men are to be dealt with and decided, and a line is to be drawn which shall mark for them the boundary between the two conditions of servitude and freedom—I hope you would not grudge to say a word in mild and guarded terms for that which is dearer to Eng-

lishmen than life itself—namely, the liberty they have fought for, they have cherished themselves, and mean to hand down to their sons, and with which they must sympathise, and which they must desire to see given to other less happy and less favoured nations of the globe. You would not surely grudge to express your hope that, in all questions between Turkey and her subjects, the influence of this country would be used in a manner agreeable to its ancient and noble traditions, and in support of that just and well-ordered freedom which affords, and which alone can afford, the smallest hope for the future peace and prosperity of the East. Now, sir, I trust that I have done something to redeem the pledge with which I set out, and that if I have not been able wholly to abstain from criticism, I have yet shown that criticism was not my main purpose. I resume my seat in declaring that, next to the paramount and sacred duty of promoting the interests of justice, humanity, and freedom all through the world, there is no object nearer to the heart of every Englishman, of every member of Parliament, than in a great crisis like the present, which has now reached its ripeness, to do something, to make some offering, however humble, towards the re-establishment of domestic concord, towards enabling those who are charged with the cares and anxieties of government to enter the council chamber of Europe strong in the strength of a united nation."

Mr. Gathorne Hardy, then Secretary of State for War, followed Mr. Gladstone with a sarcastic and rather intemperate speech, making light of his arguments, and of course precluding all hope that a conciliatory course could be adopted. Other speakers of less note followed, and on Thursday, February 7, the debate was brought to a close. Mr. Forster withdrew the amendment which he had proposed to the resolution of the government, and Sir Stafford Northcote's motion to go into committee of supply was carried by a majority of about two hundred. The leaders of the Opposition left the house previous to the division, and only ninety-six members voted against the proposal of the government.

The discussion had been aptly described by one member as "a war debate tempered by telegrams;" and there can be no doubt that the dramatic incidents which were being made public almost daily, from the first to the last of the ten days during which the motion was before the house, had much to do with the character of the speeches, and with the actual vote. The six millions would probably have been granted, in any case, by a large majority; but the events continually taking place, the uncertainty as to what was going on at the seat of war, and the grave anxiety lest Russia should be so carried away by her successes as to force a war upon England, paralysed the zeal of Lord Hartington and his colleagues, and gave the government an overwhelming majority.

Two of the circumstances which gave special importance and significance to the last day of this memorable debate may be here recorded; and if they be compared with the corresponding portions of our narrative in previous chapters, the reader will be enabled to judge of the effect which was at this time produced in England by the advance of the Russian arms in Roumelia.

A report had been spread about, before the House of Commons assembled that evening, to the effect that the Russians had actually occupied Constantinople. On the meeting of the house, the Marquis of Hartington asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether there was any truth in this report, or whether the government had been informed that the Russians were advancing on Constantinople or Gallipoli, notwithstanding the armistice?

Sir Stafford Northcote replied in the following terms:—"The government will present to the house immediately some papers containing the latest information which they have received upon this subject, and I will state briefly to the house what the substance of these communications is. We received yesterday afternoon from Mr. Layard a telegram of the date of February 5th, at night, to the following effect: That, notwithstanding the armistice, the Russians are pushing on towards Constantinople; that the

Turkish troops have been compelled to evacuate Silivri (that is a port, I believe, on the Sea of Marmora), notwithstanding the protest of the Turkish commander, which the Russian general refused to receive. The Russian general declared that, according to his orders, it was necessary that he should occupy Chatalja that day. The Porte is in great alarm and cannot understand the Russian proceeding. Representations have again been made to the Grand Duke Nicholas. It is also stated that the Servians have destroyed a place called Vranja, and are advancing on Uscup, which is on the railway leading to Salonica. Five days have elapsed since the signature to the bases of peace and of the convention of the armistice, but the protocol has not been sent to the Porte, which is in ignorance of the real terms of peace. Another telegram, dated yesterday, and received last night, states that the Russian Government has insisted, as one of the conditions of the armistice, that the Tchek-medje line should be abandoned, leaving Constantinople wholly undefended, and that the Russians have occupied Chatalja in considerable force. Chatalja forms a portion of the Turkish line of defence extending across the peninsula, of which I understand it is an outpost. This is on the line of railway from Adrianople. The distance from Constantinople, as can be judged from the map, appears to be less than thirty miles. Hon. members will see from a telegram from St. Petersburg, which is included in the papers, that the Grand Duke Nicholas telegraphs from Adrianople on the 31st January that the Port has accepted the conditions of peace, and the protocol has been signed; that an armistice has also been concluded and signed, and orders to suspend all hostilities given. It appears also from a telegram from Belgrade on the 4th inst., that orders have been given by Prince Milan for a suspension of hostilities. We cannot undertake to reconcile that statement with the information given above as to the continued advance of the Servian forces. It will be seen by the papers that the Turks had given orders to suspend operations on or before the 2nd in-



stant. It may be that the various steps are taking place, not in contravention, but in pursuance of the conditions of the armistice. That may be so, because we do not know what conditions there may be in the armistice which we are not aware of; but it appears the Porte is equally in ignorance, and is perplexed as to the meaning of these movements. We have accordingly, in a telegram which we have sent this day, asked the government of Russia to give us some explanations on the subject, and we have called attention to the declaration made by the Emperor of Russia in July last to Colonel Wellesley, to the effect that his Majesty will not occupy Constantinople for the sake of military honour, but only if such a step is rendered necessary by the march of events. Considering that the Turkish resistance had ceased, it would appear that there is now no further necessity for that step."

The other matter to which reference has been made was not of such pressing importance, nor was the information based on such high authority; but it produced at the moment a feeling of the greatest bitterness. It has already been spoken of in a preceding page; and it will be remembered that the accusations levelled against Lord Beaconsfield and Mr. Layard by Server Pacha were indignantly repudiated, not to say refuted, by the two distinguished Englishmen. The "Daily News" of that morning (February 7th) had contained a letter from its correspondent in Adrianople, in which he made the following communication:—

"I have just had an interview with Server Pacha. I had no difficulty in obtaining access to him, and he appeared glad to see me. He began by asking me if the 'Daily News' was for or against the Turks. I had to reply that we were against them on this question. I do not know whether the inquiry was put to me through ignorance, or as a test of my sincerity. At any rate, my answer did not in the least disconcert him, for he went on to say that he was glad to see a representative of so powerful a paper, more especially as he had a message to send to Eng-

land, which he would be obliged to me if I would transmit. He said:—

"Say this as coming from Server Pacha, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Sublime Porte, word for word, as nearly as you can translate it. I have hitherto been a partisan of England, of English policy, of the English alliance. I believed there were ties of sympathy, friendship, and of interest, between the two peoples, that necessitated an alliance. I believed in England to the extent of compromising myself and my government. I see that I have been mistaken; that I was deceived, or (correcting himself) that I deceived myself. I now abandon the English alliance. I no longer believe in English policy, the English government, or the English people. I accept the Russian policy and alliance. I am a partisan of them. I believe in the Russian policy. I am more Russian than the Russians themselves. Say this, please."

"In the course of conversation he repeated the above in still stronger language than before, especially on the question of his having been deceived. He said:—

"We have been encouraged, misled, *trompés* (deceived)."

"Tarin Bey, who was present, added, '*Trompés* is the word.' Then Server Pacha continued, 'And I had documents with which I can and will prove it.'"

"Soon afterwards I took my leave. I have given Server Pacha's very words as nearly as I can remember them, and if I have any opportunity before sending this telegram I will read the above to him and have him correct it if need be; but I do not think there will be occasion to do so. I had a conversation with two more members of the embassy, whose names I am requested not to use. One of them laid the whole blame of the present war on Lord Salisbury. The other confirmed all that Server Pacha said, and was far more explicit. He authorised me to repeat all he said—only not to use his name. He said:—

"We were encouraged to go to war by England, and even to continue the struggle, when our bet-

ter judgement told us we had better make peace on any terms. We would have made a peace before the fall of Plevna that would have satisfied Russia but for the councils of the English government. I do not refer to the official notes of Lord Derby. They were explicit and clear. If we believed them we had nothing to hope from England; but it is not official notes diplomatists believe in most. It is "officious" notes. It is words whispered in the ear. It was the private conversation of Lord Beaconsfield with Musurus Pacha, of Mr. Layard with Server Pacha and with the Sultan, that led us on and deceived us. It was to this his Excellency Server Pacha referred when he spoke to you about his being deceived just now. Why, I assure you, that no longer than three weeks ago Mr. Layard still assured us England would come to our aid; that we had only to fight on; that all would come right in the end. I allow you to repeat what I am now saying. Mr. Layard said to me: 'Do you think I, as a friend of Turkey, was sent here for nothing? Do you not see that it was to encourage you, and offend Russia. Believe me. Have courage. Make no peace. Fight to the end.'

"Mr. Layard spoke in the most open manner. The language held by him is well known to all the other ambassadors at Constantinople. It was no secret. He was even indiscreet, he encouraged us so openly. I would remark that Mr. Layard was by no means the man that should have been chosen for the difficult mission he has to fill in such troublesome times. I can only urge in his behalf that he himself was honestly deceived; that he deceived us the more readily because he himself was so completely deceived. Musurus Pacha represents Lord Beaconsfield's language to him in private as almost as strong, though far more cautiously expressed, than that of Mr. Layard. Server Pacha has documents which will prove beyond doubt all I say, and which will be published after the war. It has been our destruction. It has been the ruin of Turkey. *C'est triste ! C'est triste !*

"I repeat these conversations exactly as I heard

them, as nearly as I can remember, and I hope to be able to show what I have written to Server and other members of the embassy before sending it off. In any case, if I have made any mistake, I will correct it in my next telegram. Server Pacha spoke in an excited, indignant manner, and he grew more and more angry the more he talked, like a man who feels he has been deeply wronged. As I dined with them, I had ample time to get the spirit as well as the words of the conversation, and I am sure I have underrated their feelings in the matter. As to the truth of the allegations, I have nothing to say. I merely repeat what they asked me to say, word for word, as nearly as I can. Everybody, I may remark, likes gentle old Namyk Pacha. There was a calm, gentle, uncomplaining dignity about the old man that impressed me most highly. He said—

"'Allah is great. If he wills that we are to come through this trouble he will find means to do so. I know not what they may be. We have done our best. We can fight no more. We have now no help, no hope but Him. If He wills that we are to perish, still we are content.'

"His voice was so gentle and so subdued as he uttered these words, there was such a humble sorrowful resignation expressed in every line of the grand old face, that I involuntarily bowed my head before him."

Coming at such a moment, this revelation naturally produced the most lively effect upon the English nation. It was mentioned on the same evening in the House of Commons, and Sir Stafford Northcote admitted that it had been referred to Lord Beaconsfield, who described it as "an infamous fabrication." There is no necessity, of course, to suppose that it was a fabrication, either on the part of the correspondent or on that of the Turkish diplomatists. What is very credible is, that the latter may have been misled by their own sanguine dispositions during the preceding twelvemonths, and that they were carried away by mingled grief and indignation when speaking to the correspondent.



Such misconceptions have often happened, but rarely have they been brought to the front at a more critical moment.

The communications which the government received at this juncture from the seat of war determined it to order the fleet to proceed at once to the Sea of Marmora. The following message was sent to Admiral Hornby:—

“Proceed, if possible, to-morrow afternoon, with the *Alexandra*, *Temeraire*, *Achilles*, *Ruby*, and *Salamis*, to Constantinople, to protect life and property of British subjects. Mr. Layard is requested to ask the Porte to give the necessary orders without delay to the forts, and to procure a further firman if he considers it necessary.” There was already a firman, which gave the right of going up the Straits, and if necessary Mr. Layard was to ask for a further one.

This step, evidently different in character from the premature despatch of the fleet a fortnight before, was received by the great majority of Englishmen with satisfaction. Perhaps there was a little duplicity in representing that the ships were sent for the protection of British residents in Constantinople; but this was only one out of several pretexts put forward to justify the measure. The general concurrence in this particular act was illustrated by a speech from Mr. Gladstone on the evening of the 9th of February, on the second stage of the bill for providing the extra six millions. After mentioning that the latest telegrams had cleared up much of the uncertainty previously existing, Mr. Gladstone said:—“We have learned that a portion of the British fleet has gone to the Bosphorus. Nothing could be more satisfactory than the definition of the purpose for which it has proceeded to the Bosphorus; and I do not hesitate to say that it appears to me that neither Russia nor any other independent Power can have any title or disposition to complain of the measure. I hope that her Majesty’s government are certain of the assent of Turkey. I must observe that they have not had any report from the British ambassador of a danger to British life and property in Constantinople. Although I

say distinctly that I cannot conceive that the measure gives the least cause of just complaint to Russia, yet I think that if Turkey were to be found to withhold her consent, her Majesty’s government, in sending the fleet without report of danger from their ambassador, would have incurred a considerable responsibility. However, on the whole, if Turkey makes no objection, I am disposed to hope the result of that measure may be satisfactory with reference to the condition of Constantinople.”

By this time the first authentic news of the armistice had arrived in England. The terms of the Russians were known in outline; and Mr. Gladstone proceeded, in his speech, to point out the reasons which led him to think that these terms implied no threat to the paramount interests of England. After acquitting Mr. Layard of undue alarm in sending his telegram of the preceding day, he continued thus:—

“I now come to the declarations of my right honourable friend to-night, and important declarations I take them to be. He says that they must enter into the Conference for two purposes. In the first place, to maintain British interests, and in the second place, to give effect to the views that this country may entertain of the great reconstruction that is about to be effected in the East. Nothing can be more fair than that. The maintenance of British interests is at all times the most immediate and the most direct of all the duties of a government. I will not say that in every possible circumstance it is the paramount duty, but it is the most immediate duty at all times of a government; and as far as the maintenance of British interests is concerned, I am most happy to think that there is nothing that has been said or suggested by my right honourable friend that in the slightest degree tends to connect itself with the necessity for an increase of force. My right honourable friend has not himself dealt with the details of the question. With respect to the second head, which relates to the views that England may entertain on the subject of a general reconstruction in the East, I am bound to say his use even

of that expression was satisfactory to me, for it showed that he and his colleagues have not at all attempted to close their minds against admitting into them a full perception of the great magnitude of the events that have been proceeding, and that they will endeavour to cast off all the narrow diplomatic traditions which might disable them from giving full scope to the consequences of these events. Under the second head, my right honourable friend enumerated three points. He spoke, first, of the navigation of the Straits, with respect to the freedom of commerce, and with respect to the passage of vessels of war. I cannot admit into my mind the supposition that the absolute freedom of commerce in the Straits has even the smallest danger from any imaginable person. But, at the same time, if such danger were to arise, it is evidently the interest of the civilised world to maintain the perfect freedom of those Straits. It is quite impossible to suppose, in my view, that Russia should attempt to place any restraint upon them, for undoubtedly, whatever disposition there may be to disown admitting any obligation to Russia under any circumstances, it is to Russia, acting, doubtless, in her own interest, and not upon principles of wide philanthropy, that *de facto* we owe the free navigation of these Straits for the purposes of commerce. Nothing could be more equitable and fair than the language of the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the point as to the navigation of the Straits by vessels of war. He laid down no rigid dogma, he evoked no phantoms, he proposed to himself no impossibilities. He carefully avoided separating the interests of this country, in regard to the passage of the Straits by vessels of war, from the general interests. He reserved the matter fairly for the Conference, and any objection he was disposed to signify was an objection to an exclusive arrangement in favour of one Power. On this point, fully admitting that we cannot expect the government to enter into details or anticipate the form questions may assume when they are under consideration, I am satisfied with what fell from my right honourable friend,

and not only satisfied, but gratified, because I think it will tend to discourage the circulation of many absurd and idle notions which have received too much currency and favour among certain portions of the public. My right honourable friend spoke of the communications with the East, and I suppose referred particularly to the Suez Canal. I am persuaded that there can be no subject of quarrel between us there, and, what is yet more important, there can be no difference in the views of the Powers. The interest in the Suez Canal is the interest of the whole world. It is true that it is the interest of England at the head of all the world, as the first and the greatest of the commercial Powers, but, if I may venture to say so, the interest of the Mediterranean Powers in the Suez Canal is still greater, in one point of view, than our interest. It is perhaps not observed by all, but the relative benefits of the Suez Canal are greater to the Mediterranean Powers than to England, because, by the old route to the Cape of Good Hope, the Mediterranean Powers started at a disadvantage with us. By the new route through the Suez Canal the Mediterranean Powers reap the whole benefit, and are so far advanced on their way to India, whereas we have to start from behind. Therefore, it is altogether visionary to treat the question of the Suez Canal as one out of which difficulties can arise, even difficulties of argument; and I don't understand my right hon. friend to speak of it with anything approaching to apprehension. Then we come to that which is undoubtedly the heart of this question, namely, what the right hon. gentleman has introduced as the fair, probable, and endurable settlement of the countries now to be re-organised. The condition of these twelve or fourteen millions of subjects in European Turkey is the heart and root of this matter. My right hon. friend is astonished that there should have been any doubt as to the intentions of the government under this head, but I think I can point out to him reasons that made these misgivings very natural and reasonable. Was not the first recommendation to the



Porte to put down, sharply and summarily, the insurrection in the provinces? Was not the first object of your policy to restore, if possible, the *status quo* in the Turkish empire? Was not objection taken on principle to the interference of Russia between the Porte and the subjects of the Porte? I don't want to dwell upon these matters, which were matters of difference at the time; but I am certain, if my right hon. friend will measure the distance from the state of facts which then existed to the state of facts which now exist, he will find that it is not at all to be wondered at that we should be somewhat exacting on this head, that we should have felt all along that these countries, after all, existed in the main, not for the sake of Russia, not for the sake of Austria, not for the sake of the Turkish Power, which was established in them as a governing military Power, but for the sake of the populations, among whom social happiness and civilisation prevailed until they were submerged by the work of the Turkish government. My right hon. friend says he has no desire to fetter the extension of free and good government, but when he read out originally the terms of the bases of peace he did say that they cut deep into the whole framework of the Turkish empire. But my right hon. friend must feel that—I do not say what he said, because it appeared more from what he did not say—when he went over the terms of the bases of peace the reception of them, in the language of his own speech, was not that of a man who is greatly pleased with their substance, and the reception of them on the benches behind him was, I must say, nothing less than a silence that was profound and almost lugubrious. I dare say that was because of an apprehension of the abuses to which it was supposed these terms might be turned. What has my right hon. friend given us now on the subject of this extension of free government. He has given us some good words on this subject also. He says he has no desire to fetter the extension of free and good government. He has said this country is at the head of the cause of freedom, and has traditions of

freedom to which she ought to be faithful. That is better still. I would not wish anything better than what I think the genuine development of such a principle as that. My right hon. friend has pointed out that there is justice in some sense to be done to Turkey. On the same principle as in England, when we abolish useless and mischievous establishments, we always grant terms of surprising and almost romantic generosity, it may be right to ease this great transition to the representatives of the Turkish Porte, who are men like ourselves, and who, if they have been led into difficulty and crime, no doubt owe this unhappy circumstance to the overpowering strength of temptation and the presumed necessity of the situation. I do not object to doing that which can be done on behalf of the Ottoman Power without infringing on the liberties that belong to the new state of things. My right hon. friend has said, 'You must take care'—and there undoubtedly you have fair ground for watching even the most beneficent operations of the Russian power with jealousy—'You must take care that justice is done between the Slavs and the Hellenes. Russia is the protector of the Slavs. She has earned, by great sacrifice, her right to protect the Slavs. She has rendered a service as splendid and as durable as ever was conferred by a great to an oppressed and unhappy people.' The Hellenes have no such claim upon Russia. I have been forward to indicate how appropriate an opportunity offers to her Majesty's government to charge themselves with the interests of the Hellenic race in the Hellenic provinces; and I am not at all sorry to find the tone of my right hon. friend's speech to be such as not to exclude the hope that a graceful duty may be assumed and discharged by the representatives of the government in these negotiations. Nevertheless there is a misapprehension in my mind which I cannot conceal, and which has been expressed, I think, to some extent already in this debate, which has relation to one of the Powers that will take part in the Conference—I mean Austria. It is absolutely necessary that the vigilant eye of this country

should be directed to the proceedings of Austria. For sixty years past it has been the unfortunate lot of Austria in nearly every European combination—I believe in every one where two sides could be taken—to be upon the wrong side. She has unhappily adopted, I know not from what amount of interior pressure—but it has been her custom to adopt—the principle of insisting that the relations and conditions of the people in the provinces outside her borders were to be governed by considerations drawn from her domestic convenience. I will quote a case which is among the most recent. I cherish the hope that a better mind may have come to Austria. I mean to make no charge against the distinguished person who is now at the head of the Austrian government. I recollect with pleasure that the present Austrian ambassador in London, when he was head of the Austrian government, recommended this very plan of provincial tributary autonomy for the Christian subjects as the best solution of the great Eastern problem; but I think it necessary to point out that Austria, which I admit has internal difficulties to contend with, has too much temptation and tendency to insist on the regulation of the affairs of these provinces according to her internal convenience. The case I wish to cite—not the worst, but the nearest to her own borders—is that of the Danubian principalities at the period of the Crimean war. The great question arose after that war, whether they were to be united or not? Upon that subject I for one had a very strong view, and I believe it was the only question of foreign politics, down to last year, upon which I ever felt it my duty to offer a motion to the house. I moved the house in support of the union of the Danubian principalities. But the Austrian Power was opposed to that union. She saw that it would give strength and solidity to a Roumanian state, and her policy, unfortunately, was to keep all races and all these provinces disunited. In my opinion, the union of the Danubian principalities was about the wisest measure that Europe ever had adopted in dealing with the Turkish empire. Roumania

was a real barrier according to her strength, even under the exciting circumstances of the last three years. For eighteen months or more, while rebellion was raging elsewhere, and Servia and Montenegro were at war, Roumania never stirred, and fulfilled all the duties of a neutral. When Roumania afforded a highway to the Russian troops, it was under coercion. But if Roumania had been divided instead of united—if she had had no freedom or national existence of her own to defend—the probability was, she would have been involved in troubles far sooner than she was. But look at the position in which she stands now. If we put it on the score of the ambition of Russia, I look upon the national existence of Roumania as one of the best and one of the most secure obstacles that can be erected against the dynastic and territorial aggrandisement of Russia. It is an admirable provision for the introduction of a new living body and free state between Russia and the southern Slav provinces. But to that Austria was pertinaciously and bitterly opposed. What I fear, that I cannot exclude from my mind, is, that again it may be the unfortunate temptation of Austria, upon consideration of her own internal circumstances, and her relation to races within her own border, to limit the great boon that is about to be conferred upon the subject races of the Ottoman empire. And the principle I lay down is this, that if it should be so, I see no reason why the influence of England ought to be associated with Austria for any such purpose. I hope that Austria may be disposed to drop this policy, but if it is not so, I trust that even within this house many a voice will be raised to prevent the mischief which might be due to any obliquity on the part of her Majesty's government. What I think we have a fair right to ask of her Majesty's government I will venture to state in a few plain and simple words. Certain terms have been arrived at between Turkey and Russia. Russia has demanded, and Turkey has granted, certain concessions on behalf of the subject races. What I ask of the government is, that their influence shall not be



used to diminish the amount of those concessions upon which both Russia and Turkey have agreed. That I believe to be a fair proposition." (Cries of "No," "Hear, hear," and "Question.") "Then sir, it appears that there are some in this house who think that England may lawfully and justifiably go into the Conference and join hands with some other Power for the sake of cutting down and emasculating the boon which Russia and Turkey have agreed upon. My proposition is this: I should not enter into the question as between one subject race and another; that we are not to join with Austria, nor with any other Power in curtailing and diminishing the boon which Russia and Turkey, jointly, at the close of this great war, are prepared to confer on the subject races." (The right hon. gentleman spoke with great energy, striking the table forcibly.) "I hope this proposition commends itself to the government. At the same time it is one which I shall be prepared to contest, and for which I shall contend, to the utmost of my power."

It cannot but repay us to recall to our minds the circumstances of this most important debate, which revealed the policy of the two great sections of the English public in a very clear light. We will now proceed to consider the terms which were exacted by Russia from her prostrate enemy.

The anxiety felt in England at large, as to the bargain which was being concluded between Russia and Turkey, centred principally in the future condition of Constantinople, of the southern coast of Turkey, and of the Straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Whatever may have been felt by the government, or by the most extreme anti-Russian party in this country, the majority of Englishmen certainly cared little about any other points than these. However much they might sympathise with the misfortunes of the Turks, they were not likely to perceive any cause for interference so long as Russia kept clear of the Mediterranean shores. With regard to the Straits, it does not seem that the government of the czar ever seriously thought

of interfering with the settlement effected by the Treaty of Paris. The contrary idea prevailed at times, especially amongst those who ventured to forecast the Russian demands on insufficient knowledge. And it was entertained by many amongst the Russian people themselves. Mr. Wallace, writing from St. Petersburg early in January, 1878, reflected the opinions of patriotic Russians on this subject.\* "When the conditions of peace came to be discussed," he said, "the part of the negotiations which will have the keenest interest for Englishmen will probably be the question of the Straits. On this point the Russian government has hitherto been silent, but unofficial Russia has loudly expressed its views and desires, and it is not a little interesting to observe the gradual development of the question in public opinion since the commencement of hostilities. At the beginning of the war, when the great majority of the Russian people forgot selfish interests in their generous desire to free the southern Slavs from their Moslem oppressors, and when it was generally expected that the campaign would prove little more than a brilliant military promenade, people thought little of the advantages which Russia should demand for herself. In that period of excitement and enthusiasm, when the Bulgarian atrocities were still fresh in the popular memory, ordinary political and diplomatic considerations seemed utterly out of place. If a foreigner had ventured to predict that this crusading spirit would soon evaporate, and that the struggle would gradually degenerate into a war of aggression, he would probably have been told that he did not understand the Russian character, and that he was completely wrong in attributing to Russia the narrow political egotism of decrepit Western Europe. Russia, it was said, had undertaken a holy mission, and would never soil her hands with taking payment for her benevolent exertions.

"Having some knowledge of the Russian character, I do not hesitate to affirm that nine-tenths

\* "Times," Jan. 16, 1878.

of the people who spoke in this way were perfectly sincere. They indignantly spurned the idea of material recompense, and looked for their reward in the moral satisfaction of having fulfilled a noble mission, in the heartfelt gratitude of the emancipated Slavs, and in the respectful admiration of the civilised world. If the Russian armies had advanced without meeting serious resistance and had at once compelled the Porte to sue for peace, this disinterested programme would perhaps have been carried out ; but when it became evident that the war was to be very unlike a military promenade—when the army of the Caucasus was driven back to the frontier, and Gourko's division had to retreat hastily to the Schipka Pass—public feeling immediately underwent a change. It was still further transformed by the successive repulses before Plevna, and by the fruitless attempts to dislodge Mukhtar Pacha from his strong positions on the Yagnilar and the Aladja Dag. Military disasters roused the purely patriotic feelings, and the determination to restore the military honour of the country, threw into the shade the benevolent aims with which the war had been undertaken. At the same time, it became known that the Bulgarians were neither so wretched as had been supposed nor so grateful as had been expected. The natural consequence of all this was a considerable amount of disenchantment, and a marked lowering of the popular ideal—at least in the educated classes. As the list of the killed and wounded grew with frightful rapidity, and the steady fall in the foreign exchanges foreshadowed coming financial difficulties, many people began to ask, 'What compensation are we to get for all these enormous sacrifices ? When other nations talk and think only about their own interests and ridicule our Quixotic aspirations, are we, who have borne the burden, to retire with empty hands and content ourselves with mere moral satisfaction ? Are we going to imitate the foolish generosity of Alexander I., who liberated Europe from the Napoleonic yoke, and refused to take any war indemnity ? It is time we should learn to act

like other nations. For all these sacrifices we must have some material compensation.'

"The idea of material compensation was not entirely new. Even at the beginning of the war, when most people were indignantly repudiating all interested motives, some journalists had pointed out that Russia ought to remove the last traces of the humiliating Treaty of 1856, and acquire certain substantial advantages. The principal advantages enumerated were the rectification of the frontier in Asia Minor, so as to include Batoum, the recovery of the strip of land which had been ceded to Moldavia by the Treaty of Paris, and, above all, the freedom of the Straits. By freedom was meant the free passage for ships of war, and as the campaign advanced the necessity of acquiring this right was supported by the following argument :—'A merchant marine cannot prosper unless it is properly protected. In order, therefore, to develop the commerce of our southern ports, we must have a Black Sea fleet, which can pass out freely into the Mediterranean. Our former fleet in these waters was destroyed during the Crimean War, but the heroic spirit which animated it has survived, as is amply proved by the exploits of our naval officers in the Danube, and by the brilliant affair of the little 'Vesta' with the big Turkish ironclad. All that we require, in order to create a large naval force in the Black Sea, is the free passage for our war vessels through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles.'

"For a time this argument seemed very satisfactory, and no one took the trouble to inquire what freedom of the Straits really meant. It was something which would be strenuously opposed by England, and which, consequently, must be advantageous to Russia. But, when a society was formed in England to advocate the proposal, suspicions were at once aroused. If 'perfidious Albion' seemed to act generously, it might be confidently assumed that she was concocting in secret some dark nefarious scheme for her own advantage. Accordingly, the subject was examined more carefully, and the perfidy became apparent. The freedom of the



Straits, if taken in the wider sense, would admit the British fleet into the Black Sea, and as Russia could not cope with England in the matter of naval armaments, the opening of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus would be for her not a gain, but a serious loss. It was necessary, therefore, to explain that the freedom of the Straits did not mean what Englishmen understood by the term. What Russia needed was the exclusive right of passage for herself, and the journalists maintained that this right was quite in accordance with all the recognised principles of international equity. 'The coast of the Black Sea,' they said, 'belongs exclusively to Russia and Turkey, and therefore these two Powers alone should have the right of admission for ships of war. The navies of the Powers which have no possessions on the Black Sea coast have no reason to pass through the Straits except for purposes of attack and invasion.' Once fairly started in this direction the publicists advanced with rapid strides. Soon they perceived that even 'the joint possession of the Straits by Russia and Turkey' was not sufficient for the protection of Russian interests. Under such an arrangement any foreign Power, wishing to attack Russia, would merely have to form an alliance with the Porte, and might, in that way, send its fleet into the Black Sea. To prevent such a contingency Russia ought to have a material guarantee, in the form of a fortress, on the Bosphorus! One publicist even took the trouble to indicate precisely where this fortress ought to be.

"This is, so far as I have observed, the extreme limit which these imaginary demands have yet reached, but it is not difficult to foresee that they will proceed further. A fortress on the Bosphorus might protect Russia from attack, but so long as the Dardanelles are in other hands she could not have that freedom of exit which is considered necessary for the protection of her future foreign trade. In short, if we let ourselves be guided by this kind of political logic, we arrive inevitably at the conclusion that Russia must, in order to protect her real and

supposed interests, take possession of the Straits from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Thus we perceive, in the minds of amateur politicians, the question of the Straits has passed through three phases, and is evidently entering on a fourth. First, there was 'the freedom of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles,' then 'the exclusive joint possession by Russia and Turkey,' next, the acquisition of a fortress on the Bosphorus, and, lastly, no doubt, we shall have the necessity of possessing the Straits in their entire extent. This is the correct meaning of the oft-repeated and often-denied assertion, that Russia desires to gain possession of Constantinople. There may be a few visionaries, who would like to see the capital of the empire transported from the banks of the Neva to the shores of the Golden Horn, but such ideas belong, as Prince Gortschakoff once truly said, to the region of political mythology. What serious statesmen desire is, not the acquisition of a new capital, but the possession of the Straits, which would enable them to protect the southern provinces from attack, and secure an outlet to the Mediterranean. They know very well that, in the present state of Europe, their desire cannot be realised, but they keep it always in view as a great political aim, and they would strenuously resist any arrangement which might indefinitely postpone its realisation. This is why they would fight to the death rather than allow Constantinople to fall into the hands of a progressive Power likely to have a great future, and why the *grande idée* of the Greeks finds in them most determined and irreconcilable antagonists. If Constantinople could be transported a few hundred miles from the great waterway which forms the only connecting link between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, its fate would seem to Russian statesmen of the serious type a matter of very small importance.

"As to what the Russian government will demand, in reference to the Straits, there is as yet no official utterance. The general conviction is, that it will demand from the Porte the right of passage for its war vessels to the exclusion of

those of other nations. Among well-informed people, however, there is a report that this idea has been vetoed by Austria and Germany, and that consequently the question will not be raised at all.

We shall see, in the next chapter, how far these anticipations were fulfilled by the actual formulation of the Russian demands.

## CHAPTER X.

### THE BASES OF PEACE.

AS we have already seen, it was on the last day of January that the terms of the armistice were signed at Adrianople. The following were the terms agreed upon :—

The armistice contained ten Articles, and was concluded between Russia, Servia, Roumania, and Turkey. 1. A notice of three days was to be given before a resumption of hostilities. The armistice to be communicated to Montenegro by Russia. 2. Restoration of the guns and territory taken after the signature. 3. Details of line of demarcation and neutral zone for Turkey, Russia, and Servia. Fortifications not to be retained on the neutral territory, and no new ones to be raised there. A joint Commission to determine the line of demarcation for Servia and Montenegro. The Russians to occupy Bourgas and Midia, on the Black Sea, in order to obtain supplies, but no war material. 4. Armies beyond the line of demarcation to be withdrawn within three days. 5. The Turks may remove arms, &c., to places and by routes defined, on evacuating the fortifications mentioned in Article 3. If they cannot be removed an inventory of them to be taken. The evacuation to be complete within seven days after the receipt of orders by the commanders. 6. Sulina to be evacuated within three days by the Turkish troops and ships of war, unless prevented by ice. The Russians to remove the obstacles in the Danube, and superintend the navigation of the river. 7. The

railways to continue to work under certain conditions. 8. Turkish authorities to remain in certain places. 9. The Black Sea blockade to be raised. 10. Wounded Turkish soldiers to remain under the care of Russia. The armistice commences at 7 P.M. on the 31st of January. The Russian and Turkish commanders on the spot to settle matters relating to the armistice in Armenia.

The third article established a neutral zone between the invaders and the army defending Constantinople. This zone extended from the Black Sea coast between lake Derkos and Ak Bunar to the Marmora coast between Bujuk Chekmedjie to Kujuk Chekmedjie. The western boundary passed through Tchataldja, where the Russian head-quarters were established. The defensive lines run through the middle of this zone, from Buyuk to Derkos, at the eastern extremity of the lake.

The bulk of the Russian forces remained for a time at Adrianople, but strong detachments were sent to Bourgas and Midia on the Black Sea, and to Rodosto and Silivri on the Sea of Marmora. The Russians also occupied positions on the coast westward of Rodosto, as far as Sharkoi, in the direction of Gallipoli.

Some days necessarily elapsed before the terms of this armistice could be carried out, even as regards the evacuation of the neutral zone. The delay arose mainly on the part of the Turks. The commanders of the Ottoman troops at the front did not receive definite orders from Constantinople, and it was believed that the Porte hesitated to sanction the terms accepted by Namyk and Server Pachas. Renewed rumours and negotiations as to the return of the English fleet also seem to have had something to do with the Turkish hesitation.

The Russians, on the other hand, never paused in their advance, but pushed on day after day, driving in the Turkish outposts, and compelling them to fall back even before they had received the orders of their government. Mukhtar Pacha, who had recently been recalled from Erzeroum, commanded the Ottoman forces be-



fore Constantinople; and when General Skobelev found that the Turks did not retire, he sent his chief of the staff, Count Keller, to Mukhtar's head-quarters at Kadikoi, in order to inquire the reason. The pacha declared that he had not received any orders from the capital until the night of the 6th—the day before that on which the evacuation ought to have been complete, according to the spirit of the armistice. He now, however, quickened his movements, so that in less than three days General Skobelev was able to establish his head-quarters at Tchataldja.

The same difficulty was experienced by the Russians in other places. Thus at Siliuri, when General Strukoff arrived to take possession of that post on the Sea of Marmora, the Turkish commander absolutely refused to give place to him; and it was not until the Russian general brought up his artillery, and threatened to fire on the Turks, that he could induce them to abandon their positions. The news of the occupation of Siliuri, it will be remembered, was one of the causes of the panic which overtook the English Parliament during the debate which was then proceeding. General Strukoff had the advance guard of General Gourko's force, which was advancing along the coast, from Rodosto.

The Turkish armies were not to blame for their obstinacy, not having received distinct orders from Constantinople to retire, and being unable to believe that the government could consent, under any circumstances, to abandon positions on which they had been taught to believe that the safety of the capital depended. But the commanders were at last compelled to realise the stern necessity. A correspondent, on February 7th, writing from the head-quarters of Mukhtar Pacha at Kadikoi, whither he had arrived in the suite of Count Keller, shows how the armistice had affected the Turkish forces. "It was stipulated in the protocol," he says, "that the Russian lines should be from Bujuk Tchekmeje, on the Sea of Marmora, along the right bank of the Kara Su River to the Lake of Derkos, on the Black Sea; and the Turkish line

from Kujuk Tchekmeje, on the Sea of Marmora to the village of Ak Bunar, on the Black Sea, leaving a space of about seven miles between the lines as neutral ground. The village of Derkos is on neutral ground, as is the whole Turkish line of defence, and the fortifications of Bujuk Tchekmeje. The Turks really abandon their last line of defence and leave Constantinople at the mercy of the Russian line of Kujuk Tchekmeje, not fortified, and they are not allowed to work on them by the terms of the armistice.

"In consenting to this arrangement, Server and Namyk Pachas must either have been completely panic-stricken, thinking that the only way to keep the Russians from Constantinople was to throw themselves on the generosity of the grand duke, or else, having abandoned all hope, they wished to give the Russians a proof of their sincerity, in thus needlessly abandoning their last line of defence. The fact is, the Russians could not have attacked these lines for two weeks yet, as they would not have had up enough infantry to do so, and the positions are the most formidable I have ever seen. The valley of Kara Su, far above Tchataldja, is nothing but a marsh, crossed by one or two causeways, over which no troops can pass for two months yet, and it is further shortened by the Lake of Derkos. The possible line of attack cannot now be over seven or eight miles long, not more than a third of the length of Osman's lines at Plevna, and Mukhtar must have thirty or forty thousand men, good, bad, and indifferent. It seems to me the Turks might have held this line at any hazard, and the Russians could not have insisted on its evacuation, for the reason that they could not be ready to attack for two weeks. In their possession this line would have put the Turks on a much better footing for the peace negotiations. However, they have abandoned all idea of holding it, and Mukhtar received last night orders to abandon it. He has only asked for a delay of three days to remove his heavy artillery and stores, which, over the roads as they now are, is almost impossible."

The same correspondent, two days later, writ-







ing from Tchataldja, sums up the situation as it appeared to him when the Russian advance guard had occupied the extreme point of the non-neutralised territory. "We have at last come to a halt here," he says, "after a march that, for rapidity and daring, has rarely been equalled. General Skobelev, after the fight of Shenova, near Schipka, where he compelled Wessel Pacha to surrender his whole army, left Kezanlik on January 15th, and his advanced guard reached here on February 5th, having made the distance, two hundred and seventy-five miles, in twenty days. He performed the distance from Kezanlik to Semenli Junction, on the Philippopolis and Yamboli Railways, fifty-five miles, in forty hours, and from Kezanlik to Adrianople, one hundred miles, in four days. When we compare the rapid marching of Skobelev and Gourko during this period of the campaign, fighting through their enemy's country, half devastated by flying Turks, with the slow, heavy movements of the army across Roumania, a friendly country, in the beginning of the war, one can hardly believe it is the same army.

"Skobelev's march from Adrianople here has been almost as quick as from Kezanlik. The troops marched along the line of railway without baggage and artillery, which are coming on by rail. They lived partly on the supplies found in the country, and prepared by Strukoff, and partly on provisions brought from Adrianople by rail. At Lulé Burgas Skobelev set all the bakeries going, and found they could produce twelve thousand loaves per day, so that he was enabled to furnish his troops with fresh bread every other day. No fighting occurred, except a smart cavalry skirmish at the station of Tchorlou, where the Russian advance overtook the Turkish rear guard. The rapidity of movement was not in the least relaxed, even after the signature of the armistice. Although the Turkish general had received no orders from Constantinople, and had therefore transmitted no orders to his troops to evacuate the territory, as agreed upon in the armistice, the Russians pushed forward and drove the Turks out by threats and force

everywhere up to the line of demarcation. At Silivri, Strukoff had, as I informed you, to bring up a battery and to threaten to fire before the Turkish commander would consent to move, and then he did so only after putting in a protest against what he called a violation of the armistice.

The fact is, the Turks had already violated the armistice, in not fulfilling the conditions agreed upon. The neutral ground is not yet evacuated by them, although Mukhtar Pacha has promised that it shall be by the 10th; Skobelev having informally granted that delay, while reserving to himself the right to watch the proceedings step by step, and see that they are really carried out. He has informed Mukhtar that unless he sees that the evacuation is taking place, he will consider himself authorised by this continued violation of the armistice to occupy the neutral ground, and seize whatever war material, cannon, &c., he may find there. As Skobelev has not yet enough troops up to attack these formidable positions, this threat is what the Americans call a game of bluff. The grand duke considers it of the greatest importance to have these positions evacuated at once, for reasons which I will explain, and Skobelev is trying to get it done by means of threats and bluster in lieu of force, which he has not yet got at his disposal.

"It is a somewhat amusing and exciting game, and we are looking forward to the result with anxiety. The Turks assure the Russians that they have eighty-five thousand men behind these lines. The Russians assure the Turks that they have one hundred thousand ready to attack upon a moment's notice, and are only restrained from doing so by consideration for them. As by the time this is published the matter will be decided one way or other, this account of the situation here can do no harm. From what I saw of Mukhtar Pacha, however, I believe he was acting in good faith, and that he actually gave orders for the evacuation the night we were at Kadikoi, where he says for the first time he received notice from his government. Why he



did not receive orders sooner I am unable to say, unless it be on the ground that this is the usual manner of proceeding with the Turks, or else that there was hesitation in Constantinople in accepting the terms agreed upon by Server Pacha.

"If it be asked why the Russians are so anxious to have these lines evacuated now that peace is imminent, the answer is simple. Peace is not certain until it is signed. In the meantime they have the possibility of English interference continually before their eyes, an event which a discussion of the conditions of peace might still bring about. Now, with the lines of Bujuk Tchekmeje in their possession, as they virtually will be if the Turks evacuate them, Constantinople is practically as much in their hands as if there were sentinels at the doors of St. Sofia.

The railway signal posts mark seventy kilometres from Stamboul. The distance by road is fifty-five, as the railway is very crooked. In case of a declaration of war by England, Skobelev, who has now four divisions, can throw the whole force on to the heights behind Constantinople in forty-eight hours; for it may be safely said that the Turks, having given such a proof of their desire for peace as the abandonment of this line of defence, may be counted upon to offer no further resistance to the Russians, even should England declare war in their favour. I believe Server Pacha was really in earnest when he said the other day that, in future, Turkey would be the ally of Russia. His reasoning is simple and logical. Even though Lord Beaconsfield meant to interfere on behalf of Turkey, as undoubtedly Server believed, it is now too late to save Turkey by that means. Whatever the result of that interference, whether favourable or unfavourable to the Russian arms, the Ottoman empire would perish in the struggle, whereas, by making peace with Russia now, something can be saved from the wreck. Russia is evidently not yet prepared for the destruction of the Ottoman empire, and if the Porte can be brought completely under Russian influence,

and can be turned into a faithful ally, there is no reason why what will remain of the empire after this war should perish at all, protected as it will be by Russia. This is Server Pacha's line of reasoning, and it is not without logic. This is why he has given such a proof of his sincerity to Russia by giving up the last line of defence, thus putting Turkey beyond the possibility of further resistance, even though England should now declare war against Russia.

"Tchataldja is a pretty prosperous little village, with many fine, even elegant houses. It is half Turkish, half Greek, but the Turkish population has nearly all fled. Upon the arrival of Count Keller with a flag of truce, the Greek bishop called upon him, and in presence of two Turkish officers said he prayed for the health of the Emperor Alexander, and for the officers and soldiers of the army who had come to deliver the country from its oppressors. As according to the bases of peace proposed by Russia, this part of the empire remains to Turkey, I fear the poor bishop will find the country rather hot for him after peace is made, and the Russians go away.

"There has been snow here for the last three or four nights, but it melts during the day. The sun is shining brightly, but the roads are in an impassable condition, and they will probably remain so for some time. The headquarters of the grand duke are, it is said, to be removed to Silivri, on the Sea of Marmora, instead of Rodosta. Silivri is nearer Constantinople. Count Keller and Thair Bey, accompanied by Lieutenant Green, of the American army, started yesterday to go round the lines of demarcation on both sides."

On the 11th he writes:—"The evacuation of the neutral territory is completed. All Mukhtar's army has retired behind the lines of Bujuk Tchekmeje, but the heavy artillery still remains in position, and a good deal of war material is still on neutral ground, because the Turks cannot remove it. Skobelev has, I believe, told Mukhtar to at least remove the guns from their platforms. Constantinople may be virtually

considered in the hands of the Russians, just as much as if they were already in the place. They have the self-restraint not to enter, that is all. Skobelev, while walking over the lines of delimitation the other day, was near enough to see the place. He and the whole of his staff, with the escort, sat on their horses and gazed on the capital for some minutes. There was some disappointment expressed that they should not have been allowed to march in, but all are, in general, very glad the war is over.

"It would seem that we were on the very brink of a second war without knowing it. I know as a fact that, before the armistice was signed, Russia had decided that the English fleet coming to the Bosphorus, should be the signal for the Russian army to march in, and that if any English troops were found anywhere in the Turkish positions, to attack them. It was further decided to occupy Gallipoli, and every disposition was taken for that purpose. Now, it turned out that the English fleet actually had orders to go to the Bosphorus at that very moment. Had the order not been countermanded, the result certainly would have been a collision between the two forces, and a war. It was a close shave. Skobelev only received news of the armistice at Tchorlou, from which point the Sea of Marmora is visible. Everybody is glad that it has ended so; and now, that the first disappointment is over, there is no desire expressed to go to Constantinople at all. As soon as peace is signed Skobelev marches back to Adrianople."

On the following day he writes again:—"We have just had another scare. News was received here that the English fleet was on its way to the Bosphorus. Skobelev instantly informed headquarters, and had orders for concentrating his troops at a point where they could strike at a moment's notice in case orders were received to that effect. The sky was threatening for a short time. Then the news came that the Turks had refused to let the fleet pass, and that it was waiting orders at the mouth of the Dardanelles. This news raised a laugh, but the position is still regarded as threatening. Skobelev's troops

will be to-morrow at points that will enable them to cross the line, and occupy the Turkish positions in the neutral ground in two hours. He can put two divisions on the high ground just behind Constantinople in thirty-six hours. I may remark that a division of the Guards has been given to him, and that he has now three divisions and two brigades of sharpshooters under his command, really four divisions in all, besides artillery and cavalry. As our news is nearly twenty-four hours old, it is likely the order for sending the fleet has once more been countermanded, otherwise we should have heard of its arrival by this time. The coming of the fleet to the Bosphorus would probably not now be regarded by Russia as a signal for war as it would have been before the armistice, but it would be a very serious matter, nevertheless."

Next day, however, on the 13th of February, as we have seen, the English fleet actually passed the Dardanelles, and steamed towards Constantinople, in the neighbourhood of which city it was to remain for many months. This action on the part of the English government was not taken as equivalent to a declaration of war, as the correspondent predicted; but it was regarded as a countermove to the menacing position assumed by the Russians before the Turkish capital. It prevented the latter, in all probability, from occupying Constantinople, and may thus have had the effect, at that moment, of arresting a course of events which would possibly have ended in a war between England and Russia.

The excitement in England over the terms of peace was intense, and it is difficult to believe that a Russian entry into Constantinople could have taken place without causing the English government to take an irrevocable step. The czar and his more immediate counsellors doubtless knew this; and peremptory orders were sent to the Grand Duke Nicholas, to abstain from the advance which he was so strongly tempted to make.

Meanwhile, in Eastern Bulgaria, the Russians had advanced rapidly towards Varna, eager to



make the most of the time before the armistice should be communicated to them. General Zimmermann telegraphed from Bazardjik, on the 5th, as follows: "On the 3rd inst. General-Adjutant Mansei, with a detachment of dragoons, hussars, and the 18th Cossack regiment, with several guns, occupied Koslydscha and Pravady. The inhabitants received the Russians with offerings of salt and bread, and delivered to them the keys of the town. Four railway bridges in Pravady and Wentschani had been blown up, and the telegraph wires between the two stations appear to be destroyed. The enemy took to flight. Forty men of the regular infantry, and some cavalry soldiers, were taken prisoners. The Turkish corn granaries in Pravady had been burnt. On the night between the 3rd and 4th inst., immediately after the receipt of the telegram of the Grand Duke Nicholas, announcing the conclusion of the armistice, General Zimmermann despatched the intelligence to all the commanders under his orders. Adjutant-General Mansei, after receiving the despatch, entered Baladschi, about fifteen versts from Bazardjik."

We come now to the bases of peace, as agreed upon between the Russians and Turks previous to the signing of the armistice. They were summarised in the following official communication published in St. Petersburg on the 8th of February:—

"As the preliminary bases for the conclusion of an armistice, in virtue of which hostilities have been suspended, have been accepted and signed by the Turkish plenipotentiaries at the head-quarters, we are in a position to communicate the text of these preliminary bases. We remind our readers that the sole object of these bases is to mark the limits of the ground on which a definite peace—whether between the belligerents, as regards questions which touch them alone, or whether the participation of the great Powers, for the settlement of questions of European interest, is taken into consideration—can be negotiated. The preliminary conditions of peace, which were laid before the Turkish

delegates by the Grand Duke Nicholas, the commander-in-chief, are the following:—

"In the event of the Turks at advanced posts asking for peace, or an armistice, the commander-in-chief is to inform them that hostilities cannot be suspended until the following bases have been previously accepted:—

"1. Bulgaria, in limits determined by the majority of the Bulgarian population, which shall in no case be less than those indicated by the Constantinople Conference, shall be formed into an autonomous tributary principality, with a national Christian government, and a native militia. The Ottoman army shall no longer remain in it, except at some points to be decided upon by common agreement.

"2. The independence of Montenegro shall be recognised. An increase of territory, equivalent to that which the fortune of arms has placed in her hands, shall be secured to her. The definitive frontier shall be fixed subsequently.

"3. The independence of Roumania and Servia shall be recognised. An adequate territorial compensation shall be secured to the former, and a rectification of frontier to the latter.

"4. The autonomous administration, with adequate guarantees, shall be granted to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Similar reforms shall be introduced into the other Christian provinces of Turkey in Europe.

"5. The Porte shall agree to compensate Russia for the expenses of the war and for the losses which she has been compelled to incur. The nature, whether pecuniary, territorial, or otherwise of this indemnity, shall be settled hereafter. His Majesty the sultan shall agree to come to an understanding with the emperor of Russia for the protection of the rights and interests of Russia in the Straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles."

This official communication concluded as follows:—"As an evidence of the acceptance of these essential conditions, the Turkish plenipotentiaries will proceed immediately to Odessa or Sebastopol, in order there to negotiate the preliminaries of peace with the Russian plenipo-

tentiaries. As soon as the acceptance of the foregoing conditions has been notified to the commanders-in-chief of the imperial armies, the armistice conventions are to be negotiated at both seats of war, and hostilities may be suspended provisionally. Both commanders-in-chief have the right to complete the above conditions by indicating certain strategical points and fortresses to be evacuated as material guarantees for the Sublime Porte accepting the armistice conditions and commencing negotiations for peace."

Such, then, were the regulations made by the highest authorities; and, if they were not always strictly carried out, the fault probably rested with the divisional commanders of the Russian army, and with the inefficient provisions of the Turkish government.

We have seen how the Russian terms of peace, when first announced in England, were regarded by the majority of Englishmen. The impression was undoubtedly most unfavourable to Russia; for, although there were many who considered the terms easy, compared with what a conquering nation might have demanded from its victim, the prevailing idea was, that the Russian government desired to ruin Turkey utterly. Until the final treaty between the two belligerents should be signed, it was impossible to arrive at a definite conclusion on the subject; but everything tended, during that eventful month of February, to nourish suspicion against Russia, and to maintain the public mind in a condition of anxiety.

The Russian government made fitful efforts to satisfy her Majesty's government in regard to its future intentions. The semi-official agency which circulated its telegrams under the name of "Agence Russe," and which on some occasions remonstrated with, or even menaced England, did its best, on the whole, to allay the growing ill-feeling between the two countries. Late in January it issued a paragraph attempting to show that Russia was as anxious as England to avoid a misunderstanding. "With this object," it argued, "it is necessary to place Eng-

land on her guard against the game played by the Porte, which has evidently tended towards pushing matters to an extremity in order to compel the intervention of Great Britain and Europe. Russia having from the outset declared that the acceptance of the preliminary bases of peace must precede the suspension of hostilities, the Porte has caused the negotiations to drag on slowly, in order that the approach of the Russian troops towards Constantinople might determine the action of England. As stated in telegrams published by the Russian newspapers the Turkish plenipotentiaries, though notified by the Russian commanders that hostilities would continue until an agreement was arrived at, nevertheless, in accordance with their instructions, received the Russian conditions *ad referendum*, and persisted in giving no reply, with the manifest intention of gaining time, all this notwithstanding the fact that the Porte had informed Europe that it had given its representatives full powers to conclude peace immediately. This manœuvre—of staking everything at a time when the Porte ought to know that every hour brings it nearer to an extension of the crisis, by the possibility of the Greeks invading Epirus and Thessaly, and thus preventing the conclusion of peace upon moderate terms—ought not to be allowed to prevail to the detriment of a superior interest—namely, the maintenance of good relations between England and Russia."

There was truth in this accusation against Turkey, as we have already had occasion to see; but at least Russia could not have been much surprised at the fact. The Porte seized every chance which appeared to be within its reach; and no doubt it angled desperately for English assistance.

Other countries in Europe were alarmed by the reports as to Russia's exorbitant demands. Opinions varied greatly, and must continue to vary, with regard to the understanding which existed between Russia and Austria. There were some who imagined that an agreement between St. Petersburg and Vienna had been come to before the outbreak of the war; and it seems



probable that Count Andrassy had stipulated for the annexation, or "occupation," which afterwards took place. The Austrian people, however, naturally knew nothing of this secret understanding, however much they may have suspected it; and the consequence was, that a very powerful section of the Austro-Hungarian people declaimed against Russia as loudly as the warmest followers of Lord Beaconsfield in England. It was in answer to these that the Russian government was obliged to repeat, on many successive occasions, its positive assurance that Austrian interests across the Danube should in no way be interfered with. Bosnia and Herzegovina were more or less openly offered to Austria, perhaps in order to test the state of the public mind in the matter; but the idea was generally repudiated by the most honourable organs of opinion in the dual empire.

The first vague intimations that Russia would demand the retrocession of the strip of Bessarabia taken from her in 1856 were received with incredulity in Roumania, at all events by the mass of the people; and strong protests were made against the scheme. The newspapers of the principality spoke out with a good deal of vehemence; public speeches were made which counselled resistance in every shape and form; and the government itself laboured to avert the threatened violation of Roumanian integrity. It is true that the Dobrudscha was offered in place of the coveted portion of Bessarabia; but the Roumanians could not be induced to look on the exchange with favour. And it must be admitted that the brave principality was receiving a very poor return for the part which it had taken in the war.

On the 6th of February, at a secret sitting of the senate held in Bucharest, a committee was appointed to draw up a protest to the Guaranteeing Powers against the retrocession of Bessarabia to Russia. On the next day, in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, interpellations were discussed in regard to the question, and the following resolution was unanimously and jointly adopted by both houses:—

"After hearing the statement of the ministry respecting the desire of Russia to take a portion of Roumania in return for territorial compensation beyond the Danube, and considering that the integrity of Roumania has been guaranteed by the great European Powers, and that Russia has again, and in a special manner, guaranteed the present integrity of Roumania by Clause II. of the Convention of the 5th of April, 1877, which stipulates that, in order that no disadvantage or danger should accrue to Roumania in connection with the passage of the Russians over Roumanian territory, Russia lays herself under an obligation to maintain and uphold the political rights of Roumania, as defined by her internal laws and existing treaties, and also to maintain and defend the present integrity of Roumania:

"1. Whereas Roumania has faithfully fulfilled the obligations she incurred by this convention, and is convinced of the elevated sentiments of justice of the Emperor of Russia:

"2. Considering that, to maintain her integrity and consolidate her independence, Roumania has shed her blood and made heavy sacrifices:

"3. Considering that an independent and homogeneous Roumania accords with the interests of neighbouring states and with those of Europe:

"The Chamber and Senate declare that they are resolved to maintain the integrity of Roumania, and will not agree to the alienation of any portion of the country in return for territorial or other compensation."

This and a dozen other solemn protests were made in vain, as we shall presently see. The effects of the terms of peace upon the Greeks were sufficiently important to be considered in a separate chapter.

## CHAPTER XI.

## THE ATTITUDE OF GREECE.

GREECE had been restrained, with difficulty, by the constant representations of the English government. Lord Derby's urgent advice and implied promises had kept the Hellenic government quiet throughout the Russian invasion of Turkey; although the ardent population of the young kingdom, and the Hellenic populations of Thessaly and Epirus, had been constantly on the point of breaking out into open hostilities against the Turks. Russian agents had endeavoured to persuade King George and his ministers that their best hope of aggrandisement lay in the despatch of their army across the frontier; and it says much for the strength of the English influence that the statesmen of Athens resisted the many great temptations which were held out before them.

All this time the condition of the border provinces of Greece and Turkey was lamentable in the extreme, and might have been considered an ample justification for war. We cannot convey to the reader a better or more graphic description of the state of Greece, and of the relations between Greece and Turkey, at the close of the year 1877, than by making one or two extracts from the "Times" correspondence at this period.

The first of these consists of a letter from an occasional correspondent in Athens, dated October 26th. "The Greeks of the kingdom continue to make preparations for war, notwithstanding the Anglo-Turkish protest, yet with a cool deliberateness which makes the charges of lawless patriotism, and consequent breaches of international obligations, which the Porte brings against them, appear absolutely ridiculous. The fact is that, five or six months ago, a state of affairs resembling that described in the telegram which Musurus Pacha communicated to Lord Derby on the 3rd of last month, did exist. The go-

vernment then was very weak, and was unable to prevent some few adventurers from crossing the frontier. The patriotic societies of Athens displayed unusual activity, and the press demanded a warlike policy. But, at that time, the Porte was not in a position to talk about 'striking at the root' of discontent in the Greek provinces of Turkey, and the Hellenes were far more than ordinarily caressed by their Asiatic masters. It is only now, when fortune has favoured the Turkish arms, that the accusations, no longer true, are brought forward. In the interval the Fusionist Ministry has made full use of its almost absolute power, and has confined the course of patriotism and military ardour within so narrow a channel, that it can now scarcely be discerned. It has even afforded some ground for the lamentations and reproaches of those more ardent friends of liberty who, ignorant of the whole truth, say that the Greeks display a selfish want of sympathy with the other Christian races of the Balkan Peninsula.

"Hellas presents a spectacle utterly incomprehensible to those who believe that the root of discontent lies at Athens. On the Greek side of the imaginary line which separates the Greek from the Turkish provinces, one sees a people enjoying more than ordinary material prosperity and a more than ordinary exemption from crime. Their interest is centred in a small camp of five thousand men who, under the eye of their king, are learning quietly and methodically the art of war in all its most scrupulous details. There is no agitation, no display of fierce passions. On the Turkish side, a wild soldiery tyrannises over the peasantry, bands of brigands traverse the mountains, government is in abeyance, and poverty afflicts Christians and Mussulmans alike. Terrible are the accounts of suffering which reach us from Thessaly; but many of them, it is to be hoped, are exaggerated, and all must be received with caution. The following letter, however, comes from a source worthy of the fullest confidence, and speaks of events which happened within a short distance of the house in which the writer was staying. It bears date



Volo, October 17th and 18th, and is to the following effect:—

“Last Saturday eight hundred Bashi-Bazouks arrived here from Constantinople, the sweepings of the streets there and the refuse of the prisons. One hundred and twenty (so a Turkish officer said) had been taken out of prison to be sent here. Two of them are from Millias, a village about six hours from here. They were sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment for murder, but have been in prison three years only. Another man is from another of the Gulf villages, “Brumerio,” and is also a convict. Some of them are recognised as having belonged to Hadji Gomara’s band, who, you will remember, was killed some time since. In fact, these men are of the worst possible character. Eighteen Mirdits (Catholic Albanians) are among them; indeed, almost every Eastern nationality is represented. They were promised a month’s pay on their arrival here—one hundred piastres each—and they refused to depart without it. The government chest was empty; but sufficient was borrowed from the merchants to give them half, and on Monday part of them were sent off, not before some of them had threatened to draw their knives on the caimakam (a Turkish official). Yesterday, the remainder were despatched to Larissa; but soon after they left a telegram came from the commandant there directing that they should be sent to Admiro; and to this place, I believe, they have gone, although between two and three hundred Guegs are already quartered on the inhabitants there. After they were gone the people ventured to go out to the vineyards near the place where these miscreants had stayed, and there they found three men in different places nearly cut to pieces, one of them being more than sixty years of age. The wounds were inflicted by various sized knives, and, owing to the recent rains, the soft ground retained the marks of many feet, leaving no doubt as to how these poor men met their deaths. This morning two of them were brought in and buried, and the other was taken elsewhere. 18th. Another body has just been brought in, and it is

evident, from marks on a tree, that the unfortunate man was tied to it and then cut to pieces. News has also been received from a town, three hours from Larissa, that the Zeibeks quartered there have set fire to the place.’

“There can be no difficulty in ascertaining the truth of the assertions which this letter contains, for dates and names of places are not wanting. Inquiry would probably bring to light other horrible details of the crimes related.

“One is glad to turn from such a scene of wickedness and misery as are the Turkish provinces of Greece, and to contemplate again the affairs of the kingdom, although it is there, according to the accusation supported by our government, that the root of Greek discontent is to be found. Were all, and a great deal more than the Porte alleges with regard to the hostile attitude of the subjects of King George true, could any man reproach them? But it is not. Their self-restraint is marvellous. Though Volo and Thebes are little further apart than London and Dover, it is, as I have already said, on the camp at Thebes, and not on the vineyards of Volo, that their attention is for the present concentrated.

“In order to form a just conception of the Greek camp Englishmen must divest their minds of the idea that Greeks are either half-naked, mountain-prowling brigands, with the knife ever ready to hand, or else plausible, quick-witted, unscrupulous traders. Both these types have, to say the least, been thrust very much into the back ground by the freedom of fifty years. The five thousand soldiers collected at Thebes are as simple and peace-loving peasants as could be found in any part of the world. During the four days of the present week which I spent among them I did not see a single case of intoxication, and I am assured that, although they have now been assembled for a month or two, no act of violence has been reported. They live on the best of terms with the villagers of the place, as these testify; and that they compare favourably, in point of morality, with other European troops, may be gathered from the fact

that it is not considered necessary to afford any facility for the gratification of their passions. With the exception of one battalion, they wear European uniforms, carry European arms, live in a camp of first-rate huts and tents, which are pitched in due accordance with rule, and furnished with field ovens, kitchens, and all the other usual appurtenances. The infantry, cavalry, and artillery drills and manœuvres, which they are learning with a facility for which their race is remarkable, are those now practiced in other countries of Europe. The officers are, for the most part, fine soldierly men, displaying the faults and the virtues inherent in their class in every age and country.

"The king and queen are staying at Thebes in a modest house (the ground-floor is occupied by shops—a tobacconist's and a cobbler's, if I remember rightly) surrounded by subjects enthusiastically loyal. His Majesty rises each day at or before sunrise to inspect his troops at their morning drill, and later the queen is at his side. Whether or not it is, as some say, the spirit of emulation, fired by the example of Prince Charles of Roumania, which has induced the king thus to show his personal interest in the affairs of his people, it is certain that he has done most wisely. He has greatly strengthened the position of the throne at a time when disaster may soon produce a revolutionary spirit in the country, and he has helped much to give the military preparations of Greece an international as well as national character and significance.

"The contrast between the parts of Hellas governed respectively by a Christian and a Muslim sovereign is certainly very great, and must ever remain so; but although, at present, everything in the kingdom is going on excellently well, one is reminded sometimes that this may not continue. The session of the Chamber of Deputies has been opened, and although there has been no meeting as yet, another ministerial crisis is already spoken of. Are the Greeks mad? The order which the present government has secured has been of inestimable value to Greece in respect to its international

relations, and the sinking of personal ambition, which the formation of a Fusionist Ministry seemed to indicate, excited the sympathy of all Europe. Now, it would appear that they contemplate recommencing a succession of feeble governments, under which irregular anti-Turkish movements would immediately revive and plunge the country, ready or not, into discreditable 'robber warfare.'

The stormy, and even undignified aspect of political life in Athens, was due to a number of causes, for which the Greeks were not altogether responsible. The writer of the letter just quoted took somewhat of an outsider's view of the situation; but he saw clearly that the heart of the nation was in the impending struggle.

A few weeks later the Vienna correspondent of the "Times" drew attention to an alleged understanding between Greece and Italy, and to the consequent aggravation of the dispute between the Porte and the Hellenic government.

"Almost ever since this Eastern complication began," writes this very careful and judicious correspondent, "there has, rightly or wrongly, been a lurking suspicion at the Porte, that Italy was sedulously aiming at getting some material advantage out of the dispute at the expense of Turkey. The movements of Chevalier Nigra last year between Ems, St. Petersburg, and Rome, the rumours of negotiations for an alliance between Russia and Italy, and the attitude of the Italian representatives in Constantinople and Belgrade, all contributed to increase this suspicion. But, more than anything else, it was the activity of the Italian consul at Scutari, in cultivating relations with the Catholic Albanians, which gave umbrage to the Porte. The latter fancied it had found indications that Italy, by means of the priests, some of whom are Italians, while others, though Albanian by birth, have been brought up in the Propaganda of Rome, was agitating for a sort of Albanian confederation under the protectorate of Italy. While thus suspected of working directly on the Catholic Albanians, it was also feared that Italy was indirectly pursuing the same end in Montenegro,



by trying to come to an understanding about an ultimate arrangement of boundaries between the Black Mountain and this future Albanian Confederation. This alone would be sufficient to explain the tenacity with which the Porte, in spite of all assurances to the contrary, persisted that an Italian volunteer expedition was preparing, with the consent, at least, if not with the connivance, of the Italian government, for a descent on the Albanian coast.

"But, apart from this, the Porte thinks it has trustworthy information that Italy of late has been trying to sound Greece with a view to prepare the ground in that direction also. For this purpose, it seemed first of all necessary to ascertain how far Hellenic claims and aspirations extended in the direction of Albania. Rightly or wrongly, the Turks believe that the Greek government, at first, did not seem very eager to listen to the hints conveyed in this respect, and that it was only after Italy returned to the charge that M. Tricoupi at last named the River Matt as the line to which his country thought its share of territory should extend. The fixing of this limit in Albania tolerably corresponds with the border which the Greeks have generally assumed in the interior of European Turkey as the geographical line of demarcation between them and the neighbouring territory. It would run up from the River Matt to Dibra, along the central Albanian range and the Sharra Dag, to Kallandere and Uskup, and along the Kara Dag to the Despoto Dag, including all Macedonia to the watershed between the Morava and the Vardar, as well as the whole of Thrace. Only by fixing the River Matt, however, as the demarcation line on the coast of Albania of the Greece of the future, M. Tricoupi, wittingly or unwittingly, declined beforehand any offer of co-operation with Italy, with the view of sharing Albania, for this would leave very little indeed to the Albanian Confederation. Between the ground desired by Montenegro down to the Boyana, and the territory coveted by Greece up to the Matt, there remains a coast strip of about twenty-five English miles, with-

out the trace of anything approaching a harbour. Curiously enough M. Tricoupi is said to have used, as a special argument for the support of this plan, that he thought both England and Austria would eventually support the extension of Greece so far along the eastern coast of the Adriatic rather than that of any other Power. Although these preliminary overtures of Italy to Greece, even according to the Turks themselves, were not very successful, they have contributed to deepen the suspicions of the Porte."

In the meantime, the condition of Crete was no better than that of the Greek mainland. Being still a Turkish province, the island was subject to all the evils inseparable from Turkish government in its present disorganised state; and against these evils the Cretans were breaking out into open revolt. They were assisted from Greece with arms, volunteers, and money, as they had been so frequently before.

The following letter, lightly as it deals with the subject, serves to give us an idea of the island shortly before the last insurrection. "We were now at last in Sphakia," writes the correspondent, under the date of October 12th, and soon reached Askyp, an elevated plain, three thousand feet above the sea. Its once fruitful fields are still fairly cultivated; barley, tobacco, vines, mulberry trees, and the delicate cotton plant, separated by stone walls, cover a considerable part of them; but it is far less productive than it was, and bids fair to be before many years, unless there is a change, a barren waste. Seven villages, inhabited by about one hundred and sixty families, stand under the shelter of the mountains on the western side, and towards one of these we directed our course. As my guide had been for some time sniffing the air with evident satisfaction, and asking me at every few yards whether I did not find it excellent, I began to suspect that we were approaching his native place. The conjecture proved correct, for, on reaching one of the hamlets, he led me to the door of a cottage and bade me enter.

"A Cretan village is a strange-looking place. All the dwellings are alike in ugliness, oblong

in form, with walls of rough stone, and flat roofs, destitute of parapets and chimneys. One or two arches are thrown across the extreme length of the cottages to support the roof, which consists of tenacious clay a few inches deep, laid on pieces of bark, and rolled flat—let antiquaries shudder—with the drums of marble columns. In Askypho the heavy snow storms which occur there make it unsafe to carry up the buildings higher than one storey, and they certainly have a most miserable exterior. But the real comfort within doors depends at Askypho, as it does everywhere else, not on the architect, but on the lady of the house, and the wives of Sphakia take high rank with their sex. They are conspicuous for beauty. Their dark eyes are large and lustrous, their features are delicately chiselled, and waving tresses fall in graceful profusion from beneath their modest kerchiefs. Their carriage is graceful as the doe's. But, though possessed of uncommon personal charms, their attention is by no means confined to the toilet. Everything which their homes contain is the work of their own hands. The cloth of the husband's jacket and fez of the wool of the sheep he tends is dyed, spun, and woven by the hands of his faithful wife. She it is who makes his garments from the cotton plant which grows before the door; the bright scarf that binds his waist is from the silkworm which feeds upon his mulberry trees; the mats and tapestries, whose bright designs, taken from the pattern-book of tradition alone, give his home a cheerful air, are the work of her industrious loom, and many more objects than I am competent to enumerate are due to her untiring labours. It was these same Sphakian women who only ten years ago were, with their helpless children, hunted from mountain to mountain, outraged, and murdered. In the cottage of my guide, though the owner was by no means a chief among his people, the table-cloth, the napkins, the sheets, all of them home-made, were bordered with Cretan lace; the pillow-case was a single piece of the same rich material; the counterpane was so gorgeous with many colours that I did not refrain from expressing my admiration of it. 'Yes,' said

my host, 'my wife is of a very good family, and knows the old-fashioned ways of weaving which her mother taught her.' Yet the cottage itself was a miserable affair. It consisted of a moderate-sized room, with a gallery for sleeping in, and two very small ones, of which the larger was the kitchen. The walls were not even whitewashed, and the floor was of mud; yet the genial spirit that reigned there reconciled one to all. I dined with great zest off English plates, which are as much prized there as Japanese crockery is in England; but without wine, not a drop of which was to be found in any of the seven villages—a significant fact. The wife waited on us, for conjugal respect is strictly enforced, while even suspected infidelity is punished with death. It is easy to believe how such a people hate and despise any one, be he *caimakam* or be he '*mil-ordi*,' who attempts to introduce the vices of Western Europe into their mountain retreats.

"Late in the evening *Kavròs* and *Kavalàs* came for the revolvers which I had brought them from a friend at Athens, but which, from the fear of exciting jealousy, I had hesitated to give them when at *Krapi*; and several other redoubtable fighting men who had been at the Assembly dropped in, one by one. The hours passed pleasantly enough. Science, the fine arts, and literature, as displayed in the construction and finish of the arms which we wore, formed the subjects of conversation. Every pistol, gun, and knife, was weighed, tested, and expatiated upon by its owner, who seemed to take a chivalrous pride in declaring his own admiration, and in demanding from the rest of us, singly and collectively, an acknowledgment of its virtues. I do not wish to represent the mountaineers of Sphakia as altogether dove-like, and I must confess that there was other conversation, such as might have been heard in the Scotch Highlands among the stalwart clansmen of Rob Roy; but unbecoming would it be in me to betray the confidences of that merry night. Though it is my custom in this land of creeping things to sleep *sub Jove*, I had not the heart to render vain the scrupulous preparations of my pretty hostess,



and consented to take my rest in the chief apartment. She and her children spent the night at the cottage of a neighbour—in this, showing a delicacy of feeling unusual, I believe, among the peasants of Greece proper, where one may sleep in the same room with husband, wife, and children, and receive no apology beyond the word *erythrio* (I blush). My faith was rewarded, for I slumbered unconscious of the insect world.

“In the morning, Captains Hadji-Gregoraki and Coocooti came to escort me to the little port which gives its name to the district of Sphakia, and to which the people of Askyphe migrate as soon as the snows commence. We crossed the plain from the sunlit hamlet into the cold shadow of the eastern mountains, and moved along to the southern extremity, whence we ascended an open valley, and then commenced the descent of the famous pass for which so many a bloody battle has been waged between Cretan ‘rebels’ and mercenaries landed on the beach below. It is itself impregnable, but in the last war its strength availed nothing, for the Ottoman troops marched on either side along the cliffs, while their artillery and baggage defiled through. It is a glorious mountain gorge. For an hour and a half we passed along between walls of living rock, rising two or three hundred feet above us, and in many places not more than six feet apart. Yet fig trees, pines, and plane trees, clung high up the precipice, flourishing often where existence seemed impossible, like the hardy race above whom they wave their branches. Lavender and oleander, growing wild, crowded into the little stream that trickled beside us, and white foxglove, on every ledge of rock, lightly struck our faces as we were passing, as though to call attention to its beauty. Here and there nature’s tapestry of glistening ivy clothed the hard rocks; and caverns, draped with maiden-hair, where ‘the mountain-nymph, sweet liberty,’ might dwell, but which, they told me, contained human bones, opened on either side of the path. On debouching from the ravine the blue sea lay before us, the horizon broken only by Claudia, the island under which the ship of

St. Paul was driven before it was wrecked at Melita. We crossed a barren tract, at one time an olive grove, to the port of Sphakia, a small town built on a steep incline, which rises from the beach of a little bay. The houses, though in some cases two storeys high, resemble those of Askyphe; ruins are very abundant, and what trees there have been planted since the last sack of the place, some nine or ten years ago. A barrack and governor’s house, comparatively of immense size, built on a hill beside the sea, complete the scene. Hadji Gregoraki conducted us to his house, which was remarkably clean, but scantily furnished, owing to the fact that he has taken the precaution of sending the greater part of his possessions to Milo.

“The district of Sphakia has ever been a stronghold of Hellenism and of liberty, and to the present day no Mussulman, besides the soldiery, cares to reside there. In accordance with the organic law, it enjoys real self-government to an extent unknown in other parts of the island. The local court consists of four Christian judges, elected by the people, with a Christian president nominated by the central government. The local council is constituted in a manner precisely similar. The Zaptiehs are Christians, and the chiefs at least natives of the place. The only serious defect in the system is, that in all matters of law, police, and administration, except the most trivial, an appeal must be made to a mixed court or council—that is to say, to a court or council in which Ottoman influence prevails. The more respectable among the Sphakiots complain now that the governor has withdrawn the Turkish garrisons from some of the blockhouses in their territory, and seem to desire the protection of the very men they abuse. It is difficult to determine how it is that they cannot preserve order among themselves, but no favourable construction can be put upon the fact. Undoubtedly the government of the island, as a whole, is bad, and so long as it remains so, insurrections will be probable, trade consequently will be paralysed, advancement, material and intellectual, will be impossible. This it is which

makes Sphakia, though enjoying many happy exemptions, a hotbed of discontent. The mountaineers have strong sympathies, and, in wandering as they do with restless energy from one end of the island to the other, they witness the oppression of their compatriots. It may be for their suffering fellow-Christians rather than for themselves that they have so often raised the standard of revolt.

"What has been the practical result of the strangely mingled feelings and anomalous position of the Sphakiots I learnt on reaching their rude capital. There are men still living there who remember the days before the Greek revolution, when three hundred and six large ships belonging to its inhabitants traded in every port of the Levant. Now, five or six caiques bring the bare necessities of life, and carry away a small quantity of honey, soap, cheese, and wool. Then every cottage possessed its grove of orange and lemon trees, its vineyards and its olives; now, scarcely a green leaf is to be seen. Half the houses are now in ruins and half the women in widow's weeds. Invasion after invasion has swept up the mountain side, leaving desolation behind. While there are at present no more than five hundred and fifty souls at Sphakia, there are about one hundred and fifty families in voluntary exile in Milo, where they thrive under the government of King George, besides many in other parts of the Greek kingdom. Fain would the remnant of the people fly to freedom, or, at least, place their helpless wives and children beyond the reach of horrors which they believe to be approaching, but they cannot. An infamous enactment of the present governor, dignified with the name of 'police regulation,' forbids any one to leave the island. Doubtless the pacha is right in supposing that so long as a rising will expose babes and mothers to Bulgarian oppression, their fathers, husbands, and sons, will hesitate to move; but he should know by experience that the presence of the helpless is not enough to restrain, for long, the passions of an oppressed race. It is penning up sheep for the slaughter; but even yet those who shud-

der at the recital of massacres have an opportunity of preventing the celebration of similar orgies among the mountains of Crete. I have no space to describe my personal experiences at the port of Sphakia. I called on the caimakam; he slept at the house of my Greek friends, who, being men possessed of some little rural wealth, were strongly conservative in their inclinations, and left early next morning. On the road I was met by Vardino-Yanni, the chief of the Sphakian police. He apologised for not having been with me at the town, saying that business had detained him. The fact is that Sphakians had 'driven' two hundred and fifty sheep belonging to Lakkians, who had thereupon invaded Sphakia in force and 'driven' about three hundred. The Sphakians then proposed an exchange of spoils, and Vardino-Yanni had been engaged in arranging this delicate transaction, which he succeeded in doing. It is said that the Sphakians and Lakkians are now about to swear brotherhood, and to respect each other's property. Thus I obtained a last glimpse of Sphakian life."

Worse oppressions and disorders than any which had come under the notice of this traveler during his short visit to Crete occurred soon after he left the island, and gave birth to the rising which was not subdued until after the Congress of Berlin.

In the kingdom of Greece, ministers and people alike were balancing between peace and war; and up to the middle of January no one knew what a day might bring forth. The rumours of an armistice and peace produced two opposite effects; one party thinking it too late to make any movement, whilst another considered that there was not a moment to be lost, and aimed at precipitating hostilities with Turkey. "Outside, as well as within the Cabinet," wrote a correspondent from Athens, "the struggle has become intense. The government can scarcely hold the people in check, and this is not to be wondered at. The ministry has failed to obtain from England, Turkey, or any other Power, a promise that the Greeks shall receive equal concessions with the Slavs in the event of their



persevering in a peaceful policy. Fugitives and others from the Turkish provinces bring too voracious accounts of the intolerable sufferings of the Greek rayahs. It is well known that Russian agents continue to encourage irregular movements. The Servian Colonel Becker, who is considered by the party of order as a bird of ill omen, has returned here. The night before last three hundred irregulars left for Macedonia in a steamer chartered for the purpose. The Olga went in pursuit. An official despatch from Crete states that all the Mussulmans, influenced by local Beys, are intent on defeating the conciliatory measures of the Porte, and are taking refuge in the fortified towns, being conveyed there even in government transports. The government outside the towns of the island is in the hands of the Christians, who hesitate, however, to declare their independence. It is believed that the Turkish agent has full powers, even to grant autonomy. Great anxiety has been caused to-day by a report that there has been a massacre at Volo, but I am officially informed that no such news has passed through the telegraph office."

This occurred on the 12th of January. Three weeks later, though it had become evident that Greece would take some more or less desperate steps to assert her claims, she was still hesitating. Another correspondent wrote from Constantinople, early in February, that people were greatly puzzled by the attitude of the Greeks. "The Greek minister here, M. Condourioti, either believes, or professes to believe, that there is no real difficulty with Greece, and there are men of position bold enough to declare that the movement of the Greek troops across the frontier does not actually mean war, but is only a preconcerted movement to satisfy the Greek people, and to induce Europe to take care of Greek interests at the approaching Congress. Of course you in England will learn from Athens the truth about this matter before we do. For my part, I cannot believe in the insincerity of the action which Greece has taken. A most unfortunate jealousy of the Bulgarians has made the Greeks of Turkey unwilling to throw in their lot with

the Slavs, and this jealousy, combined with the well-grounded fear of the serious consequences which would result to Greece were she to declare war against Turkey, has much more probably been the reason why she has done nothing until now than any understanding with Turkey. It does not require any far-fetched reason to account for the inactivity of Greece. The greater portion of her wealth is at sea. It sounds absurd, but it is true, that the number of ships belonging to Greece is greater than that of any other state excepting England. Of course, in tonnage half a dozen European nations would take precedence; but one has only to pass a few days in the Archipelago to see Greek vessels by the hundreds, and to see that, in the event of war, they would be rapidly swept up by a Power like Turkey, possessing a tolerably effective fleet. Moreover, many of the towns of Greece—like Syra, for example—lie at the mercy of a barbarous foe, and the ministers who have to decide the question of war or peace for Greece cannot enter upon war with a light heart. To Greece war must inevitably mean very great loss and suffering; and if the Greeks declare war, their sympathy for their Greek brethren in enslaved Greece must be very deep. If it be true that Greece is on the point of declaring war, our position here would become much more isolated than it has yet been, as there will be danger of our mail service being interfered with. In Stamboul and its neighbourhood there are upwards of forty thousand Greek subjects, and it may become very difficult to avoid a collision between them and the Circassians and Turks now in the capital."

The fact is, that the difficulties of Greece increased more and more as the time went on. The government at Athens had been compelled to wait patiently and to intrigue incessantly. It could do little by force, against the will of England, and without the active support of Russia. The Greeks had vaguely hoped a great deal from the result of the war. At one time it seemed probable that the Russian invasion would entirely destroy the Ottoman empire in Europe; and

it would have been impossible for this to happen without a very large accession of territory to the Hellenic kingdom. The liberation of Thessaly and Epirus was what Greece might fairly hope for under any circumstances; but a much larger gain than this would necessarily accrue from the collapse of the sultan's dominion.

The news of Russia's moderation (as it appeared to all the Christian races of south-eastern Europe) gave the Greeks to understand that their highest ambition was not yet to be crowned with fulfilment. All the more on this account they thought it incumbent upon them to take the best possible guarantees for the due consideration of their claims on the frontier provinces.

The symptoms, however, of increased activity amongst the Greeks on the frontier at once gave rise to fresh interference, even more forcible than in the previous year, on the part of the English government. In the latter part of January our agents in Greece were constantly informing the Foreign Office of the apparent determination of the Greeks to enter on a war with Turkey. The Hellenic army was massed at Lamia, Chalcis, Thebes, and other places near the frontier. A force of two hundred and fifty men was organised in the capital, and despatched to Thessaly, by Leonidas Bulgaris; and this was followed in a few days by a force of three hundred, under Lieutenant Axelos. The government, in reply to remonstrances from Constantinople and London, declared its inability to restrain the enthusiasm of the people.

On the 19th of January, 1878, Mr. Layard telegraphed to Lord Derby that the Turkish ministers had asked him "to bring the conduct of Greece to the notice of his lordship, with the earnest request that her Majesty's government may use their good offices at Athens to prevent this fresh and unjustifiable aggression on Turkey."

On the 24th of January a change of government took place; and the new Cabinet, under M. Koumoundouros, was less inclined than the former one to restrain the national fervour.

On the 26th, Mr. Wyndham wrote to Earl Derby as follows:—"My lord, I have the honour to report to your lordship that a sitting of the Chamber of Deputies was to have taken place this afternoon, at which the government was to have brought forward the question of Greece going to war. In consequence, however, of the receipt this morning of various telegrams announcing that peace was on the eve of being concluded, the Chamber has not met. I am informed that the king's horses left Athens yesterday, and that it was the intention of his Majesty to leave for Lamia next Monday, the 28th instant. I have been also informed that up to last night persons were going over the frontiers into Turkey with money in order to induce the Christians in Thessaly and Epirus to rise in revolt. There is great popular excitement in Athens to-day in consequence of the reported peace, which is a severe blow to the aspiration of the Greeks."

On the 2nd of February the government declared its intentions more openly. M. Delyannis telegraphed to M. Gennadius, the Greek Chargé d'Affaires in London, in the following terms:—

"You are aware that the insurrection has broken out in Thessaly, and threatens to spread to other provinces. The royal government is satisfied that it has done everything to prevent this movement, which might lead to consequences serious to the security of the kingdom. Not only has it tried to calm public feeling, but it has acted with all its force against the promoters of clandestine agitations. In spite of its pacific efforts, the Christians of Thessaly, reduced to the last extremity, have taken up arms; the Cretans are in revolt, and the Christians of other provinces are following their example. The royal government, disturbed at seeing these risings, to which the Christians have been driven by the frightful prospect before them, cannot conceal from itself the consequences. The cry of revolt will resound through the kingdom, and the excitement of public feeling will aggravate our position; for the Greek rayahs are looked on as brothers by the inhabitants of the kingdom. The persecutions and sufferings of



the inhabitants of the Greek provinces of Turkey are known to all, and especially what have been the exploits of the Circassians and Bashi-Bazouks in Turkey. The royal government has always protested against the colonisation of the Circassians and the employment of irregular troops in the border provinces. The Sublime Porte has always refused to do justice to our demands, and the European governments could not compel it to do so. Lord Derby has even latterly acknowledged the justice of our complaints. If the Ottoman government could employ regular troops to suppress the revolt, one might at least hope that the calamities entailed by the employment of Circassians and Bashi-Bazouks would not be renewed, that the Christians would not be massacred, and that the civilised world would not have to regret, when too late, that a European Power was not present to ward off the calamity and to avert the perils.

"The royal government has therefore resolved to occupy provisionally, with its army, the Greek provinces of Turkey. This step, which may appear a bold one, is in reality neither unjustifiable nor strange. Greece does not wish to make war on Turkey, but to guarantee its own security, and to contribute to the definite amelioration of the condition of the Greek provinces of the Ottoman empire.

"This step is not prompted by ambitious views or by subversive tendencies, but by the desire for order, for the protection of property, and for the sake of humanity. As Turkey may take another view of it and declare war against us, I beg that you will call the attention of the government to which you are accredited to this serious complication, in order that such a disastrous eventuality may be avoided or decreased. You are invited to read this note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs."

On the same day, and on the day following, Server Pacha telegraphed from Constantinople to Musurus Pacha, the Turkish representative in London, informing him of the crossing of the frontier. The last of the telegrams was couched in these terms :—

"The anticipations which I expressed in my telegram of yesterday have just been realised. On that very day, the Greek government caused its troops to cross the frontier, declaring that, as Thessaly was in a state of insurrection, it had decided to send its army there with a view to protect Christians and Mussulmans alike, and that it hoped that the Sublime Porte and the European Powers would not fail to view this action as an act of pure philanthropy, as Greece had no wish to break off relations with Turkey.

"The pretext put forward by the Cabinet of Athens cannot be justified in any way. In fact, order and tranquillity have never ceased to reign in every part of the vilayets of Janina and Salonica, in spite of the efforts which the armed bands which have crossed the frontier have made to disseminate agitation and disorder, and the moment that the Hellenic government orders its troops to march upon the pretext of allaying disorders, it will evidently be guilty of a violation of international law which nothing can either extenuate or excuse. Your excellency further knows that Greece has always justified her armaments by alleging that she was compelled to protect the Greek element in Turkey against any preponderance of the Slav element. Now this reason can be no longer brought forward, as all the provinces of Turkey in Europe are to be granted new reforms in accordance with the general bases of peace signed with Russia. The designs and wishes of the Hellenic government have therefore quite another object. However this may be, the Imperial government, at a time when its populations, already so harassed by the calamities of war, hoped to be able to enjoy the blessings of peace, finds itself under the painful necessity of repelling a Greek invasion, and has already taken, with this object, all the measures which the circumstances demand. We cling, however, to the hope that the great Powers, who deplore bloodshed as much as we do, will give such advice at Athens as may induce Greece to abandon an attitude which threatens to provoke new and terrible calamities, calamities which would be all the more deplorable in that they

would be the result of enterprises as rash as they are thoughtless. Better informed as to the state of affairs, the Hellenic government should not hesitate for one moment to recall the armed forces which have invaded Thessaly.

"I have therefore to request that you will, in the name of the Sublime Porte, beg the Minister for Foreign Affairs to take such pressing and efficient steps at Athens as may recall the Hellenic government, while there is yet time, to the path of loyalty and legality."

In explanation of this resolve on the part of the Greek government, M. Delyannis wrote to M. Gennadius, in order that the latter might communicate the message to Earl Derby, as follows:—

"The Greek troops crossed the frontier before the government knew of the signature of the preliminaries and the armistice. If the great Powers are willing to guarantee the safety of the inhabitants of the Greek provinces of Turkey and the protection of their rights, the royal government is quite disposed to give orders for the withdrawal of its troops."

To this Lord Derby replied on the 6th:—"With reference to the communication which you have been instructed to make to me from your government, that if the great Powers would guarantee the security of the inhabitants of the Greek provinces of Turkey and the protection of their rights, the Greek government was disposed to order the troops which had advanced into Turkey to withdraw, I have to state to you that her Majesty's government do not clearly understand what is intended by a guarantee of the Powers for the security of the inhabitants of the provinces in question, but so far as it may mean that the government of Great Britain and other governments should use their influence and their utmost endeavours to prevent the occurrence of disturbances and outrages on the population, I have no hesitation in giving the assurance that her Majesty's government will certainly do all in their power, within the limits I have mentioned, to secure the inhabitants of these provinces from lawless violence. They are also wil-

ling, on being informed of the withdrawal of the Greek troops, to communicate with the Porte, and to urge that any hostile measures against Greece may likewise be countermanded.—I am, &c., DERBY."

On the same day Lord Derby wrote to Mr. Wyndham at Athens:—"The Greek Chargé d'Affaires has stated to me that, if the great Powers would guarantee the security of the inhabitants of the Greek provinces of Turkey, and the protection of their rights, the Greek government were disposed to order their troops to withdraw from Turkey. With reference to this statement, I have to inform you that you may assure the Greek government, that so far as a guarantee may mean that the Powers should use their influence and their utmost endeavours to prevent the occurrence of disturbances and outrages on the population, her Majesty's government will certainly do all in their power within the above-mentioned limits to secure the inhabitants of the provinces from lawless violence. You may add that her Majesty's government are also ready, on learning that the Greek troops have been withdrawn, to urge the Porte to countermand hostile measures against Greece. I have made a communication in this sense to the Greek Chargé d'Affaires.—I am, &c., DERBY."

On receiving this assurance, M. Delyannis, on the part of his government, wrote to declare that, relying upon the promise of the great Powers, and especially in consideration of the promise that the Greek claims would be brought before the Congress, the Hellenic government had recalled the army, and placed itself at the disposition of the Powers.

As for the pressure which Lord Derby undertook to exercise at Constantinople, its effect may be judged by the following letter from Mr. Layard to Lord Derby, dated February 9th:—

"As I received yesterday evening a telegram from Mr. Wyndham, informing me that the Greek government had actually sent orders for the withdrawal of the Greek regular troops from the Turkish territory, I called early this morning upon the prime minister to make a personal



appeal to him to suspend all hostile demonstrations against Greece; and to send instructions at once to the Turkish commanders in Thessaly to avoid, if possible, any collision with the invaders. His highness expressed himself much pleased with the steps taken by England and France at Athens to prevent a further effusion of blood and the devastation of the Turkish border provinces. He authorised me to state to your lordship that, if the promise of the Hellenic government to withdraw its troops were communicated to the Porte officially, through the British and French governments, steps would be immediately taken to stop all military operations against Greece. His highness, however, insisted that the action of the Hellenic government should extend to the armed bands which had crossed the frontiers, and which were as much under its orders as the regular troops. Should the Hellenic government, his highness observed, pretend that such was not the case, then these irregulars could only be treated as brigands, and there was a convention between Turkey and Greece which enabled the two countries to take measures to deal with them. The Greek government had only to send officers to assist the Turkish authorities in compelling those bands to retire across the frontier.

"His highness informed me that he had decided to send three or four ironclads to Volo at once; they were necessary for the conveyance of troops and of war material, and for the due protection of the lives and property of Turkish subjects and territory. But he promised me that they would not proceed further, or make any demonstration off the Greek coast, if Greece were prepared to fulfil loyally the promise she had given to England and France, of withdrawing her troops from Thessaly. If, however, the promise was not kept, the ironclads would be directed to proceed without loss of time to Syra and the Piræus.

"I urged upon his highness to take immediate steps for the protection of the Christian inhabitants of the border provinces, and for the withdrawal of the Albanians and other irregu-

lars. He replied that, although he could not give me an official promise on the subject, he would tell me privately that he was going to replace the present governor of Thessaly, and that measures would be adopted for the removal of the irregulars from Thessaly, if there were no further reason for expecting an attack from Greece. His highness added that he had already taken steps to prevent others being sent there.

"After seeing Ahmed Vefyk Pacha, I called upon the Greek minister, who, up to last night, had not been informed by his government that orders had actually been sent for the withdrawal of the Greek troops; but he had just received a telegram to that effect. I earnestly begged him to lose no time in communicating this information officially to the Porte, in order to avoid events happening which might render it more difficult to maintain peace between the two countries."

Thus for the moment the apprehension of a war between Greece and Turkey was removed.

In Crete, meanwhile, the state of affairs had become very critical. An attempt on the part of the Christians to throw off the rule of the Turks, was a matter of course, now that the Ottoman power had been so seriously shaken, and of course the movement was promoted and aided from the mainland. It was not pretended that the Cretan Greeks had suffered much, or were likely to suffer much, at the hands of their Mussulman neighbours; but the government was hopelessly bad and oppressive, and the superior race was entitled to reject the yoke of the inferior, from the moment when it could prove its excess of strength.

At the close of 1877 there was a large meeting of Christians near Canea, when a committee was established in order to secure certain reforms, which were to be peacefully demanded in the first instance. Delegates were sent to this committee from nearly every district in the island. At the important town of Rethymno, the meeting for the choice of delegates was convened by the bishop in the principal church, and seven of the most respectable Christians were

chosen. The instructions they received were—That they must insist on obtaining the demands put forth by the last two General Assemblies, and remain assembled until those demands are granted; that the Christians must give no reason to the Mussulmans to complain of their conduct; and that they were to assist in appointing a police force, charged with the duty of preserving order and of putting down robbery and disorder.

A central village was chosen for carrying out the elections of the delegates for the three western sub-districts of Kissamos, Selino, and Canea. The thirty men who were elected on this occasion addressed a letter to the consuls, in which they assured them that in thus assembling "they were far from harbouring any designs against their Moslem fellow-countrymen, whose interests were identical with their own, and that they were bound in self-defence to take steps for putting down robbery and disorder by appointing a police of their own."

There was much reason in this excuse, for the island had, for a considerable period, been in a very disturbed condition, and disorders had been committed by both sections of the population. The Turkish governor was Samih Pacha; but as soon as the Porte heard of the increase of discontent amongst the Christians, it sent a commission of inquiry, consisting of Costaki Adossides Pacha, himself of Greek birth, to examine the pleas put forward.

Costaki wished to treat with certain of the principal Christians, whom he thought likely, when once gained over, to influence the bulk of their co-religionists. But these chiefs referred him to the committee just elected, which held its sittings in the village of Campos. Costaki declined to recognise the authority of this committee, which, he maintained, had not been chosen in accordance with the constitution of the island. This constitution provides for a General Assembly, but not for an extraordinary convention such as that with which he was invited to treat.

The situation at this time will be best under-

stood if we interpolate here a few extracts from the letters of Mr. Sandwith, our consul at Canea, addressed to the Foreign Office. On the 6th and 7th of January, 1878, he wrote as follows:—

"It appears that, when the commissioners arrived here, now nearly a fortnight ago, instructions were given to the Mutessarif of Sphakia to communicate the fact to the inhabitants of his district. This he did by summoning several of the leading men among them to his presence, and acquainting them with the objects of Costaki Pacha's mission. When the latter arrived at the Mutessarif's head-quarters a few days afterwards, he was disappointed at finding that the influential inhabitants held aloof; and when two well-known chiefs were specially invited to appear, they sent to say that all power to treat with the commissioners had passed from their hands, and had been delegated to the committee. It was thus apparent that the object in view was to induce the commissioners to treat with the committee as with a legally-constituted body, and this they were not prepared to do; so that, finding their continued presence at Vamos served no useful purpose, they returned to Canea to deliberate on their future action. The beginning of the negotiations has thus been unfortunate, and I cannot but think that a mistake was committed in the first instance by the Vali neglecting to give publicity to the mission of Costaki Pacha by an authoritative proclamation. This feeling, at any rate, has been pretty generally expressed by the Christians themselves. I find that Costaki Pacha himself is quite hopeful of succeeding in his mission, and his excellency tells me that he proposes to return to Apokorona in a few days, and that he and his colleague are prepared to go to any place where the Christian delegates lately elected may happen to be, and to discuss with them the question of their demands, without, however, considering them as qualified to deal finally with it. For this purpose, it would be necessary, his excellency thinks, shortly to convoke the General Assembly (which, in ordinary circumstances, meets



in May), in order, if possible, to bring about a consensus of opinion between the representatives of the two rival communities.

"For the purpose of furthering the desire of Costaki Pacha to get speech with the Christian delegates, who form a sort of consultative body of the original committee, I have induced a person who is much respected by them to be the bearer of a letter written by Mr. Vice-Consul Moazzo, requesting three or four of those delegates to come into town to confer with Costaki Pacha previously to his excellency visiting them; and on the solemn assurances of Costaki Pacha that their persons would be respected, Mr. Moazzo has told them that they have no cause to fear for their personal safety. I am in daily expectation of seeing these delegates appear. I believe it is their intention to demand the release from imprisonment of the ex-Deputy Argyraki before consenting to treat with the commission, and Costaki Pacha thinks that he will be able to satisfy them on this point. Although a hitch has thus appeared at the outset of the proceedings, Costaki Pacha appears sanguine of a favourable result, and he founds his hopes on the evident desire of the majority of the Christians of every district, except perhaps in Sphakia, to come to some agreement with the Mussulmans rather than face the terrible alternative of civil war.

" . . . . The news of the excitement in Rethymno was followed in a day or two by the intelligence that similar scenes were occurring in Candia. Telegrams were received by all my colleagues to the effect that the Moslems in that region too were abandoning their homes, and that the Christians were completely cowed by the numbers of armed men in the streets. Mr. Vice-Consul Calocherino had informed me only a few days before that the Mahomedan peasantry were bringing in their household stuff from several villages, which he justly considered a most uncalled-for proceeding, inasmuch as there was not the slightest disposition apparent on the part of the Christians to attack the Mussulmans, nor have any gatherings occurred there

such as have been witnessed here. The Vice-Consul further informed me that three Christian peasants had been murdered in cold blood by a party of Moslems, who had cut off the nose and ears of one of their victims, whose relations refused to bury him till the act had been testified to by the local authorities. I brought these things at once to the notice of Samih Pacha, who professed to know nothing of them, but his excellency, nevertheless, started early the following morning for Candia, and has not yet returned.

"In this part of the island matters do not wear a more promising aspect. The Vali, who at first offered a strenuous opposition to the entry of the Mahomedan peasantry into the town, has at length withdrawn it, and even sent the Ottoman ironclad 'Orchanie' and a corvette to bring away their families from Selino. Those vessels landed a few days ago, at Suda Bay, two thousand six hundred women and children, who have been distributed, for the most part, in the country houses and farms of the resident Mahomedan gentry, who own the greater part of the plain of Canea. In Selino the Christians exhausted every expedient to convince their Moslem neighbours that they harboured no evil designs against them, even offering to place the children of several of their leading men as hostages in their hands.

"There can be little doubt that some sinister influences have been at work in Canea, as well as in Rethymno and Candia, to have brought about so general a flight of the Moslems to the garrison towns. It is true that there is the presence of the committee in Apokorona, and the landing of three or four chiefs, with a few followers, which may be pointed to as accounting to some extent for their fears, but no acts of violence have been committed of a nature to justify a panic. Moslem intrigues were known to have been set on foot last autumn, both here and in Rethymno, to incite the peasants to quit their homes, and similar methods have probably again been used for the same deliberate purpose. Constant communications are known to be kept

up by a clique of Mussulmans here with others in Rethymno and Candia, and it is surmised that these persons would willingly provoke an insurrection in the island, in the expectation of its resulting in the complete ruin of the Christians, who, hemmed in among the mountains, would, they think, soon be starved into submission.

"The presence of so many armed peasants in this neighbourhood, without occupation or means of livelihood, is producing its natural consequences. The roads are no longer safe for Christians, who fear to enter the town singly, as formerly, but come in in little parties for mutual protection. The Christians of the district of Rethymno, refused an entrance into the town, are removing their effects to the mountains, and the Christian villages round here are likewise being abandoned by their inhabitants, who seek shelter in Lakos and other mountain villages. In Lakos no zaptiehs now venture to show themselves, and the people have appointed a police of their own.

"Although during the flight of the Moslem peasantry, which took place in the summer, no harm was done to their property in their absence, a danger exists lest the Christians may no longer exercise the same self-restraint when they see their brethren maltreated here, and even murdered, with circumstances of cruelty, as in the instance near Candia. I have just now been informed by the Mouavin of Selino, that the Mahomedans had scarcely abandoned their houses in that district before the zaptiehs began to pillage them, and they were soon joined in the work by Moslems of a low class. This testimony has since been confirmed by a Mussulman oil-merchant who was present, and who declares that no Christians took part in the work of pillage. The rations of the zaptiehs having just been reduced from thirty-three to twenty-two ounces of dry bread a-day, it is no wonder that, half starved and unpaid, this long-suffering body of men should have at last broken through the restraints of discipline. I learnt that the visit of her Majesty's ship 'Rupert' to Rethymno, and subsequently to Candia, had a tranquillising effect on

the timid Christians of those towns, and it seems to me desirable for a man-of-war to be now stationed in Suda Bay in case of any sudden disturbance arising in any part of the island."

The petition of the Assembly, forwarded to the consuls of England, France, Italy, Austria, Germany, and Greece, was in these terms:—

"It is now about five months since the Cretan people, in order to maintain the modifications in the 'Règlement Organique,' proposed in the last two general Assemblies, held at Canea, had recourse to a pacific demonstration. These modifications, which have equality and self-government for their bases, are beneficial to all the elements of the population of the country, conformably with the principles of this century of progress. The Ottoman government has unfortunately misunderstood these pacific dispositions of the Cretan people, which have been brought to its knowledge, as also to that of the European governments, by the promulgation made by the Assembly at Clima. It has accordingly authorised, and even encouraged the entry of our Mussulman compatriots into its fortresses, thus exciting them to a hatred of the Christians, in spite of our repeated assurances that the Christians were endeavouring, by means of the modifications they asked for, to live in harmony and in brotherly friendship with the Mussulmans, sharing with them the blessings of a long and lasting peace. It was easy to foresee the consequences of this conduct. The entry into the fortresses of the more numerous Mussulmans, excited as they were against us, notwithstanding our pacific assurances, was bound to establish a serious menace against the lives, honour, and property of our co-religionists in the towns and their neighbourhood. Thus three days ago, at Rethymno, the Mussulmans closed the gates of that town, and assumed a threatening demeanour not only towards the Christian inhabitants, but also towards M. Trifilli and his Dragoman, M. Em. Papadaki, who tried to interfere on behalf of the Christians, but were obliged to seek safety in a speedy flight. It is not without reason that we, the only legal representatives of the Cretan peo-



ple in the General Assembly of Crete, legally constituted, have been alarmed, by this conduct on the part of our Mussulman compatriots, for the future security of our Christian brethren in the towns and their neighbourhood. We are accordingly in duty bound to protest against the Ottoman government and its agents, who are the only cause of this state of things, and to claim, for the lives, honour, and property of our Christian brethren, in the towns and their neighbourhood, which are at this moment in danger, the philanthropic assistance of the great Powers of Europe."

This petition was dated from "Apokorona, December 22nd, 1877 (Jan 3rd, 1878)," and was signed by about a hundred members of the Assembly.

Meanwhile the Turkish authorities were not going the right way to work in order to conciliate the Greeks. The Commission and the Governor, Costaki and Samih Pachas, did not co-operate; and it was plain that the central government had not taken the trouble to define their powers. Whilst Costaki was endeavouring to arrive at an understanding with the Christian delegates, Samih had taken on himself to summon, at Candia, a new General Assembly. Thus the difficulty of carrying on any negotiations whatever was vastly increased.

The news of the rapid advance of the Russians towards Constantinople greatly excited the Cretan Greeks, as it excited those on the mainland. The Committee, or Assembly, now extended its programme, in advance of the one which it had already drawn up, and made the following demands from the Porte:—

1. That the future government of Crete should be autonomous.

2. That the future ruler should be elected by the people.

3. That the island should pay to the Porte half a million piastres yearly, by way of tribute.

4. That the new constitution should be guaranteed by the great Powers.

The outbreak of civil war was already inevitable when the Porte recalled Samih Pacha, and

appointed Costaki in his place, as governor of Crete. On the 15th of February, after the recall of the Greek army from Thessaly, M. Delyannis wrote as follows to M. Gennadius, on the subject of the Cretan outbreak:—

"The conduct of the local authorities, notably that of Samih Pacha, who had taken the place for some days of the new civil governor of the island, during the absence of the latter at Fré (the place of meeting of the General Assembly of the Cretans), far from calming public feeling, had, on the contrary, embittered it. The provisional governor, having recruited some thousand Ottoman fanatics among the riffraff of the island, made them guardians of public order, and distributed them in the vicinity of the port of Canea, entrusting to them the safety of the country. The newly-raised Bashi-Bazouks held all the roads leading to the town, and proceeded not only to stop and rob all the passers-by, but to commit also every possible act of brigandage on the unfortunate Christians who fell into their hands. Adossides Pacha promised, after his return, and on the representations of the English Consul, to cause this band of official bandits to be disarmed, but nothing of the sort took place. Some days, indeed, after the assurances of the new government, a fresh troop of Arabs were seen going towards the arsenal for a supply of arms. The acts of brigandage committed by the improvised guardians of the public safety forced the villagers in the neighbourhood to betake themselves to the mountains. Some among them wished to carry away at least their movables from the town and put them in a place of safety. The administration forbade this in the case of the Christians, while permitting it, in the same circumstances, to the Ottomans. The consul of the king rightly protested against this flagrant partiality on the part of the authorities. But his protest was of no effect. The governor of the island replied that the prohibitory measure was general, and that he could make no exceptions. He even feigned surprise at hearing that the prohibition only really told on the Christian population, and that

the Ottomans removed their effects without any hindrance. M. Logothetis writes me word that, in the face of such arbitrary measures, he finds it impossible to give any help to the Greek population who beg his protection. What is passing at Rethymno is a repetition of the acts of brigandage committed in the environs of Canea. The Ottomans leave the town, lie in ambush on the roads, and rob the passing Christians. At Fotenou, last week, they robbed seven peasants; another, by name Nicholas Vallegi, was more unlucky still, for, after being robbed, he was also wounded in the neck. On the 24th January a merchant was robbed; he was also wounded and ill-treated in the very streets of the town.

"These acts have naturally hastened the outbreak of the insurrection, which had long been brewing, have brought about a general call to arms, and have given a rapid extension to the insurrectionary movement. Thus the garrison of Sphakia, their governor, and all the other officials and employés of the district, were told, only last week, to quit their posts; they were embarked on a man-of-war, and taken to Canea. At Cerilli, in the district of Alikiano, the old chief of partisans, Mavroyenni, at the head of six hundred men, proclaimed, ten days ago, union with Greece. Two days later his example was followed by the chief of Kissamo, A. Scallidès, who, surrounded by Pappadogomaki, Parthenios, Pèridès, and one thousand five hundred combatants, displayed the national flag, after a solemn benediction of arms, and occupied positions favourable for repulsing all attacks of the Ottomans confined within the forts. At Lakki, in the Cydonies, the chiefs Hadji Michali, Crokidas, and others, proceeded to a similar benediction of arms, and proclaimed union with Greece. At Selino the chiefs Criari, Giorgakaki, and the rest, imitated the example of the Lakkiots. They appointed an administrative committee, voted at the same time the abolition of the Ottoman Power, and proposed to communicate their determination to the European consuls and to the General Assembly. On the 30th of January all the villages raised the Hellenic

flag. Part of their representatives went to Argiroupolis, where they will soon be rejoined by those who remain at Fré to provide, by mutual agreement, for the proper administration of the provinces. M. Logothetis writes me word, that the conduct of all these armed troops, and of the Christians generally, towards their Ottoman fellow-citizens, is exemplary, and bears the stamp of humane and conciliatory feelings. While, on the one hand, quite recently, one of the partisans of the chief Mylonaki, who lost his way at Apokorona, and fell into the hands of the Ottoman soldiers, was subjected to the most atrocious martyrdom, expiring in most horrible pain, after having had his hands, tongue, and nose cut off, and his eyes torn out; the insurgents, on the other, instead of committing reprisals, behave towards the Ottomans as true fellow-citizens."

The clearest possible proof that the root of the evil in Crete was the bad government of the authorities, appeared in the fact, that grave disorders were now committed by Christians and Mussulmans alike, and that acts of lawlessness were brought home to both sides, as soon as the example had been set.

Consul Sandwith's reports, which were subsequently collected in a Blue-book, and presented to the House of Commons, were filled, at this period, with narratives of riotous outbreaks, murders, and attempted suppressions. Costaki Pacha did what he could to maintain order. Thus, in consequence of the continued troubles at Rethymno, he ordered Admiral Hussein Pacha, commander-in-chief in the Archipelago, to proceed to Rethymno, in his flag-ship "*Orchanié*," with two companies of regular troops, under the command of an energetic officer. "This measure of the new Vali," says Mr. Sandwith, "had the happiest effect, the authorities having succeeded in arresting upwards of fifty of the rioters, who will be brought to trial before a special commission, composed of an equal number of Moslems and Christians. The assassins of the two Christians, who were found murdered outside Rethymno, have also been seized. By a letter received from Mr. Trifilli, the consular agent, I have fur-



ther particulars of these lamentable doings. Two of the Christian villages in the neighbourhood have been ransacked of everything they possessed, and have been left half ruined, the marauders even tearing down the doors and window-frames, and carrying off all to Rethymno, where they were sold in the streets. The village churches were also profaned. There is the less excuse for these proceedings inasmuch as the Christians have scrupulously respected the property of the Moslems who had abandoned their homes in obedience to the orders of the committee in Apokorona. The only plea they can urge in their defence is the pressure of want, by which they are being sorely pinched. The conduct of the Mutessarif Costaki Pacha considers most reprehensible, and he has demanded his recall. The consular agent has not visited the scene of these disturbances, as since the attack lately made on him, it is not safe for him to venture outside the town. The fact of the Mutessarif having apologised for the bad usage he had then received, and his imprisoning two of his assailants, was entirely due to the arrival off Rethymno of her Majesty's ship 'Rupert.' It is needless to say that the prisoners were released a few days afterwards. At Candia the state of affairs is also admitted to be serious. The vice-consul there informs me that symptoms are again showing themselves of a movement of the Moslem peasantry towards the town. In order to prevent it, the Mutessarif called together the leading inhabitants of both communities, and they agreed that six companies of one hundred men each should be enrolled, and placed under the orders of chiefs of good repute. These volunteers will be Mahomedans and will serve without pay. They have formed, at the same time, a commission of sixteen members, eight of either creed, who will accompany the volunteers to the districts south and east of Candia, where the bulk of the Mussulmans dwell, and it is hoped that, partly by force and partly by persuasion, they will be induced to remain at home. The Moslems of those parts have a bad name for lawlessness and

ferocity, and if they were crowded together inside the walls of Candia without the means of a livelihood, the consequences might be even more deplorable than those which have happened in Rethymno."

On the 15th of February the Assembly signed at Argyropolis their decree and memorandum to the Powers, setting forth the programme already mentioned, and declaring, amongst other things, that their great and ultimate desire was to be united with the kingdom of Greece. They concluded with the expression of their desire to live in the future in harmony and equality of rights with their fellow citizens, the Mussulmans, "as people of all denominations and nationalities live together in civilised parts of the world. The Candians, with arms in hand for their own safety, will wait for the decision of the great Powers, and will not commence hostilities against the Turkish government, nor commit any atrocities against the Mussulmans, their fellow citizens. In the meantime the General Assembly will employ all means in her power for the maintenance of peace and order in the country."

The Assembly, however, was reckoning without its host in thus undertaking to maintain the peace; for within ten days from the date of its memorandum, outbreaks occurred in different parts of the island, thus entirely counteracting the measures taken by the representative body. Mr. Sandwith tells us to what influence this was imputed at the time. We may make a few more extracts from the letters in which he described what was passing before his eyes.

On the 25th of February he wrote:—"Early in the morning of yesterday two thousand armed Christians came down from the hills which inclose the Bay of Suda on the south, and began firing into the arsenal at the head of the bay, and into the fortifications of Izzedin, towards its entrance. Two battalions of regular troops and a few hundred zaptiehs and Bashi-Bazouks were ordered to drive the mountaineers back, and as they advanced in skirmishing order up the hills, which are here about one thousand five hundred feet high, they had no difficulty in

dislodging their assailants. Two Turkish vessels meanwhile got up steam, and played with their cannon on the retreating enemy. By noon they had all disappeared, the demonstration resulting in the loss of not more than eight or ten killed and wounded on either side. This is a conjectural computation, drawn from a number of sources. In the afternoon, one thousand men more appeared beyond the village of Galata, an hour to the west of this town, and firing was heard in that direction till the evening, but the same uncertainty prevails here also as to the loss in killed and wounded. This morning reports arrive that fighting has been renewed a few miles to the south-west of Canea.

"These hostile demonstrations, enacted within a week after the drawing up by the General Assembly of the memorial of which I had the honour of transmitting your lordship a translation in my last despatch, a memorial in which they formally declared that they had no intention of engaging in a struggle with the Porte, have excited no little surprise, and it is generally believed that they have occurred contrary to the wishes of the Assembly. It is well known that that body has imperfect control over the doings of the chiefs recently arrived from Greece, who are rather inclined to look for orders to the country which has supplied them with money and munitions of war."

On the 2nd of March M. Sandwith continues his narrative :—"The hostile encounters which had taken place between the Christian insurgents and the government forces on the 24th ultimo were continued on the three following days. At the end of that period the former had succeeded in capturing a large block-house at Alikiano, two hours to the south-west of this town. It was in a commanding position, the upper portion forming the residence of the caimakam of the district, and the lower serving as barracks for troops, and it was defended by a band of eighty Albanians, who were obliged to retire for want of provisions. The captors immediately set fire to it, lest it should come into the hands of the enemy again. During these days

other bands of insurgents were blockading the Christian governor of Sphakia, Nikolaki Pacha, in his head-quarters at Vamos, in Apokorona, four hours to the south-east of Canea. He has two battalions of Redif, amounting to one thousand four hundred men, and a small force of zaptiehs, to protect the place, which has no sort of natural strength. There is no danger of its being taken by assault, however; but, as it is known that the troops have only food enough for a very few days, and all the roads are occupied by the Christians, the latter hope to reduce the place by starvation. There has been no fighting since the 27th ultimo, and hopes are entertained of inducing the Christians to agree to a suspension of arms. It is supposed that the government losses in killed and wounded in the several encounters amount to about fifty in all, and the losses of the Christians are not likely to exceed that number. While the troops engaged in the skirmishes at Vamos were chiefly regulars, those who fought at Alikiano were all irregulars, composed of Albanian zaptiehs and the newly-armed volunteers. Costaki Pacha, as I had the honour to report in my despatch of the 25th ultimo, did what he could to oppose the arming of these men; but his better judgment was overborne by the zeal of the Mussulman public, who insisted on arms being served out to them, so that, counting the six hundred armed by Samih Pacha less than a month ago, there must now be quite two thousand men carrying the Peabody-Martini rifle. The town, and all the roads leading to it, are occupied by these men, and Christian peasants no longer venture near the town. Perfect order, however, continues to prevail in the town itself, nor are the Christian inhabitants at all molested. The unexpected outbreak of hostilities, and their sudden cessation, have given an artificial character to the movement, which only confirms the universal belief that it was got up to order, and in opposition to the general will of the people, which had been authoritatively expressed by their representatives in the memorial addressed to the consular body only a few days before."



On the 25th of the same month he writes :—  
 “It is just a month, yesterday, since the breaking out of the abortive insurrection, which lasted only about four days, and which ceased by a mutual understanding between both belligerents. It suited neither party that the petty warfare should continue, for the authorities had but ten thousand troops in the whole island, and the insurgents were mainly dependent on the towns for their supplies of food. During the truce which had been agreed upon the Turks have received some seven thousand additional troops, drawn from their strongholds north of the Balkans, and the military authorities have pushed forward the narrow limits in which they had been confined by the insurgents by occupying the villages of Platania, Haghia, Marina, and Stalo, ten miles to the west of Canea. Their object in thus advancing their posts seems to have been to secure the means of grinding corn for the troops, as Platania possesses water-mills, the existing mills being no longer adequate to supply the increased demand for flour, since there cannot be fewer than twelve thousand soldiers in this immediate neighbourhood, besides five hundred zaptiehs and three thousand volunteers, or Bashi-Bazouks. The latter distinguished themselves, as usual, by pillaging the villages thus occupied, in Stalo particularly, not only carrying away such portable furniture as they could lay their hands on, but completely wrecking the houses; nor did the presence of the regular soldiers have the effect of restraining their violence. What Costaki Pacha apprehended has repeatedly occurred, for his excellency was from the beginning averse to putting arms in the hands of the local Mussulmans, but he saw himself forced to yield to the popular clamour which called for that step, for there was no general at that time of sufficient authority on whom he could rely for support. He expressed himself with the greatest indignation at this wanton destruction of the property of helpless Christians, who had taken no part in the insurrection; and he begins to see that it is beyond his power to restrain the native ferocity of these Mussulmans, whose hate to-

wards the Christians is unrelenting. An energetic commander could undoubtedly put a stop to such scenes, but it is evident that the Turkish officers generally tacitly approve them.

“The ultimate pacification of the island is by these events being rendered increasingly difficult, and they are more to be regretted because the majority of the inhabitants are far from disposed to resort to arms, having all along rested their hopes on the European Powers intervening in their favour so far as to guarantee them an improved administration, union with Greece, or the forming of Crete into an autonomous principality; however earnestly they desire one or other of these alternatives, they are hardly prepared to fight for them should Europe recommend less radical changes. The physical disadvantages under which they labour largely influence their present humour, for the Cretans are no longer the high-spirited, well-fed insurgents of 1866, the younger generation of whom had had no experience of the miseries attendant on war, for now even the young men remember as children the fearful sufferings which, only ten years ago, they and their parents underwent, in the struggle for independence, either as fugitives in the mountains, or as refugees on a foreign soil. They are now reduced to a state of extreme destitution, and it is distressing to witness the haggard faces and hollow cheeks of the poor wretches who come into the town to beg for a morsel of bread, and who support life on wild roots and herbs. This is not the material from which to recruit volunteers for any cause, for the several chiefs cannot afford to feed, from the resources they receive from Greece, more than the few hundreds who already rally round each of them. However disaffected the Cretan Christians are towards the Ottoman government, their one thought now is to find the means for satisfying the cravings of hunger, and this must continue to pre-occupy them till they begin to reap their crops, about the end of May. Meanwhile vessels continue to land arms and provisions on different parts of the coast. Three such cargoes have been landed in Kissamos and Sphakia within

the last three days, and the biscuits thus brought are more welcome than the arms. There is no attempt now at keeping up the blockade, the Turkish cruisers being short of coal. The General Assembly sitting at Fré, in Apokorona, appears to be regaining the authority which had been set at nought by the chiefs when they opened hostilities. They have elected four notables to proceed to Berlin, where it is expected the Congress will meet, with the avowed object of reminding the members of that august Assembly of the claims of the Cretans."

In connexion with this outbreak in Crete the Turkish government made renewed complaints to the Powers, and especially to Great Britain. Safvet Pacha wrote a despatch on the 2nd of April to Musurus Pacha, who represented the Porte in England, justifying the measures taken in Crete, and asking Lord Salisbury (who had by this time succeeded Lord Derby) to bring the matter before the Hellenic government. This despatch was couched in the following terms:—

"Your excellency is aware of the state of affairs in our border provinces and in the island of Crete, in consequence of the disturbances which the bands coming from Greece have begun to spread there. When, on the unanimous representations of the great Powers, the Greek government recalled the troops which, on the most inadmissible pretexts, had penetrated into our territory, and given us the most categorical and formal assurances of their pacific and friendly intentions, the Sublime Porte had a right to hope that they were entering upon a line of conduct more in conformity with the relations of friendly neighbourhood existing between the two states. Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that these assurances have since then been more than once renewed, the revolutionary committees formed in Greece have all the same continued to intrigue, and to have recourse, under the very eyes of the authorities, to their insurrectionary intrigues. It is owing to this that the bands directed against our territory are assuming even greater proportions in men, arms,

and munitions of war. Never a day, so to speak, passes without the enterprises of a new band being reported to us, and, what is still more serious, these bands, which are commanded by Greek leaders, number in their ranks officers of the regular army, and are all armed with arms of precision coming from European manufactories. The localities more particularly affected by the insurrectionary committee are the vilayets of Salonica and Janina, and the island of Crete, where they seek to raise the peaceful populations against the legitimate authority of the Sublime Porte.

"In the face of such a state of affairs, the Imperial government was obliged to collect troops in sufficient numbers and to send them to the spot. They took all the measures dictated by circumstances, but, supported as the criminal enterprises are against which they have to struggle, they can only with difficulty be put down. We find ourselves, in fact, in the presence of many bands organised, equipped, and ably commanded, posted in various parts of our territory, and carrying on a guerilla campaign. With the return of the fine season these bands will find means to entrench themselves in stronger positions, and, overrunning the country in every sense, and sheltering themselves everywhere, will keep on increasing and extending their work of disorganisation. The Sublime Porte could, without any doubt, put an end to these aggressions and these disorders, by occupying the Greek frontier, and by directing its fleet against the principal islands and against the coast of Greece, but it feels a repugnance to having recourse to these extreme measures. The Greek government therefore, in order to save us from having to adopt these means, should show alacrity in quelling the source of these expeditions, which are as dangerous as they are reprehensible. We have all the more reason to demand this from them, seeing that, in an interview with me, the minister of Greece at Constantinople told me, as his personal opinion, that if an understanding were established on the subject between two countries the question would



be settled. The Cabinet of Athens could not, after that, plead weakness as their excuse.

"Be good enough, therefore, to beg the government of her Britannic Majesty to make urgent representations in this sense to the Greek government, to induce them to adopt prompt and effective measures for putting an end to a state of affairs which threatens to provoke fresh complications, and which is as prejudicial to the tranquillity and security of our provinces as it is opposed to the relations existing between the two states.

"If the object of the Greek government is to obtain reforms for our border provinces, they may be assured that the wish will be realised. In this respect, the Sublime Porte is bound by the preliminaries of peace signed with Russia, and it is already preparing to carry out immediately the new reforms. Consequently, the existence of these bands could not be justified on any grounds. They would only give occasion for useless bloodshed, and would place the peaceful inhabitants of these countries in a continual state of perplexity and excitement, which might check commerce and industry, and even works undertaken by foreigners."

So much for the Cretan rising of February and March, 1878, which although it would not have been possible if there had not been a widespread sense of injury amongst the Christian population of the island, was yet due more to the action of the volunteers from the mainland than to the islanders themselves. The latter had placed their cause in the hands of the Assembly at Argyropolis, and many of them hoped to secure the necessary reforms by peaceful methods. The outbreak of hostilities, in so far as it was avoidable, was ill-timed and abortive; but it must not be forgotten that the appeal to arms was equivalent, in many instances, to the infliction of great sufferings on the combatants, and on their wives and families; and no agitators could have induced peaceful villagers to take to mountain warfare if their lot had not been well-nigh intolerable.

The struggle was renewed at a later period;

but in the end the Turkish government succeeded in coming to an understanding with the representatives of the Cretans, and a compromise was accepted, which restored order to the island for some time to come.

It will be observed that Savvet Pacha, in his despatch to the Turkish ambassador in London, gave a promise of reforms in the border provinces of Thessaly and Epirus. As we shall see hereafter, this promise was not fulfilled, at all events during the year 1878. The reader must decide for himself on whom the principal blame should rest.

We may now return to the more important and serious outbreak amongst the Greeks of Thessaly and Epirus. We will take up the narrative from the time when the Coumoundouros government in Athens—the most popular, and, so to speak, aggressive of modern Greek governments—had been persuaded by the English and French representatives to recall the army under General Soutzo across the Turkish frontier of Thessaly.

The disappointment of the Greeks is well described by a correspondent of the "Daily News," writing from Athens on February 14th. The Greeks, he said, "are wofully puzzled by the turn which events have taken. They have waited for England to move, and have waited in vain; they have counted on Russian support, as a last resource, and seem to have reckoned without their host. In a word, they are almost as completely at sea as the English government itself, which is saying a good deal. Now that Turkey is beaten, and that Russia is inclined, as it appeared, to let her old enemy survive, upon certain conditions, the Greeks are clearly 'out of the running,' so far as Muscovite help is concerned. There was a moment, just after the fall of Plevna, when Greece might have taken part in the war with advantage to herself. But that favourable moment was allowed to slip, and it was only when, stung to madness by the feeling of being utterly ignored in the armistice negotiations, that the Greeks at length resolved on action. You have recently heard, by tele-

graph, how there was a sort of riot in Athens and a change of ministry, and an advance to the Thessalian frontier. You will have also heard, I doubt not, how the foreign representatives worked upon M. Coumoundouros to induce him to hold his hand. If Greece persisted in attacking Turkey she was to be left to her fate—Syra and the Piræus were to be left to the tender mercy of Hobart Pacha, and the English-built fleet of the sultan was to work its will, far and wide, upon the Greek sea-ports. This threat was enough to cause the invasion of Thessaly to be countermanded, and, after a few days of horrible panic at Syra, things settled down again into their ordinary course. The Greek army remained upon the frontier, and there it still remains, eager for a second order to advance. The Greek population continued its warlike preparations, and everything on the political horizon was as dark and confused as before. Whatever the politicians of Athens may have intended, the Christians of Thessaly have been thoroughly aroused by hearing that their countrymen were so near at hand, and the insurrection has spread from village to village with surprising rapidity.

“It will be very difficult for Greece to stand by and see these Thessalian insurgents reduced to submission at the point of the bayonet. Yet how is King George’s army to deal at the same time with both Russia and Turkey? That is what it, in reality, comes to. At any rate, the Greeks in general appear to think so. They fully accept the theory of an alliance between Turk and Muscovite, and they sigh over the blindness of England in not warmly supporting the Hellenic factor in the Eastern question. Of course, there may be some blindness on their own part in thus thinking. I only give you the current opinion for what it is worth. But certainly on returning, as I have, to Greece at a very critical moment, there is nothing which strikes me so much as the tone of angry disappointment about Russia, and the hope, so freely expressed, that England will now make common cause with the Greeks. Nothing would be more popular in Greece just now than a war,

with England as an ally, against both Turkey and Russia together.

“It is very cold whilst I write, and the mountains are covered with snow. But there is a clear sky overhead, and a pleasant glow of sunshine to justify the reputation of the Athenian climate. We had fine weather all the way from Corfu to Cape Matapan, and then a strong westerly wind, with torrents of rain, which continued for the remainder of the voyage to Syra. At that busy port things were not particularly cheerful. The weather was gloomy, and the inhabitants had scarcely recovered from their panic of a week ago. They still half expected the arrival of Turkish ironclads, although some one, to encourage them, had invented the report that the of the whole Turkish fleet had been bodily handed over to Russia. Nay more, it was already manned by Russian sailors, and was about to give battle to Admiral Hornby. You can judge from such a specimen of Syra gossip how ready men were to believe anything and everything that went the way of their wishes. A Turkish fleet in Russian hands would be a blockaded fleet before very long, and this was just what the islanders desired. ‘Save us from Hobart,’ was their cry, ‘and we will pay what you like towards a war on land.’

“The position of Syra is, in fact, very exposed to an enemy who had the command of the sea. The rich unfortified town lies conveniently near to a safe anchorage, where the bombarding fleet could take up a snug berth in any state of wind and weather. All the commercial progress of forty years, all the comfortable houses and well-filled store-rooms of the islanders, their shipyards, and their crowd of coasting craft, might all be destroyed in a few hours, if a hostile squadron once began the fatal work. It seems to be an understood thing among civilised nations that sailors are privileged beings who may burn and destroy at pleasure, where their military friends would be called brutes for firing a shot. No plea of defencelessness is admitted to protect you from ironclads. There is almost a feeling of scientific *gusto* in the way in which profes-



sional men talk of 'opening fire, with splendid effect,' at so many thousand yards. They seem to expect the landlubbers who suffer from this fire to enjoy the sense of doing some good in the world, when they are used as targets for heavy guns. Such being the case, no wonder that Syra was anxious at the thought of a visit from Hobart Pacha. No wonder that islanders derived comfort from seeing three foreign men-of-war anchored in the harbour."

The chief pretext urged by the Greek government for its projected invasion of Turkey was the desire to assist the oppressed members of the Hellenic family in the border provinces. There can be no doubt that great atrocities were committed by the irregular troops employed by the Turkish government, and Greece had at least as much right to protect or avenge the victims as Russia and her allies had had, on the other side of the Ottoman empire.

When, however, General Soutzo's army had been recalled, the troubles in Thessaly and Epirus still remained; and there was severe fighting in both provinces for many weeks. Mr. Skinner, whom we have already quoted, gives us the narrative of an eye-witness of what took place in this insurrection. Before quitting Athens he wrote, on the 16th of February, in the following terms:—"Thessaly is much better off, in one way, than any other insurgent province. It is supported by the immediate presence of a disciplined Greek army, with cavalry and artillery, which could cross the frontier in the easiest manner possible, and bring fearful odds to bear upon those famous Turkish irregulars. The frontier has been already passed and repassed, as every one knows, since this month of February began, and, with all their disadvantages, the Thessalian insurgents are encouraged by the knowledge that countrymen of the Greek kingdom are angry and armed and close at hand. There will be trouble, you may depend on it, if these same Thessalian insurgents are worsted by the Turks, which may very likely be the case. There will be trouble of the simple and intelligible kind, which consists in nothing be-

ing able to hold back the Greeks from interfering. They simply cannot stand by to see their kindred butchered within sound of the cries of victims. Right or wrong, the Rubicon was crossed when the Greeks make their forward movement early in the month. Thousands of Thessalians, as I hear, flew to arms, believing that the day of deliverance was at hand, and when diplomatic pressure made the Greek army fall back to its own territory, the political mischief had been done. Thessaly, hitherto wavering, had chosen the path of insurrection, and nothing lay before the wretched Christian villagers who had thus committed themselves but victory or death.

"The Turks make war, as usual, upon their grand old 'historic' plan of giving very little quarter. We have constant accounts of massacre and outrage, accounts which may, some of them, be exaggerated, but which are, at any rate, believed in Greece, and the national feeling is wrought to the highest point. In such a state of affairs the position of the Greek army, so near its foe, yet not allowed to strike, is terribly trying. It speaks well for the discipline of King George's men that they can be held in hand as much as they are. No wonder that we have news of several desertions, in which young soldiers, burning for action, have slipped away over the frontier and joined the insurgent bands. It would be impossible to prevent such unauthorised volunteering for special service, and however vexed the military authorities may be at finding awkward gaps in the ranks, the nation is by no means displeased to learn that the Thessalians are receiving this round-about sort of help.

"From Epirus we only gather the outline of a situation full of danger and excitement. The Christians of that province are slowly but surely gliding into a general insurrection. There have already been several slight skirmishes; and it is said that the Turks are everywhere falling back to their fortified positions. This last detail I rather doubt, but they are certainly in some danger should no help soon reach them, as the Chris-

tians are very numerous in comparison with the ruling caste, and have been well supplied with breechloaders by friends at a distance. Whatever the exact value, in a military point of view, of the Epirote movement, it will at least have the effect of preventing the despatch of any Turkish troops from southern Albania into Thessaly. It is there that the critical struggle of the day is to take place. If Thessaly can only be freed for a moment from the Turks, people here think that they will not be allowed to return thither as masters. No Congress or Conference would re-impose them on a province already free, nor would a formal request, *à la mode des Pachas*, with all its accompanying horrors, be for a moment tolerated. Every scrap of news, therefore, from Thessaly, is eagerly waited for in Athens, and as eagerly discussed by high and low.

"The various telegrams flashed to Athens and to all Europe, which, ere you receive this letter, will have told you of fighting in this and that village on the Thessalian frontier, have produced a great impression among the Greeks. Public excitement is kept up by the thought that blood is being shed, women and children killed or mutilated, so near the outposts of the national army. A strong effort is sure to be made to induce the government to let that army advance northwards again, and even if this effort should not succeed, there will be a continued state of agitation and anxiety so long as the wild work of which we hear is going on in Thessaly. The inhabitants of Athens will soon come to the point of exclaiming, 'Perish the Piræus,' if this sort of thing goes on. They will make their government invade Thessaly, even at the risk of bombardment by the Turkish fleet. There is a certain point beyond which prudence cannot be counted on. I do not say that this point has yet been reached, but we are getting nearer to it every day."

On March 2nd the same writer dates from the insurgent head-quarters near Armyros. "The position of affairs in this part of Thessaly reminds me of the dead-lock which occurred more than once during the Cretan insurrection. Nei-

ther side was strong enough to bring the other to battle with any prospect of advantage, and the opponents faced each other, watchfully resolved not to make the first false step. Then, as now, it was the Turk who held the fortresses, and the insurgent who occupied the open country. Then, as now, the native Mahomedans of the province were quite unable to assert their right to be a dominant caste without aid of disciplined battalions from other parts of the empire. Crete would have been free over and over again, if the Cretan Turks had been left to fight their own battles. It was only the arrival of reinforcements of regular troops and the strict blockade of the island by Hobart Pacha that brought the insurrection to an end. So will it be this time if Thessaly be destined to sink once more under the Turkish yoke.

"The mere fact of there being an insurrection in the province, coupled with the fact of a few obstinate and bloody skirmishes, which prove the insurgents to be in grim earnest in their work, is enough to deprive the Turks of everything but their fortified strongholds. They collapse at once into an attitude of dogged defence, or sally fiercely out at intervals, to burn a village or two it may be, and to get pitilessly knocked about by their active foe. All those gallant cut-throats, Zeibecks, Albanians, and the like, who were so lordly and terrible a few months ago—so clever at extorting money, so reckless in inflicting pain—are brushed away from the scene with marvellous ease by a little systematic shooting down. They don't like being shot, and are soon as shy of the mountain side as a doctor is said to be of taking his own prescriptions. Nothing would be more simple for them to do than to climb up from yonder town, which seems almost at our feet, and try the mettle of these stern, weather-beaten men, who are crouching by hundreds among the grey rocks and stunted brushwood. But it would be a costly experiment, and the Turks prefer to remain quietly in Armyros. They have no fear of being assailed in their stronghold by an enemy without artillery, and they calmly abandon the open country



to any roving bands of insurgents that choose to traverse it.

"I have spoken of the town of Armyros as seeming almost at our feet. There is, indeed, a magnificent view over a large part of Thessaly from this rugged hill-top, where the insurgents are posted. We stand among the ruins of the citadel of ancient Halos. There are huge blocks of stone around us, evidently the remains of a Cyclopean wall, and some parts of the time-worn rampart might still be used as shelter in case of attack. Below us, to the northward, is a vast and fertile plain, bounded by a distant range of mountains, and behind this first barrier are to be seen the snow-covered summits of Ossa and Olympus, shining like silver clouds on the horizon. To the north-east is the Gulf of Volo, with the town of that name, shut out from our sight by a jutting point of rocks. But Pelion is clearly visible, and we can detect several white specks upon its side, which are villages held by the insurgents. They are in some danger, it is said, just now of sharing the fate of Platanos, for the Turkish force lately engaged in this district has gone in great part to Volo, and Muchlif Pacha is supposed to mean mischief. Be that as it may, the view is very fine, and we can fully realise how easily every movement of the Turks is watched from the insurgent position. They cannot send a corporal's guard out of Armyros without being observed, and, if necessary, checked, whilst it must be almost impossible for them to gather recent news of what the insurgents are doing.

"Of course, they know pretty accurately the numbers of their foe, and have, I doubt not, a general idea of his present position. But he can always gain half a day upon them for any particular movement, which is of immense advantage in irregular warfare. Mitzas, for instance, marched across yonder plain without opposition, and has captured, we hear, a Turkish convoy on his way to Pelion. Other insurgent bands are likely soon to follow, and the garrison of Armyros is not thought to be strong enough or active enough to stop them. The fact is, that

the Turks are wofully dispirited by the defeats of their main army in Roumelia, and by the presence of the Russians before Constantinople. It seems hopeless, thankless work to fight on in Thessaly, when all is lost in Thrace. Many of the native Thessalian Mahomedans are looking anxiously to the future, and begin to see that, even if this insurrection should be put down, the province cannot be ruled much longer by Stambouli Pachas, but must soon be joined to Greece. In such a case it would be imperative on them to come to some sort of terms with their Christian neighbours. The Thessalian Turks would have quietly submitted, for the most part, to a force of regular troops. This many of them are reported to me to have said during these last few weeks, and I can fully believe them. But they can scarcely be expected to welcome irregular bands of insurgents, of whose retaliation some of them have good reason to be afraid.

"You must not fancy that the insurgent headquarters on the rugged hill-top are very snug or well furnished. There are no quarters at all, in one sense; for the ancient ruins around us do not supply a roof overhead, and there is only the bracing out-door life of a long and exciting picnic. The weather, fortunately, is fine and mild at present, but it has been very severe for the time of year in Greece, and the insurgents have suffered great hardships. They look none the worse for these, however, and are in capital fighting condition, despite their ragged clothing. As we sit under the lee of a rock, with these picturesque figures in large grey capotes clustering near us, and the meat that is to form our mid-day meal is roasting slowly over the ashes of a wood fire, I am reminded of many pleasant days on the Cretan mountains when Omar Pacha was threatening the insurgents of that ilk with destruction. Here is the same good old cause of liberty against despotism—the same bright southern sky, and the familiar accents of the Greek tongue chanting patriotic war-songs. We were not always lucky enough to have such a hearty meal in Crete, for there was not a base



GENERAL TODLEBEN





of operations like that which we now possess. An unarmed traveller may cross and recross the Greek frontier into Thessaly as often as he likes, so that our stronghold near Armyros is well supplied with food. The most serious drawback to the comfort of the insurgents is the shadow of a dreadful tortured death, which always hangs over them.

"The Turkish irregulars make war as their forefathers made it. No mercy to a fallen foe is the rule of the whole tribe. Let but one bullet bring you down on the mountain side and you are a murdered man ten minutes later, if the Turks be advancing. This is a serious reflection, and makes my wild companions in Thessaly keep a bright look-out. They play a game in which the forfeit is death, and perhaps torture, so you must allow them a little vigour of action in return. Yet I find, to my great contentment, that every effort is being made by the insurgent chiefs to prevent any unnecessary or wanton violence, even to Turkish irregulars. All hands seem to feel that we are in a state of transition from our old policy to a new, and that the Greek proverb, 'Better a wise enemy than a foolish friend,' is at this moment singularly appropriate. The insurgents have to look to a final settlement, as well as the Thessalian Turks; and when I asked whether it would be possible to burn Armyros (of course, merely as a military speculation), I was told that, unless they could occupy the town, it was no use attacking it, for it would soon be Greek.

"There was a reckless destruction of property by the Turks at Platanos, which has done their cause great harm—I ought to say, which has increased the feeling against them; for their cause, as such, is hopelessly lost already. They had unsuccessfully attacked the village—as all the world has heard—on two occasions, and the inhabitants had fled to Sourpi under the fire of the Turkish gunboat, which killed five women and three children. But Platanos was still uninjured, and the insurgents merely withdrew to the mountains behind the village, through want of ammunition. Then came a troop of Turkish

irregulars, and set fire to the whole place, so that the wretched inhabitants (now in Sourpi) have nowhere to go when peace is restored. As the war is none of their making, their case is peculiarly hard. They are left utterly destitute for the time in their refuge on Greek soil, and any charitable aid which friends at a distance might send them would be relieving a very real distress.

"Even as I write we can see a convoy of women and children creeping back cautiously from the ruins of their homes, after having selected such articles as were not quite destroyed. The sad procession winds slowly along the foot of the hill, with mothers of families carrying great bundles on their backs, and sturdy children tottering under the weight of the salvage they are trying to secure. Poor scraps of furniture and firewood it will be, after all; but when one is homeless and destitute, every little helps. As I watch the faces of my rough insurrectionary neighbours on the hill-side, I should strongly advise any small detachment of Turks from Armyros not to come out and interrupt that convoy. Some of them would get hurt, I am sure.

"The journey from Gradiki to Sourpi, which was my last stage before reaching the actual scene of the insurrection, is through a wild and hilly country, with the worst of roads to travel, and with occasional glimpses of lovely scenery to right and left. One mounts up from the coast line to a considerable elevation in order to reach the backbone of the ridge that separates Gardiki from the valley of Sourpi. There is a glorious moment, from the point of view of the picturesque, when Parnassus is still in sight to the southward, and far away Olympus opens grandly into view to the northward. The Gulf of Volo, the mountains of Eubœa, and the open sea, like a blue patch in the distance, are all to be clearly distinguished, and one could not wish for a fairer scene. Then the road winds down to the valley of Sourpi, and we travel along the bank of the little brook that separates Greece from Turkey. What a frontier between two independent states! A child could jump it



with a moderate run. No wonder that bands of volunteers can easily pass it in the night—even if the local authorities were keener to stop them than they are said to be. Down from the higher ground, we wind to the flimsy frontier line, and so to the little town, the terminus of postal and telegraphic communication, which seems quite a fashionable resort when looked back upon from the open hill-side, from the ruins of the ancient rampart and the open air feast of the *Pallikars*.

On the following day the correspondent was at Sourpi. "I left the Thessalian insurgents in their strong position on the hill-top near Ar-myros, described in my last letter, and after a hearty leave-taking with their indefatigable chief, Valenza, proceeded to visit the Greek volunteers at a village called Kaleria, not far away. It is only fair, in dealing with this insurrection, to distinguish between the native-born rebels who are trying to shake off the Turkish yoke, and the sympathisers from outside who have come to help them. I well remember how fiercely our philo-Turks of 1867 denied that any real Cre-tans were engaged in their effort against Turkey, setting everything down to Greek volunteers or Garibaldians; and if the philo-Turks of to-day have any heart left in them, I suppose they will do the same once more. It is only fair, then, to distinguish between the two classes of persons now in arms in Thessaly, and to bring out boldly the fact, that the Thessalians themselves are coming well to the front on their own behalf. They are not so well armed as the volunteers, but are far more numerous, and are led by native gentlemen of good means, who have plenty to risk besides their lives.

"Their chief in this district, Captain Valenza, has, it is true, received his military training in Greece, but he is of a well-known Thessalian family, and has under him some of the most solid men in the district. Thus much for one part of the force, and now for the volunteers. They are surprisingly few in number, when we consider the impression they have made on the Turks, and the encouragement which their pre-

sence certainly affords to the Thessalians. You might imagine from the frequent mention of different leader's names that there were thousands of these active sympathisers in the field. But the volunteer bands are very small, so that we hear of Mitzas and Nicolaides, of Zikas and of the Hieros Sochos, from Thebes, without reaching the sum total of half a Prussian battalion on a war footing. I do not say this in any tone of depreciation, for the very smallness of their number makes the pluck and audacity of the volunteers all the more remarkable. It is only to give you a just idea of the proportion of things out here that I come to these searching statistics. There must be four or five times as many, if not eight or ten times as many, Thessalians engaged in the insurrection as there are of outside sympathisers, so that the movement cannot be said to be an artificial one, kept up by outsiders alone. Men are taking part in it who, as I have said above, have plenty to lose besides their lives, and the most that the volunteers can pretend to do is to give compactness and energy to the insurrection at a particular point.

"But now let us scramble down the hill from the insurgent head-quarters, and, passing an abandoned Turkish guard-house, strike off along the edge of the fertile plain towards Kaleria. Our guide, philosopher, and friend on the occasion, is the twin brother of the gallant captain left upon the hill-top. He is as full of zeal in the civil department of the insurrection as his brother is in the military. The *mot d'ordre* of both the Valenzas appears to be 'full speed ahead.' Nor is M. Petelas, that stoutest and most jovial of insurgent secretaries, to be forgotten on our ride. His appearance alone is a guarantee that we shall get a cheerful view even of the enemy's scouts if they heave in sight. An outdoor life in winter, roughing it, and hardships of every kind, seem rather to agree with him than otherwise. We chat merrily by the way, and are reminded of the possibilities of our situation by the keen attention with which the insurgents who accompany us watch every human being that we see to right or left.

"There is no danger on this particular road, for the Turks are at some distance, but one cannot be too careful when it is a question of keeping on one's head, and the Turkish irregulars might show a historic promptness in the opposite sense should they come across us. I think that this slight shade of uncertainty gives zest to the ride. At any rate, the time flies quickly enough, and we are presently at the outskirts of Kaleria, where the Hieros Sochos is stationed. The ordinary inhabitants have taken refuge in Sourpi for fear of an attack by the Turks, and the Theban lads have the village all to themselves. They are quietly employed in cleaning their arms, in cooking, in mending their clothes, or in any of the other hundred small duties of camp life when we arrive, and seem to have taken very patiently to the less pleasant and exciting part of a soldier's life. I notice that their Chassepôt rifles are kept in excellent order, and that they are as smart and cleanly in their personal turn-out as can be expected after the rough time they have been having.

"This 'Sacred Band' of Thebes is more like a crack volunteer corps among ourselves in its constituent elements than like the rank and file of a regular army. If they only get fighting enough to keep them in good spirits, they will do famously, but I should fear they would find the continued hardships of mountain campaigning very trying. However, they seem in the best of spirits thus far, much comforted, no doubt, by having arrived in time for the affair at Platanos, where they showed a most commendable *elan*. It is a pity that there are only two hundred of them. But one cannot expect the whole force to take part in a dangerous expedition beyond the frontier. The Theban lads in Thessaly are much in the case of a picked party of volunteers from a volunteer corps, such as we may often see on foreign service if England should ever be hard pressed to hold her own. Their white gaiters and *fustanellas*, their black caps and shaggy grey capotes, would make a capital uniform for a whole army intended to serve in mountain warfare. Though there are

only a couple of hundred of them they have made quite a name for themselves in this insurrection.

"Angered by the resistance they met with, and by the checks they have sustained, the Turks are guilty of many harsh and cruel acts in Thessaly. A certain Hassim Aga is reported to have massacred several Christian women the day before yesterday, and each refugee who arrives in Greece brings news of fresh outrages. I do not dwell very much upon this part of the question, because our home public has grown accustomed to read of wholesale butcheries, which throw into the shade anything yet done in Thessaly. But I must, from all that I can gather, support the complaint of the Greeks, that their insurgent friends are goaded into acts of reprisal by the brutal violence of the Turkish troops. It has been earnestly wished to limit the efforts of the insurgents to attacks upon armed men in the government employ, and to injure the peaceful Mahomedans of the province as little as possible. It has been wished to do, by the clumsy means of the insurrection, what Europe seems foolishly to have forbidden to be done, by the natural and proper mode of a military occupation of the province by Greece. But the task of thus sparing Turkish property has been almost an impossible one. The insurgents have, up to this time, committed no wanton massacres of Turkish families, in which they have manifested much more humanity than their opponents; but they have been obliged to destroy a good deal of property. At one place, some mills were burned, to cut off the enemy's supply of food. At another place, a whole village had to be set on fire, to dislodge its Turkish garrison. These things are part of the hard necessity of the time, and lie at the door of those foreign diplomatists who are leaving the Thessalian question to work its own solution. We cannot expect the rough-and-ready insurgents, who are risking their lives for their country's cause, to make war in kid gloves, whilst the Turks are recurring again and again to their bad habit of intimidation by massacre.

"Only this morning we have news of more



people killed near Volo, and it is certain that even those who are lucky enough to live in the garrison towns go in terror of their lives from the Turkish irregulars. Nothing seems capable of drumming into your genuine Turk a decent respect for non-combatants. He has got his own fierce narrow rule of right and wrong, and cannot be tamed by any amount of public opinion. After all, what is public opinion to a Zeibeck or Albanian? He reads no newspapers and cares not a jot for any remarks made upon him at a distance. Let foreign critics say what they like, his justification is ready to hand in the shape of sword and rifle. Force is his supreme law, and he cares for no other.

"But the Turkish navy ought to show a little more humanity. The ships are manned by regulars, not by Bashi-Bazouks, and are under responsible command. All the more painful is it therefore to find a case of reckless cruelty brought up against the Turkish navy. Thus it stands:—On the day of the battle at Platanos a number of women and children were escaping from the scene of danger, and hurrying along the road at the foot of the hills, which leads across the Greek frontier to Sourpi. A Turkish war-ship (I have not been able to ascertain her name) came across the Gulf of Volo and opened fire upon these helpless fugitives. The range was long, and it may be said that the women and children were mistaken for retreating insurgents. But I have, by actual observation, tested it as a fact, that with a moderately good glass—far less powerful than is carried on every ship of war, the women, and especially the children, could be clearly distinguished at the distance from which the Turkish fire was directed. What was the meaning of this brutal attack? It could not assist the troops that were engaged in the valley beyond, and had only the wretched purpose of killing five poor terrified women and three of the little ones they were trying to save. Such acts of wanton barbarity do more to rouse the Thessalians to resistance than to awe them into submission.

"We have news to-day that Nicholaides, with

his small band of volunteers, mostly composed of Greek students, has broken away in the direction of Pelion, and passed safely through the Turkish lines. This is only another illustration of how completely the open country is free to the insurgents to circulate at pleasure. Any armed party strong enough to encounter a stray patrol of Turks can go pretty much where it chooses, and has little or nothing to fear from the enemy. They are for the most part shut up in the principal towns, and do not venture forth except in considerable strength. The insurrection is spreading far and wide, and, though but on a small scale as yet in the way of actual fighting, must be an immense annoyance to the Turkish authorities. The rule of the province seems to be slipping from their hands, though they can force their way in any given direction with more or less sacrifice of life.

"At this moment there are three chief centres—one in the district of Armyros; another east of Volo, on the slopes of Pelion; and a third towards the border line of Epirus, near Karditza and Phanari. In each of these centres there have been several battles—as they call them hereabouts—or rather obstinate skirmishes, in which the Turks have been generally worsted; and in each there is a local revolutionary government acting on behalf of the insurgents. I understand that similar movements are planned for the districts around Olympus, and even for part of Southern Macedonia, so the sultan's representatives will soon have a lively time of it. Their old imperial prestige is quite destroyed by recent events further north, and nothing but the arrival of a large disciplined force of men of the Plevna stamp will enable the Turks to crush out this rebellion of their Greek subjects."

On the 6th of March Mr. Skinner wrote:—"I have been constantly on the move, and have acquired much additional information respecting the insurrection. From the snug little haven of Mintzela, or Amaliopolis, we steamed round to the northern end of Eubœa, where we took up many passengers, and then headed for the Lamian Gulf. There was, first and fore-

most, a glorious view of Pelion as we passed out of the Gulf of Volo. The great mountain is now topped with snow, and the villages upon its side look like stray patches of the same white covering, which has slid down towards the Turkish stronghold. There is Makrinitza, famous for the recent repulse of Mouchlif Pacha, and there are other spots soon to be heard of, it may be, as fighting ground for the insurgents. Pelion is occupied with bands of armed men, who set the pacha at defiance, and if only the Turks were reinforced to the proper point for bearing down all opposition, there would besome hard fighting in the Volo district. But, as it is, I do not think that the Turkish commander will risk the tremendous loss necessary to stamp out his active opponents. He will content himself with attacking them in a cautious fashion, which can lead to nothing decisive, and will spare his dispirited soldiery the thankless task of storming Pelion in the old dashing Suleiman Pacha style, that heaped up the Schipka Pass with Turkish dead. With Russians at Constantinople, and a Conference of the Powers in a mood favourable to Greece clearly impending, it is not to be expected that beys and agas and pachas should show their ancient vigour. They are playing a lost game, and many of them would rather come to terms with the Greeks than risk their lives in exterminating them. Many more have no heart left for fighting, on account of the wretched condition in which their government has allowed them to exist during the last year or two."

It certainly seemed at this moment as though the Greeks might have thrown off the yoke of Turkey with very little external aid. But it turned out that the mood of Europe was not so favourable to the insurgents, or to the Hellenic race in general, as was supposed by the writer here quoted.

This insurrection, according to Mr. Skinner, had been carefully arranged and conducted, so far as the work of organisation was concerned. There was a "provisional government" in the district of Pelion, on the east coast, which had

made great efforts to carry on its administration in a regular and legal form. "Everything was to be done in the name and by the authority of the provisional government, and no excesses or disorders were to be permitted. These two Thessalians had got through the Turkish blockade in a boat to the island of Skiatto, and had there taken ship for the mainland of Greece."

On his way to Chalcis, Mr. Skinner had the opportunity of again visiting Lamia, where the head-quarters of General Soutz were still established. "I found the Greek army just as impatient of its enforced inaction, and just as steady in its mechanical discipline, as when I passed through the town in the latter part of February. The various accounts which have circulated in regard to the unsatisfactory state of the army scarcely deserve to be contradicted, they are such utter nonsense. The army is in good condition, and could take the field to-morrow with every chance of success against any foe of its own strength—or a little stronger, my enthusiastic Greek friends would be sure to add. But though quite efficient as a fighting machine, General Soutzo's force is in somewhat low spirits, because of the retreat from Thessaly. This is what is meant by its discouragement, and the like, of which we occasionally hear. The wonder is, as I said in a former letter, that discipline was so well maintained under the strain of the retreat, and my object in recurring to the matter at present is to say that there have been surprisingly few desertions to the insurgent camp. From what I had heard before going north, I had supposed that a wholesale flight from the regulars to the irregulars had occurred, and that scores of King George's soldiers had gone secretly into the neighbouring province. This, however, is not so. A few men have deserted, but so few that their presence with the insurgents does not form even a minor feature of the struggle. The Greeks cannot be praised for maintaining a very strict or benevolent neutrality towards Turkey just now. That much their friends must admit. But the regular army has struck very creditably to its colours, with numerous temptations to



slip off and join the fight raging so close at hand."

The insurrection was maintained with a good deal of spirit, and desultory fighting was continued for some time longer. Constant efforts were made by the representatives of the Powers to restore peace, and pressure was brought to bear on both sides. The prospect of a Conference of the Great Powers eventually induced the insurgents to sheathe the sword.

The final days of this petty warfare were marked by an untoward event, namely the murder by Turkish troops of Mr. Charles Ogle, correspondent of the "Times" in Greece. Towards the end of March a number of massacres took place in the Pelion district, and between Mount Pelion and Volo. A correspondent at Volo sent the following account of these cold-blooded atrocities, dated the last day of the month.

"The work of pillage, and the destruction of the villages on Mount Pelion continue, and, as if in mockery of the powerlessness of the Turkish authorities to prevent the pillage, notices were posted up, on the evening of yesterday, about the Christian quarter, inviting the unhappy refugees to return to the very houses that had been plundered. Seven old men and two old women were murdered in Makrinitza and Fortaria; the churches were broken open and pillaged, and the sacred vessels and other things offered for sale in the streets of Volo by the regular troops. The same work is going on in other villages from which the inhabitants have fled, but, as everywhere else, they had taken the precaution to shut up their houses. Here, in Volo, a complete state of terror exists. After sunset no one is to be seen on the main streets. The dwellings are barricaded, and, except in the houses of the consuls, and of a few foreign residents, not a light is to be seen after dark. The excuse made for the troops is that they have received no pay for months, and that in consequence a strict discipline cannot be enforced.

"This being true, it becomes evident that the army employed in suppressing the revolt in

these provinces must degenerate into so many sortie-robbers dependent upon pillage to recompense their service. If such acts are perpetrated as they are under the eyes of the foreign consuls, and in the vicinity of foreign war ships, the conclusion is unavoidable that worse is taking place in the districts where no such restraining influence exists. The insurgents have retreated to the mountain on the side overlooking Zagora, where they are entrenching themselves. Near Katerina the Turks have captured four thousand six hundred rifles, with a large quantity of ammunition, which had been landed on Wednesday night by some steamers. Fourteen battalions are going round to Preveza from Salonica, to reinforce the troops in Epirus.

"I have just received a report of the death of Mr. Ogle, the 'Times' correspondent, as it has been furnished by the Turkish authorities; but information subsequently obtained leads to the grave suspicion of his having suffered unfair treatment."

A week later the same correspondent wrote:—"I have seen Hobart Pacha this morning, and he informed me that he received a telegram from Mr. Layard, asking for information about the murder of Mr. Ogle, which he read to me, as also his answer, which was in substance affirmative of the report first made by the Turkish authorities—namely, that Ogle was killed in the action of the 29th ult., and afterwards decapitated. He at the same time asked Mr. Layard to send a ship of war.

Captain Pelly has been authorised to make a searching inquiry into this murder. Mr. Ogle's remains were taken this morning on board the gun boat Wizard, which left at ten o'clock for Athens. The foreign ships of war in the port had their flags at half-mast, but no other display was made. The menacing conduct of the soldiers in the streets towards the Christian population, and the threatening of the Ghiours of Volo, with death, have necessitated a joint representation being made to the Turkish authorities and the consuls of foreign Powers."

The true circumstances of Mr. Ogle's death

were never discovered. A commission of inquiry was sent to the spot, consisting of the English Consul Fawcett and a Turkish pacha; but no trustworthy evidence was forthcoming, the Greek witnesses being (so it was alleged) intimidated by the presence of the Turkish officials.

In the report which Mr. Fawcett sent home, at the close of the inquiry, he expressed the opinion that the unfortunate correspondent met his death by a gunshot or bayonet wound on Friday afternoon, the 29th March, whilst retreating with the insurgents, after the second battle of Makrinitza; that he was afterwards mutilated, his head being cut off by Turkish soldiers; and that his great imprudence made it extremely probable that some such casualty would happen to him.

Referring to the battle, and the movements of Mr. Ogle on the 28th and 29th of March, Mr. Fawcett wrote:—"On the 28th firing was heard about Makrinitza, and Mr. Ogle at once left Volo and went up to that village. On the same day the insurgents were driven from the position I first described on the lower shoulder of Pelion below the village, and retreated to the other one above and to the left of it. During the night a body of Ottoman troops had turned the mountains further south, and on Friday morning they attacked this position from the further or eastern side after some heavy fighting, which lasted from 8 A.M. till about 1.30 P.M. The insurgents broke and retreated past the monastery of St. Elias, and took up a fresh position on the second ridge, which is the northerly edge of the ravine, separating the township of Makrinitza from that of Portaria. Now, it is admitted that during this battle, which was severe, the Turks having upwards of three hundred men *hors de combat*, Mr. Ogle was close to the insurgents, and in considerable danger. The Turks said he was seen fighting in the entrenchments, and encouraging the insurgents. I do not believe this statement; I do not believe that Mr. Ogle took an active part in the fight. The Frank seen with the gun in his hand was, without doubt, Souta. When the insurgents

retreated to their second position the fighting ceased for a while, and recommenced about 3 A.M., when the Turks again attacked them. In a short time the insurgents broke again and fled, some to Portaria, some to Makrinitza. The summits of the ravine were crowned on both sides by Turkish troops, who kept firing at the fugitives. Standing on the position taken by the Turks, and looking south towards Portaria, you overlook the ravine, which has a very steep face on the north side beneath the ridge upon which you are standing. About half a mile from the summit of Pelion, an almost impossible mountain path leads down the face of the cliff; going down this about two hundred yards, you come to a single tree. To the right the path goes to Makrinitza; to get to Portaria opposite you must descend two hundred yards more and turn to the left, which brings you to some stepping stones, over which you can cross the torrent. From the tree, turning sharp to the left, there is apparently a path, but it ends in nothing but an abrupt precipice. Over this an unhappy peasant ran and fell some three hundred feet into the torrent below; his blood was still on the rocks as we passed. Sixty yards from the tree to the left, and fifty yards from the cliff, Mr. Ogle's body was found. There was a broom-bush and a little plateau in front of it. On this ledge the body was lying when found by the Cavass Hassan. Now, though there has been a great mass of evidence taken, there is but little to the point, much which is irrelevant having been accepted by Mr. Blunt in his anxiety not to exclude anything, but the testimony of Dr Dromidis (though hearsay) is remarkable. He says, according to those who had just come from the place, that they saw a Frank running down this path. Knowing that it led nowhere, and that he could not escape that way, they called out to him, but he did not hear them, but kept on. They went downwards and reached Portaria in safety. That seems to have been about 3.30 P.M., and was the last time he was seen by any one; as far as I can make out, no evidence has been given of any trace of him afterwards. These



witnesses also say that bullets were then falling in every direction. At this point the evidence of the man who hid himself comes in. He states that some time about 4 P.M., while lying close, four soldiers passed him with a head on a bayonet, going to Makrinitza. Now, that man was lying about one hundred and fifty yards from where Mr. Ogle's body was found, and any one taking the murdered man's head to Makrinitza would pass by where the peasant was hiding. It is true he does not absolutely swear to Mr. Ogle's head, but he says it was not one of his people, and had a light moustache. The only other direct evidence is that of Iskender Pacha, who says the Englishman's passport was brought to him late in the afternoon of Friday, by which he knew that an Englishman had been killed in the fight. I must here observe that I think Iskender Pacha (himself a European) would have done better to have ordered an immediate search for the body, instead of sending the passport down to the authorities at Volo to be examined, and leaving the body for days on the ground. Reverting to the place where the dead body was found, I was astonished to observe, even after a month had elapsed, distinct traces of the blood. Every one who saw it at the beginning states that there was a very large quantity, and from that fact, and because, in my opinion, the blood I saw was coagulated, and therefore arterial and not venous blood, I conclude that the head was cut off either while the man was living, or immediately after death. Standing on the spot Hassan pointed out to me the places between it and the torrent below where he had found from seven to eight other bodies, one with the head off; above he said he found three more, and two or three more on the Portaria side, and also the man who had fallen over the rocks. I was also shown the spot where the witness hid himself. I myself picked up, within one hundred yards, two Martini-Henry cartridges, and one muzzle-loader cartridge, such as used by the insurgents. Looking at the position in which the body was found amongst other corpses, and the statement that he was seen going a wrong path, I conclude

that he got as far as the rocks, and, finding he could get no further, he turned, and either sat down for shelter under the bush, and was there shot, or was overtaken by soldiers and bayoneted and afterwards mutilated in the manner which has been described. I am firmly persuaded that Mr. Ogle met his death amongst the fugitive insurgents on that hillside on Friday, the 29th March last. A great deal has been said about his having been seen alive afterwards, but I feel convinced that, if any one really did see him alive, they would have come and said so. There are persons here who are very anxious to make political capital out of this sad affair, and who have tried every method to induce some of the peasantry to come down and give this evidence, but they have not been successful. One individual from Makrinitza has given evidence and another from Portaria. Nothing could be stronger than the assurances of safety Redjeb Pacha and myself gave, and I have come to the conclusion that no more evidence was forthcoming, simply because none existed."

Meanwhile negotiations had been pending between the English and Greek governments, with the object of securing the representation of Greek interests at the forthcoming Congress. The following correspondence will show with what result. The first letter is from Mr. Delyannis, the Greek foreign minister, to Mr. Gennadius in London.

"Athens, February 11 (23), 1878. Monsieur—When I informed you, in my despatch of January 27 (February 7), of the order given to the royal troops to withdraw from the Greek provinces of Turkey, which they had occupied provisionally, I acquainted you at the same time with the assurances given to his Majesty's government by the majority of the representatives of the great Powers at Athens, that a Hellenic question would be discussed at the approaching Congress, and that the cause of the Greek populations of Turkey would not fail to be a subject for the serious consideration of the European plenipotentiaries who took part in it. These assurances, which were yet another

proof of the sympathy of the great Powers towards the Hellenic race and its future, have encouraged his Majesty's government to bring to the notice of Europe the request to obtain likewise a place in the future Congress, as being the natural representative of the national aspirations of the Greek population of the Ottoman empire. Although I have already authorised you by my aforesaid note to submit this request to the appreciation of her Britannic Majesty's government, and have briefly pointed out to you the arguments which militate in favour of its acceptance, I nevertheless think it my duty to recur to it, and to beg you to repeat our request formally to his excellency the minister for foreign affairs of Great Britain.

"We are, according to all appearances on the eve of the convocation of the Congress which will be called to lay down the bases of a lasting peace in the East, and to ensure to the populations the conditions of a national and prosperous existence. Now, this opportune prospect imposes a sacred duty on his Majesty's government of once again raising their voice to plead before the European tribunal the cause of the Hellenic populations of the Ottoman empire. Driven desperate by abuses and indescribable exactions of the Ottoman rule, they have just taken up arms, somewhat late it is true, but still in time enough to protest before civilised Europe against a destiny which is a disgrace of civilisation. It is not a right of protectorate which free Greece would claim over the Hellenes of the Ottoman empire. We have often been accused of such aspirations, and we greatly desire to have the question examined from its true point of view. The Hellenic kingdom has always but shared, and now at this present time does only share, in the interest which Christian Europe has so often manifested for enslaved Hellenism.

"If it constitutes itself the champion of a cause which is sacred in its eyes, it is because it cannot forget the ties of origin and religion which unite its children with their disinherited brethren, nor can it suppress the painful feeling

of sympathy which their sufferings for centuries past have produced in the hearts of the free Hellenes. No one, assuredly, would reproach free Greece for her wishes for the emancipation of the Hellenes of Turkey, nor for her efforts to procure for them a national existence. If the Hellenic kingdom has at present the desire to represent, at the approaching Congress, the undeniable rights and national aspirations of the Greek populations of the Ottoman Empire, and trusts that this desire will be favourably entertained by the great Powers, it relies fully on the feeling of justice which, we are firmly convinced, animates Europe for the destinies of the Greeks of Turkey.

"Happily for these populations the European Cabinets seem disposed to give their serious attention to the definitive improvement of their future condition. They have given us a formal assurance of this. We have no doubt that this question will be broached and discussed at the future congress. In such a case would it not be just and reasonable to allow the Hellenic kingdom a place there, in order to explain the rights of these populations, their struggles and sufferings, to justify their aspirations, and to try to induce the supreme arbiters of the Congress to realise them! Without this, would not the cause of the Greek provinces of Turkey run the risk of being viewed less favourably than these populations would have a right to expect? Combated naturally at the Congress by the Ottoman government, which would have a capital interest in perpetuating a state of things long since condemned by humanity, would not this cause be compromised for lack of a natural defender who could plead for it?

"We venture to hope that the decision of the great Powers will not be unfavourable to our request. We hope it all the more, because such a concession, which would be for the Hellenic populations a favourable augury of the disposition of the European Cabinets in their favour, would contribute greatly to remove the perils, renewed every day, by which the kingdom is surrounded, and to clear up a situation, difficult and strained,



which threatens to compromise its safety. In authorising you, Monsieur, to submit our request to the government of her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, I beg that you will read this note to his excellency the minister for foreign affairs of the British government, and ask for a reply. It is my duty to inform you also that this corrective circular has been addressed to all the legations of his Majesty in Europe."

On March 9th Lord Derby wrote the following letter to M. Gennadius:—"Foreign Office, March 9, 1878—M. le Chargé d'Affaires—Her Majesty's government, having considered the appeal addressed to them by the government of Greece, in a despatch communicated by you on the 4th instant, that Greece should be represented in the Congress which has been convened to meet at Berlin, are of opinion that the Greek kingdom is fairly entitled to be represented at the Congress, and will signify this opinion without delay to the other Powers."

At the same time Lord Derby sent copies of this correspondence to the English ambassadors in Turkey and Russia. On the 11th March our representative at Athens wrote to Lord Derby as follows:—"The Greek minister for foreign affairs, to whom I yesterday communicated the substance of your lordship's telegram as to the representation of Greece at the approaching Congress, has informed me that he has been charged to convey to her Majesty's government the thanks of the king for this fresh mark of goodwill towards Greece, and he begged me, at the same time, to express the thanks of the Greek government to her Majesty's government."

This attitude of the English government caused the most lively satisfaction in Greece, where the good feeling towards this country assumed an enthusiastic character. As soon as Lord Derby's pledges were made public in Athens, a deputation, headed by the metropolitan, the chiefs of the municipalities of the church, the university, and the banks, waited on Mr. Wyndham, and presented to him an address signed by almost all the adult population of Athens and the Piræus, expressing gratitude towards Eng-

land and confidence in her future policy. According to a correspondent, some personal compliments were paid to the English minister, who assured the deputation that England always sympathised with Greece, and he hoped that during his sojourn among them he would merit the esteem now shown him. He concluded by expressing his good wishes for the prosperity of Greece, and the happiness of the king, queen, and royal family.

A rumour was soon spread, to the effect that Russia objected to the presence of Greece at the Conference; but this turned out to be practically unfounded.

Before bringing to a close this chapter on the brief struggle of the Greeks in 1878, it will be interesting to inquire more closely into the sentiments of Englishmen on the Hellenic question in general. England has long been known for its friendly feeling towards the Greek race; and whatever may be thought of the checks which English policy has occasionally imposed on Greek ambition, when this seemed likely to precipitate the ruin of the Ottoman Power in Europe, it must not be forgotten that the present Greek kingdom would scarcely have existed if it had not been for Canning and his successors, backed up by the goodwill of the nation. Our friendship for Greece has been somewhat damped in recent times by the failure of the Greeks to repay the debts which they had incurred towards us. Other causes, into which it would be impossible to enter, have contributed to make a large number of Englishmen lukewarm in their advocacy of the Hellenic claims, who would otherwise have been amongst their warmest champions.

It is natural, however, that those who have least confidence in Turkish reforms, and least sympathy with Ottoman rule, should be most inclined to aid the Greeks. Thus, in the famous debate of the first week of February, Mr. Gladstone referred in generous terms to the claims of the Greek subjects of Turkey. "I come," he said, in the speech from which we have already quoted, "to one other question which may

come before the Conference, and that is as to the condition of the Hellenic provinces. In considering this question we must distinguish between the kingdom of Greece and the Hellenic provinces. I don't say that the kingdom of Greece has or can have very positive substantive claim for itself either upon Turkey or upon any of the other Powers, but I think that the Hellenic provinces have a very considerable claim upon them. And even with regard to the kingdom of Greece, I would go as far as to say that I don't think that the government of Greece can be very severely blamed for what it is now doing. Indeed, I am rather astonished that so young and so small a government has been able to exercise so lengthened a forbearance and so great a pressure upon the national spirit of its own people. But with regard to the Hellenic provinces, the question is most important. It has come to be slowly understood in this country that, while there is a very strong sympathy at the present moment between Russia and her Slav subjects of Turkey, there is very little sympathy indeed between Russia and the Hellenic provinces. On the contrary, it might almost be said that, in certain circumstances, there is an antipathy between them. I do not believe that Turkey has any cause to complain of the conduct of her Hellenic provinces during this war. I must say that I have been astonished at the patience they have shown. I could hardly believe it was possible that, during such a war, and especially when the catastrophe began to happen which has reduced Turkey so low, patience should endure so long. I do not want to preach any extreme doctrine on the subject; but I cannot for the life of me conceive why, within reasonable limits, the government of this country, towards which the Greeks have the strongest feeling of sympathy, and from which they would always wish to derive assistance and countenance rather than from any other quarter in the whole world—I cannot conceive why the government of this country should not assume its natural and beneficial attitude in the Conference in defending the cause of the Hellenic provinces. The Slavs have a powerful champion

in Russia, and I think it is most natural and most becoming, most politic and most expedient, if you want to check the advance of Russia in the south, that, within reasonable limits, you should associate yourselves with the cause of the Hellenic provinces in the councils of Europe. The chancellor of the exchequer spoke with some alarm and misgiving about the extension to be given to Bulgaria itself. I really go a long way with him if that is to be an extension to the undue prejudice of a great race. Why should not the right honourable gentleman and the government avail themselves of the powerful assistance they would derive from the strong national life and sentiment of that people by befriending their cause, and becoming, in a certain sense, the advocate and champion of that cause in the Conference which is about to meet?"

These sentiments were undoubtedly shared by more than one member of the Cabinet, as we shall hereafter have occasion to see. In the same week with Mr. Gladstone's speech, Lord Derby received a deputation consisting of a number of Greek gentlemen resident in London; and his reply, though couched in very cautious language, showed that he was in some points at one with the leader of the Opposition. The spokesman of this deputation was Mr. E. A. Mavrocordato, who began by telling the foreign secretary that he and his colleagues had come, in the present critical phase of the national life of their country, to implore the sympathetic and forbearing appreciation of his lordship and the British nation on the recent step taken by the Greek government. "They did not represent the Greek government, and did not profess to speak in its name. They might say, however, that the recent movement had been the result of the national impulse; in fact, it had been impossible to repress the feelings of the people, hearing of the outrages and acts of oppression that were continually coming to their knowledge from the other side of the border. They also felt that, in this supreme moment, when the fate of the Christian populations was being decided, it was their duty to stand up for the protection



of the interests of the Hellenic people. What he wished more particularly to call his lordship's attention to was, that in the strife that had thus been commenced Greek interests were exposed, in the protection of which the assistance of the British government might be invoked. The principal towns of Greece, which were the commercial towns, were all on the seaboard. They were the emporia in which were deposited the goods of international trade. Although Greece was interested in the property, many nations had an interest in it, and more particularly the English nation. These ports were entirely unprotected, and the interference of this government might save them from wanton and unnecessary destruction. There was another interest very dear to this country and to all civilised nations. He referred to the monuments of antiquity, which stood a short distance from the shore of Attica, and which should, by all possible means, be protected from ruthless attack. Finally, they felt that the movement made by the Greek people was not inimical to the interests of this country, which had protected the cause of freedom, civilisation, and progress, in all parts of the world, as being most consonant with British feeling and British interests."

In reply to this and other speeches, Lord Derby said:—"I have listened to you with very great attention and interest. Probably, from the nature of the case, you have not specified very distinctly what you mean by the assistance and protection and support for which you ask. If you mean as to future territorial arrangements, I can only, as a general expression, say that this is a large matter, upon which you cannot expect me now to give any opinion. But if you mean to express a hope that the Greek element in the Turkish provinces should not be sacrificed to the Slav, there we shall be entirely on your side . . . . With regard to the step which has been taken—unfortunately taken, I think—by the Greek government, I am quite aware that it has been pressed upon the Greek Cabinet by a very strong expression of popular feeling. I also understand very well what are the inducements to

that step being taken. At the same time you must recollect this, that, if you send your armed forces into the territory of the country with which you are not at war, without the knowledge and consent of the government of the country into which you send them, you must expect that they will consider themselves free to act as they shall think fit in their own interests. I think and hope, however, that the present question is in a fair way of settlement. I do not know whether you are in possession of any more recent information, but according to my advices from Athens the Turkish fleet had left the Dardanelles, and was expected to be at the Piræus to-day. I also hear that the Greek government is considering the propriety of coming to an arrangement for withdrawing its troops from beyond the frontier, and we shall do what we can to arrange this difficulty. But all these things are not at all likely to influence the final result. I therefore think that it would be much better to leave this question to the Powers at the Conference, which I expect will be held shortly. If there should be any question of the war being carried on in a manner not warranted by the usages of nations that would be a fair ground for interference, but I hope we shall have no occasion for this, and that the matter will be ultimately arranged."

It was reassuring to hear from the foreign secretary that the government was fully alive to the importance of maintaining the Hellenic claims in certain provinces of Turkey as against the Slavonic claims; for this was a point which had undoubtedly seemed to be in danger of being overlooked. We shall see how this pledge was redeemed by Lord Derby's successor at the Congress of Berlin.

## CHAPTER XII.

## THE LAST RUSSIAN ADVANCE.

THE movements of the Russian armies after the conclusion of the armistice, and whilst it was still possible to doubt whether the orders to cease hostilities had actually reached the front at every point, may be described as a desperate scramble. There was little or no resistance on the part of the Turks, and little, if any, method or arrangement in the advance of their enemies. The Grand Duke Nicholas himself, probably, could not have told where his generals were at the moment when he signed the preliminary conventions with the Turks.

The wildest rumours were naturally spread abroad as to the intentions of the Russians at this juncture; and many Englishmen were particularly confident that the advancing armies would never stop short of Constantinople and Gallipoli. We have already seen how far the grand duke penetrated in the Thracian peninsula, and what were the limits assigned to either side by the armistice. We have seen how the Russian army was gradually moved nearer and nearer to Constantinople; how the lines of defence, extending across the promontory on which the Turkish capital lies, known by the name of the lines of Tchataldja, were occupied by the invader, after strong pressure had been brought to bear upon the sultan and his advisers; and how, in the last week of February, the headquarters of the Grand Duke Nicholas, together with Generals Ignatieff and Nelidoff, and the diplomatic staff, were moved forward to San Stefano, on the Sea of Marmora. This step was taken, as averred by the Russians, on account of the sudden appearance of the English fleet. The relations between England and Russia were at this moment strained to the highest degree of tension, and it was feared on all hands that another war would break out, which might not improbably drag into its vortex the greater part of Europe.

English suspicion and jealousy of Russia, coupled with sympathy for the Turks, was at one time nearly precipitating such a disaster. On the 24th of January, as related in a previous chapter, the Earl of Carnarvon had quitted the cabinet of Lord Beaconsfield, owing to the fact of his colleagues having resolved to order Admiral Hornby, then in Besika Bay, to enter the Dardanelles. On the 13th of February, after the armistice had been signed, and the seaport of Rodosto had been occupied by the Russians, and a few days after the English Parliament had voted a sum of six millions sterling in order to place in a state of greater readiness the national armaments, Admiral Hornby received fresh instructions, and passed the Straits with his fleet on the 13th of February. It was ten days after this that the Grand Duke Nicholas removed to San Stefano.

This movement to San Stefano was considered by many to be a distinct breach of faith on the part of the Russians. They had themselves selected the neutral zone, and promised to remain outside the lines of Tchataldja; and scarcely was the promise made when it was violated in the most flagrant manner. On the other hand, the Russians themselves urged that the advance of the head-quarters (which was, of course, equivalent to the advance of the army) to such a very short distance from the capital, was a mere measure of self-defence. They said that it was done as a counter-move to the advance of the English fleet; and there can be no doubt that the English government must have expected some action of the kind when they sent Admiral Hornby his orders. The question now was rather between Russia and England than between Russia and Turkey; and no nation in a similar predicament would have abstained from taking a like precaution.

It is needless to say that the sudden approach of a Russian force, through the midst of the Turks, to a place barely twelve miles from the outskirts of the capital, caused a great sensation throughout Europe, and added not a little to the dangers of a situation which was already threatening in the extreme. Both Eng-



land and Russia were blamed on the continent for their menacing attitude at this moment; and there were probably few who did not anticipate that the new war would break out within a short time. A "Daily News" correspondent describes the aspect of affairs on the morrow of the forward march. Writing from San Stefano on the 26th of February, he said:—"There has been a great change in the situation since a week ago. Then, to all appearance, Russia had not decided to accept the provocation offered her by the British fleet coming here. The Russian troops were still in the positions assigned to them in the armistice when I passed through Tehataldja on Tuesday last. There was no movement among the troops of Skobeleff's corps, or anywhere else on the line. Upon arriving at Adrianople, on Wednesday, I heard no talk of the speedy removal of head-quarters, but on Thursday there was a change. General Gourko suddenly left Adrianople, his staff receiving only two hours' notice of his departure. On Friday morning it was known that the whole of the head-quarters' staff, General Ignatieff, and the Diplomatic Chancery, were to start next day for San Stefano, and there was a forward movement of the Russian troops.

"This sudden change of plans was coincident with the news of the fall of Server Pacha; and it was this which seems to have decided the movement, although it had evidently been in contemplation before, as an answer to the coming of the British fleet. I certainly thought that Russia would not accept the provocation, because, after all, it was a very harmless one. Russia has judged otherwise. The coming of the fleet was the first step in the slippery descent which leads to war; the coming of the Russians to San Stefano the second. Both moves were equally unwise and unnecessary. Now it only remains for the fleet to come to the Bosphorus, the answer to which will be a Russian army occupying the heights of Buyukdere, when the forces of England and Russia will be within gunshot of each other. If the fleet moves again nearer Constantinople, the

situation will become most dangerous, and war can hardly be avoided. The fact is, General Ignatieff is very glad of a good pretext for getting nearer Constantinople. The negotiations had been going on very slowly, although Safvet Pacha was supposed to have full powers to treat. He, in fact, continually refused to accept point after point without orders from Constantinople, and telegraphic communication was constantly mysteriously interrupted. He was three or four days getting an answer. It was the same with the telegrams to General Ignatieff. They were four or five days *en route*. General Ignatieff here received telegrams sent to Adrianople four days before.

"Then Safvet Pacha was taken ill, and it was with the greatest difficulty General Ignatieff could get him to proceed with the work. He wanted, from the first, to await the arrival of Sabdoullah Bey from Berlin. He had completely forgotten the whole programme of the Conference last winter, and had to be continually referred to it. Again, he did not know the lines of delimitation agreed upon in the armistice, and had no map. He had to accept whatever the Russians told him on this head. One day he complained to General Ignatieff of the depredations of the Circassians in some village south of Sofia, and asked if the Russians could not stop it. General Ignatieff showed him that this village was on the Turkish side of the neutral ground, and therefore it was the business of the Turks to keep order, but offered to send Russian troops there if he wished to punish the Circassians. Under such circumstances it was most difficult to push the negotiations rapidly. General Ignatieff said the end of it would be that he would have to deliver an ultimatum in order to get peace signed. It is impossible to say whether these delays were caused by the natural and ordinary unreadiness of the Turks, or by a wish to gain time. General Ignatieff thinks that the knowledge of the Conference had much to do with it. They think the peace signed now will not be final and conclusive, and this makes them hesitate. Then came news of

the fall of Server Pacha, and Savvet said that the negotiations must be suspended until further orders.

"This was the last straw on the camel's back. It was immediately decided to go to San Stefano, the consent of the Turks to that step having been previously obtained. The Turks agreed to abandon the last line of defence, Kujuk Chekmejeh; but if the fleet had not appeared in the Straits, General Ignatieff would have undoubtedly been obliged to find some other solution of the difficulty. That gave him the very pretext he wanted. I left Adrianople on Saturday morning with the head-quarters' staff. It was a beautiful day. Everybody was in excellent spirits, delighted at the exchange of the muddy streets of Adrianople for the pretty village of San Stefano, on the shores of the Sea of Marmora.

"Our gaiety seemed almost misplaced, considering the gravity of the step we were taking. We arrived at Tchataldja about six in the evening. Here General Skobelev's corps and a portion of the Guards were drawn up to receive the grand duke. He reviewed them, and found the troops, having had a rest, in excellent condition; but, when on the point of continuing the journey, he was accosted by Tahir Bey, the Turkish officer appointed for regulating the lines of delimitation, who, for some days, had been at Skobelev's head-quarters. Tahir said that Mukhtar Pacha had no orders to withdraw his troops from Kujuk Chekmejeh. He could not, therefore, allow the Russian troops to occupy these positions, nor to go to San Stefano. This was news indeed, and of the most serious nature. The Turks were refusing to do what they had agreed upon, and were stopping the grand duke after allowing him to come as far as Tchataldja. Had the Turks held out there could have been only one result—the assault of the Turkish positions next morning at daybreak.

"The moment was an exciting one, and for a couple of hours we seemed again on the brink of war. The telegraph was set a going, but nothing seemed to come of it, for finally the grand

duke grew very angry and indignant. He thought he was being trifled with. The spirit of his father rose within him, and as he walked up, his resemblance to the Emperor Nicholas just then was striking, and it was still more evident when he called Tahir Bey, and said to him, with an energy that made the latter tremble—

"Go, and tell Mukhtar Pacha that when I give an order he must obey it, and at once, or it will be the worse for him. Go."

"There was a dead silence for a moment. Everybody felt the gravity of the situation. Tahir withdrew precipitately, sprang upon a locomotive, and in a moment was flying through the darkness down over the line to Kujuk Chekmejeh as fast as steam could carry him. It was now known by all the officers present that, unless the Turks abandoned the positions instantly, they would be attacked at daylight. The situation was considered very critical. Peace was trembling in the balance, and yet there is not the slightest desire expressed at head-quarters for the continuance of the war under any circumstances whatever. Mr. Gladstone seems to fear the danger of the army escaping from the control of cooler heads at St. Petersburg. There is not the slightest danger of this. There has not been a move without orders. The aversion of the grand duke for the continuation of the war was shown in a somewhat amusing way. While waiting for the result of Tahir's mission, the question of what was going to happen was criticised in an animated manner. The grand duke, who was excited and indignant at the situation, asked Skobelev, it is said, what he thought of it. The latter, with the reckless indifference which characterises him, replied—

"For my part, Monseigneur, I think we shall have to fight England."

"Oh, but you are a madman," exclaimed the grand duke in a half-angry manner, turning from him, and spitting as every Russian peasant spits when anything displeases him. It is the highest expression of displeasure or anger.

"Finally, after two hours, news came that the positions were being evacuated by Mukhtar,



and that the Russians were marching in. At midnight the train was again in motion, and at two o'clock on Sunday morning the grand duke was in San Stefano. The line Kujuk Chekmejeh was abandoned completely by Mukhtar, who is now behind the little creek that empties itself into the Marmora, half-way between San Stefano and Jedi Kuleh. This is the most tangible result of the coming of the fleet so far.

"The Russians are delighted with the beautiful little place. San Stefano is very clean and bright, after much of Bulgaria. The weather is delicious, and the quay and sea-shore present a very animated appearance, lined with officers in brilliant uniforms, ladies, and the population, walking up and down, listening to the music that is played all day long. It is very pleasant to watch the glimmer of the sunshine over the Sea of Marmora, with Mount Olympus in the misty distance. Numerous boats and caiques give animation to the scene close at hand, and picturesque groups of Cossacks, bathing their horses, are continually seen. General Ignatieff inhabits a pretty villa, whose walls are washed by the waves, and from the windows of which the minarets of Saint Sofia are plainly visible. It is here that peace is to be signed.

"As regards the progress of the negotiations, I can only say, that General Ignatieff told me just before leaving Adrianople that no point had been touched upon but questions relating to Bulgaria, and that little progress had been made even in the arrangement of the frontiers. I may remark, that all accounts of the conditions of peace published in various journals are more or less fantastical, except those given out officially by the Russian general. The outlines are well known, and the details are not yet arranged. It is not true that there are any secret conditions, or any secret treaty. The conditions of peace could not be kept secret, because they are of such a nature as cannot be carried out without being known. As regards the secret treaty, secrecy in diplomacy is one of the things of the past. No diplomatic secret can be kept long. The whole thing would be known a week

after it was arranged. Besides, Russia can obtain nothing by a secret treaty which she cannot better obtain without it. A moment's reflection will convince everybody of this. The only question that could be arranged by a secret treaty is the question of the Straits. Now General Ignatieff authorises me to state again, as I informed you nearly two months ago, that Russia did not wish the existing treaty changed with regard to the Straits, whether by agreement with the Turks or by an European Conference. She prefers to adhere to the Treaty of Paris."

The Turkish government, in order to explain the entrance of the Russians into a suburb of Constantinople, caused the following notice to be published:—"Whereas some ships of the British fleet, which have for some time been stationed at Besika Bay, have entered the Dardanelles, and have come with amicable intentions to anchor in the Gulf of Mondenea, by reason of the present situation; whereas previous to this event, the Imperial government having concluded an armistice with Russia, the latter has likewise demanded permission for the entry in an amicable manner of some Russian battalions into Constantinople: in consequence of telegraphic communications interchanged between the Sultan and the Emperor of Russia, in which it was demanded that the Russian army should be provisionally established at *Buyuk Chekmejeh* and at *Kujuk Chekmejeh*, this proposition was submitted to a council-general specially convoked by the sultan at the imperial palace. This council, in which all the ministers took part, as well as the ulemas and high functionaries, decided to grant this demand of Russia, considering the same only conformable to the circumstances. It was therefore decided by the imperial government to give their authorisation to permit the Grand Duke Nicholas, with his staff, composed of one thousand to two thousand officers and servants, to establish themselves provisionally at San Stefano. The manner of the entry of the Russian troops into the above-named locality has been fixed, as well as the new line of demarcation. No one will be

allowed to cross this line without having previously obtained permission."

The grand duke had remained in Constantinople for nearly a week; and compliments were frequently exchanged between him and the sultan. So friendly, indeed, were both the belligerents, in outward seeming, that on the 3rd of March, the date of the czar's accession, the sultan sent the following telegram to the Emperor of Russia from Constantinople:—"On the occasion of the anniversary of your Majesty's accession to the throne, I offer my congratulations, with the desire of renewing our friendly relations."

The emperor telegraphed in reply as follows:—"I thank your Majesty for your congratulations, which I received simultaneously with the news of the signature of peace. I perceive in this coincidence a presage of good and lasting relations between us."

The Russians did not go further than San Stefano, either then or at any subsequent period, though the grand duke himself paid a visit to the sultan. It is certainly a little surprising that the armies of the czar, in the flush of their famous victories, were denied what would have been such a crowning triumph. Indeed, there can be no doubt that the idea was entertained by the staff of the Grand Duke Nicholas. The temptation was doubtless a great one, and the Russians displayed much self-restraint in resisting it. At one time, it is said, General Skobeleff had orders to enter the capital as soon as the English fleet should appear in the Bosphorus. This was before the conclusion of the armistice between Russia and Turkey; and it is unquestionable that affairs were then critical in the extreme. An accident might almost have precipitated an Anglo-Russian war, which was only averted by forbearance on both sides. The jealousy of the English people, against Russia, had been thoroughly aroused; and the occupation of Constantinople by the armies of the czar would have given the war party in this country sufficient impetus to carry their views into effect.

Nevertheless the Grand Duke Nicholas himself did visit Constantinople, with his staff and

an escort; and he exchanged visits with the sultan. It had been predicted that such a visit would be unsafe, in the disturbed condition of the public mind amongst the Mahomedans, and strong efforts were made to induce the brother of the czar to alter his purpose. But he insisted on doing as he had purposed; and the event passed off without any evil results. The Turkish population, indeed, behaved better than had been predicted. A general feeling of submission to the decrees of fate appears to have taken the place of their former dogged resistance; and even the vast crowds of refugees who had swarmed in and around the capital were kept in tolerable order without very great difficulty. Hunger and misfortune had tamed the fiercest minds, and succeeded where nizams and zaptiehs might have failed.

On the side of Gallipoli, there was likewise much excitement and doubt for many days. When Suleiman Pacha and his brother generals escaped in this direction, nothing would have been more natural than that the Russians should have pursued them, and attempted their capture, wherever they might be overtaken. But here also the victors abstained, wisely avoiding what would in all probability have been a cause of serious disagreement with England. In the last week of January the "Agence Russe" had formally contradicted the report current at Constantinople, that a Russian corps would march upon Gallipoli. "The Imperial government," it declared, "is not unaware of the importance attached by the British government to Gallipoli. Russia has no interest in touching this point, which does not come within the sphere of her operations, and it will neither be occupied nor attacked unless the Turkish regular army should be concentrated there, in which case it would be impossible to leave such a force on our flank."

Meanwhile Suleiman Pacha had saved himself by a headlong retreat, in the depth of winter, across the Rhodope mountains, with the loss of his artillery, much of his baggage, and many men, and had collected the remains of his fifty thousand troops at Gumuldjina, on the east of



the bay of Lagos. He was preparing to return by sea to Constantinople, in order to place himself at the service of his government for the defence of the capital, when he was arrested on various charges connected with the grievous mis-carriage of his operations in Roumelia. Whether or no the failure of this unfortunate general was to any large extent due to his incapacity or dereliction of duty, it is for the military critics to decide. Even they are not in union upon the point, so that it would profit us little to enter upon the discussion. Suleiman Pacha was destined to wait long for his trial, and to fare ill at the hands of his judges. His fate resembles that of many another luckless general before him, in every land and almost every age.

It may not be out of place to revert here to the effect which was produced in Roumania, and elsewhere in Europe, by the Russian demand for the restitution of Bessarabia, or rather of that portion of Bessarabia which had been taken from Russia after the Crimean War. According to a statement, apparently authentic, which was made public soon after the termination of the war, General Ignatieff was made the bearer of an autograph letter from the Emperor of Russia for the Prince of Roumania. This letter informed the prince that General Ignatieff was charged to make important communications from his Majesty. General Ignatieff accordingly put forward a demand for the retrocession of Bessarabia, given to Roumania by the Treaty of Paris. The arguments used by General Ignatieff were—first, that Russia must take possession of Bessarabia, because it is a matter of honour with her to efface the last vestiges of the humiliations inflicted by the Treaty of Paris. "It is better," said General Ignatieff to the Roumanian minister, "to yield, in accordance with a friendly understanding, that which can be seized by force. It is better to give up for a sufficient compensation, and to keep the friendship and goodwill of a powerful empire, than to be deprived without compensation, while incurring the anger of a great state. What is the piece of Bessarabia worth to Roumania? Nothing. She can neither

construct a railroad on it, nor have a seaport, for the Kilia branch of the Danube is not navigable. On the other hand, the Dobrudscha and the mouth of the Danube which are offered to you afford to Roumania two seaports—Sulina and Kustendje. As regards extent and population, the territory offered to you is double what Roumania loses, whilst as to revenue, Roumania will come into four times as much as the Bessarabian districts bring to her. She has everything to gain."

More precise and conclusive evidence of Russia's intentions in the matter was soon forthcoming. On the third of April, Sir Henry Elliot, now ambassador at Vienna, forwarded to Lord Salisbury a despatch which he had received from the Roumanian agent at St. Petersburg (General Ghika). The general telegraphed as follows:—

"This morning Prince Gortschakoff requested me to call upon him, and said to me:—'Is it true that your government intends to protest against Article 8 of the treaty, which provides for a communication of the army of Bulgaria with Russia through Roumania? The emperor, already ill-disposed towards you by your attitude about Bessarabia, would lose all patience if such a declaration is made, and his Majesty orders me to tell you, for the information of your government, that, if you have the intention of protesting or opposing the article in question, he will order the occupation of Roumania and the disarmament of the Roumanian army.' Upon my observing that it was with Roumania, and not with Turkey, that Russia should concert for passage of her army through the principality, Prince Gortschakoff said:—'We did not choose to have anything more to do with you on account of your conduct. It is important you should know that we insist upon free passage through your country, and that you should inform your government of the declaration of the emperor. Your government must explain themselves categorically. Do they, or do they not, intend to protest and oppose themselves to the right we have reserved ourselves under this article?'"

This was imperious, and even insulting language, which immediately increased the sympathy already felt for Roumania in Europe. We shall presently see, however, that Prince Charles and his people had no alternative but to accept the exchange which Russia offered them, and which Europe as a whole was not prepared to forbid.

### CHAPTER XIII.

#### THE TREATY OF SAN STEFANO.

EIGHT days after the arrival of the Grand Duke Nicholas and his head-quarters at San Stefano—that is to say, on March 3rd, 1878—the Treaty of Peace was signed between the Russian and Turkish plenipotentiaries.

The document was described as “The Preliminaries of Peace,” Russia reserving to herself to conclude a more definite instrument at a future time, and by no means wishing to imply that the terms exacted from the Turks were to serve as the mere preliminaries to a general European agreement.

In view of the importance of this instrument, especially as it bears upon the subsequent Treaty of Berlin, we may here subjoin it in full.

The preamble ran as follows :—

“His Majesty the Emperor of Russia and his Majesty the Emperor of the Ottomans, inspired with the wish of restoring and securing the blessings of peace to their countries and people, as well as of preventing any fresh complication which might imperil the same, have named as their plenipotentiaries, with a view to draw up, conclude, and sign the Preliminaries of Peace—

“His Majesty the Emperor of Russia on the one side, the Count Nicholas Ignatiev, Aide-de-Camp General of his Imperial Majesty, Lieutenant-General, Member of the Council of the Empire, decorated with the Order of St. Alexander Newsky in diamonds, and with various other Russian and foreign orders, and Sieur Alexander Nelidow, Chamberlain of the Impe-

rial Court, Conseiller d’Etat actuel, decorated with the Order of St. Anne of the first class, with swords, and with various other Russian and foreign Orders ;

“And His Majesty the Emperor of the Ottomans on the other side, Safvet Pacha, Minister for Foreign Affairs, decorated with the Order of the Osmanié in brilliants, with that of the Medjidié of the first class, and with various foreign Orders, and Sadoullah Bey, His Majesty’s Ambassador at the Imperial Court of Germany, decorated with the Order of the Medjidié of the first class, with that of the Osmanié of the second class, and with various other foreign Orders ;

“Who, after having exchanged their full powers, which were found to be in good and proper form, have agreed to the following Articles :—

“ART. 1.—In order to put an end to the perpetual conflicts between Turkey and Montenegro the frontier dividing both countries will be rectified in the following way :—From the Jobrosdtza mountain the frontier will follow the line indicated at the Constantinople Conference to Korito, through Bilek, thence will go to Gatzko, Metochia, Gatzko belonging to Montenegro, towards the confluence of the Piva and Tara, rejoining the Drina northwards to its confluence with the Lim. The Oriental frontier will follow the last-named river to Drijepolie and through Roskai and Soukhaplanina, leaving to Montenegro, Bihor, Roskai, taking in Rugowo, Slava, and Gusinje along the mountain ridge, through Shlieb, Saklen, along the north frontiers by the mountain tops of Koprivnik, Babavich, Borvih, to the highest summit of Prokled ; then by the summit of the Biskoschik Scait to Lake Tjicenitlod, dividing it from Tjicenikastrati, it will cross the Lake of Scutari and join the Boyana, whose course it will follow to the sea. Niksitch, Gatzko, Spuz, Podgoritza, Zabliah, and Antivari remain to Montenegro. A European Commission, in which the Porte and Montenegro will be represented, will have to fix the definitive limits of the principality, modifying the general outline when found necessary and equitable for the respective interests and



tranquillity of both countries, the necessary equivalents being agreed to. The navigation of the Boyana, which always provoked contests between the Porte and Montenegro, will be the object of special regulation by same European Commission.

“ART. 2.—The Sublime Porte definitively recognises the independence of Montenegro. An agreement between the governments of Russia, and Turkey, and Montenegro, will ultimately determine the character and form of the relations between the Porte and Montenegro respecting the agents of Montenegro in Constantinople and other localities of the Ottoman empire where necessary, the extradition of fugitive criminals on the one territory or the other, and the subjection of Montenegrins travelling or sojourning in the Ottoman empire to the Ottoman laws and authorities, according to the principles of international law and the established usages concerning the Montenegrins. A convention will be concluded between the Sublime Porte and Montenegro to regulate the questions connected with the relations between the inhabitants of the confines of the two countries and with the military works on the same confines. The points upon which an understanding cannot be established will be settled by the arbitration of Russia and Austria-Hungary. Henceforward, if there is any discussion or conflict, except as regards new territorial demands, Turkey and Montenegro will leave the settlement of their differences to Russia and Austria-Hungary, who will arbitrate in common. The troops of Montenegro will be bound to evacuate the territory not comprised within the limits indicated above within ten days from the signature of the Preliminaries of Peace.

ART. 3.—Serbia is recognised as independent. Its frontier, marked on the annexed map, will follow the thalweg of the Drina, leaving Little Zwornik and Zakar to the principality, and following the old limit as far as the sources of the stream Dezevo, near Stoilac. Thence the new line will follow the course of that stream as far as the River Raska, and then the course

of the latter as far as Novi-Bazar. From Novi-Bazar, ascending the stream which passes near the villages of Mekinje and Irgoviste as far as its source, the frontier line will run by Bosur Planina, in the valley of the Ibar, and will then descend the stream which falls into this river near the village of Ribanic. The line will then follow the course of the Rivers Ibar, Sitnitza, and Lab, and of the brook Batintze to its source (upon the Grapachnitza Planina). Thence the frontier will follow the heights which separate the waters of the Kriva and the Veternitza, and will meet the latter river by the shortest route at the mouth of the stream Miovatzka, which it will ascend, crossing the Miovatzka Planina and re-descending towards the Morava, near the village of Kalimanci. From this point the frontier will descend the Morava as far as the River Vlossina, near the village of Staikovtzi. Reascending the latter river, as well as the Linberazda, and the brook Koukavitze, the line will pass by the Sukha Plinina, will run along the stream Vrylo as far as the Nisawa, and will descend the said river as far as the village of Kronpatz, whence the line will rejoin by the shortest route the old Servian frontier to the south-east of Karaoul Baré, and will not leave it until it reaches the Danube. Ada-Kale will be evacuated and razed. A Turco-Servian Commission, assisted by a Russian Commissioner, will, within three months, arrange upon the spot the definite frontier line, and will definitively settle the questions relating to the islands of the Drina. A Bulgarian delegate will be admitted to participate in the work of the Commission when it shall be engaged on the frontier between Servia and Bulgaria.

ART. 4.—The Mussulmans holding lands in the territories annexed to Servia, and who wish to reside out of the principality, can preserve their real property by having them farmed out or administered by others. A Turco-Servian Commission, assisted by a Russian Commissioner, will be charged to decide absolutely, in the course of two years, all questions relating to the verification of real estate in which Mussulman

interests are concerned. This Commission will also be called upon to settle within three years the method of alienation of state property and of religious endowments (*vacouf*), as well as the questions relative to the interests of private persons which may be involved. Until a direct treaty is concluded between Turkey and Servia, determining the character of the relations between the Sublime Porte and the Principality, Servian subjects travelling or sojourning in the Ottoman Empire shall be treated according to the general principles of international law. The Servian troops shall be bound to evacuate the territory not comprised within the above-mentioned limits within fifteen days from the signature of the Preliminaries of Peace.

“ART. 5.—The Sublime Porte recognises the independence of Roumania, which will establish its right to an indemnity, to be discussed between the two countries. Until the conclusion of a direct treaty between Turkey and Roumania, Roumanian subjects will enjoy in Turkey all the rights guaranteed to the subjects of other European Powers.

“ART. 6.—Bulgaria is constituted an autonomous tributary principality, with a Christian government and a national militia. The definite frontiers of the Bulgarian principality will be traced by a special Russo-Turkish Commission before the evacuation of Roumelia by the imperial Russian army. This Commission will, in working out the modifications to be made on the spot in the general tracing, take into account the principle of the nationality of the majority of the inhabitants of the border districts, conformably to the bases of peace, and also the topographical necessities and practical interests of the intercommunication of the local population. The extent of the Bulgarian principality is laid down in general terms on an accompanying map, which will serve as a basis for the definitive fixing of the limits. Leaving the new frontier of the Servian principality, the line will follow the western limit of the Caza of Wrania as far as the chain of the Kara-dagh. Turning towards the west, the line will follow the west-

ern limits of the Cazas of Koumanovo, Kotchani, Kalkandelen, to Mount Korab; thence by the River Welestchitza as far as its junction with the Black Drina. Turning towards the south by the Drina and afterwards by the western limit of the Caza of Ochride towards Mount Linas, the frontier will follow the western limits of the Cazas of Gortcha and Starovo as far as Mount Grammos. Then by the Lake of Kastoria, the frontier line will rejoin the River Moglenitza, and after having followed its course, and passed to the south of Yanitza (Wardar Yenidje), will go by the mouth of the Warder and by the Galliko towards the villages of Parga and of Sarai-keui; thence through the middle of Lake Bechik-Guel to the mouth of the rivers Strouma and Karassou, and by the sea-coast as far as Buru-Guel; thence striking north-west towards Mount Tchaltape by the chain of Rhodope as far as Mount Krouschowo, by the Black Balkans (Kara-Balkan), by the mountains Eschek-koulatchi, Tehepelion, Karakolas, and Tschiklar, as far as the River Arda. The line will thenceforth be traced in the direction of the town of Tchirmen, and leaving the town of Adrianople to the south, by the villages of Sugutlion, Kara-Hamza, Arnaout-keui, Akardji, and Enidje, as far as the River Tekederessi. Following the rivers Tekederessi and Tchorlderessi as far as Loule-Bourgaz, and thence, by the river Soudjak-dere as far as the village of Serguen, the frontier line will go by the heights straight towards Hakim-tabiassi, where it will strike the Black Sea. It will leave the sea-coast near Mangalia, following the southern boundaries of the Sandjak of Toultscha, and will come out on the Danube above Rassova.

ART. 7.—The Prince of Bulgaria shall be freely elected by the population and confirmed by the Sublime Porte, with the assent of the Powers. No member of the reigning dynasties of the great European Powers shall be capable of being elected Prince of Bulgaria. In the event of the dignity of Prince of Bulgaria being vacant, the election of the new prince shall be made subject to the same conditions and



forms. Before the election of the prince an Assembly of Bulgarian Notables, to be convoked at Philippopolis (Plowdiw) or Tyrnowo, shall draw up, under the superintendence of an Imperial Russian Commissioner, and in the presence of an Ottoman Commissioner, the organisation of the future administration, in conformity with the precedents established in 1830 after the Peace of Adrianople, in the Danubian principalities. In the localities where Bulgarians are mixed with Turks, Greeks, Wallachians (Koutzovlachs), or others, proper account is to be taken of the rights and interests of these populations in the elections and in the preparation of the organic laws. The introduction of the new system into Bulgaria, and the superintendence of its working will be entrusted for two years to an Imperial Russian Commissioner. At the expiration of the first year after the introduction of the new system, and if an understanding on this subject has been established between Russia, the Sublime Porte, and the Cabinets of Europe, they can, if it is deemed necessary, associate special delegates with the Imperial Russian Commissioner.

"ART. 8.—The Ottoman army will no longer remain in Bulgaria, and all the ancient fortresses will be razed at the expense of the local government. The Sublime Porte will have the right to dispose, as it sees fit, of the war material and of the other property belonging to the Ottoman Government which may have been left in the Danubian fortresses already evacuated in accordance with the terms of the armistice of the 19th and 31st January, as well as of that in the strongholds of Schoumla and Varna. Until the complete formation of a native militia sufficient to preserve order, security, and tranquillity, and the strength of which will be fixed later on by an understanding between the Ottoman Government and the Imperial Russian Cabinet, Russian troops will occupy the country, and will give armed assistance to the commissioner in case of need. This occupation will also be limited to a term approximating to two years. The strength of the Russian army of occupation, to be com-

posed of six divisions of infantry and two of cavalry, which will remain in Bulgaria after the evacuation of Turkey by the imperial army, shall not exceed fifty thousand men. It will be maintained at the expense of the country occupied. The Russian troops of occupation in Bulgaria will maintain their communications with Russia, not only through Roumania, but also by the ports of the Black Sea, Varna and Bourgas, where they may organise, for the term of the occupation, the necessary depôts.

"ART. 9.—The amount of the annual tribute which Bulgaria is to pay the Suzerain Court, by transmitting it to a bank to be hereafter named by the Sublime Porte, will be determined by an agreement between Russia, the Ottoman Government, and the other Cabinets, at the end of the first year during which the new organisation shall be in operation. This tribute will be calculated on the average revenue of all the territory which is to form part of the principality. Bulgaria will take upon itself the obligations of the Imperial Ottoman Government towards the Rustchuk and Varna Railway Company, after an agreement has been come to between the Sublime Porte, the Government of the Principality, and the Directors of this Company. The regulations as to the other railways (*voies ferrées*) which cross the principality, are also reserved for an agreement between the Sublime Porte, the Government established in Bulgaria, and the Directors of the Companies concerned.

"ART. 10.—The Sublime Porte shall have the right to make use of Bulgaria for the transport, by fixed routes, of its troops, munitions, and provisions, to the provinces beyond the principality, and *vice versâ*. In order to avoid difficulties and misunderstandings in the application of this right, while guaranteeing the military necessities of the Sublime Porte, a special regulation will lay down the conditions of it within three months after the ratification of the present Act by an understanding between the Sublime Porte and the Bulgarian Government. It is fully understood that this right is limited to the regular Ottoman troops, and that the irregulars,

the Bashi-Bazouks, and the Circassians, will be absolutely excluded from it. The Sublime Porte also reserves to itself the right of sending its postal service through the principality, and of maintaining telegraphic communication. These two points shall also be determined in the manner and within the period of time indicated above.

"ART. 11.—The Mussulman proprietors or others who fix their personal residence outside the principality may retain their estates by having them farmed or administered by others. Turco-Bulgarian Commissions shall sit in the principal centres of population, under the superintendence of Russian Commissioners, to decide absolutely in the course of two years all questions relative to the verification of real property in which either Mussulmans or others may be interested. Similar Commissions will be charged with the duty of regulating within two years all questions relative to the mode of alienation, working, or use for the benefit of the Sublime Porte, of the property of the state, and of the religious endowments (*Vacouf*). At the expiration of the two years mentioned above all properties which shall not have been claimed shall be sold by public auction, and the proceeds thereof shall be devoted to the support of the widows and orphans, Mussulman as well as Christian, victims of the recent events.

"ART. 12.—All the Danubian fortresses shall be razed. There shall be no strongholds in future on the banks of this river, nor any men-of-war in the waters of the principalities of Roumania, Servia, and Bulgaria, except the ordinary *stationnaires* and the small vessels intended for river-police and custom-house purposes. The rights, obligations, and prerogatives of the International Commission of the Lower Danube are maintained intact.

"ART. 13.—The Sublime Porte undertakes to render the passage of Soulina again navigable, and to indemnify the private individuals who have suffered loss by the war and the interruption of the navigation of the Danube, applying for this double charge a sum of 500,000 francs

from the amount due to the Sublime Porte from the Dannbian Commission.

"ART. 14.—The European proposals communicated to the Ottoman plenipotentiaries at the first sitting of the Constantinople Conference shall immediately be introduced into Bosnia and Herzegovina, with any modifications which may be agreed upon in common between the Sublime Porte, the Government of Russia, and that of Austria-Hungary. The payment of arrears of taxes shall not be required, and the current revenues of these provinces until the 1st of March, 1880, shall be exclusively applied to indemnify the families of refugees and inhabitants, victims of recent events, without distinction of race or creed, as well as to the local needs of the country. The sum to be received annually after this period by the Central Government shall be subsequently fixed by a special understanding between Turkey, Russia, and Austria-Hungary.

"ART. 15.—The Sublime Porte engages to apply scrupulously in the Island of Crete the Organic Law of 1868, taking into account the previously expressed wishes of the native population. An analogous law adapted to local requirements shall likewise be introduced into Epirus, Thessaly, and the other parts of Turkey in Europe, for which a special constitution is not provided by the present Act. Special Commissions, in which the native population will be largely represented, shall in each province be entrusted with the task of elaborating the details of the new organisation, and the result of their labours shall be submitted to the Sublime Porte, who will consult the Imperial Government of Russia before carrying it into effect.

"ART. 16.—As the evacuation by the Russian troops of the territory which they occupy in Armenia, and which is to be restored to Turkey, might give rise to conflicts and complications detrimental to the maintenance of good relations between the two countries, the Sublime Porte engages to carry into effect, without further delay, the improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces



inhabited by Armenians, and to guarantee their security from Kurds and Circassians.

"ART. 17.—A full and complete amnesty is granted by the Sublime Porte to all Ottoman subjects compromised by recent events, and all persons imprisoned on this account or sent into exile shall be immediately set at liberty.

"ART. 18.—The Sublime Porte will take into serious consideration the opinion expressed by the Commissioners of the Mediating Powers as regards the possession of the town of Khotour, and engages to have the works of definitive delimitation of the Turco-Persian boundary carried into effect.

"ART. 19.—The war indemnities and the losses imposed on Russia which his Majesty the Emperor of Russia claims, and which the Sublime Porte has bound itself to reimburse to him, consist of—(a) 900,000,000 roubles for the expenses of the war (maintenance of the army, replacing of war material, and war contracts). (b) 400,000,000 roubles on account of damage done to the south coast of Russia, to her export commerce, to her industries, and to her railways. (c) 100,000,000 roubles for injuries inflicted on the Caucasus by the invasion; and (d) 10,000,000 roubles for costs and damages of Russian subjects and establishments in Turkey. Total, 1,410,000,000, roubles. Taking into consideration the financial embarrassments of Turkey, and in accordance with the wishes of his Majesty the Sultan, the Emperor of Russia consents to substitute for the payment of the greater part of the moneys enumerated in the above paragraph, the following territorial cessions:—(a) The Sandjak of Toultecha, that is to say, the districts (Cazas) of Kilia, Soulina, Mahmoudie, Isaktcha, Toultecha, Matchine, Babadagh, Hirsowo, Kustendje, and Medjidie, as well as the Delta Islands and the Isle of Serpents. Not wishing, however, to annex this territory and the Delta Islands, Russia reserves the right of exchanging them for the part of Bessarabia detached from her by the Treaty of 1856, and which is bounded on the south by the thalweg of the Kilia branch and the mouth of the Stary-

Stamboul. The question of the apportionment of waters and fisheries shall be determined by a Russo-Roumanian Commission within a year after the ratification of the Treaty of Peace. (b) Ardahan, Kars, Batoum, Bayazet, and the territory as far as the Saganlough. In its general outline, the frontier line, leaving the Black Sea coast, will follow the crest of the mountains which separate the affluents of the River Hopa from those of the River Tcharokh, and the chain of the mountains to the south of the town of Artwin up the River Tcharokh, near the villages of Alat and Bechaget; then the frontier will pass by the peaks of Mounts Dervenikghek Hortchezor, and Bedjuguin-Dagh, by the crest which separates the affluents of the Rivers Tortoum-tchai and the Tcharokh by the heights near Zaily-Vihine, coming down at the village Vihine-Kilissa to the River Tortoum-tchai; thence it will follow the Sivridagh chain to the pass (col) of the same name, passing south of the village of Noriman; then it will turn to the south-east and go to Zivine, whence the frontier, passing west of the road which leads from Zivine to the villages of Ardost and Horasson, will turn south by the Saganlough chain to the village of Gilitchman; then by the crest of the Charian-Dagh it will arrive, ten versts south of Hamour, at the Mourad-tchai defile; then the line will follow the crest of the Alla-Dagh and the summits of the Hori and Tandourek, and, passing south of the Bayazet valley, will proceed to rejoin the old Turko-Persian frontier to the south of the lake of the Kazli-gueul. The definitive limits of the territory annexed to Russia, and indicated on the map, will be fixed by a Commission composed of Russian and Ottoman delegates. This Commission in its labours will take into account the topography of localities, as well as considerations of good administration and other conditions calculated to insure the tranquillity of the country. (c) The territories mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b) are ceded to Russia as an equivalent for the sum of one milliard and one hundred million roubles. As for the rest of the indemnity, apart from the 10,000,000 of roubles

intended to indemnify Russian interests and establishments in Turkey, namely, 300,000,000 of roubles—the mode of payment and guarantee of that sum shall be settled by an understanding between the Imperial Government of Russia and that of his Majesty the Sultan. (d) The 10,000,000 roubles claimed as indemnity for the Russian subjects and establishments in Turkey shall be paid as soon as the claims of those interested are examined by the Russian Embassy at Constantinople and handed to the Sublime Porte.

ART. 20.—The Sublime Porte will take effective steps to put an amicable end to the lawsuits of Russian subjects pending for several years, to indemnify the latter if need be, and to carry into effect without delay all judgments passed.

ART. 21.—The inhabitants of the districts ceded to Russia who wish to take up their residence out of these territories will be free to retire on selling all their real property. For this purpose an interval of three years is granted them, counting from the date of ratification of the present Act. On the expiration of that time those of the inhabitants who shall not have sold their real property and left the country shall remain Russian subjects. Real property belonging to the state, or to religious establishments situated out of the localities aforesaid, shall be sold within the same interval of three years as shall be arranged by a special Russo-Turkish Commission. The same Commission shall be entrusted with determining how the Ottoman government is to remove its war material, munitions, supplies, and other state property actually in the forts, towns, and localities ceded to Russia, and not at present occupied by Russian troops.

ART. 22.—Russian ecclesiastics, pilgrims, and monks, travelling or sojourning in Turkey in Europe or in Asia shall enjoy the same rights, advantages, and privileges, as the foreign ecclesiastics of any other nationality. The right of official protection by the Imperial embassy and Russian consulates in Turkey is recognised, both

as regards the persons above-mentioned, and their possessions, religious houses, charitable institutions, &c., in the holy places and elsewhere. The monks of Mount Athos, of Russian origin, shall be maintained in all their possessions and former privileges, and shall continue to enjoy in the three convents belonging to them and in the adjoining buildings the same rights and privileges as are assured to the other religious establishments and convents of Mount Athos.

ART. 23.—All the treaties, conventions, and agreements previously concluded between the two high contracting parties relative to commerce, jurisdiction, and the position of Russian subjects in Turkey, and which had been abrogated by the state of war, shall come into force again, with the exception of the clauses affected by the present Act. The two governments will be placed again in the same relation to one another, with respect to all their engagements and commercial and other relations, as they were in before the declaration of war.

ART. 24.—The Bosphorus and the Dardanelles shall remain open in time of war as in time of peace to the merchant vessels of neutral states arriving from or bound to Russian ports. The Sublime Porte consequently engages never henceforth to establish at the ports of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov a fictitious blockade (*blocus fictif*), at variance with the spirit of the declaration signed at Paris on the 4-16th of April, 1856.

ART. 25.—The complete evacuation of Turkey in Europe, with the exception of Bulgaria, by the Russian army, will take place within three months after the conclusion of the definitive peace between his Majesty the Emperor of Russia and his Majesty the Sultan. In order to save time, and to avoid the cost of the prolonged maintenance of the Russian troops in Turkey and Roumania, part of the imperial army may proceed to the ports of the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmora, to be there shipped in vessels belonging to the Russian government or chartered for the occasion. The evacuation of Turkey in Asia will be effected within the space of six months, dating from the conclusion of the



definitive peace, and the Russian troops will be entitled to take ship at Trebizond in order to return by the Caucasus or the Crimea. The operations of the evacuation will begin immediately after the exchange of ratifications.

ART. 26.—As long as the imperial Russian troops remain in the localities which, in conformity with the present Act, will be restored to the Sublime Porte, the administration and order of affairs will continue in the same condition as has existed since the occupation. The Sublime Porte will not participate therein during all that time, nor until the entire departure of all the troops. The Ottoman forces shall not enter the places to be restored to the Sublime Porte, and the Sublime Porte cannot begin to exercise its authority there, until notice of each fortress and province having been evacuated by the Russian troops shall have been given by the commander of these troops to the officer appointed for this purpose by the Sublime Porte.

ART. 27.—The Sublime Porte undertakes not to punish in any manner, or allow to be punished, those Ottoman subjects who may have been compromised by their relations with the Russian army during the war. In the event of any persons wishing to withdraw with their families when the Russian troops leave, the Ottoman authorities shall not oppose their departure.

ART. 28.—Immediately upon the ratification of the Preliminaries of Peace, the prisoners of war shall be reciprocally restored under the care of special commissioners appointed on both sides, who, for this purpose, shall go to Odessa and Sebastopol. The Ottoman government will pay all the expenses of the maintenance of the prisoners that are returned to them, in eighteen equal instalments, in the space of six years, in accordance with the accounts that will be drawn up by the above-mentioned commissioners. The exchange of prisoners between the Ottoman government and the governments of Roumania, Servia, and Montenegro, will be made on the same basis, deducting, however, in the account, the number of prisoners restored by the Ottoman government from the number of prison-

ers that will have to be restored to that government.

ART. 29.—The present Act shall be ratified by their Imperial Majesties the Emperor of Russia and the Emperor of the Ottomans, and the ratifications shall be exchanged in fifteen days, or sooner if possible, at St. Petersburg, where likewise an agreement shall be come to as to the place and the time at which the stipulations of the present Act shall be invested with all the solemn forms usually observed in treaties of peace. It is, however, well understood that the high contracting parties consider themselves as formally bound by the present Act from the moment of its ratification.

"In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have appended their signatures and seals to the present Act.

"Done at San Stefano, February 19th (March 3rd), 1878.

"CTE. N. IGNATIEW.

"SAFVET.

"NELIDOW.

"SADOULLAH."

This, then, was the famous instrument in which the Russian government set forth its own estimate of the value of its victories over the Porte. It would perhaps be rash to conclude that Ignatieff, or the Grand Duke Nicholas, or the czar himself, expected to secure for Russia all the advantages to which they had laid claim. They could scarcely suppose that the definite resettlement of south-eastern Europe would be left in their own hands, or as a matter of arrangement between themselves and the Turks. Europe, and especially England, had already given many signs of their determination to have a voice in the re-adjustment of the quarrel, and it must have been perfectly plain to the czar and his counsellors that a fresh war was the only alternative to concurrence in this reasonable demand. They therefore drew up the Treaty of San Stefano rather as an expression of their desires than as a final statement of their fixed resolve. They doubtless acted on the principle which guides every shrewd driver of a bargain, asking more than they actually expected to get,

in order that, after Europe had been satisfied by concessions, enough might remain to satisfy themselves.

The demands of Russia in this instrument were very large, even when we confine our attention to that which she required for herself exclusively. The vast increase of territory in Asia Minor, the important rectification of frontier in Europe, the stipulation for a crushing money indemnity, which the Porte had no prospect whatever of being able to pay—these, and sundry other clauses of the treaty, were framed solely in the interests of Russia, and possibly in some degree with the object of retaining a hold upon the Ottoman empire long after the recovery of peace. That, at all events, is the interpretation which was freely placed upon the indemnity clauses as soon as the terms were made public; and there are many grounds for concluding it to be the right one.

Apart from these exorbitant requirements, however, the treaty weighed heavily on the unfortunate victim of the war. The new Bulgaria as sketched above would have more than eaten the heart out of the Ottoman empire in Europe; and if, as appears probable, it was a foregone conclusion that Austria should take Bosnia and Herzegovina, the sultan would merely have retained a portion of Thrace, southern Macedonia, with the Greek provinces, and the western belt of Albania. It was, in fact, an absurd and impossible arrangement, which stood condemned from the beginning; and the suspicion is irresistible that Russia only proposed this wild reconstruction of the map of Turkey in order to increase her chance of establishing a larger Bulgaria than had hitherto been conceived.

The circumstances under which this treaty was signed at San Stefano invest the action with a specially dramatic interest. It was not only the Russians themselves who looked upon the 3rd of March as a red-letter day, and who hailed with acclamation what they trusted was to be the death-warrant of Turkey. The little seaside village was crowded with visitors of many different nationalities, who came from Constanti-

nople, and further still, to witness the closing scene of the war, and the military review by which it was to be celebrated. English, French, Germans, Greeks, and Bulgarians, even Mahomedans in large numbers, gathered together and waited patiently until the eventful moment should arrive.

"In a house by the seaside at San Stefano," says one correspondent, "shaken by the increasing gale that tore across the Sea of Marmora, were busy, all night long, the secretaries of both diplomatic bodies copying and arranging for the signatures the Treaty of Peace, the result of the now concluded negotiations. All night long Prince Tzereteleff dictated the treaty to his colleague, Chebachoff, who wrote and wrote through the long hours until the document was finished. Although wearied by continuous labour, these two secretaries, appreciating the value of their work, kept at their task, only stopping for refreshment and to listen to the scratch of the reeds of the Turkish secretaries in an adjoining room, busy with their own copy, until the full dawn found them still at the table. Then, the last word being on paper, they slept amid the confusion of documents, maps, and volumes, as a soldier sleeps in his harness. Scarcely was it daylight when, notwithstanding the storm, there was an unusual movement in the village. There was a general idea that peace was to be signed that day. The steamers from Constantinople came rolling along through the rough sea, overlaid with excursionists attracted by the review which had been announced to take place in celebration of the anniversary of the czar's accession to the throne. Greeks, Bulgarians, Turks, and Russians, crowded the little village, besieging the restaurants, swarming about the doors of houses whence were supposed to issue some of the great personages who were to become famous in history, all impatiently awaiting the hour of two, the appointed time of the review. The horses of the grand duke and his staff were gathered about the entrance to his quarters, and keen-eyed spectators, ready to interpret the slightest movement of the commander-in-chief, formed



unbroken ranks around the group of horses in the street."

The correspondent of the "Standard" at San Stefano wrote home a graphic account of the ceremonial. "In the expectation," he began, "that this day would witness the consummation of another act in the drama which all Europe has been watching for so long, preparations had been made for a grand review in honour of the event; but this review was not to take place until the military authorities had been informed that the signatures were an accomplished fact. It had been calculated that the review might be held at two o'clock, and at that hour the grand duke's horse was waiting at his door. The troops had marched out in the forenoon to the review ground, and their numbers had been swelled by a large contingent from Tchataldja. The battalion of the Imperial Guard piled their overcoats in heaps at the railway station, and left them under a guard while they took part in the evolutions. The clergy also were not idle, for they chanted the Liturgy and sang a *Te Deum* in the church on the morning of this memorable Sunday.

"The Grand Duke Nicholas appeared on the ground at five o'clock. There were assembled twenty-nine battalions of infantry, forty-four guns, and eight squadrons of cavalry drawn up in five parallel lines, with a space of fifty yards between one line and the next. Some two hundred yards in advance of the front line stood an oblong table bearing a picture of Our Lord gorgeously decorated in silver, a Bible bound in gold, and several books with portraits of saints. Upon a round table behind the larger one stood a silver basin of holy water and a brush of the same precious metal. To conduct the religious portion of the ceremony a number of Russian priests were in attendance, headed by one who was habited in a short robe of golden texture, strewn with red crosses, over a purple silk under-garment, and his hat was of purple velvet. The sky was overcast, but nothing could chill the enthusiasm of the troops, who cheered as the grand duke and his staff rode in and out be-

tween their lines, cheered as the distinguished party moved forward to take their appointed places, and continued to make the air ring with their acclamations whenever an excuse was found for a cheer.

"Before the functions of the priests were employed the officers had gathered round their commander to hear his congratulations. His Imperial Highness looked supremely happy as, in a loud voice, he announced that peace was concluded. He thanked the army, and especially the Guards whom he had so long commanded, for the bravery they had displayed; and finished by taking off his cap, waving it in the air, and shouting hurrah. The example was contagious. For the moment there was no thought of military discipline, and a rare scene of enthusiasm was witnessed. The men in the ranks kissed and hugged one another; they cried, they shouted, they flung up their caps, and gave themselves up to a complete abandon of joy, in which some poor Turks who had been standing among the spectators joined, using their turbans in the absence of a more soldierly head-dress. The tumult of this indescribable gladness was only subdued when the grand duke was seen advancing to the improvised altar. There, kneeling before a gold cross which the priest extended to him, his Imperial Highness kissed the sacred symbol; then rising he took the brush, dipped it in the water, and made the sign of the cross upon his forehead. After kissing the hands of the head-priest he made way for his son, who did as his father had done. General Ignatieff, whose blue spectacles made him very conspicuous, was the next to take the water of sanctification; and scarcely less noticeable was the late ambassador's wife, dressed in mauve silk, a jacket trimmed with a dark fur, and a black velvet bonnet with two saffron-coloured feathers.

"The march past commenced soon after six o'clock, and the troops followed one another in the following order:—Two squadrons of Cossacks, one squadron of mounted gendarmerie, the Imperial Guard, the infantry in their great-

coats, the guns, the cavalry, the hussars, and the Cossacks. Each colonel, after saluting the grand duke at the head of his regiment, left the line and joined the brilliant staff; each band also took up a position near the review staff, and played as its own regiment was passing. The regimental flags, carried over the shoulder like rifles, were torn and pierced with bullet holes, evidence of many a desperate engagement, and were surmounted with eagles. The Cossacks needed no band, for they sang their wild melodies as they marched; some of them carried bamboo lances which they had captured in fight from the Turkish irregulars, and which they had been allowed to retain, as they considered them superior to their own. I mention this fact on the authority of a Russian officer, as I never chanced to see any of these bamboo lances during the campaign in Europe. The battalions of the line were still armed with their unwieldy old-fashioned rifles.

"The rejoicings of the troops continued far into the night, and the cheering repeatedly broke the stillness, until the overjoyed soldiery were overcome by sleep, and the camp was left to the tread of the sentry. To their credit, it must be added that very little drunkenness was to be seen. Although an illumination had been spoken of as a fitting conclusion of the day, none took place; the only lights in the town after dark being the lantern at every third house, in accordance with a regulation of the authorities, and on the shore a lamp at each house. Some four hundred officers, many of them of superior rank, eschewing the restraints of the camp at a moment when the new peace permitted the relaxation of almost all discipline, assembled at a miserable Eastern copy of the Parisian *café chantant*, and constituted themselves both performers and audience. National airs sung lustily, if not harmoniously, were alternated with choice bits from *La Fille de Madame Angot*, and the opera got the better of the patriotism among the excited gathering after a large quantity of champagne had been consumed. One officer, a Bulgarian, and said to be an edu-

cated man, became so elated that, springing upon a table, he danced the *can-can*, amid the hearty applause, and to the infinite satisfaction of his friends.

"All this afternoon display and this evening carousing were consequent upon the simple incident I have mentioned in my opening lines—an incident, however, so momentous that the scene of its occurrence will be celebrated in coming time as is the house at Sedan where the leaders in the Franco-German war held their memorable interview. For the signing of the treaty a house had been selected which stands upon the brink of a precipitous cliff, into whose cave-eaten base the waves seemed to boom a constant protest against peace. The Plenipotentiaries met in an elegantly-furnished room, about twenty-five feet square, upholstered in blue, with yellow flowers and stripes, and carpeted with the produce of the looms of Smyrna, in green and red. Porcelain vases of evergreens stood in each window. Through the windows, the eye ranged over a splendid panorama—first, the dark blue-sea flecked with white sails; in the middle distance the Prince's Islands, rocky cliffs rising in barren majesty out of the expanse of water; and in the background the mountains of Asia, misty and undefined, except where a snow-capped peak raised its head above the hazy outline. At the opposite side of the room from the windows was a divan, in front of which stood a large table covered with maps. General Ignatieff and M. de Nelidoff took their seats, with their backs to the window, so that they could scrutinise every play of feature which at this supreme moment must surely break through the impassive stolidity of the two representative Turks commissioned to ratify the defeat of their nation and its consequences. Safvet Pacha sat on Ignatieff's right, there being a small round table before these two functionaries. Sadoullah Bey was nearer the centre of the room, in a large fauteuil, bordered with heavy gilt fringe. The other occupants of the room were Prince Cherofeli, M. Bazil, and two Turkish secretaries.

"When all was ready, General Ignatieff and



Safvet Pacha signed simultaneously, the latter holding the document on his hand as he wrote, after the Turkish manner; the Russian writing on the table. Each then took the other's paper, and signed again, and the Treaty of San Stefano was completed."

A "Daily News" correspondent wrote of the same occasion:—"After the review, gathering his officers about him where the priest stood ready for the *Te Deum*, the grand duke spoke briefly and emphatically, saying:—

" 'To an army which has accomplished what you have, my friends, nothing is impossible.'

"Then all dismounted, uncovered, and a solemn service was conducted, the soldiers all kneeling. A few ladies were present at this ceremony. Among others I noticed Madame Ignatieff, kneeling on a fur rug beside her carriage.

"All the generals, except Skobelev, were in attendance. He was back in Tchataldja. Baron Loenhausen and Captain Bolla, the Austrian military attachés, the former wearing the Cross of St. Vladimir, received for coolness under fire, the latter with the St. George, for acting as Skobelev's aide-de-camp, on the day he took the redoubts on the Loftcha road; Colonel Gaillard, the French attaché, who has been along with the grand duke ever since the army was mobilised, eighteen months ago, decorated with the St. Vladimir around his neck; Major Leignitz, the Prussian attaché, with the St. George, for services, at the Grivica redoubt; Lieutenant Green, the American attaché, wearing the St. Vladimir for the last Balkan campaign; and, finally, the two Swiss attachés, who had arrived just in time for the *Te Deum*. These officers, with a few of the correspondents who had followed the army, were the foreign witnesses of the closing scene. Of the correspondents who, eighty strong, joined the head-quarters at Ploesti, only five now remain with the army.

"Never has a peace been celebrated under more dramatic and picturesque conditions, or with more impressive surroundings. The two armies face to face, the clearing storm, the wan-

ing light of day, the rush of the wind, and the near wash of the wave mingling with the chant of the priests and the responses of the soldiers, and the roar of the Sea of Marmora, swelling and falling. The landscape, always of great beauty, now formed a wonderfully appropriate background to the picture. Across the fretting chafing waters of the sea, the dome and slender minarets of St. Sofia came up most beautifully against the sky, the dominant points in the interesting silhouette of distant Stamboul. Away to the south, the Prince's Islands rose like great mounds, dark and massive, against the distant Asiatic shore, and behind them, we knew, was hidden the English fleet. Above and far beyond, the white peak of Mount Olympus unveiled for the moment its majestic summit, as the rays of the ruddy sunset were reflected from the snow-covered flanks.

"The religious ceremony over, the grand duke took his stand, and the army began to file past with a swinging rapid stride, in forcible contrast with the weary pace with which they used to drag themselves slowly along at the end of that long and exhausting chase, scarcely at times able to put one foot before the other. The night was falling, and darkness settled quickly over the scene. When we left the spot the grand duke was still sitting immovable on his horse, and the troops were still passing. As we rode down into the village, we could hear the joyful shouts still ringing in the air, and the measured tramp, tramp, going off in the darkness."

The conflict of arms was at an end. There was to be no further bloodshed between Russians and Turks, at all events for any cause which was then discernible. The Mahomedans had made their last stand, and had been beaten; they now submitted to all that was imposed upon them, patiently and even tamely, as coming by the decree of a fate which it would be impossible to avoid, and of which it would be impious to complain.

But the war of the sword was to be followed by a war of diplomacy, in which the victories,

though bloodless, were not less effectual than those gained in Bulgaria and Roumelia. England and Russia, as well as Austria and Russia, were to measure their strength in council, in intrigue, in the display and the menace of national resources; and at Berlin, the Areopagus of Europe, a battle-royal was to be fought by the statesmen of the great Powers, even more important to the community of nations than the struggle between the armies of the czar and the sultan.

The events of the next few months sprang directly from the Turko-Russian war, the history of which would not be complete without a narrative of its sequel.

#### CHAPTER XIV.

##### EUROPE AND RUSSIA.

THE effect upon Europe of the victories of Russia, and of the far-reaching treaty by which the war had been brought to a close, was very great. The interests of all the Powers were affected, though in different modes and degrees, so that there was at once created a sort of common bond amongst the governments which, though there may have been few points on which all alike were agreed, was still exceedingly strong as far as it extended.

One principle on which all were united was, that, after the vast changes which had actually been brought about in south-eastern Europe, it became absolutely necessary that the great Powers should meet in conference, and decide upon their future relations, in so far as their past relations had been disturbed by accomplished facts. It would have been impossible that the European community should have long overlooked or undervalued this principle, which is the foundation upon which the edifice of international rights has been built. Nevertheless, for some time after the completion of the Russo-Turkish agreement, there was little evidence in the di-

plomacy of Europe, so far as outsiders were able to judge, that the statesmen who guided the destinies of the great Powers, set an adequate value on the maintenance of the general concert.

Something in the nature of a stupor had fallen upon the chancellors and prime ministers of the five Powers whose duty it was to insist on the meeting of Europe in council. The feeling was due, in part, to the rapid succession of victories gained by Russia, which had brought her, at a few weeks' notice, to the very gates of Constantinople. But more important motives than this were at work. The interests of several of the Powers drew them in various directions, and made their united action difficult, if not for a time impossible. Italy was jealous of Austria, and France of Germany. Every attempt on the part of one Power to profit by the decay of Turkey brought the claims of others into prominence, and rumours of agreements and "compensations" were circulated continually during the months of March, April, and May. On the other hand, there was unquestionably a great amount of indifference amongst the majority of the governments as to the future fate of Turkey. With the Porte in Europe scarcely any nation except ourselves displayed a practical sympathy, and scarcely any, unless it were France, and possibly Austria, saw reason to object to the advance of Russia to the Mediterranean. Thus there was no sufficiently strong or general motive amongst the great Powers to make them combine effectively for a common course of action.

The long uncertainty and delay in the diplomacy of Europe during this crisis may be explained in another way, perhaps more satisfactorily than either of those above-mentioned.

Europe virtually saw the work being effected for her by England, who was the first to take it in hand, who was regarded as the natural advocate of the Ottoman Power, and who had the greatest interest in assigning limits to the advance of Russia in the East. The English government lost no time in giving Russia to understand that they would, in any case, require her to submit her treaty to Europe in council; and



Europe, finding the thing which was necessary done in her own name by the spontaneous zeal of a single nation, willingly left the quarrel to be fought out between the two.

The question raised was practically this. Ought Russia, or ought she not, to submit the treaty of San Stefano to the Powers which had been parties to the treaty of Paris? The Russian government urged that there was no necessity of the kind, and endeavoured to make a precedent of the treaty of Versailles, which was concluded and ratified by Germany and France alone. There was, of course, no great difficulty in setting aside this plea. The treaty of Versailles affected no country except the two which were parties to it, and it touched none of the clauses of the treaty of Paris. The treaty of San Stefano, on the other hand, dealt with the same interests as that of Paris, and meddled, more or less, with the majority of those clauses.

The English government demanded, in the firmest manner, that this submission of the treaty should be made; and it was Russia's unreasonable obstinacy in the matter which kept the diplomatic world in a state of the highest tension for several weeks. The negotiations for the meeting of a Congress went on independently of the special form of difficulty between London and St. Petersburg. Austria invited the governments to send their plenipotentiaries to Vienna; whilst, as an alternative locality, first Baden, and then Berlin, was suggested.

Russia objected to Vienna, alleging that the Austrian government was on some points inimical to her; and, in addition to this, the Russian statesmen may have been unwilling to meet in a capital where Sir Henry Elliott had recently been appointed English ambassador. However this may appear, it is true that the choice of place was narrowed down to the German capital, but, even when Russia agreed to the actual holding of a Conference, she persisted in maintaining that there was no necessity for her to lay the whole treaty on the table. She was willing to invite consideration by the great Powers of the clauses which directly affected their several in-

terests, but sought to avoid the formal submission of the entire document.

England persisted; and Austria also was known to have urged her claims as a Danubian, and partly Slavonic Power, with a great show of determination. Germany appeared, for the most part, indifferent. At times her policy assumed an air of complete selfishness and isolation; at others, it seemed to aim at producing, rather than averting a fresh war. On the whole, the bearing of Prince Bismarck towards Prince Gortschakoff was a friendly one, and the German chancellor certainly assisted the Russian statesman to secure some of his greatest diplomatic triumphs. But, at the same time, it was well known that a considerable amount of jealousy existed between the two; and it was very plausibly stated that Bismarck had nursed a grudge against Gortschakoff for the friendly attitude which the former had displayed towards France a few years previously.

The condition of affairs in the latter days of March may be gathered from the contemporary expressions of opinion in the leading newspapers of the time, which, almost, without exception, came round to the views entertained by the English government. It was only the Russian organs which continued to maintain the impracticable ideas of Prince Gortschakoff. The arguments employed by them were concisely put in the letter of a Russian correspondent of the "Political Correspondence" of Vienna, on the 19th of March, according to which the divergencies of opinion between the British and Russian governments had become more acute in consequence of the categorical demand of Great Britain, that all points of the treaty of peace should be submitted to the European Congress for discussion and revision. The conditions of the treaty, observed this writer, could, without doubt, be seriously discussed at the Congress itself, and Russia would, as far as possible, pay due regard to all arguments adduced for the purpose of bringing about a cordial agreement, but "she is not disposed to comply with imperative orders given to her before the opening of



PRINCE GORTSCHAKOFF





the Congress. By pursuing this course England would only render the meeting of the Congress nugatory."

Russia next tried to satisfy the demand made upon her by declaring that she would communicate the whole of the terms of peace to the Powers before the Congress assembled, so that every government would have the opportunity of stating its opinion as to which of the points partook of a European character, and which did not.

In point of fact, the Russian government did formally communicate to all the great Powers the preliminaries of the San Stefano treaty. At the same time the "*Agence Russe*" circulated a statement to the following effect:—

"As the text itself of the treaty of San Stefano is communicated to the Powers, and as Russia recognises the principle that in every Congress each Power is perfectly free in regard to its proposals, motions, and opinions, it would seem as though there was no longer any object in the formality required by England, namely, that all the conditions of peace should be submitted to the Congress in order to determine which of them require the sanction of the Powers. The preliminary commission assembling in Berlin does not possess the importance attributed to it by some journals, its object being merely to come to an understanding as to the formula of the official invitations."

The steps which England had taken in the matter were succinctly stated by Lord Derby in the House of Lords, on the 21st of March. Replying to a number of questions and strictures from the Duke of Argyle and others, he said:—"On the 9th of March we stated, in a letter to the Austrian ambassador at this court, that, while we had no objection to the change from Baden-Baden to Berlin, we still considered that it would be desirable that all the questions between Russia and Turkey should be considered as the subject to be discussed at the Conference, and that no alteration of the treaties should be valid until it had received the assent of the Powers. Some doubt was entertained as to the meaning

of that declaration, and I repeated, in a letter of the 13th of March, that her Majesty's government desired to state that they distinctly understood, before they entered the Congress, that every article of the treaty of peace between Russia and Turkey would be placed before the Congress, not necessarily for acceptance, but in order that it might be considered what articles required the acceptance and concurrence of the several Powers, and what did not. Some discussion has arisen, and we have, on the part of the Russian government, a declaration that the text of the treaty will be communicated to the Powers when the ratifications are exchanged. But a further question arose, as to which we had not yet come to an understanding, as to whether it is to be understood that all the conditions of the treaty are to be placed before the Congress for discussion? I will not now quote the correspondence, which will be, no doubt, laid before Parliament, but the question we put was this: Whether the government of Russia is willing that the communications of the treaty, in its entirety, to the various Powers, should be treated as placing the treaty before the Congress, in order that the whole treaty, in relation to existing treaties, may be examined and considered by the Congress. The noble duke said—Would it be unreasonable to expect that the Russian government, having sacrificed so many men, and so much money, should place before the Congress the treaty which she had attained by virtue of those sacrifices, and submit the questions at issue between her and Turkey to be decided by the Congress? Now, no proposal of that kind has been made by her Majesty's government. As a matter of fact, I believe it is the universal rule that the representatives at a Congress do not vote; there is no majority, and the questions before it are not decided by plurality of votes. I therefore agree with the noble lord that the Russian government may object to placing the whole terms of the treaty at the decision of a majority of the Congress. That we do not ask; but what we do ask is, that all its articles may be laid for discussion, and for discussion only, be-



fore the Congress, because we believe that in that manner only can we decide which of them do, and which do not affect Europe. We believe that, as the Congress will be asked to give a European sanction to the changes now being made, we ought to have the whole case before us for the purpose of discussion. That is the sole question at present at issue. I am not prepared to say what answer the Russian government will give to our demand; but I think your lordships and the country will be of opinion that the demand itself is reasonable and moderate, and that without such a condition as that which we make it would be of little use for the Congress to meet at all."

Meanwhile Prince Gortschakoff was attempting to prevent the mutual understanding of England and Austria, which manifestly forced his hand. General Ignatieff was despatched on a mission to Vienna, with the object of satisfying the Austrian government by a special arrangement, and thus isolating England to that extent. His mission, however, completely failed. The general, according to a good authority, was informed by the government that Austria would require certain modifications in the terms of peace, and also that such modifications should be made with the concurrence of the other Powers. This action on the part of Austria clearly tended to the maintenance of peace, and of the European concert. The great danger for Europe was not in the assumptions of Russia alone, but in the offensive alliance of the three Eastern empires against the remainder of Europe. The wise resolution of Austria preserved us from such a danger.

Within a week from the utterance by Lord Derby of the speech above quoted his lordship had resigned. He was succeeded at the Foreign Office by the Marquis of Salisbury, who at once forwarded to the English embassies abroad the following important despatch, in which he recapitulates the diplomatic measures of England since the beginning of the year, and formulates the objections of the government to the San Stefano Treaty:—

"Foreign Office, April 1, 1878.

"My Lord (Sir)—I have received the queen's commands to request your excellency to explain to the government to which you are accredited the course which her Majesty's government have thought it their duty to pursue in reference to the Preliminaries of Peace concluded between the Ottoman and Russian governments, and to the European Congress which it has been proposed to hold for the examination of that treaty.

"On the 14th January, in view of the reports which had reached her Majesty's government as to the negotiations for peace which were about to be opened between the Russian government and the Porte, and in order to avoid any possible misconception, her Majesty's government instructed Lord A. Loftus to state to Prince Gortschakoff that, in the opinion of her Majesty's government, any treaty concluded between the government of Russia and the Porte affecting the treaties of 1856 and 1871 must be an European treaty, and would not be valid without the assent of the Powers who were parties to those treaties.

"On the 25th January the Russian government replied by the assurance that they did not intend to settle by themselves (*isolément*) European questions having reference to the peace which is to be made (*se rattachant à la paix*). Her Majesty's government, having learnt that the bases of peace had been arranged between the Turkish and Russian delegates at Kyzanlik, instructed Lord A. Loftus, on the 29th of January, to state to the Russian government that her Majesty's government, while recognising any arrangements made by the Russian and Turkish delegates at Kyzanlik for the conclusion of an armistice, and for the settlement of bases of peace, as binding between the two belligerents, declared that, so far as those arrangements were calculated to modify European treaties, and to affect general and British interests, her Majesty's government were unable to recognise in them any validity unless they were made the subject of a formal agreement among the parties to the treaty of Paris.

"On the 30th January, Lord A. Loftus communicated this declaration to Prince Gortschakoff, and his highness replied that, to affect an armistice, certain bases of peace were necessary, but they were only to be considered as preliminaries, and not definitive as regarded Europe; and stated, categorically, that questions bearing on European interests would be concerted with European Powers, and that he had given her Majesty's government clear and positive assurances to this effect.

"On the 4th February, the Austrian ambassador communicated a telegram, inviting her Majesty's government to a Conference at Vienna, and her Majesty's government at once accepted the proposal.

"On the 5th of February, his excellency addressed a formal invitation to Lord Derby, stating that—*L'Autriche-Hongrie, en sa qualité de Puissance Signataire des actes internationaux qui ont eu pour objet de régler le système politique en Orient, a toujours réservé, en présence de la guerre actuelle, sa part d'influence sur le règlement définitif des conditions de la paix future. Le Gouvernement Impérial de la Russie, auquel nous avons fait part de ce point de vue, l'a pleinement apprécié. Aujourd'hui que des Préliminaires de Paix viennent d'être signés entre la Russie et la Turquie le moment nous semble venu d'établir l'accord de l'Europe sur les modifications qu'il deviendrait nécessaire d'apporter aux Traités susmentionnés. Le mode le plus apte à amener cette entente nous paraît être la réunion d'une Conférence des Puissances Signataires du Traité de Paris de 1856 et du Protocole de Londres de 1871.*"

"On the 9th instant the Austrian government proposed that, instead of the Conference at Baden-Baden, as previously contemplated, a Congress should be assembled at Berlin. Her Majesty's government replied that they had no objection to this change, but they considered 'that it would be desirable to have it understood, in the first place, that all questions dealt with in the Treaty of Peace between Russia and Turkey, should be considered as subject to be discussed

in the Congress; and that no alteration in the condition of things previously established by treaty should be acknowledged as valid until it has received the assent of the Powers.'

"On the 12th March, Count Beust was told that her Majesty's government must be perfectly clear on the points mentioned in the letter to him of the 9th instant before they could definitively agree to go into Congress.

"On the 13th her Majesty's government explained further the first condition:—'That they must distinctly understand, before they can enter into Congress, that every Article in the Treaty between Russia and Turkey will be placed before the Congress, not necessarily for acceptance, but in order that it may be considered what articles require acceptance or concurrence by the several Powers, and what do not.'

"On the 14th, the Russian ambassador communicated the following telegram from Prince Gortschakoff:—'*Toutes les Grandes Puissances savent déjà que le texte complet du Traité Préliminaire de Paix avec la Porte leur sera communiqué dès que les ratifications auront été échangées, ce qui ne saurait tarder. Il sera simultanément publié ici. Nous n'avons rien à cacher.*

"On the 17th, Lord A. Loftus reported that he had received the following Memorandum from Prince Gortschakoff:—'In reply to communication made by Lord A. Loftus of the despatch by which Lord Derby has replied to the proposal of Count Beust, relating to the meeting of the Congress at Berlin, I have the honour to repeat the assurance which Count Schouvaloff has been already charged to give to her Majesty's government, viz., that the Preliminary Treaty of Peace concluded between Russia and Turkey shall be textually communicated to the great Powers before the meeting of the Congress, and that in the Congress itself each Power will have the full liberty of its appreciations and of its action.'

"In a despatch, received on the 18th, Lord A. Loftus stated that Prince Gortschakoff had said to him that, of course, he could not impose



silence on any member of the Congress, but he could only accept a discussion on those portions of the treaty which affected European interests.

"Lord Derby having asked Count Schouvaloff for a reply from Prince Gortschakoff, his excellency informed him on the 19th that he 'was charged to represent to her Majesty's government that the treaty of peace concluded between Russia and Turkey—the only one which existed, for there was no secret engagement—would be communicated to the government of the queen in its entirety, and long before (*bien avant*) the assembling of the Congress. The government of the queen, in like manner as the other great Powers, reserved to themselves at the Congress their full liberty of appreciation and action. This same liberty, which she did not dispute to others, Russia claimed for herself. Now, it would be to restrict her if, alone among all the Powers, Russia contracted a preliminary engagement.'

"On the 21st, Lord Derby replied that her Majesty's government could not recede from the position, already clearly defined by them, that they must distinctly understand, before they could enter into Congress, that every article in the treaty between Russia and Turkey would be placed before the Congress, not necessarily for acceptance, but in order that it might be considered what articles required acceptance or concurrence by the other Powers, and what did not.

"Her Majesty's government were unable to accept the view now put forward by Prince Gortschakoff, that the freedom of opinion and action in Congress, of Russia, more than of any other Power, would be restricted by this preliminary understanding.

"Her Majesty's government therefore desired to ask whether the government of Russia were willing that the communication of the treaty *en entier* to the various Powers should be treated as a placing of the treaty before the Congress, in order that the whole treaty, in its relation to existing treaties, might be examined and considered by the Congress.

"On the 26th, Count Schouvaloff wrote to Lord Derby that the Imperial Cabinet deemed

it its duty to adhere to the declaration which he was ordered to make to the government of the queen, and which was stated in the letter which he had the honour to address to him, dated the 19th of March.

"As different interpretations had been given to the 'liberty of appreciation and action' which Russia thought it right to reserve to herself at the Congress, the Imperial Cabinet defined the meaning of the term in the following manner:—'It leaves to the other Powers the liberty of raising such questions at the Congress as they might think it fit to discuss, and reserves to itself the liberty of accepting or not accepting the discussion of these questions.' Her Majesty's government deeply regret the decision which the Russian government have thus announced.

"How far the stipulations of the treaty of San Stefano would commend themselves as expedient to the judgment of the European Powers it is not at present possible to decide. But even if a considerable portion of them were such as were likely to be approved, the reservation of a right, at discretion, to refuse to accept a discussion of them in a Congress of the Powers would not, on that account, be the less open to the most serious objection. An inspection of the treaty will sufficiently show that her Majesty's government could not, in a European Congress, accept any partial or fragmentary examination of its provisions. Every material stipulation which it contains involves a departure from the treaty of 1856.

"By the declaration annexed to the first protocol of the Conference held in London in 1871, the plenipotentiaries of the great Powers, including Russia, recognised 'that it is an essential principle of the law of nations, that no Power can liberate itself from the engagements of a treaty, nor modify the stipulations thereof, unless with the consent of the contracting Powers by means of an amicable arrangement.' It is impossible for her Majesty's government, without violating the spirit of this declaration, to acquiesce in the withdrawal from the cognisance of the Powers of articles in the new treaty which

are modifications of existing treaty engagements, and inconsistent with them.

"The general nature of the treaty, and the combined effect of its several stipulations upon the interests of the Signatory Powers, furnish another and a conclusive reason against the separate discussion of any one portion of those stipulations apart from the rest.

"The most important consequences to which the treaty practically leads are those which result from its action as a whole upon the nations of south-eastern Europe. By the articles erecting the new Bulgaria, a strong Slav state will be created, under the auspices and the control of Russia, possessing important harbours upon the shores of the Black Sea and the Archipelago, and conferring upon that Power a preponderating influence over both political and commercial relations in those seas. It will be so constituted as to merge, in the dominant Slav majority, a considerable mass of population, which is Greek in race and sympathy, and which views with alarm the prospect of absorption into a community alien to it, not only in nationality, but in political tendency, and in religious allegiance. The provisions by which this new state is to be subjected to a ruler whom Russia will practically choose, its administration framed by a Russian commissary, and the first working of its institutions commenced under the control of a Russian army, sufficiently indicate the political system of which in future it is to form a part.

"Stipulations are added which will extend this influence even beyond the boundaries of the new Bulgaria. The position, in itself highly commendable, of improved institutions for the population of Thessaly and Epirus, is accompanied by a condition, that the law by which they are to be secured shall be framed under the supervision of the Russian government. It is followed by engagements for the protection of members of the Russian church, which are certainly not more limited in their scope than those articles of the treaty of Kainardji, upon which the claims were founded, which were abrogated in 1856. Such stipulations cannot be viewed

with satisfaction, either by the government of Greece, or by the Powers to whom all parts of the Ottoman empire are a matter of common interest. The general effect of this portion of the treaty will be to increase the power of the Russian empire in the countries and on the shores where a Greek population predominates, not only to the prejudice of that nation, but also of every country having interests in the east of the Mediterranean Sea.

"The territorial severance from Constantinople of the Greek, Albanian, and Slavonic provinces, which are still left under the government of the Porte, will cause their administration to be tended with constant difficulty, and even embarrassment; and will not only deprive the Porte of the political strength which might have arisen from their possession, but will expose the inhabitants to a serious risk of anarchy.

"By the other portions of the treaty analogous results are arrived at upon other frontiers of the Ottoman empire. The compulsory alienation of Bessarabia from Roumania, the extension of Bulgaria to the shores of the Black Sea, which are principally inhabited by Mussulmans and Greeks, and the acquisition of the important harbour of Batoum, will make the will of the Russian government dominant over all the vicinity of the Black Sea. The acquisition of the strongholds of Armenia will place the population of that province under the immediate influence of the Power which holds them; while the extensive European trade which now passes from Trebizond to Persia will, in consequence of the sessions in Kurdistan, be liable to be arrested at the pleasure of the Russian government by the prohibitory barriers of their commercial system.

"Provision is made for an indemnity, of which the amount is obviously beyond the means of Turkey to discharge, even if the fact be left out of account that any surplus of its revenues is already hypothecated to other creditors. The mode of payment of this indemnity is left, in vague language, to ulterior negotiations between Russia and the Porte. Payment may be demanded



immediately, or it may be left as an unredeemed and unredeemable obligation to weigh down the independence of the Porte for many years. Its discharge may be commuted into a yet larger cession of territory, or it may take the form of special engagements subordinating in all things the policy of Turkey to that of Russia. It is impossible not to recognise in this provision an instrument of formidable efficacy for the coercion of the Ottoman government, if the necessity for employing it should arise.

"Objections may be urged individually against these various stipulations; and arguments, on the other hand, may possibly be advanced to show that they are not individually inconsistent with the attainment of the lasting peace and stability which it is the highest object of all present negotiations to establish in the provinces of European and Asiatic Turkey. But their separate and individual operations, whether defensible or not, is not that which should engage the most earnest attention of the Signatory Powers. Their combined effect, in addition to the results upon the Greek population and upon the balance of maritime power, which have been already pointed out, is to depress almost to the point of entire subjection the political independence of the government of Constantinople. The formal jurisdiction of that government extends over geographical positions which must, under all circumstances, be of the deepest interest to Great Britain. It is in the power of the Ottoman government to close or to open the Straits which form the natural highway of nations between the *Ægean* Sea and the *Euxine*. Its dominion is recognised at the head of the *Persian Gulf*, on the shores of the *Levant*, and in the immediate neighbourhood of the *Suez Canal*. It cannot be otherwise than a matter of extreme solicitude to this country that the government to which this jurisdiction belongs should be so closely pressed by the political outposts of a greatly superior Power that its independent action, and even existence, is almost impossible. These results arise, not so much from the language of any single article in the treaty as from

the operation of the instrument as a whole. A discussion limited to articles selected by one Power in the Congress would be an illusory remedy for the dangers to English interests and to the permanent peace of Europe which would result from the state of things which the treaty proposes to establish.

"The object of her Majesty's government at the Constantinople Conference was to give effect to the policy of reforming Turkey under the Ottoman government, removing well-grounded grievances, and thus preserving the empire until the time when it might be able to dispense with protective guarantees. It was obvious that this could only be brought about by rendering the different populations so far contented with their position as to inspire them with a spirit of patriotism, and make them ready to defend the Ottoman empire as loyal subjects of the sultan.

"This policy was frustrated by the unfortunate resistance of the Ottoman itself, and, under the altered circumstances of the present time, the same result cannot be attained to the same extent by the same means. Large changes may, and no doubt will, be requisite in the treaties by which south-eastern Europe has hitherto been ruled. But good government, assured peace, and freedom, for populations to whom those blessings have been strange, are still the objects which this country earnestly desires to secure.

"In requiring a full consideration of the general interests which the new arrangements threaten to affect, her Majesty's government believe that they are taking the surest means of securing those objects. They would willingly have entered a Congress in which the stipulations in question could have been examined as a whole, in their relation to existing treaties, to the acknowledged rights of Great Britain and of other Powers, and to the beneficent ends which the united action of Europe has always been directed to secure. But neither the interests which her Majesty's government are specially bound to guard, nor the well-being of the regions with

which the treaty deals, would be consulted by the assembling of a Congress, whose deliberations were to be restricted by such reservations as those which have been laid down by Prince Gortschakoff in his most recent communication.

"Your excellency will read this despatch to the minister for foreign affairs, and give him a copy of it.—I am, &c., "SALISBURY."

The effect of this clear and candid exposition was to put Russia more than ever in the wrong with the public opinion of Europe; and the czar's advisers were not long in perceiving that they must yield their contentions with the best grace possible. The lesson of the despatch was brought home to Prince Gortschakoff in particular by one or two very significant articles in the Berlin "*Post*," a newspaper which was well understood to be conducted in the interests of Prince Bismarck. One of these articles pointed out the mistakes committed by Russian diplomatists in a very forcible manner. "The importance of Lord Salisbury's note," it said, "consists in this, that Russia knows, as also does Europe, that she cannot go to the Congress without parting with the San Stefano treaty. Russia and Europe are now aware that if Russia would drop the points of dispute in respect to the preliminary conditions of the Congress, and consent to submit the whole treaty to the judgment of the Congress, England would not leave undisputed a single clause of the treaty. The Congress will, therefore, have to determine upon new stipulations on every point, or, where this plan fails, will have to fall back upon the Paris treaty of 1856, which will, according to the English view, remain the law of Europe. England will hardly remain alone in this view; therefore we must repeat that Russia has no choice except war, or parting with the treaty of San Stefano. By going to the Congress she would have already parted with the treaty. How did Russia arrive at this difficult situation, the same Russia which, not long ago, appeared to consent to the Congress only in order to invite Europe to sanction her triumph?" This alteration in the

political situation, according to the "*Post*," could not be explained by England's unexpected energy, but was due to Russia's extravagant demands.

The article continued:—"In our opinion Russia has done much too much, because she did too little. Our opinion was that Russia would, unobstructed by any protest whatever, have entered Constantinople had she previously invited thither, not only the English fleet, but also those of all the other Powers. We believed that Russia would at Constantinople have proclaimed, as her invincible determination, the end of the Turkish rule in Europe, and would have declared that the organisation of the Balkan peninsula would be left entirely to a European Congress, claiming for herself merely a suitable territorial acquisition in Asia. By such a course the Emperor Alexander's promise not to make any European conquests would have been kept; the liberty of the Straits would have become the watchword of Europe; and it would have been England's ungrateful task, if Russia's territorial aggrandisement in Asia had met with the consent of the Powers, notwithstanding its possible dangerous influence upon English interests, to combat it alone. Russia's determination to forego finally and forever the possession of Constantinople, and therewith the domination of the Mediterranean, would have been followed by a lasting change of public opinion in her favour. What has Russia done instead of this? She has attempted to combine, by the craft of the diplomatists, the liberation of the Bulgarians, the maintenance of Turkey, and the connivance of Austria; she has tried to preserve Turkey in order to rule at Constantinople; to deliver the Bulgarians in order to grasp Constantinople; to grant to Austria an apparent influence on the western part of the Balkan peninsula, in order to silence Austria and to make her at the same time hostile to Turkey. It is quite impossible to enumerate all the cunningness of the peace of San Stefano. This masterpiece of craftiness is, however, untenable by the excess of this quality. We have supported Russia as much as we



could, and as long as she directed her powers to the great task of liberating the Christians. If Russia takes broken Turkey to her arms, and covers her with her cloak in order to rule her possessions and to keep back from her victim all the rest of the world; if she liberates the Christians incompletely, in order always to have a finger in the pie, we can, indeed, conceive such a policy dictated by the interest of universal dominion, but we are not able to support it morally. We are now waiting to see what steps she will take to secure the stipulations of the treaty of San Stefano."

Thus, whatever had been Prince Bismarck's hesitations or temptations in the past, it was now certain that he was no longer prepared to give his countenance to the arbitrary and unscrupulous contentions of the Russian government. This out-spoken criticism from Prince Bismarck's organ did as much as anything to clear the way for the Congress of Berlin.

In the meantime, Austria had been following the example of England in expending a certain sum of money on warlike preparations; and the judicious mind of Prince Bismarck induced him to render further assistance to the cause of peace by lending a kind of moral support to the Austrian government. During the debate on the appropriation of money, in the Austrian Reichsrath, Count Andrassy, in referring to a recent speech of Prince Bismarck in the German Parliament, said he felt himself honoured in the highest degree by the confidence which the German Chancellor had expressed towards him. Prince Bismarck had said as much as he could say when he stated his intention of proffering an honourable mediation. "He could not pronounce in favour of the interest of one state or another at such a moment. Prince Bismarck would scarcely have undertaken to preside at the Congress if the actual conditions of peace were merely to be registered by it." Count Andrassy further stated, that not only his personal intercourse with Prince Bismarck, but also the relations between the two states, had always been most frank, trustworthy, and cordial, and so they would remain.

Count Andrassy, then reverting to the grant of sixty million florins, reminded the assembly of his previous declarations as to the views of the government in regard to recent events and to the future. He thought he had gone as far in those explanations as he could under present circumstances. In reply to those who disapproved his policy, without being able to say how the government ought to have acted in order to have done better, he said that they should reserve their judgment until success or non-success should place the policy followed by the government in its proper light. "At the present moment the position of affairs was as follows:—Peace was still preserved, and its maintenance constituted the policy of the Austro-Hungarian Cabinet. Hitherto, moreover, the government had not sacrificed any of the interests of the monarchy in preserving it. So far it had been hoped and believed that it would be possible to reconcile accomplished facts with the present state of European law and the interests of other countries. If the government had pursued some other policy, such as, for instance, that advocated by the Opposition, the state of affairs would be very different. A protracted war with a great neighbouring Power, and the unquenchable hatred of the whole of Eastern Christendom, would have been the result of such a policy." Count Andrassy referred with feelings of gratification to the fact that in Hungary, when any important interests of the monarchy were in question, party differences disappeared; and, in conclusion, he recommended the adoption of the proposal which was before the delegation. After this the credit of sixty million florins was voted unanimously.

It was perhaps not entirely without significance that the vote of credit was precisely the same as that which had been introduced in the English Parliament.

The measures which were thought necessary by our own government were steadily continued. On the 2nd of April, the following notice was issued from the war office:—

"First-class army reserve called out for per-

manent service.—1. Her Majesty having been graciously pleased by royal proclamation to direct that her first-class army reserve be called out for permanent service staff-officers of pensioners will at once follow the instructions contained in the ‘Regulations for the Mobilisation of the first-class army reserve for permanent service,’ issued with the army circulars and auxiliary and reserve forces circulars, dated 1st of April, 1878. 2. The date to be inserted by the staff-officers of pensioners in the notices and placards referred to in the regulations above-mentioned will be the 19th day of April, 1878. 3. The staff-officers of pensioners will make known as widely as possible to the men the provisions of paragraphs twenty-five and twenty-six of the regulations above quoted, under which separate allowances will be granted to the wives and families of the men on rejoining the army.”

It was to this, amongst other warlike steps of the government, that Lord Derby attributed his resolution to quit the Cabinet at this critical moment. He did not wish to be in any sense responsible for a war between England and Russia, which he described as being altogether unnecessary. The speech which he made in the House of Lords, on the 8th of April, explanatory of his action, was one which cannot be lost sight of amongst the materials for a complete history of the question; although his lordship’s conduct in making such a speech at such a moment was very warmly condemned by his late colleagues and their supporters.

Referring to Lord Beaconsfield’s assertion that he had committed himself to the policy of the Cabinet by agreeing to the expenditure of six millions sterling in military and naval preparations, Lord Derby said:—“I must, with all deference, dissent from the appeal which my noble friend addressed to me when he said, ‘How can you doubt the policy of this measure—the calling out of the reserves—when you assented to the early calling together of Parliament and to the vote of six millions, which were only parts of the same policy?’ My noble friend knows that I did not very willingly acquiesce in the

early summoning of Parliament, and that the date ultimately fixed was a compromise on a proposition that Parliament should meet even earlier than it did. My noble friend is also aware that I expressed grave doubts as to the necessity for this vote of six millions, at least to its full extent. I remember that my right hon. friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer endeavoured to remove my doubts by assuring me—which I have no doubt he did in perfect good faith—that we wanted the money principally as a vote of confidence, and that only a small portion of it would be spent. No doubt I acquiesced in the vote of six millions; but if I am to make a clean breast of it, I will state that, upon that question, I temporarily retired from the Cabinet. My resignation was in my noble friend’s hands for a period of forty-eight hours. Meanwhile, however, public notice had been given of the vote. I could not but feel, in these circumstances, that it was impossible for the government to recede from that step, and, feeling the great inconvenience of breaking up the Cabinet at such a moment, I acquiesced in what I had previously opposed. My lords, I think this is a time when the whole situation may be fairly reviewed, because, until the treaty of San Stefano was made public, the materials for discussion were wanting, and if, now that the terms of the treaty are known, discussion were further delayed, it might be too late to serve any useful purpose. Well, the government determined to call out the reserves, and the formal declaration is accordingly made that the present state of affairs is one of emergency. Now, my lords, I am not quite satisfied on that point. I want to know what the emergency is, and who has created it. I can interpret that announcement only in one manner—namely, that the government consider that negotiations with Russia have been, or are shortly to be broken off, and that immediate war is an event which must at least be looked forward to as probable. My lords, I cannot take that view of the case; it is not the fact that diplomatic means are exhausted. The negotiations for the Congress, it is true, have



come to a dead-lock, but I do not know that that fact by itself is much to be regretted. With the single exception of Austria, I do not know that any single Power has ever been anxious that the Congress should be held. Russia objected to it in the first instance. Germany came into it with some reluctance; the French government did not disguise their aversion from it, giving the somewhat characteristic reason that they would appear there in a different position from that which they held in 1856. Now, my observation is, that a Conference or Congress is a very convenient agency for putting on record, in the most formal manner, international decisions which have already been come to in substance; and in these days, when we can ask a question and get an answer from the furthest end of Europe within twenty-four hours, it is just as easy to ascertain opinion, and almost as easy to conduct negotiations, outside a Congress as within. If I had to deal with the matter, I should endeavour to keep the Congress alive, saying and doing nothing to prevent its ultimate meeting, but letting it stand over until the way was smoothed by private and separate negotiations between the Powers concerned. Now, my lords, looking at the question from that point of view, I regret the steps which the government have taken. They put forward a series of objections to the treaty of San Stefano—objections of a most comprehensive character—and they communicate those objections, not only to other European governments, which is perfectly reasonable, but to the people of this country and the entire public of Europe. Now, my lords, when in addition to that we proceed to arm in such a manner as to indicate an expectation of war, the general impression must be that the English government demands that the treaty of San Stefano should be torn up, and is preparing to support that demand by force. It may be said that this is a very spirited and decided policy. So it is. But what is the next step to be taken? There are only three possible issues; and of these three, one, I am afraid, is hardly within the range of possibility. It is possible that

our demands may be acceded to. That would be a signal diplomatic triumph, on which I should be the first to congratulate my noble friend; but that Russia should give up most of the results of the war, and that she should undergo what the public opinion of Europe would pronounce to be a diplomatic humiliation, is a result which I can hardly conceive can be hoped for. The second possibility is that we, on our side, may withdraw or greatly modify the objections we have taken. But in that case the diplomatic failure would be on our side. It would be well enough in a private communication between two Powers, or in a private bargain between two individuals, to ask, in the first instance, a great deal more than you meant to get, but after a declaration of that kind is made public, and after you are prepared apparently to support it, to drop it or to recede from the position you have taken up creates a situation of an almost ridiculous character. As to the circular of my noble friend at the head of the foreign office, if it had been addressed, as I have no doubt it was originally intended to be addressed, to the British representative at the Conference, as a summary of what the British government desired to see accomplished, I should have no criticism to make upon it. But I am afraid that when the government put forth its programme to all Europe as that which they intended to follow, and when they accompanied that announcement with military measures, the effect of which will be enormously exaggerated abroad, they are making concessions on the part of Russia much more difficult than before. I go so far as to say that, if Russia were willing to take back her treaty, although I do not contend that operation would not be beneficial to Europe, it would at least be a strong proof that she is not so aggressive and dangerous a Power as we have been in the habit of thinking. On the other hand, Russia, as I believe, is not willing to cancel the treaty; but if, as I also suppose, she is prepared, in deference to European opinion, to consent to a liberal modification of what she has proposed, then I think the diffi-

culty has been increased in two ways—first, by the publication of these negotiations, and next by the appearance of menace, which that publication involves. We all know how difficult it is in private life, when anything like a threat has been used, to yield that which, if such pressure had not been brought to bear, would have been readily yielded. I may be asked, however, what in the circumstances would you do if you were consulted? My answer is, that I would not have pressed matters on in such haste. There is just now great irritation against us in Russia, and I do not think I am wrong in saying that in this country a very strong feeling of irritation against the Russian government exists. I am speaking of public opinion in both countries, and not of their governments. I do not believe that there is any very strong ground for irritation on either side. By giving an opportunity for that feeling to subside it appears to me that no harm could be done, while some good might be effected. I should have placed our views directly before the Russian government, and discussed them point by point. The opinion of other governments would not have been difficult to obtain; on many points we have got them already, and I think that many of the results of a Congress might be attained without the rather cumbrous machinery of a Congress itself. No doubt, I may be told that while we were doing all this we should be losing time. Well, it is certainly an evil to prolong the state of anxiety and suspense in which we have already so long continued, but where military measures are concerned I own I do not see, on the English side, what good reason there is for haste. Assuming that the worst happens, that we are not able to settle this question peaceably, and that war is proclaimed, who, I would ask, would lose most by delay?"

There can be no doubt that Lord Derby's arguments were very strong in themselves; but it was useless to preach calmness and delay at that particular moment. With regard to the attitude of the Continental Powers, and the probability of one or more of them according us a hearty support, his lordship made some valuable obser-

vations. "In the event of a war against Russia being undertaken," he said, "whom are we likely to have for allies? Now, that is a matter upon which we have abundant means of forming a judgment, and I can tell you with certainty who will not be our allies. In Germany, so far as the government is concerned, the feeling has been, from the very beginning of these transactions, as is abundantly proved on the face of documents which have been laid before Parliament, one of warm and undisguised sympathy with Russia. That may not be the feeling of the German people, and there is every reason to suppose that, so far as a large portion of the German people is concerned, that is not the feeling which exists. But, be that as it may, neutrality, and that which would not be called a benevolent neutrality, is all, I think, that we could expect from Germany. From Germany I pass to France. What is the line likely to be taken by the French government? That is a question which I can answer without the slightest hesitation. I can do so, not because of any private or exclusive information, but judging by what we all know of the state of feeling in that country. There is not, I believe, a single French politician of any party who would accept the policy of another Crimean war. The fact, so far as I am able to form an opinion, is, that the Crimean war was never popular in France. We all know that that war, however useful or beneficial in its results, was made by the late emperor of the French for personal and dynastic objects. He at the time stood in a very peculiar position. He exercised supreme power, but he found it very difficult to get any respectable men to come near him. In these circumstances he, as an absolute sovereign, no doubt thought it a wise policy to sacrifice one hundred thousand French lives in order to secure the *prestige* and respect which he expected would accrue, and which undoubtedly did accrue to him, from an alliance with this country. That *régime* has, however, collapsed, as everybody knew that it would sooner or later; and, in the present political situation of France, it seems to me that there is little pros-



pect of her joining us in a policy of war. From France I pass to Italy. There, no doubt, the circumstances are extremely different, but the result is, I am afraid, the same. Sardinia, in 1854, joined the allies in a most gallant and spirited manner. Sardinia in 1854 was just in that position in which an adventurous policy was popular. She wanted a great deal; but she is now absorbed in Italy. Italy is complete and is content; her finances have been restored; and I am sure neither my noble friend at the head of the foreign office, nor any one else, entertains much hope of common military action with us in the case of Italy. There remains, no doubt, one great Power, and that is Austria. I fully admit that, if you are to seek with a chance of success for an ally anywhere on the Continent, Vienna is the quarter to which you must look. But it is, I think, fairly open to doubt whether it would be safe for us to rely much on Austrian co-operation. I am only stating that which every one knows when I say that there are very close and intimate ties between the three emperors. In the next place, situated as Austria is, she would hesitate before embarking on anything that might be regarded as a rash policy, and would hardly come to a rupture with Russia unless she were previously assured of the support, or at least the neutrality, of Germany. Her population, too, is divided into a great many races, and, in fact, Austria is a country which a single unsuccessful campaign might not impossibly break up. Then you have to look at the internal divisions of the empire. No doubt, the Magyars have strong sympathies with Turkey, but a directly opposite view is taken by the Slavs. Then you have the Austro-Germans, who want only peace. With two independent nations pulling different ways, with an army which could not be trusted to fight against the Slavs, with finances in such a state that I understand she had considerable difficulty in raising the five or six millions required for the first mobilisation of her troops—with all these elements of weakness Austria, it seems to me, is a country on whose efficient aid we cannot fairly

count. Then, my lords, admitting, as I undoubtedly do, that the Austrian government are sincere in their professions; assuming, if you please, that she is a strong military Power, the wide divergencies between Austrian interests and those which we consider ours are such that, even if she were to enter into alliance with us, a compromise might at any time be effected between her and Russia by which we would lose that alliance. You cannot be certain that, if Austria comes into the field as an ally, we may not have to go out of the field without her."

On the 9th of April Prince Gortschakoff's reply to Lord Salisbury's despatch was received in London. It was neither very cogent nor very conciliatory, and did little to clear up the difficulties of the situation. The Russian despatch was couched in the following terms:—

"It is not accurate to say that the treaty of San Stefano has created a new Bulgaria or a very strong Slav state under the control of Russia. Bulgaria existed, though in a state of oppression. Europe perceived this, and was desirous of providing a remedy. The Constantinople Conference indicated the measures thought necessary to attain this end. In suggesting these measures the plenipotentiaries assembled in the Constantinople Conference certainly did not think of rendering them inefficacious. It should be admitted that they contemplated the endowment of Bulgaria with a national existence and a real administrative autonomy. In such case the Bulgarian state, though divided into two provinces, would have been constituted in germ, and this germ, developing itself under the ægis of Europe, would have achieved the result which the treaty of San Stefano is designed to bring to maturity. The refusal made by the Porte, and the war by which it was followed, did not permit, in the avowal of the Marquis of Salisbury himself, of a return pure and simple to the programme of the Conference of Constantinople. The treaty of San Stefano only makes it obligatory on the Porte to consent to a programme of reforms more complete, more *precis*, and more practical; but even the fact that the San Stefano

treaty is a preliminary one indicates that, in the mind of the Imperial Cabinet, it is only a matter of principle, without prejudging definitively the application, which requires technical studies, an exact appreciation of geographical necessities, and the conciliation of numerous interests. It is because of this that many articles are expressed in vague terms, so as to leave room for ulterior understandings as to the modifications deemed indispensable.

"The treaty of San Stefano has not placed the new state under the control of Russia. The Imperial Cabinet has done only what it accomplished in 1830 for Moldo-Wallachia. Experience has demonstrated that the work of that period in these principalities was useful by contributing to the prosperity of these provinces. It was not perceived that the result would be such a preponderance of the influence of Russia as to disturb the European equilibrium. It may be added that if Moldo-Wallachia, which owes its existence to and borders upon Russia, has been able to make itself independent of her, with yet stronger reason should one count on the same result for Bulgaria, the territory of which would be separated from Russia in the foreseen event of a cession of the Dobrudscha to Roumania.

"3. The *maximum* term of two years has been assigned to the provisional occupation of Bulgaria, because this lapse of time has been thought necessary to maintain order and peace, to protect the Christian and Mussulman populations against reciprocal reprisals, to reorganise the country, and to introduce national institutions, the native militia, &c.; and also because, if the occupation had been indefinite, the fact might have been regarded as a step towards a *prise de possession*, which the Imperial Cabinet has never contemplated. But it is unnecessary to say that, this term being approximate, the Imperial Cabinet is quite ready to shorten it as much as possible without endangering the success of the difficult work which it is proposed to carry out in the interests of general peace.

"4. The delimitation of Bulgaria has been

indicated only in general terms. The sole principle which has been laid down is that of the majority of the population, and certainly anything more equitable and rational can hardly be imagined. It meets the objections suggested by the difference of the races, of the minority, whose interests, moreover, have been guarded by express stipulations. But the application of this principle has been reserved for a mixed commission, whose local investigations can alone dissipate the doubt and uncertainty which still exist in respect of these vexed questions. The preliminary delimitation is opposed on the ground that it assigns to Bulgaria some ports on the Black Sea, but the Constantinople Conference itself decided that, unless these countries debouched on the sea, they could not prosper. With regard to the ports of the Ægean Sea, the commercial development of Bulgaria has alone been in view. Certainly Russia will not profit by this development so much as England and the Powers whose Mediterranean commerce—much more active than that of Russia—has always been a powerful lever for the maintenance of their political influence.

"5. The preliminary treaty in no way places Bulgaria under the domination of a chief chosen by Russia. It is formally stipulated that the governor shall be elected by native administrative councils, with the confirmation of the Porte and the assent of Europe, and that members of the reigning dynasties shall not be eligible for the office. It is not seen what better guarantees could be given of the liberty of elections. As to the organisation of the principality, that is left to an assembly of native notables. The Russian Imperial Commissary has a right of *surveillance* to exercise in concert with an Ottoman Commissary. Moreover, an understanding between the Great Powers and the Porte is expressly reserved, in order that the Russian Imperial Commissary may be associated with special delegates. Meanwhile, the provisional measures taken by the Russian authorities for the administration of the country are far from being framed with the view, as has been affirmed, of mak-



ing Bulgaria a part of the Russian political system. Almost no change has been made in the institutions to which the country was accustomed. Care has only been taken with the execution, which was defective. The slight alterations which have been effected are the abolition of the *redévance* for redemption from the military service, the abolition of the tithes, and their replacement by a more normal impost, the abolition of the rent of the imposts, which was the source of the principal abuses, and the right attributed to the Christian inhabitants in mixed localities to refuse at election time those Mussulmans who had distinguished themselves by acts of persecution towards the Christian population. The state of siege to which the country was reduced during the war rendering the nomination of Russian governors indispensable, Bulgarians have in all quarters been appointed vice-governors, in order that after the peace, according to the rapidity with which tranquillity is restored in the country, these vice-governors might be able to replace the Russian governors without causing any interruption to the administration of the country. The exclusive object of all these provisional measures has been to protect the national development, and to render possible the re-union of the first Bulgarian assembly called to regulate the institutions of the principality.

"6. The assertion, that the treaty of San Stefano has extended the influence of Russia beyond the limits of Bulgaria, while stipulating for ameliorated institutions for Epirus and Thessaly, affords room for surprise. If Russia had stipulated for nothing in favour of those provinces, she would have been accused of sacrificing the Greeks to the Slavs; if she had sought to obtain for them the vassal autonomy which is condemned in Bulgaria, she would have been accused of entirely destroying the Ottoman empire and implanting Russian influence in its place. The Imperial Cabinet has always understood the mission which, in a Christian sense, history assigns to her in the East, without distinction of race or of creed. If she has stipulated for conditions more complete and more precise in fa-

vour of Bulgaria, it is because that country had been the principal cause and theatre of war, and that Russia had acquired positive belligerent rights. But in limiting itself to stipulating for ameliorated institutions in the Greek provinces, it reserved to the great Powers an extensive right of protest. It is equally inaccurate that the treaty of San Stefano stipulated that these institutions should be placed under the direction of Russia. The general type to which they have been assimilated by the treaty is that of the Cretan regulation, which has been *octroyé* by the Porte under the influence of the great Powers. The treaty stipulates that the application should be made by a special commission, or that the native element should be largely represented. It obliges the Porte, it is true, to consult Russia before putting it in execution, but does not interdict the Porte from equally consulting the representatives of the friendly Powers.

"7. The subsequent clause, concerning the protection of the members of the Russian Church, must have been ill understood to be compared to that of the treaty of Kainardji, abolished in 1856. The clause of Kainardji concerned the Greek orthodox body, and could embrace all the Christian subjects of the sultan who professed the rite. The treaty of San Stefano mentions exclusively monks, ecclesiastics, and pilgrims, who are Russian or of a Russian origin, and stipulates for them only the rights, advantages, and privileges, belonging to the ecclesiastics of other nationalities. From all this it is impossible to regard as just the assertion, that the *ensemble* of these stipulations of San Stefano is of such a nature as to extend the power of the Russian empire in countries where the Greek population predominates, to the prejudice of this nation, and to all countries having interests in the East and in the Mediterranean.

"8. One may equally find exaggerations in the affirmation, that the *ensemble* of the stipulations of San Stefano as to the retrocession of Roumanian Bessarabia, the extension of Bulgaria up to the Black Sea, and the acquisition of the port of Batoum, render the will of Russia

predominant in the whole neighbourhood of the Black Sea. Russia has powerfully contributed in the past to emancipate Greece and Roumania, but has not reaped so much benefit from it as have the other Powers. The retrocession of Roumanian Bessarabia would be only a return of an order of things modified twenty-two years ago for reasons which have no longer a *raison d'être*, nor legal title, nor even pretext, since that the liberty of the navigation of the Danube has been placed under the control and guarantee of a *Commission Internationale*, and especially at the moment when Roumania proclaimed her independence, and when Europe seemed disposed to recognise it. It must be added that this retrocession does not include all the part of Bessarabia ceded in 1856. The delta of the Danube is excluded from it, and the project of the Russian government is to give it to Roumania, from which it had been taken in 1857. This circumstance reduces considerably the importance of the desired retrocession from the point of view of influence over the navigation of the mouths of the Danube.

"9. Batoum is the only good port in this district available for the commerce and the security of Russia drawn from a war which she has waged single-handed, and which has cost her so much. It is not then by any means a gratuitous cession, it is far from being the equivalent of the pecuniary indemnity which it would represent. As to the acquisitions in Armenia, they only possess a defensive value. It is possible that England would rather see these strong positions in the hands of the Turks, but from the same motives Russia sets a value upon the possession of them for her own security, so as not to have to lay siege to them in each war, as in the case of the fortress of Kars, which she has been obliged to take three times within half a century. Territorial cessions are a natural consequence of war. If England had wished to spare them to Turkey, she had only to ally herself with Russia, as was proposed to her on two occasions—first, by the Berlin Memorandum, and then by the mission of Count Estou Soumarai-

koff to Vienna, in order to put a united maritime pressure on the Porte, which would probably have sufficed to obtain the ends acquired to-day at the price of so much bloodshed. The English government, having refused this, has now no ground for denying to Russia, who has shed her blood, the right of promoting the creation of a state of things which relieves her henceforward from such sacrifices, or renders them less onerous.

"10. But what is impossible to understand, are the consequences to the freedom of the European commerce of Trebizond, *via* Persia, which are drawn from these rectifications of frontier. These assertions are in contradiction to those uttered on more than one occasion by several members of the British Cabinet, according to whom the taking possession of Erzeroum and of Trebizond by Russia would not constitute a danger to British interests. The rectifications of frontier in Asia, stipulated by the treaty of San Stefano, are very far from touching this extension. It is carrying distrust to an extreme, to affirm that they place Russia in the position of impeding, by prohibitive obstacles, the European commercial system.

"11. The objections taken to the treaty of San Stefano, in regard to the indemnity claimed from Turkey, are surely not better established. The amount of this indemnity is out of all proportion with the overwhelming charges which the war has entailed upon Russia. It may be that they exceed the actual resources of Turkey, and increase her difficulty in satisfying the claims of her creditors. But it is to be noted that Turkey failed in her obligations towards her creditors long before the war by reason of the disorder caused by her mal-administration. There is reason to believe that if peace is established upon the rational bases which the treaty of San Stefano has in view, and to which the European sanction would give a solid and lasting character, it would result, as far as Turkey herself is concerned, in a diminution of her expenses and an augmentation of her resources, which would enable her to respond to the exigencies of her



foreign credit. It is in view of these possible results that the stipulations of San Stefano which relate to the indemnity have been maintained in the undefined state which has been made the subject of reproach. If the amount of the indemnity is criticised as being too high, the unreasonableness of an immediate payment has been criticised for a much stronger reason. If the precise manner of payment had been stipulated, it would have been necessary to encroach upon a region already mortgaged to the foreign creditors of the Porte. It is that which the treaty of San Stefano has sought to avoid, reserving the question for a future hearing. It is true that, by this precaution, Russia exposes herself to the suspicion of seeking to paralyse or dominate over Turkey for several years, or of meditating new territorial acquisitions, as a substitute for the indemnity. It would have been easier to have seen in this a design to care for Turkey as well as for the interests of Europe, and to maintain the Turkish government in the fulfilment of its engagements, and of pacific relationships, which would be profitable to all. But against mistrust there is no remedy.

"12. From the conclusion of the Marquis of Salisbury's despatch it is gathered that the end and ardent desire of her Majesty's government are always to insure good government, peace, and liberty, to the populations to whom these benefits have been strange. With equal satisfaction has the frank avowal been noted that this policy has been frustrated by the unhappy resistance of the Ottoman government; that in face of the modified circumstances of the present time the same result cannot be obtained in the same direction by the same means—that is to say, the programme of the Conference of Constantinople—and that great changes may, and without doubt will be necessary in the treaties by which the south-east of Europe has, up to the present time, been governed. If to these considerations be added the fact, that the reiterated refusal of the English government to join in exercising collective material pressure on the Porte, has prevented Europe from obtaining pacifically the re-

sults desired by the Cabinet of London itself, it will be recognised that the war and the peace of San Stefano have answered to the exigencies of the situation which the Marquis of Salisbury has set forth with such great frankness, and in such a high spirit. This situation resolves itself into this:—The existing treaties have been successively infringed for the last twenty-two years—first, by the Turkish government, which has not fulfilled its obligations towards the Christians; then by the united principalities, by the French occupation of Syria, and by the Conference of Constantinople itself, constituting an interference in the interior affairs of the Ottoman Empire.

"13. The Marquis of Salisbury himself recognises that great changes must and ought to be made. In the present circumstances, it remains for us to learn how his lordship means to reconcile practically these treaties, and the recognised rights of Great Britain and other Powers, with the benevolent wishes towards a realisation of which the united action of Europe has always been directed for a good government, peace, and assured liberty to the populations to whom these benefits have been strange. It remains also to be learnt how, beyond the preliminary bases laid down by the treaty of San Stefano, his lordship means to reach the desired goal, while bearing in mind the rights acquired by Russia, for the sacrifices which she has borne, and borne alone, in order to render the realisation possible. The despatch of the Marquis of Salisbury contains no response to these questions. For these reasons it appears that the considerations which it contains would have been more effective if accompanied by practical proposals of a nature to assure an understanding in the solution of present difficulties in the general interest of a solid and lasting pacification in the East."

The procedure insisted upon by England, that Europe, in council, should determine any changes to be effected in the treaty relations of the Powers, amounted to a declaration, on our part, that we were ready to bring forward "practical

proposals" for the re-settlement of the East. That particular objection to the Congress on the part of Russia was therefore without force. Indeed, there was at this time little more than a question of form between the two governments. It was a desperate struggle for a diplomatic triumph; and for many weeks the whole of Europe seemed to tremble between peace and war, whilst the English and Russian governments were, to all appearance, contending over the turn of a sentence.

## CHAPTER XV.

### PREPARATIONS FOR CONGRESS.

THE more the meeting of a European Congress was delayed the more work was prepared for it by the disturbed condition of the East.

In the first place, a new insurrection, this time principally of Mahomedans, had occurred in Roumelia. Scarcely had peace been signed between Russia and Turkey when it was found that the mountainous district between Philippopolis and the *Ægean* was crowded with Mussulman refugees, who refused to lay down their arms, and offered resistance to all the Russians or Bulgarians who attempted to approach them. Little attended to at the time, this rising presently grew more and more formidable, until, in the end, it became a hopeless task to stamp it out by force. The Russians, at all events, declined to set about it, and the Bulgarians were not able to do so.

Here was evidently a fact of which the statesmen of Europe were bound to take notice, for it bore directly upon the problem which they had to consider. How was Turkey to be re-constituted when this was the first result of Christian supremacy?

It was not until the end of April that the general public had any idea of the magnitude and importance of the occurrence.

The *Pera* correspondent of the "*Times*,"

writing on the 23rd, sent home the following account of the Mahomedan rising:—"It has been remarked in previous letters that the peace of San Stefano could not have pacific results to Bulgaria, and the extraordinary development within the last few days of a Mahomedan insurrection in the Rhodope mountains fully bears out this view. This insurrection, having its focus in the mountainous region of Sultanyeri, west of Demotica, extends northward to the valley of Krishna, between Philippopolis and Tatar Bazardjik, southwards to Ghinmursina, where the Pomaks on the Sitchanjik mountains have taken up arms, and eastward of Tchirmen. The first engagement occurred on the 14th of April near Selbukrum, above Tchirmen, between Cossacks and Mussulmans, and there has been frequent fighting ever since. The guerillas having recovered four Krupp guns left during Suleiman's retreat, use them with effect. At Tchirmen the Russians have concentrated twelve thousand troops—viz., eight thousand from Philippopolis and four thousand from Adrianople, with mountain guns. The fire of artillery and small arms is heard daily in that district. The assemblage of numerous threatening bands near Demirler Djumasty, two hours north of Orta-keue, compelled the sudden despatch thither, on the 17th of April, of five hundred Russian Infantry from Adrianople, four thousand from Mustapha Pacha, and two battalions from Demotica. In the Sultanyeri district a serious struggle is going on, twelve thousand Russians operating there from Demotica. There was an important engagement on the 18th of April, and much blood spilt on both sides. The Russian loss is stated to have been five hundred killed and wounded, including eight officers killed. No decisive advantage has yet been gained by either side, but the commander of Demotica demanded reinforcements, and two thousand infantry and three sotnias of Cossacks were hastily sent from Adrianople on the 19th of April. Thus the insurrection engages thirty thousand Russian troops, and extends over an area of nearly ten thousand square miles. The



draughting away of troops against the insurgents leaves the garrisons of Philippopolis and Adrianople much reduced. The Russians are endeavouring to recruit volunteers at Adrianople, but with little success, the military chest being empty, and the army known to be considerably in arrears. Presumably to provide accommodation for their wounded the Russians have requisitioned several large houses at Adrianople, furnishing them out as hospitals.

"The cause of the rising is the intolerable oppression of the Russo-Bulgarian *régime*. The insurrection was brought to a head through the Bulgarians sacking two Turkish villages, Tcherlen Karagatch and Bildirkeui, near Tchermen, carrying off two married women and one girl. The Bulgarian ravisher offered to sell back the girl to her father for four thousand piastres, but the father having a pistol concealed about him, shot the ravisher dead, and gave the signal for a general rising. When the leaders of Sultanyeri were summoned by the Russians to lay down their arms, Turkey and Russia having signed a peace, they replied, 'We are fighting for no sovereign, but for our own lives and honour.'"

Without following this insurrection in detail, it may be observed that the issue raised by these dispossessed Mahomedans was one which could not be treated lightly by Europe, but which at all events deserved to be seriously dealt with by the Congress.

Another urgent matter for the statesmen who were about to assemble at Berlin was the condition of Thessaly and Epirus, where the Greek insurgents were not entirely pacified by the assurances of Lord Derby, their uneasiness being increased by his lordship's retirement from the Foreign Office. The fighting was continued up to the eve of the Congress, though the Christians struggled against immense odds. The Turkish government poured its troops into Thessaly, and overwhelmed the patriots; whilst the only step taken in the unequal strife by the Powers was that England held the hands of the weakest combatant.

The bare possibility of a war between Eng-

land and Russia inspired many of the Greeks with the notion of an Anglo-Greek alliance. They seemed to forget that they would in that case have to fight as the allies of the Turks, simply concluding that, if they assisted us to check the designs of Russia, they would have earned some recompense which it would be in the power of England to give them.

The ideas of this party were reflected in the letters of the "Daily News" correspondent in Athens, who, at the moment indicated, gave expression to the desire entertained amongst the Greeks. "The force of events," he wrote in one letter, "is too strong to be resisted by any old-fashioned prejudices against a Greek alliance. Englishmen and Greeks have the same interest in putting some sort of check upon Russian ambition. We pull in the same boat, and the sooner we recognise the fact, the better for all parties. It is useless to deny that the alliance will be rather one-sided, in regard to material resources. England is very rich and Greece is very poor, but England wants a barrier against the southward progress of the Slavs, and here is such a barrier, ready to her hand. Let us but put the Greeks firmly on their feet—give them their outlying provinces, and help them to form a sufficient army and navy, and we secure the best possible base of operations in every future development of the Eastern question. Without the Greek sailors to man her fleet, Russia can do little or nothing in the Mediterranean, even if she should make the new Bulgaria a stepping-stone to its shore. Without a paramount influence among the Greek islands she can never seriously threaten our road to India.

"I do not affect to be an alarmist, and am quite confident in our power to defend ourselves against all comers, when and where we please. But, as I see that most of my countrymen are much exercised just now about Russia and her designs, it seems only reasonable to suggest an obvious remedy. For my own part, I would rather that we helped to free the Greeks for freedom's sake. There is something below the dignity of dear Old England in being so very keen

after her own interests. We were in better form, I fancy, in the days of Canning and Wilberforce, of Navarino and of West Indian emancipation. But, be that as it may, the British public of our own time is more anxious to have a barrier against Russia than to do abstract justice of any kind. The feeling is honest and practical, though not very exalted, and to this feeling it is perfectly fair to appeal. If, then, our object be to check the progress of the Slavs, we must take Greece by the hand and pull her through her present difficulties at any price—even at the tremendous price, if necessary, of a war with Russia. It is idle to play with the worn-out idea of Turkish integrity. The Turk cannot be set up again as an independent anti-Russian, as he was before Plevna and Schipka. He must, more or less, take his orders in future from St. Petersburg. If, then, we leave any considerable number of Greeks in his power, we leave them to Russian influence at second hand. I know Greece well, as also the Greek provinces of Turkey, and I venture to assert that even so-called autonomy, or local self-government, will be a dangerous thing for us. Either the substantial power in these provinces will be in the people's hands, in which case they will soon declare themselves annexed to Greece, and the whole question will be suddenly re-opened, or the power will remain with some Turkish pacha, who will look to his Russian patron for instructions. No amount of theoretical constitutionalism, or whatever we may choose to set up by way of autonomy in Thessaly or Crete, will prevent the shrewd Asiatic in command from taking his orders from those who can make or mar him. Every province will have its Russian party, supported by the authority of the Turkish governor; and the very influence that our alarmists most deprecate will be gradually extended to the whole of Turkey in Europe. The only remedy for this is to lop off from the helpless trunk all that we wish to save from Russianising intrigues in the future—to make Greece as strong as possible, whilst there is yet time, and to encourage the Hellenic element, as far as it is the predominating ele-

ment in any place, to maintain itself against the Slavs, by uniting it to the kingdom of Greece. Look, for instance, at Thessaly, and see what a much better barrier there would be against Russian designs in a Greek province governed and garrisoned by independent Greeks, with the laws and the constitution, and, above all, the 'national idea' of the little kingdom behind it, than in a troubled and half hearted autonomous state, ruled by a Russian nominee. Or, take the instance of Crete, where we should be very sensitive to the presence of anti-English influence in case of a maritime war, and decide how far it would suit us that General Ignatieff should be the most potent person there, rather than King George of Greece! You answer, of course, that it would not suit us at all. Yet this is what Turkish rule in Crete will presently come to mean. There is no remedy for the impending danger but an Anglo-Greek alliance and a vigorous and timely extension of the Hellenic kingdom. It is more an English than an European interest that is at stake in these waters, and England herself must look to it whilst yet there is time. She must not trust to what that vague and unconscionable person, Dame Europa, will do on our behalf.

"Having just returned from Crete, and having been a pretty close observer of what is going on in the island, I can form some idea of the danger of Russian intrigue should a Turkish official retain the supreme power. Nobody among the Cretans dreams of being annexed to Russia. They know that our fleet could easily prevent any such result. Yet, there is a feeling that the Russian consul will be a very great man. He will not rule directly; he will not have a chance of ever being backed up by Muscovite force on the spot. But his master and employer will rule the master and employer of the pacha of whom all are to stand in awe. What more do you want, as a good foundation for a Russian party in the island. Even as it is, whilst all is doubt and uncertainty as to the future, the actual governor of Crete, Costaki Pacha—a Christian in faith—is supposed to



count on Russian favour to render possible his candidature for the Cretan throne, should autonomy be granted. I do not know whether this report is well founded, but it shows the way in which men's minds fly to the conclusion that the master of the Turks at head-quarters will have much to say in the Turkish provinces. Costaki Pacha would very likely deny this particular suggestion of hopefulness on his part, though it is certain that he is believed to be scheming for the Cretan throne—as a vassal of the sultan, I need scarcely say. Those who know the public feeling best, however, say that he has not a chance of being elected. No one who has served the Turks would be trusted by the Cretans, if they had any voice in the matter.

“You will have heard by telegraph of the reverses sustained by the insurgents near Volo, and of the sad death of Mr. Ogle, the correspondent of the ‘Times.’ It seems only too certain that he was cruelly murdered by Turkish troops, though whether the Turkish authorities connived at the deed (as I hear roundly asserted in some quarters) is not quite so clear. The brave Englishman lost his life in the zealous discharge of his professional duties—made more dangerous to him by his openly avowed horror of the outrages that he saw committed by the Turks—and it was only fit that the Greeks should show every honour to his mangled remains. Right heartily did they come forward, high and low, rich and poor, upon the melancholy occasion. Though I have arrived in Athens too late to witness the ceremony, I am assured on all sides that poor Charles Ogle's funeral was one of the most touching and genuine displays of popular feeling that has been seen in the Greek capital.”

This letter, though not in all respects perspicacious as regards the necessities and possibilities of the situation, fairly illustrates the feeling of the Greeks towards us in the month of April, whilst the preparations for a Congress hung fire, and an Anglo-Russian war was at least an apparent probability.

The meeting of the Powers, however, was anticipated with greatest anxiety by the subject

races of Turkey, for whom so much depended on the deliberations of the plenipotentiaries. The treaty of San Stefano had promised liberty to more than half of the Ottoman empire in Europe; and there seemed to be reason to fear lest the representatives of the Powers should interfere with this arrangement, and curtail the limits of emancipation which had been so liberally drawn by Russia. The new Bulgaria, and especially the large district lying south of the Balkans, which General Ignatieff had included in the proposed principality, with scant regard for the “principle of nationalities,” had scarcely had time to realise the extent of its good fortune; but enough was known of the disposition of the western states, as well as of Austria, to make it appear likely that the work of San Stefano would be modified.

The inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina, of Epirus and Thessaly, and even of the parts of Albania and Roumelia, not mentioned in the Russo-Turkish agreement, were anxious as to their future. Memorials were drawn up for presentation to the Congress, and energetic efforts were made to ensure a hearing before the virtual court of appeal which was to determine the problem of the re-settlement of Turkey.

As regards the “principle of nationalities,” no doubt the San Stefano treaty violated it in several important respects; and this was pointed out by almost every one who passed the Russian arrangement under criticism. It was shown that in several parts of the proposed Bulgaria the Bulgarians were decidedly not a majority of the population. In many eastern districts—especially from Shumla to the north of Adrianople—the Turks were as numerous as the Bulgarians. “In the south, and especially on the *Ægean*, in the countries of Salonica, Kavala, and Lagos, the populations belong exclusively to the Greek race. The most recent work on the subject—*‘L’Ethnographie de la Turquie d’Europe,’* by M. F. Bianconi, Member of the French Geographical Society—contains some most interesting details. The Greeks, according to this author, form a numerous population,

compact, homogeneous, and closely united ; they dominate the other races not only by their numbers, but also by their intelligence, instruction, and relative prosperity. If the Bulgarians, their friends in misfortune, have given themselves up to the cultivation of the land, the Greeks, on the contrary, have preferred to withdraw, some to the mountains inaccessible to the Turks, the Pindus, and the Rhodope, others to the towns, there to live on the produce of their commerce and industry. In the provinces comprised between the Archipelago to the south and the great transversal arteries of the centre of European Turkey, the Greeks alone occupy themselves with the wheat trade, which goes on in the rich provinces on the borders of the Maritza, the Kara-Son, and the Vardar. The Greek race may be distributed approximately as follows :—

Epirus and Lower Albania . . .	1,600,000
Thessaly . . . . .	500,000
Macedonia . . . . .	600,000
Thrace (not including Constantinople)	500,000
Constantinople, and the coasts of the Bosphorus . . . . .	500,000
	<u>3,700,000</u>

“With regard to the Bulgarians, a certain number of colonies belonging to that race may be found in territories which are purely Greek. At Ferre, Demotica, on the productive but unhealthy banks of the Maritza, on the side of Uskiub, Istib, Stroumitza, the Bulgarians, driven out of their country, live in great poverty. These populations, who have preserved their Bulgarian character, are very thinly scattered over the above-named parts. But it is different in the provinces between the southern slopes of the Eminéh-Daph and those to the north of Philippopolis and Zamboli. Here the Bulgarian and Greek races are so mixed up that it is impossible to fix any regular or exact limit on the map. Thus at Batak, Peroutchiza and Es-ki-Saghra, the Bulgarians are in the majority ; but the Greeks are superior in numbers and importance in neighbouring localities. At every step in these parts are found Bulgarians, Greeks,

Turks, and Circassians, indiscriminately. The province of Macedonia, although completely Greek, is inhabited in certain parts by Bulgarian families. In the regions of Uskiub, Ciakovitza, Kalyandere, Prizrend, Kommarova, and Kustendil, the Greeks and Albanians are in the minority. The total number of all these Bulgarian populations is estimated by Mon. Bianconi at about three millions. It will be seen from the above figures that the delimitation given to Bulgaria by the San Stefano treaty is very arbitrary. A conclusive fact in this respect is the extension of the new principality as far as Kastoria, to the north of Salonica. All the country north, east, and west of Kastoria, is inhabited by Greeks, either of pure or mixed race. But Kastoria possesses a small Bulgarian colony, and hence the reason of its incorporation in Bulgaria. It is the same with that part of Macedonia bordering on the Ægean as far as Kavala. Here the Bulgarians do not form one-fifth of the population ; nevertheless it is to belong to Bulgaria.

“It must be remarked, however, that the figures given by M. Bianconi differ considerably from the official statistics published in Turkey. According to them the populations of the various nationalities of Turkey in Europe are as follows : Servians, 1,872,000 ; Bulgarians, 1,860,000 ; Greeks, 1,136,000 ; Albanians, 1,229,000 ; and Roumanians, 200,000. Another statistician, M. W Jaksihitsch, estimates that Turkey possesses about 3,732,000 Slavs (Servians and Bulgarians) and 2,253,000 Greeks (Greeks pure and Albanians). The same authority estimates the Turkish population at 2,210,000 (Turks, Circassians, and Tartars). But M. Bianconi reduces this figure to 1,470,000, thus divided :—

Osmanli Turks . . . . .	650,000
Circassians (of the Caucasus) . .	260,000
Tartars . . . . .	100,000
Renegade Bosnians . . . . .	150,000
Renegade Bulgarians . . . . .	140,000
Arnouts (Renegade Albanians) .	150,000
Renegade Greeks . . . . .	20,000
	<u>1,470,000</u>



To complete these statistics, here, according to the 'Almanach de Gotha,' is the religious denomination of the total population of Turkey in Europe:—

Christians . . . . .	4,820,000
Mahomedans . . . . .	3,611,480
Jews . . . . .	75,165

It is needless to point out how difficult it would be to make the above contradictory statistics agree. But as they refer exclusively to the number of the population, they do not destroy the ethnical calculations given above.\*

By none were the Russian demands more warmly contested than by the Greeks—both in the kingdom of Greece itself and in the Turkish provinces, where men of Greek race abounded. Their claims were fully set forth by a hundred different authorities, and with what appeared to be irresistible force. We may here quote a few passages from a pamphlet on "Hellenic Claims and the Congress," issued by a committee of the friends of Greece in London, during the period immediately preceding the Berlin Congress.

"The project of a new Bulgaria, extending beyond the Balkans, its natural boundary to the south, is revived to-day, but the preliminary triumph of its authors is more complete. In 1872, the limits of this abortive creation were to be traced by the pen of the Bulgarian ecclesiastic, to-day they are drawn with a Russian sword. The interests of the Turkish empire necessitated opposition to the former scheme; but they are European safeguards that demand it at the present day. The establishment of a border state, south of the Balkans, is essential as a bulwark against a renewal of Russo-Bulgarian encroachments, and its elements are only to be found among the Hellenic population of Thrace. Already they have developed capacity for administration, and possess all the qualifications necessary to national stability and progress. Although a definitive solution of the Eastern question is

rudely thrust upon Europe by a victorious Russian army at Constantinople, it may be regarded as a hopeful sign that the subject races immediately concerned continue to make great efforts to lay before Europe their claim to freedom, based upon the vastness of their respective population, and the extent of the territory they occupy.

"The difficulty of re-arranging the government of the south-east of Europe, though its necessity has long been admitted, has led from time to time to its indefinite postponement, and the fear of arousing the dreaded spectre, by intervention on behalf of the Christian races, has resulted in their continued oppression. But their claim now cannot fail to be heard; their numbers and the districts they people are everywhere matters of contention, and properly so, for not even the legislation of United Europe can look for stability of its decrees, unless the first importance be attached to the consideration of the numbers, character, and distribution of the races in whose interest its arbitrament is invoked. It is, however, a matter of regret that the pretensions of certain of the subject races of European Turkey are not confined within such limits as would bear critical investigation. Many writers, who espouse the cause of the Slavs, have laid themselves open to the gravest charges in this respect. Even the science of geographical investigation has been perverted, and fanciful charts, full of the grossest misrepresentations, circulate throughout Europe with the authority of an established reputation. . . .

"Suffocated by the Turks in the caverns of Melidhoni, massacred by Albanian mercenaries, the Cretans have never been subdued, and to-day, after half a century of cruel misgovernment, they are united by the same indomitable spirit in open hostility to the Ottomans, and are now demanding their emancipation, after fifty years of the hated despotism to which Europe has so unjustly condemned them. Well may the Greeks of Epirus, Macedonia, Thessaly, and of the islands, mindful of the fate of autonomous Scio and Psara, regard with distrust the inefficient expedients of local self-government and auton-

\* See the letter of the Paris-correspondent of the "Standard," March 26th, 1878. The figures may be compared with those given in a previous page of the present work.

omy. The people of the provinces and islands will be satisfied only with their incorporation with the Hellenic kingdom, and await with impatience the declaration of their freedom. The change of government would meet with no resistance at the hands of these small Greek-speaking Turkish communities, whose interests are so bound up with the national life of the Greeks, that a complete fusion would be peaceably effected. There is now presented to Europe an opportunity to repair the effect of the mistaken policy that confined the Hellenic kingdom within such narrow boundaries; a policy that has been condemned, as short-sighted, by the leading statesmen of Europe."

It was not until the end of May, or the beginning of June, that Europe was able to feel assured of the speedy meeting of the Congress. Count Schouvaloff, the Russian ambassador in England, had gone to St. Petersburg to ask the assent of the czar to a secret understanding with the English government, whereby certain special points should be conceded by both sides. He had succeeded in the object of his mission; and on the 18th of May he left the Russian capital in order to return to London. On the 30th of the same month the Anglo-Russian agreement was signed by Count Schouvaloff and the Marquis of Salisbury.

This famous agreement consisted of two memorandums. The first and principal one was described as a "Memorandum determining the points upon which an understanding has been established between the governments of Russia and Great Britain, and which will serve as a mutual engagement for the Russian and English plenipotentiaries at the Congress."

After a preamble, expressing the desire of the Russian and English governments to establish an understanding that might obviate the settlement of the Eastern question by the sword, the memorandum proceeded thus:—

"1. England discards the longitudinal division of Bulgaria, but the representatives of Russia reserves to himself to point out the advantages of it to the Congress, promising, neverthe-

less, not to insist upon it against the definitive opinion of England.

"2. The arrangement of the boundaries of southern Bulgaria should be modified in such a manner as to remove them from the *Ægean* Sea, according to the southern delimitation of the Bulgarian provinces, proposed by the Conference of Constantinople. This does not concern the question of the frontiers so much as it refers to the exclusion of the littoral of the *Ægean* Sea, that is to say, to the west of Lagos. From this point to the coast of the Black Sea the discussion of the frontier will remain free.

"3. The western frontiers of Bulgaria should be rectified upon the base of nationalities, so as to exclude from that province the non-Bulgarian populations. The western frontiers of Bulgaria ought not to pass in principle a line traced from close to Novi-Bazar to Koursha Balkan.

"4. The Bulgaria replaced in the limits which are mentioned in the points 2 and 3 shall be divided into two provinces, namely:—

"The one to the north of the Balkans should be endowed with political autonomy, under the government of a prince, and the other, to the south of the Balkans, should receive a large measure of administrative self-government (*autonomie administrative*)—for instance, like that which exists in English colonies—with a Christian governor named with the acquiescence of Europe, for five to ten years.

"5. The Emperor of Russia attaches a peculiar importance to the retreat of the Turkish army from southern Bulgaria. His Majesty does not see any security of guarantee for the Bulgarian population in the future if the Ottoman troops are maintained there.

"Lord Salisbury accepts the retreat of the Turkish troops from the southern Bulgaria, but Russia will not object to what is enacted by the Congress respecting the mode and the cases where the Turkish troops would be allowed to enter the southern province to resist an insurrection or invasion, whether in a state of execution or in a state of menace.

"England, nevertheless, reserves to herself to



insist at the Congress on the right of the sultan to be able to canton troops on the frontiers of southern Bulgaria.

"The representative of Russia reserves to himself at the Congress complete liberty in the discussion of this last proposition of Lord Salisbury.

"6. The British government demands that the superior officers (*chefs supérieurs*) of the militia in southern Bulgaria should be named by the Porte, with the consent of Europe.

"7. The promises concerning Armenia stipulated by the preliminary treaty of San Stefano should not be made exclusively to Russia, but to England also.

"8. The government of her Britannic Majesty taking, as well as the Imperial government, a warm interest in the future organisation of the Greek provinces of the Balkan peninsula, the Article 15 of the preliminary treaty of San Stefano shall be modified in such a manner that the other Powers, and notably England, may have, like Russia, a consulting voice in the future organisation of Epirus, Thessaly, and the other Christian provinces resting under the dominion of the Porte.

"9. In so far as the war indemnity is concerned, his Majesty the emperor has never had the intention of converting it into territorial annexations, and he does not refuse to give assurances in this respect.

"It is understood that the war indemnity will not deprive the English government of their rights as creditor, and it will in this respect remain in the same state that it stood before the war.

"Without contesting the final decision which Russia will take with respect to the amount of the indemnity, England reserves to herself to point out to the Congress the serious objections which she sees to it.

"10. As to the valley of Alashkert and the town of Bayazid, that valley being the great transit route for Persia, and having an immense value in the eyes of the Turks, his Majesty the emperor consents to restore it to them, but he has demanded and obtained in exchange the

cession to Persia of the little territory of Kho-tour, which the commissioners of the two mediatory Courts have found just to restore to the Shah.

"The government of her Britannic Majesty would have to express its profound regret in the event of Russia insisting definitively upon the retrocession of Bessarabia. As, however, it is sufficiently established that the other signatories to the treaty of Paris are not ready to sustain by arms the delimitation of Roumania stipulated in that treaty, England does not find herself sufficiently interested in this question to be authorised to incur alone the responsibility of opposing herself to the change proposed, and thus she binds herself not to dispute the decision in this sense.

"In consenting not to contest the desire of the Emperor of Russia to occupy the port of Batoum, and to guard his conquests in Armenia, the government of her Majesty do not hide from themselves that grave dangers, menacing the tranquillity of the populations of Turkey in Asia may result in the future by this extension of the Russian frontier. But Her Majesty's government are of opinion that the duty of protecting the Ottoman empire from this danger, which henceforth will rest in a special manner upon England, can be effected without exposing Europe to the calamities of a fresh war. At the same time the government of the queen take cognisance of the assurance given by his Imperial Majesty, that in the future the Russian frontier will be no more extended on the side of Turkey in Asia. Her Majesty's government being consequently of opinion, that the modifications of the treaty of San Stefano approved of in this memorandum suffice to mitigate the objections that they find to the treaty in its actual form, engage themselves not to dispute the articles of the preliminary treaty of San Stefano which are not modified by the ten preceding points if, after the articles have been duly discussed in Congress, Russia persists in maintaining them.

"It may be that, during the discussion in Congress, the two governments may find it pre-

ferable to introduce, of a common accord, fresh modifications, which it would be impossible to foresee, but, if the understanding respecting these new modifications be not established between Russian and English plenipotentiaries, the present memorandum is destined to serve as a mutual engagement in Congress for the plenipotentiaries of Russia and Great Britain.

"In faith of which this document has been signed by the Russian Ambassador at London, and the principal Secretary of State of her Britannic Majesty. Done at London the 30th May, 1878.

(Signed) "SCHOUVALOFF.  
"SALISBURY."

The second memorandum formed an annex to the first, and was signed by both plenipotentiaries on the same date. It ran as follows:—

"Besides the stipulations of the preceding memorandum, the British government reserve to themselves to point out to the Congress the following points:—

(a) The English government reserve to themselves to demand of the Congress the participation of Europe in the administrative organisation of the two Bulgarian provinces.

"(b) The English government will discuss in Congress the duration and the nature of the Russian occupation of Bulgaria, and of the passage through Roumania.

"(c) The name to be given to the southern province.

"(d) Without touching on the territorial question, the British government reserve to themselves to discuss the questions of the navigation of the Danube, in which matter England has rights by treaty.

"(e) The English government reserve to themselves to discuss in Congress all questions relative to the Straits. But the Russian ambassador at London takes cognisance of the verbal communication which he has made to the principal Secretary of State, that is to say, the Imperial Cabinet stands by the declaration of Lord Derby of the 6th May, 1877, and notably:—

" 'The existing arrangements made under European sanction, which regulate the navigation of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, appear to them (the British government) wise and salutary, and there would be, in their judgment, serious objections to their alteration in any material particular.'

"And the Russian plenipotentiary will insist at the Congress on the *status quo*.

"(f) The English government will address to his Majesty the Sultan a request, to promise Europe to protect equally, on Mount Athos, the monks of other nationalities."

The circumstances under which this important document was made public were peculiar, and deserve to be placed on record. The heads of the agreement between Russia and England were published in the "Globe" newspaper on the evening of the day (May 30th) on which it had been signed at the English Foreign Office. The statement was scarcely credited at the time; and indeed a member of the ministry declared, in answer to a question in Parliament, that it was unworthy of credence. A fortnight later, on the day on which the Berlin Congress held its first sitting, the same newspaper contained the agreement entire, as given above. There was every mark of credibility in the text thus printed (the French and English versions being placed side by side); and once more an attempt was made in the House of Lords to throw discredit on the information of the "Globe." Most men, however, by this time had been prepared to hear that England and Russia had come to an understanding; and it soon became known that the terms of this understanding were correctly given in the newspaper above mentioned.

The fact that a Conservative journal, without any official inspiration, had thus made public a most important and confidential document, before either the English or the Russian government had seen fit to do so, afforded matter for a nine days' wonder; and a good deal of annoyance was apparently felt on the subject by both ministers and their friends. For some time it



was commonly assumed in England, and on the Continent also, that Count Schouvaloff had been at the pains to reveal the secret, in order to discredit the English government and to weaken their hands at the Congress. But it soon leaked out that the indiscretion of the publication, if such it can be called, was due to a writer in the foreign office, who had been employed to copy the document in question, and who had sold the knowledge thus acquired to the "Globe" newspaper. This clerk was prosecuted by government for "stealing" the paper; but the prosecution could not be sustained, and the case was dismissed.

It was natural enough that the publication of the agreement at that particular moment, and in that unexpected manner, should be embarrassing. Lord Beaconsfield had long and frequently professed that he considered the "independence and integrity" of Turkey to be an indispensable condition of any settlement; and though the Russian successes had doubtless altered the situation within the last few months, still there was room for surprise at the cavalier manner in which the champion and the enemy of the Porte seemed to have coalesced for the purpose of utterly destroying both its independence and its integrity. There is no doubt that from this moment many Conservative and other supporters of the government in England grew lukewarm in the cause. This was especially the case with those who had persistently hoped that we should gain our ends in the field of battle, rather than in the council chamber.

At the same time it is evident that England had secured many valuable concessions and admissions from Russia in this document, and that the Russian government had fully granted our right to exercise a potent voice in the final arrangements. If Lord Salisbury had been compelled to give way on several points whereon he and his colleagues had hitherto maintained an attitude of firmness, on the other hand he had obtained pledges and guarantees which removed many of the principal obstacles to a Congress. It was, in fact, by this secret agreement that the

meeting of the great Powers, hitherto supposed to be all but impossible, was really brought about.

This, however, was not the only secret understanding with which our plenipotentiaries went to Berlin. If we had come to an agreement with Russia on the one part, we had made a private arrangement with Turkey on the other.

The Anglo-Turkish Convention was not made public until the Congress had held a majority of its sittings. Its circulation gave rise to scarcely less excitement than the Anglo-Russian agreement, and an equally bitter controversy has been waged over it. We may here introduce the terms of this convention, and the despatch in which Lord Salisbury explained its purport to Sir A. H. Layard. It will be observed that the date of this despatch is the same as the date of the agreement between Russia and England. We quote from the papers presented to Parliament on July 9th.

"THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY TO MR. LAYARD.

"Foreign Office, May 30, 1878.

"Sir—The progress of the confidential negotiations which have for some time past been in progress between her Majesty's government and the government of Russia make it probable that those articles of the treaty of San Stefano which concern European Turkey will be sufficiently modified to bring them into harmony with the interests of the other European Powers, and of England in particular.

"There is, however, no such prospect with respect to that portion of the treaty which concerns Turkey in Asia. It is sufficiently manifest that, in respect to Batoum and the fortresses north of the Araxes, the government of Russia is not prepared to recede from the stipulations to which the Porte has been led by the events of the war to consent. Her Majesty's government have consequently been forced to consider the effect which these agreements, if they are neither annulled nor counteracted, will have upon the future of the Asiatic provinces of

the Ottoman empire, and upon the interests of England, which are closely affected by the condition of those provinces.

"It is impossible that her Majesty's government can look upon these changes with indifference. Asiatic Turkey contains populations of many different races and creeds, possessing no capacity for self-government, and no aspirations for independence, but owing their tranquillity, and whatever prospect of political well-being they possess, entirely to the rule of the sultan. But the government of the Ottoman dynasty is that of an ancient but still alien conqueror, resting more upon actual power than upon the sympathies of common nationality. The defeat which the Turkish arms have sustained, and the known embarrassments of the government, will produce a general belief in its decadence and an expectation of speedy political change, which in the East are more dangerous than actual discontent to the stability of a government. If the population of Syria, Asia Minor, and Mesopotamia, see that the Porte has no guarantee for its continued existence but its own strength, they will, after the evidence which recent events have furnished of the frailty of that reliance, begin to calculate upon the speedy fall of the Ottoman domination, and to turn their eyes towards its successor.

"Even if it be certain that Batoum, and Ardahan, and Kars, will not become the base from which emissaries of intrigue will issue forth, to be in due time followed by invading armies, the mere retention of them by Russia will exercise a powerful influence in disintegrating the Asiatic dominion of the Porte. As a monument of feeble defence on the one side and successful aggression on the other, they will be regarded by the Asiatic population as foreboding the course of political history in the immediate future, and will stimulate, by the combined action of hope and fear, devotion to the Power which is in the ascendant, and desertion of the Power which is thought to be falling into decay.

"It is impossible for her Majesty's government to accept, without making an effort to

avert it, the effect which such a state of feeling would produce upon regions whose political condition deeply concerns the Oriental interests of Great Britain. They do not propose to attempt the accomplishment of this object by taking military measures for the purpose of replacing the conquered districts in the possession of the Porte. Such an undertaking would be arduous and costly, and would involve great calamities, and it would not be effective for the object which her Majesty's government have in view, unless subsequently strengthened by precautions, which can be taken almost as effectually without incurring the miseries of a preliminary war. The only provision which can furnish a substantial security for the stability of Ottoman rule in Asiatic Turkey, and which would be as essential after the re-conquest of the Russian annexations as it is now, is an engagement on the part of a Power strong enough to fulfil it, that any further encroachments by Russia upon Turkish territory in Asia will be prevented by force of arms. Such an undertaking, if given fully and unreservedly, will prevent the occurrence of the contingency which would bring it into operation, and will, at the same time, give to the populations of the Asiatic provinces the requisite confidence that Turkish rule in Asia is not destined to a speedy fall.

"There are, however, two conditions which it would be necessary for the Porte to subscribe before England could give such assurance.

"Her Majesty's government intimated to the Porte, on the occasion of the Conference at Constantinople, that they were not prepared to sanction misgovernment and oppression, and it will be requisite, before they can enter into any agreement for the defence of the Asiatic territories of the Porte in certain eventualities, that they should be formally assured of the intention of the Porte to introduce the necessary reforms into the government of the Christian and other subjects of the Porte in these regions. It is not desirable to require more than an engagement in general terms, for the specific measures to be taken could only be defined after a more careful



inquiry and deliberation than could be secured at the present juncture.

"It is not impossible that a careful selection and a faithful support of the individual officers to whom power is to be intrusted in those countries would be a more important element in the improvement of the condition of the people than even legislative changes; but the assurance required to give England a right to insist on satisfactory arrangements for these purposes will be an indispensable part of any agreement to which her Majesty's government could consent. It will further be necessary, in order to enable her Majesty's government efficiently to execute the engagements now proposed, that they should occupy a position near the coast of Asia Minor and Syria. The proximity of British officers, and, if necessary, British troops, will be the best security that all the objects of this agreement shall be attained. The island of Cyprus appears to them to be in all respects the most available for this object. Her Majesty's government do not wish to ask the sultan to alienate territory from his sovereignty, or to diminish the receipts which now pass into his treasury. They will, therefore, propose that, while the administration and occupation of the island shall be assigned to her Majesty, the territory shall still continue to be part of the Ottoman empire, and that the excess of the revenue over the expenditure, whatever it at present may be, shall be paid over annually by the British government to the treasury of the sultan.

"Inasmuch as the whole of this proposal is due to the annexations which Russia has made in Asiatic Turkey, and the consequences which it is apprehended will flow therefrom, it must be fully understood that, if the cause of the danger should cease, the precautionary agreement will cease at the same time. If the government of Russia should at any time surrender to the Porte the territory it has acquired in Asia by the recent war, the stipulations in the proposed agreements will cease to operate, and the island will be immediately evacuated.

"I request, therefore, your excellency to pro-

pose to the Porte to agree to a Convention to the following effect, and I have to convey to you full authority to conclude the same on behalf of the queen and of her Majesty's government:—

"If Batoum, Ardahan, Kars, or any of them, shall be retained by Russia, and if any attempt shall be made at any future time by Russia to take possession of any further portion of the Asiatic territories of the sultan, as fixed by the definitive treaty of peace, England engages to join the sultan in defending them by force of arms. In return, the sultan promises to England to introduce necessary reforms (to be agreed upon later between the two Powers) into the government of the Christian and other subjects of the Porte in these territories; and, in order to enable England to make necessary provision for executing her engagement, the sultan further consents to assign the island of Cyprus to be occupied and administered by England.

"I am, &c.,

"SALISBURY."

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"SIR A. H. LAYARD TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.

"Therapia, June 5, 1878.

"My Lord—I have the honour to enclose the Convention of Defensive Alliance between England and Turkey to secure the sultan's territories in Asia for the future against Russia, signed yesterday at the Imperial Palace of Yeldiz by his Excellency Safvet Pacha, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, and myself, as her Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.

"I have, &c.,

"A. H. LAYARD."

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(Enclosure.)

"CONVENTION OF DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND TURKEY, SIGNED JUNE 4, 1878.

"Her Majesty the Queen of the United King-

dom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, and his Imperial Majesty the Sultan, being mutually animated with the sincere desire of extending and strengthening the relations of friendship happily existing between their two empires, have resolved upon the conclusion of a convention of defensive alliance, with the object of securing for the future the territories in Asia of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan.

“ ‘ Their Majesties have accordingly chosen and named as their plenipotentiaries, that is to say :—

“ ‘ Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, the Right Honourable Austen Henry Layard, her Majesty’s Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at the Sublime Porte ;

“ ‘ And his Imperial Majesty the Sultan, his Excellency Safvet Pacha, Minister for Foreign Affairs of His Imperial Majesty ;

“ ‘ Who, after having exchanged their full powers, found in due and good form, have agreed upon the following Articles :—

“ ‘ ARTICLE 1.

“ ‘ If Batoum, Ardahan, Kars, or any of them, shall be retained by Russia, and if any attempt shall be made at any future time by Russia to take possession of any further territories of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan in Asia, as fixed by the definitive treaty of peace, England engages to join His Imperial Majesty the Sultan in defending them by force of arms.

“ ‘ In return, His Imperial Majesty the Sultan promises to England to introduce necessary reforms, to be agreed upon later between the two Powers, into the government, and for the protection, of the Christian and other subjects of the Porte in these territories ; and in order to enable England to make necessary provision for executing her engagement, His Imperial Majesty the Sultan further consents to assign the island of Cyprus, to be occupied and administered by England.

“ ‘ ARTICLE 2.

“ ‘ The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged, within the space of one month, or sooner, if possible.

“ ‘ In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

“ ‘ Done at Constantinople, the fourth day of June, in the year one thousand eight hundred and seventy-eight.

“ ‘ A. H. LAYARD.

“ ‘ SAFVET.”

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“ SIR A. H. LAYARD TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.

“ Therapia, July 1, 1878.

“ My Lord—I have the honour to enclose the original annex to the Convention entered into between England and Turkey, for the occupation of the island of Cyprus by the former, signed this day by the grand vizier and myself.

“ Your lordship will perceive that I have made the alterations in Articles 3 and 4, as instructed by your lordship, to prevent the Porte from claiming, as average revenue, under the third clause, the yield of land which it has let or sold under the fourth. The grand vizier insisted upon inserting in Article 3 the amount of surplus of revenue over expenditure, but it is provided that the sum mentioned is to be verified hereafter.

“ The article providing that Turkey shall not be called upon, in case of the evacuation of the island, to pay for improvements, &c., was withdrawn from the annex on the assurance given by me to the grand vizier, that your lordship would cause a revised article to be framed in the sense desired by his highness, but at the same time meeting the objections put forward by your lordship.

“ I have, &c.,

“ A. H. LAYARD.”



“ANNEX TO THE CONVENTION OF DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND TURKEY, SIGNED JUNE 4TH, 1878.

“The Right Honourable Sir A. H. Layard, G. C. B., and his Highness Safvet Pacha, now the Grand Vizier of his Majesty the Sultan, have agreed to the following annex to the Convention signed by them, as plenipotentiaries of their respective governments, on the 4th day of June, 1878 :—

“It is understood between the two High Contracting Parties that England agrees to the following conditions relating to her occupation and administration of the island of Cyprus :—

“1. That a Mussulman religious tribunal (Mehkémei Shéri) shall continue to exist in the island, which will take exclusive cognisance of religious matters, and of no others, concerning the Mussulman population of the island.

“2. That a Mussulman resident in the island shall be named by the Board of pious foundations in Turkey (Evkaf) to superintend, in conjunction with a delegate to be appointed by the British authorities, the administration of the property, funds, and lands belonging to mosques, cemeteries, Mussulman schools, and other religious establishments existing in Cyprus.

“3. That England will pay to the Porte whatever is the present excess of revenue over expenditure in the island; this excess to be calculated upon and determined by the average of the last five years, stated to be twenty-two thousand nine hundred and thirty-six purses, to be duly verified hereafter, and to the exclusion of the produce of state and crown lands let or sold during that period.

“4. That the Sublime Porte may freely sell and lease lands and other property in Cyprus belonging to the Ottoman crown and state (Arazii Miriyé vé Emlaki Houmayoun), the produce of which does not form part of the revenue of the island referred to in Article 3.

“5. That the English government, through their competent authorities, may purchase com-

pulsorily, at a fair price, land required for public improvements, or for other public purposes, and land which is not cultivated.

“6. That if Russia restores to Turkey Kars, and the other conquests made by her in Armenia during the last war, the island of Cyprus will be evacuated by England, and the Convention of the 4th of June, 1878, will be at an end.

“Done at Constantinople, the 1st day of July, 1878.

“A. H. LAYARD.

“SAFVET.”

This Convention was certainly, as the “Times” described it in a leading article on the day of its publication, one of the most important measures of foreign policy which have ever been resolved upon by a British government. “The measure hitherto only surmised by the public is no longer a mere scheme or proposal; it is an accomplished fact. It lies, no doubt, in the power of Parliament, by a decisive expression of disapproval, to stay its final execution. But, in the exercise of that power of initiative which our constitution intrusts to the crown, the measure has been actually adopted, and is at this moment being carried into effect. More than a month ago the British government signed a defensive alliance with Turkey which, in the event of Batoum, Ardahan, or Kars, being retained by Russia, secures the sultan’s territories in Asia against any further encroachment by the czar. In return for this guarantee, the sultan enters into two agreements. In the first place, he promises to introduce necessary reforms, to be agreed upon later between the two Powers, for the government of the Christian and other subjects of the territories thus secured to him. In the second place, in order to enable England to make necessary provision for executing her agreement, the sultan consents to assign the island of Cyprus, to be occupied and administered by England. The identical statement made yesterday by the Duke of Richmond and Gordon, and by Mr. Cross, announces that this convention is at this moment being executed. The

condition on which it was founded having arisen in consequence of Russia having finally declared her intention to retain the Armenian fortresses, a firman has been issued by the Porte authorising the occupation of Cyprus by England, and possession of the island will at once be taken and the government administered on behalf of her Majesty. Sir Garnet Wolseley, who has justly won confidence by his discharge of several very responsible duties, has been appointed governor, and British troops are doubtless on their way to establish our authority in the island."

The island was, in fact, taken possession of by Mr. Baring, on behalf of Great Britain, on the 11th of July, two days before the close of the Berlin Congress.

## CHAPTER XVI.

### THE MEETING OF THE CONGRESS.

THE general condition of Europe, at the time when the plenipotentiaries of the Great Powers met at Berlin to modify the treaty of Paris, was in itself remarkable, apart from the special circumstances which had brought these statesmen together. Although much had been said of the universal anxiety throughout Europe lest a fresh war should break out, and involve most of the Powers on one side or another, and notwithstanding the widespread depression of trade, which undoubtedly afflicted the majority of the European nations, France had afforded, throughout the crisis, a model of a peaceful and well ordered state. The country which, under the imperial régime, had never been satisfied without taking part in every intrigue and quarrel amongst her neighbours, had now devoted her whole energies to the preparation and holding of a great international exhibition. The republican government had clearly made up its mind not to be drawn into the Eastern imbroglio, although the disturbance of the settlement of 1856 would have given her ample excuse for taking a

prominent part in the discussion. The ministry of Mr. Dufaure, which succeeded to power late in the year 1877, resisted every temptation to turn the situation to their own account; and their attitude assured the neutrality of Germany.

It is scarcely too much to say that the calmness, the industrial enterprise and achievements of France, in the Spring of 1878, considerably lightened the gravity of the crisis in Europe, and went far to preserve the general peace. The first formal invitations to the Powers to assemble in conference were sent out by Austria on the 3rd of February. From that time until May and even June, the outlook was constantly gloomy, and hardly a day passed without raising some new danger or fear of war. But all this time France was persevering in her efforts, in spite of the fact that an actual outbreak would have converted her undertaking into a failure. The exhibition was opened on the 1st of May, and every country except Germany contributed largely to render it a success.

This practical triumph of a republic at a moment when the absolute and constitutional monarchies of Europe were on the brink of war was significant; and no less so was the contrast afforded by the state of public opinion in the various nations. In France, where a long course of tyranny, producing agitations and revolutions, had caused the people to be undeservedly stigmatised as fickle and incapable of self-government, everything now bore witness to contentment and satisfaction. The socialistic and subversive doctrines which had formerly thriven under oppression, and had startled the world by the vehemence of their outbreak, had, for the most part, disappeared; whereas, in other countries, with rare exceptions, the people were found to be discontented in the highest degree, overburdened by taxation and military service, and in many cases exasperated beyond endurance.

There was no cause for surprise in the plots and assassinations of Constantinople, or in the conspiracies of Russian secret societies; but the eyes of many people were opened by the at-



tempted assassination of the Emperor of Germany, on the 11th of May. Another attempt was made on the 2nd of the following month, when the aged monarch was gravely wounded by Dr. Nobiling, under circumstances which led to the suspicion that the assassin was connected with a dangerous society, the rules whereof were inimical to the imperial family and the government.

This outrage on the Emperor William took place on the day before the invitations to the Berlin Congress were sent out by Prince Bismarck; and the trial of Hoedel, the first assassin, actually took place in the German capital during the residence of the plenipotentiaries.

Another remarkable accompaniment of the Congress, though this was by no means contrary to precedent in such cases, was the active preparation made for war by the nations which were about to meet for a peaceable discussion of their views. England, as we have already seen, was bringing native troops from India to Malta, and some thousand horse and foot arrived in that island between the sending out of the invitations and the actual meeting of the plenipotentiaries. Austria was expending a large sum of money, like ourselves, in putting her army in a state of readiness. Russia on her part, in addition to maintaining her immense armaments in Turkey, was making at this time a national demonstration of patriotism by fostering a popular subscription for the purchase of vessels intended to act as privateers, in case of a war with England. Several large ships were bought in the ports of the United States, and actively fitted out for purposes of attack. All this contributed to deepen the gloom of the situation, and to make it seem very doubtful, up to the last moment, whether the difficulty could be solved without war.

On the eve of the meeting at Berlin, the Porte was ill-advised enough to draw up a memorandum which it proposed to present to the Congress, giving a history of the negotiations at Adrianople and San Stefano, which preceded the conclusion of the treaty of San Stefano. The

memorandum stated, according to Reuter's abstract, that the negotiations lasted only seventeen days, during which discussion was impossible, as the propositions were not at once submitted in their entirety, but were brought forward separately, with permanent pressure, tending to precipitate matters. The resolutions taken were adopted blindly and hastily, and at each article the Turkish representatives were met with signs of impatience, ironical comments, and threatening observations from the Russian plenipotentiaries. At the least objection offered on the Turkish side, the Grand Duke Nicholas threatened to terminate the armistice, and declared that if matters were not concluded before the anniversary of the czar's accession to the throne, negotiations would be broken off. When the Turkish plenipotentiaries objected to the extension of the Servian boundaries, the grand duke, states the memorandum, gave orders for the Russian army to advance on Constantinople, but withdrew the order the following day. The same threat was renewed on each subsequent occasion that any difficulties were raised by the Turks. On the anniversary of the czar's accession, the Grand Duke Nicholas demanded the acceptance within an hour of several important remaining articles of the treaty. The boundaries of the new Bulgaria were fixed according to Russian information, declared to be absolutely correct, whereas the memorandum points out that ethnological documents afterwards proved it to be erroneous. The questions of the war indemnity, and of the Turkish cessions of territory to Russia, were settled at the last moment in a few hours.

The publication of this complaint naturally gave umbrage to Russia; and one of its results appears to have been the dismissal of Said Pacha and the appointment of Ruchdi Pacha as grand vizier—a post which had been for a few months abolished. Five weeks later, Ruchdi was succeeded by Safvet Pacha, who maintained his position until the following December.

It had been intended to present this memorandum formally to the Congress; but the Porte



TURKS STORMING THE VILAGE OF KIZILA





was better advised, and went through the formality of denying its genuineness. Before this, however, Prince Gortschakoff's organ, the "*Journal de St. Petersbourg*," published an article upon the memorial, in the course of which it said:—

"If the Porte, in support of its demand of an alleviation of her obligations under the San Stefano treaty, knows of no other arguments to raise than those contained in that document, her cause appears to be in danger. Europe will approach the Eastern question from the point of view of ensuring the peace of Europe, and removing every germ of discord, and since the governments are convinced of the necessity of watching over the safety of the states, the Porte will not succeed in bringing about a split amongst the Powers." In fact, the friends of Turkey saw that nothing like recrimination would serve her purpose at this moment, and it was on their urgent advice that the memorial was withdrawn.

The invitations to the Congress were at once accepted by all the Powers to which they were addressed—Russia, Austria, France, Italy, and England. It had originally been intended that we should be represented on this occasion by Lord Derby, and Lord Lyons, our ambassador at Paris; but the arrangement was subsequently modified. Lord Derby had retired from the government, and it was now announced that our plenipotentiaries should be Lords Beaconsfield and Salisbury, the Premier and Foreign Secretary.

The Opposition saw reason to object to this course, which, under the circumstances was certainly an unusual one. Lord Granville stated his opinion on the subject in the Upper House. "We all know," he said, "that there are precedents for foreign secretaries attending congresses of an important character; but Lord Derby stated expressly that, in the opinion of her Majesty's government, such a course on this occasion would be most inadvisable. He stated that it would be most inconsistent that a foreign secretary in a great government like our own, whatever might be the case with regard to foreign governments, should be cut off from all

communication with his colleagues, and that also he would have to act on instructions which he had no hand in preparing. I entirely acquiesce in the course which her Majesty's government then proposed to take. If these objections were valid as to the appointment of a foreign secretary for such purpose, their weight must be much more than doubled by the fact that two such important members of the Cabinet as the foreign secretary and the prime minister are both absent from the country for a purpose of this sort. Either one of two things must be. Either, as I trust is the case, everything is substantially settled between the Powers of Europe previous to going into Congress; in that case, there will be only forms of details to be settled, and, without the slightest disrespect to the two noble lords opposite, this might be quite as well done by trained diplomatists of great experience as by two of the ablest men in England, who have had not the slightest experience in the management of such details and forms. On the other hand, if there remains anything to be settled, or if something might suddenly arise, either the two plenipotentiaries will agree or disagree. It is possible that they may not agree, and is the Cabinet to decide, without the advantage of consulting or hearing the discussions between the two noble lords, and without being able to use that personal influence which colleagues can so efficiently bring to bear on one another? If, on the other hand, they agree on any sudden emergency or on any important case—and I see that it is already given as one of the advantages of their appointment—they need not refer home to the Cabinet at all, and it will be left entirely outside of their decision in the matter. The other night a noble friend behind me (Lord Hamond) stated, more broadly than I thought was required, the important position which the prime minister and the foreign secretary held with regard to foreign affairs. I thought the remark applied equally to the duties, rights, and responsibilities of the whole Cabinet, and I do appeal to the noble lord whether he can approve of a course in which these two noble lords are



to be separated from their colleagues, and I say it without the slightest disrespect, their practically leaving their colleagues somewhat in the position of cyphers on the decision of an important question. I trust the house will excuse me for having made these remarks, and I wish to ask the noble earl whether he can give any precedent whatever for a double appointment like this being made with regard to any previous conference or congress."

In support of the proposal Lord Beaconsfield delivered a characteristic speech. He began by admitting that there was no precedent exactly similar to the course which had been taken on this occasion. "The decision of the government upon such a matter," he said, "can only be arrived at after long deliberation, and also upon an acquaintance with all the facts in great detail, which it would be most inconvenient to introduce into any discussion at present in your lordships' house. I cannot understand exactly the reasoning by which the noble earl has come to an opinion that the absence of my noble friend and myself from the Cabinet would reduce our colleagues who are left behind to cyphers, when it seems to me rather that the consequence of our absence will be to increase their importance and responsibility. I can at least say that we have undertaken this very important and laborious task with the full concurrence, and at the wish and instance of our colleagues; and in taking the course we have done we are only fulfilling their wishes. The noble lord will hardly be able to persuade either your lordships or the country that in what we have done we have slighted our colleagues, or placed them in any position in which their influence and importance will be diminished. The noble lord asked me for a precedent, which I frankly told him I could not furnish. Upon matters of this kind we must not be guided by mere precedent. There are a variety of considerations quite independent of the power of adducing precedents which must guide our course. In the first place, I may remark that when the Conference was first mentioned there was a general understanding that the

Powers would be represented by the ambassadors of the different countries, but that course has not been adopted in the present instance, from the fact that the chief ministers of Austria and Germany will certainly be present at the Congress, and, as we are at present advised, the chief minister of Russia. Therefore it was open to us, and it became our duty, to consider whether, under the altered circumstances of the case, the government of her Majesty should be represented in a different manner from that which has been just proposed. On the whole of these questions we feel the great responsibility of the step we have taken. We look, under these circumstances, to the support of your lordships' house and of the country; and if we fail in our duty—if it can be shown hereafter that any failure which may occur has arisen from the mode in which the representatives of the government of the queen have been selected, we must abide the consequences, which we shall certainly and entirely deserve."

It had been arranged amongst the Powers that they should be represented on this occasion by their principal ministers, so that, apart from the fact of withdrawing two prominent members of the Cabinet from England during a session of Parliament, there was nothing incongruous in the mission of Lord Beaconsfield and Salisbury.

Germany was represented by the Chancellor, Prince von Bismarck, who necessarily assumed the presidency of the Congress, by Baron Bülow, and by Prince von Hohenlohe, the German Ambassador at Paris.

Austria was represented by the Chancellor, Count Andrassy, by Count Karolyi, and by Baron Haymerle, Austrian Ambassador at Rome.

France was represented by the Foreign Minister, M. Waddington, by Count de St. Vallier, who had been attached to the French Embassy at Berlin, and by M. Desprez.

Great Britain, in addition to the Premier and the Foreign Secretary, commissioned Lord Odo Russell, our Ambassador at Berlin.

Italy was represented by the Foreign Secretary, Count Corti, and by Count de Launay.

Russia was represented by the Chancellor, Count Gortschakoff, by Count Schouvaloff, who had done so much to remove the obstacles to the Congress, and by M. d'Oubril.

Turkey sent Caratheodori Pacha, a man of Greek extraction, hitherto almost untried in the higher diplomatic functions, Mehemet Ali, the general, who was a German by birth, and Sadoullah Bey, who had been Turkish Ambassador at Berlin.

It was in the order here given (being, with the exception of Germany, the alphabetical order of the countries) that the above statesmen signed all the protocols of the Congress.

The reader probably understands the motives and intention with which the several Powers entered into the Congress of Berlin; but it is worth while to quote the statement made in the French Chamber by M. Waddington, in reply to an interpellation of M. Leon Renault, who asked for a declaration of the policy of ministers. M. Waddington began by reviewing the events of the late war, and the incidents which led the way to the meeting of a Congress. The action which France had taken, the minister proceeded, had been invariably exercised in favour of peace. "With regard to the Congress, France formulated the reservation that the questions of Egypt, the Lebanon, and the Holy Places, should be excluded from its deliberations, and this had been accorded. France had, moreover, not forgotten that she had signed the treaties of 1856 and 1871, and she considered that a Congress alone could settle the details of the Eastern question. An agreement had now been established preparatory to the Congress." M. Waddington then read the formal invitation of the German government to France to take part in a Congress to meet on June 13th, and also the reply of the French Cabinet, accepting the invitation on condition that no other question but that of the recent war should form the subject of discussion. The minister went on to say that the maintenance of peace was now almost a certainty. "France would go to the Congress without any feelings of cupidity, but with a desire

to preserve peace and neutrality, and he hoped it would not be forgotten that there existed other Christians besides the Bulgarians in the Balkan peninsula."

It is highly to the credit of the Western Powers at this juncture, and to England and France in particular, that they dwelt with special emphasis upon the necessity of European concert in dealing with treaty obligations! The German government rendered, at all events, a passive assistance to Russia, and seemed to treat the question of treaty rights in a spirit of cynicism and indifference. The Russian diplomatists were certainly disposed to pay scanty respect to the claims of those Powers who had signed the Paris Treaty. The resistance of England, France, and even Austria, upon this principle, was therefore of the utmost value to the community of nations.

The meetings of the Berlin Congress were arranged to be held in Prince Bismarck's new residence, known as the Radziwil Palace; and the plan of the mansion has become famous. From the basement, the diplomatists ascended a grand staircase, and entered the vestibule. Hence they passed into a room set apart for the secretaries of the Congress, and thence into the hall of Congress, which was fitted up throughout on a magnificent scale. This saloon was of imposing dimensions, and very tastefully decorated, the carpet being of a light colour, with a large admixture of gold. In the centre of the room there was a horseshoe-shaped table, and in the middle, on the outer side, was the presidential seat of the Imperial Chancellor. On the side of the Congress hall, near the secretarial room, there were two conference rooms, to which the members of the Congress could retire for consultation; and it was in these rooms, as well as outside the palace, between the formal meetings, that most of the hard work of the Congress was performed.

There were at first some doubts as to whether Prince Gortschakoff would be able to attend. He had been indisposed for several weeks, and was scarcely able to travel; but the news that



Lord Beaconsfield had resolved to come to Berlin in person, seems to have decided the Russian Chancellor to make the effort. A St. Petersburg correspondent, writing on the 5th of June, had some remarks on Prince Gortschakoff, which may be appropriately repeated here. "Yesterday," he said,\* "the emperor came from Tsarskoe Selo, and went to see the venerable chancellor, and his journey to Berlin was decided at this interview. To do him justice, Prince Gortschakoff has always regarded political questions from an elevated and European point of view. He has never been of opinion that the interests of his country consisted in making war. For this reason he was always opposed to the last war against Turkey, which would certainly never have taken place had his ideas prevailed. For the same reason, he has always endeavoured to bring about an understanding between the Powers on the Eastern question—an understanding such as would guarantee to Europe many years of peace, and force Turkey, by collective coercion, to fulfil her obligations towards the Christian populations, and to execute the decisions of Europe. As this object could not be attained, he would have preferred that Russia should have declared that she refused all responsibility for the inaction of Europe, and then have adopted a policy of non-intervention, or even of isolation. Russia, having then nothing more to do with questions not directly concerning her, might once more have devoted herself exclusively to her own domestic affairs—to reforms, to progress, and to industry. Events, easy to foresee in a future more or less distant, would have shown the Powers the fault they had committed in refusing to respond to her disinterested and far-sighted appeal. This policy, as you know, is not that which has prevailed. Prince Gortschakoff gradually withdrew from the direction of foreign affairs, and watched over them rather than controlled them. He did not resign, for that would have been too much of a manifestation, would have made too

much impression on Europe, and seemed an act of impatience towards his sovereign, and of indifference towards his country. At Bucharest he even kept completely aloof from foreign affairs. But the conciliatory and judicious influence of Count Schouvaloff, which always met with the sympathy and the approval of the chancellor, having at last triumphed, he has gradually resumed the direction of public business, and has supported to the utmost the beneficial action which the count came here to exercise. Thus, although suffering from gout, and still very weak, he did not hesitate a moment. When he saw that success had crowned the efforts of the count, and that Lord Beaconsfield was to go to the Congress, which he regarded as proof that matters were not merely to be patched up, but that a new and durable state of things was to be established, as well as fresh relations of friendship between England and Russia, he determined to attend the Congress, and strengthen by his presence and his legitimate influence the agreement arrived at. He also wished to meet Lord Beaconsfield. The matter, as I have said, was decided yesterday. Owing to the state of his health, the prince will not be able to attend all the sittings of the Congress, but he will be at hand in the Russian Embassy to offer suggestions and to give advice, and will have opportunities of constantly meeting the representatives of the other Powers—Lord Beaconsfield, Prince Bismarck, Count Andrassy, &c., and of presiding over the private meetings that will be held."

It turned out, however, that Prince Gortschakoff was able to be present at many of the formal sittings, and to take part in the discussions, though he laboured under great difficulties throughout, due both to physical weakness and to mental anxiety. The position of Russia was indeed by no means an easy one. The same correspondent wrote three days later:—"It is said here that there are many difficulties remaining which the Congress will have to deal with, and that it will be no easy work to arrange matters which are so entangled to the satisfac-

\* "Daily News," June 11, 1873.

tion of all parties. People nevertheless hope that this specific result will be attained, and the only fear is lest complications should be caused in Constantinople, where great anarchy still prevails. It is said also, and everything indicates that the statement is worthy of belief, that efforts are being made in the Turkish capital to prevent the Congress from completing the work which should be the object of all its labours, which is the cause of its meeting, and which, in the event of success, will be its undoubted glory—I mean, an understanding between Russia and England. I have always maintained, and events have not contradicted me, that two powerful nations, with such different interests, could be very useful to each other, and greatly benefit each other; that two nations so enlightened, and having so much at heart the welfare of their citizens, could scarcely appeal to that worst of all arguments, war, as long as it was possible to have recourse to other means of settling their disputes. Yet the Russian press takes a long time to accustom itself to the idea of a Congress in which Russia is to make concessions. It has added fuel to the flames, ever since the commencement of the difficulties, or at least this is what has been done by some of the papers. They have perhaps rendered more service to the cause of peace and harmony than they expected, certainly more than they wished. The Chauvinist and Slav organs took infinite pains to prevent the success of Count Schouvaloff's mission. The most ardent in this struggle of national vanity against national common sense were the 'Moscow Journal,' the 'New Times,' and the 'Russian World.' Only the other day the last-named paper contained a very insidious article against Count Schouvaloff, in which it sung the praises of General Ignatieff in the loudest tones. According to this paper, General Ignatieff is the only Russian diplomatist capable of properly defending Russian interests, the only one thoroughly acquainted with foreign diplomacy, the only one familiar with the East, and his own country, and who ought undoubtedly therefore to represent that country as its first plenipoten-

tiary at the Congress. You know what attention has been paid to these outbursts. Count Schouvaloff, the representative of pacific ideas, who has done so much to bring about an understanding between Russia and England, and who to secure it undertook the mission which will for ever be associated with his name, Count Schouvaloff, I say, has been sent to the Congress. As to General Ignatieff, where is he? Thus, as you see, the Slav party for the moment is disposed of. Will it come to the front again? It is to be hoped not, for the sake of the real interests and prosperity of Russia, and the general peace and harmony of Europe."

As for the objects with which England entered into the Congress of Berlin, they are explicitly unfolded in a despatch written by the Marquis of Salisbury to Lord Odo Russell, on the 8th of June, formally announcing to him that he had been selected as the third English plenipotentiary.

In this despatch, the Foreign Minister wrote:—"In respect to a large number of questions of detail which will rise upon this instrument, the government and the other plenipotentiaries expect to derive much advantage from the experienced counsel which they will be certain of obtaining from your excellency. It is only necessary that I should sketch out to you the general principles upon which, in the judgment of her Majesty's government, a settlement should be effected. The points upon which the most beneficial results are likely to arise from the exertions of her Majesty's plenipotentiaries in the deliberations of the Congress will necessarily be those in which the interests of England and the interests of other European Powers are alike directly concerned. The matters which are dealt with in the earlier Articles of the treaty of San Stefano may not be considered as interesting England in a primary degree, but will not the less require the vigilant attention of the plenipotentiaries. The frontiers, for example, to be assigned to Servia and Montenegro, and the arrangements to be made with respect to Bosnia and Herzegovina, though they



are all comprised within the provisions of the treaty of Paris, and therefore come within the category of subjects on which England is entitled, if she thinks fit, to express and sustain her opinion, belong to this class of questions. Your counsels on these points will, in the first place, be directed to assure the welfare and the good government of the populations concerned; and you will not forget the ancient alliance between Austria and this country, and the general coincidence of their interests. It is important that, in the discussions of the Congress on these matters, you should support any legitimate proposals tending to benefit and strengthen the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. But, in doing so, you will bear in mind that, if Russia should ultimately adhere to the proposals of the preliminary treaty, these do not touch the interests of England so closely as to justify the plenipotentiaries in pushing their opposition so far as to break up the Congress on that account.

"On the other hand, the proposed annexations in Asia, which have an injurious bearing upon the interests of Great Britain, are not likely to excite any serious opposition on the part of the other European Powers. It is understood that there will be little difficulty in inducing the Russian government to make considerable concessions in respect to that part of the conquered territory which includes the caravan-route from Trebizond to Tabreez. But there is no ground for believing that Russia will willingly give way in respect to Batoum, Kars, or Ardashan; and it is possible that the arguments of England urged in Congress will receive little assistance from other Powers, and will not be able to shake her resolution in this respect. You will not, on that account, abstain from earnestly pressing upon them and upon Russia the justice of abstaining from annexations which are unconnected with the professed objects of the war, and profoundly distasteful to the populations concerned; and the expediency, in regard to the future tranquillity of Asia, of forbearing to shake so perilously the position of the government of Turkey. In the event of the

failure, in this respect, of the efforts of the English plenipotentiaries, you will be made acquainted with the course which her Majesty's government have decided to pursue.

"The other portions of the treaty concern other Powers as well as England, and it is probable that, in respect to them, the English plenipotentiaries will not be left to stand alone. None of the Powers, indeed, appear to attach so much importance to the union of Bessarabia with Moldavia, provided for in the treaty of Paris, as to be willing to prevent by force the retrocession of that region by Roumania; not even those Powers to whose trade the Danube is an important outlet. England, therefore, whose direct interests are little affected, and whose means of action are comparatively restricted, could not assume the responsibility of doing so. A distinct protest, however, should be entered against a violation of international law, for which there seems to be little excuse, and which cannot be justified by reference to the purposes with which the war was undertaken. At the same time, the rights of the Powers with respect to the navigation of the Danube must be fully respected, and no countenance must be given to an interpretation of the 19th article of the treaty of San Stefano which would give to Russia in any case the power of keeping the Dobrudscha as Russian territory. If, indeed, it shall happen that Roumania should refuse to make the retrocession of Bessarabia in exchange for the equivalent which is offered, a case will arise which is not referred to in the treaty of San Stefano, and which will be outside the competence of a Congress summoned only to consider that treaty.

"The demand of Russia to be exclusively consulted as to the administrative institutions of Bulgaria, Thessaly, Epirus, Crete, and the other provinces of Turkey in Europe, cannot be accepted by the other Powers, and will, probably, not be maintained in argument. The claims which will undoubtedly be advanced by the government of Greece in reference to some of these provinces will receive the careful consideration of her Majesty's plenipotentiaries, and I doubt

not, of the whole of the representatives of the other Powers.

"The constitution of the province of Bulgaria will especially merit the attention of the English plenipotentiaries. The tributary principality, which, under the treaty, extends to the Ægean on the south, and beyond the lake of Ochrida on the west, and trenches closely on the important towns of Adrianople and Salonica, requires very material reduction. In the judgment of her Majesty's government, it should not be allowed to extend south of the Balkan range. Those parts of the territory south of that chain, which are principally inhabited by Bulgarians, ought to have the protection of institutions generally similar to those which were proposed at the Conference of Constantinople. Great care, however, should be taken that, while every necessary safeguard is provided for the good government of the population, the political and military authority of the sultan's government is sufficiently secured to provide against the risk of this province being made the arena of treasonable intrigues, or the gate of an invading army. While it may be proper that the Turkish forces should not be cantoned among the body of the Bulgarian population, and especially in the neighbourhood of the towns which have been the scenes of lamentable calamities, it is very important, for the security of Constantinople, that they should continue to occupy the passes of the Balkans. England could not acquiesce in the institution of any local militia in that province, unless its principal officers are nominated by the sultan.

"It is essential that the Greek populations which have been so largely included in the new Bulgaria by the treaty should be preserved from the danger of absorption by a dominant Slav population; that Salonica and Cavalla should be kept at a distance from the jurisdiction of any state likely to fall under the influence of Russia; and that the Ægean littoral generally should remain in the hands of the Porte. But it is scarcely less important that, in the arrangements made for the government and defence of

the territory south of the Balkans, the position of the sultan should be made strategically so secure as to enable him to discharge independently the political duties which he has to perform. The provision of the preliminary treaty, under which Russian troops will be permitted to occupy Bulgaria for two years with a force of fifty thousand men, would enable Russia to impress her influence deeply, and perhaps ineffaceably, upon the organisation of the new community. It will be the object of the plenipotentiaries to diminish the length and force of this occupation to the utmost possible extent.

"The financial questions arising out of the indebtedness of Turkey, the indemnity imposed upon her, and the distribution of the whole of the liabilities she has incurred among the provinces which have acquired a complete or partial independence, will require the most careful attention of the plenipotentiaries. The difficulties will be chiefly in detail; but as matter of principle it will be necessary to provide that the securities to which her Majesty's government, as creditors of the Porte, are entitled, should be left entirely unaffected by the operation of the treaty. Care must also be taken that the indemnity, payable in money, shall not, under any circumstances, be made the pretext for a new demand of territory.

"In respect to the straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, which are dealt with in the 24th article of the treaty, her Majesty's government will, in preference to the provisions of that article, insist on the maintenance of the regulations which existed before the war."

The first sitting of the Congress took place on Thursday, June 13th. Count Andrassy began by proposing that Prince Bismarck should preside over the meetings, and this was, of course, unanimously agreed to. The president, after one or two formalities, addressed the members in a few significant words, as follows:—

"Gentlemen—It is before everything my duty to thank you, in the name of my master, the emperor, for the unanimity with which the whole of the Cabinets have been pleased to



answer the invitation of Germany. We may well look upon this accord as a first pledge for the happy accomplishment of our common task. The events which have occasioned the assembling of the Congress are present to the memory of all. Already, towards the end of the year 1876, the Cabinets had used their combined efforts with a view of re-establishing peace in the peninsula of the Balkans. They had sought, at the same time, effective guarantees for ameliorating the lot of the Christian populations of Turkey. These efforts were not successful. A new and more formidable conflict broke out, to which the arrangements of San Stefano have put an end. The stipulations of this treaty are, in several points, of a nature to modify the state of things as fixed by former European conventions, and it is for the purpose of submitting the work of San Stefano to the free discussion of the Cabinets Signatories of the treaties of 1856 and 1871 that we have assembled. Our object is to secure, by common agreement, and on the basis of new guarantees, that peace of which Europe so much stands in need."

With regard to the special subjects of discussion which the Congress would have before it, Prince Bismarck went on to say that the future constitution of Bulgaria was the most prominent; and he proposed to start with this, after an interval of a few days, "in order to give time to the plenipotentiaries to exchange their ideas."\* This proposition having been generally agreed to, the leading plenipotentiaries of England and Russia made their first declarations.

The Earl of Beaconsfield observed that, before examining the treaty of San Stefano, the Congress encountered a preliminary question of extreme urgency, namely, the position which the Russian forces occupied at that moment in the neighbourhood of Constantinople. Lord Beaconsfield considered this situation to be abnormal and dangerous. He pointed out that the Russian troops had advanced beyond the line fixed by

the armistice, and looked upon their presence as a danger to the two parties concerned, as well as to the interests of Europe. He feared the impulses to which two armies brought so close to one another might be exposed; "an incident, a rumour, might bring about the greatest calamities, possibly even the capture of Constantinople." He questioned whether it was proper that the Congress should deliberate in the presence of such perils; and, while regretting that the efforts made by the Cabinets interested to bring about an arrangement equitable to the two parties should have produced no result, he invited the attention of his colleagues to this preliminary question.

Prince Bismarck, while remarking that this question did not appear to him to be one that it would be desirable to enter into during that day's session, asked the Russian plenipotentiaries if they wished to reply to the observations of Lord Beaconsfield.

Prince Gortschakoff declared that Russia had come to take part in the Congress, with the intention of avoiding all recrimination with regard to the past. He could not therefore enter upon an examination of the motives and of the circumstances which led to the treaty of San Stefano. The Russian government was, above all, desirous to remove all uncertainty and distrust. The object of the Emperor Alexander, which, in his Majesty's belief, was in consonance with every European interest, was to give to the Christian subjects of the Porte an autonomous existence, secured by effective guarantees. "If to attain such a result the Congress should discover other means than those which had appeared to Russia to be the best, the government of the emperor would examine them, but its only object was to secure and to guarantee effectually an autonomous existence to the Christian populations."

It will be observed that Prince Bismarck, at the first show of a tendency on the part of one of the plenipotentiaries to adopt a tone of complaint, or to use a heated argument, instantly suggested the postponement of the topic. He pursued the same course on every similar occa-

\* See Blue-book "Correspondence relating to the treaty of Berlin," from which the following account of the Congress is mainly taken.

sion ; and it was to his adroitness in this respect that the amicable character of the formal sittings was unquestionably due.

The subject was soon allowed to drop, and the remainder of the first sitting was without special importance.

The second meeting took place on the 17th of June, and the proceedings were once more of a preparatory kind. The question of the admissibility of delegates from several minor states had been raised, and it was necessary to consider at the outset which of these representatives should be allowed to lay their case before the Congress.

In every meeting of the Powers such as that which was now being held at Berlin, efforts are wont to be made, not only by states, but also by corporations, and even by individuals, to obtain a hearing for special grievances ; and in this instance a considerable number of petitions and memorials had been addressed to the plenipotentiaries. In regard to these, it was agreed that none of them should be taken into consideration unless it was brought to the notice of the Congress by one of the plenipotentiaries ; and the result was, that the majority of them were passed over in silence.

## CHAPTER XVII.

### GREECE AND THE CONGRESS.

THE case of Greece was introduced at the second sitting by the Marquis of Salisbury, who had prepared the following statement on the subject, which he now read to his colleagues. It will be observed that the English foreign secretary committed himself to a very decided view in regard to the claims of the Hellenic race.

“The proposal for the assembling of a Congress was no sooner made than her Majesty’s government conveyed to the Six Powers its opinion that Greece ought to be represented in

it. The reasons which prompted this proposal may be easily understood. The government which commenced the war, now concluded, declared that it had undertaken it with elevated views, and without ulterior object. It announced that it did not seek territorial acquisitions ; its aim was to deliver the Christian populations from the evils of which the existence was generally recognised, whatever might be their cause. His Highness Prince Gortschakoff has reiterated the same elevated views in this hall at the first sitting of the Congress. A war undertaken with such views ought evidently to be terminated by a peace bearing the impression of the same sentiments ; and the first duty of the representatives of the Powers will be to watch that the provisions of the treaty should be restricted within the limits thus laid down. But the Christians of these regions are divided into two parties, whose interests are not identical, and whose sympathies are not in harmony.

“The Congress is well aware that, during late years, the bonds of friendship which formerly united the Greek and Slav subjects of the Porte have been broken. From allies they have become rivals. The Slavs who formerly recognised the authority of the Greek Patriarch have given their adherence to a new ecclesiastical organisation which has claimed their submission. In a considerable portion of the territory inhabited by the Greek race, the right of possessing churches and schools has given rise to disputes, often even to collisions, between the populations of the two races. The conflict has been profoundly aggravated owing to the events which have taken place during the last few months, and the passions engendered by these conflicts have more and more estranged these two races. It was a matter of more than a mere divergence of opinion on questions of ecclesiastical government. The Greeks fear, and with reason, the subjection of their church, the suppression of their language, and the gradual absorption and disappearance of their race, if their rivals should gain a preponderant influence. These points are for them of capital interest, and their fate depends



on the form which the Congress shall give to the arrangements which will be decided upon with the object of protecting the Christians and securing order and security to the provinces of European Turkey.

"But the two races are not on an equal footing before the Congress. The Slavs have, as their defender in this room, a powerful military nation, related to them by blood and by faith, strong in the prestige of its recent victories. The Greeks, on the contrary, have, as their representative here, no nation of the same race.

"Her Majesty's government is of opinion that the decisions taken, under such circumstances, would not content the Greek race, and consequently, would not promote either the tranquillity of the Ottoman empire or the peace of Europe. It is to be feared that fresh agitations may arise among that people, so profoundly devoted to its faith and its nationality, which will have acquired the conviction that Europe has abandoned it, and has left it under the domination of a race from which its sympathies are entirely estranged.

"England, therefore, proposes that the Hellenic kingdom should be admitted to fill this position on behalf of the Greeks, and to take part in the deliberations of the Congress; or at least to assist at all sittings in which questions in connection with the interests of the Greek race shall be discussed."

Prince Bismarck at once proposed that the consideration of this question should be left over until the next meeting. Prince Gortschakoff, whilst assenting to this, took occasion to say that Russia was well disposed to all the Christian subjects of the Porte, and that she would even demand, for the Greeks of the Ottoman empire, an autonomy similar to that which was demanded for the Slavs. After this, M. Desprez, on behalf of France, gave notice of the following proposition:—

"Considering that, in the examination of the new arrangements to be taken with a view to ensuring peace in the East, it is fair to give the Court of Athens an opportunity of expressing its

wishes; and that it may be useful to the Powers to know them, the Congress invites the government of his Hellenic Majesty to name a representative, who shall be admitted to give expression to the observations of Greece when the question of determining the future of the provinces bordering on the kingdom shall come up for discussion, and who may be summoned into the Congress itself whenever the plenipotentiaries shall deem this advisable."

After M. Desprez had read this proposal, the subject was deferred till the next meeting. It may be well that we should bring together the whole proceedings of the Congress in relation to Greece, instead of taking all the matters discussed by the plenipotentiaries in the order of their discussion.

At the fourth sitting, then, which took place on the 19th of June, Caratheodori Pacha began by protesting against the separate and exclusive consideration of the claims put forward on behalf of any particular class of the sultan's subjects. This passed without remark, and Prince Gortschakoff then read the following rejoinder to Lord Salisbury's statement:—

"The Marquis of Salisbury has presented an elaborate proposal, having for its object the admission of Greece to take part in the Congress, or at least to be present at the sittings at which questions connected with the interests of the Greek race shall be discussed. The plenipotentiaries of Russia, on their side, think it right to set forth, in a similar declaration, the views of their government on this subject:—

"1st. Russia has always had in view, in Turkey, the interests of the Christians, without regard to race. Her whole history has sufficiently proved this. With the Hellenic race she has a powerful bond of union, that of having received from the Eastern Church the religion of Christ. If, in the present war, Russia has been forced to take up more especially the defence of the Bulgarians, this is due to the fact that Bulgaria has, owing to circumstances, been the principal cause and the scene of the war. But Russia has always contemplated extending, as far as

possible, to the Greek provinces the advantages which she might succeed in winning for Bulgaria. She is gratified to see, by the proposals of the plenipotentiaries of Great Britain and of France, that Europe shares these views, and she congratulates herself upon the solicitude which the Powers evince in favour of the populations of the Greek race, and the more so as she is convinced that this solicitude will equally extend to the populations of the Bulgarian race. The Imperial government of Russia will, consequently, willingly adhere to any proposition which may be laid before the Congress in favour of Epirus, of Thessaly, and of Crete, whatever may be the extent which the Powers may desire to give to the advantages which may be reserved for them.

"2nd. The Imperial government of Russia does not recognise any well-founded reason for the antagonism of races which has been pointed out, and which cannot have its origin in religious differences. All the nationalities belonging to the Eastern Church have successively claimed the right of having their autocephalous Church, that is to say, their independent ecclesiastical hierarchy, and their national tongue for public worship and schools. Such has been the case in Russia, Roumania, Servia, and even in the kingdom of Greece. There is no sign that this has led either to the rupture of the bonds which unite these independent Churches with the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, or to any antagonism whatsoever between the races. The Bulgarians do not ask more than this, and their rights to it are absolutely the same. The cause of the differences of opinion and of the casual disputes which have occurred is, therefore, to be sought in certain private influences and intrigues, which would appear to be neither consonant with the real interests of the races, the tranquillity of the East, nor the peace of Europe, and which, therefore, ought not to be encouraged.

"3rd. As regards the territorial boundaries of the various races, as affecting the interests of the Hellenic race, which it is intended to protect, they could hardly be determined on a more

rational, equitable, and more practical principle than that of the majority of the population. Taken as a whole, the stipulations of the Conference of Constantinople tended to this result, and it is laid down by the preliminary treaty of San Stefano. Distributions of territory, proposed without regard to the principle of the majority of the population, might be suggested, not by considerations of race, but by particular views of political, geographical, or commercial interest. Russia having, as far as she herself is concerned, no material advantage to seek in these countries, can only estimate these various propositions from one point of view—viz., that of equity and conciliation, to which she is always inclined, with a view to the consolidation of an European agreement and of general peace.

"Such are the sentiments with which the plenipotentiaries of Russia desire to formulate their adhesion to the proposition of the plenipotentiary of France; that is to say, to invite the government of his Hellenic Majesty to appoint a representative, who shall be allowed to develop the opinions of Greece when the question arises of determining the lot of the border provinces of the kingdom, and who may be summoned into the Congress whenever the plenipotentiaries shall deem it advisable. They extend these provisions equally to Crete."

After the reading of this statement by the Russian Chancellor, Lord Salisbury proposed to substitute in the text presented by the French plenipotentiaries the words "Greek provinces" for "border provinces of the kingdom of Greece." If this modification, which seemed to him to make the text clearer, were admitted, he would willingly concur in the French project thus amended, if it would be accepted by the majority of the Powers. The object of his lordship was to make Greek subjects in other provinces, besides Thessaly and Epirus. Austria and Italy voted with England, whilst Russia and Germany preferred the limitation of the Greek question to the two provinces bordering on Turkey. Thus the Marquis of Salisbury's amendment failed to secure a majority, and the proposition of



the French plenipotentiaries was adopted. The result was, that two Greek delegates were admitted to plead the cause of Thessaly and Epirus, but not of the Hellenic populations in Macedonia and Thrace.

It is clear, however, that England had, up to this point, shown herself more eager than any other Power in advancing the claims of Greece, and that the pledges previously given by Lord Derby had been so far redeemed. The Greek government appointed the foreign minister, M. Delyannis, and M. Rizos Rhangabe, who forthwith prepared a statement of the Greek claims on behalf of the two frontier provinces, and awaited the summons of the Congress.

The plenipotentiaries, in the meantime, went into the subject of Bulgarian emancipation, and it was not till the 9th sitting, on June 29th, that they invited the Greek representatives to make a declaration of their views. The delegates having been introduced, Prince Bismarck informed them that the Congress desired to hear the wishes of the Hellenic government before deciding on Article 15 of the San Stefano treaty which had been under consideration. Thereupon M. Delyannis read the following memorial:—

“The only and genuine desires of the Hellenic government have ever been identical with the aspirations of the entire nation, whereof liberated Greece forms but a single portion. These same aspirations animated the Hellenic people when, in 1821, it entered upon the long war of independence. As for their complete realisation, the Hellenic government cannot deceive itself concerning the many difficulties which stand in its way.

“The firm resolution of Europe to establish peace in the East, without disturbing too much the existing state of things, indicates to the Hellenic government the limits which it must place on its aspirations.

“Thus the government must limit its desires, and must recognise that the annexation of Candia, and of the provinces bordering on the kingdom, is all that for the moment can be done for Greece.

“The wishes of the government of the king are not opposed either to the interests of Europe or to those of the neighbouring state. A compliance with them would be the realisation of the firm and fixed will of the population of those provinces, and would give peace and a possible existence to the kingdom. We believe that a compliance with the desires above expressed is in the interest of Europe. Her desire being to bring about and to consolidate peace in the East, the annexation of these provinces would be the most efficacious and only possible means of averting all the causes which, in the future, might endanger the pacificatory work of Europe.

“It is only necessary to recall the past history of these provinces, the causes which have so often agitated them, and the extreme measures to which these countries have had recourse for the amelioration of their condition, in order to be perfectly convinced that the same causes would lead, in the more or less proximate future, to the same sad results. Moreover, Europe having seen, in the creation of the Hellenic kingdom, a work eminently tending to civilisation, the aggrandisement of that kingdom would be but the completion of that work. The annexation of these provinces would also be in the interest of Turkey. It would remove from her, in the future, all source of troubles, which have so often exhausted her exchequer, compromised her political interests, and embittered her relations of good neighbourhood, of which the Hellenic kingdom has ever been so mindful.

“As to the capital interest which these provinces themselves would find in their annexation, it is generally known that, for the last half-century, they demand their union with Greece. They have often and loudly expressed this wish. They have not even hesitated to take up arms again and again, and to incur all the miseries of war to realise it. Only a few months ago, one of them could only be pacified upon the formal assurance of a great Power that ‘the Hellenic cause should not be injured,’ and that this Power itself would state explicitly to the Congress that this pacification is owing to this

intervention. Another province, the Island of Candia, is still in full insurrection, and, according to the latest news, much blood is being shed there. Would it not be a work of justice and humanity to satisfy the national aspirations of these countries, to fulfil their wishes so often expressed, and for the future to spare them the destruction and catastrophes to which they expose themselves in order to gain a national existence? As regards the Hellenic kingdom, the expression of the national wishes of the Hellenic population of Turkey can naturally only produce profound emotion in the Hellenic kingdom. The natives of the Greek provinces of the Ottoman empire are counted by thousands; a great number occupy high positions in all branches of the administration, in the navy, and in the army; others, not less numerous, are distinguished by their commercial and industrial activity. The echo which the news of an Hellenic insurrection in Turkey produces in their hearts is too powerful not to move them. Some it drives to cross the frontiers to join the combatants, others to empty their purses for the common cause. This excitement is rapidly communicated to all the inhabitants of the country, although not natives of the fighting provinces, and the whole population of the kingdom, which cannot forget what it owes to the former struggles of these disinherited brethren, nor remain impassive in view of their struggle for deliverance, rushes to join their ranks, in order to assist them in re-conquering their liberty. Such a state of affairs gives rise each time to serious crises in the Hellenic kingdom, which render the position of its government very difficult. Unable to refuse its sympathies to the Greeks of the provinces in question, united by the bonds of history, race, and common misfortunes, to free Greece; unable to proclaim an indifference which would deprive it of the confidence of Hellenism, and would smother the just hopes which the Greeks of Turkey have always founded on free Greece; every Greek government would be powerless to struggle against the stream.

"Should it even believe it its duty to do so

at the sacrifice of the most precious interests of the kingdom, it would be overturned by the current, which would carry away the whole country into the struggle of the insurgent provinces. Even if the government had the power of opposing a barrier to the national current, all these efforts would be without effect, by reason of the extent and conformation of the frontier line of the kingdom, which an army of one hundred thousand men would not be sufficient to guard, so as to be able to prevent the clandestine departure of volunteers.

"The situation created for the Hellenic government by these insurrectional movements, is not less difficult and untenable from a financial point of view. The budget of the kingdom has often experienced, and is even now experiencing, the influence of like events. However great and striking may be the difference between the budget of public revenues drawn up in 1829 by the president of Greece and that of the accounts of last year, it is none the less true that the pecuniary assistance granted each time to refugees from the insurgent provinces, and to the repatriated combatants, and the armaments caused by this abnormal situation, and by the somewhat strained relations with the neighbouring state, which have always resulted therefrom, have frequently swallowed up several millions, increased the public debt, and appropriated, in fruitless outlay, the greater part of the public revenues, which, if employed in the material development of the country, would have greatly increased its resources and well-being.

"If great and rich nations, with which little Greece could never compete, have always, under analogous circumstances, felt the onerous effects of expenditure of a like nature, it is very natural that the poor Hellenic kingdom, which more than once has found itself obliged to confront like obligations, which, at the present time, has on its territory thirty thousand refugees, and to make preparations beyond its strength, it is very natural that it should not only feel the ill effects of all the burden of such expenditure, but should be crushed by it.



"The government of his Majesty is imbued with the unshaken conviction that a like state of things cannot continue longer. It believes itself to be fulfilling a duty that ought not to be neglected when it hastens to lay before the Congress this situation, and begs it to be so good as to provide a remedy for it by removing the causes which brought it about."

To this statement M. Rhangabe added a few observations, which are not preserved in the formal protocols of the Congress. He remarked, amongst other things, that the progress of his country since the time when it achieved its independence had been checked by the smallness of its territory, by the absence of natural frontiers, and the constant disturbances between the free and the oppressed Greek races. He asserted that the enlargement demanded by M. Delyannis was necessary, not only to the existence of Greece, but to the peace of the East.

Prince Bismarck then informed the Greek delegates that, when the Congress had considered their statements, they would communicate with them again, and invite them to attend a future sitting.

It was at the 13th sitting that the Congress returned to the consideration of the Hellenic question. The discussion was commenced by M. Waddington, who, after disclaiming all idea of offending the susceptibilities of the Porte, went on to state that his only desire, and the desire of all the plenipotentiaries, was to put an end to the disturbed condition of the East, to obviate further difficulties by establishing a permanent constitution, and to provide for the various interests which co-exist in the Balkan peninsula.

"Amongst these interests," M. Waddington continued, "those of the Hellenic race hold a foremost place. The first French plenipotentiary is persuaded that, so long as the Sublime Porte shall not have given them a sufficient measure of satisfaction, her frontier will continue to be exposed to unceasingly recurring agitations. His excellency considers that concessions in this direction would be advantageous to the Ottoman government, and he is under the impression

that the Porte does not reject the idea of entering into negotiations with Greece on the basis of a rectification of frontiers. The settlement of these standing difficulties is, in fact, for Turkey a condition of internal security and prosperity; for, so long as these troubles shall last, the development of her resources will be paralysed by them.

"With regard to Greece it is not, of course, the object of the Congress to afford satisfaction to the extravagant aspirations of certain organs of Hellenic opinion; but M. Waddington thinks that it would be an equitable and politic act to annex to her populations which would be, for her, a source of strength, while they are but one of weakness to Turkey. In connection with this scheme, his excellency recalls the opinion of a prince to whom the crown of Greece was offered in 1830, and who, later on, being called to rule over another country, acquired, by his wisdom, a great authority in Europe. This prince used to consider that Greece could not thrive under the territorial conditions imposed upon her—above all, without the Gulfs of Arta and of Volo, with the territories adjacent to them, and experience has proved the justice of that view. Greece can never prosper within her existing limits; her government is incapable of preventing the difficulties and conflicts which periodically reproduce themselves on her frontier, and the position of the country, in respect to economy, does not enable her to meet the engagements obligatory on all civilised states.

"The first plenipotentiary of France believes that he is equally furthering the interests of both countries in asking leave of the Congress to point out, in a general manner, and without infringing upon the sovereignty of the Porte, the limits which he should wish to see assigned to Greece. The authority of the high European Assembly would impart to the governments—Ottoman and Greek—the moral strength necessary for the former to consent to opportune concessions, and for the latter to abstain from exaggerated pretensions. But, to accomplish this object, his excellency considers it ne-

cessary, on the one hand, not to demand from the Porte impossible sacrifices ; on the other, to appeal to the moderation of Greece. The first French plenipotentiary has therefore thought it of use to trace, as a basis for negotiations, a general line, indicating, at one and the same time, to Turkey, the measure of the intentions of Europe, and to Greece, the limits beyond which she cannot be allowed to go. Such is the object of the following resolution, which he has the honour to submit, in common with the first plenipotentiary of Italy, to the deliberations of the Congress :—

“The Congress invites the Sublime Porte to arrange with Greece for a rectification of frontiers in Thessaly and Epirus, and is of opinion that this rectification might follow the valley of the Salamyrias (the ancient Peneus) on the side of the Ægean Sea, and that of the Calamas on the side of the Ionian Sea.

“The Congress is confident that the interested parties will succeed in coming to an agreement. At the same time, the Powers are prepared to offer their direct mediation to the two parties.”

Count Corti supported the French representative, in the following brief speech :—

“To secure to the work of the Congress any chance of stability it is necessary, within the bounds of possibility, to do away with the grounds for future conflicts. It is superfluous to recite here the unhappy complications which have arisen in recent times between Turkey and Greece. Means should be looked for to obviate similar dangers for the future. Such a result ought to interest Turkey even more than the other Powers. After the unhappy events of which the Balkan peninsula has just been the theatre, Turkey must needs experience a keen desire for peace and tranquillity. Now, it is open to doubt whether a sincere friendship can be re-established between Turkey and Greece without some concessions being made to the aspirations of the latter. The king's government and the Italian nation are deeply interested in this question, and the Italian plenipotentiaries

act as the interpreters of these sentiments in addressing to the plenipotentiaries of Turkey a friendly appeal in support of the proposition just submitted to the Congress.”

After this, and before proceeding to discuss or decide upon the proposition, Caratheodori Pacha made a statement in regard to the memorial of M. Delyannis, above quoted.

He urged that Greece had not even attempted to show a reason for her appeal to the Powers on any single principle of the law which governs the relations of independent states to each other. He admitted what had been said as to the frontier difficulties, but maintained that these disturbances could never be removed until those ideas had been renounced which had been suggested by the Greek delegates. He asserted that the Greek demands had no reference to the purposes for which the Congress had been called together, and declared that Turkey would insist on retaining her provinces, “the populations whereof are attached to her.” He concluded by calling on the Powers to restrain Greece from the aggression which she still seemed to contemplate.

The plenipotentiary of Austria having adhered to the proposal of France and Italy, Lord Beaconsfield made the following important speech on the subject. To quote the words of the 13th protocol, “Lord Beaconsfield desired, before the Congress decides the important question submitted to it, to offer some remarks, intended to prevent a misunderstanding which might arise by the declaration of the Greek delegates. His excellency states that England has always used her influence (*‘insisté’*) towards Greece and Turkey, with a view to the maintenance of a good understanding, indispensable in her eyes to counterbalance the influence of a third race, that which, by disturbing peace, has led to the assembly of the Congress. At first these efforts of Great Britain were seconded on both sides. But the two countries found themselves in presence of a great difficulty, the insufficient and imperfect frontier traced in 1831. In the eyes of every competent statesman, this frontier is a



danger and a disaster as well for Turkey as for Greece: its conformation is an encouragement to brigandage, and brigandage necessarily produces agitation in the neighbouring provinces. When the last war commenced, and the inhabitants of the district bordering on the frontier became excited by it, England caused representations to be made to the Porte, which that Power listened to favourably; but his excellency regrets to have to add, that this time it was not the same as regards Greece; the good advice of England could not prevail against the contrary opinion, and serious difficulties arose. Lord Beaconsfield, however, believes it to be his duty to add, that the insurrection in Epirus and Thessaly was not fomented by the Greek frontier, which, on the contrary, in conformity with the advice of Great Britain, applied itself to its repression—England, moreover, caused to be conveyed to Athens the advice not to count upon territorial aggrandisement.

“His excellency, seeking for the motives of this attitude, thinks that it should be attributed to the false idea that was formed, after the conclusion of the treaty of San Stefano, as to the principles which should guide the Congress. An erroneous opinion attributed to the Congress the intention to proceed to the partition of a worn-out state (*‘Etat vieilli’*), and not to strengthen, as the high Assembly has done, an ancient empire, which it considers essential to the maintenance of peace. It is true that often after a great war territorial re-arrangements are brought about. Turkey is not the only state that has sustained territorial losses; England herself has lost provinces to which she attached great value, and which she regrets to this day; the word ‘partition’ cannot be applied to such arrangements and retrocessions, and the Greek government was entirely mistaken as to the views of Europe. His excellency took this occasion to repel the insinuations of a part of the press which had described as a partition the decision of the Congress upon the subject of Bosnia and the Herzegovine. It is, on the contrary, for the purpose of preventing a partition that this decision

has been taken. Numerous historic precedents justify it: Bosnia, abandoned to herself, without the elements of good government, surrounded by independent or semi-independent states, would have been, in a very short time, the theatre of sanguinary struggles. In this state of affairs Great Britain made an appeal to a neighbouring Power, strong, and interested in the maintenance of peace; Europe, sharing the same view, confided to Austria-Hungary the occupation and administration of Bosnia. His excellency mentions the fact that, in neighbouring countries and elsewhere, the same mission has, on several occasions, been entrusted to Austria; so that the initiative of Great Britain does not prove that she is favourable to a partition.

“Returning to Greece, Lord Beaconsfield says that no one could doubt as to the future of this country; that states, like individuals, which have a future, are in a position to be able to wait. But, at the same time, his excellency is convinced that Greece and Turkey will proceed to a rectification of their frontiers; that a cause of disorder and trouble will thus be got rid of, and a lasting peace secured. The first plenipotentiary of Great Britain adds that he would not recommend, for the attainment of this end, measures of coercion; in his eyes, the sultan, tried by such great misfortunes, deserved great respect and sympathy. His excellency believes, however, that the opportunity should not be allowed to pass, of expressing, in a very decided manner, the opinion that a rectification of frontier would be an act of high policy favourable to the welfare of the two countries. Lord Beaconsfield looks upon the boundary proposed by the first plenipotentiary of France as open to discussion; but, unanimity being above all things desirable, his excellency would withdraw all objection in presence of an unanimous vote of the other Powers. The first plenipotentiary of Great Britain ended by expressing the hope and even the conviction, that an equitable solution of the question of frontiers will be accepted by the sultan.”

On the conclusion of this statement, Prince

Gortschakoff observed that he saw no great difference, in principle, between the French propositions and the arguments offered by the first plenipotentiary of Great Britain. Both were of opinion that there was an urgent need to rectify the frontiers of the Hellenic kingdom; and in that opinion the Russian chancellor concurred.

In the result, the French proposal was adopted by the Congress, the Ottoman delegates alone reserving their votes, with the remark that they felt it necessary to await more definite instructions from Constantinople.

At the 14th sitting, the case of the Greeks in Turkey was again incidentally referred to. Count Schouvaloff observed that, in regard to various territories, both in Europe and Asia, which had not been the object of the special deliberations of the high Assembly, no amelioration of the lot of the Christian populations had been expressly stipulated. The treaty of San Stefano, in creating a great Bulgaria, only contemplated in Article 15 the Greek provinces, and some territories which might have escaped attention. The situation had changed; the creation of a restricted Roumelia left in suspense numerous Christian populations, which might not be assimilated either to the reforms proposed in Eastern Roumelia, or to those which the treaty of San Stefano contemplated for the Greek provinces. The lot of the Christians of the East, constituting one of the first concerns of Europe and of the Congress, his excellency hoped that the stipulations of Article 15 would extend equally to all the Christian populations of the Balkan peninsula, for whom no special organisation was stipulated.

Prince Bismarck said that the Congress had adopted Article 15 in its entirety, and that it extended it, in principle, to all portions of the empire. It would, moreover, be for a future diplomatic assembly that these questions of detail could, if necessary, be reserved.

Count Schouvaloff said he was happy to see it recorded that the stipulations of Article 15 were applicable to all those portions of Turkey

in Europe which had no special regulations applied to them.

Count Andrassy agreed fully with the plenipotentiaries of Russia, as to the necessity of ameliorating the lot of the Christians, but his excellency did not think that ready-made constitutions were the best means to succeed in doing so. Diplomacy ought to confine itself to laying down principles, and ought to be wary of entering into details, which are often a danger to the populations.

In this vague state, the question of reforms, in the Ottoman empire, was left for solution by other statesmen, and possibly by another generation.

In the 18th sitting, during the discussion of that article in the San Stefano treaty which insisted upon an organic law for the benefit of the Christian provinces of Turkey in Europe, a conversation arose with respect to the analogy to be drawn between this organic law and that which is already in force for Crete. It was decided that it should not embrace financial matters, and that the following words, as proposed by the drafting committee, be added to the article as it originally stood—"Except in so far as concerns the freedom from taxation granted to Crete."

The paragraph referring to the mediation of the Powers in the eventuality that Turkey and Greece do not arrive at an agreement for the rectification of the frontiers indicated in Protocol 13, gave rise to a demand for adjournment on the part of Caratheodori Pacha. His excellency added that he expected to receive instructions from the Porte to-morrow. On this, Prince Bismarck said that "the paragraph in question expresses a wish on the part of the Congress, and not a resolution with which the Porte should be asked to identify itself. The Powers merely declare that they are animated with the desire of seeing these negotiations brought to a successful issue, and on this point it would seem that the Porte has neither an opinion to offer nor a decision to take in Congress."

This, then, is what the Congress actually did for Greece. It was very far from satisfying the



Greek government, or its friends in Europe; and it may not be uninteresting if we quote here a few paragraphs from Mr. L. Sergeant's "New Greece," which gave expression to the dissatisfaction experienced by those who had hoped for a better treatment of the Hellenic kingdom.

"Lord Beaconsfield regarded even the Calamas and Salamyria line as open to discussion. He thought the very nearest natural frontier too wide for the country which he desired to protect from border trouble. Surely this moderating influence had gone far enough! What, then was the premier's idea? Was Greece, unable to assure herself from disturbance in the passes of the Othrys, to set up a line of stones somewhere down the mountain sides, and there beat the boundaries at stipulated periods? Was this his plan for getting rid of 'disorder and trouble,' and securing 'a lasting peace?' He had just reminded Greece that she had a future, and he must have known what Greece herself understood her future to be. What 'lasting peace' did he expect from a country which, having a future, was put off with an appetising morsel of her legitimate inheritance, and cynically told to wait for the rest? The objection applies to the frontier traced by M. Waddington's proposal scarcely less than to the yet narrower limits which Lord Beaconsfield would apparently have assigned. What are we to think of the collective wisdom of Europe, which, anxious to rectify a weak and vulnerable frontier, shifts the line from the crest of a mountain range to a couple of rivers in a comparatively flat country, with a wide gap between their sources? How are we to reconcile the zeal of the Congress for a definitive settlement with their conduct in throwing down a bone of contention between the Greeks and the Turks? Did they imagine that Thessaly and Epirus, which, by tradition, education, prevailing language, and customs, should be treated as living and sentient organisms, might be wantonly cut in halves without a desperate and protracted struggle? Did they for a moment contemplate a lasting peace, so long as Crete should not be united with the mother country?

"But we are concerned mainly with our own representatives; and, as for them, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion, that their statesmanship was utterly at fault in regard to the Hellenic difficulty. This inference must be drawn even from their own point of view, and on the evidence of their own words.

"1st. By sending Greece from the Congress dissatisfied, and by assigning to her narrow and inadequate frontiers, they have ensured the renewal of the border struggles on an early occasion, when their very aim in rectifying the frontier was to prevent these disorders.

"2nd. By refusing to decide between Turkey and Greece, by sending Greece cap in hand to Turkey, and by declaring at the same time (as Lord Beaconsfield declared) that they would not 'recommend coercive measures against Turkey,' they lost the opportunity of closing the incident at once, and made it very questionable, indeed, whether the Porte would follow their advice.

"3rd. By dividing Epirotes from Epirotes, and Thessalians from Thessalians, they effected almost the only 'partition' of a race for which the Congress is responsible; and thus Lord Beaconsfield himself, in one breath, affirmed a great principle and violated it.

"In brief, our plenipotentiaries posed as the restorers of Turkey, as the advocates of the Hellenic claims in their widest sense, as the friends of humanity, as the champions of international agreements, as sticklers for the authority of the European concert. And when the time came for deeds instead of words, they left a powerful and determined enemy on Turkey's western frontier, absolutely certain to harass her perpetually; they snubbed Greece for 'mistaking the intentions of Europe;' they took no note of Turkish atrocities in Thessaly and Epirus, as shocking in their character as those in Bulgaria; they made light of an agreement which they had themselves entered into with Greece; and they prevented the authority of Europe from intervening in Turkey on the only worthy and sufficient grounds.

"This is how Greece was treated at Berlin,

and by her friend England in particular. This is what she obtained by trusting us, and sheathing her sword, when she might have annexed three large provinces. Russia, France, Italy—all had helped her, or desired to help her. England alone had stood in her way. England, the very soul of generosity when speaking from national impulse, too often harsh and unscrupulous when a bold minister conceives her interests to be at stake—England, great and powerful, turned round to Greece, and said, ‘I promised to “do all I could” for you; but it has since occurred to me that, to keep my promise, might cost me something. In one respect our interests seem to be opposed, and—*la force prime le droit*!’

“From the Congress, then, Greece received nothing—scarcely even fair words. It has indeed been taken for granted that her frontier will be advanced to Janina and Trikala, on the recommendation of the plenipotentiaries. We shall see. There may be a number who imagine that Turkey will cede territory to Greece, without being compelled, after ceding so much to Russians and Slavs on compulsion. It will, however, be more in accordance with precedent if she steadily declines to do this, knowing herself to be safe from coercion. It is true that the Congress, by the terms of the Franco-Italian resolution, declares that the Powers are to be ‘ready to offer their direct mediation,’ in case the Porte and the government of Athens should be unable to agree. But whatever force may have been intended to reside in this declaration was practically destroyed by Prince Bismarck in the 18th meeting. The 13th protocol was being read over for confirmation, and when the paragraph referring to the disposition of the Powers had been recited, Caratheodori Pacha asked that it might be adjourned, on the ground that he was expecting instructions from his government. Thereupon Prince Bismarck observed that ‘the paragraph in question expressed a desire of the Congress, and not a resolution, in which the Porte was asked to concur. The Powers confine themselves to declaring that they are ani-

mated with the desire of seeing the negotiations succeed.’

“The pachas were satisfied; and so, no doubt, was the Porte. The language of the plenipotentiaries, to which Lord Beaconsfield supplied the key-note, signified, as plainly as possible, that the government of the sultan might do exactly what it liked. There was no necessity that it should give a single acre to Greece—unless it particularly wished to satisfy the Hellenic aspirations (meaning, to ruin itself) or to gratify the desire of the Powers (meaning, to display its supernatural gratitude, such as the Koran, at all events, does not prescribe).

“So much for Thessaly and Epirus. As for Crete, the Sublime Porte engages scrupulously to apply the organic law of 1868, with such modifications as shall be judged equitable.’ A great deal, it will readily be admitted, depends upon the authority which is to decide what is equitable, and what is not; but it is certain that many modifications will be necessary before the constitution of Crete can satisfy the Greeks in that island. In the course of the year 1878, the general Assembly in Crete forwarded a ‘Decree and Memorandum’ to the governments of the Christian Powers. From these documents we may gather the professed objects of the Cretans in their last insurrection. The Assembly demanded complete autonomy and self-government, the right of electing their own ruler, and a guarantee from the Powers; and they offered to pay a tribute of half-a-million piastres to the Porte. But, at the same time, they indicated what they considered the most just solution of the difficulty, and what is evidently the ultimate aim of their policy—the union of the country with the kingdom of Greece. It is not easy to suppose that any ‘lasting peace’ will result from mere modifications of the existing form of government in Crete.

“The same article of the treaty of Berlin, which has been ratified by the sultan, records certain further engagements of the Porte. These are the terms of the last batch of Turkey’s promises:—



“Analogous laws, adapted to local requirements, shall be similarly introduced into other parts of Turkey in Europe for which special provision has not been made by the present treaty. The Sublime Porte shall appoint special commissions, in which the native element shall be largely represented, to elaborate the details of these new laws for each province. The proposed laws resulting from their labours shall be submitted to the examination of the Sublime Porte, which, before promulgating the acts destined to put the laws in force, will take the sense of the European Commission appointed for Eastern Roumelia.’ Add to this that the Porte has promised full religious toleration throughout its dominions, and we arrive at the sum total of what Greece and the Greeks obtain (or are invited to expect) from the Congress.

“The question again recurs—Have they obtained anything at all? It is impossible to anticipate that the work of Europe at Berlin will be entirely fruitless, or that its fruits will be limited to those which the Powers have given themselves the right to seize by force of arms. Unless the governments abdicate their authority and sacrifice their dignity, we must conclude that the ‘analogous laws’ will be introduced and ‘scrupulously applied,’ in Albania, in Western Roumelia, in Macedonia, and Thrace. These provinces will at least have new laws and assemblies, similar to those of Crete; and the several ‘native elements’ will be represented. Though the initiation of the reforms is left to the Porte, the authority of the European Commission ought to be quite equal to the task of ensuring their introduction. Therefore it may be assumed that a slight advance of some sort will be made in the direction of liberty. And if the intentions of Europe in this respect are actually carried out, if there is a genuine representation of ‘native elements’ in the *Ægean* provinces, there can be little doubt that the Hellenic race will at once assume its legitimate predominance—legitimate, not merely from the numerical superiority of the Greeks along the whole littoral, from Avlona to Burghas, but al-

so on account of their intellectual and political qualities, which will draw the practical hegemony of European Turkey into their hands.

“This would be a great gain; and indeed the kingdom of Greece, which, as Lord Beaconsfield says, is lord of the future, however difficult she may find it to wait for her inheritance, may yet be consoled by the amelioration of her children’s lot. She is heir to all the good that may be secured to the Greek subjects of Turkey by the treaty of Berlin. If the Hellenes of Roumelia, Macedonia, and Thrace, are to serve their apprenticeship to constitutionalism under the sway of the sultan, it is in the Hellenic state that they will hereafter translate the lesson into action, and it is to Athens that they will continually turn their eyes and direct their aspirations. But it can hardly be expected that the hopes of Greece will be sanguine by reason of anything which has taken place at Berlin. The fatal example of Crete must rise between the promises of Turkey and the anticipation of their fulfilment. Crete, too, elicited the sympathy of Europe. Crete was patronised by the Powers, and received a constitution from the Porte. We have had no cause to believe that the nature of Turkey has changed, and we have therefore no right to ask a Greek to trust a Turk. ‘Analogous laws’ may only too naturally end in analogous oppressions and analogous bloodshed.

“On the whole, it results from the treaty of Berlin, and from the protocols on which it is based, that the kingdom of Greece has been virtually abandoned by Europe, whilst the Hellenic race in general, if it is to profit at all by the deliberations of Europe in council, will do so simply as one of the ‘native elements’ of Turkey, and on no other basis than the Gueghs of Albania, the Mirdites, the Selavs scattered over Western Roumelia, and the Mahomedans themselves.”

## CHAPTER XVIII.

## BULGARIA AND THE CONGRESS.

OF course the widest and most urgent question arising out of the treaty of San Stefano, with which the Congress of Berlin had to deal, was that which related to the new state of Bulgaria. The limits assigned by Russia to this emancipated province were so large that it was generally recognised on the part of the plenipotentiaries that they must be contracted in a very considerable degree; and the representatives of the Powers set about this difficult task without delay.

At the second meeting of the Congress, the Marquis of Salisbury expressed the views of the English government in the following clear and significant statement:—

“The most striking effect of the articles of the treaty of San Stefano, which relate to Bulgaria (I do not say the effect which it was intended to give to them) is to reduce Turkey to a level of absolute dependency upon the Power which has imposed this treaty.

“It is our task to replace her, not upon the footing of her former independence, for it would be impossible entirely to annihilate the results of the war, but to restore to her a relative independence, which shall permit her efficaciously to protect the strategical, political, and commercial interests of which she is to remain the guardian.

“Other dangers not less important are to be feared. The Greek race, which inhabits numerous localities in the new Bulgaria, will be subordinated to a Slav majority, with whom its relations are by no means friendly, and, as I have already submitted to the Congress, it is probable that the Greek language will disappear, and that the race will be absorbed.

“Moreover, the admission to the littoral of the *Ægean Sea* of a new maritime Power could not be accepted without great regret by the Powers in the neighbourhood of the Mediterranean.

“In my opinion, a remedy for these injurious results is to be found in a modification of the articles to which his highness the president has called our attention. If Bulgaria, instead of extending to the *Ægean Sea*, and to the Lake of Ochrida, were limited to the south by the line of the Balkans, and if the other part of the province remained under the political and military authority of the sultan, these dangers would be considerably lessened, even if they did not entirely disappear.

“In this case, a new maritime Power would no longer extend to the shores of the *Ægean Sea*, a very numerous proportion of the Greek population which was menaced with absorption into the new Bulgaria, and with subjection to a Slav majority, would remain in the political position which it at present occupies, and the Porte would possess a strategical frontier which it would be able to defend against any future invasion. This strategical advantage might be attained without injury to the interests of the population of this region, whose lot would rather be improved thereby.

“England has never admitted, either in the Conference at Constantinople, or at any other time, that it was necessary, in order to guarantee the populations of European Turkey against the abuses of the government, and against oppression, to detach them from the political supremacy of the Porte. This guarantee, which is of the very highest importance, requires rather the reform of the internal administration than a political separation.

“I propose, therefore, to the Congress, on the part of England, to examine the two following proposals:—

“1. That the tributary autonomous principality of Bulgaria should be restricted to the part of European Turkey which is situated to the north of the Balkans.

“2. That the province of Roumelia, and all other territory south of the Balkans, shall be under the direct political and military authority of the sultan, all necessary precaution being taken that the welfare of the populations shall



be protected by sufficient guarantees of administrative autonomy, or in some other manner."

Count Schouvaloff, alluding to a passage in the document which had just been read said that he could not accept, on behalf of his government, the words "to entirely annihilate the results of the war." Russia had entered the Congress with a view to harmonise the preliminary treaty of San Stefano with the general interests of Europe, but not to "annihilate" the results of a war, in the course of which she had imposed upon herself so many sacrifices. He pointed out that the general sense of the communication made to the Congress by the Marquis of Salisbury is, that England cannot assent to the delimitation as traced at San Stefano; but between that delimitation and the one which the plenipotentiary of Great Britain had just indicated, there was room for discussion. For example, the limits fixed by the Conference of Constantinople had the advantage of having been traced by the representatives of Europe, and were in conformity with the conditions of the Bulgarian race. Prince Bismarck hastened to suggest the postponement of the discussion, which was agreed to.

Before the sitting came to an end, however, Count Andrassy intimated the general concurrence of Austria in the English view. The count dwelt upon the great importance of the discussion, which was to bring about the formation of countries destined, it is to be hoped, for a long existence. "The question presents a double aspect; on the one hand it is purely political, and may be summed up in these terms: Shall there be an autonomous tributary Bulgaria, administered by a Christian government? On this point Austria-Hungary has no objection to make. But, on the other hand, the question has reference to a demarcation of frontiers, more particularly affecting Austria-Hungary, as it is a question of defining the situation of Bulgaria, both as regards border countries like Servia, and also the western frontiers, which enter into the sphere of Austro-Hungarian interests. While Austria-Hungary certainly desires a hap-

py solution of present difficulties, from the general point of view of peace and stability, the frontier questions, nevertheless, have for her quite a special interest; his excellency, therefore, thinks it advisable that an Austro-Hungarian delegate should take part in the private interviews of the English and Russian plenipotentiaries. He does not, however, hesitate to adhere, in principle, to the English proposition as to the frontier line, while reserving to himself the right to present observations of detail, which he hopes to see accepted by his colleagues."

The suggestion was agreed to by the other plenipotentiaries, and it was arranged that the representatives of England, Russia, and Austria, should discuss the matter in private conferences, and, after arriving at an agreement, communicate the result to the Congress.

Thus was established the special system by which the Berlin Congress achieved its definite results. It was at these private conferences, as already indicated, that the principal work of the plenipotentiaries was accomplished. We shall never know what went on at the hotels of the three delegations, but we may be sure that much risk of a rupture between England and Russia was avoided by the discussion of the points at issue in a familiar and colloquial manner.

It was not until the 4th sitting, on the 22nd of June, that the matter was again brought before the Congress as a body. The Marquis of Salisbury began by reading the following document, which he described as containing the development of the English proposals:—

"Recognition of the frontier of the Balkans for the principality of Bulgaria; the province to the south of the Balkans is to assume the name of Eastern Roumelia.

"The incorporation of the Sandjak of Sophia, with strategical rectification of the frontiers of the principality, would be agreed to, either in consideration of the retention of Varna by the Turks, or of the exclusion of the basins of the Mesta Karasou and Strouma Karasou from Eastern Roumelia. Eastern Roumelia shall be placed

under the direct military and political authority of the sultan, who will exercise it under the following conditions :—

“He shall have the right to provide for the defence of the sea and land frontiers of the province, the faculty of maintaining troops there, and of fortifying them there.

“Internal order shall be maintained by the militia, the officers of which shall be appointed by the sultan, who shall take into consideration the religion of the population.

“The governor-general shall have the right to summon the Ottoman troops, should the internal or external security be threatened.

“The western frontier remains to be described. From the place where the western frontier cuts the southern frontier of the Conference, the southern frontier of Eastern Roumelia will follow the line of the latter as far as the mountain of Kruchovo, then the line of San Stefano almost as far as Mustafa Pacha. From this point a natural frontier will go as far as the Black Sea to a point to be decided upon between Sizéboli and Agathopoli. The line of the frontiers will be arranged by a European Commission, with the exception of the two points touching the Black Sea, which have not yet been decided upon.”

Prince Bismarck having asked the plenipotentiaries of Russia if they adhered to the principles summed up by Lord Salisbury, Count Schouvaloff declared that “the plenipotentiaries of Russia have brought forward two amendments, which, in their opinion, do not alter in principle the modifications proposed by Great Britain in the treaty of San Stefano, but which, nevertheless, in spite of their moderation, have not been accepted by their English colleagues. Reverting to the general nature of the negotiations which have been carried on for some days, his excellency announces that the plenipotentiaries of Russia have accepted the division of Bulgaria by the line of the Balkans, in spite of the serious objections which this division, objectionable for many reasons, presents ; the substitution of the name of Eastern Roumelia for

that of South Bulgaria, reserving, at the same time, to themselves on this point, which has been conceded by them with regret, full liberty of subsequent discussion at the Congress ; the retention of the word ‘Bulgaria’ has been considered as a watchword or rallying-point for dangerous aspirations ; it is with pain that they have, so to speak, deprived a part of the population of a name which belongs to them. They have, in like manner, consented to remove the boundaries of the new province from the *Ægean* Sea. It was feared that Bulgaria might become a naval Power. These fears appear to them illusory, but they have nevertheless consented to this change of frontier. They have, moreover, allowed a rectification on the western frontier of Bulgaria, which they consider as a mutilation, because it divides compact Bulgarian populations. This was demanded in view of certain strategical and commercial considerations which did not concern Bulgaria, and were rather prejudicial to her. They have consented to rectify the southern frontiers towards the Black Sea, thus abandoning the boundaries traced by the treaty of San Stefano, and even throwing back those of the Conference of Constantinople. Lastly, they have given to the sultan the guardianship of the frontiers of Eastern Roumelia. In the opinion of Count Schouvaloff, the demands which have been proposed to him had really for their object the protection of the strong against the weak, the protection of the Ottoman empire, whose armies, with a courage to which his excellency is glad to render homage, have resisted during many months the Russian army, against the future aggressions of a province which as yet has not a single soldier. However this may be, the Russian plenipotentiaries have accepted them ; but, in their turn, they think they have the right to ask that the weak shall be protected against the strong, and that is the object of the two amendments which they have brought forward, and of which the following is the text :—

“The plenipotentiaries of Russia are authorised to accept the following points :—



“(1.) The sultan shall have the right to provide for the defence of the land and sea frontiers of the province, to keep troops there, and to fortify them there.

“(2.) The internal order of Eastern Roumelia shall be maintained by militia, the officers of which shall be appointed by the sultan, who shall take into consideration the religion of the population.

“The plenipotentiaries of Russia think, at the same time, that the principle on which they are all agreed, that the interior of Eastern Roumelia should only be occupied by native militia, ought to be guaranteed. This could only be done, in their opinion, by a European Commission being charged to determine the points which the Ottoman government might be allowed to occupy on its frontiers, and the approximate strength of these forces of occupation.

“The plenipotentiaries of Russia are also authorised to accept the point relative to the right of the governor-general to call in Ottoman troops in case the internal or external security should be threatened.

“But they think it necessary not to deviate from the principle that the Congress shall determine as to the occasion for, and the manner of the entry of the Ottoman troops into Eastern Roumelia. They ask, consequently, that the Congress shall discuss the contingency, for if it were to occur it would be a subject of alarm for Europe. They think it useful that the future governor-general should recognise the importance of such a measure, and that he should know that it has been an object of solicitude to Europe.”

Count Schouvaloff added that these reservations in no wise altered the principles admitted by the plenipotentiaries of Great Britain; but, “considering that the autonomous and guaranteed institutions to which his colleagues of England have alluded would not in practice be sufficient to protect the Bulgarian province against the excesses of the soldiery, since institutions alone, however good they may be, have never protected a people when these same institutions have remained under the protection of a military force

who had no national interest in maintaining and protecting them, his excellency insists on the adoption of measures of precaution, which, moreover, are very moderate, and hopes that they will obtain the support of Europe.”

Lord Beaconsfield said that the Congress had reason to be satisfied with the result of the private deliberations which had taken place, and with the present aspect of the question. “It remains established, in fact, by unanimous assent, that the sultan, as a member of the political body of Europe, is to enjoy a position which shall secure to him the respect of his sovereign rights. This point is attained by the two resolutions submitted to the Congress by Lord Salisbury, and which give to the sultan—

“1. A real frontier.

“2. A military and political power sufficient to enable him to maintain his authority and protect the life and possessions of his subjects.”

His lordship feared that the amendments brought forward by the plenipotentiaries of Russia would weaken the force of these two resolutions. “He, in the first place, looks upon the institution of a European Commission as evidently derogatory to the right of the sovereign. The power of the sultan could not possibly be respected, if the Ottoman government were hampered in the future defence of its frontier. Moreover, the strategical points which might be fixed by the European Commission could not be durable, by reason of the modifications which unceasingly occur in the range of arms of warfare. He hopes sincerely that the Congress will not sanction this proposition of the Russian plenipotentiaries. As to the second amendment, he considers it as even more inadmissible than the first; and cannot understand how a governor-general, in truth the only competent judge of the circumstances, should be only able to invoke the assistance of the troops at need, according to rules drawn up beforehand by the Congress.”

Count Andrassy, on the invitation of the president to make known his opinion, confined himself to recalling the fact, that “the Austro-Hun-

garian government has solely in view the creation of a state of affairs which shall give the greatest possible chance of duration and stability. From this point of view, he considers the English proposition as sufficient and accepts it, while reserving to himself the faculty of expressing an opinion, if necessary, at a future discussion upon the amendments of the plenipotentiaries of Russia."

Count Schouvaloff, in answer to the observations of Lord Beaconsfield relative to the restrictions which would be placed on the political and military power of the sultan, expressed an opinion that the situation of the province under discussion being abnormal, it could not be governed according to absolute principles. "The precautions required by the Russian plenipotentiaries would be no more derogatory to the dignity of the Ottoman government than the institution of the militia already agreed upon. The sole wish of the Russian government is to find a solution which may prevent a return of the excesses of which Bulgaria has been the scene, and Count Schouvaloff thinks that it is the duty of Europe to prevent this province from becoming the scene of reprisals."

The president having asked Caratheodori Pacha his views, the latter declared that this proposition is presented for the first time, and that he would wish to postpone making any observations thereon until later. Thereupon Prince Bismarck observed, that "the Congress is ready to listen to-day to the observations of the Ottoman plenipotentiaries. It cannot be in the interest of the Sublime Porte to create difficulties in the progress of discussions which, according to the intention of the high Assembly, might restore to the authority of the sultan those countries which Turkey had surrendered by the treaty of San Stefano. All the governments take part in the deliberations in the interest of the general peace; the public opinion of Europe, which wishes for peace, will be grateful to the Powers which shall have contributed to ensure it, but would regret that this task should be rendered more difficult for the Congress."

The actual words of Prince Bismarck on this occasion seem to have been much more severe in their tone; and, indeed, the German chancellor has been credited with having treated the Turkish delegates in a very off-hand manner. No doubt he succeeded, by this means, in preventing the Ottoman representatives from throwing any more delays in the path of the plenipotentiaries. The prince was not the man to suffer such obstructions as Safvet Pacha and his colleagues had caused at the Conference of Constantinople.

This sitting concluded by a general adherence to the English proposal, as recorded in the second protocol, and by the appointment of M. Waddington to draw up a plan by which the latter part of the proposal might be made to harmonise with the suggested amendments of Count Schouvaloff.

At the fifth sitting, Count Andrassy made the following statement and proposition, with regard to the evacuation of Bulgaria by the two armies, and to the future maintenance of order in the principality, until such time as the state should be self-dependent:—

"The government of his Majesty the emperor and king has been always imbued with the conviction that the work of the Congress could not be crowned with success except upon the condition that the transition from war to a definitive peace should be as short as possible, and that the state of things which shall succeed to the war should be a definite peace, with all its beneficial consequences.

"Starting from this conviction, the plenipotentiaries of his imperial and royal Majesty consider themselves obliged to give expression to certain apprehensions with which the dispositions of Article 8 inspire them. This article stipulates for the entire withdrawal of the Turkish troops from the principality of Bulgaria; it contains, moreover, a clause to the effect that, after the evacuation of Turkey by the Russian troops, a Russian army corps, not exceeding fifty thousand men, shall, until the complete organisation of a native militia, occupy Bulgaria,



and that the duration of this occupation shall be about two years.

"We are far from ignoring the necessity that exists for providing for the maintenance of order in the new principality, even during the period of transition comprised between the conclusion of peace and the organisation of native civil and military powers. We are convinced that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg only sought, by this occupation, to provide for this necessity, and that the measure in question, as the imperial government itself has declared on more than one occasion, has no other object in view.

"The imperial and royal government also does not think that the Congress will object in principle to the stipulation, in virtue of which, after the evacuation of Bulgaria by the Turkish army, a Russian army corps would be provisionally charged with the maintenance of order. On the other hand, the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the emperor and king cannot conceal from themselves the inconvenience there would be in allowing the projected occupation to depend upon a period so difficult to fix beforehand as the completion of the organisation of the militia of the country, or upon a lapse of time so remote, as the period of two years. They fear that it will be difficult to reconcile such a stipulation with the joint efforts of the high signatory Powers for the prompt re-establishment of a definitive peace.

"So long as the troops of the Power which has made war remain on foreign territory, public opinion would not consider the events of the war as having entirely terminated; the public credit, and even the prosperity of countries that took no part in the war, would remain exposed to all the fluctuations of an ill-defined order of things. The right having been reserved to Turkey to occupy militarily its frontiers of the Balkans, it must not be lost sight of that the troops who have lately been enemies, will find each other face to face, even after the conclusion of peace.

"The situation of Roumania is also an object of serious anxiety to us. In the article in ques-

tion the right of passage across the said principality during the continuance of the occupation is stipulated for in favour of the imperial Russian troops, with the object of securing their communications.

"If the duration of the occupation remained undefined, or if it were prolonged for two years, this principality would consider itself deprived of the enjoyment of its independence, which may be recognised by Europe, and it might view it in the light of a suspension or limitation of its rights. The imperial and royal government, in view of all these considerations, thinks that it would be in the interest of all parties that a distinct period should be fixed for the occupation of Bulgaria. It seems to it, moreover, that the Congress ought to make provision for the contingency that, at the expiration of that period, the condition of the provinces in question might still require the presence of a non-indigenous armed force.

"The imperial and royal government has therefore the honour of proposing that the Congress should decide as follows:—

"1. The duration of the occupation of the principality of Bulgaria by the Russian imperial troops is fixed at six months, to date from the conclusion of the definitive peace.

"2. The imperial Russian government undertakes to terminate within a further period of two or three months, or sooner, if it can be managed, the passage of its troops across Roumania, and the complete evacuation of this principality.

"3. If, contrary to all provision, at the expiration of the term of six months, the presence of the foreign auxiliary troops in Bulgaria should be considered by common agreement necessary, the great Powers would supply contingents, of which the total would amount to about ten thousand or fifteen thousand men, which contingents would be placed under the orders of the European Commission, and their maintenance would be at the expense of the country occupied."

Lord Beaconsfield concurred in the proposals

of Austria ; but Count Schouvaloff urged a number of objections, especially to the idea of the joint occupation. This suggestion, which was also opposed by Prince Bismarck, was consequently abandoned ; and the Russian representative consented, "in order not to prolong the debate," to a period of nine months for the evacuation of Bulgaria, and three months more for the evacuation of Roumania, "so that at the end of a year the Russian army will have completely evacuated the two provinces." This proposal, after a short discussion, was agreed to by all the plenipotentiaries.

At the 6th sitting, the Congress proceeded with the clause which M. Waddington had been requested to amend, so as to arrive at a form on which the Russian and English plenipotentiaries might agree. The foreign minister of the republic proposed that, whilst the sultan should have the right of calling in Ottoman troops into the province of Roumelia, in the event of the internal or external security being threatened, the Porte should, in that case, "communicate its decision, as well as the necessity which justifies it, to the representatives of the Powers at Constantinople." This being agreed upon, the following paragraphs were proposed in the same manner :—

"Internal order is maintained by a native gendarmerie, assisted by a local militia.

"In the formation of these two corps, the officers of which are named by the sultan, the religion of the inhabitants, according to the different localities, will be taken into consideration.

"His Majesty the sultan engages only to employ regular troops in the frontier garrisons. The troops destined for this service are not, in any case, to be billeted on the inhabitants when they pass through the province ; they are not to make any stay in it."

The first plenipotentiary of France added that this passage, which only applies to a state of peace, aims at three points :—1. The sultan shall not employ Bashi-Bazouks. 2. The soldiers shall not be billeted on the inhabitants ;

they are to be lodged in barracks, or in khans, or under canvas. 3. The troops shall not be allowed to stay in the interior of the province when they are on their way to the frontier for service in the garrisons.

On these points the English and Russian plenipotentiaries were agreed, but a divergence existed. Whilst Count Schouvaloff insisted that these arrangements, accepted by him in principle, should be subject to the superintendence of a European Commission, the English plenipotentiaries rejected this arrangement, which seemed also to the French plenipotentiaries to constitute too great an interference with the sovereignty of the sultan.

Count Schouvaloff accepted the paragraphs, with the reservation of adding an additional clause relative to the European Commission. The Russian government, he said in consenting to leave to the sultan the power of occupying the strong places on the frontier and on the sea-coast, intended to make reservation of the intervention of the European Commission, as regards the strategical points, and the number of the Ottoman troops employed in guarding the frontier. Russia had since waived the idea of controlling the strategical points and the number of the Turkish forces, but she feared that the arrangements laid down in the documents now before the Congress would not be executed without the co-operation of special European agents.

The point thus reserved was ultimately settled according to the desire of Russia, at least so far as concerned the appointment of a European Commission to determine the initial constitution of the new autonomous province.

At the seventh sitting, Prince Gortschakoff, who had been absent from several previous meetings of the Congress, began by expressing his regret at that circumstance, especially as the discussion had turned upon Bulgaria. With regard to this matter he desired to add, as shortly as possible, a few words, inspired by the spirit of conciliation. "Lord Beaconsfield," he said "in a preceding sitting, had expressed the de-



sire that the sultan should be master in his own dominions; his serene highness, like Lord Beaconsfield, desires that the sultan should be master in his own dominions, but he thinks that the existence of this authority depends on certain conditions, without which even genius itself could not accomplish miracles. In the opinion of the first plenipotentiary of Russia these conditions are administrative and political; it is of importance also, from an administrative point of view, that the inhabitants of the provinces which shall not have been declared independent by the Congress may be assured of their possessions, lives, &c., not by promises on paper, which might, like the former ones, not be carried out, and prevent neither abuses nor exactions, but by a European agreement, which may assure their efficacy, and inspire the populations with confidence. From a political point of view, Prince Gortschakoff observes that, instead of an English, French, or Russian preponderance, which history shows us to have existed at Constantinople at different periods, he would wish that there should be, in the East, no preponderance whatever, not more for Russia than for any other state, and he would desire to see substituted for the paltry and deleterious struggle of individual rivalries on the shifting ground of Constantinople a collective action of the great Powers, which would spare the Ottoman Porte many illusions and many faults. His serene highness, making use of an expression which will certainly appear to every man competent in the art of war to be justified by the heroic efforts of the Russian armies, observes that Russia brings hither laurels, and he hopes that the Congress will convert them into olive-branches." The prince added that his two colleagues in the last two sittings had made very great concessions to the desire for peace, which inspired Russia equally with all Europe. They had presented not phrases, but facts, to the high Assembly. The first plenipotentiary of Russia felt assured that the members of the Congress rendered full justice to his country in this respect. He therefore "discarded the thought that any Power

whatever wished to oppose the great and splendid result of peace which reigned supreme over all the interests of Europe, by raising its demands to limits which it would be impossible for the great sovereign and the great nation which he represented to overstep. He could not admit the possibility of a deed which would be severely judged both by contemporaries and by history."

Lord Beaconsfield said that he felt a lively satisfaction in seeing Prince Gortschakoff resume his seat in the Congress, and he looked upon the eloquent speech of his serene highness as a happy evidence of the improvement in his health. His excellency, recalling the words of the plenipotentiary of Russia in relation to the considerable sacrifices to which the great sovereign and great country, so worthily represented by his serene highness, have consented with a view to peace, considered himself fully authorised to say that he himself and his English colleagues had in like manner made important concessions with the same pacific intention. Peace was, in fact, the wish of Europe, and Lord Beaconsfield was happy to note, in accordance with the words which he had just heard, the now unanimous expression of this sentiment. But, in order to accomplish this wish, the spirit of conciliation was still necessary. His excellency had, beyond this, nothing more to say concerning the considerations presented by Prince Gortschakoff, which he had listened to with the greatest pleasure.

Prince Bismarck thereupon declared that he was "convinced that the spirit of conciliation will continue to animate the Congress, and that all the members of the high Assembly have the same opinion of their supreme duty—viz., that it is that of keeping and consolidating the peace of Europe. The progress made in the work of the Congress causes his serene highness to hope that the representatives of the Powers will gain the end which the two illustrious statesmen have just indicated, both of them expressing pacific intentions, with restrictions dictated by the sentiment of national honour. These restrictions, his serene highness does not doubt,

will not seriously interfere with the work of the Congress, and national honour, on both sides, will accord perfectly with conciliatory dispositions. Prince Bismarck observes that the states less directly interested in the questions which might trouble the peace of the world are naturally called upon to raise an impartial voice on every occasion when, for motives which appear of secondary importance in the eyes of Europe, the pacific object of the meetings of the Congress may be compromised."

We have cited these complimentary speeches, because they show how great were the dangers and difficulties through which the Congress passed during its earlier phases, and how carefully the representatives of England and Russia felt themselves compelled to fence with each other.

At the same sitting Caratheodori Pacha proposed the following proposition with regard to the public debt of Turkey :—

"Independently of the tribute, the principality of Bulgaria shall bear a part of the debts of the empire proportional to its revenues."

The pacha read the following statement in support of his proposal :—

"In proposing that, independently of the tribute, the principality of Bulgaria shall bear a part of the debts of the empire proportional to its revenues, I am only doing what I consider a duty towards the creditors of Turkey.

"I cannot deny that the revenues of the districts which constitute the new principality are explicitly appropriated, in a general manner, to the whole of Turkey's public debt ; for certain loans some of these revenues are even pledged in a special manner.

"In the document put upon the list of the petitions addressed to the Congress under number 16, and which has also been sent directly to me, the creditors of Turkey have cited precedents drawn from the practice of European public right.

"I hasten to admit that the analogy is not perfect, since the precedents cited concern territories which have been annexed to independent states, or else territories which have been

declared independent, whilst, in contradistinction, the principality of Bulgaria is only autonomous. But, although deprived of the prerogatives of independence, the principality of Bulgaria will none the less have, in virtue of the principle even of its internal autonomy, a financial system, and consequently a distinct and separate budget of receipts and expenses, and it is precisely for the very reason of the non-independence of the principality that the Congress will perhaps think it useful to solve the doubts which might exist on this head.

"The participation of the principality of Bulgaria in the public debt of the empire should not be confounded with the tribute which the principality is to pay. The two things are distinct. The participation in the debt is simply the consequence of the recognition, or rather of the simple admission of a right of the creditor.

"The tribute, on the other hand, concerns the Suzerain Court. It represents the bond which unites the principality to the empire ; it is the price of redemption from direct subjection, and is independent of the existence of other debts, past or future. In support of this view of the case, I may be permitted also to remind you that the imperial government of Russia, in stipulating for a tribute only, had thought that there was no occasion to specify the matter more closely, on the ground, he said, that the interests of third parties might be encroached upon.

"The proposition which I have had the honour to submit to the Congress is formulated with the same idea. It leaves untouched the question of the tribute, prejudices nothing, and its only aim is the affirmation of a principle."

This proposal, which was strictly in accordance with precedents, caused no special difficulty ; but Count Corti proposed the following form of words, in lieu of those suggested by Caratheodori :—

"When the tribute to be paid by Bulgaria to the Sublime Porte is fixed, it shall be taken into consideration what part of the public debt may be attributed to the principality, on the basis of an equitable proportion."



Caratheodori accepted these words, with the remark that, "in treating of figures, equity means proportion." Which was an epigram; but there is a manifest distinction between the two formulas.

After conversation on the subject of religious toleration in Turkey, Count Andrassy announced that an exchange of ideas having taken place, in conformity with the wish expressed by the Congress at the preceding meeting, between the Cabinets of Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, Russia, and Italy, upon the subject of Articles 7-11 of the treaty of San Stefano, the plenipotentiaries of these Powers had agreed upon a new draft.

Baron Haymerle explained these modifications. As far as Article 7 is concerned paragraphs 1 and 2 were maintained; paragraph 3 now ran thus:—"An assembly of the notables of Bulgaria, to be summoned at Tirnova, will decide, before the election of the prince, the organisation of the future administration." Paragraph 4 was maintained, with the omission of the words "Koutzo Vlachs." Paragraph 5 was suppressed, and the following substituted:—

"The provisional administration of Bulgaria will, until the introduction of the new organisation, be directed by an Imperial Russian Commissioner. An Imperial Ottoman Commissioner, and the Consuls deputed *ad hoc* by the other Powers, will be summoned to assist him in the control of the working of the provisional régime.

"In case of disagreement between the consular delegates, the majority will decide; and in case of divergence between this majority and the Imperial Russian Commissioner, the representatives of the Powers at Constantinople assembled in Conference will give their verdict.

"The prince once elected and installed, the new organisation will be put into execution, and Bulgaria will enter into the full enjoyment of its autonomy.

"Immediately after the conclusion of peace a European Commission will be instituted for

the organisation of Eastern Roumelia, and for its financial administration until the completion of the organisation."

Article 8 of the San Stefano treaty was amended so as to begin in the following form:—

"The Ottoman army shall no longer remain in Bulgaria, and all the old fortresses shall be razed at the expense of the local government, which will be required to raze them with the least possible delay, and not to have others constructed. The Sublime Porte," &c.

This practically concluded the business of the Congress in relation to the new principality of Bulgaria; though the important question as to the delimitation of the frontiers still remained. This question gave rise to considerable difficulties, but was at length settled in the form which will be found recorded in the definitive treaty.

At the twelfth meeting, the Marquis of Salisbury proposed the following modification of Article 22 of the San Stefano treaty:—

"All the inhabitants of the Ottoman empire in Europe, whatever may be their religion, shall enjoy a complete equality of rights. They shall be able to compete for all public employments, functions, and honours, and shall be equally admitted in evidence before the tribunals.

"The exercise and public practice of all creeds shall be entirely free, and no obstacle shall be offered, either to the hierarchical organisation of the different communions, or to their relations with their spiritual heads.

"The ecclesiastics, the pilgrims, and the monks, of all nationalities, travelling or dwelling in European and Asiatic Turkey, shall enjoy an entire equality of rights, advantages, and privileges.

"The right of official protection is accorded to the diplomatic representatives and to the consular agents of the Powers in Turkey, both as regards the persons above indicated, as well as their possessions, religious, charitable, and other establishments, in the holy places and elsewhere.

"The monks of Mount Athos shall be maintained in their possessions and former advantages, and shall enjoy, without any exception

whatsoever, an entire equality of rights and prerogatives."

Lord Salisbury explained that the two first paragraphs of this proposition applied to the Ottoman empire the principles adopted by the Congress, at the request of France, as regards Serbia and Roumania. The object of the three last paragraphs was to extend to the ecclesiastics of every nationality the advantage of the stipulations of Article 22, specially applicable to Russian ecclesiastics.

On the first paragraph, Caratheodori Pacha remarked that the principles of the proposition were accepted by Turkey, but his excellency would prefer their not being looked upon as an innovation; and he read the following communication from his government:—

"In presence of the declarations made in Congress in various circumstances in favour of religious toleration, you are authorised to state that the sentiments of the Sublime Porte on this point are entirely in harmony with the objects sought by Europe. Its most steadfast traditions, its secular policy, the instinct of its populations, all tend to this result. Throughout the whole empire religions widely differing are professed by millions of the sultan's subjects, and no one has been annoyed in his faith or in the exercise of his creed. The Imperial government is determined to maintain this principle in all its force, and to give it all the extension it admits of."

The Turkish plenipotentiary was, in consequence, anxious that, if Congress agreed to the English proposal, "it should at least be shown in the text that the principles in question are in conformity with those which actuate his government. Contrary to what was going on in Serbia and Roumania, there existed, in the legislation of the empire, no inequality or incapacity founded on religious grounds, and he requested the addition of some words showing that this rule had always been applied in the Ottoman empire, not only in Europe, but in Asia. The Congress could, for instance, add, 'in conformity with the declarations of the Porte and with the

previous stipulations which it declares itself willing to maintain.'"

Lord Salisbury had no objection to make to Caratheodori Pacha's request, at the same time remarking that "these dispositions are to be met with in the declarations of the Porte, but have not always been carried out in practice." However, his excellency in no way objected to insert the additional words. After a discussion on the words, "in Europe," for which Caratheodori Pacha proposed to substitute "in Europe and Asia," the Congress decided that the special designation of Europe should be suppressed, and that the clause should be referred to the drafting committee, with a recommendation that it should take into consideration the declaration of the Sublime Porte.

On the fourth clause Caratheodori Pacha remarked that the right of official protection was recognised by this passage as regards the "possessions" of ecclesiastics. His excellency requested the suppression of the word "possessions," on the ground of the protocol of 1868 relative to the right of property of foreigners, which excludes all special protection as regards real property. If this property, subjected, by virtue of the protocol of 1868, to local jurisdiction, were placed at the same time, by the terms of the fourth clause, under the official protection of the diplomatic representatives and consular agents, serious difficulties, both administrative and judicial, might result.

One of the Russian representatives observed that the word "possessions" had been used in the San Stefano treaty; but ultimately the Congress agreed to suppress the word to which the Porte objected.

With regard to the war indemnity exacted by Russia from Turkey, Caratheodori Pacha read a formal protest to the Congress, in the following terms:—

"The Ottoman plenipotentiaries feel it their duty to call especially the attention of the high Assembly to the stipulations of the treaty of San Stefano concerning the indemnity of war. They beg, first of all, the Congress to take into consi-



deration that the war which has just terminated has not had, as its cause, the violation by Turkey of an engagement which this Power might have contracted with respect to Russia. The Cabinet of St. Petersburg having declared war in obedience to a sentiment which it felt bound to submit to, the great and brilliant advantages which it has borne away, and the results which it has obtained, constitute an ample compensation for the efforts and the pecuniary sacrifices which the Imperial government of Russia had naturally looked forward to.

“Without laying stress on precedents, which the most recent history of Russia itself could furnish them with, and which must be fresh in the memory of all the members of the Congress, the Ottoman plenipotentiaries, in reverting to the stipulations of the treaty of San Stefano relative to the payment of a war indemnity, believe that they would have merely to invoke the explanations which the Imperial government of Russia has given on this point to show that, in the belief of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg also, the possibility of Turkey paying the war indemnity forms the subject of very serious doubts. On the other hand, the serious disadvantages which would result from the existence of a debt, the realisation of which could not be otherwise than left uncertain, have been pointed out in a striking manner. In fact, the war which has just ended has caused Turkey incalculable losses. Not to mention the finances, the state of which is pretty accurately known, the misery in which are plunged the towns and country districts both of Turkey in Europe and Asia, is perhaps without example in history. Whence would Turkey today draw the resources which would be indispensable for her to provide for expenses on account of the most urgent services, to avoid leaving her creditors entirely without compensation, to perform, within the bounds of possibility, a mere duty of humanity towards the masses deprived of absolute necessities, and at the same time to meet the demands of a war indemnity? We do not speak of improvements to be introduced—improvements the extreme urgency for

which is recognised by the Imperial Ottoman government quite as much as by Europe, and all of which would require further outlay. But, independently of these improvements, the inexorable expenses of the present hour must be provided for. All the Powers recognise the fact that Turkey cannot meet them, even at the cost of the greatest sacrifices; how could she then undertake the payment of a war indemnity? The Imperial government of Russia, which understood this state of affairs, has demanded territories in Europe and in Asia, to stand in the place of the greater portion of the indemnity which it had calculated to be due to it.

“The facilities which the Congress has elaborated for the European order of arrangement affecting the Dobrudscha and Bessarabia have been based upon a considerable deduction made from the war indemnity. Although the question of Asia has not yet been treated in the Congress, it may at once be mentioned that, in that quarter also, Russia will acquire territories, which, to follow alone the estimate of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg itself, will represent enormous sums. If further payments still are exacted, the Ottoman plenipotentiaries feel it their duty to declare that they really do not see whence Turkey can find the amounts for them, without affecting seriously the most essential conditions of the working of her government.

“They beg the Congress to consider that, if to satisfy the payment of the war indemnity, an intolerable financial situation were created for Turkey, such a decision would not only ruin populations for which Europe shows interest, but would at the same time act in opposition to the idea which has been expressed relative to the conservation of the authority of the Ottoman government, and to which his highness the first plenipotentiary of Russia, has given, in one of our preceding sittings, so explicit an adherence.”

On this Count Schouvaloff observed that he had compelled himself, up to the present moment, to abstain from reverting to the past with the Ottoman plenipotentiaries; but that, in presence of the observations read by Caratheodori



THE RUSSIAN ADVANCED GUARD IN ROUMANIA





Pacha, it was his duty no longer to keep silence. The first plenipotentiary of Turkey had affirmed that the last war had been provoked by no violation of anterior arrangements. Count Schouvaloff maintained, on the contrary, that the war had been the consequence of the constant and daily violation of dispositions agreed upon, and notably of the obligations contracted by the Porte in 1856 at the Congress of Paris. Russia remained for long a passive spectator of these violations; she had kept silence; but she had been obliged at last to intervene."

As regarded the war indemnity, Count Schouvaloff declared that Russia would not seek to convert any portion of it into a territorial aggrandisement; nor would she ask for a guarantee which should interfere with the existing dispositions of Turkish revenues covering the foreign loans. With these assurances the plenipotentiaries were satisfied; and Turkey gained nothing by her protest. In fact, Prince Bismarck reminded Caratheodori Pacha that there was no longer any question of entering into obligations, which had already been done in the San Stefano treaty.

We may now turn to the work of the plenipotentiaries in connection with the Danubian principalities.

## CHAPTER XIX.

### THE CONGRESS AND THE DANUBIAN PRINCIPALITIES.

THE case of Roumania came forward at the 9th sitting of the Congress. The complete independence of the principality was at once recognised; and then arose the much-vexed question of the exchange of Bessarabia for the Dobrudscha, ceded to Russia by the Porte for that purpose.

Prince Bismarck began a rather heated discussion by seeking to make the task of the Russian plenipotentiaries easy for them. He asked whether the Congress was disposed to maintain

unconditionally the principle set forth, or to make it subordinate to the acceptance by Roumania of the territorial redistribution which she appeared disposed to reject. His highness had no personal opinion on this point, but desired to know if the representatives of other Powers considered that the independence of Roumania was subject to the recognition by that principality of the totality of the treaty of San Stefano, and if they did not, in consequence, regard as connected the two questions of independence and territorial changes.

Count Corti observed that the preliminaries of San Stefano were concluded between Russia and Turkey, and that Roumania could therefore take no part therein, being placed under the sovereignty of the Porte. He would not think it just that the principality should be bound in the same degree as the Ottoman government. He considered it inopportune to make the independence of Roumania depend on her adhesion to the stipulations which concern her.

Count Schouvaloff "in no way shared this opinion. Roumania, it is true, has proclaimed her independence herself, but this independence cannot take effect without the assent of Europe, and the Congress has the right to come to a conclusion without examining whether or not Roumania be engaged by the other articles of the treaty of San Stefano."

On this, the Earl of Beaconsfield remarked, in the words of the protocol, that he had "viewed the stipulations of the 19th Article of the treaty of San Stefano relative to Bessarabia with the deepest regret. In the first place, this plan is an infringement of the treaty of 1856, and it was only a case of extreme necessity which should have authorised an alteration in so solemn an act. Moreover, this necessity has not even been alleged. In the second place, it would be, in his eyes, a grave error to consider this stipulation as constituting a simple exchange of territory between the two states. The 4th and 20th Articles of the treaty of Paris constitute an engagement entered into between the European Powers and Russia, with a view to



ensure the freedom of the navigation of the Danube, and his excellency cannot find any guarantee for this freedom in the treaty of San Stefano. In the 4th Article of the treaty of 1856, the allied Powers undertook to restore to the Emperor of Russia all the territory occupied by their troops, but, upon the condition laid down in Article 20—that a rectification of the Russian frontier should take place in Bessarabia “for better securing the freedom of the navigation of the Danube.” It was an engagement entered into with Europe. Now, however, the Russian government proposes to retain the restored territory without fulfilling the conditions under which they were restored. The first English plenipotentiary begs, in such a grave situation, for all the attention of the high assembly. Lord Beaconsfield deposes this interference with the treaty of Paris, and protests against it without reference to the question whether the proposed exchange is or is not sanctioned by the present possessor. The other signatories of the treaty of Paris having declined all intervention in this affair, the first plenipotentiary of Great Britain could not recommend the government of the queen to employ force to maintain the stipulations of this treaty; but he protests against this change, and awaits the explanations which his Russian colleagues will be in a position to give concerning the engagements their sovereign would be willing to enter into for the preservation of the freedom of the Danube.”

Prince Gortschakoff thought, with Lord Beaconsfield, that the free navigation of the Danube is a European interest, but could not see what influence the cession of Bessarabia could exercise on the free navigation of the Danube. “Roumania is, in truth, of no account in the ameliorations of which the course of the river has been the object; doubtless the treaty of Paris gave to Moldavia a part of Bessarabia and the Delta of the Danube, but in 1857 the same Powers restored the Delta to the Turks, and they thus rendered Moldavia a service, since it was not in a position to execute the works

necessary for free access to the Sulina mouth. It is since then that the European Commission of the Danube has executed the great works from which such important advantages to the commerce of the world have resulted. His serene highness, looking at the question from another point of view, recalls the fact that, in 1856, Bessarabia was joined to Moldavia only, at a period when the principalities were to remain separate. Subsequently, Wallachia and Moldavia united, in spite of the treaty of Paris, and notwithstanding the opposition of the European Cabinets, the united principalities have elected a foreign prince, for whom, moreover, his serene highness professes the greatest respect; the situation is, therefore, no longer the same as formerly. Prince Gortschakoff declares, moreover, that his government cannot give way on this question, and hopes that Lord Beaconsfield will not persist in his objections, when his excellency shall have seen that the liberty of the Danube will in nowise suffer by reason of the retrocession of Bessarabia.”

Count Schouvaloff said that, if he had rightly understood the observations of the first plenipotentiary of England, the noble lord had expressed regret that the treaty of San Stefano interfered with the treaty of 1856, by which Russia had contracted engagements towards Europe. “The plenipotentiary of Russia considers it his duty to remind them that the treaty of San Stefano is a preliminary convention, having obligatory force only upon the two contracting parties, and by which Russia intended to let the Turkish government know beforehand the demands she would formulate later before Europe. It is with this intention that Russia has come to the Congress after a long and victorious war. The noble lord has added that he does not consider the retrocession of Bessarabia necessary. Count Schouvaloff thinks that Lord Beaconsfield cannot but allow that, when a nation has re-entered into possession of a portion of territory, which a preceding war has deprived it of, it is difficult to make this same nation abandon the territory which it has re-conquered.

As regards the free navigation of the Danube the plenipotentiary of Russia will present some explanations which seem to him of such a nature as to satisfy Lord Beaconsfield. The question of Bessarabia might be looked upon by Russia as a question of ambition and of interest, or as a question of honour. Russia has desired to reduce it to a question of honour, and it is for that reason that she does not demand back the portions of territory the possession of which might have constituted a menace, or at any rate an interference with the free navigation of the river. She offers, moreover, to Roumania, in exchange, a territory more vast, conquered at the price of her blood, and which ought to be considered a fair prize of war. Count Schouvaloff has the conviction that Roumania does not lose by the exchange. As for the principle of the integrity and independence of Roumania, his excellency thinks, with Lord Beaconsfield, that such principles ought not merely to be expressed by words, but ought to be a reality. Now, Roumania cannot really preserve her independence and her integrity as long as she persists in living upon the spoils of a great empire which considers that it has the right to reclaim a shred of its former territory. Count Schouvaloff is firmly persuaded that Roumania herself, that all Europe, has an interest, that this question should be resolved in the sense of the legitimate aspirations of Russia."

Prince Gortschakoff desired to add an observation relative to the value of the exchange.

"Roumania would obtain, as a result of the war in which she took part, not only the recognition of her independence, but the destruction of the fortresses which menaced her security. There have been stipulated in her favour eventual annexations which would increase her territory to the extent of three thousand five hundred kilometres in area and of eighty thousand souls in population, compared with what she would have to give up, and which would ensure her besides the Delta of the Danube, which Europe took away from her in 1857; certain fertile districts, such as Babadagh, and a good com-

mercial port on the Black Sea. The Imperial Russian government is convinced, therefore, that it is not only maintaining a right, but that it is taking up an equitable position in settling with the Roumanian government, on mutually advantageous bases, a question which, were it not now settled, would render impossible the establishment between Russia and Roumania of the good relations necessary to the consolidation of peace in the East. His serene highness considers that these indications demonstrate sufficiently that Russia does not demand more than she gives. Prince Gortschakoff wishes besides to recall that, in reality, all the rights, and privileges of Roumania have been ensured to her at the cost of Russian blood. There exists no treaty concluded by Russia with Turkey during the last century which does not contain stipulations favourable to the Roumanians. His serene highness wishes to add a psychological observation, and regrets to have to record that if, in private life, it often happens that, by rendering a service to a friend, one converts him into an adversary, this truth is still more applicable to politics. Prince Gortschakoff confines himself to citing the example of the Roumanians, and his observation appears to him to be of a nature fully to reassure those who appear to apprehend that Russia will acquire the absolute devotion of the populations for which she has imposed on herself the greatest sacrifices."

After this, the discussion was adjourned to the next meeting, when the representatives of Roumania, M. M. Cogalniceano and Bratiano, were admitted to put the case of the government, and to protest formally against the cession demanded from them.

M. Cogalniceano thanked the Congress for their kindness in admitting the Roumania representatives, and read the following memorandum:—

"Messieurs les plénipotentiaires,

"Our first anxiety is to return thanks to the Congress for consenting to listen to the Roumanian delegates at the moment of deliberating upon the question of Roumania. It is a fresh



title added by Europe to those which have long called for the gratitude of the Roumanian nation, and this pledge of unanimous good-will appears to us of happy augury for the success of the cause which we are called upon to defend before you.

"We will not dwell upon the events into which we have been drawn by overpowering necessity. Equally will we pass in silence over both the military action in which we have taken part and the diplomatic action in which we have not been allowed to have a share. We have already had occasion to assure ourselves that the hour of negotiation has been less favourable to us than the fortune of arms

"We shall confine ourselves to declaring the claims and the wishes of our country upon the basis of the recapitulation set forth in the memorandum which we have recently had the honour to submit to the Congress.

"1. We are of opinion that, in strict justice, no portion of its present territory ought be taken away from Roumania.

"The restitution, by the treaty of 1856, of a portion of Bessarabia to the principality of Moldavia, was an act of justice on the part of Europe. The partition of 1812 could not be justified by the fact or the right of conquest.

"In 1812, Bessarabia was a fief of a principality whose autonomy had been solemnly attested by all the treaties previously concluded between the Russian and Ottoman empires. The treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji in particular acknowledged the Princes of Moldavia and Wallachia, in their quality as sovereigns, and laid down that Bessarabia formed part of Moldavia.

"There then was a Roumanian country, with Roumanian institutions and laws, explicitly upheld by his Majesty the Emperor Alexander I. This respect for the ancient nationality was expressed in the Imperial rescript which promulgated the administrative and judicial organisation of this province after its incorporation with Russia, without the smallest distinction being drawn between lower and upper Bessarabia.

"It would seem that there was a disposition to conclude that Bessarabia was a Turkish or

Tartar region, because of the simple fact that the Ottomans occupied three fortresses there.

"But the history of Wallachia presents a similar anomaly. Turkish fortresses have long existed there; it by no means follows, however, that Wallachia has ever been a Turkish country.

"Bessarabia cannot be claimed from Roumania by virtue of right of conquest any more in 1878 than in 1812. It forms part of a principality which Russia herself, during the whole course of her recent war with the Ottoman empire, has considered and treated as an independent allied state.

"Moreover, upon entering on the campaign, Russia signed a convention with Roumania, whereby she expressly guaranteed the existing integrity of the Roumanian territory.

"This guarantee was demanded, and given, when it was as yet a question merely of the passage through Roumania of the Imperial armies. It would seem that it should have been of redoubled weight from the day when, at the appeal of Russia herself, the support of the Roumanian nation became more substantial, and was transformed into an active military co-operation, in complete alliance. Our troops have in fact fought side by side with the Russian armies. If that be no ground upon which to add to our possessions, it surely is none upon which to take away from them. Failing other claims, the Convention of the 4-16th April, 1877, which bears the signatures and ratifications of the Imperial Cabinet, would of itself suffice to preserve to us an important region of the Danube in which the commercial prosperity of Roumania is so intimately bound up.

"In support of the retrocession of Bessarabia, considerations of gratitude, and of military glory and valour, have been brought to bear. But, during a long series of wars, Russian arms have immortalised themselves upon many a field of battle, and have pushed their glory to the very walls of Adrianople. That, however, constitutes no title to the ownership of the region of the Balkans.

"But considerations of gratitude have alike been invoked. Roumania knows how to fulfil the duties of gratitude, and has proved it many times over. She does not forget her history, nor the names of her benefactors; she reveres in Catherine the Great and in Nicholas I. the generous authors of the treaties of Kainardji and of Adrianople.

"But she retains also the memory of the sacrifices she has imposed on herself for the sake of the aggrandisement, the fortune, and the glory of Russia. She bears in mind how, from Peter the Great to our own day, she has been alternately or simultaneously the basis of the military operations of Russia, the granary which nourished her armies, even when they were employed beyond the Danube, and the theatre, too often selected, for the most terrible collisions.

"She recalls, moreover, how, in 1812, she lost, to the benefit of Russia, the half of Moldavia, that is to say, Bessarabia from the Pruth to the Dniester.

"2. We urge that Roumanian soil may not be subjected to a right of passage during the occupation of Bulgaria by the Russian armies. The Danube and the sea offer them the easiest and least expensive means of transport and communication. Roumania, after all her sufferings, yearns for absolute repose, which is necessary for the reparation of the damages caused by the war. An untoward condition, indeed, for the accomplishment of the work of healing and for the tranquillity of our land, would be the passage of foreign troops.

"3. It appears to us just that Roumania, by virtue of its ancient claims, should re-enter into possession of the islands and of the mouths of the Danube, including the Isle of Serpents. There would be in this restoration an equitable return to the original dispositions by which the great Powers, in 1856, confided to the Danubian principalities the care of the freedom of the Danube at its mouth.

"4. We have a firm hope that Roumania will receive, from the Russian Imperial govern-

ment, a war indemnity proportionate to the military force sent into the field by her. We consider it rightful, in all respects, that the indemnities claimed and obtained by Russia, in the name of the various allied states, should be divided in proportion to the military establishment of each of the belligerents. The Imperial government has recognised this principle of distribution in favour of Servia and Montenegro, and insists upon its being carried out.

"Roumania has a right to demand the benefit of this provision in her turn. In fact, being obliged to keep her army mobilised for a long time in order to provide against imminent eventualities, she has had under her standard, whether as regular or reserve forces, more than seventy thousand men. Moreover, she has suffered considerable losses; her towns, and all her bank of the Danube, have been ruined by the bombardment, her means of communication thrown out of gear, her war material damaged.

"The compensations due under these different heads should be levied upon the total indemnity allotted to the Imperial government of Russia, and provided in the manner which the Congress may consider most expedient.

"5. Roumania is confident that her independence will be definitively and fully recognised by Europe.

"To her primitive right, whose principle had been betrayed by the ambiguities of history, are added to-day the titles whose acquisition she has regenerated, or rather rejuvenated, upon the field of battle. Ten thousand Roumanians have fallen around Plevna to win liberty and independence for their country.

"But all these sacrifices would not suffice to assure to Roumania the pacific disposition of her destinies. She would be pleased and grateful to see her efforts, whereby she has manifested her individuality, crowned with an European gift. Such a gift would be the real guarantee of her neutrality, for it would put her in a position to show to Europe that her sole ambition is to be the faithful guardian of the freedom of the mouths of the Danube, and to devote her-



self to the improvement of her institutions, and the development of her resources.

"Such, Messieurs les plénipotentiaires, are briefly laid before you, the wishes of a little state which is not conscious of having forfeited the esteem of Europe, and which makes through us an appeal to the justice and goodwill of the great Powers, whose illustrious representatives you are."

M. Bratiano then read the following additional statement:—

"The exposition which my colleague, in our united names, has just traced of the claims and interests of Roumania, has no need of further development. The high Assembly, whose mission is to set in order the affairs in the East, possesses fully the necessary powers for the accomplishment of its task.

"We are convinced that the sentiments of justice and of good-will which have opened to us an access to your presence will also assure the adoption of the resolution relative to Roumania.

"I beg simply to add, that the withdrawal of a part of our inheritance would not only be a profound grief to the Roumanian nation, it would destroy in her the confidence in the efficacy of treaties and in the observation both of natural equity and written law. The difficulties which her faith would encounter in future would paralyse her pacific development and her impulse towards progress.

"In conclusion, I take the respectful liberty to submit these reflections to the august consideration of the great European Council, and in particular to the illustrious representatives of his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, whose lofty spirit and generous heart we have so often had occasion to admire during his sojourn in our midst."

The president replied that the Congress would conscientiously examine the observations offered by the delegates from Roumania.

The Roumanian representatives then retired; and Prince Bismarck invited the plenipotentiaries to consider the question of the independence of the principality. M. Waddington began the discussion by declaring that France demanded

this boon for Roumania on the same conditions as those which had been applied to Servia. He could not, he said, conceal from himself the local difficulties which existed in Roumania, but, after a careful examination of the arguments on one side and on the other, the French plenipotentiaries had thought it better not to depart from the grand rule of the equality of rights and freedom of worship. It would be difficult, moreover, for the Roumanian government to reject, within its territory, the principle admitted by Turkey for her own subjects. "There can be no possible doubt that Roumania, in demanding an entrance into the great European family, ought to accept the obligations and even the drawbacks of the position, the benefit of which she claims, and that it will be long before an equally solemn and decisive occasion will present itself for affirming anew the principles which constitute the honour and the security of civilised nations. As for the local difficulties, the French plenipotentiary deems that they will be more easily surmounted when those principles shall have been recognised in Roumania, and when the Jewish race shall have learnt that it has nothing to hope for but from its own efforts, and from the union of its interests with those of the indigenous populations." M. Waddington concluded by urging that the same conditions of political and religious order determined on for Servia should be equally imposed upon the state of Roumania.

Congress being generally agreed upon this point, it was next urged, by M. Waddington, and most of the other plenipotentiaries, that Roumania ought, in consideration of her agreeing to the cession of Bessarabia, to receive a greater enlargement on the south than would be implied in the annexation of the Dobrudscha alone. The French representatives suggested a frontier from Mangalia, on the Black Sea, towards Silistria on the Danube—thus cutting off from Bulgaria an important district, in addition to what had already been taken from the limits assigned to the new principality in the treaty of San Stefano.

The Russian plenipotentiaries made a virtue of this transference; but eventually Count Schouvaloff made the following proposal, which was agreed to by the Congress. "In consideration of the presence of Roumanian elements, the Russian plenipotentiaries consent to prolong the frontier of Roumania along the Danube, from Rasova in the direction of Silistria. The point of frontier on the Black Sea should not be beyond Mangalia." The precise delimitation was left to be decided by a special commission.

The Turkish representatives, after vainly attempting to throw upon Roumania a portion of the Ottoman debt (a question which Prince Bismarck said was beyond the competence of the Congress) secured the omission of part of the San Stefano treaty which bound the Porte to pay a war indemnity to the principality. It was agreed that all these "private questions" should be discussed between Turkey and Roumania alone. And, in the result, the claim of one country appears to have been taken as a set-off against that of the other.

It may here be observed that the Roumanians were slow to accept the exchange of territory imposed upon them, though they gave way at last. In regard to the establishment of religious equality they were still more obstinate, and long refused to grant equality of rights to the Jews. In consequence of this, the Western Powers delayed the full recognition of their independence, and the appointment of diplomatic embassies at Bucharest.

On the question as to Servian independence, which was taken before the corresponding question of Roumania, the Turkish plenipotentiary saw fit to make the following observations, amounting virtually to a protest on the part of the Porte:—

"Upon the first occasion which represents itself to the Congress to pronounce upon the stipulations of independence inserted in the treaty of San Stefano, Caratheodori Pacha begs permission of the Congress to accompany his opinion with a few words. It was in view of a great European interest, as well as that of

Servia itself, that Europe had sanctioned the bond of vassalage which has hitherto united this principality to the Suzerain Court. That Turkey has exercised the right conferred upon her by the treaties with a moderation which has never belied itself, not even in the midst of the severest trials, that this right has afforded a really useful standpoint for the easy settlement of the difficulties which at different times have keenly interested Europe, that this sovereignty, understood in this manner, has assured to Servia a real independence, and that she herself has several times over acknowledged its great value—these are incontestable facts.

"The treaty of San Stefano set on foot a new system for this country, as well as for others which were nearly in similar circumstances, by detaching them from the centre which had been assigned to them. If the idea of independence has the upper-hand to-day in the counsels of Europe, Turkey will not oppose it, for she is confident that this independence, which it is for the Congress to sanction, will be real and honest, that it will be assumed by the countries in full recognition of the rights as well as of the duties thereby imposed upon them, for from thenceforth it will be respected, and will not diminish the guarantees of European public order which the bond of suzerainty had sufficed to create and maintain."

Prince Bismarck observed that it would not be possible for Turkey to withdraw her assent to the independence of Servia; and he then put the question to the vote of the other plenipotentiaries.

Lord Salisbury was prepared to recognise the independence of Servia, but thought it would be opportune to stipulate for the principle of religious liberty within the principality.

M. Waddington also admitted the independence of Servia, but on the condition of the following proposition, identical with that which the Congress had accepted for Bulgaria:—

"The inhabitants of the principality of Servia, of whatever religion, shall enjoy a complete equality of rights. They may offer themselves



as candidates for all public offices, functions, and honours, and may practise in all professions, and difference of creed shall never be brought against them as a reason for exclusion.

The exercise and open practice of all rituals shall be entirely free, and no hindrance shall be allowed to be offered either to the hierarchical organisation of the different communions, or to their relations with their spiritual chiefs."

Prince Gortschakoff demurred somewhat to the admission of this principle as regarded the Jews; but M. Waddington strongly insisted, and the Congress fully supported him. In the final text of the treaty of Berlin, the rights of the Jews are admitted.

Congress next assented to the proposal that Serbia should receive an increase of territory; the delimitation of the frontiers being left, as in the other cases, to special commissions. On Austria's proposal it was declared that Serbia should carry on her due share of the conventions, commercial and otherwise, hitherto existing between Austria and Turkey.

The question of Montenegro was settled in a similar manner.

It was at the eighth sitting of the Congress that the question of Bosnia and Herzegovina was introduced. It was already known that Austria had made certain demands in connection with these provinces of Turkey; and the various plenipotentiaries were consequently prepared with statements on this subject.

Count Andrassy began by reading the following document:—

"All the governments are agreed in recognising the fact that Austria-Hungary, in its quality of limitrophe Power, is more interested than any other Power in the settlement of the state of affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The belligerents had this point in view when, by Article 14 of the preliminary treaty of peace, they reserved the definite solution of this question, pending an understanding with Austria-Hungary. In developing the objections to the before-mentioned Article, which arise from the special nature of the Austro-Hungarian interests,

the plenipotentiaries of his Imperial and Royal Majesty think it their duty to remark that the Bosno-Herzegovinian question, although concerning more directly Austria-Hungary, does not cease to be a question eminently European.

"It ought not to be lost sight of, that the movement which has led to the war in the East had its origin in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The evils and dangers which have resulted from them to Europe are well known; Austria-Hungary has been affected by them more than any other Power. The considerable number of troops stationed along our frontiers has not sufficed to prevent the passage of insurgents and reciprocal incursions. The Turkish forces concentrated in Bosnia at the beginning of the troubles have not been in a position, however numerous they may have been, to put an end to continual insurrection and emigration. More than two hundred thousand people have thus abandoned their homes. For three years past the Imperial and Royal government has had to bear the burden of the expense of their maintenance. Ten millions of florins have already been expended in this manner. Distrusting the lot which awaits them upon their return, the emigrants refuse to go back to their native country. Thus day by day new and heavy sacrifices are imposed on us, and nothing leads us to suppose that they will soon cease. Our limitrophe populations suffer incalculable harm from this incessant and prolonged immigration.

"In view of this state of affairs, which it has not been possible for them to prevent, the Imperial and Royal government can have no other aim than to see an end put to it, once and for all, by a solution offering guarantees of stability. Article 14 of the preliminary treaty of San Stefano proposes as a solution the introduction of an autonomy, of the form which was communicated to the Ottoman plenipotentiaries in the first sitting of the Conference of Constantinople. The government of his Majesty the Emperor and King would be ready to accept any solution which might give hope of the prompt and definitive pacification of the provinces under

discussion. Nevertheless, taking into consideration their national, religious, and geographical conditions, rendered still more complicated by the territorial changes resulting from the war, we cannot but consider the solution indicated as altogether impracticable. Insurmountable obstacles can be urged against it both as to principle and as to execution.

"The population of these countries is composed of Mussulmans, Orthodox Christians, and Catholics, fanatical in the antagonism which divides them, and living, not in separate districts, but pell-mell in the same localities, the same towns, the same villages. On the Sublime Porte would devolve the difficult task of reuniting all these opposite elements in the mould of an autonomous administration. It would have to proceed to the repatriation of the refugees dispersed in Austria-Hungary and Montenegro, to make provision for their maintenance, and, in order to enable them to recommence peaceful labour, to provide them with grain for the sowing of their lands, and with materials for the reconstruction of their houses. It would have to undertake the settlement of the agrarian question, the principal cause of the periodical agitations which have disturbed those countries, a problem bristling with obstacles, in the midst of a population distracted by religious hatred and social rivalries, a problem that a strong and impartial power can alone solve in a country where all the real estate is in the hands of Mussulmans, while the Christian agricultural labourers or farmers form the majority of the inhabitants. At the same time that the Sublime Porte would be called upon to make sacrifices beyond its means, Article 14 provides that it shall not be permitted to recover the arrears of taxes, and obliges it to renounce during another two years the current revenues of those provinces.

"Assuredly it is no reproach to Turkey, nor is it casting doubts on her good-will, to affirm that she would not be equal to this task. It would be impossible for her to accomplish it under normal circumstances. It is all the more

impracticable at the conclusion of a war, as yet scarcely brought to an end, in the presence, above all, of the revival of the antagonism which displays itself with greater force than even at the beginning of the disturbances, now that districts inhabited by Mussulmans are, or are about to be, placed under the Servian and Montenegrin rule. The apprehension has but too good foundation, that autonomy, under such circumstances, far from bringing about the pacification of these countries, would only make them the permanent hot-bed of trouble. It is evident, from the preceding succinct explanation, that a durable settlement of this question could not be attained on the basis of Article 14. Every fruitless attempt to establish an autonomous organisation in those provinces would give new impetus to the disturbances, and we should thus, in a short time, be exposed afresh to the intolerable burden which the troubles in those provinces have laid upon us, and for which we still continue to suffer.

"The Austro-Hungarian government must, moreover, take into consideration the geographical situation which will result for Bosnia and Herzegovina after the territorial re-arrangements resulting from a new demarcation of Servia and Montenegro. By bringing close together the frontiers of those principalities, the means of communication in those parts with the rest of the East would be placed under conditions unfavourable to the commercial interests of the monarchy. For these motives the plenipotentiaries of his Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty think it their duty to call the serious attention of the Congress to the dangers which any solution, without guarantees of duration, would bring about. Especially interested, as a limitrophe Power, Austria-Hungary is obliged to declare frankly and openly that its most vital interests only permit it to accept a solution of the Bosno-Herzegovinian question, which would be likely to bring about the durable pacification of the said provinces, and to prevent the occurrence of events which have put the peace of Europe to such grave dangers, and cre-



ated for Austria-Hungary, while it imposed on her great sacrifices and severe material losses, an intolerable situation, of which she could not admit the continuance."

Lord Salisbury then read the following statement:—

"The social condition and geographical position of Bosnia and Herzegovina are equally deserving of the attention of the Congress. They are the only provinces of Turkey in which the proprietors of the soil have, almost without exception, a different religious belief to that of the peasants. The insurrection which has resulted from this antagonism has given rise to the war which has lately devastated Turkey, and the animosities which separate the two classes of the population are not less strong than they were three years ago. They have been exasperated by the passions of the civil war, and the opposition to the government will be stimulated by the recent successes of the two neighbouring principalities. It is hardly probable that the Porte will be capable of successfully combating, at present, agitations which she was not strong enough to prevent or to suppress, even before the sad events of the last two years had taken place.

"For this purpose there would be need of a government which should have, not only the means necessary for the establishment of a good administration, but which should also possess forces sufficiently preponderating to suppress every kind of disturbance. If the powers should not succeed at once in establishing a stable and strong administration in these regions, they will be responsible for the inevitable renewal of the sufferings which have roused the lively sympathies of Europe, and which have given rise to events of such gravity. The geographical position of these provinces is also of high political importance. In case a considerable part of them should fall into the hands of one of the neighbouring principalities, a chain of Slav states would be formed which would stretch across the peninsula of the Balkans, and the military force of which would menace the popu-

lations of other races occupying the territory to the south.

"Such a state of things would, without doubt, be more dangerous to the independence of the Porte than any other combination. It is, however, very probable that such a result would be brought about if the Porte remained charged with the defence of these two remote provinces. There would be great danger to be apprehended, both for the provinces and for the Porte, if the latter still continued to occupy and administer them. On the other hand, Bosnia and Herzegovina contribute nothing to the wealth or to the strength of the Porte. It was established at the Constantinople Conference that their revenues did not equal the expenses which were incurred on their account. The expense necessary for defending them would be enormous, and they have no strategical value for Turkey. The Porte then would give evidence of the highest wisdom if it refused to burden itself any longer with a task which surpasses its strength, and by entrusting it to a Power capable of discharging it, would avert serious dangers from the Turkish empire.

"For these motives, the government of the queen proposes to the assembled Powers that the Congress should decide that the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary."

Prince Bismarck declared that he supported, in the name of Germany, the proposition which the Marquis of Salisbury had just read, and explained his vote by the following considerations:—

"Europe wishes to create a stable state of affairs, and to give security, in an efficacious manner, to the lot of the populations in the East. It is from this point of view that the representatives of the Powers assembled in Congress have a special interest in devoting their attention to the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is a notorious fact, that the periodical shocks which have disturbed the East, and notably the last disturbance, which has threatened to cause a conflagration in Europe, have

had their origin in this province. It is not only therefore an Austro-Hungarian interest, but a duty general to all to find efficacious means for preventing the return of like events.

"Germany, which is bound by no direct interest in the affairs of the East, shares, nevertheless, the desire to put an end to a state of things which, by its continuation, would contain the germ of new disorders, which would be followed by discord between the European cabinets. It would be dangerous to hold to the illusion that, in order to remedy this situation, it would be sufficient to introduce reforms into Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the basis of the present institutions. Only a powerful state, and one having at its disposal the necessary forces within range of the seat of disorder, will be able to establish order there, and give security to the lot and future of these populations. On these grounds I support, in the name of Germany, the proposition of the plenipotentiary for Great Britain, and I recommend it strongly for the acceptance of the high Assembly."

Caratheodori Pacha then expressed the opinion of his government in the following terms:—

"The very strong desire of the Ottoman government has been, since the beginning, to furnish, in all that concerns it, every possible facility for the work of peace and conciliation which constitutes the mission of the great Powers of Europe, assembled at this moment in Congress. The attitude of the Ottoman plenipotentiaries, in this high Assembly, has been ever in conformity with this fundamental principle of the policy of their government. During the deliberations which have continued up to this time, and in which questions of the highest importance, for the present as well as the future of the empire, have been discussed and resolved upon, they have always made it their duty—their colleagues will certainly render them this justice—to show the highest deference to the desires expressed by the great Powers, with a view to terminating the pending difficulties. They only regret the more deeply to be obliged to-day to give expression, with regard to the proposed

occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to an opinion differing from that which has just been announced.

"First of all, the Ottoman plenipotentiaries avow that they see no urgent necessity for giving effect to the motion for occupation. The gravity of the motives which have been alleged in favour of a measure of this kind is not felt by them in the same degree as by their excellencies the members of the Congress, who seem to attach a decisive importance to it. The aim of this occupation can evidently only be to re-establish order and tranquillity in those provinces, and to proceed to the repatriation of the refugees. The Sublime Porte, in like manner, pursuing only this same end, and possessing, moreover, sufficient means to realise it, cannot willingly leave to any other Power the care and burden of fulfilling a task which belongs to it naturally, and of right.

"The Ottoman plenipotentiaries hasten, moreover, to announce to this high Assembly that the Sublime Porte engages to proceed immediately to put in operation the proper means for bringing about the desired result, by sending immediately to the spot high commissioners, who will be charged with the organisation of a police, will provide for the housing and maintenance of the refugees, until the commencement of agricultural labour, and will put into execution the system of administration which shall be adopted for those two provinces, as well as other measures of reform. The Ottoman plenipotentiaries hope that the Congress will appreciate the extent and importance of this engagement, which they do not hesitate to give in behalf of their government. They also venture to believe that it will not be difficult for them to convince this high Assembly of the efficacy of the measures which the Sublime Porte would put into operation without the least delay. The principle motive of doubt which has appeared even here arises from the fact, that it is said it has been impossible to re-establish order in Bosnia and Herzegovina for nearly three years. From this it is concluded that those provinces



are already, in some manner, placed beyond the circle within the extent of which the normal influence of the power of the Sublime Porte is exercised.

"However, if their excellencies the members of the Congress will be kind enough to take into consideration that, if the disorders in Bosnia have lasted during a period of time relatively rather long, this persistence is explained very easily, if the very exceptional difficulties with which the Ottoman government has had to struggle during this time are taken into account. The open hostilities carried on against the Sublime Porte for now nearly three years by the two principalities which are limitrophe to Bosnia, and the great and grievous war which has desolated the empire in Europe and Asia, could not fail to absorb the strength and attention of the state, and to furnish ever fresh incentives to the ideas of revolt and aggression which prevail in Bosnia. Thus, far from furnishing a proof of the weakness of the power of the sultan in this country, the circumstances to which allusion has been made give rise to an altogether different conclusion. The force and influence of the Sublime Porte must be very powerful in Bosnia when, during three years of war and calamities throughout the whole extent of the empire, the Ottoman authority has maintained itself intact in this province. Is it, then, at this time, when peace is about to return, and just at the moment when the Sublime Porte will be able to concentrate all its forces and attention to the re-establishment of order in this country, that it is to be believed that it is incapable of fulfilling this task?

"The Imperial government has full consciousness of the efficacy of its powers over these provinces; and in spite of the territorial additions which it seems decided to give to the neighbouring principalities, additions which, if the case occurs, would doubtless augment their powers of aggression, Turkey is of opinion that she is still in a position to repress this cupidity, if it ever showed itself, especially if she were assured of the moral assistance of the Cabinet of

Vienna. It is to this moral aid that the Ottoman government attaches the greatest value: it is this aid that it hopes to conciliate to itself under these circumstances. It has been thought that Bosnia not being a province of great importance to the Ottoman exchequer, its occupation by the Austro-Hungarian armies would not, consequently, cause great inconvenience to the Sublime Porte. It may be permitted to the Ottoman plenipotentiaries to make a note of this declaration, according to which all the revenues of the province of Bosnia are spent in the province itself. But they must, on the other hand, call attention to the fact that, although a province does not furnish considerable sums to the exchequer, it does not follow that its occupation by the troops of a foreign Power must, therefore, be a subject of indifference to the sovereign who owns it. Without insisting further on the consideration of this order of ideas, the Ottoman plenipotentiaries have the honour to repeat to their excellencies the members of this high Assembly that the Sublime Porte offers to undertake to fulfil itself the programme of reform which may appear, at this moment, most appropriate to the exigencies of the circumstances. As regards the agrarian question, it would, perhaps, be inopportune here to enter into long explanations; it would be equally useless to recall the various solutions which this question has received in divers countries, where it has caused difficulties analogous to those to which attention is called in Bosnia. Is it the Sublime Porte alone that would be unable to apply remedies of the like nature? Moreover, the agrarian question exists still in several countries, for which, nevertheless, no one has ever thought of having recourse to means of the nature of those which are now proposed for Bosnia.

"Thus, without seeking to develop their ideas any further, the Ottoman plenipotentiaries consider that what has just been said is sufficient to persuade the high Assembly that, were it to take note of the engagement which they offer in the name of their government, it would secure

much better and more certainly the pacification of those countries than if it gave its assent to a proposal for occupation, which is capable of giving rise to inconvenience much graver than those which it is proposed to remedy."

After some further discussion, in which the other plenipotentiaries agreed with the proposal of Lord Salisbury (though unwillingly, so far as the Italian representatives were concerned), Count Andrassy made the following formal declaration:—

"The proposal of the plenipotentiaries of Great Britain and of Germany seeming to be the solution the most likely to tend to the speedy, complete, and lasting pacification of Bosnia and of Herzegovina, and thus best attaining the common aim that all the Powers have in view, namely, to create a stable state of affairs, the plenipotentiaries of Austria-Hungary have the honour to announce that they acquiesce in it, and to declare that the Austria-Hungarian government are ready to undertake the occupation and administration of these provinces. As the territory of the sandjak of Novi-bazar, which extends between Servia and Montenegro in a south-easterly direction as far as Mitrovitza, and which is part of the ancient 'vilayet' of Bosnia, does not actually border on Austro-Hungarian territory, the plenipotentiaries of his Imperial and Royal Majesty declare that Austria-Hungary does not wish to undertake the administration of this sandjak, and that the Ottoman administration can continue there. Nevertheless, in order to maintain the new political position—liberty and security for the means of communication—Austria-Hungary must reserve the right of garrison and military and commercial roads along the whole extent of the district described as the ancient 'Vilayet of Bosnia.'"

Prince Bismarck, while remarking that the opinion of the different members of the Congress was indicated by the speeches which had been delivered, asked for the formal vote of the representatives. Austria, France, Great Britain, and Italy, agreed to the English proposal. Rus-

sia accepted it also, remarking that her vote applied exclusively to Lord Salisbury's motion. The Ottoman plenipotentiaries refused to agree to it, declaring that they were bound by the instructions of their government.

The president, in the name of the majority of the Congress, and specially of the neutral Powers, reminded the plenipotentiaries of Turkey that the Congress had met, "not for the safety of certain geographical positions, for the maintenance of which the Porte might be anxious, but in order to preserve the peace of Europe now and in the future." He pointed out to the Ottoman representatives that, without the intervention of Congress, they would find themselves face to face with the articles of the treaty of San Stefano as a whole; that this intervention secured to them a much larger and more fertile province than Bosnia, namely, the territory extending from the *Ægean* Sea to the Balkans. The great Powers had agreed upon the matters affecting Bosnia and Herzegovina, and he trusted that "a work from which Turkey was destined to reap great advantages would not be interrupted by the opposition of the Porte." He invited "fresh instructions" from the Ottoman government; but, as we shall see, the Porte was not easily persuaded to submit to the Austrian occupation.

The reader will have observed that England had made herself mainly responsible, at all events ostensibly, for this special partition of Turkey. There can be little doubt that she had done so at Austria's request and demand, in consideration of the support afforded by the latter to the English government in its controversies with Russia.

It will not be necessary that we should follow the proceedings of the Congress in regard to the treatment of the Armenian question, or to other subsidiary points. The text of the final treaty will sufficiently indicate the conclusions arrived at on each particular question.

The Congress came to an end on the 13th of July, after sitting more or less continuously for one calendar month. Opinions will probably



always differ in respect of the value, justice, and efficacy of this high Assembly; but the magnitude of the interests involved in its decisions must render it for ever memorable in the pages of history.

## CHAPTER XX.

### THE TREATY OF BERLIN.

THESE materials for the history of the Turko-Russian War, and of the group of events which immediately sprang from it, would not be complete without the text of the treaty of Berlin; more especially as the text of the San Stefano treaty has already been given. The practical work of the Congress may be measured by comparing the texts of these two treaties with each other—though it is not to be forgotten that the Russian government still claimed the right to include, in a separate convention with Turkey, all the articles of the San Stefano instrument not formally abrogated at Berlin.

The treaty was signed on the 13th of July, and was in the following terms:—

PREAMBLE.—His Majesty the Emperor of Germany, his Majesty the Emperor of Austria-Hungary, the President of the French Republic, her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, his Majesty the King of Italy, his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, his Majesty the Sultan of the Ottomans, desiring to settle, with a view to European order, and conformably to the stipulations of the treaty of Paris, of March 30th, 1856, the questions raised in the East by the events of late years, and by the war which has resulted in the treaty of San Stefano, have been unanimously of opinion, that the assembling of a Congress would be the best means of facilitating a mutual understanding. To this end they named the plenipotentiaries whose names are given below, and who, after having exchanged their powers, which were found in good and

due form, have stipulated and agreed to the following articles:—

ART. 1.—Bulgaria is constituted an autonomous and tributary principality, under the suzerainty of his Majesty the Sultan. It shall have a Christian government and a national militia.

[ART. 2. defines the geographical limits of the new principality of Bulgaria, constituting the Balkans as its southern frontier.]

ART. 3.—The Prince of Bulgaria shall be voluntarily elected by the population, and confirmed by the Sublime Porte, with the assent of the Powers. No member of any of the reigning dynasties of the Great European Powers shall be elected Prince of Bulgaria. In the event of the princely dignity becoming vacant, the election of the new prince shall be made under the same conditions and in the same forms.

ART. 4.—An assembly of the notables of Bulgaria, convoked at Tirnova, shall prepare, before the election of the prince, the organic law of the principality. In the localities where, besides Bulgarians, the population includes Turks, Roumanians, Greeks, and others, account shall be taken of the rights and interests of these classes of the population in whatever relates to the elections and the elaboration of the organic law.

ART. 5.—The following arrangements shall form the bases of the public law of Bulgaria:—Distinction of religious belief or confession shall not operate against any one as a reason of exclusion or incapacity in what concerns the enjoyment of civil and political rights, admission to public employment, functions, or honours, or the exercise of different professions or industries, whatever the locality may be. Liberty of openly professing every creed shall be assured to all those under the jurisdiction of the principality as well as to strangers, and no trammels will be imposed on the hierarchical organisation of the different religious bodies, or their relations with their spiritual chiefs.

ART. 6.—The provisional organisation of Bulgaria shall be directed, till the completion of the

organic law, by an Imperial Russian Commissioner. An Imperial Turkish Commissioner, as well as consuls delegated *ad hoc* by the signatory Powers of the present treaty, shall be appointed to assist him, in order to control the action of this provisional administration. In the event of difference among the consuls appointed the majority shall decide, and in the event of difference between that majority and the Imperial Russian Commissioner or the Imperial Turkish Commissioner, the representatives of the signatory Powers at Constantinople assembled in Conference shall decide.

ART. 7.—The provisional government cannot be prolonged for more than nine months from the date of signature of the present treaty. When the organic law has been fully settled, the election of the Prince of Bulgaria will immediately follow. As soon as the prince is installed the new organisation will be put in force, and the principality will enter into full possession of its autonomy.

ART. 8.—The treaties of commerce and navigation, as well as all the conventions and agreements concluded between foreign Powers and the Porte, and which are at present in force, are maintained in the principality of Bulgaria, and no change can be made in them with any of the Powers until she has given her consent thereto. No transit duty shall be levied in Bulgaria on merchandise passing through the principality. The subjects and traders of all the Powers shall there be placed upon a footing of perfect equality. The immunities and privileges of foreign subjects, with the rights of jurisdiction and of consular protection, which have been established by the capitulations and by custom, will remain in full force, as far as not modified by the consent of the parties interested.

ART. 9.—The amount of the annual tribute to be paid by the principality of Bulgaria to the Suzerain Court, by deposit in a bank which the Sublime Porte will subsequently name, shall be settled by arrangement between the signatory Powers of the present treaty at the end of the first year's working of the new organisation.

This tribute will be based upon the average revenue from the territory of the principality. Bulgaria will have to bear a part of the public debt of the empire. When the Powers have determined the amount of tribute, they will take into consideration what part of this debt shall fall upon the principality, upon the basis of an equitable proportion.

ART. 10.—Bulgaria is substituted for the Imperial Ottoman government in its duties and obligations towards the Rustchuk-Varna Railway Company from the day of signature of the present treaty. The arrangement of the former accounts is left to an agreement between the Sublime Porte, the government of the principality, and the railway company. The principality of Bulgaria is, in the same way, substituted as party to the engagements which the Sublime Porte has contracted with Austria-Hungary, as well as with the company for the working of the railways of Turkey in Europe, with respect to the completion, union, and working of the lines placed upon her territory. The necessary conventions for the arrangement of these questions will be concluded between Austria-Hungary, the Porte, Servia, and the principality of Bulgaria, immediately upon the conclusion of peace.

ART. 11.—The Ottoman army shall no longer remain in Bulgaria. All the former fortresses will be destroyed, at the expense of the principality, within the space of one year, or sooner if it can be done. The local authorities shall take immediate steps for their destruction, and shall not erect new ones. The Sublime Porte will have the right to dispose, as it thinks fit, of the material of war and other objects belonging to the Ottoman government, which may have remained in the fortresses on the Danube already evacuated under the armistice of January 31st, as well as those which shall be found in the strongholds of Shumla and Varna.

ART. 12.—Mussulman proprietors or others, who may fix their domicile without the principality, may retain their lands in it by leasing them, or allowing them to be administered by



third parties. A Turko-Bulgarian Commission will be appointed to regulate, within two years, all matters relative to the manner of transfer, working, and use, on account of the Sublime Porte, of the state properties and the religious foundations (*Vakouf*), and the question concerning private individuals who may be interested therein. The natural subjects of the principality who are travelling or living in other parts of the Ottoman empire shall be under the authority and laws of the Turks.

ART. 13.—There is formed to the south of the Balkans a province, which will take the name of Eastern Roumelia, and which shall remain under the direct military and political authority of his Imperial Majesty the Sultan, subject to certain conditions of administrative autonomy. It shall have a Christian governor-general.

[ART. 14. defines the limits of Eastern Roumelia.]

ART. 15.—His Majesty the Sultan shall have the right to provide for the defence of the inland and maritime frontiers of the province, by raising fortifications on these frontiers, and by keeping troops there. Internal order shall be maintained in Eastern Roumelia by a native gendarmerie, assisted by a local militia. In the composition of these two corps, whose officers shall be named by the sultan, account will be taken, according to locality, of the religion of the inhabitants. His Majesty the Sultan engages not to employ irregular troops, such as Bashi-Bazouks and Circassians, in the frontier garrisons. The regular troops appointed for this service shall not in any case be quartered upon the inhabitants, and when passing through the province they shall not make any sojourn in it.

ART. 16.—The governor-general shall have the right to call in the aid of Turkish troops should the security of the province be menaced from without or within. In that event the Sublime Porte shall be bound to intimate its decision, and state the justifying necessities of the case to the representatives of the Powers at Constantinople.

ART. 17.—The governor-general of Eastern Roumelia shall be appointed by the Sublime Porte, with the assent of the Powers, for a term of five years.

ART. 18.—Immediately after the signature of the present treaty a European Commission shall be formed for the purpose of arranging with the Ottoman Porte the organisation of Eastern Roumelia. This commission shall have to determine within the space of three months the powers and functions of the governor, and also the judicial, financial, and administrative requirements of the province, taking, as a starting point, the different laws of the vilayets and the proposals made at the eighth meeting of the Conference of Constantinople. The whole of the arrangements agreed upon for Eastern Roumelia shall form the subject of an Imperial Firman, to be promulgated by the Sublime Porte, and communicated to the Powers.

ART. 19.—The European Commission shall be charged, together with the Sublime Porte, with the administration of the finances of the province till the completion of the new organisation.

ART. 20.—The treaties, conventions, and international arrangements, of whatever nature, concluded, or to be concluded between the Porte and other Powers, shall be applicable to Eastern Roumelia as to all the Ottoman empire. The immunities and privileges accorded to foreigners, whatever their condition, shall be respected in that province. The Sublime Porte engages to enforce respect there for the general laws of the empire, as to religious liberty granted to all creeds.

ART. 21.—The rights and obligations of the Sublime Porte, as regards railways in Eastern Roumelia, shall be integrally maintained.

ART. 22.—The Russian army of occupation in Bulgaria and in Eastern Roumelia shall be composed of six divisions of infantry, and two of cavalry, and shall not exceed fifty thousand men. It shall be maintained at the expense of the occupied country. The troops will retain their communications with Russia, not only

through Roumania, under arrangements to be concluded between the two states, but also through the ports of the Black Sea, Varna, and Burgas, where they may maintain, during the period of occupation, the depôts which are necessary. The duration of the occupation of Eastern Roumelia and Bulgaria, by the Imperial Russian troops, is fixed at nine months from the date of signature of the present treaty. The Russian government engages to carry out, within a further period of three months, the passage of its troops through Roumania, and the complete evacuation of that principality.

ART. 23.—The provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary. The government of Austria-Hungary, not desiring to charge itself with the administration of the sandjak of Novi-bazar, which extends, between Servia and Montenegro, in a south-easterly direction, to beyond Mitrovitz, the Turkish administration shall continue in force in that district. At the same time, in order to insure maintenance of the new political condition, as well as freedom and security of communication, Austria-Hungary reserves to herself the right to establish garrisons, and to maintain military and commercial routes over the whole extent of that portion of the ancient vilayet of Bosnia.

ART. 24.—The independence of Montenegro is recognised by the Sublime Porte, and by all the high contracting parties who had not yet admitted it.

ART. 25.—The high contracting parties agree to the following conditions:—In Montenegro distinction of religious belief or confession shall not operate against any one as a reason of exclusion or incapacity, as far as concerns the enjoyment of civil and political rights, admission to public employment, offices, or honours, or the exercise of different professions or industries, whatever the locality may be. Religious liberty, and the open profession of every creed, shall be assured to all the natural subjects of Montenegro, as well as to strangers, and no trammels shall be imposed on the hierarchical organisation of the differ-

ent religious bodies, or their relations with their spiritual chiefs.

[ART. 26 defines the limits of Montenegro.]

ART. 27.—Antivari and its sea-board are annexed to Montenegro under the following conditions:—The districts situated to the south of this territory, according to the delimitation above laid down, as far as the Boyana, Dulcigno included, shall be restored to Turkey. The commune of Spizza, as far as the northern boundary indicated in the detailed description of the frontier, shall be incorporated with Dalmatia. Montenegro will have free and entire liberty of navigation on the Boyana. No fortifications shall be constructed on the course of this river, with the exception of such as are necessary for the local defence of Scutari, and these shall not extend beyond a distance of six kilometres from the town. Montenegro shall have no flag or ship of war. The port of Antivari, and all the Montenegrin waters, shall be closed to the war-ships of all nations. The fortifications situated between the lake and the sea-shore on Montenegrin territory shall be razed, and no fresh ones can be erected within this zone. Maritime and sanitary police functions, both at Antivari and along the Montenegrin coast, shall be exercised by Austria-Hungary by means of coast-guard lighters. Montenegro shall adopt the maritime code of rules in force in Dalmatia. On her part, again, Austria-Hungary engages to extend her consular protection to the merchant flag of Montenegro. It is left to Montenegro to come to an understanding with Austria-Hungary on the right to construct and maintain a road and railway across the new Montenegrin territory. Entire liberty of communication will be assured on the public ways.

ART. 28.—Mussulmans or others possessing property in the territory annexed to Montenegro, and who would rather take up their residence beyond the principality, may retain their lands, either by letting them, or allowing them to be managed by third parties. No one shall be bereft of his landed property except for the public interest, on good and legal cause shown,



and after previous indemnification. A Turko-Montenegrin Commission shall be appointed to regulate, within three years, all matters connected with the mode of transfer, management, or use, on account of the Sublime Porte, of state property, religious foundations (*Vakouf*), as well as all questions relative to the interests of private persons thereby affected. The principality of Montenegro shall come to a direct understanding with the Ottoman Porte as to the institution of Montenegrin agents at Constantinople, and certain other places of the Turkish empire, where their presence shall be deemed necessary. Montenegrins travelling or dwelling in the Ottoman empire shall be subject to Turkish authority and rule, in conformity with the general principles of international law and established usage affecting the Montenegrins.

ART. 29.—The Montenegrin troops, within a period of twenty days, or earlier if possible, from the date of signature of the present instrument, will have to evacuate the territory now held by them beyond the new limits of the principality.

ART. 30.—Montenegro will have to bear her share of the Turkish public debt proportionate to the new territory accorded her by the treaty of peace, and the representatives of the Powers at Constantinople will determine the amount thereof, in concert with the Sublime Porte, on an equitable basis.

ART. 31.—The high contracting parties recognise the independence of the principality of Serbia, attaching to it the conditions set forth in the following article.

ART. 32.—In Serbia, distinction of religious belief and confession shall not operate against any one as a reason of exclusion or incapacity in what concerns the enjoyment of civil and political rights, admission to public employment, offices, or honours, or the exercise of different professions or industries, whatever the locality may be. Religious liberty, and the open profession of every creed, shall be assured to all the natural subjects of Serbia, as well as to strangers, and no trammels shall be imposed on the

hierarchical organisation of the various religious bodies, or their relations with their spiritual chiefs.

[ART. 33 defines the new frontiers of Serbia.]

ART. 34.—Till the conclusion of the new arrangements, nothing shall be changed in Serbia in the present state of the commercial relations of the principality with foreign countries. No transit duty shall be levied on merchandise passing through Serbia. The immunities and privileges of foreign subjects, and also the laws as to consular jurisdiction and protection as at present existing shall remain in full force till modified by common agreement between the principality and the Powers interested.

ART. 35.—The principality of Serbia is substituted as a party to the engagements which the Sublime Porte has contracted, both with Austria-Hungary and with the railway companies of European Turkey, as regards the completion, connection, and working of the railways to be constructed on the territory newly acquired by the principality. The conventions necessary for a settlement of these questions shall be concluded immediately after signature of the present treaty, between Austria-Hungary, the Porte, Serbia, and, within the limits of its competence, the principality of Bulgaria.

ART. 36.—Those Mussulmans who possess property in the territories annexed to Serbia, and who may wish to fix their residence outside the principality, shall be at liberty to retain their immovable property by leasing it, or intrusting it to the administration of third parties. A Turko-Servian Commission shall be charged with the duty of settling, within the space of three years, all matters relative to the mode of transfer, management, or use, on account of the Sublime Porte, of state property and religious foundations (*Vakouf*), as well as all questions relative to the interests of private persons thereby affected.

ART. 37.—Till the conclusion of a treaty between Turkey and Serbia, Servian subjects travelling or residing in the Turkish empire

shall be treated in accordance with the general principles of international law.

ART. 38.—The Servian troops shall be allowed fifteen days from the signature of the present treaty to evacuate the territory not comprised in the new limits of the principality.

ART. 39.—The tribute of Servia shall be capitalised, and the representatives of the Powers at Constantinople shall fix the rate of this capitalisation by agreement with the Sublime Porte.

Servia shall pay a part of the Ottoman public debt proportionate to the new territories given her by the present treaty, the representatives of the Powers at Constantinople determining, in concert with the Sublime Porte, the exact amount of the sum on an equitable basis.

ART. 40.—The high contracting parties recognise the independence of Roumania, attaching thereto the conditions set forth in the two following articles:—

ART. 41.—In Roumania distinction of religious belief and confession, shall not serve as a reason for the unfitness or exclusion of any one from the enjoyment of civil and political rights, admission to public employment, offices, and honours, or from the various professions and industries, whatever the locality may be. Religious liberty, and the open profession of every form of worship, shall be assured to all the natural subjects of the Roumanian state, as well as to strangers, and no impediment shall be thrown in the way either of the hierarchial organisation of the various religious bodies, or of their relations to their spiritual chiefs. The subjects of all nationalities, merchants or others, shall be treated in Roumania, without any distinction of creed, upon a footing of perfect equality.

ART. 42.—The principality of Roumania gives back to his Majesty the Emperor of Russia that portion of the territory of Bessarabia detached from Russia by the treaty of Paris of 1856, bounded on the west by the Thalweg of the Pruth, and on the south by the Thalweg of the Kilia branch and the Stary Stamboul outlet.

ART. 43.—The islands forming the Delta of the Danube, as well as the island of Serpents,

the Sandjak of Tultcha, comprising the districts (*Cazas*) of Kilia, Sulina, Mahmoudie, Isaktcha, Tultcha, Matchin, Babadagh, Hirsovo, Kustendje, Medjidie, are united with Roumania. The principality receives, in addition, the territory situated to the south of the Dobrudscha, as far as a line starting from a point to the east of Silistria, and joining the Black Sea to the south of Mangalia. The line of frontier will be arranged on the spot by the European Commission instituted for the delimitation of Bulgaria.

ART. 44.—The question of the division of the waters and fisheries shall be submitted to the arbitration of the European Commission of the Danube.

ART. 45.—No transit duty shall be levied in Roumania on goods passing through the principality,

ART. 46.—Conventions may be made by Roumania for the regulation of the privileges and powers of consuls in matters of protection in the principality. Acquired rights, however, shall remain in force so near as not modified by common agreement between the principality and the parties interested.

ART. 47.—Until the conclusion of a treaty regulating the privileges and powers of consuls as between Turkey and Roumania, Roumanian subjects travelling or residing in the Ottoman empire, and Ottoman subjects travelling or residing in Roumania, shall enjoy the rights guaranteed the subjects of other European Powers.

ART. 48.—The tribute of the principality of Roumania shall be capitalised, and the rate of this capitalisation shall be fixed by the representatives of the Powers at Constantinople by arrangement with the Sublime Porte.

ART. 49.—In all that relates to the carrying out of public works and matters of a like nature Roumania will take upon her the rights and obligations of the Sublime Porte with regard to all the ceded territory.

ART. 50.—In order to extend the guarantees insuring liberty of navigation on the Danube, which is recognised to be of European interest, the high contracting parties decide that all the



fortresses and fortifications existing on the course of the river from the Iron Gates to its mouth shall be razed and no others constructed. No ship of war shall be permitted to navigate the Danube below the Iron Gates, except light vessels in the service of the river police and of the Custom-house officers. The guard-ships of the Powers, however, at the mouth of the Danube shall be permitted to ascend the river as far as Galatz.

ART. 51.—The European Commission of the Danube, at the table of which Roumania shall be represented, is maintained in its functions, and will exercise them henceforth as far as Galatz, in complete independence of territorial authority. All treaties, agreements, deeds, and decisions, relative to its rights, privileges, prerogatives, and obligations, are confirmed.

ART. 52.—One year before the expiration of the term assigned for the duration of the European Commission, the Powers shall come to some agreement on the prolongation of its authority, or as to modifications they may deem necessary to be introduced.

ART. 53.—The rules of navigation, of river police, and of supervision, between the Iron Gates and Galatz, shall be framed by the European Commission, assisted by delegates from the riparian states, and brought into harmony with those which have been, or may be decreed for the course of the river below Galatz.

ART. 54.—The execution of the works for the removal of the obstructions caused by the Iron Gates and the Cataracts to navigation is intrusted to Austria-Hungary. The riparian states on this part of the river shall afford every facility necessary in the interest of these operations. The directions contained in Article 6 of the treaty of London, of the 13th of March, 1871, relating to the right to collect a temporary tax to cover the expenses of these works, are maintained in favour of Austria-Hungary.

ART. 55.—The Sublime Porte engages to scrupulously apply in the island of Crete the organic law of 1868, with such modifications as shall be judged equitable. Analogous regulations, adapt-

ed to the local requirements, shall be fairly introduced into other parts of Turkey in Europe, for which a special organisation has not been provided by the present treaty. The Sublime Porte shall engage special commissioners, in which the native element shall be largely represented, to elaborate the details of these new plans in each province. The plans of government resulting from their labours shall be submitted to the examination of the Sublime Porte, who, before promulgating the acts destined to be put in force, shall take the advice of the European Commission appointed for Eastern Roumelia.

ART. 56.—In case the agreement relative to a rectification of frontier provided by Protocol 13, between the Sublime Porte and the kingdom of Greece, should not be realised, the Powers declare themselves ready to offer their good services to the two Powers, Ottoman and Greek.

ART. 57.—The Sublime Porte having expressed its willingness to maintain the principle of religious liberty, and to give it the widest sphere, the contracting parties take cognisance of this spontaneous declaration. In every part of the Ottoman empire difference of religion shall not be held as a reason of exclusion or unfitness in anything that relates to the use of civil and political rights, admission to public employment, offices, and honours, and the exercise of all professions and industries, whatever the locality may be. Every one shall be admitted, without distinction of creed, to give evidence before the tribunals. The exercise and open profession of all religions shall be entirely free, and no impediment shall be offered either to the hierarchical organisation of the various religious bodies, or to their relations with their spiritual chiefs; ecclesiastics, pilgrims, and monks of all nationalities, travelling in European and Asiatic Turkey, shall enjoy the same rights, advantages, and privileges. The right of official protection is accorded to the diplomatic and consular agents of the Powers in Turkey, both with regard to the persons above-mentioned, with their religious and charitable establishments, and to

others in the holy places and elsewhere. The rights conceded to France are expressly reserved, it being well understood that the *status quo* with respect to the holy places shall not be seriously affected in any way. The monks of Mount Athos, whatever their nationality, shall be maintained in possession of their possessions and previous advantages, and shall enjoy, without exception, full equality of rights and prerogatives.

Such was the definite result of the Congress of Berlin, so far as its formal conclusions were incorporated in the treaty. That it was an entirely satisfactory conference of the great Powers, or that the instrument which contains its decisions was a thoroughly admirable piece of work, perhaps there are few, even amongst the supporters of the respective governments which are responsible for it, who will maintain. The most that can be said for it is that it was the best Congress, and that the treaty of Berlin was the best treaty, possible under the circumstances. It will hardly rank with the Conference and treaty of Paris, as regards the conclusiveness of the new settlement which it brought about. In 1856, the Power which had been worsted in the preceding conflict was still sufficiently strong to ensure that a certain amount of deference should be paid to its views. In 1878, the worsted Power was unable to insist upon any important point whatever; whilst its friends in the council were not in a position to save it from the heavy consequences of its failure.

In plain terms, Turkey was partitioned at Berlin; whereas at Paris it had been preserved and restored. The work of the Berlin Congress to some extent undid and superseded the work of the Congress of Paris; and there would not have been so much to regret in the fact if this reversal of the decisions of Europe had not been attended by the success of certain unquestionably selfish ambitions and demands. A bad example had been set by Russia in laying claim to territory on her own account, both in Europe and in Asia. No one, indeed, affected to be surprised at this claim, in spite of the fact that the czar personally, and his government after him,

had repudiated all desire to profit by the war. An entirely unselfish attitude had never been confidently expected from Russia; and it may be that there is no government in the world which could have abstained scrupulously from any kind of self-aggrandisement, after such a costly and triumphant invasion of a tottering empire.

Russia's example was followed by Austria, who, with her wonted *finesse*, had secured a good price for her assistance, and had played off her two friends against each other. Nor can England herself be considered as wholly disinterested in the matter; although it may be claimed on her behalf that the footing which she obtained in Turkey was ostensibly in the interest of the Porte, that it cost her more than it was worth from a selfish point of view, and that it was secured with the consent of the Porte itself.

When Lord Beaconsfield and Salisbury returned from Berlin they were welcomed in England with no little enthusiasm on the part of their friends and supporters, who boasted that at least a diplomatic victory had been gained by England over Russia. Lord Beaconsfield, in a memorable speech delivered a few days after his return, claimed, on behalf of himself and his colleague, that they had brought back "peace with honour." The claim was allowed by a majority of the country; whilst the queen testified her approbation of the conduct of her two ministers by conferring upon them the riband of the Garter. Those, on the other hand, who believed that the government had not pursued a worthy policy in assenting to the partition of Turkey after stoutly declaring that it would never do so, protested against the applause which was so freely bestowed upon the plenipotentiaries.<sup>1</sup>

On the very day on which the treaty of Berlin was signed, Lord Salisbury addressed a despatch to his colleagues at home, in which he answered his critics beforehand, and stated the grounds on which he and the premier were prepared to rest the justification of their conduct. He wrote from Berlin as follows:—



"I have the honour to enclose a copy of the treaty which was signed to-day at Berlin by the seven signatory Powers of the treaty of Paris. The treaty is one of unusual length, and enters fully into the various questions raised by the treaty of San Stefano, so far as they affect the dispositions of the treaty of Paris. The alterations which are made in the preliminary treaty are very large, and extend to nearly all the articles of that instrument. Their general effect has been to restore, with due security for good government, a very large territory to the government of the sultan; and they tend powerfully to secure from external assault the stability and independence of his empire. Provisions, having for their object to ensure entire equality of all religions before the law, have been applied to all the territories affected by the treaty."

After referring to this circular, which he had addressed to the various governments before the convocation of the Congress, the Foreign Secretary continued:—"A statement has been made, and constantly repeated, especially upon the Continent, that the views set forth in that despatch have been abandoned in the subsequent action of her Majesty's government. To obviate the continuance of such a misconception, it may be well to point out in detail how far the decisions to which her Majesty's government have assented in the Congress of Berlin correspond with the language of the circular. The essential contention of the circular, that the articles of the preliminary treaty, as being a departure from the treaty of Paris, must be discussed by Congress as a whole, has, it is hardly necessary to say, both in theory and practice, been admitted to the largest possible extent. Of the detailed objections made in the circular to the treaty of San Stefano, the first and the most important is couched in the following terms:— 'The most important consequences to which the treaty practically leads are those which result from its action as a whole upon the nations of South-Eastern Europe. By the articles creating the new Bulgaria, a strong Slav state will be created under the auspices and control of Rus-

sia, possessing important harbours upon the shores of the Black Sea and the Archipelago, and conferring upon that Power a preponderating influence over both the political and commercial relations in those seas. It will be so constituted as to merge in the dominant Slav majority a considerable mass of population which is Greek in race and sympathy, and which views with alarm the prospect of absorption into a community alien to it, not only in nationality, but in political tendency and religious allegiance. The provision by which this new state is to be subjected to a ruler whom Russia will practically choose, its administration framed by a Russian commissary, and the first working of its institutions commenced under the control of a Russian army, sufficiently indicates the political system of which in future it is to form a part.' It will be seen that all these objections have been removed by the treaty of Berlin. . . . On the Euxine, the important port of Bourgas has been restored to the government of Turkey; and Bulgaria retains less than half the sea-board originally assigned to it, and possesses no other port except the roadstead of Varna, which can hardly be used for any but commercial purposes. The new Slav state, therefore, is no longer strong—no longer merges in a Slav majority any considerable mass of Greek population, and will certainly not confer upon Russia any preponderating influence over either the political or commercial relations of those seas. The events of the late war must for many years secure to Russia a great authority in this state, which will be assisted by affinity of language and similarity of religion. But the influences under which its institutions were to have been formed, and to have commenced their working, will no longer be specially Russian. The Russian and Ottoman commissaries, who will supervise the election of the prince and the selection of a constitution by the 'notables,' will be placed under the authority of the Conference of Ambassadors at Constantinople, acting through a consular commission upon the spot; and the retirement of the Russian army from the pro-

vince must take place before the period at which the working of the new institutions is to begin. Its administration, therefore, will be framed by others besides a Russian commissary, and the first working of its institutions will not be commenced under the control of a Russian army. The territorial severance from Constantinople of the provinces left under the government of the Porte, by the extension of Bulgaria to the *Ægean*, was another of the results which was indicated by the circular of the 1st April, as tending to weaken the political strength of the government of Turkey. The restriction of Bulgaria to the valley of the Danube has necessarily restored the continuity of the dominions remaining to the Porte. The special protection which is so particularly stipulated for ecclesiastics of the Russian religion, and for Russian monasteries on Mount Athos, and the power which is reserved to the Russian government of shaping the institutions to be given to the rest of European Turkey, were objected to by her Majesty's government as tending to increase the power of the Russian empire in the countries and on the shores where a Greek population predominates. These exclusive stipulations have been entirely abandoned. The treaty contains large provisions for securing religious liberty to all persons, natives or foreigners, living within the Ottoman dominions, but no special privileges are created for the members of any single nation. Improved institutions will be given to Thessaly and Epirus, but their form will be determined in the last resort, not by the government of Russia, but by a European Commission. The pecuniary indemnity, to which many objections were taken by her Majesty's government, has been excluded altogether from the treaty at Berlin. The Congress declined to revise a contract which was no infraction of the treaty of Paris, and which it was therefore within the competence of two independent Powers to conclude. But declarations were made in Congress, and are recorded upon the Protocol, which profoundly modify its practical effect. The Russian plenipotentiaries declared that Russia would not seek to annex

territory in satisfaction of the indemnity, and that they would not contend that it should be preferred either to debts guaranteed by other governments, or to debts in respect to which Turkish revenues had been hypothecated. The English plenipotentiaries declared that they could not recognise in the indemnity any claim of priority over the debts of any kind which were anterior to it in date. It results from these declarations that Turkey is not internationally bound, and cannot be compelled to pay any portion of the indemnity until the claims of all the creditors of loans anterior to the war have been paid in full. If the prosperity of Turkey should ever increase to such a height as to satisfy this condition, then the indemnity may be undoubtedly demanded. But in such a contingency it will no longer be a disproportional, or even a heavy burden upon the finances of Turkey. The stipulation must be regarded as one which in its actual form is not contrary to international law, but of which the performance must, in the nature of things, be postponed to a period infinitely remote. The replacement under Turkish rule of Bourgas and the southern half of the sea-board of Bulgaria on the Euxine, and the strictly commercial character assigned by the treaty of Batoum, have largely obviated the menace to the liberty of the Black Sea which was contained in the original proposals. The retrocession of the district of Bayazid necessarily removes all apprehensions of any obstacle being interposed to arrest the European trade from Trebizond of Persia. So far, the Congress has applied an adequate remedy to all the dangers which, in the judgment of her Majesty's government, were threatened by the treaty of San Stefano. On the other hand, the provisions of the treaty of Berlin have not withdrawn from Russia any of the Armenian strongholds which had been acquired in the late war, though a portion of the annexed district has been surrendered. Her Majesty's government have already provided, by arrangements external to the action of the Congress, suitable precautions against the dangers threatened by those annexations. This completes the list of the detailed



objections advanced against the treaty of San Stefano in the circular of April. With the exception of those last named, which are dealt with by the recent convention with Turkey, these objections have all been met by the treaty of Berlin. But in that circular it was emphatically declared that it is not to any of those details, taken separately, that the opposition of England was chiefly directed:—‘Their separate and individual operations, whether defensible or not, is not that which should engage the most earnest attention of the signatory Powers. Their combined effect, in addition to the results upon the Greek populations and upon the balance of maritime power, which have been already pointed out, is to depress, almost to the point of entire subjection, the political independence of the government of Constantinople. It cannot be otherwise than a matter of great solicitude that the government should be so pressed by the political outposts of a greatly superior Power, that its independent action, or even existence, is almost impossible.’ To these three important objections the Congress of Berlin has supplied an entire remedy. The Greek populations no longer fall within the boundaries of the autonomous Slav principality; and all Russian influence has been removed to a distance from the shores of the *Ægean* Sea. The same territorial arrangements have the effect of attaining the essential aim which, in their recent negotiations, her Majesty’s government have had in view—the independent existence and action of the government of Constantinople. The political outposts of Russian power have been pushed back to the region beyond the Balkans; and its opportunities for establishing influence in the reduced Bulgaria have been materially diminished. The sultan’s dominions have been provided with a defensible frontier, far removed from his capital. The interposition of the Austrian Power between the two independent Slav states, while it withdraws from him no territory of strategical or financial value, offers him a security against renewed aggression on their part which no other possible arrangement could have furnished. Rich and extensive

provinces have been restored to his rule, at the same time that careful provision against future misgovernment has been made, which will, it may be hoped, assure their loyalty and prevent a recurrence of the calamities which have brought the Ottoman power to the verge of ruin. Arrangements of a different kind, but having the same end in view, have provided for the Asiatic dominions of the sultan security for the present, and the hope of prosperity and stability in the future. Whether use will be made of this—probably the last—opportunity which has been thus obtained for Turkey by the interposition of the Powers of Europe, and of England in particular, or whether it is to be thrown away, will depend upon the sincerity with which Turkish statesmen now address themselves to the duties of good government and the task of reform.”

The following complimentary letters were written from the Foreign Office at the conclusion of the Congress. It contains the names of English officials who took a very important, though inconspicuous part, in the framing of the treaty.

The Marquis of Salisbury wrote to Lord Odo Russell:—My Lord, I have had the honour of representing to the queen, and to her Majesty’s government, the very valuable assistance which your excellency rendered to the Earl of Beaconsfield and myself in your capacity of third plenipotentiary on behalf of Great Britain at the Congress of Berlin. Your excellency’s assiduity in the onerous and responsible labours which devolved upon you, and the tact and judgment with which your diplomatic duties were discharged, have earned for your excellency the high appreciation of all those who had the honour of being associated with you on this occasion; and it is with the greatest satisfaction that I have received the queen’s commands to convey to you her Majesty’s entire approval of your conduct as her Majesty’s plenipotentiary, and the thanks of her Majesty’s ministers for the efficient manner in which you represented the government of Great Britain throughout the Congress.”

The Marquis of Salisbury wrote to the Home Secretary:—"Sir, I have much satisfaction in placing on record the very valuable and important services rendered to the Earl of Beaconsfield and myself by Mr. Montagu Corry and Mr. Philip Currie, as the secretaries of her Majesty's special embassy, and also the able assistance which we received from Mr. Hertslet, the secretary of the embassy specially attached, as keeper of the papers and librarian of the Foreign Office. I have also much pleasure in expressing my appreciation of the zeal and assiduity displayed throughout the proceedings by the Honourable F. Bertie, the Honourable E. Barrington, Mr. Algernon Turner, Mr. Le Marchant Gosse-*lin*, Mr. H. Austin Lee, and Mr. Hopwood."

Lord Tenterden wrote to the Under-Secretary of State for War:—"Sir, I am directed by the Marquis of Salisbury to request that you will convey to the Secretary of State for War his lordship's thanks for having permitted Major-General Sir L. Simmons and Captain Ardagh, R.E., to be attached to the special embassy to Berlin. Those officers were in the greatest service to her Majesty's plenipotentiaries, more especially in regard to questions of military topography and the delimitation of boundaries, and the Marquis of Salisbury will be glad if the approval of her Majesty's government may be placed on official record with his grace the Commander-in-chief. I am to take this opportunity of at the same time expressing Lord Salisbury's thanks for the assistance which has been so frequently and so ably rendered to this department on many occasions during the recent Congress, and the preceding diplomatic negotiations, by the Intelligence department of the War Office."

## CHAPTER XXI.

### THE RE-SETTLEMENT.

SOME time naturally elapsed before the results of the Berlin Treaty became conspicuous, and before the several clauses were practically carried

out. This was especially so in the cases where the Porte had undertaken to cede territory to its late enemy, or to the allies of Russia. There was considerable delay in the evacuation of Batoum, of Shumla and Varna; and a still more protracted delay occurred in the transference of territory to the principalities. Servia and Montenegro at once entered into the enjoyment of the districts which they had seized; but the latter was long disappointed of Spuz and Podgoritzza, whilst, in the middle of the Greek rectification, the Porte showed itself more dilatory still.

As for the Russians, they lost no time in setting about the re-organisation of the provinces which had been temporarily placed under their charge. There were, indeed, some parts of Bulgaria which had lost and forgotten all traces of Ottoman rule from the moment when the invader had set foot in them, during the summer of 1877. They had been brought under Russian authority and influence, and had already adopted the system imposed upon them by their liberators. Good and evil were mixed in this tutelage of a simple and impressible race by men who, whilst they undoubtedly had a general desire to improve the lot of their protégés, yet at the same time confessedly aimed at "Russianising" the Bulgarians.

A certain revulsion of feeling had taken place in the minds of many lookers on in regard to the character of those Slavs of the lower Danube. Their great sufferings under Turkish rule had excited a strong sympathy in their behalf, much of which had subsequently been destroyed by the mean, or cruel, or rapacious conduct of many Bulgarians during the war. They were, not, unnaturally, actuated by vengeful feelings against the Mussulmans, especially on the scenes of the outrages of 1876; but in other parts of the country, where the inhabitants had long enjoyed comparative immunity, and had fairly prospered on the soil, their greed and cruelty were displayed. Many black pictures were painted of the Bulgarian peasants. One of these not the blackest of all, may be quoted from the



letter of one of the war correspondents, written on the morrow of the battle of Gorny Bugaroff, north of the Balkans.

"The village," he remarks, "lies in a shallow valley near the edge of the level plain that stretches away uninterruptedly towards Sofia. The hills about the village are low, and the rise on all sides is gentle and unbroken by ravines or cover of any kind; the stalks of Indian corn sticking out of the snow show that the land was cultivated, but not a hedge or ditch interrupts the smooth blank surface of the plain. No, not blank, for everywhere scattered thickly over the snow, are black spots all along the hill-side, in groups near the line of shallow rifle-pits on the top of the rise west of the town, clustered by dozens in the cornfields at the foot of the first slope, and straggling away down to the road nearly a mile away. It is early morning, and coming towards the battle-field like a flock of vultures, impelled by similar instincts, no more worthy the respect and consideration of civilised men than these foul birds, are crowds of Bulgarians, every man with a stick and a bag. Two or three of them assemble around a corpse; they poke it with their sticks; they pry over the rigid thing, half afraid to touch it; but a red sash is too much for one of them, and he seizes it and drags it from the dead man's waist. Another grabs the uniform jacket, and snatches the sleeves from the stiff arms as if he were afraid the dead man would harm him. Now they grow bolder and actually wrangle and shove each other about, for one of them wants the trousers, and a second ruffian disputes the prize with him.

"While I am looking at this scene, half making up my mind to leave fresh subjects for spoliation on the battle field alongside the dead of two days before, a soldier comes along and spits on the group in disgust. I feel that this is an insult that they can understand, and leave them to continue their robbery in another part of the field, for they have hurried away after the soldier has passed. In a few moments the battle-field swarms with these human vultures, and I

sit hopelessly, helplessly on my horse, and watch them strip entirely naked, underclothing and all, the brave fellows who fell within two horses' lengths of those rifle-pits. Now I understand why those corpses in the snow on Shandarnik were naked; now for the first time I see what I have always heard of the Bulgarians, that they rob the dead after a battle, and have no scruples about it either.

"The peasants in the valley here are a pretty hard-looking set at the best. They are finely developed physically, with rather gross features, and rarely anything attractive in their type. They generally shave their heads, leaving a long scalp-lock like the Chinese or the American Indians, and dress in a short loose jacket and tight trousers, like the Japanese. They are quite a different type from the peasants about Tirnova, much more brutal in their manners, and without anything like affection for family or friends, as far as I have seen them during my short stay here, and what experience I have had with them in money matters has made me believe there is little honesty among them. In the mountains, at Etropol, at Orkanieh, I met numbers of really superior caste among the peasants. This side of the range I have yet to find one above the average, which is low enough without any question. I would not pretend to make any general statements about the race, although I have been in contact with them without intermission since the first crossing of the Danube at Matchin, for I find them quite different in many traits of character in different regions, the native of the mountains being quite another man from the peasant of the plain, and those on the Tirnova side as much superior to those about Orkanieh as human beings, as can be imagined. I only state the facts which have come under my observation without discussing the reasons for the brutality and sordidness of this people, or such of them as I have met. The argument of those very charitably inclined towards the Bulgarians is that they strip the dead, because they believe they are only taking back what has been stolen from them. A like argument would apply to the

cases where the men beat their sick mothers because they groan ; it is only paying back the cuffs they received in childhood."

As to the cruelty and revenge of the Bulgarians, or of large numbers amongst them, these vices were not thoroughly betrayed until after the cessation of the war, or during the final retreat of the Turks, when there was less force in the excuse which can always be made for an oppressed and just emancipated race. The stories of revenge amongst the Southern Bulgarians were not eagerly accepted by the English public, and indeed it has been proved that they were frequently exaggerated. But in some cases they were only too well authenticated ; and men originally as well affected towards the race as Mr. Gladstone were compelled to acknowledge that there was truth in the charges.

Thus, in the spring of 1878, an address was received by the distinguished ex-premier in England from the Bulgarian inhabitants of Bourgas, thanking him for his efforts on behalf of their country. To this address Mr. Gladstone sent the following reply :—

"*London, 11th July, 1878.*—Gentlemen—I have had the honour to receive your letter of the 25th April, which was posted in Constantinople only on June 26th, and in which you were pleased to refer to my conduct during the last two years with an approval highly gratifying to my feelings. It is alike my duty and my pleasure to contribute, in any humble measure, to the defeat of oppression and the advance of freedom. In Turkey I contended that these purposes should be promoted in a manner that would impart as little shock as possible to the territorial arrangements of the East ; other counsels prevailed, and the expulsion of the Turkish power from Bulgaria has been wrought out with accompaniments of misery and slaughter which might have been, and ought to have been, avoided. Power was in the hands of those professing friendship to the Ottoman government ; and they have continued to use it in such a way as to leave to the Porte but a fraction of its European territory, and to ren-

der it a question whether in Asia it will or will not henceforth be a Power at all. So far as the changes decreed at Berlin, and principally due to the agency of Russia, shall put an end to deeds of shame and give to the provinces now or lately Turkish the opportunity of peaceful development, I rejoice in them from the bottom of my heart. But I earnestly hope that the new life of these provinces is not to be disgraced by a revival of the old and abominable course of crime which has led to the downfall of Ottoman government over so wide a space. To me, for one, it will be no consolation to find that any of those who once were the sufferers have now become the criminals and the tyrants. It is bad that Christians should be oppressed by Mussulmans. It is far worse that Mussulmans should be oppressed by Christians, who were born under the law of love, and whose duty it is to exhibit the efficacy of that law to the less favoured adherents of other religions. Accounts are now going forth to the world which, until they are confuted, place some portions of the Bulgarian and Roumelian country under grave, and even foul imputations. If I have any, the slightest title to your acknowledgments, let me employ it to conjure you to use all your influence to denounce and put down every tendency to use the recovered liberties in the exercise of outrage and oppression. Let me remind you that, in the catechism of instructions prepared by the Bulgarian insurgents of 1876, it was set down that every unoffending Mussulman was to be spared, and that the honour and safety of the young, the aged, and the women, were to be not only safe, but sacred as those of your own people. Be assured that those who either commit or countenance any act in derogation of such principles are a disgrace to the Christian name, and are likewise the deadliest enemies of Bulgarian and Roumelian freedom. I have the honour to be, gentlemen, your most faithful servant,

"W. E. GLADSTONE.

"M. Dobri P. Minkoff and others."

The reproof and the warning were not un-



needed, as has been admitted by the best friends of the Bulgarian race.

But the benefits of the more settled form of government, and of the exercise of comparative freedom, are already manifest in the behaviour of the liberated nation; and Russia may fairly claim her share of credit for the fact.

The first Russian administrator of Bulgaria was Prince Tcherkassky, a man of somewhat liberal views, who had earned notoriety by his effectual, though severe measures for the pacification and organisation of Poland after the last insurrections. He was selected for the position mainly in deference to the Moscow Panslavist party; and it is impossible to say how his work might have prospered if he had lived to carry it on. It was criticised in no friendly spirit by a Russian writer, M. Outine, who contributed an article on the subject to a French paper. The first measure ordered by Prince Tcherkassky," says M. Outine, "was the formation of a committee charged to collect the materials necessary to arrive at an intimate knowledge of Bulgaria and its interior condition. The committee was appointed in a small town of Roumania. It began to sit on the 3rd of May, and on the 21st of the same month it published the first result of its labours, which consisted of a small pamphlet of nine pages. Taking into account the time it took to print the pamphlet, in a town where printing is almost unknown, we find that the committee must have got through the first part of its work in the short space of three days. This, however, is not surprising. On opening the book, it is found to consist of a translation of a few extracts from German and French works on Bulgaria, which had fallen by chance into the hands of the committee! The new administration was, of course, to be supported by the resources of Bulgaria. The Russians, it is well known, proposed to themselves to deliver the Bulgarians from the yoke of the Turk. However, when we see the salaries of the governors, the sub-governors, &c., we are led to ask who dipped the deeper into the pockets of the Bulgarians, the

Turk or Russian? For example, every governor—and there were fifteen of them—received seven thousand roubles a year as salary, and ten thousand roubles for expenses, of which he was not called on to give an account. Each sub-governor got four thousand five hundred roubles for salary, and six thousand roubles for expenses. The payment of all the officials of the administration was in the same proportion." The Bulgarians were not particularly satisfied with this *régime*. "Why are you displeased with the administration of Prince Tcherkassky?" was the question I one day put to an important member of the *soi-disant* young Bulgaria party. 'We were made to feel, from the first day,' he replied, 'that the Russians had not come to Bulgaria to learn and to know our country, and to look after our wants and grievances, but simply to command us, and to make us serve in a work which was quite foreign to us. When the Russian army crossed the Danube, a Bulgarian deputation went to Plojesti; it was very graciously received by the czar and Prince Gortschakoff, but it met with a very different reception from the civil administration, who told it plainly that it was wrong to imagine that it represented the Bulgarian nation, and that, in short, such deputations would not be tolerated. Bulgaria, it was told them, did not possess any political representation, nor was it likely to obtain one, and should, therefore, give up indulging in political dreams. Some members of the deputation having timidly protested against this view, were silenced at once with the answer, "We don't want your opinion; all you have to do is to obey and ask no questions." Up to the present moment,' concluded my young Bulgarian, 'we imagined that such treatment was only adopted by the Turks.'

M. Outine goes on to tell us what the Russians think of the Bulgarians:—

"A Russian district chief held forth to me as follows:—'I am well aware that these "Bulgarian brothers" don't like me, but what do I care about that? The race is worth absolutely nothing, and requires to be treated with

nigcur. These Bulgarians are afraid of me, because they know I will overlook nothing. Everybody found in fault immediately receives twenty-five lashes of the *nagaika*.' I remarked that the application of the knout was not exactly the best means of arousing the sympathy of the Bulgarian people. Ah, he replied, 'if you were only here a week, you would soon see that nothing can be done without the *nagaika*. Two or three hundred lashes are distributed daily. You don't know the Bulgarians. What do we care for the sympathies of such a people?' To which I rejoined, 'but we came here to deliver the Bulgarian, and you administer the knout.' The Russian chief replied, 'I can assure you that that instrument is his best deliverance.'

It is evident that the Russian organisation aimed, as Prince Tcherkassky very candidly admitted, at "turning the Bulgarians into good Russians." The plan did not quite succeed, either under him or under his successor.

The prince died early in March, 1878. The following observations upon his work, both in Bulgaria and in Poland, taken from an unfriendly obituary written shortly after his decease, will enable the reader to form a fairly accurate view of his character and talent for organisation.

"Prince Tcherkassky, and his associates in the great work of Bulgarian re-organisation, made no secret of the fact that they intended, by what is called a 'necessary act of transpropriation,' to make over to Bulgarians a certain number of estates, or portions of estates, which until the war had belonged to Turks. This was not to be looked upon as anything resembling confiscation. It was merely an expedient for 'strengthening the Bulgarian at the expense of the Turkish element.' Not that the 'Turkish element' would be made to suffer unduly in a pecuniary point of view. Its rights would be respected not only in theory, but also, to some extent, in practice. In these cases, the dispossessed landowner receives what in organiser's jargon goes by the name of 'a partial indemnification.' The fields and meadows, for instance, which he is called upon to 'cede' are valued by

a government appraiser, who has received special instructions, and knows what he is about. Then, of such a sum as the land is estimated to be worth, one-third goes to the proprietor—not, of course, in hard cash, but in state bills; it being understood that of the other two-thirds one-third is sacrificed in the interest of the peasant who is to acquire the transferred land, while the other third goes to the government—which cannot be expected to direct operations for nothing.

"The system which Prince Tcherkassky was to have applied in Bulgaria had been previously tested in Poland, where it gave results which, by the Russian government, were considered successful. The Polish proprietors were not well satisfied with the measures devised for the benefit of their peasantry by Prince Tcherkassky, the late M. Miliutin, M. Samarin, and other 'organisers' of a destructive turn of mind, who, in Lithuania and the kingdom of Poland, were enabled at once to carry out the views of the government against Poland as a whole, and their own particular views against the Polish aristocracy, and the Roman Catholic Church. The party to which Prince Tcherkassky belonged, and of which he was a leading member, was not, until the time of the Polish insurrection of 1863, looked upon with much favour by the ruling powers in Russia. On many points it was opposed to Russian state policy, which was not sufficiently Russian, not sufficiently Slavonic to suit its aspirations and tastes. Prince Tcherkassky, and his set, were highly national, extremely liberal, and slightly mystical; and they saw in the as yet unemancipated Russian peasant the preserver of the true spirit of what may be called 'Russianism,' the guardian of the sacred idea lying at the heart of everything good and great in the present, but, above all, in the undeveloped future of Russia. The Russian peasant differed, in regard to two important and unalterable points, from the inhabitants of Western Europe. He belonged to a commune, each member of which enjoyed an equal right with the other members, to a not by any means



inalienable, but constantly renewable assignment of land; and he also belonged to the Church styled 'Orthodox.' In these ancient national peculiarities the Tcherkassys and the Miliutins—like the Aksakoffs and the Slavophiles generally—saw the salvation of Russia; which, instead of imitating other countries, ought, they declared, to seek within herself for natural, life-giving principles.

"The Slavonic preachings seemed for some time little better than spoken dreams. But when the Polish insurrection of 1863 broke out and spread from Poland to Lithuania—the Polish-speaking inhabitants joining it there as readily as in Poland itself, where it had long been prepared—then the ardour of the peasant-living, and in, a certain sense, communistic Slavophiles could be turned to account. All the west of Europe, with the exception of Prussia, had taken the part of Poland, and Poland was a thoroughly Catholic country. Poland, moreover, supported by her western friends, if not allies, was claiming the restoration of provinces which had belonged to Russia for the last ninety years; provinces which were inhabited by a peasantry, not of Polish but either of Lithuanian or of Russian origin, and which not more than four hundred years before had belonged to the Russian Orthodox Church. That 'Poland must be destroyed' was the cry of all good liberals in Russia, especially those of the Slavophil party, during the Polish insurrection; and when, at last, the insurrection had been suppressed, Prince Tcherkassky was one of the first persons selected for the duty of devising and carrying out such measures as would effectually prevent it from again raising its head. He, as well as the associates sent with him to Poland, had rendered good service in connection with serf emancipation in Russia. But in Russia it had been necessary to take into consideration the interest of the proprietors. In Poland it would be possible to do what Napoleon said could only be done in the East—*travailler dans le grand*. There it was not only permitted, it was even desired, that everything should be sacrificed to the

interest of the peasant. For in Poland—as probably in many other countries—patriotism as an active principle is confined to the educated classes; so that to ruin these, while raising up the newly-emancipated serfs, was to abase Poland and exalt Russia. To some who have not studied the mysteries of Panslavism, it will perhaps appear strange that the Slavonic enthusiasts of Russia should make it one of their chief objects to injure and humiliate the Slavonians of Poland. But this can be easily explained. The Poles, say the Russian Panslavists, have aristocratic tendencies, whereas the true, uncorrupted Slavonian is a democrat, and places his faith in such simple primitive cultivation as belongs, or does not belong, to the peasantry of his land. The Poles, too, have western tendencies. They allowed themselves to be contaminated by Latin civilisation, attached great importance to the study of the Latin language, which they used in their law courts and assemblies, and embraced the Roman Catholic instead of the Greek Orthodox religion. In all these matters they departed from 'the true spirit of Slavonianism,' which the Russian Slavophiles insist on associating with the Greek Church, and with mistrust of all that comes from the west. The two great things, then, on which the official missionaries of Slavonian Russia made war in Poland were the power of the Polish nobility, and the influence of the Roman Catholic Church; to these may be added, so far as the Lithuanian provinces were concerned, the use of the Polish language.

"In Bulgaria Prince Tcherkassky would only have had to carry out against the Turks the policy which he had pursued in Poland against the Poles. The relations of Polish proprietors towards their peasantry were certainly not those of Turks towards Bulgarians. But much of the land in Bulgaria belonged to Turks; and, to strengthen the 'Bulgarian element,' it had been decided that it would be necessary to give more land to the Bulgarian cultivators. In Bulgaria the Russians wished to favour a peasantry which considers itself to be of the same race and is of the same religion as the Russians. Thus

the problem they had undertaken to deal with in Bulgaria was almost identical with the one they had set themselves to solve fourteen years before in Lithuania; and, appropriately enough, they sent to Bulgaria some of the very men, with Prince Tcherkassky at their head, who in Lithuania and Poland had proved their remarkable aptitude for 'organising' a newly conquered land.

Prince Tcherkassky was succeeded in his office by Prince Dondoukoff Korsakoff, a man of less energy and talent for organisation, but apparently more bent, if possible, upon establishing the Russian supremacy in Bulgaria. After the Congress of Berlin it became manifest that an agitation would be set on foot against the partial retention of Turkish rule in Eastern Bulgaria, and in favour of the union of this province with the principality of Bulgaria. Prince Korsakoff openly advocated this union; and it was thought that he was aiming at the acquisition of the new throne. His general attitude caused no little uneasiness, and he was summoned to the presence of the czar, who had, as usual, spent the autumn in his palace at Livadia, in the Crimea. After his return to Turkey his conduct became less aggressive in several respects; and, especially, he ceased to throw obstacles in the way of the Commission which was deliberating at Philippopolis on the future of Eastern Roumelia. It was supposed that the czar had enjoined the prince to modify his action; and various other incidents of a like character contributed at this time to show that his Majesty was not prepared to support any attempt to evade the provisions of the Berlin treaty.

Early in November, Count Schouvaloff paid a visit to Livadia, and the rumour was revived of his approaching substitution for Prince Gortschakoff in the Russian Chancellerie. More probably, however, this journey was connected with certain representations which it had been found necessary to make to the Emperor Alexander, with regard to the conduct of the Russian officers and functionaries in Turkey. The headquarters of General Todleben had been withdrawn

from San Stefano on the 21st of September, and from Tchataldja on the 27th. On the 10th of October, however the forces returned to the latter place, on the plea that the Christian inhabitants of the neighbourhood were molested as soon as the Russians turned their backs. Other motives were imputed to the military authorities, and serious misgivings began to arise as to the good faith of the government itself. So serious did these misgivings presently become that the diplomatic situation once more grew difficult and perilous, and notes on the subject were interchanged between the various courts. It was doubtless in connection with this change in the political atmosphere that the Russian ambassador in England undertook his journey to Livadia and to Vienna.

At any rate the czar and his advisers thought well to act candidly in the matter, and to remove, as far as they could, the suspicions which had entered the minds of the diplomatists. A letter from the Pesth correspondent of the "Times," in its issue of November 9th, 1878, explains the situation at the moment of Count Schouvaloff's return. "Count Schouvaloff," says the writer, "coming from Livadia, is expected to arrive here to-day on his way to London. His arrival having been previously announced, it may be assumed that his coming hither is not merely an act of courtesy. To judge, indeed, by his former activity, his mission may be to give assurances here as elsewhere about the sincere intentions of Russia to carry out the stipulations of the Berlin treaty. This seems all the more probable, as signs are not wanting that the excitement caused by the Bulgarian insurrection, by the attitude of Russia in Constantinople, and the East Roumelian Commission, has produced some effect in Vienna, and that it is thought advisable to allay the alarm.

"*November 8th.*—Count Schouvaloff has not yet arrived, as was expected. The delay may be connected with the accident the other day to the Russian yacht Livadia, having the Grand Duke Sergius, and likewise Count Schouvaloff,



on board, which went ashore in a fog near Odessa, all hands, however, being saved.

"There are now better accounts of the Eastern Roumelian Commission than hitherto; so that, at least as regards the powers of the European Commission over the finances, the threatened conflict may be prevented by a compromise, the Russian authorities retaining the management, and the Commission controlling it by its agents. Except in principle, however, not much will be gained just now, as all taxes have been received to the end of the year and taken to Sofia.

"The distrust and suspicion which existed between England and Russia last spring contributed not a little to embroil things. It is, therefore, with some anxiety that men watch the symptoms of a similar feeling which has been growing more and more of late. In cases where feelings come into play it would be idle to seek for where the fault lies. The Russians attribute the resistance to their demands on the part of the Turks to English influence; while, on the part of England, it may be at least with as much, if not more, reason be pointed out that the Bulgarian insurrection, the return southwards of the Russians, or, at any rate, the stopping of their retreat, their declaration not to withdraw their troops until the definitive treaty with Turkey was signed, and the difficulties raised in connection with the Eastern Roumelian Commission, are not calculated to inspire confidence. It can only be a revival of this general feeling of distrust of Russia which can have hitherto stood in the way of the British government's acquiescing, like the others, in the initiative taken by France to bring about collective action on the Greco-Turkish difference. The weakest part of the Berlin treaty, as was repeatedly pointed out, lies precisely in the want of any provision to enforce, on the different parties to the instrument, the execution of the task assigned them. An effort in this respect was made by the Berlin Cabinet some time ago, when Turkey, by delaying to give up Podgoritzza and the other districts ceded to Montenegro, to appoint commissioners

for rectifying the frontier, and to arrange with Greece, laid herself open to the serious charge of throwing obstacles in the way of the execution of the treaty. It was chiefly owing to the objections raised by England to such common diplomatic action that the Cabinet of Berlin gave up its design. This initiative, however, if acquiesced in then, would have furnished a precedent of some value now when, by the military movements in Roumelia, by the Bulgarian commotion, and by the direct and indirect opposition to the activity of the Eastern Roumelian Commission, Russia seems to have laid herself open to the same charge as Turkey. Still the initiative now taken by France seems to offer another opportunity for inaugurating a sort of European control and collective action. Such action, it is true, is not likely to go to the *ultima ratio*, and can, of course, be no panacea for all the troubles which may come from one or the other side, but still it might have some effect in restraining those who might be inclined to make light of treaty obligations by showing Europe in the distance. This Europe has, indeed, become rather shadowy for some time past, but might it not happen that such an effort to keep Europe together, at least nominally, might convert a shadow into a reality.

"Besides the official denial in the 'Journal de St. Petersburg' of the charge that Bulgarian bands had passed into Macedonia, Prince Labanoff has assured the Porte that none of the Russian military commanders have allowed, or would allow the passage of such bodies into that country. On the contrary, other reports from the scene of the insurrection state positively that the last band which moved thither proceeded from Philippopolis, having left that place just before the arrival of the European Commission.

"In the work of the Russo-Turkish Commission for the repatriation of the Mahomedan refugees, a dead-lock seems to have set in. The Turkish Commissioners will not admit the right claimed by the Russians to make exceptions and limit the permission to return to certain classes—to those, in particular, who can prove

that they have landed property, or that they are engaged in trade or commerce. This has only confirmed the previously existing impression, that the aim of the Russians is to prevent, as much as possible, the return of the Mahomedan refugees, and to supply their place by a Bulgarian emigration from the districts remaining in the hands of the Turks."

The 9th of November was Lord Mayor's day, and, as usual, the ministers were entertained at the Guildhall by the incoming chief magistrate of London. Two years before, as our readers will remember, Lord Beaconsfield had made a somewhat heated speech in reference to the supposed intention of Russia to go to war, and, almost simultaneously, the czar had given assurances that he had no idea of national aggrandisement in the attitude assumed by the empire against Turkey. A very similar coincidence occurred on the present occasion.

The premier made an important and significant speech, in the course of which he reviewed the position of affairs in the following terms:—"The Eastern question, which is in everybody's mouth, has a double aspect. It is not merely the safety of our Indian empire which we should consider—not that this is a selfish consideration, because the world is equally with England interested in the prosperity and good government of India; but there is another aspect of the Eastern question, and that involves the independence of Europe, and especially of the Mediterranean Powers. I will say of all Powers, because the policy which we would pursue would prevent the fatal supremacy of any individual state. How that great end was to be secured, so far as the opinion of England was concerned, was by establishing the sultan as a truly independent prince. When we repaired to the Congress of Berlin, that object was equally professed by all the future signatory Powers of that treaty. It has been said that the sultan, by the regulations of the treaty of Berlin, has been deprived of provinces and many millions of subjects. Now, the policy that was pursued at the Congress of Berlin was this. It was to extricate the sultan

from those ruinous relations with pseudo-feudatories or small tribes differing in race and religion, but who were the constant and ready instruments of hostile external influences against the Porte, and who carried on affairs in such a manner that really the greater part of the European territories of the sultan was the scene of chronic conspiracy, varied only by occasional insurrection—it was to extricate the sultan from this source of constant exhaustion that the provisions were agreed to at the Congress at Berlin which now regulate the position of the sultan in Europe. Following this policy, the Congress of Berlin secured for the sultan an impregnable capital, the custody, guardianship, and possession of the Straits, rich provinces in European Turkey, the most valuable harbour in the Black Sea, and, generally speaking, an intelligible frontier. A prince so circumstanced, if at the same time he could rest upon the basis of twenty millions of Asian subjects, constantly improving by their administration in their wealth, in their resources and power—a prince so circumstanced would have no inconsiderable influence, and could exercise that influence in the maintenance of the political balance.

"I know it is said that these views, however plausible, have not been carried into effect, and that the treaty of Berlin already has proved to be inadequate to carry the results which it aimed at into operation. My Lord Mayor, if the grave matters which were settled at Berlin could have been settled in twenty-four hours a Congress was unnecessary. They might have been settled by post, or by the queen's messengers. Whenever a treaty has emanated from a great Congress, it has always provided that a certain time should be allowed to carry the regulations into effect. The treaty of Berlin is not different from other treaties in this respect. A certain period is provided for and prescribed, during which interval the agreements and regulations of the treaty were to be carried into execution. Of that period not half—not much more than one-third—has already elapsed. Has nothing been done during that time under the treaty of



Berlin? Under the provisions of the treaty of Berlin, Russia has retired from Constantinople, which was within her grasp. Under the provisions of the treaty of Berlin, Russia has retired from the Straits of Gallipoli, second only in importance to Constantinople, and by some deemed equivalent to it. Under the provisions of the treaty of Berlin, Russia has restored to the Porte the city of Erzeroum, which soon will, in all probability, be the scene of the strongest fortifications in Asia Minor. Under the provisions of the treaty of Berlin, the sultan has surrendered his fortresses on the Danube. Under the provisions of the treaty of Berlin, the Bay of Batoum, which it was said could never be obtained except by a sanguinary civil war, has been given up without shedding a single drop of blood. Under the provisions of the treaty of Berlin, there are at this moment committees, formed of the most able subjects of the states of Europe, arranging the lines of demarcation for the different states and provinces created by the treaty of Berlin. Why, these are the most considerable points of the treaty. Little more than three months have elapsed—hardly a third, or not much more than one-third of the time provided by the treaty, has elapsed—yet these great results have been obtained; and why are we to believe that all the others—not so important, generally speaking—which remain unconcluded will not be consummated in the time provided for by the treaty? This I can say for her Majesty's government, that we have never received any intimation whatever from any of the signatories of that treaty that it is their desire or their intention to evade the complete fulfilment of its conditions.

“Unquestionably, in settling the affairs of Europe at Berlin, the claims of one of the belligerents who, at the immense sacrifice of men and treasure, had conducted the war to a triumphant end, were considered, and it was necessary that those claims should be recognised and considered. In the first place, if the Powers were not prepared to recognise and consider these claims, the Congress could never have

been held, the war might have gone on, and probably a general war would have resulted; but, subject to these considerations, which were the necessary consequence of having conducted a successful war as Russia had done, the principal object of the Congress at Berlin was to establish the sultan as a truly independent prince, with an adequate territory, both in Europe and in Asia, to allow him to become a member who would contribute to the maintenance of the political equilibrium. That was the policy acknowledged, and that was the policy which, I believe, will be pursued. I must, therefore, disclaim and repudiate those notions, which I am greatly surprised have been circulated, that the signatories, or any signatory of the treaty, contemplates the possibility of evading or avoiding his engagements.

“They say, my lord, that in politics you ought to contemplate the impossible. I think it at this moment quite impossible that any of the signatories of the treaty of Berlin would attempt in any way to withdraw from their engagements; but this I can say, on the part of her Majesty's government, that they will not be the signatory to retire. I can say this on the part of her Majesty's government, that it is their policy and their determination that the treaty of Berlin shall be carried out in spirit and to the letter; and believing that the settlement of Berlin expressed in the treaty is one that will advance the progress and civilisation of the world, and that it includes provisions admirably adapted to secure peace, and the maintenance of peace, her Majesty's government would, if necessary, appeal with confidence to the people of this country to support them in maintaining to the letter and the complete spirit the treaty of Berlin, with all their energy and all their resources. But I will not believe that we can under any circumstances be driven to a course which otherwise we shall be determined to pursue, because I will give credit to the signatories of the treaty for an honourable fulfilment of their engagements. I admit that there are paragraphs in newspapers of a different import; I admit that there is gos-

sip, which may not even be authentic, reported by the subalterns of different states, who may have expressed a different opinion. But the government of the world is carried on by sovereigns and statesmen, and not by anonymous paragraph writers, or by the harebrained chatter of irresponsible frivolity; and therefore, my lord, I look with confidence to the treaty of Berlin being carried out completely within the period provided for the completion of its arrangements; and I believe that, by carrying that treaty into effect, we shall secure and maintain an enduring peace in Europe."

The reference to Russia's attitude in regard to the treaty of Berlin attracted special attention; but it was not known for some time afterwards that positive assurances had already been received from the government of the czar to the effect that it was resolved to carry out its engagements without reserve. The note containing these assurances was sent by telegraph, on the 4th of November, to London, Berlin, Paris, Vienna, and Rome. This document, which marked the turn that had occurred in Russian politics, ran as follows:—

"The emperor has received the French note with regard to the rectification of the Hellenic frontier. The emperor authorises Count Orloff to declare that, as a strict observance of the treaty of Berlin forms the basis of the present policy of Russia, the French government may reckon on the co-operation of Russia in the steps contemplated by France in favour of Greece. The Russian ambassador in Constantinople has already received corresponding instructions.—  
GIERS."

This despatch from Livadia was sent off at the same time with another note, announcing that the czar had enjoined the prompt execution of the treaty of Berlin on all his functionaries. Simultaneously with the publication of these notes, an inspired telegram was circulated from St. Petersburg in the following terms:—"In official circles here it is considered evident that, whatever events may arise in Turkey, Russia has to adhere solely to the principles established by

the treaty of Berlin, all assertions to the contrary being contradicted. The attitude of Prince Lobanoff corresponds, in every way, with this view. If, on the one hand, he demands from Turkey the punctual fulfilment of the engagements undertaken by the Porte at Berlin, the accomplishment of which seems at times beyond her power, he is, on the other hand, aware that he is bound to prevent as far as possible all incitement to disorder in Macedonia. Neither the Porte nor any other Power can contest that the attitude assumed by Prince Lobanoff is the correct one. It is, moreover, certain that Russia earnestly desires an understanding with England both in Europe and in Asia. Such an understanding in Europe is rendered necessary for many reasons, and especially on account of the failure of the Turkish government to establish its authority in its own country. The object of such an agreement in Asia is to maintain by this means the influence of both Russia and England in that part of the world, to fix suitable limits to that influence, and to prevent the incitement of the Asiatic tribes to insurrection."

Meanwhile the Commission for Eastern Roumelia had fairly entered upon its labours. At Constantinople, in the first place, Sir H. Drummond Wolff, Lord Donoughmore, and their colleagues, entered into the preliminary discussions, and laid the basis on which their deliberations were to proceed; and after this, towards the end of October, they proceeded from the capital to Philippopolis, the chief town of the new province, where the Commission was to sit. Here they were met by demonstrations of the inhabitants, as they had been on their progress through the country, urging upon them the strong determination of the South Balkan Bulgarians to seek union with their brethren in the North, and their absolute rejection of Turkish rule. The Commissioners had much difficulty in pacifying the crowds of men and women who continually besieged them, and they called upon the Russian authorities to repress the demonstrations. The Russians, of course, represented that no such phenomenon could have been exhibited to the



delegates of Europe, if the feeling denoted by it had not been genuine and forcible. They denied that any action of their own had created, or even fostered this agitation; but, at the same time, they took steps to keep the expression of the sentiment within bounds.

The nature of the work which had to be accomplished by the Commission, and the difficulties by which the English and the neutral members were confronted, arose from this display of hostility on the part of the population for whose future government they had to provide, and from the jealousy or intrigue of the Russian commissioner, occasionally supported by his German colleague. A letter from the Constantinople correspondent of the "Times," dated the 2nd of November, gives an outline of the position of affairs at that moment.

"All the members of the Eastern Roumelia Commission," he wrote, "have now arrived at Philippopolis, and are about to enter on the chief part of the mission intrusted to them. Before leaving Constantinople they solved all the preliminary questions, some of which threatened to cause very serious dissensions, not only between the delegates, but also between the governments which they represent. The principal of these was the question of the provisional administration. On this point the treaty of Berlin is, unfortunately, extremely vague. Some of the delegates held that all branches of the administration should be at once placed under the control of the Commission, and hinted that the existing Russia-Bulgarian administration should be replaced by a Turkish governor-general and officials named by the Porte. The Russians, on the other hand, maintained that, by the treaty, the finances alone were intrusted to the Commission, and that all the other branches should remain in their present condition until a new system had been created. The former based their view on what they considered a fair and liberal interpretation of the treaty as a whole; while the latter took their stand on the precise words of the document. Both parties could adduce, especially in private informal deliber-

ations, strong arguments in support of their opinions. The one argued that a temporary military occupation had nothing to do with the civil administration of a country, that the existing Russo-Bulgarian administration had no legal basis, and that the control of the finances necessarily implied control of all other branches. The other pointed to the practical inconvenience of dissolving an existing organisation and creating a new one for a few months, and predicted that, if a Turkish administration of the old type were introduced into the province, the reforms about to be elaborated by the Commission would never be executed.

As is frequently the case in discussions of this kind, the real motive of the dispute never found expression. It was simply this; the existing provisional *regime* is being used to Russianise, or at least Bulgarianise the province, and to prepare the way for its ultimate union with the Bulgarian principality. The anti-Russian party in the Commission were naturally anxious to bring this state of things at once to an end, while the Russian delegates wished to continue it as long as possible. Could the matter have been decided by pure logic, perhaps the former might have been victorious, but, as things really stood, their position was hopeless. The Russians were in possession, and there was no power at hand stronger than logic to drive them out. To have continued the discussion would simply have been to play their game, for the provisional *regime* would have been thereby prolonged. Perceiving this, the delegates who had raised the question allowed it to drop, and, contenting themselves with the administration of the finances, determined to begin as quickly as possible the elaboration of the organic statute.

"The chief indications given by the Congress for the elaboration of this statute are contained in Article 18 of the treaty of Berlin. It is there said:—'The Commission will have to determine, in a period of three months, the powers and functions of the governor-general, as well as the administrative, judicial, and financial system of the province, taking, as its starting-point, the

different laws for the vilayets and the proposals made in the eighth sitting of the Conference at Constantinople.'

"In other articles it is provided that there shall be a governor-general named by the Sublime Porte, with the assent of the Powers, for a term of five years, and that for the maintenance of internal order there shall be a native gendarmerie, assisted by a local militia. In respect to the composition of these corps, the officers of which are to be named by the sultan, regard shall be had to the religion of the inhabitants in the various localities. If we add to this the vague general expression, that 'the province will remain under the direct political and military control of the sultan, under conditions of administrative autonomy,' we have the limits within which the Commission is free to act. These limits, it will be perceived, may be made elastic enough to contain a system very different from anything which has hitherto existed in Turkey, or they may be narrowed and stiffened so as to admit of nothing but a few modifications in the old vilayet system. All depends on the way in which the words are interpreted and on the spirit in which the work is carried on. At present, so far as one can judge from fragmentary information, there seems to be in the Commission three distinct tendencies:—

"The aim of the Russians, as plainly shown in Prince Dondoukoff Korsakoff's speech to the authorities at Philippopolis which I lately forwarded to you, is to assimilate the administration as much as possible to that of Bulgaria, or, in other words, to preserve as much as possible of the provisional administration which they have already created. The British commissioners, on the other hand, wish to introduce considerable modifications. Sir H. D. Wolff has already prepared, it is said, an elaborate scheme, which gives to the province the greatest amount of self-government compatible with the indispensable rights of the sultan, and protects the rights of minorities in each locality by a device closely resembling the 'three-cornered constituencies' in England. The third tendency is represented

by the Turkish commissioners, who will seek to reduce to a *minimum* the autonomous element in the new administration, and to re-establish the old law of the vilayets, with certain modifications, some expressly secured by the treaty of Berlin, and others suggested by past experience. To me, at least, this seems evident from a project for the re-organisation of Eastern Roumelia, which the Porte has recently drawn up and forwarded to its representatives at Philippopolis. I have not been able to obtain a copy of the document, so that I must speak under a certain reserve; but I have before me a tolerably full summary of it, which is quite sufficient to show its general character.

"According to this summary, which I have every reason to regard as accurate, the Porte is to divide and subdivide the province into sandjaks (districts), cazas (arrondissements), nahiés (cantons), and kura (plural of karié, village). The governor-general will be named by the Sublime Porte, with the assent of the Powers, for a term of five years, and will be assisted by a secretary-general appointed by the Porte. The provincial administration will be divided into seven departments:—1. Correspondence, by which vague term is probably meant the general direction of affairs; 2. Justice; 3. Finance; 4. Public works and land registration; 5. Agriculture and commerce; 6. Imperial domains; 7. Indirect taxes. At the head of each department will be a director named by the sultan on the recommendation of the respective ministries. These directors, together with the secretary-general, will form the administrative council, which is to direct affairs and propose officials (except those to be chosen by popular election) for nomination by the governor-general. Besides this, there is to be a 'Conseil-Général,' in which two-thirds of the members are to be selected by ballot from the population, three from each caza, and the remaining third to be named by the governor. New elections will be held every two years in half the cazas, the particular cazas to be determined by lot. The functions of this council are to discuss and adopt (nothing



is said about rejecting) the measures presented by the governor, to vote the provincial budget, and to examine matters affecting the welfare of the province, such as agriculture, public works, commerce, and education. It will have to consider also the complaints of so-called 'local delegates,' one of whom will be elected in each *caza* to represent the peculiar local interests of the *caza* in the assembly. They are to arrive in Philippopolis a month before the opening of the session, and to remain a month after its close. The council will sit once a year for not more than two months. A president and two vice-presidents will be named by the governor-general from among ten members chosen by ballot in the assembly. The governor-general may, with the consent of the Porte, convene an extraordinary session during the recess. He may likewise dissolve the Assembly with the sanction of the Porte, in which case new elections must be held within six months, according to the provisions of an electoral law to be promulgated simultaneously with the Organic Statute. In each *sandjak* a *Mutessarif* will be named by the Porte, on the recommendation of the governor-general, and will be assisted by an administrative council, composed of the three highest officials of the *sandjak*. Its functions will be in the *sandjak* the same as those of the superior administrative council in the province. In each *caza* there will be a *Kaimakam* named by the Porte on the proposition of the *Mutessarif*, with the assent of the governor-general. The *nahiés* will be divided into three classes, according to their size and importance. The first class will have a *Mudir* and a justice of the peace, both named by the authorities, and a mayor (*Maire*) elected by the population for a term of four years; the second will only have a justice of the peace and a mayor, the latter fulfilling the duties of *Mudir*; in the third, the three functionaries will be combined in the person of the mayor. These officials will be assisted in each *nahié* by a municipal council. Each *karie*, or commune, the lowest administrative unit, will have a *Mukhtar* elected by the inhabitants.

"The future judicial organisation of the province is roughly sketched thus:—In each *nahié* (*arrondissement*) there will be a court composed of the justice of the peace and two assessors. They may decide without appeal in civil cases up to five hundred piastres—if paper currency is meant, that sum represents about thirty shillings—and in criminal matters they may condemn to fifty piastres fine, or five days' imprisonment. Subject to appeal, they may decide civil cases up to five thousand piastres, and condemn to three months' imprisonment. A higher court, composed of three sections—civil, criminal, and commercial—will be established in the chief town of each *sandjak*, and a supreme court of appeal, composed of the same three sections, in Philippopolis. As a general rule, all cases are to be decided by the Ottoman code, but matrimonial cases, and affairs of inheritance, are to be decided, among Mussulmans, by the *Sheri*, and among Christians by the special laws of their respective denominations. All decisions are to be written in the Turkish language, which is to be the official language of the province; but when one of the parties is Bulgarian or Greek, he will receive an official translation of the same in his native tongue. The taxation is for the present to remain as formerly, but it may hereafter be modified by the council-general, with the consent of the Porte.

"Such are, so far as I have been able to discover, the views of the Porte for the organisation of Eastern Roumelia. It is intended to prepare a scheme of reforms for the Asiatic vilayets on the same basis, with such modifications of detail as may be rendered necessary by the peculiar local conditions, and with due attention to the recommendations made by the British government."

These ideas, at least so far as they were based on Turkish ideas, had subsequently to be modified in very important respects. Meanwhile the Commission found it necessary to insist upon the transference to itself of much of the authority hitherto exercised by the Russian functionaries, and especially of the financial adminis-

tration of the province, on which most of the others naturally depended. About a fortnight after the sittings at Philippopolis had begun, this difficulty was removed, and the manager of the Ottoman Bank at Pera was unanimously appointed director of general finances, and the governor-general undertook to hand over the treasury chest and archives. The "Times" correspondent telegraphed, on the 10th, that "the Russian and Turkish Commissioners presented a project for the reorganisation of the archives; but the Commission, on the proposal of the Austrian delegate, decided that, before considering these projects, it would be well to lay down some general principles, and have the various branches of the subject sketched out by individual members. In accordance with this proposition, the public and administrative privileges of the province were intrusted to the British first commissioner, the finances to the Italian, the judicial organisation to the Austrian, public instruction to the German, and the civil administration to the French delegates. Lord Donoughmore was requested to draw up a project for the organisation of the gendarmerie, and it is believed he is doing so on the model of the Irish Constabulary. Sir H. Drummond Wolff's project was brought forward to-day and ordered to be printed. It is conceived in a very liberal spirit, on a wide basis of popular representation. The Commissioners have to devote a considerable portion of their time to receiving deputations. They have replied, to all petitions presented to them, that they earnestly desire to secure for the population good government and liberty within the limits laid down by the treaty of Berlin, but that they cannot entertain any request contrary to that document. They seem to be on amicable terms with each other, and to reserve their differences for the council chamber."

On the next day, there was considerable excitement in the town; "the shops were closed, and it was generally believed that a monster demonstration was being organised to protest against the transfer of the financial administration to the International Commission. Wild

rumours were afloat about a project of pillaging the shops of Mussulmans, Greeks, and Jews. The leaders of the agitation met in a large school-house, and took measures to prevent the public money being given to the Turks. After some time the head of the police appeared and suggested that a small deputation should be sent to the governor-general. Three delegates were accordingly chosen for the purpose, and, on presenting themselves before the governor-general, were informed of what was really being done. The police then took measures to have the shops re-opened and the excitement subsided. Meanwhile, two gentlemen deputed by the Financial Sub-Commission had presented themselves at the provincial treasury, and requested that the chest should be handed over to them. The chief official declared that he had received no orders to make the transfer, and accordingly refused; but, in the course of the day, the chest was handed over to the new director-general of finance. The cause of the excitement seems to have been this: The Financial Commission had chosen as its president Abro Effendi, the Turkish second commissioner, and had received the power of dismissing any official whom it might consider unqualified. These particulars becoming known in a distorted and exaggerated form produced, under the influence of certain agitators, the belief that the public money was being taken possession of by the Turkish authorities. In the afternoon the metropolitan waited on the governor-general and informed him that the population were much alarmed, because they believed that this transfer of the treasury-chest was a first step towards re-establishing the Turkish authorities and the old system of things. His excellency replied that there was no danger of the kind, for, according to the treaty of Berlin, the Russians had to give up only the financial administration. He further informed his eminence that, while admitting perfect freedom in expression of opinion, he would not allow any popular disturbances."

The following lively letter describes the financial difficulty in a more picturesque manner,



and gives us a fair insight into the proceedings at Philippopolis. The writer commences with a sketch of the locality, and our readers may like to have the town of Philippopolis brought before them in a few graphic touches.

"Why nature should have raised these rocky hills abruptly from the plain it is impossible to say, but it is not very difficult to understand how, when once raised, they became the site of a town. In the old days, when physical force had more legal significance than at present, it was customary to build towns on positions easily defended, and these hills on the right bank of the Maritza, overlooking a vast expanse of level country, must have been very formidable positions before the invention of artillery. In the present conditions of warfare the place is not at all well adapted for defence, and no attempt has been made to fortify it. The town has gradually spread down from the heights to the plain, and in this expansion there is a peculiarity which might, if we had no written or oral sources of history, lead us to conclude that the Christians have been, for many generations, the dominant race. The heights, and higher part of the slopes, are occupied almost exclusively by Bulgarians and Greeks, while the Mussulmans, who composed, it is said, until lately about a third of the population, collected chiefly on the narrow strip of land between the hills and the river. Concerning the flight of these latter, and the destruction of their property, I have obtained a good deal of information; but as the evidence in my possession contains some discrepancies and contradictions, I refrain from speaking on the subject till I have made further inquiry.

"On the top of the ridge, and commanding a magnificent view of the surrounding country, stands the British Consulate, and on the other side of the narrow street the house occupied by the British Commissioners. The latter might be described in advertising language as a large and commodious tenement, admirably adapted for a summer residence. From the windows there is a magnificent view of the lower parts of the town, the great plain, with its serpentine

river, and the northern spurs of the Rhodope Mountains, as a grand picturesque background. Unfortunately, the warm summer has already given place to cold autumn, and many of the amenities have, consequently, become drawbacks. The high ceilings, admirable ventilation, and innumerable windows, cannot be fully appreciated when a chilly northern blast is coming down from the snow-covered peaks and stealthily obtaining admittance through the numerous chinks and crevices of the lightly-constructed building. Some precautions, it is true, have been taken against this uninvited and unwelcome guest, who will, doubtless, become more and more objectionable and intrusive as the winter advances; but the desire to keep down expenses seems to hamper a policy of energetic resistance. The same motive has evidently influenced the furnishing of the apartments. If the books, papers, red tape, and other diplomatic *impedimenta* were removed, the rooms would look very bare and comfortless. Even as they are, the prospect of spending Christmas in them makes already some of the inmates think with regret of their bright, comfortable English homes. It must be added, however, that the establishment has one very imposing, ornamental appendage, in the form of a gigantic, uncouth, black Kavass, a Bengalee, who speaks a practically unlimited number of foreign tongues, all more or less unintelligibly, with reckless and astounding volubility. His splendid uniform, black face, and stentorian voice, awaken the admiration and awe of the juvenile population. When he goes out with the Commissioners, he struts before them with a swagger that a Highland piper might envy, and is with difficulty restrained from rudely pushing aside any Bulgarians, Turks, or Russians, who chance to come in his way. Sometimes he replaces his ordinary Kavass dress by a uniform closely resembling that of a Turkish lieutenant-general, and on these occasions he accepts, with admirable complacency and fitting condescension, the salutes of the Russian soldiers.

"In a narrow, steep lane near the house of the British Commissioners, is the house in which



MEHEMET ALI PASHA  
COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE TURKISH ARMY





the meetings of the Commission are held. On the ground floor is a small printing establishment, expressly organised for printing the protocols and documents; up stairs are the bureau and the room for the sittings. The latter is a modest apartment, barely large enough to contain the eleven members and three secretaries. The furniture consists of a large table covered with green cloth for the Commissioners, a small one for the secretaries, a third still smaller for simple refreshments, the customary divan round two sides of the room, and a quaint dark-blue stove in the recess in the wall.

"Since the arrival of the Commission in Philippopolis, about a fortnight ago, it has been chiefly occupied in getting into his own hands the financial administration of the province. On the 2nd inst. M. Schmidt, occupying an important position in the Imperial Ottoman Bank, was unanimously chosen director-general, without the necessity of a vote being taken. The Russian governor-general of the province was at once officially informed of the fact, and requested to send instructions to the officials, that they should recognise M. Schmidt as director-general, hand over to him, without delay, the treasury chest and archives, and give him all necessary assistance during the period of transition. His excellency was further requested to intimate what had occurred to the taxpayers by the usual modes of publication. In reply, General Stolypin notified his acquiescence in the wishes of the Commission, but at the same time protested against a part of the resolution, to the effect that, in all cases of resistance, the civil military authorities should be obliged to give armed assistance to the financial administration, without examining the motives of the demand. He considered that this was a recognition of the Commission as the superior of himself and of the valiant *corps d'armee* which he had the honour to command. In the resolution it was expressly said that, if the financial officials should make any unjustifiable use of their power, they would, of course, be responsible, and would be duly punished by the regular tribunals; but this clause

seemed to him an aggravation of the supposed attempt to encroach on his rights, as it admitted the possibility of the troops being used for illegitimate purposes. The Commission, however, explained that it had no intention of encroaching on the rights of the military commanders, and that it simply requested the assistance which, in all countries, is necessary for collecting the taxes. This explanation was considered satisfactory, and on Saturday, the 9th inst., the Commission was officially informed that orders had been given to place the treasury chest and accounts in the hands of the financial committee on the following Monday morning. Then followed some incidents which have in themselves very little importance, but which ought, perhaps, to be described in detail, because they illustrate the relations existing between the Commission and the Russian authorities, and because they have given rise to many false rumours. On the morning of the intervening day (Sunday) M. Schmidt goes to General Hübsch, the governor of the town and district of Philippopolis, and proposes to arrange the formalities to be observed in transferring the chest and archives. The general at first gives an evasive reply, but ultimately agrees that he himself, or a representative, should accompany the delegate of the financial committee to the provincial treasury. Next morning at the appointed hour M. Schmidt goes to General Hübsch, and is informed, to his surprise, that his excellency is not at home. Finding that things are being done in an irregular way, he requests M. de Coutouly, member of the financial committee, to accompany him to the konak where the chest is kept. On arriving there they are informed by the chief cashier that no orders have been received to hand over the chest, but another official announces that he has been sent by the governor to be present at the formality, and requests MM. Schmidt and Coutouly to wait a little till the orders arrive. This proposal is declined, and the delegates retire; but, in the course of the day, M. Schmidt returns, and the chest, containing one million-thirty four thousand four hundred and



seventy two piastres—about ten thousand pounds—is handed over to him. Meanwhile, alarming rumours have been spread that all the money in the public treasury is about to be handed over to the Turks and taken to Constantinople. The people assemble in the school-house and elsewhere, and propose to get up a monster deputation to protest against the supposed confiscation of the public funds. Some think that energetic measures should be taken at once to prevent the chest from being carried off. If some persons, as it is asserted, formed the project of using force, they had no opportunity of putting it into execution, for M. Schmidt, after formally taking over the chest, left it where it was in the *konak*. Since that period the excitement has somewhat subsided. The Bulgarians are coming to distinguish between the Commission and the Turkish authorities, and some of them now understand that there is no intention of replacing the present financial administration by Turkish officials.

“This incident illustrates, as I have said, the relations between the Commission and the Russian authorities. The former complains that obstacles and difficulties of every kind are intentionally thrown in its way, while the latter declare that they do all in their power to execute the obligations imposed on them by the treaty of Berlin. The apparent contradictions may, I think, be easily explained. The Commission was created against the will of Russia, and with the avowed intention of greatly diminishing her influence south of the Balkans. It is not difficult, therefore, to foresee that the constitution which it is about to prepare will not be such as Russia would desire. Turkish rule will, it is believed, be reintroduced, in a modified form, and thereby part of the work accomplished by the Russian army will be undone. In such circumstances it can hardly be expected that Russian officers who took part in what they consider a great work of political emancipation should give a very warm welcome to the Commission, or display very much zeal in facilitating its labours. The simple existence of the Commission must

be certainly disagreeable to them, and it must be much more unpleasant to have the intruders here in Philippopolis, insisting on taking an active part in the administration. In all matters where the treaty is quite clear, and where any attempt at evasion would probably produce inconvenient political complications, they execute what is required of them; but in all matters beyond these limits they seek to diminish as far as possible the importance, influence, and activity of the Commission. The Russian delegates regularly show this tendency. They protested, for example, against introducing for consideration the question of the refugees, and vigorously opposed the motion that the governor-general should be requested to make known to the population the functions and intentions of the financial committee. One of them frankly confessed afterwards that he had opposed the motion because he did not wish the Commission to have any direct relations with the people. Even in trifling matters, as, for example, in not giving to the Commission a guard of honour, the same spirit is shown. It must not, however, be supposed that commissioners and authorities are avowedly in a state of war. On the contrary, the private relations between them are perfectly amicable, and the tone of the official correspondence is, if not cordial, at least scrupulously polite. The best way, perhaps, to understand the spirit and conduct of the Russian officials is to imagine for a moment that an International Commission, including two Russian delegates, was sent to Cyprus for the purpose of re-organising the island in such a way as to exclude, so far as possible, British influence. The two cases are, of course, not strictly analogous, but the comparison may help the reader to realise the state of things here.”

A few days later the populace gave a significantly warm reception to Prince Dondoukoff Korsakoff, when passing through Philippopolis on his way to Livadia. “The occasion was seized for a great ovation. The people, going out in crowds to meet him, detached the horses from his carriage and conducted the prince in triumph

to the residence of General Stokytin, the governor of Eastern Roumelia. Later on a deputation waited upon the prince and represented the impossibility of Eastern Roumelia falling again, even indirectly, under Turkish rule. They urged upon the prince that he should use his influence to prevent the Balkan passes, which guarantee the security of Eastern Roumelia, from coming into the hands of the Turks. Prince Dondoukoff Korsakoff, in his reply to the deputation, told them not to despair, but to trust that their future was safe in the hands of the Emperor Alexander, whose generous intentions towards the welfare of all the nations of the East were well known."

In spite of this, the Bulgarians were discouraged on account of the unwillingness of the Eastern Roumelian Commission to support their aspirations. "They addressed themselves to M. Kallay, the Austro-Hungarian commissioner, who spoke in Bulgarian, and assured them that both he and his colleagues were animated with the best intentions towards them. He informed them at the same time, however, that the Berlin treaty must be carried out to the letter, and that the Bulgarians, in their own interest, should see the necessity of submitting to the decisions of Europe. The German commissioner spoke in the same strain. Sir Drummond Wolff assured them, on his side, that the Commission would endow the province with institutions calculated to excite the envy of the Bulgarians of the principality, and that the government of Eastern Roumelia would become a model for all the peoples of the Balkan peninsula. The remarks of the Italian representatives were friendly and tranquillising, while the French commissioner, Baron de Ring, held out little hope that what they had come to petition for would be granted. The deputation thus failing in its mission, the metropolitan went to see the British commissioner, and said—'You do not know the Turks; they will promise you everything, as they did to Lord Derby, who demanded in an emphatic way the punishment of the authors of the massacres of Batak and Perushtiga, and then act as they

did in that case, when the guilty received decorations from the sultan. If the Turks return, they will commit the same atrocities as they did before. We will not, therefore, allow the Porte to rule over us again. We all think, and mean to act together.' The British representative merely replied to this that he would report the same to his government. Among the Bulgarians at large, the work of the Commission is looked upon as quite abortive, and the public mood is described to be such as to forbode serious difficulties in the practical application of the new organisation, so that an insurrection in such a case in Eastern Roumelia ought to be early taken into consideration as by no means impossible."

Amongst other subjects which had to be discussed by the Commission was the question of the future official language of the province. "The Russians proposed that it should be Bulgarian, while other commissioners were of opinion that Bulgarian and Turkish should have an equal footing, and that Greek should be privileged. Prince Tsercheleff endeavoured to explain how inconvenient it would be to have a plurality of tongues, citing, in support of his theory, the case of Jersey and Guernsey, where French alone is employed. Sir H. Drummond Wolff replied that, according to his experience, the disadvantages urged by Prince Tsercheleff would be found to be imaginary, adducing in proof of this the cases of Malta, the Mauritius, and other British dependencies, where more than one official language prevails. The Austrian commissioner maintained that, to attempt to reduce everything to one language, might have very serious consequences, as could be seen in Servia; but Prince Tsercheleff, who had spent several years in the principality, called this in doubt, and the result of the discussion was that Baron de Ring was appointed to draw up the article in the shape of a compromise, on the basis proposed by the Conference at Constantinople."

The final result of these deliberations on the future constitution of Eastern Roumelia cannot



be adequately discussed in the present place ; and indeed it is hardly probable that the Bulgarian question will be settled on a permanent basis for some time to come. That which has been done up to the present amounts to little more than a temporary compromise, with which no one is thoroughly satisfied. The protests of the Bulgarians have had some effect in making Europe doubt the wisdom of cutting the nation so completely asunder as was proposed by the Berlin treaty, and of planting Turkish garrisons in the midst of a hostile population—a step which would inevitably have caused an outbreak of the old quarrel sooner or later. The natural demands of the Bulgarians have been to some extent regarded ; but it is impossible to think that affairs have yet been placed on a just or definite footing.

Meanwhile the country south of this province, between Eastern Roumelia and the sea, which is inhabited by Bulgarians and Greeks, had been in a state of continual insurrection. The first which Europe heard of the disturbances in the Rhodope district, was to the effect that many thousand refugees from Russian severity and Bulgarian cruelty and revenge, had assembled in the mountains, and refused to trust themselves to the safe-keeping of the authorities. The Berlin Congress appointed a Commission to inquire into their grievances ; and a report was signed on the 25th of August by the English, French, and Italian representatives. This document cast much of the blame upon the Russians ; but it cannot be considered as a valuable historical document owing to the fact that the other three members of the Commission declined to append their signatures.

The Christian insurrection broke out in the autumn, and was, in the first place, confined to the southern borders of Bulgaria, south of the sandjak of Sofia. It was alleged that the leaders of the movement came from Bulgaria, and that they were assisted with Russian money. However this may have been, the agitation spread with rapidity ; and very soon we began to receive accounts of terrible repressions by the

notorious Bashi-Bazouks. A trustworthy authority wrote, towards the end of November, that up to that time three centres of the movement were specified—the first and strongest, along the Struma valley, in the Perimdagh and the Malesh Planina, extending from Djuma and Kriva down to Meliki and Dorian ; the second, south of Kustendil, at Kosjak, and the Dovanitza Planina down to Karatova ; and the third in the country west of the Vardar valley, ranging from the Kara-Dagh near Uskub down to Monastir and Zlorina. “A fourth, however, is now mentioned in the district of Giortsha, on the slopes of Mount Gramnos ; and even a fifth, on the slopes of Mount Olympus. The whole district between these two last centres is said to be infested by insurgents, consisting of pure and partly of Hellenised Bulgarians. The mere extent of country stated to be in insurrection, together with the fact that since the skirmishes, in the middle of October last, about Kriva and Yenкои, absolutely nothing has been heard from either side about the activity of these insurgents, who are said to number many thousands of men, must go far to suggest the idea that all these accounts must be grossly exaggerated, and that, with the exception, perhaps, of the Upper Struma Valley and the district of Kosjak, which lie in close vicinity to Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia, these bands are less indicative of an insurrectionary movement than of brigandage on a large scale. The motley population of Bulgarians—Greeks, Zigaris, and Albanians—mixed up in the country lying to the north of Thessaly and Epirus, has even, in ordinary times, always been rather lawless, and ready to seize any occasion to live at the expense of others. Still, if the movement is chiefly brigandage, it must have assumed considerable proportions, as the commander of the third *corps d'armée* at Monastir, Shefket Pacha, has received orders to move out and act in concert with Salih Pacha, who is operating against the insurgents in the Struma Valley.”

The Porte had lost no time in accusing Russia of instigating or encouraging the fresh outbreak ; and representations were made to the

great Powers to this effect. The Russian ambassador at Constantinople, Prince Lobanoff, replied to the note of the Porte about the Bulgarian ravages. He denied all connivance, on the part of the Russians, at the excesses committed, which were grossly exaggerated. The villages mentioned by the Turks as having been burnt down already figured in the report of the Rhodope Commission, so that they must have been previously destroyed. The prince reminded the Porte that he advised the latter to draw a cordon between the Russian troops and the Rhodope insurgents, but that it refused to do so. The Porte, besides, was accused of having done nothing in Macedonia to maintain order; it had therefore, no right to accuse the Russians of having produced commotions.

These arguments were, at all events, forcible enough to satisfy the friends of Russia, and to throw the burden of disproof upon the Porte. It was clear that the latter was not strong enough to maintain order in the country left to it by Europe, except in the manner which Europe had already so firmly condemned. Details of the excesses committed by these irregulars, including the destruction of villages, the plunder and massacre of peaceable inhabitants, and the outrage of women, were reported on authority which it was impossible to gainsay. Mr Palgrave, the English Consul at Sofia, visited the fugitives from Turkish barbarity, and reported that tens of thousands of persons had been driven from their homes, and made dependent upon charity. Sir H. Layard, doubting the magnitude of the evil, sent a special commissioner from Constantinople to inquire into the facts; and the latter returned with a story which confirmed that of Mr. Palgrave in all essential particulars.

Other portions of Turkey in Europe were at the same time a prey to popular agitation and insurrection. In Albania, where the Mussulmans are a considerable majority, the authority of the Porte was practically defied. In Thessaly and Epirus, as we have seen, the Greeks were demanding their union with the Hellenic kingdom, and were barely restrained by the prospect of

the rectification of frontier recommended by the Congress. In Northern Albania the Mahomedans of Podgoritzza, Spuz, and the neighbourhood of Scutari, stoutly refused to deliver to the Montenegrins the territory ceded at Berlin; and when the Porte sent Mehemet Ali to enforce its decision, that unfortunate general was assassinated, with many of his suite.

The men of purest Albanian descent were also more or less disposed to make an effort to throw off the Turkish yoke; and they were incited thereto from outside.

The hereditary prince, Skanderbeg, assumed the active leadership of the national movement, and published a proclamation, which produced a great impression in Albania. The following is a translation of the original:—

“Albanians!—You alone among the nations of the East have remained quiet. While war raged around you, and all strove, as you desired no advantage to the detriment of your neighbours, you thought, and justly, that others would afterwards respect your possessions, and that, in the final settlement of the Eastern question, your rights would be taken into consideration.

“But in order that your silence might not be interpreted as a proof of indifference to the fate of the nation, you proclaimed publicly your warm attachment to the integrity of your Albanian fatherland, and your firm determination to support it against all enemies.

“Exhort your countryman, those who have descended from your national leaders, to unite their efforts with yours and lend their aid to your strife before the eyes of Europe.

“Your voice has reached me, in exile, where I share all your afflictions and your hopes, and whence I do not cease for a moment to watch over you.

“Albanians, your rights are imperishable. When all the nations of the peninsula submitted to the fierce and powerful conqueror, your fathers, led by my ancestors, opposed him with invincible resistance. In that contest a handful of men opposed the entire armies of an empire,



which was then the terror of both Asia and Europe; and during nearly fifty years the Albanian standard never wavered.

"Albania was never conquered. It was given voluntarily to the sultans, who promised to respect its freedom and its rights, which they have acknowledged through many and repeated firmans.

"If for four hundred years of foreign domination you have preserved the sacred inheritance of your nationality, who can take it from you to-day?

"The great Powers desire to establish in the East a just and permanent state of affairs, based upon respect of the rights of every nation, and upon harmony between these nations.

"The Sublime Porte has promised repeatedly, and has engaged officially, to introduce into each of its European provinces reforms which will afford to the people of each a government agreeable to its necessities and desires.

"But can the European Powers show themselves indifferent to a nation which has never caused trouble, and never endangered the peace of Europe?

"Can the Sublime Porte treat less favourably a people which has so valiantly assisted it to extend its power in Asia, and which for four centuries has afforded invaluable support in Europe?

"You can be sure, therefore, that not only will your national integrity remain untouched, but that it will be strengthened, in accordance with your just desires.

"But if your holy, inalienable, and just rights were ignored, if your national existence were threatened, then, O Albanians, you would rise as one man, and you would see among you at your head a Skanderbeg.

"Born in Kroia, where my father planted the standard of the great George, I hope that there I may die, but not before I see the whole of Albania free, from the harbour of Skodra (Scutari) to the Gulf of Arta.

"What, then, is wanting, Albanians, in order that you may rise once again and vindicate your name and your place among nations?

"It is not strength of arm, or intelligence, or courage, or the means. One thing alone is lacking, 'Unity and Concord.'

"Orthodox Christians, Mussulmans, Catholics, forget your differences, sole source of your ills. Unite yourselves in concord as children of one mother, Albania, as believers in one God, for there is but one.

"No power then can triumph over you, Albanians! You will establish our dear fatherland, strong and prosperous, great and happy.

"SKANDERBEG."

The story of the "re-settlement" of Turkey after the disasters of the war is, as the reader has probably noted, very largely intermixed with records of fresh disturbances, and fresh approximations to dissolution. It was not that the schemes of reform were few, or that they were invariably weak in a theoretical sense; but they have so far ended, for the most part, in projects and promises, and have not been carried into practice by the Porte. This has been the case with the reforms which England undertook to recommend to the sultan's government; and, in particular, it has been the case with the suggested reforms in Asia Minor.

A scheme was drawn up for Asia Minor by the English government; and, after much delay, the Porte accepted it. The four fundamental points of the scheme are as follow:—

1. The establishment of a gendarmerie, as stipulated by England. It will be organised by European officers, and will be governed by regulations to be drawn up by the Porte, based upon the best European models. The draught of the regulations has already been submitted to the sultan's sanction. In addition to this, the Porte will appoint central administrative councils for the gendarmerie, to which European officers will be attached.

2. The Porte modified the second point of the English scheme of reforms relative to judicial re-organisation. England proposed that European judges should be attached to the assize courts of each vilayet. Though not declining

this in principle, the Porte objects that it would be difficult to find European judges sufficiently conversant with Oriental languages and the Turkish laws to fill such positions. The Porte, therefore, proposes to appoint for each vilayet two inspectors, one of whom would be an European, and who would be charged to travel from one district to another to receive complaints against the judges, visit the prisons, and in general watch that justice prevailed. The other inspector would be his coadjutor.

3. The Porte accepts the financial re-organisation as proposed by England, although pointing out that it can only be applied at present in one or two provinces, and that the complete realisation of this part of the scheme, as well as of the other reforms, depends upon the necessary financial means. The Porte, however, undertakes to abolish the tithes immediately, and to replace them by a new system of land taxation. European controllers will be appointed for this purpose when the state of the finances will permit.

4. The sultan agrees that the term of office of the valis and financial inspector shall not be less than five years, and that they can only lose their posts before the expirations of that time for reasons of state, common law crimes, or by voluntary resignation.

Sir H. Layard succeeded with much difficulty in inducing the government of the sultan to accept the scheme in this sense; and Midhat Pacha, after more than eighteen months of exile, was appointed to superintend the realisation of the project. But nothing of value has resulted from all these good intentions.

It is difficult for Englishmen to understand the strength of the obstacles which render all reforms in Turkey so hopeless, not to say impracticable. It is not only the traditions of the government, but the very character of the people which stands in the way. This is especially so in Asia Minor; and the fact is aptly illustrated by the following account of a purely Turkish attempt to approximate towards reform from within. In October, the Turkish government, with the idea of doing something

to reform the administration, and ameliorate the condition of the people in Asia Minor, requested some of the principal men in the provinces to give their opinions on what ought to be done. A "Times" correspondent supplied an abbreviation of the report of the senior Mussulman Member of Parliament for Angora. The writer was looked upon as a very distinguished and learned man.

ART. 1 begins by saying that all are bound to assist the government according to their powers, by pointing out remedies for well-known evils.

ART. 2 says that sickness is very general, and the death-rate excessive. This is caused by the number of stagnant pools of water, and the dirty habits of the people. The remedy he recommends is to oblige the people to be more cleanly, and to secure the services of more doctors.

ART. 3 says that the cattle are subject to much sickness. "From this cause the cultivation of the soil is impeded, the peasantry are reduced to want and misery, and the riches they would otherwise accumulate lost to the province. They are reduced to despair, and their grievous condition is so notorious, that it requires no proofs, as every one (myself included) can bear witness." To remedy this, the writer recommends that plenty of veterinary surgeons should be engaged.

ART. 4 says:—"Ever since the establishment of the Ottoman government in this province the population of it has always taken its full share of the public burdens. It has freely given men, money, and goods, and has always been remarkable for fidelity and courage; but, leaving aside the obvious cause of the diminution of the peasant class, I would call attention to some customs that explain it—viz., the difficulty and expense attending the betrothal and marriage of the lower classes." The remedy is to enforce the excellent laws which provide against this extravagance, but which have remained a dead letter. "The enforcement of these laws would be such an obvious benefit that it is unnecessary to define further the benefit which would result therefrom,



ART. 4 also says, that Angora being far from the coast, all cereals beyond what are necessary for local consumption go to waste. "To prove this, I have only to call attention to the state of the corn in the government granaries" (grain received for the Ushir or tenths). "An oke of grain costs on the spot one and a half piastre; to transport it to the nearest seaport costs four or five piastres. To ameliorate this deplorable state of things railways and roads are recommended."

ART. 5 says that education is very necessary, but nothing but elementary schools now exist. "We have an immense number of payments to make on account of Vacouf (pious foundations). Numbers of Imaums and others receive these sums on pretence of repairing sacred buildings, feeding the poor, who come and go from day to day, &c. Now, it is notorious that these so-called sacred buildings are in ruins, or have no existence; and as for the poor, they have long since ceased to relieve them." The remedy for this is to apply these funds to purposes of education, and then the country would no longer have to complain of the want of efficient officers, and the people would gain in self-respect.

ART. 6 says that formerly the province was celebrated for its superior breed of horses, which have now disappeared, and suggests that Arab stud horses should be imported and distributed throughout the province.

ART. 7.—"At present the tithes are collected sometimes by the government direct, sometimes by those who purchase them for ready-money payments. The peasantry complain bitterly of this impost, in whatever way it is collected. Not to torment this invaluable class, there are three modes open; first, by making an average of five years' produce, and intrusting the collection of this average quantity to the notables of each village; secondly, to collect it on the average production of each farm; and, thirdly, to collect by a direct tax on the oxen and ploughs used in cultivation." Experiments on each system to be made, and that adopted which works best.

ART. 8.—All yellow berries, opium, and gum, being exported, the tithes on them might be collected as export duty.

ART. 9.—The tithe on tobacco, giving rise to numberless abuses, should be collected on a careful valuation of the fields where the plant is grown, and collected in money, not in kind.

ART. 10.—"This province contains two good silver mines and various other mineral deposits. In former times these were energetically worked, but have now been abandoned on the extraordinary allegation that the profit of working little more than suffices to pay the cost of the enterprise. This seems contrary to all experience and sense; but, allowing that it is so, what better work could a government engage in, than to find work for the thousands of despairing and starving creatures that wander here and there, seeking labour and food, yet finding none, whereas, were these employed, it is admitted, even by the prejudiced, that no loss would befall the government?"

ART. 11 says that the province is traversed by two rivers. These should be made navigable, to transport the coal that exists near Angora, and other produce.

ART. 12 says that formerly the province was covered with forests, "but since the calamitous invasion of Tamerlane, and the turbulent epoch that ensued," they have been destroyed. The rainfall has decreased, and even the hills are denuded of soil, famine being the consequence. In future all existing forests should be carefully preserved, and new ones gradually planted.

ART. 13 says that the registration of the people for the purposes of the conscription, and to avoid the irregularities that now occur, should be revised.

ART. 14 recommends the re-arrangement of the military districts.

ART. 15 says that hand-woven fabrics were formerly in general use, but now they are supplanted by European copies of Turkish manufactures—worthless rubbish—which do great injury to native industry. Machines to compete with foreign machines should be introduced.

ART. 16 repeats nearly the same thing with regard to carpets, and then goes on, "In reference to such suggestions some will ask, 'do you expect a government to do everything, and at such a critical time?' to these I reply, 'If everything cannot be done at once, let us at least do what we can.'"

ART. 17 says that the registers of property and income tax have not been revised for eleven years, and even when originally made were imperfectly done. Some properties are put down at ten times their value, and others at not a tenth part.

ART. 18 says, "To carry out many of these reforms the activity of government and the confidence of the people are all that are necessary."

"Regarding the selection and support of capable and honest officials, so much has been said on this subject in the Parliamentary debates, in our provincial councils, in the public journals, in the conversation of the old, the wise, the experienced, that for me to make suggestions would be superfluous, having in the foregoing contributed what will be considered a sufficiency."

"This document," adds the correspondent, "will appear to an ordinary Englishman a crude, but at the same time a very mild one. Here I understand that it is considered as an almost savage attack on the government. It must, however, be understood that anything like rough, or what we should call plain speaking is almost unknown in Turkey. The severest censure is conveyed in a phrase that, by the uninitiated, would be considered complimentary, and, however conversant any one may be with the Turkish language, it is next to impossible to give the full significance of a document in a translation."

The difficulties in the way of a settlement of Turkey after the war did not all come from the Turkish government and people. Thus it was not until the end of November that the Roumanians were able to occupy their new territory in the Dobrudscha; the delay having been caused partly by their own reluctance to cede Bessarabia, and partly by the unreadiness of the Russians to hand over the possession of that cor-

ner of Bulgaria. At length, however, the troops of the principality crossed the Danube at Braila, where the prince issued the following proclamation to the people of the Dobrudscha:—

"By the treaty of Berlin, your country has been united with our own. We do not enter your territory as conquerors, although Roumanian blood has been shed for the liberation of the people on the right bank of the Danube. The inhabitants of all religions and nationalities of the Dobrudscha, the country of Stefan the Great, become from this day part and parcel of Roumania, and in future you will not be subject to the arbitrary will of any one man, but to a nation where the most sacred gifts of humanity—life, honour, and property—are protected by the shield of a constitution which is an object of envy to many foreign nationalities. Your religion, families, and domestic thresholds, will be protected by our laws, and no one will dare to attack them, punishment being certain to follow any infringement of the law. Mahomedans, Roumanian justice does not recognise any distinction of race or creed; your faith, and your families, will receive the same protection as that accorded to the Christians; your religious and domestic concerns will be confided to the care of your chosen religious counsellors. Christians and Mahomedans, receive with confidence the Roumanian authorities. They come among you to put an end to the troubles which have so long harassed you, to heal the wounds made by the recent war, to protect your persons, property, and interests, and to develop your moral and material prosperity. The Roumanian troops have no other purpose in entering the Dobrudscha than the establishment and maintenance of public order, and, as patterns of discipline, to guard the peacefulness of your future lives. Greet, therefore, with affection the Roumanian standard, which to you will be the symbol of liberty, peace, and justice, over all your province. Receive an administrative system, organised upon a constitutional basis, which will take into account your requirements and your established usages, and give to your citizenship



a firm foundation. The Roumanian authorities will make it their first duty to examine and satisfy those requirements, to care for your happiness, and call forth your loyalty to that land to which your destiny is now attached. As a first proof of our fatherly care for you, and desire to deliver you from your present burdens, we release you from all payment of the *Dimes* for the year 1879. From the 1st of January will be levied in place of the *Dimes* a tax more just and less onerous to the agricultural population. The following taxes will be totally abolished :—That on exemption from military duty, the 2 per cent. tax on cattle sales, and the mill tax. The following imposts are to be regulated by a clearly defined cash payment :—The tax on real property in town and country, the 3 per cent. on agricultural and industrial products, and the taxes on grocers, *cafes*, and hotels. Praying for the blessing of God upon our action, we take, in the name and with the consent of all Europe, formal possession of the Dobrudscha, which is now and will remain Roumanian territory ; and while we send you our princely greeting, we hope that this day will be the commencement of a peaceful and happy future for the Roumanian territory.—Given at Braila the 26th of November, in the year of Grace, 1878, and the 13th year of our reign.—CHARLES, countersigned by BRATIANO, COCALNICIANO, ROSETTI, CAMPINEANU and STATESCU.”

The Roumanians were themselves still more dilatory in performing their part in the contract with Europe which bound them to give equality of rights to the Jews in the principality ; and the like unwillingness was displayed by Servia.

Of the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Austrians, we must speak in another chapter.

## CHAPTER XXII.

### THE AUSTRIANS IN BOSNIA.

AUSTRIA, it will be remembered, was authorised by the Congress of Berlin to occupy the two

Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which the Porte had been unable to pacify for several years past, and which were the scene of perpetual revolt. The Christians of these provinces had been the earliest to enter upon the great struggle into which first Bulgaria, then Servia and Montenegro, then Russia, had subsequently cast themselves. It was from this corner of the Turkish empire, amongst the Slavs who had long contemplated and sighed after the freedom of their brethren across the Austrian frontier, that the great upheaval in Turkey had begun.

The Mussulman armies had so far triumphed that they had compelled the insurgents to keep to the fastnesses of the mountain country, whilst they themselves held the open plains and all the large and fortified towns. But they could not go beyond this ; they could never entirely subdue the insurgents, or pacify the Christian population. Many thousands of refugees, as we have already seen, had been driven into Austrian territory, and were there supported on the charity of Europe ; and there was no hope that these unhappy creatures would return to their native land, so long as it remained under the sway of the Mahomedans. There was, in short, no reasonable chance of restoring order in Bosnia and Herzegovina, even after the peace between Russia and Turkey, whilst the sultan retained his authority over them.

These and other considerations had weighed with the Congress of Berlin, when it agreed to the proposal of Lord Salisbury (doubtless at the instance of Austria), and embodied it in the 23rd Article of the treaty. This proposal, in its definitive form, provided that “the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be occupied and administered by Austro-Hungary. The government of Austro-Hungary, not desiring to charge itself with the administration of the sandjak of Novi Bazaar, which extends between Servia and Montenegro in a south-easterly direction to beyond Mitrovitz, the Turkish administration shall continue in force in that district. At the same time, in order to ensure the maintenance

of the new political condition, as well as the freedom and security of the communications, Austro-Hungary reserves to itself the right to establish garrisons and maintain military and commercial routes over the whole of that part of the ancient vilayet of Bosnia."

This, then, being the general basis on which the partial emancipation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was founded, it remained for Austria and Turkey to arrive at a suitable convention for its practical realisation. It is needless to say that this task was a very difficult one, and that considerable delay occurred before it was accomplished. The Austrian government, however, did not wait on diplomacy. The treaty was signed on the 13th of July. The occupation of Bosnia began on the 29th of the same month; but it was not until the 15th of August that the convention in its first shape was concluded. Caratheodori Pacha had proceeded from Berlin to Vienna for the express purpose of conducting the negotiations, which were carried on with great secrecy; and their result was not made public for some time after it had been arrived at.

For Austria herself it was necessary to move in the matter with considerable caution, chiefly on account of the jealousy of the Hungarians, who were vehemently opposed to the admission of a large increase of Slavs into the empire. Count Andrassy, on the other hand, was apparently willing to take the risk of this on his shoulders; and he was to some extent justified by the compact entered into by Austria after the battle of Sadowa, when the dual empire agreed to its definitive exclusion from the Germanic confederation.

Austria met with an almost unexpected resistance in the two provinces from the Mussulman population. There was a large number of regular Turkish troops in the capital, Bosna-Serai, or Serajevo, as well as in other towns; and these, with or without the connivance of the Ottoman government, made common cause with the fanatical levies. The latter were incited to resist by the Mahomedan mollahs and others,

especially by Hadji Loja\* in Serajevo. On the last day of July the "Times" correspondent in Vienna telegraphed that reports from Serajevo, coming by way of Mostar, "speak mournfully of the state of affairs in the Bosnian capital. At the instigation of Hadji Loja, a notorious chieftain, at the head of a band of Bashi-Bazouks, an insurrection broke out anew in Serajevo, in consequence of which the civil governor, Mazhar Pacha, and the military commandant, Hafiz Pacha, fled with a detachment of troops. They were, however, pursued, captured, and brought back to Serajevo by Hadji Loja, who deprived them of their dignities and possessions. The insurgents, attempting to get the armoury into their hands, a violent struggle, lasting for several hours, arose between them and the watch, which ended in the defeat of the latter. The citadel of Serajevo is said to be still held by the Turkish regulars. Authority, however, is at an end, and complete anarchy reigns, threatening the lives and property, not only of the Christian inhabitants, but also of foreigners, and even of the consuls. An attempt was made to carry the insurrection to Banjaluka, an emissary, supposed to be the brother of Hadji Loja, having been sent thither for that purpose. He has, however, been captured and imprisoned."

With regard to the first step in the occupation of Bosnia, the commander of the 13th Army Corps telegraphed from Derbent under date the 30th of July:—

"The main column encamped this afternoon at 8.30 at Derbent. The Turkish officials, some officers, the clergy, and many of the leading inhabitants of the place, came out, some in carriages, others on horseback, to meet and salute the commandant of the corps, and declared

\* According to one account, Hadji Loja was a fanatical Dervish. "He is said to be the tallest man in Bosnia, and always walks about in tattered and fantastic attire. Summer and winter he goes barefooted, and during the Ramazan period becomes half-naked. His practice is to beg alms, with which he feeds dogs around the mosques. While rapt in a holy trance he has murdered many Christians, but has never been brought to book, and punished for his crimes and malefactions."



their allegiance and submission to his Majesty the Emperor of Austria. Although the troops did not march quite three miles, they suffered much from the excessive heat. The second division crossed the Save at Samac without encountering any opposition. The mountain brigade of the seventh division, along with the large part of the column, also meeting with no resistance, arrived in the evening, after a toilsome march, at Novi, where they found the railway to Benjaluka completely laid with lines." A further telegraphic report stated that, on the night of the 30th of July, between eight and eleven, rain poured down in torrents, and at two o'clock in the morning began anew, sweeping away all the bridges and cutting the communication between Derbent and Brod. To repair the damage detachments of the Engineers were sent to the Save at daybreak. It being concluded that the roads in the direction of Totscha would be very bad, the commandant of the corps thought proper to give the main column a day's rest on the 31st, and the advance was renewed on the following day. The Vienna correspondent above quoted telegraphed on the 2nd August:—"The heavy downpour of rain, sadly damaging all the roads and bridges, arrested for some time the march of the corps of occupation into the interior of Bosnia, compelling the main body to linger at Derbent throughout the 31st of July and 1st of August, until the lines of communication both in front and behind were restored. To-day, however, the chief corps has resumed its march, and probably has already established its head-quarters at Doboi. The column of troops under Archduke John Salvator advance at a somewhat more rapid pace, having on the 31st of July entered Banjaluka, where they met with no resistance. Shortly after their taking possession of the place, a deputation of the leading Beys waited upon the Archduke and expressed their allegiance to the emperor, and their gratitude for the protection he extended them. Only in coadherence to the Austrian government, and in annexation to the powerful state adjoining their province, they

said, was there any security for the preservation of their religion and institutions, and under their new ruler they believed a happy future was opening out for Bosnia.

"As already foretold, the Herzegovinian frontier was yesterday crossed by the column under General Joannovich, the passage having been made at two places, Vergorach and Imoschi. These troops have now pushed forward as far as the district of Ljubuski. According to private intelligence arrived here, affairs are not proceeding so smoothly in that quarter, the flight of the Montenegrins in Ljubuski, the first considerable place on the line of march, having given occasion to anarchic scenes there similar to those which broke out in Serajevo. It is, therefore, quite possible that the first serious resistance to the advance of the Austrian forces will be offered there, and that it may be necessary to take the place by force. In any case, whether peacefully or by violence, Ljubuski is now probably in the hands of the Austrians."

Thus, by the 1st of August, both provinces had been entered, Bosnia from the north, and Herzegovina from the west, by way of Dalmatia; and so far there had been no resistance. Signs of hostility, however, soon began to show themselves. Two days later the same correspondent wrote:—

"The fear of a serious conflict at Ljubuska between the Imperial troops of Austria and the Mussulman inhabitants of that place has happily not been realised. The steady and resolute bearing of General Joannovich inspired the bellicose elements there with a conviction of the uselessness of all resistance, and, according to official reports which have reached here, the Imperial troops on the 2nd of August, at noon, meeting with no resistance, marched into Ljubuska, on the castle of which they at once hoisted the Austrian flag. Before they had reached the place deputations from the Mahomedan and Catholic inhabitants came out to meet them and declare their submission.

"Regarding the further advance of the 13th Army Corps under General Philippovich, no

authentic intelligence has up to the present hour arrived. On the other hand, trustworthy news comes from Serajevo that in Mostar, the seat of the governor of Herzegovina, a revolt has broken out. The rebels, whom three battalions of the Turkish troops there joined, have murdered the governor and set up another in his place. Three other Turkish battalions are said, however, to have marched out of Mostar to meet the advancing Austrian forces, submit their allegiance to the commander, and offer to join his ranks. Communications, however being interrupted, there is no direct information from Mostar. From Serajevo it is further announced that the band of Hadji Loja seeks, by fictitious stories of deeds of violence and cruelty perpetrated by the Austrian troops to excite the populace to resist their progress. I hear from another source that these battalions are on their way to Metcovich to seek refuge in Austrian territory.

"A report in the '*Politische Correspondenz*' of a great Cabinet Council held yesterday week under the presidency of the sultan, in which the Bosnian occupation was debated, without any positive resolution being adopted, indicates the prevailing currents of opinion in the circles of the Sublime Porte. The correspondent states that Safvet Pacha himself combated the arrangement proposed by Austria on diplomatic grounds. There was no need for haste. It could not reasonably be expected that they should hasten the execution of the decision of the Congress regarding Bosnia while the Berlin treaty had not yet been signed by any of the signatory Powers. He advised delay. The old fanatical Namyk Pacha expressed himself in most vehement language against the decision of the Congress, and the Sheikh-ul-Islam sympathised completely with his views. Even Osman Pacha, though his language was more moderate, characterised the arrangement proposed by Austria as unacceptable. Finally, another speaker said that the Porte was resolved to endure the occupation, but not to acquiesce in it. To further it actively would be for the sultan to give up all rights to the provinces. The Porte, convinced that all

resistance, by means of a Turkish army, was useless, renounced the undertaking.

"It is certain, however, that the Porte in an underhand way has been stirring up the Mahomedan population of Bosnia to resistance, in order afterwards to be able to say that the Turkish government had yielded up its power, but that the people protested, sealing this protest with their blood, and so consecrating the rights of the sultan, even for the future. The correspondent of the '*Politische Correspondenz*' reports as a certain fact that fanatical Softas and Ulemaes were sent by the Sheikh-ul-Islam as emissaries to Serajevo, Travnik, and Banjaluka, to incite the Mahomedan population in those places to oppose the progress of Austrian arms. The same correspondent even asserts, as an assured fact, that Hafiz Pacha, commanding in Bosnia, was secretly instructed to furnish privately, with arms from the magazines, those Mahomedans who were willing to fight against Austria. This statement is, however, in part contradicted by events in Serajevo and Mostar, the governors of both which places, along with the commander-in-chief in Bosnia, were driven out by the populace, and one of them killed for refusing to deliver up arms. This qualification, however, of the report in the '*Politische Correspondenz*' does not militate against the fact that the troubles in Bosnia have been connected with influences proceeding from Constantinople."

It was at Maglai, a place occupied almost entirely by Mahomedans, that the Austrian advance was marked for the first time by serious bloodshed. The official despatch of the '*Wiener Abendpost*,' quoting from a telegraphic report sent by the commander of the 13th Army Corps, ran as follows:—

"After the engineers had repaired the heavy damage inflicted on the lines of communication by the floods of rain, the main column resumed its march through the Bosna valley. The population generally of the places occupied were, thanks to the tact and friendly spirit displayed by both officers and men, readily gained over to Austria. This was especially the case with the



classes possessed of property, who saw, in the disturbances at Serajevo, a plainly communistic tendency. Already, on the 1st of August, General Philippovich despatched from the camp at Derbent, the head of the General Staff, Millinkovich, with a squadron of the 7th Regiment of Hussars, as a reconnoitring force, into the Bosna valley, not only for the purpose of obtaining correct information regarding the effect of the storm on the bridges and roads, but also making known the Austrian proclamation to the people of the different localities through which he should pass, and of preparing them for the approach of the Imperial troops. The same head of the staff was also instructed to make inquiry in the larger inhabited places—Doboi, Maglai, and Zepoc—what provisions could there be obtained, so as to lighten the burden of sending supplies after them on their march. Everywhere, apparently, he was gladly received. At Maglai, in particular, the Kaimakam, and the leading citizens, expressed their unconditional submission, declared themselves ready to guarantee the peaceful reception they should there meet, promising also supplies in large quantities. From various reports which had come to the ears of Captain Millinkovich, that a plot was being organised in Zepoc to obstruct the passage of the Austrians through the defile in that neighbourhood, he wished to proceed to that place and probe the rumour to the bottom. Unmolested, he arrived at the entrance to this place when a volley of musketry was discharged at him. A detachment of Hussars formed in order for an engagement, but Captain Millinkovich, perceiving the uselessness of trying to force his way further, marched back to Maglai. The people there, formerly so friendly, had, however, in the meantime, barred the main street, and opened a heavy cross fire from the houses and both banks of the river on the advancing squadron of Hussars. Maglai is situated in a narrow defile on the right bank of the Bosnia, is mostly inhabited by Turks, and has a ruined castle commanding the valley. Steep declivities make any attempt at swerving from the road very difficult, and con-

fine the movements of the troops to the pathway running along hard by the Bosna. The Hussars, therefore, had to defile through this pass possessed by armed inhabitants, in doing which, as far as yet known, seventy of them fell. The remainder of the squadron, with Captain Millinkovich and Rittmeister Paezona, each of whom had two horses shot under him, reached our outposts uninjured. Baron Philippovich was to-day to have advanced towards Maglai in order to quell opposition there and occupy the place. The 8th and 20th Divisions have hitherto met with no resistance, and are now proceeding onwards. Shortly after the reported revolutionary outbreak in Mostar, and the murder of several Turkish functionaries, the advanced guard of the 18th Division, on the 4th of August, at Citluk, came upon a body of five hundred insurgents. The latter held a strong position, and received our troops with a lively fire; but after a short engagement, in which the 8th Jäger Battalion and one battalion of the 28th Foot, with a mountain battery, took part, the enemy evacuated their position and retired towards Mostar. Of the 8th Jäger battalion ten men were wounded. The foe left several dead behind, with thirty-three prisoners, one standard, over one hundred rifles, much ammunition, and three horses fell into our hands. Baron Philippovich is advancing on Mostar."

On the 5th there was better news. A telegram from Mostar announced the entry of Austrian troops into the capital of Herzegovina without meeting any resistance. "What with the difficulties connected with the bad state of the roads, and the frequent skirmishes with insurgents suddenly appearing on heights menacing the line of march, the advance of the main column under General Philippovich is necessarily slow. Yesterday evening our forces had reached the heights of Maglai, and to-day the place has probably been occupied. There is every appearance of the insurgents in that place offering resistance. The column under General Szapary, advancing towards Svornik, had to suppress an insurrection which broke out at Grac-

anica, the insurgents losing in the engagement which occurred several dead, and our troops having only a few wounded."

The "*Wiener Abendpost*" published the following official despatch from a report of the commander of the 20th Division:—

"To-day a fourth attempt at insurrection in Gracanica, on the part of the Turks, was quelled after an engagement of two hours and a half, in which Lieutenant Vukmirovic, and four men of the 70th Infantry Regiment, were wounded. The number of the enemy killed is unknown, but among the Turkish prisoners taken thirteen are wounded. The commander of the 13th Corps reports, under date the 5th of August, that, in consequence of the damage done to the bridges by the heavy rains, the march of the troops from Dobof went on very slowly. Not until twelve o'clock could the troops advance from that place, the repair of the Uzera-bridge, notwithstanding the utmost exertions, occupying many hours. At a very sharp turn of the River Bosna to the north of Kosna the scouts of the vanguard were assailed with rifle shots. With the instinct peculiar to savages, the Mahomedan insurgents had marked out and occupied a very advantageous position on a declivity overhanging the valley. Only by forcing a way over rough, wooded mountains, and thus turning the flank of the enemy, was it possible to dislodge them from their position. For this purpose, while a reserve regiment, the 27th, engaged the enemy in front in a light, continuous fight, the larger part of the forces, including the 27th Jäger battalion and a battalion of the 52nd Infantry Regiment, was sent to perform that difficult movement. About 5.30 the detachments of the 27th Regiment of reserves made a vigorous attack on the enemy, and at the same time there arrived the advanced guard of the 7th Regiment belonging to the column which was advancing along the right bank of the Bosna. The battle now took a favourable course, and by seven in the evening the insurgents were driven from all their positions and pursued towards Kosna. Our losses in this engagement, as far as yet known,

are one man killed, one lieutenant, and eight men wounded. The 27th Jäger battalion, and the 52nd battalion of the infantry regiment sent to turn the flank of the enemy arrived when the insurgents were already in flight. On account of the rugged and wooded nature of the ground, it was not easy to compute exactly the number of the insurgents, but, according to the best calculations, they might have amounted to about one thousand five hundred.

"The behaviour of all the detachments in this engagement was highly praiseworthy, all the more so as, on account of wet bivouacs and the toilsome marches they had to make, the troops were by no means in the best condition for fighting. It was evening when the engagement ended, and our soldiers made bivouacs in the positions they had wrested from the enemy. The rain, which throughout the conflict had ceased, began again, at its close, to pour in torrents, thus denying the troops the repose they so much needed. The march is continued still amid a pouring rain."

With regard to events at Mostar, since the commencement of the occupation, the "*Neue Freie Presse*" published the following detailed report from its correspondent there, under date August 6:—

"Towards the end of July the 18th Division had taken up position along the frontier. In the last days of the same month the various forces of this body, having studiously concealed all knowledge of their operations, converged at a surprisingly rapid pace towards Vergoracs, where they concentrated, and on the 1st of August they crossed the border. On this occasion an unusually trying scheme of march was arranged for all the troops, and, in spite of the extremely intractable nature of the ground to be passed over, excessive heat, severe storms by night, and deficiency of good water, the programme was carried out remarkably well. The instructions of the commanding general, Field-Marshal Jovanovich, to advance with the utmost possible circumspection, and to prosecute the work connected with the occupation in the most



peaceful way, rendered it necessary to delay a day in Ljubuski, whither the division, after crossing the frontier on the 2nd of August, was directed, difficulties having presented themselves in connection with the accommodation of the troops at Mostar. Meanwhile, serious disturbances had broken out in that town, caused by the agitations of fugitive Turks from Niksich. To these tumults several prominent officials there, among them a Kaimakam, who were willing to submit to the Austrian occupation, fell victims. A certain Alievaz Ali Effendi usurped the direction of affairs in the town and the Imperial consul-general had to flee to Metkovich. In face of these events Field-Marshal Jovanovich, at the head of the whole division, on the 3rd of August began his march hither, reaching Cerna that same day. On the 4th the advanced guard (the mountain brigade of Colonel von Klimburg), with a Jäger battalion commanded by Lieutenant von Kloss, encountered an armed insurgent force of from five to six hundred men occupying Citluk, who received them with a volley of rifle shots. An engagement ensued, resulting in the expulsion of the insurgents from their good position, our losses being four men wounded, of the Jäger battalion. Two houses of the Place Brotno during the fight caught fire. The division remained at Citluk on the 4th, and on the 5th of August resumed their march towards Mostar. By noon the 2nd brigade took possession of all the heights commanding that town, while the commander despatched General Theodorovich, at the head of a mountain brigade, direct into the place itself, his march being covered by the 2nd brigade. Fully empowered deputies of the town came, however, and declared their complete submission. General Theodorovich occupied the town that same evening, the 2nd brigade keeping their posts on the hills, and the 3rd, under General von Schluderer, making their encampment in the Jesenica valley. To-day the entry of the whole division, under Field-Marshal Jovanovich, was effected. Deputations of all classes, the clergy of all creeds, and the foreign consuls resident there, came and sought audience at the

head-quarters. The occupation was carried out in excellent order, with the evident sympathy of all grades of the population, who lined on both sides the long column of soldiers defiling into the town. As the last line finally merged into one compact body the National Anthem arose as with one voice from the whole organised force, which, in spite of the great fatigues the soldiers had undergone, looked fresh and vigorous. Notwithstanding the enormous difficulties connected with this branch of the service, the commissariat is on a satisfactory footing."

General Jovanovich reported progress as follows:—"On the afternoon of the 5th of August the Imperial troops took possession of Mostar unopposed, and on the following day the commander of the division received deputations of the inhabitants of all three confessions in his camp. At noon the entry of the troops into the Herzegovinian capital was effected in exemplary order. Thereupon Baron Jovanovich appointed a new man in room of the murdered Kaimakam. The Austrian troops are animated by the best spirit."

As may be supposed, the hostility displayed by the Mahomedan population, and the suspicion that this hostility was nursed secretly by the Turkish government, did not promote the efforts of the diplomatists to agree upon the terms of a convention. The Austrian government began to realise the fact that it would have no simple military promenade in the occupied country, and it was obliged to turn its attention to the increase and strengthening of the armies under Generals Philippovich and Jovanovich. Fresh levies were therefore sent to the front in all haste, and the country at once regarded the matter as a very serious one. The discontent of the Hungarians, indeed, was aggravated by the fact that the losses at Maglai, as well as in subsequent brushes with the enemy, fell very heavily upon their own countrymen in the ranks.

The Vienna correspondent, already quoted, wrote on the 7th of August:—"Having regard to the underhand insurrectionary movements betraying themselves from different sides, and the

conflicts which are increasing, there presses itself on the notice of military authorities the question as to what additions are to be made to the military forces, so as to keep open the different lines of supplies and defend them by sufficient bodies of troops. According to universal report, two new divisions, at present only on a peace footing, are to this end to be directed to the southern frontier of the kingdom.

"According to trustworthy information which arrived here some days ago, the inhabitants of Broaka, on the Servian frontiers, presumably at the instigation of the Kaimakam there, rose up in arms to oppose the Austrian occupation. The intelligence which comes from that quarter to-day is, happily, of a very different strain, announcing that the people of that place have reconsidered the matter, and in a public assembly lately held came to the resolution to throw away their arms and meet the Imperial troops in the most friendly spirit. Whether this change of sentiment on the part of the people of Broaka is entirely due to the approach of Count Szapary's troops marching against Svornik, or whether instructions from Constantinople have operated to this effect, I am not in a position to determine. It is, at any rate, an established fact that lately the Porte most solemnly disclaimed having given the Kaimakam any instructions or suggestions to resist the Austrian progress. The Turkish government has, on the contrary, it emphatically repeats, given express orders to all its representatives, in all parts of the provinces to be occupied, not to oppose the Austrian troops. Lately, indeed, actual commands to that effect are said to have issued from the Porte, though the fact that they have been delayed till insurrection has established itself in the heart of Bosnia, and her authority is set at naught, detracts somewhat from their value. Meanwhile the negotiations between Caratheodori Pacha and the government here regarding the Austro-Turkish Convention are dragging their slow length along. Contrary to one telegraphic announcement that Caratheodori Pacha had received instructions from Constantinople

to sign the convention with Austria, I am able to state most positively that yesterday the Turkish plenipotentiary referred to confidentially confessed that the latest directions he had received from his government insisted on fixing a limit of time for the Austrian occupation, and, therefore, offered no basis on which any arrangement could be effected. He had consequently, he said, no prospect but that of leaving Vienna with that business in no way further advanced."

Some difficulty, or rather a menace of difficulty, arose between Austria and Servia, the latter country being at one time suspected of harbouring and assisting the insurgents in the east of Bosnia, who took refuge across the frontier, and returned to carry on the fight. But no such violation of neutrality was brought home to the Servian government.

The Austrian troops behaved with considerable magnanimity in the majority of their movements. The main column of the 13th Army Corps had no difficulty in occupying Maglai; but they took no sanguinary revenge for the treacherous massacre of the Hussars. The commander telegraphed from Maglai on the 6th:—

"Yesterday, the 5th inst., at 8 A.M., amid pouring rain, the main column began its march to Maglai. By five o'clock that same morning the wing columns had already been set in motion thither, in order that all the different parts of the forces might concentrate simultaneously upon Maglai. The march was very toilsome, the ground having been churned into a puddle by the rains, and the troops having to wade ankle-deep in the mud. To the north of Mosevar, from a height commanding the valley on the west, some stray shots were discharged on our men by insurgents who, safe in their wood resort, could not be followed up. At 4.30 P.M. the vanguard stood in front of Maglai. Lieutenant Pittel, commanding the left wing, was also on the ground, and sent some gunshots into the insurgent camp on the left bank of the Bosna. Finding their quarters getting rather hot for them they attempted a retreat towards Zepce, but at Caiskopolje, on their way thither,



were encountered by Colonel Kinnart at the head of the right wing, who galled them sorely both on flank and rear. A battle ensued, lasting half an hour, which cost the insurgents two flags and a quantity of arms, munitions, and provisions, besides heaps of slain. A single detachment of twenty men was pressed into the Bosna, where they were all drowned. It was now late in the evening, and the troops were much fatigued, and General Philippovich did not consider it advisable to send his cavalry alone after the routed enemy into the defile of Zepce. The behaviour of the troops in this engagement was exemplary. In particular, that of the 4th battalion of the Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 4, distinguished itself, both by the loss it inflicted on the enemy and by the admirable discipline it maintained. The losses of the Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 7, were one man killed and three wounded; of the Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 47, one man killed and eight wounded. The exhaustion of the troops, produced by an accumulation of trials, severe marches, wet bivouacks, and long-delayed supplies, caused by the wretched state of the roads—induced the commander of the Corps to decree the 5th of August as a day of rest to the weary soldiers.

“Maglai, except for a few Christian families, was found deserted of all its citizens, and there was, therefore, no use in trying to visit an empty town with merited punishment. On the march from Doboi to Maglai several hussars belonging to the 5th squadron were picked up in the woods, where they had fled for refuge, in the last degree of exhaustion. In all, twenty-five men were recovered to us in this way, which brings down the losses of the 5th squadron of Hussars from seventy to forty-five men. Some dead hussars were found maimed in a most shocking manner; and several people in the town, declared by the inhabitants themselves to be insurgents, and on whom were detected several articles which had been the personal property of murdered hussars, were, according to the martial law, there and then shot.”

The conduct of the Austrians in the occupied

towns appears to have been wise and humane. Thus, according to intelligence received from Mostar, under date the 7th of August, regarding the 18th Division, Baron Jovanovich is, above everything, anxious to introduce order into all the government departments of the Herzegovinian capital, the insurrection which raged there, and the murder of the governor, having opened the floodgates of confusion and anarchy in all branches of the administration. The insurgents having put to death five government officials, among them the Kadi, the Commander, Baron Jovanovich, set up the Ulema Omer Fendi Lugio in room of the latter. The necessary arrangements were also made regarding the disposal of the war material found in the place, and of the official and government archives, as also for the disarmament of the insurgent part of the population. Another task of the divisional commander is to restore telegraphic and other communication with Dalmatia. On the forenoon after the entry into Mostar all the officials of the place were presented to Baron Philippovich, while all the most important citizens came to express their delight at the way in which law and order were being restored. The municipality resolved to send a telegram of allegiance to his Majesty the king and emperor. Meanwhile, the Austrian troops, despite the comprehensive measures taken to facilitate their task, are encountering daily difficulties. The latest news tells of an uprising in Trebinje, which compelled the Austrian Consul-General Verceovich to take to flight, towards Ragusa, it is said. In Ratza and Bjelina, too, near the Servian frontier, anarchy is said to reign, the contagious result apparently of the armed insurrection at Broka. According to trustworthy tidings just arrived from Srajevo, the insurgents are said to have subsequently attacked and plundered the residence of Monsignor Wussitch, the Roman Catholic Bishop here, forcing the holy man to take to speedy flight.”

An account of the engagement at Zepce on the 7th of August was given in a despatch from the Austrian head-quarters, in which it was

stated that Turkish regulars were present in considerable force, under their officers. The course of the battle was as follows:—The 6th Division, followed by the corps train, set out from Maglai in three columns. “Their chief body, under the divisional commander, took the highway, its vanguard being led by Colonel-Brigadier Polz; the right wing, under Colonel Kinnart, advanced by way of Lopatovech and Novisch; while the left wing, commanded by Lieutenant Pittel, marched through Brankovich and Vinistje. The enemy had taken up, as their first position, the Velja Planina. By eight in the morning the right wing, having pushed forward at a rapid pace, engaged in a skirmish, lasting till noon, with the enemy’s advanced posts. The column under Lieutenant Pittel encountered at Brankovich considerably superior hostile forces, which, however, manfully fighting his way step by step, he succeeded in driving to their second positions. At eleven the battle began along the whole line. The enemy brought four guns and a rocket battery into the field, and Baron Philippovich, with his staff, was repeatedly exposed to their fire. At 3.30, amid a severe storm, the enemy were dislodged from their first position, and, with considerably reduced numbers, were driven back to a strong position on the height of the pass, which was at once assailed by the 27th Jäger battalion, supported by infantry from the centre. At 3.30 the block-house was captured and an Antalion battalion of Redifs taken prisoners. At six the enemy were in flight along the whole line. At seven, when we entered Zepce, the place was found deserted by its Mahomedan inhabitants. According to calculations which were made, the strength of the enemy amounted to at least six thousand men, three thousand of whom are reckoned to have fought with our left wing. Many of the latter were killed, and over four hundred made prisoners, among them three hundred and sixty-one regulars, soldierly-looking men, with a staff-officer and six officers. The Turkish regulars were well clothed, and rejoiced in the good reception they met at the hands of our brave troops. Yesterday they were de-

spatched to Maglai. Our losses were six dead, among them being Lieutenant Kubin von Hartung, and fifty-eight wounded. To-day is given as a day of rest.”

Baron Philippovich, at the close of his report of this affair, said:—“The courage, and more particularly the endurance of all the troops who took part in this battle, were remarkable. The 27th Jäger battalion displayed singular activity and efficiency. The enormous difficulties connected with the bringing of supplies on the only road which exists, and which is in a very bad state, and the necessity of repairing bridges which had been destroyed by floods, induced the commander to decree the troops one day of rest.”

The following interesting details of the fighting at Zepce and Maglai are from a report in the ‘*Tagblatt*’:—“According to the statements of those taken prisoners, the number of the insurgents who fought at Zepce amounted to six thousand five hundred. Besides the trophies already reported, the 27th Jäger battalion captured four munition waggons, together with the horses. The insurgents who crossed the river by a ford above a Turkish cemetery, retreated in far better order than those of the left wing, who, hard pressed by the battalion under Colonel von Hartung, fled in complete disorder towards Golubinje. Arms, baggage, and munition pouches, lying in irregular heaps as they had been thrown away, marked the track the insurgents had followed, and betokened the haste with which they had fled from their pursuing victors. Little bundles of Kaimés or Turkish paper money were also picked up, not, however, the issue of the Ottoman bank in Constantinople, but a kind prepared at Serajevo, and compulsorily put in circulation throughout Bosnia. A red silk flag, bearing the inscription, ‘Death to the foreigner,’ was also captured, and a number of important documents in the Turkish language was taken possession of.

“The troops who, with such surprising dexterity succeeded in making prisoners the regular Turkish battalion, form the second company,



under the command of Captain Schmidt, belonging to the 27th Jäger battalion, and the same body escorted their captives to Maglai. They have been interned in the fortress there, to be supported at the expense of the community. The insurgents found with arms in their hands have been tried by court-martial. One of them was lately executed. This morning two other insurgents were shot. One of them, a gray-headed Zaptieh, sixty-three years old, was one of the murderers of Lieutenant Count Chormsky, of the Hussar squadron, whose boots he was found wearing. The other was a young insurgent leader, who, having been wounded at the capture of Maglai, had hidden himself among the brushwood on the Bosnian bank, where he was found with fourteen thousand five hundred fl. which he had plundered. He having been convicted of being one of the murderers of Lieutenant Haydeck, the commander-in-chief could not extend him pardon. Yesterday, the bodies of Lieutenant-Colonel Kubin and Lieutenant-Count Chorinsky were buried."

From Kotorosko a correspondent wrote to the same paper:—"The insurgents set fire to this place and the village on the other side of the river. The road is meanwhile deserted by the insurgents. While I am writing this telegram the weather is beginning to clear. I also just hear that the emperor has commissioned the commander, Philippovich, to express to the troops his thanks and acknowledgments for the courage and steady bearing they manifested against the enemy, as also to the engineers for the distinguished services they had rendered. The inhabitants of this place assure me that the insurgents suffered a complete defeat on the 7th at Zepce. Vranduk, and the whole defile as far as Sienica, are said to have been evacuated by them. It is proper, however, to wait for confirmation of this last intelligence. In Zepce order has been restored. Our military prevented the people from plundering Mahomedan houses. The Kaimakam has been re-established in his functions. Field telegraphs have been constructed as far as Doboi."

The Montenegrins behaved very well during the Austrian occupation. The prince posted a small detachment of troops in the neighbourhood of Zubci and Grahovo, in order to guard the frontier, and hold the turbulent native elements in check. Two companies of Turkish Nizams, coming from Trebinje, having asked from the Montenegrins to be allowed to pass by way of Bilek to Foca, were refused permission, and were commanded to disarm and let themselves be interned.

Meanwhile that column of the corps which had entered Bosnia from the north, and which was under the lead of the Duke of Wurtemberg, advanced steadily, and on the 11th of August captured Travnik, the ancient capital. This was well on the way to Serajevo, and the Mussulmans did not attempt to make a stand on the road. They fell back to Serajevo, where it was expected that a hard struggle would have to be fought. There had been much disorder in the Bosnian capital, where Hafiz Pacha, the governor, had been expelled from office, and Hadji Loja had been for a time supreme. The discord, however, had been healed, and the authority of Hafiz had been in part restored. It was stated that the Porte had sent word to Hafiz Pacha to make his submission to the Austrians, and to secure good terms for the surrender of Serajevo. The fiery dervish would not listen to this proposal; and it seems that the pacha had a very difficult part to play in the matter.

One division of the Austrian forces had been despatched eastward, towards Swornik, near the Servian frontier, under Count Szapary; and its progress was not so satisfactory as that of the other division. According to the Vienna correspondent previously quoted, this part of the forces of occupation, in advancing through a district which showed decided hostility, had important outpost engagements at Gracanica and Hamperkovach on the 4th and 8th of August respectively, and on the two following days was drawn into very obstinate conflicts immediately before Tuzla. "The exhaustion of the troops, and the insurmountable difficulties connected

with the transport of supplies—most of the beasts employed in this service having succumbed to the hardships of the way, and men being requisitioned to draw the carts—induced Count Szapary, for the sake of securing the line of communication till the necessary transport assistance was forwarded him, and fresh provisions arrived, to fall back upon Gracanica. The retreat is said to have been made under great difficulties, but in the best order."

There can be no doubt that this retreat was very disastrous for the Austrians. General Szapary, in a despatch from Doboi, stated that, on the 13th, the division commanded by him was vigorously attacked. The assailants were repulsed, but on the following day the division continued its retrograde march to Doboi, on account of a lack of ammunition." The troops, who were worn out with fatigue, effected the march in excellent order, though they were constantly harassed by bands of insurgents. All the wounded officers and soldiers, and the entire train, were safely brought back, though, in accomplishing this task, the troops, with much labour and self-sacrifice, had, in great part, to drag or push the waggons along themselves over very bad roads."

This disaster naturally revived the suspicions of the Austrians that the Turkish government was playing them false, and that the hostility of the Mussulmans was inflamed by agents from Constantinople. The "Times" correspondent at Vienna wrote as follows:—"The momentary reverses which have befallen a few detachments of the Austrian army in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially the forced retreat to Doboi of General Szapary's division, have produced a considerably depressing effect here. Anxiety is felt lest, in the event of General Szapary not speedily receiving the necessary reinforcements, he should be attacked and driven from his present place of defence, thereby leaving General Philippovich's line of retreat in imminent danger from the insurgents. While these apprehensions are entertained by the public and ventilated in the press, a much calmer view is taken of the

situation in competent military circles. The retreat of General Szapary is there regarded as one of those small checks which, even in the most successful warfare, can scarcely be avoided. While, however, in view of the ample reinforcements which are being collected, the result of the war cannot be at all doubtful, it is here clearly perceived that General Szapary, as soon as his forces have been raised to the due strength, or possibly a successor to his command, will have an entirely new campaign to begin in the direction which has hitherto been unsuccessfully followed. Hafiz Pacha's confession that thirty regular Turkish battalions fought in the ranks of the insurgents against the Austrians, created quite a sensation here, and has greatly embittered the minds of the people against the Porte. It is here understood that all the opposition on the part of Bosnia against the Austrian occupation, from the insurrection of Hadji Loja, down to the most recent conflicts, has been contrived at Stamboul and hypocritically imputed to the refractory spirit of the Bosnians.

"Whatever may transpire regarding the presumed Austro-Turkish Convention, it is certain that the underhand dealings of the Porte have brought about a change in the relations of this government with Turkey which a short time ago would have been deemed impossible. It is recognised in official circles here that the Servians have made every exertion to keep back the turbulent elements in the principality from joining the Mahomedan Bosnians against Austria, and there are even signs of a considerable *rapprochement* between Austria, Servia, and Montenegro. This, of course, is altogether counter to the advice given to Austria by the "Journal des Debats," to reduce Servia to harmlessness by occupying it."

The same correspondent wrote on the 18th:—"The declinatory attitude of the Porte towards Greece; its delay in evacuating Batoum on the pretext that it cannot possibly let the fortifications fall into the hands of the Lazes, who oppose the step—a pretext reported from Constantinople to the 'Politische Correspondenz,' the armed



resistance to the Austrian occupation of Bosnia; the refusal to yield up the territory assigned by the Congress to Montenegro; and, finally, the organised movement of Albanians in Old Serbia, threatening the Servians in their newly-acquired lands there—are here regarded as so many evidences of a deliberate policy, which aims at stultifying the Berlin Congress and its results. It is the general opinion here, however, that by such a policy the Porte is playing a dangerous game. As to Austria, the Porte by its double dealing, which has cost this country much blood that might have been spared, has put the programme of the Vienna government to a severe trial. The Austrian occupation of Bosnia was intended by the Cabinet here as a preventive to the complete dissolution of the Turkish empire, by opposing an effectual barrier to the further progress of Slav aggression in Turkey, the Vienna Cabinet finds itself checked by the Porte, whom it would befriend, and its own interests thereby endangered. In this juncture of affairs Austria must consult, above all, how to guard her own affairs, and, in her deliberations to that end, the thought cannot but occur to her, whether it would not be easier to come to an understanding with Serbia and Montenegro than with the Porte, an understanding which, for a long period at least, would suffice to protect Austrian interests from danger. It appears, in point of fact, that these considerations have not been absent from the Vienna Cabinet, and that it has actually entered into negotiations with those two minor neighbouring Slav states, which may result in a sympathetic *rapprochement*, on their part, with Austria. In view of public opinion, which regards with suspicion the new ostensible friendship of Serbia and Montenegro, the Austrian government is exerting itself to secure the most incontestable proofs of the sincerity of the two states in their dealings with this country, as in case of their proving in any way false the consequences might be dangerous.

“Contrary to repeated Reuter’s reports from Constantinople regarding the conclusion of an

Austro-Turkish Convention, it is only too certain that none such has been effected. Public opinion, and almost the whole press, declare unanimously against such a convention. Least of all should Count Andrassy venture to conclude a convention recognising the continuance of the sovereignty of the sultan over Bosnia. The effect so far of the Porte’s double dealing is, that no individual in Austria will any longer hear of an eventual restitution of this province to Turkey.

“To day, which commemorates the birth of the emperor, very favourable intelligence has arrived from the seat of operations in Bosnia. General Philippovich has gained brilliant advantages over the enemy at Han Belolovac. In military circles the opinion is expressed that, in consequence of this victory, he ought to reach Serajevo in three days. General Szapary’s division hold fast their position at Doboi, and the enemy, though furnished with guns, did not venture yesterday to deliver any new attack. Soon very considerable reinforcements will arrive to strengthen this military body, when it will resume the offensive.

“A paper of this place alleges that there have been great concentrations of Italian troops in Upper Italy, and that a war council of Italian generals, under the presidency of General Piannett, has been held at Verona, from which no end of serious consequences for Austria are inferred. It is clear that all this is only sensational stuff, having no new facts to rest on. The foreign office here has not received the least indication of any such military tendencies in Italy.”

With regard to the last paragraph, it was of course only natural that Italy should be jealous of the large gain of territory made by her old enemy Austria, with the consent of Europe; and there was an Italian party, numerous and noisy, if not very influential, which demanded compensation from Austria against the latter’s advance on the east of the Adriatic. The demand, however, was unreasonable, as well practically hopeless; and the Italian government took instant

measures to check the demonstrations, so as to avoid all cause of offence with its neighbour.

As to the successes at Han Belalovac, General Philippovich sent full particulars.

From reconnaissances and other sources of information it had been ascertained that considerable bands of insurgents had collected in the wooded defile between Oyciluka and Han Belalovac, and that unless the enemy should again retire at the last moment, some hard fighting might be expected. "Accordingly, on the 15th, Austrian troops were despatched to those two points, where the enemy could most advantageously be provoked into an engagement. On the evening of the same day the left wing column, consisting of Muller's brigade, three battalions, and a mountain battery, stood to the east of Brizej; the middle column, composed of six battalions, one mountain battery, and the reserve artillery, was stationed at Busovaca; while the right wing column, formed by Vilecz's brigade, four battalions, and one mountain battery, was pushed forward towards Stina. On the morning of the 16th these three bodies began to move forward, the left column setting out at 6.30, the right at 5.30, the centre column not advancing till 7.30. The two wing columns were ordered to take the rear of the Belalovac ridge, which it was thought probable would be the main position of the enemy. All the trains were, meanwhile, left behind. The centre column had scarcely passed Busovaca when, at 8.30, Muller's brigade delivered the first gunshot. A cannonade now followed, lasting for half an hour, which drove some detachments of the insurgents from the wooded declivities where, during the night, they had planted themselves, at a distance of two thousand paces from the position of Muller's brigade. At 9.30 the vanguard of the main column encountered the enemy at a point where the road crosses the Kosica brook, and where also the wooded defile begins. The slopes enclosing the brook are not, indeed, steep, but are of very broken and irregular formation, rendering the movements of troops no easy matter. The vanguard, under the personal leadership of

Colonel Popp, soon succeeded, however, in forcing their way into the wood, when a very lively skirmish ensued, in which the 39th Jäger battalion, and two infantry companies from the centre column, as also a battalion of Muller's brigade, took part. Meanwhile, General Philippovich moved up four guns from a light battery of the reserve artillery to a height on the left of the road. The position was an exceedingly favourable one, commanding, as it did, a view of the enemy's position to the summit of the ridge, which was also in part within reach of Austrian shot. To drag up the guns, however, was a task of desperate difficulty. Exactly at 11 the battery gained the summit of the height, and fired the first shot at the very moment when the infantry engagement was waxing hot. This was the turning point in the battle, the artillery at once, and conspicuously, rendering effectual service. The enemy's fire grew weaker. Soon they were seen retreating. As the left wing, however, could only toil slowly and laboriously over difficult ground, and no news had been received of the right wing, General Philippovich ordered the centre, for the meantime, not to advance. At 11.45 was heard from the distance, in the rear of the enemy, a thundering cannonade, proceeding, no doubt, from Vilecz's brigade, who had accomplished the task assigned them. At 5.30 the brigade had started from their bivouac at Stina, had happily overcome the great difficulties of movement, had gained the height to the south of Belalovac, and were now ready for service, when large forces of insurgents, suspecting no harm, were retreating in their direction, and unwittingly offering themselves for execution. Colonel Vilecz at once had his battery in position, and poured volleys down upon the surprised and disordered bands of the insurgents, who, unable to offer any resistance, dropped everything they had with them and straggled up the wooded declivities on the other side of the road. The panic spreading infected also the insurgents appointed to defend the ridge, who left their intrenchments in haste. Four guns which they had placed there they



managed to remove from their position, dragging them probably to wooded heights to the east of the road. When at 2.30, the Austrians reached the enemy's camp, they found twenty tents, with a large number of arms, a great quantity of munition, provisions, clothes, waggons, horses, &c. The brilliant turn given to the battle was due to Villecz's brigade having, at the exact time when needed, taken up the vantage ground, where their shots could avail. Had Muller's brigade not had such great obstructions to clear in their advance, and had they succeeded in pushing over more ground, the insurgents seeking to escape from Villecz's fire would have fallen among shots fired at them from Muller's brigade, when a complete catastrophe would unavoidably have overtaken the insurgents. The victory, however, as it was, was in a moral sense decisive. The losses of the Austrians amount only to the incredibly small number of twelve men; those of the enemy were more considerable in dead, besides one hundred and thirty taken prisoners, two flags, and a mass of field stores."

It was on the 19th of August that Serajevo was taken by the Austrians, after a shorter delay than had been anticipated. The defence of the town collapsed, probably owing to the want of harmony and co-operation amongst the authorities; but a terrible combat was waged by the fanatics, under Hadji Loja, in the streets of the capital. The report of General Philippovich, dated Serajevo, August 19th, was as follows:—

"Lieutenant Field Marshal Tegetthoff, having fought an engagement with the insurgents near Kahani, began his march upon Visoka on the 18th inst. At about 8 A.M. on that day he encountered the enemy, who had occupied a long line from Caici, on the right bank of the Bosna, along the Podvinasaka, to Mount Kraljevae, on the left bank; the hostile forces were rather numerous, especially on the Vratnica, which was held by three rows of Redifs. After a long and desperate engagement, the enemy was driven back to Visoka, which Lieutenant Field Marshal Tegetthoff, after having previously forced the Bosnians

on the left bank to retire, and, after receiving reinforcements, at once proceeded to occupy. He found there a large quantity of arms and ammunition. His losses were two officers, eighty men wounded, and four men killed. Lieutenant Field Marshal Tegetthoff's report respecting the events of the 17th instant, only reached Fieldzeugmeister General Philippovich yesterday morning, and in consequence of this and the fatigue of his troops the commander-in-chief had remained at Blazni, while Lieutenant Field Marshal Tegetthoff advanced as far as Han Seminovas. About 2 P.M., on the 18th, General Philippovich, with two squadrons of Hussars and two guns, made a reconnaissance in the direction of Serajevo. Lieutenant Field Marshal Tegetthoff ascended the Cosarsko Brdo with his whole column. For to-day's operations (19th) the main body was placed under the orders of General Kaiffel, with instructions to ascend the slopes of the Jaran and the Jasarina, and then take the direction of Debelo Brdo and Serajevo. Another column, under Colonel Villotz, was despatched along the road towards Kratinsele; while Lieutenant Field Marshal Tegetthoff was intrusted with the task of gaining the heights of Pasan Brdo. A thick fog favoured the march of the columns, which reached the points assigned to them without loss. At 6.30 A.M. Tegetthoff opened fire upon the castle, which was surrounded by a wall, and in which the insurgents had placed several guns in position. At 7.30 A.M. batteries of heavy guns, which had been brought up near Bunfaill, engaged in the attack upon the castle. At the same time Colonel Villotz attacked the insurgents' position near Krodinselo, which had been strengthened by artillery and intrenchments. Finally, at 10 A.M., General Kaiffel, who had only been able to drive slowly and with difficulty before him the strongly situated forces he encountered, made his appearance on the heights of Debelo Brdo, and thereupon the enemy's guns were silenced. The infantry then advanced in swarms to the town.

"Fighting of the most horrible kind ensued. Our troops were fired upon from house, door-

way, and window. Even women, and the sick and wounded insurgents in the military hospital, took part in the fighting, which lasted until 1.30 P.M. Incredible scenes of the widest fanaticism were enacted, and it was only owing to the good nature and discipline of our troops that the town was not more seriously damaged than is the case. Nevertheless, a few houses were plundered and set on fire. Our losses, unfortunately, are not inconsiderable. The trophies taken cannot yet be accurately stated. The insurgents dispersed in all directions, and especially towards Gorasda and Rogatica. After the close of the fighting, and the complete occupation of the town, the Imperial flag was hoisted over the castle, and saluted with one hundred and one guns, amid the singing of the National Anthem and unceasing acclamations, in which the troops were joined by the Christian inhabitants."

A considerable quantity of military stores and guns, including over twenty large Krupps, was captured at Serajevo. More than six thousand rifles were collected in pursuance of the order for the disarmament of the inhabitants. Among the prisoners taken at the capture of the Bosnian capital were a large number of Turkish soldiers, Nizams and Redifs, of whom two transports, to the number of fifty-five officers and eight hundred and thirty soldiers, were escorted to Brod.

It was observed that Hadji Loja was already wounded, before the assault on the town began. The story went that, on the 12th of August, a movement was made against Hadji Loja, with the object of seizing him, removing him from Serajevo, and giving up the town without opposition to the Austrians. "A Turkish inferior officer was found, who determined, with the help of several resolute companions, to accomplish the arrest of Hadji Loja. The latter, who had been apprised of their intention against him, paid a visit next day, August 13th, to the Konak, to see who would have the courage to lay hands upon him, and as he left the Konak, his gun fell from his hand, and the charge entered his foot."

A day or two after the capture, Caratheodori Pacha had an audience of Count Andrassy, at which, in the name of the Porte, he begged that leniency might be shown to the inhabitants of Serajevo for the irregularities they had committed. He was informed that instructions to that effect would be sent to the commander-in-chief, and it would appear that the Austrian general treated the town with much forbearance. With no unnecessary delay, a communal council was formed at Serajevo, composed of eighteen respectable citizens of all confessions—namely, five Mahomedans, three Catholics, six of the Orthodox faith, and four Jews. From this body, Fazli Pacha, the former civil governor, was appointed mayor. He was a man held in great respect among the citizens of the town, and of stainless reputation. With the consent of the commander of the army, a collection was set on foot on behalf of the Mahomedan families who were proved not to have taken part with the insurgents, and who, by the insurrection and bombardment, had been reduced to want and misery.

The Vienna correspondent, from whom these details are derived, wrote, on the 2nd of September:—"Day by day the news received here shows that the insurrectionary movement in those parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina occupied by the Austrian troops is at its last extremity. The isolated smaller divisions of the insurgents are scattering and returning to their homes, while detachments of Turkish soldiers are laying down their arms, and are being sent, *vid* Albania, to Constantinople. This applies more particularly to Herzegovina, where the calm and attentive attitude of General Joannovich has always borne good fruit, and often been the cause of preventing bloodshed. Yesterday's news shows that, at Trebinje, the only place of any importance in Herzegovina, which at the present moment is not in the hands of the Austrians, a regular battle has broken out between the Turks who hold the citadel and the insurgents. The Turkish garrison refuse to give up the citadel to the insurgents. If this resolution of the garri-



son holds good for a short time, the fate of the insurgents in and around Trebinje will soon be settled. It is stated to-day, on very good authority, that the Austrian troops in the forward march already have possession of Foca. If this be true, then the insurgents are already caught between the Austrian and Turkish cross fire.

"From the Zwornik district we have no trustworthy news to-day, except that the main body of the insurgents is stationed near Tuzla, and evidently aspiring to attack the troops under Count Szapary at Doboi, though these have hitherto repelled all assaults. As considerable reinforcements, however, must by this time have joined the count, we hourly expect to hear news of his having resumed the offensive. Well-informed military authorities, however, are of opinion that this can only be the case in a day or two, as a simultaneous movement in the direction of Serajevo seems undoubtedly to be in contemplation. Were this feasible, the insurgents would have their retreat cut off, and be forced to capitulate without more ado."

Count Szapary was not fated to crush his enemies so easily, though he did something more than hold them in check. On the 5th of the month he sent the following bulletin to Vienna:—

"Early this morning four battalions and two guns, under Pistory, were sent forward towards Tesanj to disarm the place, a task they accomplished. Simultaneously with this movement five companies of the 29th Foot Regiment made a successful advance from Doboi to reconnoitre the front of the enemy's position on the right bank of the Bosna. The insurgents having assembled in considerable force on the road to Maglai, on the other side of the river, a further offensive movement was undertaken by the 54th Regiment in the direction of Lipaz. At eleven o'clock in the forenoon an engagement began, and the above-named foot regiment encountered most stubborn resistance. I therefore saw good to push forward the 8th Foot and a mountain battery, under Baron Waldstätten, in support. After a tough encounter of seven hours the insurgents were repulsed at all points, and

pursued till nightfall, as far as it was possible to do so from the peculiar nature of the ground. The favourable issue of this combat is due to the distinguished conduct of Baron Waldstätten and the great bravery of the troops, of which I myself was an eye-witness. Our losses are not yet ascertained, but amount in any case to over one hundred and thirty men, mostly wounded. The insurgents were in great numbers and provided with guns."

On the 7th it was reported that "the commandant of Bjelina, the most strongly-fortified of the insurgent positions, has ordered all non-combatants to leave the town immediately. The Vienna and Pesth journals of yesterday, moreover, announced that operations on a large scale were about to be resumed, more particularly in the valley of the Lower Drina. General Szapary telegraphs from Doboi under to-day's date that a portion of the defeated troops of the insurgents were dispersed in various directions, while the remainder retreated behind Sprezza. The Austrians hold the road between Gracanica, Trbuk, and Maglai, and are engaged in fortifying their position. The losses on the 5th inst. consist of five officers and sixty men killed, thirteen officers, and three hundred and thirty men wounded, and thirty-four missing. General Zach, in a despatch from Zavalje dated to-day, reports that obstinate fighting occurred to-day on his right wing. The two most important outworks of Bihać were captured by the Austrians, but the positions before their left wing were still in possession of the enemy."

The Austrians naturally received some assistance from the Christian inhabitants. Thus, a former chief of the insurgents, who took part in the rising against Turkish rule in Herzegovina, a Roman Catholic priest named Music, placed himself, with one thousand three hundred Catholic guerilleros, at the disposal of the Austrian General Joannovich, and was said to have rendered excellent service in skirmishes against the Mahomedans.

The fortune of war went, on the whole, very steadily with the Austrians, though they suf-

ferred heavy losses on some occasions, as at the taking of Trebinje, Bihacs, and Kljuc. According to a despatch of the 9th, "after the occupation of Trebinje by the Austrians, half a battalion of Austrian troops, which had been left behind at the Trebinjica bridge, was attacked by the insurgents, who were, however, completely repulsed, after an engagement of an hour's duration. The Austrian loss in the affair was one lieutenant and six men killed, and eight missing. The Austrian troops encamped near Trebinje were also harassed by musketry fire proceeding from the insurgent blockhouses in the neighbourhood, against which two companies of troops were subsequently despatched. In the engagement at Bihacs two Austrian officers were killed, and sixteen officers and four hundred men wounded. Among the officers wounded were Colonel le Gay and Lieutenant-Colonel Kokotovich. There are also two officers missing." The losses at Kljuc were ten officers and two hundred and fifty men dead and wounded.

After a little further trouble, General Szapary compelled the insurgents to fall back before him, took Swornik, and cleared Eastern Bosnia. The Mahomedans retreated to Novi-Bazar, and in a few weeks the occupation of the country was practically concluded.

It was during the progress of these events, in the first week of September, that the unfortunate Mehemet Ali, sent by the Porte to arrange the surrender of Podgoritzza to Montenegro, was murdered by the Albanian Mussulmans near Jakova. The Vienna correspondent of the "Times" thus described the circumstances of his death :—

"News to hand from Constantinople tends to throw some light, though very scanty, on the terrible massacre at Ipek. It seems clear that at Gusinje, Plava, and Kolasin, even before the arrival of Mehemet Ali, the most complete anarchy had gained the upper hand. On arriving in Jakova the Mushir found the greatest excitement prevailing among the inhabitants. He was violently upbraided with having come up to hand over the land to the Servians. The agita-

tion went on increasing, finding vent especially in vehement abuse of Abdullah Pacha, and the house selected by Mehemet Ali for a lodging was set on fire by the Albanians of Jakova and Ipek. This done, there arose, between the incendiaries and Mehemet Ali's escort, a regular fight, in the course of which twenty men of the latter fell. Towards evening, through the intervention of some Ulemas, the conflict was appeased, the insurgents promising to observe a peaceful attitude. About 6 in the evening, however, in Jakova, where Mehemet Ali still remained, the struggle broke out afresh, resulting in the death of the Mushir's Adjutant, Abdullah Pacha, with several officers, and the house in which they had taken refuge was fired. Nevertheless, Mehemet Ali succeeded in escaping from the burning building and concealing himself in a small erection close by, but his hiding-place was soon discovered, and he, too, was mercilessly put to death. The commander-in-chief had previously summoned to his assistance two companies of foot from Prisrend, for the fate of whom the gravest apprehensions are now felt in Constantinople."

A very interesting account of this remarkable man was given by M. de Blowitz, who had met him at the Congress. Writing from Paris, M. de Blowitz said :—

"It is thought by many here that Mehemet Ali's assassination is not due to Albanians alone, but that the jealousies he had excited may have had something to do with this strange end of a strange life. His presence as second Plenipotentiary at the Berlin Congress brought into still greater prominence his striking features, and the singular mixture in him of European good nature and subtlety with Turkish stolidity and fatalism. Mehemet Ali, as is well known, sprang from a Huguenot family, which on the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes migrated from France to Germany. He joined a German merchantman as cabin boy, escaped, at the age of eleven, to Constantinople, and entered the household of Ali Pacha, who speedily, struck by his intelligence, gave him military instruction, and made



him enter the army, in which he eventually gained the high position he held at the outbreak of the late war. His nomination as plenipotentiary was not so strange as appeared at first sight. He was acquainted with the Russians, spoke German and French fluently, had a more supple mind than most of the eligible Turks, and had much more culture and aptitude than could have been found elsewhere. Nothing in his physiognomy could have made him be mistaken for a Turk; and when he happened to doff his fez he showed the purest conceivable German type. His accent, whatever language he used, was also German; but he had a liveliness of disposition rather recalling his French extraction, and in France he would have been familiarly described as a *bon enfant*. At Berlin he had to display prodigies of skill to maintain a position essentially false; but he ultimately won a certain popularity among the members of the Congress. He amused them by the originality of his situation and character. He one evening delayed the whole Frontier Delimitation Commission by reciting a poem he had written in German, full of sentiment and delicacy, entitled 'The Rose of Jericho.' Prince Bismarck one day said of him:—

"'It would very much amuse one to chat with Mehemet Ali, who must be a very shrewd man to have reached his present position; but I cannot do so. I must not be unmindful of the dignity of the emperor whom I represent, and who must have been hurt at the selection of him as plenipotentiary. I can understand his escaping when eleven years old from a German vessel; I should, perhaps, have done the same; but to think that, being French and German, he made himself Turkish, and that, being a Turk, and having made his way as he has done, he should agree to come here and parade before his countrymen his new creed and defend its interests against the representatives of Christian Europe—I cannot help feeling I was justified in adopting towards him the attitude I shall retain all through.'

"The prince, in fact, never for a moment de-

viated from an attitude of which Mehemet Ali was conscious, and even complained privately, but which he was careful not to notice publicly. Contrary to custom, there was no exchange of decorations between the Powers represented at the Congress, each remaining free to give or withhold them. At Berlin it was affirmed that Germany wished thereby to avoid the obligation of bestowing a grand cross on Mehemet Ali, who, it was added, only desired to go to the Congress for the sake of obtaining it. The consciousness of this position, however, did not affect his good humour. He was one of the merriest guests at the diplomatic dinners, and if he drank pure water it was to drink wine without diluting it. When in an amiable mood he was the first to condemn the abuses and red-tapeism of Turkey, and he once related to me, in a graphic way, the troubles of a Turkish peasant who started from Novi-Bazar with wheat for the Ottoman commissariat, and was forced to stop three days and secure twenty-two signatures before he could draw a Turkish pound to meet his expenses during that time. I may add that one evening, in a fit of frankness, he confessed that the Porte had not ventured to hope to leave the Congress with such advantageous conditions as had been conceded to it. Apart from these candid moments, he was extremely discreet, and no effort could succeed in extracting from him what he meant to conceal. He did not speak much at the Congress, but, in accepting his mission, he refused to pursue an obstructive policy; and when he declared he had no instructions, this was really the fact, for it was he who induced his two colleagues to sign the treaty including the Greek clause; their instructions did not authorise their doing so. At fashionable gatherings he was amiable and playful with men, and very gallant with women. He was not, perhaps, the most polished of diplomats, but he had a vivacity and liveliness which made him welcome. He certainly rendered great services to Turkey. He said what he wanted to say laughingly, but he said it. He was natural and unembarrassed with everybody.

Bismarck alone awed him, and he jocosely remarked, 'That devil of a man! When he looks at me he has always the air of saying, 'Ab, if you were still a German, I would lead you a pretty dance.' He was fond of Germany and France, and had an idea of coming to Paris to see the end of the exhibition. It was very interesting to listen to him on military subjects, and he mixed spicy anecdotes with his account of the campaign on the Lom. He admitted the necessity of reforms, of popularising education, and checking the finances; but it was difficult to tell whether he did this to win over his listeners to the side of Turkey, or whether he spoke from conviction. He certainly made people believe in the possibility of a reformed and regenerated Turkey. His death is a loss for that country, if not for humanity, and if he does not leave the deep impression among those who knew him which is created by really superior minds, he leaves at least that of a man who felt what he owed to his adopted country, and served it with a sincere but not unselfish devotion, characteristic of all who serve Turkey; for he, too, though not born a Mussulman, was convinced that the fatherland is neither in Europe, nor in Asia, nor in Africa, but wherever the standard of the prophet is unfurled."

Scarcely was the insurrection over, and the military occupation complete, when the Porte gave an instance of its political unwisdom and want of diplomatic perception by forwarding to the Austrian government a formal complaint against the cruelties of the Austrians towards the Mahomedan populations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The fact seems to have been that the Austrian soldiers had behaved with considerable forbearance to the insurgents; and the complaint of the Turks was generally felt to be an absurd one.

The communication which Caratheodori Pacha was instructed to make to the Cabinet of Vienna was to the following effect:—"The Austrian government began to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina before the ratification of the treaty, and without coming to an understanding with the

Porte. Negotiations for a convention have been carried on for a considerable time; but the Porte has been unable to obtain the insertion of two points contained in the declaration made by the Austrian plenipotentiary at Berlin on the 13th of July. The first was, that the occupation should not infringe the sovereign rights of the sultan, and the second, that the occupation should be provisional. Besides this, atrocities have been committed which the sultan, as caliph, could not cover by making a convention at the present moment. The Porte, therefore, refuses to sign a convention, even though the Cabinet of Vienna should be ready to insert the above two points. In conclusion, it is requested that the Austrian troops should not advance towards Novi-Bazar, as an attempt to occupy that part of the country would lead to very serious consequences." A circular note, containing an account of the atrocities said to have been committed by the Austrian troops was despatched to the Powers, in order to give weight to the protest against the advance on Novi-Bazar.

Count Andrassy sent the following dignified rejoinder, addressed to the Austrian Ambassador at the Porte:—"Vienna, Oct. 14.—"The Turkish Ambassador has presented a circular about acts of cruelty which have been committed by our troops of occupation. You will receive a copy of it by post. First, we repudiate with indignation these accusations, which are as unexpected as they are contrary to truth. They will not deceive any one in Europe, where the respect which the Imperial and Royal army inspires, and its reputation, are too firmly established to be reached by calumnious insinuations. What strikes one at once in the Turkish circular is the evidence on which they are founded. The connivance of Hafiz Pacha with the disturbances in Bosnia and Herzegovina is no secret to any one. Our consul-general in Serajevo has notified and proved it to us a long time ago. In the publication of his report we have suppressed the passages referring to it out of consideration for the Porte, not wishing to compromise publicly one of its high functionaries, whose disloyal



attitude would have reflected on the Porte itself. What strikes us, in the second place, is that the Porte should have thought it compatible with its dignity to bring before the great Cabinets such grave accusations on a foundation so erroneous, without having even addressed itself previously to the Imperial and Royal government, which would have given it every facility to convince itself of the untruth of the reports which have reached it. It is repugnant to us to refute in detail the accusations which the circular enumerates. We must, however, record (*constater*) that at Banjaluka our soldiers have confined themselves to repelling the attack undertaken by barbarous hordes against the hospital occupied by sick, wounded, and dying Bosnians, as well as Austro-Hungarians; and that at Serrajevo only a few houses have been burnt, not as a measure of retaliation after the taking of the town, but as a natural consequence of the fierce and sanguinary contests which took place in the streets. Although fanatics fired on our troops from the windows and the attics, the town has been neither burnt nor sacked. There has been no act of pillage on the part of our troops. Frequently, on the contrary, our soldiers have prevented pillage on the part of the natives. As regards all that precedes, foreign and military correspondents confirm the official bulletins. Let the Porte compare the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Imperial and Royal troops with that accomplished in 1851 and 1852 by Omar Pacha, with the object of introducing the Tanzimat. We had to fight the same elements with which Turkey had to do then—elements which the Turkish ministers themselves have characterised to you quite lately as untamable savages. We have accomplished in two months what it took Omar Pacha two years to accomplish. While his army lived on requisitions, and while he drew up long lists of proscriptions and executions, which he kept at the disposal of the Porte, and in which figured distinctly a large number of persons of every religion, and, above all, several Pachas and many Beys, we have paid ready money for everything, and our mili-

tary tribunals have only executed a few individuals, whose participation in the horrible atrocities committed on our soldiers or Turkish functionaries and foreigners had, after the most scrupulous trial, been proved by evidence. Let the Porte, then, compare this legal and humane proceeding of our troops with the massacre and mutilation of our wounded. As regards the accusation relating to the transportation into Austria of Ottoman soldiers who had not even fought, we can really not wonder sufficiently at the shortness of the memory of the Porte. Does the Porte not remember that, without even waiting for the end of the struggle, we have sent back to their homes thousands of men who, faithful to the honourable traditions of every army which respects itself, have refused to participate in an insurrection organised by men without faith or law, and issued from the scum of the population, and who, after having murdered the officers and the Ottoman functionaries, established a reign of terror and plunder? We record here with satisfaction that in general the respectable classes have not taken part in the movement except in some localities, and in the case of some individuals who, in order to escape confiscation and massacre, had to submit to the yoke of the insurgents until our soldiers arrived. The spirit in which the occupation was undertaken is patent in our proclamation. If, instead of proclaiming the respect of all confessions, we had unfurled the flag of the deliverance of the Christians, the task which we are accomplishing would certainly have demanded fewer sacrifices. But this would have been a signal for the extermination of the Mahomedans, whom it was our duty to protect as much as the Christians. In spite of the savage treachery, so contrary to the laws of war, like that at Maglai, the Imperial and Royal army, in which discipline and generosity are traditional virtues, has felt in honour bound to accomplish its mission in the spirit of the European mandate and of our proclamation, which, by order of his Majesty the emperor and king, my august master, has preceded the entry of our troops. The odious columnies launched

against it cannot reach it, but they cannot but revolt public feeling in Austria-Hungary. It is my duty to repudiate them, and to notify to the Porte the bad effect which they could not fail to produce here. Your excellency will communicate this despatch to Safvet Pacha, and leave him a copy should he desire it."

With regard to the clamour raised against Austria by a large party of impatient patriots in Italy—the *Italia Irredenta* party, as they call themselves, or the party of "unredeemed Italy"—something may be added here to the casual mention which appears in the preceding chapter.

If the Italian government made haste to put down the agitation, even at the cost of incurring not a little unpopularity in the country, it was not because they did not believe in the abstract justice of the Italian demand for Trieste and the Trentino, but only because they saw no legitimate opportunity of raising the question at that moment. Europe could not have permitted Austria to be attacked whilst she was engaged in a work which had been sanctioned by a Congress of the great Powers. The ministers of King Humbert saw this, and felt that the proprieties of international law rendered any action on their part impossible. But they did not suppress the movement because they thought it based on unreasonable claims.

The true position of affairs on this question was clearly defined at the time by a writer in the "Times," dating from Florence on the 26th of August. The letter is here appended:—

"It must not be supposed that the agitation in favour of the annexation of 'unredeemed Italy'—viz, that territory lying between the Julian Alps and the present frontier—is a new pretension of the Italianissimi. The effervescence in 1866 was by no means inconsiderable, as the district in question was supposed to have indefeasible rights to accompany Venetia, its companion, through so many centuries of good and evil fortune.

"The question of the annexation of Istria to Italy involves both strategical and historical

considerations—the ethnical side of it leaving, I believe, as little question as the geographical. If the historical antecedents of the province at large are almost without exception favourable to an Italian connection, the city of Trieste nevertheless has its own history, and has been from 1382 until the conquest by Napoleon autonomous and a free port, under the authority, direct or indirect, of the Dukes of Austria. As to Istria, its history is one of the most varied and eventful of all the Italian provinces, and all its mutations show that it is a part of Italy, and that its contested possession was the cause of wars almost without number between the republic of Venice and the rulers of Austria and Hungary.

"Istria was colonised by the Greeks, who in prehistoric times established a commercial state or series of petty states, which yielded to the Roman arms only in A.C. 179, and were admitted to the citizenship of Rome under Julius Cæsar, and a fortified line was constructed from Fiume up to Mount Re, about twenty miles north-east of Trieste, to keep back the untamed barbarians beyond. The colonies established in the country so fenced in, the fortresses constructed, chief of which were Trieste and Pola, Aquileia and Pirano, formed, with the contiguous Venetia, the tenth region called *Venetia et Histria*, and later Venetia, upper and lower. Of this district the river Arsa was the boundary, which coincides nearly with the present limit between Istria and Croatia.

"Repeatedly colonised and favoured by the Romans, filled with public works, theatres, baths, villas and palaces by the sea, it was visited by emperors, its products ranked among the choicest of the empire, and it remained, until the decline of the empire, as much Italy as Tuscany itself. It fell under the flail of the barbarians, was thrashed and winnowed, swept from the end of the fourth century almost to our own day by all the hordes which fertility, prosperity, and the beauty of Italian nature, could draw from the wilds beyond; governed by Theodoric, then by Justinian, now from Ravenna, then from Con-



stantinople, sharing the disasters, as it had the benefits, of a civilisation which made it worth possessing.

"Under Charlemagne began the immigration of the Patriarchs of Aquileia, whose attempts to dominate over the whole of Istria were the cause of many and long wars. In 948, and again in 1217, treaties were made in which the Patriarchs engaged to co-operate with Venice in the extirpation of pirates, the latter recognising Istria as a contracting party, but confederated with Venice. In 1420 the Patriarchs became Margraves, finally lost all political power, and the cities of Istria, with the exception of Trieste, fell under Venetian rule, first as protectorate, and after as dominion, the Patriarch-Margrave receiving as compensation five thousand zecchini.

"From this time until the decline of Venice the history of Istria is contained in that of Venice, which found in her Istrians rather allies or fellow citizens than subjects. They shared the crusades, the wars against the Turks, and when finally the republic fell before Napoleon, the grief of Istria was not the least sincere of that felt by the colonies.

"The Dukes of Austria, by intermarriages and various intrigues in the times when the whole province was divided into countries more or less independent (of which there were about one hundred), had acquired the jurisdiction, property, or protectorate of Trieste, the counties of Govizia, Cormone, &c., on the Upper Isonzo, carrying their authority in various forms up to the frontier of Carinthia, all the remainder being in possession of Venice as dominion. The treaty of Campoformio in 1797 terminated the sovereignty of Venice, and, until 1813, Istria underwent all the vicissitudes of Northern Italy, included first in Napoleon's kingdom of Italy, then in that of Illyria, until the Councils of Europe consigned it, with Venice and Lombardy, to Austria. In 1848 Istria shared the agitation of the uprising, and many of her children the fortunes of the war of Charles Albert, and numbers of manifestoes and *brochures* remain to show how earnest was the propaganda of Istrian an-

nexation to Italy, an agitation doomed to be fruitless as against the claims of Austria to hold Trieste, her oldest and busiest seaport.

"The question of strategic frontier is one which requires no study and admits no discussion. It is not necessary to quote the authority of Napoleon, who declared the Julian Alps the natural frontier of Italy, any more than historically it is needed to quote the line of Dante, which every northern Italian repeats of the Quarnero :—

'Che chiude Italia e i suoi termini bagna';—

for the slightest inspection of the map shows that the Julian Alps are the territorial limits of the Italian lands, and that the natural division from the Slavonian countries beyond is the ridge whose summit is the watershed between the Danube and the Isonzo—on one side lie Carinthia and Croatia, and on the other Istria, Trieste, Friuli, and Udine. The present frontier has the disadvantage not only of not being defensible, but of not being even suggested by the nature of the country. It does not even follow the Isonzo, but, starting with an insignificant stream west of that river, the Arsa runs across the open country, strikes a branch of the Isonzo, and, following it for a few miles, leaves it for the highlands, which it follows in an arbitrary manner as the valleys in the lower country, and even cuts off fantastically the valley of Malborghetto, as if to keep a stronghold from which to move down on Udine conveniently. The military position, which cannot possibly be held before a much superior force, will never allow disarmament, so that the position of the north-eastern Italian frontier is one which can only be held by painful watchfulness, and one under which no nation which prizes its independence can sit down contentedly.

"The ethnical question is one concerning which statistics may easily be tortured into any desirable conclusion. Under the Roman empire the population was thoroughly reduced to that kind of unity of which many-peopled Rome







showed so many examples—fusion of races by administrative organisation and language, with a strong inoculation of colonial stock, such as has made Latins of races less closely allied than were the pre-Roman inhabitants of Istria. Charlemagne introduced Slav colonists, but, in deference to the protests of the inhabitants against the introduction of these barbarians, they were limited to the localities made desert by war and pestilence. Venice, later on, followed the example, and introduced Marlacchi, Montenegrins, Albanians, Treviscini, who were planted along the frontier, where they served to defend the province from the invasions of Croats and Huns, or, later, from those of the Turks of Bosnia and the Uskoks of Dalmatia. The hordes of Bosnia, Serbs become Mussulmans, twice ravaged the country as far as Udine, but neither these nor any of the invasions of the non-Mussulman Slavs, Wend, Croat, or Serb, seem to have left any traces in the country, those migrations which took root being the planted colonies of Venice and Austria, added to those of Charlemagne, mainly along the frontiers.

“If the preference of the population were to determine the destination of Istria there can be little doubt that it would become Italian. Even Trieste, which has longest submitted to the Austrian *régime*, is, if a considerable personal experience can qualify an observer to form an opinion, distinctly an Italian city, in feeling as in language; at least, the German propagandism of last century made no more progress than the Slav seems destined to do in this. In 1732, 1776, and in 1787, Imperial ordinances recommended to ‘manage that the public should use little by little the German language,’ and later here, as in the Dalmatian cities, German became at one period the obligatory official language, but, as in Dalmatia again, official schemes make feeble way against the tendencies of a race. German is almost as little known in Trieste as in Venice. Italian is the universal language, and if the contending claims of the various races in the city as in the province were to be brought out, the Italian language would be the only medium by

which all parties could make known their ideas to each other. And, whatever be the contention, the house of Hapsburg holds the allegiance of no one of the races in presence. The loyalty to Austria is almost everywhere in the empire a loyalty of bureaucracy or of interest. In Istria the political life was developed under the Venetian system, which gave the largest possible development to the communes, while the influence of Austria was from the beginning feudal, and latterly centralising, equally repugnant to a race civilised under the colonial system of Rome, and ripened under that of Venice, under which the Istrian was *civis Venetianus*. Two Doges of Venice were Istrian, and a long line of eminent citizens. The security of her Istrian cities cost Venice many a war, and their loyalty lasted to the end. And this is the form in which Italian influence is known in Istria—the institutions, the language, the traditions, are all Venetian.

“The presence of Austria has, on the contrary, been (as it has in all her possessions) the incubus of a huge bureaucracy, hated in the degree in which it was felt; no tie of race was possible in this polygolt realm, and the iron centralisation which it left to chance to demonstrate gave no room for any loyalty to grow in. Austria has been the limbo of fragmentary or undeveloped peoples gathered in by, or consigned to her, because their proper place was not known or ready—an empire without a people—an *ex officio* administrator of the estates of the political minors, but the limbo yields to a definite state, and the administrator has some day to surrender his wards their liberty and the heirs their goods. The burning in Italy over the question of the *irredento* may be kept down for a time, but it can only be extinguished in one way. The sentimentalists will throw fuel on it because they believe in the kindred, but more serious statesmen must keep it up because Italy cannot live with such a door always open to an enemy, and because to hold her position in the Adriatic she has need of a great port and naval station, which her whole coast does not furnish, and which Istria does. Austria, in her Dalmatian posses-



sions, has an infinity of ports of all qualities and capacities. Fiume is, for Vienna and the intervening country, as convenient as Trieste. But Austria never voluntarily looses her hold on any province once hers, and a new war and combination against her alone will recover Istria for Italy. Napoleon I. said that European peace could only be secured by a complete reconstitution of Italy; it is to be doubted if there will not arise motives of dissension more important still to Europe, but this is certain, that, with Italy compelled to throw her balance of power into the scale whenever Austria is weighed, neither of these Powers can disarm or anticipate a long peace. The claim of Italy to Istria is so well founded that it cannot be well abandoned by any Italian government, however much it may deplore an agitation, inopportune, because premature."

## CHAPTER XXIII.

### TURKEY'S PROSPECTS.

It would be very courageous on the part of any one, whether as a sympathiser with Turkey, or as a supporter of Lord Beaconsfield's policy, or as an independent observer of events, to prophesy that the Eastern question, in its acuter form, has been set on one side, or that Turkey will permanently recover from the paralysis by which she has been struck, and re-establish her authority over Albania, Macedonia, Roumelia, and Thrace. As time goes on, and the various clauses of the Berlin treaty become subjected to the test of experience, we find that everything depending upon the energy of other governments is arranged without much difficulty or delay, whilst all that depends on the Porte itself is either neglected or encountered by a succession of obstacles and evasions.

The most important question raised by this indisputable fact is, whether Turkey really has the power to move in the path of reform, even

if she wished to do so. The Porte never had more inducement to remodel itself on the patterns of European forms of government than it has had since the Berlin Congress. It must be evident to every intelligent Turk that the last chance of preserving the Ottoman rule in Europe has now arrived. The provinces still remaining to the sultan are well worth keeping, and might be made to yield a large and increasing revenue. They are, for the moment, in a condition of anarchy, and of rebellion more or less pronounced; and there is much reason to fear that the authority of the Porte alone will not be able to pacify and govern them. But there is, at the same time, amongst the governments of Europe, a genuine desire to see the sultan's rule once more established in western and southern Turkey, if only this rule might be firm and humane, and based on the principles which are acknowledged over the rest of Europe.

England, in particular, has offered her powerful aid to the Ottoman government; and there can be no doubt that, if the latter would take our advice, and make use of us to this extent, the half-ruined country might yet be restored, and might become richer and stronger than ever. The Turks admit that we have proved our friendship, and profess to believe in our sincerity; but they still regularly and consistently refuse to be guided by us. To every one outside of Turkey the question seems to be a simple choice between destruction and salvation. Judging from the conduct of the Porte, it does not see the matter in this light. The sultan and his ministers first rejected the English proposals of reform, and then, after accepting them in a certain shape, failed to carry them into effect. They have spent many months in deliberation, and hardly come to a single resolution implying a desire to conform to the will of Europe. They have done nothing for their own subjects, either Christians or Mahomedans; they have placed obstacles in the way of an arrangement with Greece and Montenegro; they have evaded the spirit of their engagements with Austria

and England, and they have been consistent only in requiring fresh loans of money from their creditors.

The case of Greece affords a good instance of the procrastination and prevarications of the Porte. Turkey knew full well, as we have seen in a former chapter, that Greece was, at one time, on the point of making common cause with Russia and her Slavonic allies, with as good an inducement for so doing as any of the states which actually went to war. The Hellenic government was barely able to restrain its subjects from going to the relief of the Greeks in Thessaly and Epirus; and it did so at last only on the urgent persuasion of England, and on the understanding that its claims should be attended to at the Congress equally with the claims of the Slavs. Turkey, which had appealed to England to undertake this intervention on her behalf, was morally bound by the engagement of England towards Greece; and there can be no question that the English government promised what it did as the protector of Turkey, and in her name.

We saw what the Congress did for Greece. It was little enough; and it was due to England that it was no more. Lord Beaconsfield and Salisbury incurred blame from almost all sides on account of the very slender satisfaction which they gave to the Greeks; and this moderation was in itself another strong moral obligation upon Turkey to act upon the decision of Europe. Greece was not awarded half as much as she had claimed; but the proposed rectification of the frontier was really the price at which her abstention from war had been valued, and it ought to have been looked upon by Turkey, under the circumstances, as a most honourable debt.

The precise manner and spirit in which the representatives of the great Powers determined the question of Greece at the Congress are very clearly set forth in a paper by M. de Blowitz, who doubtless derived much of his information from M. Waddington. His memoir is amongst those which must go towards the making of

any future history of the question, and for that reason it may be quoted here.

"Among the questions discussed at the Congress of Berlin none has given rise to more contradictory criticism than that of the Greeks. None, moreover, in the course of the Congress itself, was the subject of greater and more unexpected vicissitudes. It is not surprising, therefore, that those who had not the opportunity of very closely observing the causes of the changes I refer to fall into errors in estimating the results obtained for Greece at the eleventh hour. The most intelligent men are exposed to these errors when dealing with the question of Greece before the Congress. To mention only one, M. Edmond About, whose sound judgment is often brought to bear on complicated questions, in an article published the other day in the '*Siecle*,' blames the Congress for not having considered whether Turkey could live under the new conditions created for her, and the same article rates it for not having seen that the population of Greece, amounting to one million two hundred thousand souls, was being suffocated within its present narrow boundaries. Such contradictions are quite natural with men whose fancy runs away with their judgment; but, in the case of a man like M. Edmond About, they show an absence of precise information on the subject of the Greek question, and the necessity of more correct knowledge.

"It is evident that, when the Congress met, there existed between Greece and some of the Powers, not written engagements, but regular and implicit promises, which gave Greece the right to hope that the Congress of Berlin would give satisfaction to what she called her legitimate aspirations. Russia had encouraged her to complicate further the situation of the Ottoman empire, to join her own arms and paralyse the Turkish forces, by creating a new field of battle in the provinces of Thessaly and Epirus. It is certain that in exchange Russia held out to Greece the prospect of large territorial compensation. This is not the place, however, for an inquiry as to whether the czar would have kept,



or even been able to keep, his engagements, or whether the Congress, having passed judgment on those engagements, would have ratified them or not. But what is certain is, that Russia made proposals to Greece at the commencement of the struggle, that for a long time the latter declined those proposals, and that, when the war was over, believing victorious Russia would thenceforth be sole mistress in the East, she allowed herself to be led into making a demonstration intended to procure for her real advantages, and place her among the eventual co-parceners of Turkey in Europe. But on the 4th of February last, on the pressing and almost imperative invitation of the French government, followed two days later by a similar invitation on the part of the English Cabinet, General Soutzo, who had just crossed the frontiers of Thessaly, received orders to return and remain on Greek territory. There is no doubt that the peremptory request of the French and English governments was accompanied, if not by promises, at least by moral engagements, which afforded Greece the hope ultimately of obtaining what she deemed indispensable to her existence. Moreover, in the English as well as the French Parliament, Greece had received such encouragement as could not but send her with full confidence to Berlin. This confidence, reposing, moreover, as it did on the promises received on the occasion of the meeting of Lord Derby and the Greek delegates, was shared by all who were present at the Congress, or who followed its deliberations. At the beginning of the meeting the members themselves would have been profoundly surprised had they been told what was to be their final decision with respect to Greece. Every one was convinced that the treaty of peace would give her a large share in the satisfaction reserved for the nationalities whose fate was to be settled. All were convinced that Greece would issue from the Congress, certainly not of the magnitude which ridiculous maps then circulating predicted for her, but with her territory and field of action sensibly extended. Thus, at the commencement of the Congress, the situa-

tion of Greece, and the success which seemed in store for her, could not have been more brilliant. Her admission to the special deliberations had been proposed and accepted after a thorough discussion. The protests of Turkey had only added to the importance attaching to this discussion, and Russia, in the course of the Congress, had made declarations which indicated that there was unanimous sympathy for Greece. In Greek circles outside the Congress it was seriously debated whether Greece could accept the cession of the island of Crete, and a rectification, comprising the Gulf of Volo, the Pindipigadia Hills, the Gulf of Arta, and the town of Janina. Some thought these acquisitions insufficient; others—that is to say, the more cautious friends of Greece—deemed them legitimate and suitable, and urged the Greeks to accept them without protest. Just then some members of the Congress had already become alarmed at the excessive demands ‘officially’ put forward by the Greeks, and at the scheme of partition which the deliberations of the Congress would seem to sanction, in acceding to the Hellenic demands. But the unanimous feeling even then, I repeat, was that Greece would issue from the Congress considerably increased in size, and enjoying the sympathies of Europe. Greece, for the rest, in the Congress and without it, was represented at Berlin by three men of different, but equally striking character. M. Delyannis, the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, had gone to the Congress. He displayed a mild persuasiveness, a patience and an activity which could not be too much praised. He discussed the Hellenic question with unflagging eloquence from morning till night. He never ceased insisting on the necessity of extending the frontiers of Greece, of guaranteeing them against the constant incursions of brigands, as well as of putting an end to the dangerous agitation which continually kept Europe in excitement and Greece in peril. He explained to the members of the Congress that they would leave their work dangerously incomplete if they drove the Greeks to finish it by force, and to procure themselves the justice

which the Powers denied them. M. Delyannis represented at the Congress the mild and persuasive, one might almost say the melancholy, side of the modern Hellenic kingdom, which is, amid present civilisation, the shadow, as it were, of ancient Greece. His attitude was dignified and modest, such as became the representative of a country demanding of the Powers, from moral considerations, what the sword was unable to obtain. In the diplomatic meetings he exhibited a tone and bearing which exactly corresponded to the position he had accepted; and even among the eminent men who filled the diplomatic drawing-rooms at Berlin, the mild, attentive, and distinguished appearance of M. Delyannis, excited the attention of all who did not know that he was the Hellenic Minister of Foreign Affairs. M. Rhangabé, the Greek Minister at Berlin, represented quite a different phase of the Greek character. His small, spare, delicate, and bright figure, was full of vivacity. Beneath his gray hair and eyebrows, his dark, lively eyes, watched every face within their reach. Under the pretence of asking advice of everybody, he endeavoured to obtain a correct idea of the opinion prevailing in and outside of the Congress. He moved about the streets and drawing-rooms of Berlin with great activity, giving a smile to one, listening with exemplary gravity to another, and always grateful for what he was told. He determined to accept cheerfully whatever would be decided by the Congress, and to this philosophic resolution he remained faithful. Before the Congress sat he showed himself modest but convinced. He pleaded the cause of Greece as well as he could; and when the triumph of that cause was reduced to the dimensions now known to everybody, he merely showed the slight disappointment he had experienced by gravely stating, after the publication of the Anglo-Turkish Treaty, that Greece would propose to Turkey to guarantee her African possessions and occupy in exchange the island of Crete, on conditions similar to those stipulated by England with regard to Cyprus. M. Gennadius, again, who had come from London to join M. Delyan-

nis and M. Rhangabé in representing Greece at Berlin, was of the three representatives the most convinced of the necessity of a considerable increase of territory, and at the same time, from the first day, the most alarmed as to the issue of the discussion. Being very warm in his manner of speech, and possessed of a patriotic ardour, which his youth prevented him from disguising, he defended the necessities of Greece with a kind of wild eloquence which often embarrassed those acquainted with the fluctuations in the minds of the members of the Congress.

"It may easily be imagined that Greece, represented in this way, would certainly have achieved complete success, had not circumstances intervened during the sitting of the Congress to modify utterly the mood of the Powers. When the press of England and France was seen reproaching the plenipotentiaries of these two Powers with having made too great concessions to Russia, and accusing them of sharing in the partition of Turkey, it is easy to understand how the cause of Greece was compromised by these violent onsets. The question of Bulgaria was arranged; Constantinople was protected by the line of the Balkans and Eastern Roumelia; and the attitude of Turkey, as to the question of Bosnia and Herzegovina, tended to show that the Congress might once too often be guilty of the signal mistake committed by the Constantinople Conference and the London Protocol in forgetting that they were Ottomans. In point of fact, it was seen that, before the unanimous wish of the Powers and the energy of Prince Bismarck, Turkey would have to yield in the matter of Bosnia and Herzegovina; but it was clearly perceived, according to the expressed opinion of Prince Bismarck, that she would resist all territorial cessions of Greece, and it was perfectly plain that the Congress would neither be sufficiently energetic nor unanimous to impose its will on her. But there was another reason—a considerable and weighty one, too—tending to prevent England from undertaking the defence of the Greeks against the Turks, and that was the



Anglo-Turkish Convention. How could England, in opposition to Turkey, whose possessions she was about to guarantee and protect, undertake the defence of Greece, who was seeking a fresh slice from the Ottoman dominions? The Marquis of Salisbury, in the circumstances in which England was placed, had already sufficiently proved to be the slave of his word in defending before the Congress the admission of Greece; but to go further, to ask the Powers to impose fresh territorial cessions on Turkey, to justify the attacks of those who were crying out against partition at the moment when a defensive treaty between England and Turkey was about to be signed, this would have been to demand of the English plenipotentiaries a course of action neither in keeping with their ability nor their duty. The English plenipotentiaries, therefore, were compelled, as well in view of the opposition attacks at home, as from consideration of the treaty of the 4th of June, not only not to constitute themselves the champions of the Hellenic cause, but even to contend against those who had adopted its defence. M. Waddington, in the statement he made from the French tribune previous to his departure for Berlin, clearly indicated that at the Congress he would become, if not the sole defender, at least the powerful ally of those who undertook the defence of Greece. Speaking of the Bulgarians, he said that France, in joining the Congress, would remember that there were other Christian peoples in the East besides those of Bulgar blood. And M. Waddington remembered his words. Greece was admitted to lay her grievances before the Congress, and M. Delyannis and M. Rhangabé there made themselves listened to in words of which the eloquence may still be traced in the protocol of the sitting. After this however, silence was observed on the Greek question. The Congress decided, it is true, that the representatives of Greece should attend of right the discussions relating to the provinces bordering on the kingdom, and that they might be called in whenever it was deemed necessary; but the sittings passed without any such invita-

tion being addressed to them. Warmer and more commanding debates engrossed the attention of the Powers. It was not Germany merely who hastened on the discussions and prevented her representatives from lingering on the way; it was England also. The attacks of certain English prints were becoming more violent; the opposition was bestirring itself even more busily, and the Cabinet did not wish to be long in communicating to Parliament the Defensive Alliance of the 4th of June. Before producing it, it was necessary for the last delicate and important question to be submitted to the Congress—the question of Batoum and of Asia Minor had to be settled. As the English Cabinet was very eager to communicate the Convention to Parliament, the English plenipotentiaries were no less interested than Prince Bismarck in hurrying on the business of the debates. Thus it was that the Greek question was relegated to one of the last sittings. M. Waddington caused it to be taken up. Count Corti, influenced by the Italian journals, who reproached him with deserting Greece, seconded the efforts of M. Waddington, who likewise found in Herr von Bülow, German Minister of Foreign Affairs, an unexpected and very sympathetic ally. M. Waddington then undertook the task—rendered arduous and well-nigh impossible by the constrained attitude of England—of doing Greece immediate justice, and to achieve this he conceived the idea of dealing simultaneously with the question of Batoum and that of the Greek provinces. At that particular moment, the Russians and the English seemed equally resolved not to yield an inch on the question of Batoum. With the Russians Batoum had become a second Bessarabian question, on which the Emperor of Russia had set his heart. In English eyes, Batoum in the hands of the Russians would constitute a possible menace to the dominions in Asia Minor, and might become a second Sebastopol on the banks of the Black Sea. It did not seem possible to reconcile opinions so absolute and so diametrically opposed. It was then that M. Waddington thought of proposing to the

Russians and to the English to yield on the question of Batoum, to declare it a free port, to neutralise part of its territory, to render the harbour accessible to all trading vessels, without distinction or difference, and to replace Batoum and its neutralised territory under the direct protection of Turkey. In return for this restitution of Batoum to Turkey, the latter would concede to Greece such an extension as might be deemed necessary to give her a rational and defensive frontier. Here, then, evidently, was a combination calculated to satisfy all demands and to reconcile claims to all appearance irreconcilable. Unhappily for the idea, however, the Anglo-Turkish treaty changed the inclination of England, and Russia remained firmly resolved to keep Batoum. As for England, with the convention of the 4th of June in her possession, she ceased to show the same thorough determination with regard to Batoum; while at the same time she appeared less disposed to defend the cause of Greece in opposition to Turkey. M. Waddington, therefore, was obliged to give up the idea according to which Batoum was to be the price given to Turkey for a new frontier line to Greece. In the meantime the Anglo-Turkish Convention became known to the public, and from this time forth the attitude of the English plenipotentiaries became more clearly defined. England refused to join the champions of Greece and offer resistance to Turkey. It was then that M. Waddington, Count Corti, and Her von Bulow resolved to insist with all their force at least that the paragraph relative to Greece, figuring under the head of a simple expression of desire in a protocol, should be transferred to the text itself of the Berlin treaty. Apart, however, from the French, Italian, and German plenipotentiaries, no one seemed then disposed to agree to this. It was proposed to insert a thoroughly unpractical formula in the treaty, but neither Germany nor England seemed disposed to accompany this formula by indicating the limits to be conceded to Greece, the only thing that could give to this formula a positive and precise character. Here I must declare in

homage to the truth—and this has reference to what precedes—that Lord Beaconsfield was among those who opposed the insertion in the treaty of definite limits. Therein he perceived, and perhaps he was right, a direct blow to the sovereign will of the Porte, and in any case he found that it was not the part of the new protectors of Turkey to mark out beforehand the cession of fresh territory, conveying a moral obligation. Thus, things remained till shortly before the Congress met on the 11th of July. Lord Beaconsfield resisted. Prince Bismarck shared his resistance; and, as the designation of the new territory could only be inserted by the unanimous consent of the Powers, the cause of Greece seemed to be definitely compromised. But on the evening of the 10th Count Schouvaloff had declared in conversation that, although in the eyes of General Ignatieff there existed no other interesting people than the Bulgarians, he saw, in the East, races equally attractive, and notably the Greek race, of which Russia would undertake the defence. Next morning, Count Andrassy, on the demand of the defenders of Greece before the Congress, went to Lord Beaconsfield and drew his attention to the declaration of Count Schouvaloff. He pointed out to his lordship that, if the Congress did not take in hand the Hellenic cause in a practical way, by clearly indicating the limits desirable for Greece, Russia would promptly take advantage of this mistake committed by the Congress, undertake herself the cause of Greece, and seek, in the future defence of Hellenic interests, a new pretext for agitation in the East in place of the Bulgarian instrument now broken. This consideration struck Lord Beaconsfield, who then agreed to the insertion of the clause as it now figures in the treaty of Berlin. At the same time a Philhellene, Count Herbert Bismarck, son of the chancellor, an hour before the meeting of the 11th, begged the count to point out to the chancellor that, since the publication of the Anglo-Turkish defensive treaty, England would have to range herself rather in opposition to Greece than on her side, and that the



defence of Greece thenceforth fell to France and Italy, and that it would be inflicting a complete check on the representatives of these two countries, who had shown themselves so disinterested, not to make them succeed in their generous championship of the cause they had taken in hand. These reflections were communicated to Prince Bismarck, who took them into consideration, and who, while lessening the significance of the clause embodied in the treaty, nevertheless achieved its insertion, and thus contributed to give Greece the only and the greatest success to which she could aspire in the circumstances in which the Congress was placed."

This was how the claims of Greece were adjudicated by the great Powers; and it will be seen that the fullest deliberation was bestowed upon them, both by the professed advocates and the bitter enemies of the Turks. Whilst some should have given Greece more, some would have given her less; and the compromise arrived at was all the more binding because it was a compromise. There could be no honourable escape from these pledges, either on the part of England or on the part of Turkey; and yet Turkey persistently declined to discuss the matter with the Hellenic government for many months after the Congress.

A Turko-Hellenic Commission was at last appointed. The Porte nominated Mukhtar and Constant Pachas to meet the representatives of Greece, and to settle with them the precise boundary which was in future to divide the two countries. Delay after delay was still created by Turkey, and the first meeting of the delegates was not held until February, 1879.

In the meantime, the Porte did not fail to intrigue with the Powers, in the hope of persuading them to withdraw their proposal. These intrigues were met, for the most part, with firmness. France even went so far as to intimate, through M. Waddington, that, in case of any possible rupture between Turkey and Greece, she would consider an attack by sea of the former upon the latter as inadmissible. This, and the general attitude assumed by the French

and Italian governments, seem to have made an impression upon the Porte, and to have convinced it that there was no possibility of entirely evading the engagement made on its behalf.

The Turkish government, however, made more than one vigorous effort to set aside the necessity of coming to terms with Greece before it finally consented to appoint representatives on a frontier Commission. Thus, very soon after the signature of the treaty, Safvet Pacha sent the following circular note to the Powers:—

"Constantinople, Aug. 8, 1878.

"The Berlin Congress, having admitted the delegates of the kingdom of Greece to state the desires and views of the Hellenic government, M. Delyannis formulated and developed before the distinguished assembly the demand for the incorporation with Greece, of Epirus, Thessaly, and Crete. It was in consequence of this step of the Hellenic government, that a desire was expressed by the Congress that Greece should be accorded a rectification of frontier, a desire which gave birth to Article 24 of the treaty of Berlin, whereby the great Powers reserve the right of offering their mediation to the Sublime Porte and to Greece, in case the two governments should not agree on the rectification of frontier. The Ottoman plenipotentiaries at the Berlin Congress declared, in accordance with the instructions of the Sublime Porte, that the Imperial government reserved the right of explaining to the Powers the real state of things as concerns Greece. It is by virtue of this reservation, which was inserted in the protocol, that the Imperial government, after having examined with the most scrupulous attention the reasons adduced by the Cabinet of Athens to justify its pretensions, submits to the great Powers the considerations of a political and moral order which should enable them to judge, with full knowledge of the matter, of the character, bearing, and consequences, of a cession of territory to Greece. The Sublime Porte is bound to declare at the outset, in the most formal manner, that neither

his Imperial Majesty the Sultan, nor his government, ever had to deliberate on a project of this nature, and that it was for the first time called on to consider it when the project came to light within the Congress. It knows that the Cabinet of Athens endeavours to prove that it was owing to the counsels and assurances of some of the great Powers that it abstained during a long lapse of time from any act of aggression against the states of the sultan, and it thus hopes to show that these Powers, who paralysed, by their pacific influence, the action of Greece, are now its debtors, and loyally bound to support the Hellenic claims. It is not for the Imperial government to investigate the value and bearing of the counsels given to Greece, for the last two years, by the Western Powers; but it has a right to affirm that if Greece maintained an expectant attitude, and abstained from any act of direct hostility towards Turkey during some time, it was not merely through regard for the counsels and promises of certain European Powers, but also and especially by reason of the constant defeat of all its measures for getting itself guaranteed against the results of its enterprise. To convince any one of this, it will be sufficient to reperuse the manifesto published by M. Deligeorgis, ex-Minister of his Majesty, King George, to justify his ministry from the reproach of inaction. Let us now examine the demand formulated by M. Delyannis before the Berlin Congress. That demand consists in the annexation, pure and simple, of Epirus, Thessaly, and the Isle of Crete, to the kingdom of Greece, and is justified, according to the Hellenic Ministry, by arguments and considerations which may be thus summed up:—

“Greece aspires to unite under the same government all the countries inhabited by populations of Greek origin; but she acknowledges the necessity, for the present, of limiting her desires to the annexation of Candia and the provinces bordering on the kingdom, in order to respond to the desires of Europe. This annexation has from all time been the dearest wish of those provinces, which have often expressed it

by taking up arms. Satisfaction given to this desire would be an act of justice and humanity which would complete the pacificating work of Europe, and would thus render impossible the return of the troubles periodically agitating these countries. Greece, which has all along experienced the rebound of the troubles, and which exhausts herself in armaments grounded on this abnormal situation, and in expenditure caused by the necessity of according succour to the refugees of the insurgent provinces and to the repatriated combatants, might thenceforth devote her resources to the material development of this country. Turkey herself would gain in security, and the relations of neighbourliness which would be established between the two countries would run no further risk of being disturbed. The rejection of the wishes of Greece would infallibly lead to a general conflagration in these countries, in which the Hellenic people would be led to take part, whatever the efforts of its rulers to prevent it.’

“Such are in substance the reasons adduced by M. Delyannis to justify his demand for an annexation. It is easy to dispose of a doctrine which, dangerous in itself, is contrary to all the principles of political right, and rests, indeed, on entirely erroneous historical *data*; but the Congress having at the very first definitely set aside the idea of the annexation of Crete to the kingdom of Greece, and having maintained as realisable only a project of a simple rectification of frontier on the continent, we will confine ourselves to recalling that the inhabitants of that isle have never taken up arms against the legitimate authority of the Sublime Porte, or against each other, except at the instigation of intriguers from abroad, and on the invasion of their country by bands of foreigners organised in Greece, not to give succour to their brethren in arms, but to involve them in war without provocation or pretext.

“Thus to consider only the third Cretan insurrection, that of 1867, the long and the bloodiest, it is a fact that the island did not rise in insurrection, but experienced a veritable



Greek invasion. On the very day the invasion ceased—that is to say, when the insurrection found nothing more to nourish it from without, the island was pacified as if by witchery. The result of this sad enterprise was the ruin of Crete, the death of three-fourths of the unfortunate inhabitants, who were obliged to expatriate themselves, the exhaustion of Greece, and the loss of so many brave Ottoman soldiers, defenders of their sovereign's rights. It was also, or it ought to be, a striking and painful proof of the true character of Cretan movements, always and exclusively egged on by Greece, who took no thought of the calamities which it periodically called down on this unhappy island. Crete, however, being left out of the question by the wise will of the Congress, it remains to look at the past and present situation of the provinces contiguous to Greece, and examine the value of the arguments adduced by the Cabinet of Athens to sunder them from the Ottoman empire; and let us first attend to the state of suffering, of discontent, and effervescence in which Epirus and Thessaly are alleged to have been plunged for many years. History will refute the assertion. History teaches us that from 1829, when the feudal system was abolished in Roumelia, to 1853, these two provinces have lived in perfect tranquillity, that they were only troubled for an instant in 1845 by the resistance of the Mussulman population of Lower Albania—a resistance soon quelled, and which for the rest had nothing to do with the pretended claims for independence attributed to the Christian element. In 1853 Epirus and Thessaly were invaded by two Greek army corps, who laid the country waste and perpetrated on the property and persons of the Christians themselves, whom they pretended they had come to deliver, such excesses as compelled France and England to occupy the Piræus in order to put an end to them. Again, after fifteen years of quiet, these two provinces were troubled afresh with hostile tentatives publicly prepared under the eyes of the Hellenic government. Bands of volunteers crossed from Greece into

Thessaly and Epirus, carrying into these countries fire and sword, obliging the inhabitants, as the Imperial government is prepared to prove, to rise against their lawful rulers, but finally failing before the wisdom and loyalty of all the people. Then it was that, in view of these failures the government of his Hellenic Majesty, discouraged by the inflexible refusal of Russia to give Greece a share of the fruit of her victories, and feeling that opportunity slip away, caused its army to invade Ottoman territory without rupture of diplomatic relations and in full peace, in order to secure what M. Delyannis called the objects of the national aspirations of Greece. Now, if yielding to the observations of some of the great Powers, his Majesty King George recalled his troops to Hellenic territory, is it possible that his government can now make of that an argument for maintaining that these same Powers, by thus inviting him to terminate an enterprise so contrary to the law of nations, have entered into an obligation with Greece to make good to her the price of her docility by means of a cession of territory.

“But, however that may be, what we have just said concerning the moral and material state of Epirus and of Thessaly for the last fifty years, will suffice to nullify the first and most important arguments urged before the Congress by M. Delyannis—to wit, that the populations of these provinces have always submitted with impatience to Ottoman sway, that they have constantly risen in insurrection to achieve their independence, and that their only ambition is to see their country united to the kingdom of Greece. It is now, on the contrary, perfectly clear that the inhabitants of Epirus and Thessaly have always lived peaceably, and willingly submitted themselves to the Ottoman authorities, that they have never taken up arms to make good supposititious claims, that they have sometimes endured, but never invoked, the intervention of a neighbouring country, and that, in fact, if rendered secure from the enterprises set afoot by that neighbour, they would continue to live happily and prosperously under the laws of the Ot-

toman Empire. It was, therefore, not in the name of these provinces, the annexation of which he demanded, that M. Delyannis was entitled to speak at the table of the Congress. Among the other arguments brought forward by him to convince that high Assembly, we shall not stop to deal with that which consisted in the assurance that the annexation demanded would complete the happiness of Greece. We are not qualified to deal with this question; it is for the Powers more disinterested than we, and who have studied the history of Greece since its creation, to determine whether an addition of territory would result in procuring for her peace, inside and outside her bounds, with stability of institutions and government. We must confine ourselves to pointing out that political honesty will not permit the dismemberment of one nation to the advantage of another, for the simple reason that the latter would thus be rendered happier. The last great argument of M. Delyannis was based on the assertion, loudly proclaimed, that by giving Epirus and Thessaly to Greece, Europe would close for ever the era of struggles and conflicts between that kingdom and the Ottoman empire, and consolidate its work of peace. Why should M. Delyannis have taken pains to deprive this argument of all credibility and force by stating, at the very outset, in the written communication made by him to the Congress, that the true and only wishes of the Hellenic government are, and always have been, to unite under the same sway all countries inhabited by Greeks, and that if Greece confined herself for the moment merely to demanding the annexation of a few provinces, it was out of regard to the firm resolution of Europe to establish peace in the East, without too much shaking the existing state of things? In view of such a statement, which opens out the seductive prospect of a lasting peace between the two states, is it not clear that, if in a few months, perhaps, Greece deems the hour arrived to undertake a new campaign on the ground of supposititious national claims, the same causes would produce the same effects, and what then

would become of that peace which promised to be perpetual, but which lasted no longer than was strictly necessary to hatch fresh enterprises against the law of nations? Would Europe, called upon to pronounce upon this new conflict, imperilling afresh the peace of the East and the feelings of harmony among the great Powers, again determine to sacrifice the rights of lawful ownership to the covetousness of an ambitious neighbour, or would she hesitate to do an act which would be repugnant to her honour? But, however that may be, this eventuality forces itself with such a degree of certainty on all minds, it is so rooted in the order of things, and so in keeping with Hellenic theory, that it is not possible for the great Powers to admit, as a decisive argument in favour of the demands of Greece, the certainty, or even the hope of thus doing away with the source of conflicts between Turkey and Greece. Such are the chief facts and considerations which impose on the Sublime Porte the duty of appealing to Europe itself from the opinion it expressed in the Congress concerning the granting to Greece of some additional territory. His Majesty the Sultan and his government are firmly convinced that the great Powers, if further enlightened on the nature, arguments for, and consequences of the demand put forward by the Hellenic government, will modify their first opinion, and hasten to bring home to the Cabinet of Athens counsels of rectitude and prudence, calculated to turn it from an enterprise equally unjust and impolitic. In any case, Europe will never seek to follow Greece along this dangerous path, and thus run the risk of jeopardising its work of peace. I beg you to read this despatch to his Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs of———, and to leave with him a copy. SAFVET."

This bid of the Porte for a release from its engagements met, as has been said, with no encouragement. As time went on, and Turkey showed no inclination to do what was expected of her, M. Waddington addressed to the governments an important circular, dated the 21st of



October, 1878. In the course of this generous plea for Greece, the French Foreign Minister wrote as follows :—

“The Congress of Berlin, at its 13th sitting, decided that the Sublime Porte should be invited to come to an understanding with Greece, in regard to a rectification of the frontiers in Thessaly and Epirus, and expressed its opinion that this rectification might follow the course of the valley of the Salamyria on the side of the *Ægean*, and of that of the Calamas on the side of the Ionian Sea. In a spirit of wise foresight, the high Assembly added that, if Turkey and Greece should not come to an agreement, the Powers were ready to offer their mediation to the interested parties ; and this disposition was confirmed by Art. 24 of the treaty of July 13.

“The Hellenic government at once entered on the path opened up to it by the resolutions of the Congress. On the 17th of July it addressed itself to the Minister of the Porte at Athens to suggest the nomination of two Ottoman commissioners, charged to proceed, together with those who should be named by Greece, to the delimitation whereof Europe had formulated the basis.

“The government of the Sublime Porte remained silent in regard to this communication, but, in a circular dated August 8th, it undertook to show the danger of these Hellenic claims, and to deter the Powers from giving their support to designs which it represented as calculated to compromise the general peace.

“The conclusion of this document induced the Cabinet of Athens to renew its pressure at Constantinople, in order to secure a direct reply to its demand of July 17th. The Sublime Porte then declared to the envoy of the Hellenic government, that it could not accede to his request before knowing the opinions of the Powers on the memorial which it had just addressed to them.

“Having regard to this definitive failure to obtain what it sought, it appeared to the Cabinet of Athens that its action was at an end for the moment, and, demanding the benefit of Art.

24 of the treaty, it has now solicited the mediation of the Powers.

“In expressing the desire that a rectification of frontiers might be assented to by the Porte in favour of Greece, the Congress of Berlin acted upon considerations of which the importance has not diminished. The Powers agreed, in the conviction that nothing would be more likely to consolidate the new political system created in the East than to aim at discovering the conditions on which amicable and confidential relations might be established between Turkey and Greece ; and they thought that such might, in fact, be the effect of a territorial arrangement so conceived as to give satisfaction to the one without weakening the other. The first plenipotentiary of England expressed the opinion of the Congress when he declared that a rectification of frontiers would be a political act favourable to the prosperity of both countries.

“We, for our part, have always placed the highest importance on assuring the complete execution of the treaty of Berlin, without distinction as to the stipulations contained in it, and attributing to each of them the same value, in a work where all was mutually dependent. It is from this point of view that we now regard the questions raised by Art. 24.”

After dwelling upon the danger to Europe of acquiescing in the Porte's refusal, and thus permitting a cause of strife to arise amongst an easily inflammable population, M. Waddington continued :—

“We trust that the Cabinet of London will not overlook the importance of these considerations, and that it will agree with us that, as Europe finds herself in the position foreseen by Article 24 of the treaty of July 13th, the time has come for her to offer her mediation to Turkey and Greece. The nature and the aim of this step would, moreover, be clearly defined. The six Powers would express their desire that the Porte should give its explicit adhesion to the principle of a rectification of frontiers in favour of Greece, according to the desire expressed in the sitting of the 5th of July, and should also

name commissioners charged to consider the new boundary, in common with the commissioners of Greece. This step, in order to accord with the idea of the Congress, should be taken with all the authority which the Powers alone can give it; and we suggest that it shall take the form of an identic and simultaneous communication."

The text of this note was not made public until it was given in the original French, in a letter from the Roman correspondent of the "*Times*," on the 10th of the following January. The English reply was forwarded to Paris on the 21st of November, and was unfavourable to the formal mediation proposed by M. Waddington. Independent pressure was, however, brought to bear upon the Porte, with the result already mentioned.

The conduct of the Ottoman government on this point alone was calculated to inspire Europe with grave doubts as to its power and desire to carry out the treaty of Berlin; but the same doubts were excited by many other acts or omissions of a similar character. The radical defects of Turkish rule, as well as the apparent helplessness of the Porte, were illustrated in almost every province where the peace and order of the inhabitants depended solely upon the Turkish functionaries. Revolt against the sultan's authority seemed to be the normal condition of every district of the empire, whether in localities where the invaders had not set their foot, or in those which were evacuated in accordance with the treaty.

On the 13th of October the Russians were bound to retire to Adrianople, and they did in fact withdraw from San Stefano and Tchataldja. No sooner had they done so than disorders arose. As the Vienna correspondent of the "*Times*" observed, ten days after the first withdrawal of the Russian troops, however much allowance might be made for exaggerations, both wilful and unintentional, the state of affairs in Constantinople, no less than in the provinces of European Turkey, was calculated to inspire uneasiness, showing difficulties and complications

in almost every direction. The appearance of so many difficulties, small and great, indicates that obstacles in the way of the execution of the treaty of Berlin are arising in every direction, and threatens, even though they should not be directly connected with each other, to lead gradually to a kind of dead-lock. The first and most serious of these complications is that which has gradually been formed in Constantinople in consequence of the negotiations about the Russo-Turkish Convention, and of the arrest of the Russian troops in their return march. If we are to believe the last accounts, things are more and more taking the turn which they had when the Russian and Turkish forces about Constantinople were in a state of semi-hostility, watching each other to guard against a sudden attack, and preparing on both sides to resist such an attack. Most of the Turkish troops have been moved into the positions evacuated by the Russians. The earthworks are being inspected, repaired, and armed. In the direction of Gallipoli similar precautions are being taken, and dispositions are also being made to increase the forces stationed there. Officers on half-pay are again being called to active duty, and a special committee for the defence of the capital has been formed at the Seraskierate. On their side the Russians seem to show little disposition to resume their retirement to Adrianople. On the contrary, partly on the plea afforded by the excesses perpetrated in the evacuated districts and the emigration of the Christian population, partly on that of the non-signature of the convention, they seem determined to remain in the positions now occupied by them across the isthmus leading up to Constantinople. Serious as all this looks the complication in Constantinople is, after all, a diplomatic one, which may be ultimately removed; but the news which comes from East Roumelia and Macedonia shows that a complication of a far more serious nature is preparing in another direction. From the districts of Samakov, Djuma, Kustendil, Nerrokop, and Uskub simultaneously, the news comes that great agitation prevails, extending down to Seres and the



neighbourhood of Salonica, and foreboding another Bulgarian insurrection for the purpose of preventing the execution of the treaty of Berlin, and of bringing about the incorporation of all these districts with the newly-created Bulgaria. The northernmost of these districts have been, it will be remembered, included in East Roumelia, while the southern districts have been left entirely under Turkish rule. That, sooner or later, such an agitation to unite, in accordance with the treaty of San Stefano, all countries where Bulgarians dwell would come every one could foresee. It seems, however, that an attempt is to be made to effect this object at once. The English members of the East Roumelian Commission are to leave to-day for Philippopolis; the others to-morrow; and already we are informed that demonstrations are preparing to make them understand that they are not wanted. Unpleasant as such demonstrations might become, should they be really carried out, they cannot do much harm in the end. In out-of-the-way places, however, about the Bilo Dag and the sources of the Metsu and Strymon, on the one side, and those of the Miritza, on the other, where the population is mixed, the demonstrations would mean a renewal of the civil war, and in some instances collisions have already occurred. What with the approaching winter and the six months which still remain before the Russians have to evacuate East Roumelia and Bulgaria, it is not, indeed, probable that much more than local disturbances here and there will break out. Should, however, the International Commission make no attempt to get the organisation and administration really into its hands before the Russians have to leave, those practical difficulties will arise which have been urged by the Russians as an obstacle in the way of their evacuating the country; and if they should want a pretext next year for remaining longer than the time assigned, they might easily find one in those circumstances. Such an eventuality, indeed, was alluded to in the Congress when Count Schouvaloff, insisting that the time given

was too short, pointed out all the difficulties which might arise in consequence, and the opinion of the most of the plenipotentiaries seemed to be that, in such a case, a joint occupation would meet the difficulty. But, somehow or other, neither the treaty nor the protocols show any trace of this incident, and so there is a wide door left open for unexpected contingencies. That the agitation is not a sporadic, but a systematic one, is proved by the circumstance that, in the Bulgarian communities, both of East Roumelia and Macedonia, a petition is being addressed to the great Powers praying for the union of all Bulgarians into one state, as intended by the treaty of San Stefano. It thus looks as if this Bulgarian movement would begin in an orderly manner."

The idea of a joint occupation of Eastern Roumelia was suggested at a later date, but it did not meet with general favour; nor yet did the proposal, that France or Italy alone should undertake the police of the disturbed districts.

Turkey was, in fact, distinctly on her trial before the Courts of Europe, and it was felt that, if she could not herself grapple with and overcome her difficulties, no other Power could permanently save her from her impending fate. Her future depends ultimately upon her own efforts, however much aid she may derive from without; and it is impossible to feel any large amount of confidence in the issue of her final stage of probation. Great as is the interest felt by Europe (and especially by England) in the maintenance of peace in Turkey, we have a yet more urgent concern, at least from a commercial point of view, in the stability of Egypt, the most important of all the dependencies of the sultan. England had acquired a large pecuniary interest in the Suez Canal for the express purpose of emphasizing her responsibility in the future of this state; and from that time to the present she has devoted herself to the re-organisation of Egyptian finances, and the re-establishment of Egyptian credit.

The results of these efforts, in which this country was warmly seconded by France, was

the appointment of a Commission to inquire into the state of the public and private debts of Egypt—the obligations incurred by the viceroy for state purposes, and those which were guaranteed on his ample private estates. This Commission reported in September, 1878, and, whilst revealing a far from satisfactory condition of Egyptian finances, it suggested methods whereby the burden might be gradually removed, and prosperity might be restored.

After many difficulties, the advice of the Commission was taken ; and the khedive, willing to show his patriotic feeling, and his confidence in his new counsellors, abandoned his private claim on his family estates—an example immediately followed by his sons and other relatives.

A correspondent of the "Times" thus summarised the conclusions of the Commission :—"The report of the Commission represents the deficit as £9,200,000, but the bare publication of these figures would give a very inaccurate idea of the actual situation. The Commission were very properly not content with representing a statement of the condition of the country at the moment—a condition which might be changed by further liabilities before the reforms proposed could have time to operate. They therefore fixed on the 31st of December, 1879, as the date at which the country might fairly be considered to have surmounted its present difficulties, and have commenced to reap the benefits of the new system. Moreover, their report when drawn up was not accepted, and it was consequently necessary to accept the figures before them without making allowance for changes which the viceroy's acceptance might produce.

"Among these figures there appeared a sum of £1,100,000, stated to be due to the government by the dairas of the viceroy and his family, and there was a sum due to the syndicate, secured, indeed, by various guarantees, but inadequately so at the then value of Egyptian securities. The scheme is now complete, the conclusions of the report accepted in their entirety, and the reforms on the eve of execution. From the amount of £9,200,000 we have, therefore, at

once to deduct the £1,100,000, his claim to which the viceroy abandons ; while the amount due to the syndicate, considered uncovered to the extent of £800,000, would be wiped away by a rise in the Unified Loan, held as part security, to sixty-five. Further similar reductions, which I am not at liberty to mention, and the not unreasonable hope that the estimated deficit of 1878 may be converted into a surplus, enable us to state with certainty the actual deficit as under seven millions sterling.

"The lands ceded by the viceroy to the state, apart from those already hypothecated, are over four hundred and thirty-two thousand acres. It is true that these estates were represented to the Commission as producing only £422,000 ; but no one who knows the country, and more particularly these estates, will hesitate to admit an estimate of £2 net profit per acre as moderate, and the amount thus raised is, therefore, amply sufficient to meet the increased liabilities."

A few days after the presentation of the report, the following letter was sent by the viceroy to Nubar Pacha, calling upon him to form a ministry :—

"Mon Cher Ministre—I have seriously considered the changes in our position at home and abroad brought about by recent events, and at the moment when you are engaged in the work of forming a Cabinet, I desire to repeat my firm intention to establish the lines of our administration in conformity with the principles which guide European administrations. Instead of personal government, as is the present government of Egypt, I desire a power which shall exercise, it is true, some general supervision of affairs, but which shall be balanced by a council of ministers. In one word, I wish for the future to govern with, and by my ministers.

"With these ideas I consider that, to carry out the reforms which I have already announced, the ministers should be together responsible for one another. This is an essential point. The ministers will discuss all important questions concerning the country ; the opinion of the ma-



majority will carry that of the minority. Decisions will thus be carried by a majority; and in approving those decisions, I shall consequently be sanctioning the opinions which have prevailed.

"Each minister will carry out the decisions of the ministry approved by me in his own department.

"The nomination of moudirs, governors, and prefects of police, will be discussed by the minister to whose department they belong and the president of the council, and they will be submitted for my approval by the latter.

"The minister under whose immediate control the above functionaries serve, will have the right to relieve them of their duties, but after agreement with the president of the council. A change in their position, or their dismissal, can only be effected by agreement between the president of the council, with my sanction.

"The ministers will choose the higher officials of their departments, and will submit their choice for my approval. For secondary officials a simple letter, or ministerial decision, will be sufficient.

"Each minister will confine himself to his own department, and the officials and clerks of each department will receive orders only from the head of their department, and will only obey him.

"The ministry will sit under your presidency, as I confide to you the labour and responsibility of this new organisation.

"I consider that the establishment of a ministry possessing these powers is not foreign to our manners and ideas; it is, on the contrary, in conformity with one of the precepts of our sacred law. With an extended judicial organisation this institution will answer the necessities of our social progress and enable my decided convictions to be realised.

"I place every confidence in you to carry out these reforms on which I have decided, and which, I hope, will give to the country all the guarantees it has a right to expect from my government."

In his reply Nubar Pacha requested permission to defer naming his minister of finance until he was able to submit a name "which enjoys the esteem of your highness and possesses the public confidence."

This referred to Mr. Rivers Wilson, for the loan of whose services a formal demand from the viceroy to the British government was at once forwarded to London. Mr. Wilson was subsequently appointed minister of finance, a Frenchman being at the same time nominated as minister of public works. Thus a strong Cabinet was formed, in which every one had confidence; and it seemed as though the prospects of Egypt were at that time far brighter than those of any other portion of the Ottoman empire.

## CHAPTER XXIV.

### THE ENGLISH IN CYPRUS.

It has already been said that England took possession of Cyprus a few days after the signature of the treaty of Berlin.

Sir Garnet Wolseley had been sent out to Malta with orders to proceed from thence, with the bulk of the Indian troops which had been brought over some months before, and plant the British flag in our new dependency. Some little delay occurred through the sickness of the Indian soldiers, who had not thriven well in Malta, and also through the lack of certain indispensable stores; but Sir Garnet threw himself into the business with his usual alacrity, and thus, on the 22nd of July, the ironclad *Himalaya* dropped anchor off the town of Larnaca.

Cyprus was destitute of a good harbour, and, though Larnaca was chosen as the best place at which to land the British troops, great efforts had been necessary in order to make it available for the occasion. The Duke of Edinburgh, who had been serving on his ship the *Sultan*, with the British fleet in the Sea of Marmora,

had made a cruise to Cyprus as soon as it had been made over to us by the Porte, and he now won golden opinions by the energy with which he superintended the preparations for Sir Garnet Wolseley's arrival. It was apparently due to him that the apparently difficult task of landing a large body of troops, with their heavy equipment, was effected with so little trouble.

An eye-witness shall describe for us the landing of the new governor, and his reception by the native population of Cyprus. "The town of Larnaca," he says, "facing south, is set back in a deep bay, sheltered from the westward by a spur of land jutting far out into the sea, and it lies like a curved white fringe for about a mile upon the blue ocean. The streets, tortuous, deep in dust, and ill-paved, run back from the shore but a little length; three or four mountain peaks appear in the background, and trend away to the east in rugged, broken, and barren hills of chalky limestone. Within view of a ship in the roadstead there is hardly a vestige of green vegetation beyond a few cocoa-nut palms at the western end of the town. The waves, curling over a beach of pure shingle, without sand or mud, have eaten away at places the quay of rude stones which runs along the length of Larnaca. The place had one landing-stage alone of a flimsy texture until the arrival of the Duke of Edinburgh as beach-master, who has already constructed piers of sufficient strength and number for the landing of troops and heavy stores. The inhabitants have been accustomed to bring their imports to land by wading to the boats' sides and bearing off the burdens upon their backs. The roadstead is fairly filled with merchant craft, principally brigs and brigantines, which come and go, as far as I can ascertain, with a general cargo; open boats, caiques, are numerous.

"Almost immediately after the dropping of the anchor, at about seven o'clock this morning, the disembarcation of the troops commenced. In part upon the recommendation, presumably, of Admiral Lord John Hay and of the engineer and commissariat officers who have been sent in

advance to the island, a camping ground has been selected at a distance of about five miles from the town, plentifully supplied with excellent water (for it is in the neighbourhood of an aqueduct), and situated upon sloping ground. The spot has the drawback of being destitute, or almost destitute, of trees, and there is, therefore, a want of shade; but, apart from this disadvantage, the troops, it is believed will be conveniently and comfortably encamped. It is understood that the distribution of the forces has been already determined. The English troops will be brigaded at Larnaca, and battalions of the Indian regiments will be despatched severally to occupy the towns of Nicosia, the capital, Famagousta, Limasol, Kyrenia, and perhaps Baffa, the ancient Paphos. A company of the 42d has already been started to set up the first part of the camp near Larnaca. The soil abounds in thistles, and the Black Watch will not languish for want of their national emblem.

"The disembarcation was most picturesque. The brilliance of an unclouded sky, the pale blue calm waters, the long white aspect of Larnaca, and the painfully bleak and white stretches of mountain, hill, and shore around, threw into vivid outline the scarlet tunics and coloured kilts of the Highlanders as they streamed down the ship's side, and crowded the caiques hired for their transport. Swarthy Greeks and Turks swarmed, worked, and vociferated with untiring energy. Upon shore camels were the principal means of transport, and gradually, as the men were landed upon the pebbly beach, these patient, ungainly animals, undisturbed by all the excited movement around them, took their burdens and struggled to their feet, awaiting almost motionless for hours the word to march. Meanwhile the Scotchmen were making friends with the Turkish Guard, who had been sent, perhaps, to amuse themselves, or, perchance, to aid in maintaining order; and while snow from the mountains was being supplied on one side by an aged Turk amid a dense crowd of compatriots to cool lemonade for a dry Highland throat, on the other side a Highlander was comparing his



rifle, through explanatory signs and gestures, with the old muzzle-loading percussion musket he has come to supplant. The march to camp, owing to the great heat, was not to commence until nightfall.

"The heat to-day, although certainly intense, has been by no means excessive and dangerous. A cool breeze has been blowing all day from the south or south-east, and upon the water, or upon the quay facing the wind, there has been a steady and refreshing current of air, moderating the temperature. A week or so ago the weather was far more oppressive, and its effects are still visible in the sick lists of the ships of the navy which are here, many men being disabled by remittent fever.

"Admiral Lord John Hay, shortly after landing in the island, determined to dispatch to Nicosia, the capital, a body of fifty marines. Nicosia is twenty-five miles from Larnaca, and it was arranged that the men should start at two o'clock in the morning upon mules, the calculation being that they would arrive at Nicosia before the heat of the day. Unfortunately, and uncomfortably for their riders, the mules were sent off without drivers, and a tragedy, both humorous and serious, was the result. The mules, after a time, refused obedience, and distributed themselves, some still ridden, some riderless, over various parts of the country. Most of them turned for their homes in Larnaca, and were abandoned. The men, who were compelled to continue their march on foot, were provided with no better protection against the sun than their glengarry caps, and not being able to reach Larnaca till four in the afternoon, no less than ten of them—ten out of a body of fifty—were knocked down by sunstroke. Their exhaustion is described as extreme. The road to Nicosia, though not a good road for vehicles, is passable, and is not unusually trying to travellers on foot. Two companies of marines have since made the journey, and by starting earlier in the night have marched through safely and without suffering.

"At 6 o'clock this evening, as you have been

informed by my telegram, Sir Garnet Wolseley, accompanied by his private secretary and military staff in full uniform, proceeded from the Himalaya in a barge towed by a steam pinnace to the fort of the kaimakan, the chief official of the town, to take the oaths of allegiance and office, and to assume the government of Cyprus. The fort is now occupied by British marines. A large crowd, never such a one, it is said, has been known for many years, was assembled at the landing-steps. On one side stood the stately, spectral figures of Turkish women, clothed in pure white, their faces shrouded, and nothing human showing but dark, unfathomable eyes; on the other side (the passage was kept clear by a guard of honour of marines) jostled and peered a motley crowd, men, women, and children—some half-naked, others decked completely in the fanciful colours and dresses which are dear to the East. As Sir Garnet Wolseley stepped ashore the band of the marines, which was drawn up beneath the chamber within which the ceremony was to be enacted, played a bar of 'God save the Queen.' Admiral Lord John Hay and the Duke of Edinburgh here received Sir Garnet Wolseley, and ushered him up a flight of stairs and through passages lined with files of the Guard to a room in which, upon a crimson carpet, was set a chair covered with crimson. When Sir Garnet Wolseley had seated himself in this chair, Lord John Hay standing upon his right, the Duke of Edinburgh upon his left, and the staff being grouped around and closely packed through the pressure of the crowd—for the room, by no means a large one, was filled with an eager audience, Turk and Greek—Colonel Greaves, C.B., the chief of the staff, read in a clear voice her Majesty's Commission, appointing Sir Garnet Joseph Wolseley to be High Commissioner in and for the island of Cyprus. The High Commissioner (Lord High Commissioner by courtesy) then, having had a bible placed in his hand, took successively the oath of allegiance and the oath of office. This formality concluded—*giuramento di fedeltà*, I heard it exclaimed (for most Cypriots of the seaboard speak Italian) by one

of the straining and intensely interested crowd—Colonel Greaves read in English the Lord High Commissioner's proclamation, of the substance of which I have already informed you by telegram, and the Greeks cried, 'Hurrah! hurrah!' waving their hands in the air with the highest enthusiasm. Next, the proclamation was read in Greek, and again and again the periods of it were interrupted with bursts of the enthusiastic 'Zito.' The reader was the Professor of the Greek College in Larnaca, and a Greek ecclesiastic, a fine man, with aquiline features, dark hair, hardly touched by age, and restless black eyes. He was intensely nervous, and his hand trembled and his voice shook so that he could barely gather the words from the paper and speak them continuously. At the conclusion, 'Zito' after 'Zito' re-echoed, and the reader, appearing to be fairly carried away with excitement, turned again to the audience and addressed them a rapid sentence—congratulatory words of his own, I imagine—the precise purport of which I failed to understand. Then the proclamation was read again, this time in Turkish, the Greek ecclesiastic repeating the Greek version line by line, while a Turk, the cashier of the Ottoman bank here, acting as interpreter, reproduced it in his own language. Turks are not prone, like Greeks, to excited utterance, and they received the proclamation staidly, the Greeks, however, who seemed to understand this version also, maintaining the vivacity of the proceedings by the interposition of their voluble expression of approval.

"The moment the proclamation had thus been triply delivered, the band from outside played 'God save the Queen.' Then stepped forward the Greek Bishop of Larnaca, and, on behalf of the Greek population of the island, read an English translation of a Greek address to his excellency. The address affirmed that the Greeks welcomed their new governor with unlimited rejoicing and delight. . . . The Cypriotes welcomed also, they said, their new fortunes, by which a bright page, they were well

assured, was opened in their history—and they described their happiness at coming beneath the same government as the great English nation, the most advanced and civilised of the nations of Europe. . . . A spokesman came forward for the Moslems also, and, being apparently unprepared with a written address, spoke in extempore language, which was interpreted bit by bit as the speech proceeded. The Moslems were understood to express their contentment and welcome. Sir Garnet Wolseley informed both representatives that he would reply to them in writing, and the proceedings being thus concluded, his excellency returned with his staff on board the Himalaya. The feelings of the Greeks of the island at the change of rule may fairly be described in their own language as those of delight and hope. The Turks are reported as having witnessed the hauling down of the Turkish flag and the running up of the British Ensign with sorrow and chagrin. Until this visible token of the transfer was before their eyes they had been slow to believe that they were actually to be no longer under Turkish government; but they are said to have bowed their heads with resignation to the inevitable, exclaiming, 'It is the sultan's wish.' 'It must be.' This demeanour is said to have been especially discernible at Famagousta, whither the English consul at Larnaca proceeded, to be present at the ceremony of changing the flags.

"It may be premature at present to speculate with any attempt at detail as to the machinery of government which will be set up throughout the island; but it is understood that Sir Garnet has a scheme by which the existing divisions of island into districts for administrative purposes will be continued. These districts, termed *Kaimakanmats*, are appointed each to a resident *kaimakan*, a Turkish official holding, apparently, a position resembling that of a lieutenant-governor, and the Lord High Commissioner proposes, it is supposed, to appoint to each of these districts, of which there are six, a resident civil commissioner, who will be invested both with judicial and administrative powers, and



will be instructed, while leaving undisturbed, as far as is consistent with good government, the greater part of the present institutions, to interpose his authority in all extreme cases, and to require obedience to his orders; and in the ordinary processes of government to exercise as far as possible a mainly corrective influence co-ordinately with the existing authorities. The names of these districts are Larnaca, Famagousta, Nicosia, Kyrenia, Baffa, and Limasol. Sir Adrian Dingli, the Crown Advocate of Malta, is present with Sir Garnet Wolseley as a legal adviser.

"I forward to you a copy of the Lord High Commissioner's proclamation, the reading of which I have described to you above. Copies in Turkish and Greek of this document will, it is understood, be circulated throughout the island. A copy in Greek was last night despatched to Nicosia, the capital, by special messenger. It is expected that so soon as all arrangements for the encampment and comfort of the troops have been completed, the Lord High Commissioner will proceed to Nicosia. The first idea that some great change was impending for Cyprus seems to have been suggested by the arrival at Larnaca, about the latter part of June, of purchasers of buildings and lands from Constantinople. The people could not understand this desire for their poor property. Then arrived her Majesty's ship *Raleigh*, and anchored in the roadstead; then the *Invincible*, and finally Lord John Hay, who had been cruising about outside, but had not yet entered the bay, landed at Larnaca and proceeded to Nicosia, where, with the exception of a flying return for a few hours, he remained until the arrival of the *Himalaya*. The marines, who preceded the admiral to Nicosia, telegraphed their safe arrival there by means of bonfires."

A week later Sir Garnet Wolseley went on to Nicosia, an inland town on the higher ground near the centre of the island. The same correspondent described the journey in a letter dated July 31st.

"Yesterday Sir Garnet Wolseley and staff

arrived at Nicosia at about eleven o'clock in the morning. His excellency, who on Sunday night had transferred his head-quarters from the *Himalaya*, which sailed for Malta, to the *Salamis*, started on Tuesday morning, at a quarter to five o'clock, with Colonel Greaves (the chief of the staff), Colonel Baker Russell, Colonel Brackenbury, and Mr. Herbert, for Nicosia. As the steam-pinnace made its way from the *Salamis* to the shore the guns of the *Minotaur* fired a salute, the steam-pinnace resting on its oars—or, in other words, shutting off steam. Horses were ready upon the beach, and the party set off almost immediately, the sun just commencing to appear above the waters of the bay. After a hot and dusty ride of about a couple of hours, broken now and then by a reconnoitring canter among the undulating curves of the hills to right and left, his excellency and staff dismounted and took to the diligence, now regularly established under government control, which had been allowed to overtake them. The horses, which belonged to a native battery, were sent back in charge of five natives, who had come on in the diligence. The country between Larnaca and Nicosia, a distance of twenty-five miles, is most uninviting to the eye. In the far distance, before the face of the traveller going north, is a circular range of rugged, broken mountains, totally bare of green vegetation, into which he seems to be riding when descending into Nicosia, as into a basin. To the right and left the ground sweeps away in long smooth undulations, or rises in great juts of stone and gravel, like broken masses of table land. Upon whole miles of it there is no sign of cultivation, and only here and there the softer valleys, or small spaces of plain by the hill sides, or now and then a limited stretch of hillside itself, is planted with vines or beans. Near Larnaca fields of cotton were not infrequent, but further on, beyond vines or beans, or a few fig trees, no green thing was visible. The plains and hill sides are thickly tufted with wild thyme and low-lying bushes of a fuzzy nature, while great thistles, two and three feet high, stretching strong branches right and left

in abundance—mostly looking as brown and sunburnt as the dust of the road itself.

“Such is the aspect of the country until from the brow of a hill Nicosia appears some two miles distant, nestling, as it seems, beneath the mountains, though divided in reality from them by a large plain, green with waving willows and the tops of the palm trees. The two minarets of the Greek cathedral stand high above all buildings, and a Greek church and one or two mosques and other buildings catch the eye with their greater proportions. The town is irregularly built, with the same narrow, stone-paved lanes, and the partially-covered bazaars that are a feature of Larnaca.

“But one thing here is conspicuous—clear, cool water, coming from the mountains in abounding freshness, trickles through the streets in little runnels or spouts from the pipes in the walls, whereupon the stray drops stealing away have helped to build a green cloak of moss. The town could hardly be dirtier, but the quantity of pure water which flows through it is a bright feature.

“About two miles from the town his excellency and staff, leaving the diligence, mounted horses, brought out from the town for their use. Before this a troop of Turkish soldiers had appeared as an escort, and their procession started for the capital. The scene was a strange one. The horses provided for the staff were no more than ponies; with one or two exceptions they were saddled and caparisoned in Turkish fashion, with large crimson saddle-cloths fringed and tasselled. The girthing seemed a matter of little moment, for I saw one or two girths hanging at least three inches below the horse’s belly. A most motley crowd followed—half-dressed men, bare footed, the little clothes they had striking the eye with crimson, and green, and mingled hues of almost every description; boys innumerable, some bare headed, but most wearing the fez; half-a-dozen Greek priests who ran, peered, and jostled like the rest; the whole in effect like a sea of which every wave was particoloured and split into a hundred hues, surging in and out

among the horses. His excellency alone was left to move unimpeded, and so dense and pressing was the throng that the use of the whip upon bare brown shoulders, or a dark green sash here and there, was the only means of securing room to advance. At the summit of a hill, close to the gates of the town, the cavalcade halted, that his excellency might receive from the Greek Archbishop a bunch of flowers. As the procession passed beneath the ramparts and through the gates (for Nicosia is a walled and fortified town) a salute was fired. Drawn up in the gateway was a guard of honour of the marines and blue-jackets, who occupy the fort by the gate, and here, for the first time, we saw that the women were also curious to see the new arrival. There had been none of them so far in the crowd, not even a little girl; but here they were gathered in numbers by the gate, and on the parapets above. The way in the town was by the stony, uneven, narrow, and sinuous alleys I have described. Now and then a *zeto* struck our ears, but there was no regular cheering, except when the archbishop presented the flowers; the crowd were too curious, too eager to catch every sight and sound, and they would not drown their chances of observation in the tumult of a cheer.

“So difficult is it to obtain suitable accommodation in Nicosia that his excellency and staff were compelled to become quasi-guests in a house which it is intended shall be taken for the Lord High Commissioner. At the gate of this house a guard of honour of marine artillery and seamen was stationed to receive Sir Garnet. All further ceremonial was deferred till the afternoon, when at 3 o’clock his excellency and staff proceeded to the Konak to pay a visit to Samih Pacha and the kaimakan. His excellency’s horse, so soon as it was mounted at the gateway, before starting, frightened by the “present arms” of the guard, reared, and slipping on the stones of the narrow lane, for the approach to the house is no more, fell over with him. Fortunately his excellency sustained no injury, and remounted. There were assembled in the council-room of the Konak for the reception of the Lord High



Commissioner about twenty persons of official position in Nicosia, including, besides Samih Pacha and the kaimakan, the cadi and the mufti (the judge and the adviser in Mahomedan law), and the colonel commanding the troops of the town, who, by the by, among his five medals, had the medals of Sardinia and the Crimea, and it was observable that he wore them on their wrong ribands, having the Crimean medal on the Sardinian riband. After some conversation of a congratulatory character between his excellency and Samih Pacha, Mr. Baring acting as interpreter, cigarettes and coffee were handed round. Then, after a time, an address was read to his excellency in Turkish, and an address in Greek. These addresses conveyed little more than expressions of welcome, the Greek one alone containing, perhaps, a certain significance in its concluding paragraph, wherein a certain shadowy hope seemed to be expressed for representative institutions. If, it said, there is called to the counsels of the government a certain number of persons distinguished for their intelligence and experience, who are consulted upon questions touching the language, the legislation, the customs, and the form of government, and the wants of the people, there is reason to hope that their good advice may be profitable. Such was the purport of the words as I gathered it, though, as I have been unable to see the address itself, I cannot reproduce the exact language which was used. These proceedings concluded, one by one those present came up to bow to his excellency before withdrawing. The colonel of the troops touched his cap in military salutation, but the others, bending their bodies forward, and dipping below the knee with their right arm, brought up the hand before their face, and, still bowing, retired. There was a strange-looking dervish present, tottering and trembling with age, whose gray hair was bound fantastically in and out of the folds of his turban. Afterwards the same officials came to pay their respects to the Lord High Commissioner, and were welcomed with a similar refection of coffee and cigarettes, sweetmeats, &c."

The task of Sir Garnet Wolseley was a very difficult one. Though he had no open hostility to encounter from the inhabitants of Cyprus, as the Austrians had from the Bosnian Mussulmans, he was, nevertheless, met by more than one obstacle of a serious kind. In the first place, the island was unhealthy, and numbers of his men at once fell sick. Again, no sufficient precautions had been taken to determine the question of authority and law, so that it soon became manifest that the sultan remained practically master of Cyprus, as owner of a vast portion of the soil, as well as in several other important relations. Before long, too, a deep feeling of jealousy was manifested between the Greeks and the Mussulmans. The former constituted a numerical majority in the island, and it would seem that the English authorities (or some of them) took little trouble to avoid wounding their natural susceptibilities.

Sir Garnet, however, set himself courageously to work, in order to establish a sound form of government, and to assure the population, without delay, that a reign of impartial justice had begun for them. We cannot do better than indicate the principal measures adopted for this purpose by continuing the diary of the gentleman last quoted.

"It is now a week since my last opportunity of writing to you, and the government of Cyprus seems fairly established at Nicosia. Sir Garnet, with his personal and head-quarters staff, has been living in a house hired for a year for the government. For the house, the property of a Greek, which, although one of the best in the place, is but a miserable residence for the representative of royalty, a yearly rent of £250 has been exacted, and a small part of the furniture, such as it was absolutely necessary to purchase, was sold only at a most exorbitant price. The head-quarters staff, who have been in search of a dwelling, have been unable to procure one of anything like a suitable character. Extortionate sums have been demanded for houses almost in ruins (for many of the best buildings here are in wretched repair), with small and low rooms

and without a supply of water. It has been determined, consequently, by Sir Garnet, that since the town is both unable and unwilling to offer sufficient accommodation to the government at a reasonable rate, the Lord High Commissioner, with his personal and head-quarters staff, shall go under canvas outside the town; and a site for the camp has been selected at a distance of about two miles, close to a convent. It is hoped that some of the rooms of the convent will prove available for offices. Whatever may be the discomforts of life under canvas, I do not imagine that either Sir Garnet or his staff will regret the change. The town of Nicosia offers few attractions. So barren, indeed, is it of interest, that I find it difficult to add to the very meagre description of the place which I gave you in my last letter. A more intimate acquaintance with the streets and buildings, has enabled me to discover little worth notice. The principal mosque is a fine building, carefully preserved inside, and bearing on its exterior all the appearance of venerable age. The town is girdled with ramparts three miles in circumference, pierced by three gates, through which alone an entry can be gained. Streets run at most points as radii to the ramparts, which, when they are mounted, present good space for riding and walking, and afford the only complete view easily obtainable of the city and the surrounding country. A redeeming feature, it must be granted, to the eye of an observer looking from above exists amid this closely-packed mass of mud-plastered houses in the glimpses of green garden that are everywhere visible. But for all the wayfarer in the streets can see, there might be never a green leaf in all the town, except where, here and there, an orange tree, taller than its brothers and sisters, or a willow waving in the wind, or the ragged lace of a rustling banana peers above the lofty lines of mud wall, or is caught for a moment by the eye through the vestibule of a house. For the walls of the narrow streets shut in everything completely, and there seems hardly breathing room, much less space for scenery. The one exception from

the list of hidden and imprisoned greenery must be made for the tufty tops of the tall palms, which, standing out in solitude, or in groups of two or three against the heavens, with not even a passing cloud for a friend, seem, in their eminent loneliness, almost to ask for sympathy. In the streets there is little to look at. Brown women suckling babes as they sit at their doors in the street; mules in the evening passing to and fro with brown pitchers of water in panniers on their backs; dogs in the deepest depths of manginess; here a Turkish girl huddling her face from the gaze of unholy eyes, and there a Turk bowing his head and touching his breast in respectful salutation—these are all that the government of Cyprus need mourn the loss of, in passing out through the walls of the city of Nicosia.

“Far more interesting to you, I do not doubt, than a rhapsody upon cloudless heavens or picturesque Greeks, or a stone of Venetian cutting emergent through Turkish mud-plaster, will be some account of the advance of English government in the island. The Turks, I believe, as a body—the official Turks, of course, excluded—welcome the advent of the English, if not with the joy felt by the Greeks, at any rate with sincere satisfaction. There will be no conscription, they know; their families will not be broken up by the hand of war; and there will be no doubling of taxes which war has brought. And further than this, as far as I can gather, there is a feeling of relief among the Turks, for it seems they were not without fear that they might, in the arrangements of Congress, be handed over to Greece. The rejoicing of the Greeks is unbounded. I believe they regard Sir Garnet Wolseley as a deliverer, and many times I have been assured by Greek priests that they know God at last has heard the cry of their suffering, and has sent to save them.

“The official Turk is, perhaps, a more interesting, because a deeper, object of study. With his impenetrable composure and his polite, his almost gallant assurances, his thoughts and his aim are clothed in words and a deportment



which are hard to read. The Turkish government is represented in Cyprus by Samih Pacha, the bearer of the firman, and Bessim Pacha, the mustessarif or governor. These are the chief officers at the capital, while in the six districts there are the six kaimakans or lieutenant-governors. Then, as judicial officers, there are the *cadi* or judge, and the *mufti* or legal adviser; and the list of officials is swelled by a number of minor instruments of government—administrative and judicial. In the sphere of administration the question of first difficulty is, without doubt, that of the taxes. The taxes are, and long have been, most burdensome. To meet the expenses of the Russian war there has been double taxation, and taxes are assessed after the custom of primitive society, not upon individuals, but upon villages; and the head men, or reeves, to use an old English and an American word, of the villages, are held responsible for payment. Taxes are sold to tax farmers, and the Turkish government acts hardly ever as the collector of its own imposts; but the tax farmers are entitled to the assistance of the *zaptiehs*, the government police, in their efforts to exact their dues. These arrangements affect mostly the Greeks, who are the peasants, the tillers of the soil of the country, and their complaints are frequent. On the one hand, there appears reason to fear that the Greeks look upon the arrival of the English as a sign of release from all taxation, while, on the other hand, it seems that the Turkish government are striving, with their last grasp, to fill their hands to overflowing. It is, of course, to their interest to show to the English auditor a full treasury and evidence of large receipts, for on that basis will be calculated the revenue, of which a certain excess is to come to them; and this idea is probably sufficient of itself to induce the government to lend all the assistance of its *zaptiehs* to the farmers. And it is further probable that the expiring officials are not more scrupulous than most Turkish officeholders in the matter of appropriation of money. It is, therefore, satisfactory to reflect that the civil commissioners appointed to reside in the

several districts of the island with large and summary powers, and with special instructions to tolerate no injustice, and to see right done even, if need should be, without awaiting the formal procedure of the law, have already entered upon their duties, and are present among the people for whose protection and improvement their office has been created. To each civil governor is attached an assistant civil commissioner. The judicial powers of the former extend to the infliction of sentences of imprisonment not exceeding two years; the latter may award sentences not exceeding six months. This is the only important respect, I believe, in which, since I last wrote to you, addition has been made to the powers of the commissioners, or, perhaps, to speak strictly, I should say in which their powers have been defined.

“Another matter which will require extensive and careful examination is that of the property of the Turkish government in lands. Almost immediately, upon assuming the temporary administration of the island, Lord John Hay found it necessary to prohibit the sale of lands in the neighbourhood of the towns, and there can be little doubt that the Turkish government has been making efforts to sell land as freely as possible. It is expected that, with regard to the article of the annex to the convention, by which the sale of lands the personal property of the sultan is allowed, the Porte will assert claims to sell property, as the sultan's property, to which they have no longer any title. It is stated that where sales have been attempted the order for selling has emanated in some cases from Bessim Pacha, the Turkish governor, and in some from Samih Pacha, and in one instance it is said that the order came direct from Constantinople. These attempts to sell were all, as far as it is known, unsuccessful, being frustrated, on more than one occasion, by the naval officers acting under Lord John Hay's instructions, who were stationed provisionally for the protection of the newly-hoisted flag at the different towns. A Commission to inquire into the amount of the lands in the island, and the tenure by which they

are held will shortly be appointed. It will consist of three English officers and two Mussulmans, and will be instructed to report as to the quantity of land belonging respectively to the sultan, to the Turkish government as distinct from the sultan, to churches and mosques, and to private persons. The titles by which the land is held will also be subjected to examination.

"The institution of new machinery for the administration of justice has already commenced in the appointment of the civil commissioners, and reforms of the law itself are already, it is understood, under consideration. It is by no means an easy task to say what the law is in any part of the Turkish dominions, and least of all is it easy here in Cyprus. From the Koran first flows all law, and the sanction of all law, and by exposition of the sense of the Koran the law is made known on those matters which have come down from primitive society. But there appear to be some of those matters in regard to which the Koran, designating them as under the sole arbitrament of the sultan, the sultan has made a law by ordinance. Of these the question of the inheritance to land is one, and decisions, consequently, in disputed cases of real property, are given after consideration of the sultan's ordinances on the subject; while in a case of which personal property is alone involved, the Koran is the text of the judgment. But apart from these matters upon which appeal is made alone to the Koran, there is the great body of administrative laws and regulations required for the protection and maintenance of a state in advanced civilisation; and if there is any one who imagines that the indolent Turk has no provision for these wants, or has only, as it were the barest, tattered, disorderly, ill-fitting provision for them, he is far in error. It is not the want of laws that is the disease of Turkish government, but the disregard of laws; not bad laws do the most injury, but the bad administration of good laws. Ottoman laws, ordinances, firmans, regulations, reaching into all the tortuous recesses of a highly civilised existence, have

been proclaimed in abundance. I have been shown a collection of laws printed at Constantinople in Greek, which I am assured is the accepted law of the Turkish empire, and which, as far as a rapid and cursory glance can be trusted for information, leaves little to be desired on the score either of completeness or natural equity. Moreover, the title page is faced by the fine passage from Aristotle's '*Politics*,' which tells us that he who bids the law to rule bids God and the mind to rule; but he who bids a man to rule sets up a beast, for desires and passion turn the best man wrong; for law is mind purified of appetite.

"It is well-known that in Cyprus, as elsewhere in the Turkish dominions, the evidence of a Christian is allowed in a court of law to have little effect against the evidence of a Mussulman, and yet I am told (although I have not verified the statement by search myself) that there is a law among this collection directing that a Christian's word shall have equal weight.

"Among a people exhibiting this wide and melancholy contrast between fair notions of jurisprudence and foul administration it is certain that the chief labour of good government will consist, not so much in the elaboration of new laws, as in the firm execution of laws already existing. In all probability it is with some such views as these that Sir Garnet Wolseley will issue his first proclamation relative to a change of the laws in force in Cyprus. The proclamation, which will be published almost immediately, contains some thirty articles. All persons are made admissible as witnesses, without distinction of race or creed, and it is provided that a witness shall be sworn in the manner he considers most binding upon his conscience; the credibility of witnesses is made a matter for the discretion of the court, and the testimony of a single witness, when fully believed by the court, is to be considered as ample proof as the testimony of two or more witnesses; the examination on oath of an accused person is forbidden, and powers are given to courts to imprison witnesses refusing to answer, provided that no



witness need incriminate himself. A penalty not exceeding five years' imprisonment is attached to the giving of false evidence, and subornation is similarly dealt with. Sentences of death, and sentences 'awarding a kind of punishment not sanctioned or allowed by any law in any part of the British dominions,' are to be referred for the consideration of the Lord High Commissioner. The Lord High Commissioner is to be informed as soon as possible of every sentence of imprisonment for a period exceeding a year, and of every fine exceeding £20. Heavy penalties are enacted against extortion by, or corruption of judicial officers, or other government servants.

"'Any judicial officer or other person employed in the service of the government who shall accept any present or any promise, or offer of any present, or of any pecuniary or other advantage whatsoever, shall be punished'—(1) if the object of the corrupt offer is to induce the performance of a duty, by imprisonment with hard labour for not over a year; (2) if to induce the omission of a duty, by imprisonment with hard labour for not over two years; (3) if, besides accepting the offer, present, or promise, the officer shall actually fail to do his duty, the punishment is to be imprisonment, with hard labour, for a period not exceeding five years. The person who makes the offer, present, or promise, is subject to similar punishment.

"Beyond these provisions, there are articles bringing into force the Merchant Shipping Acts and the laws relating to the extradition of offenders, and to the surrender of deserters from merchant ships. There are provisions against harbouring deserters from merchant vessels, and the ports of Larnaca, Famagousta, Kyrenia, Paphos, and Limassol, are made the sole ports for the embarkation and disembarkation of goods and passengers; a master of a vessel breaking this regulation is liable to imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for not over three months, or to a fine not over £50. Goods disembarked in contravention are to be forfeited. No person who has not been domiciled in Cyprus

for at least three years, arriving in a merchant ship, may land unless he can produce, besides a passport, a certificate of good character, signed by a British consular or other authority, or unless two respectable residents of Cyprus will certify to his good character. The master of every vessel arriving is to deliver to the chief magistrate of the place a list of passengers landing, and of seamen whose service is ended, and ships are forbidden to disembark passengers before receiving *pratique*.

"Such, in substance, is the first proclamation of laws in Cyprus under British rule. It will be observed that the most significant provisions are those relating to the admissibility, on equal ground, of all good evidence, and to the establishment of proof on the evidence of one witness. In regard to the matter of the first of these provisions, I have already made some remarks, and it is only necessary to remember that, whatever the law has been so far, whether the same with that now enacted or very different, the publication of this first ordinance by British authority will exercise a salutary effect. The provision, making the evidence of one witness sufficient for proof, is directed against the existing law, which, it is asserted, demands, as necessary to a conviction, the evidence of two persons at least in addition to the offended party. The examination of the accused on oath is forbidden, in order to abolish a custom said to prevail, by which a prisoner is allowed to purge himself from the charge by an oath. Beyond the articles directed against official corruption, which will appear strange, perhaps to English eyes, but which are imperatively demanded by the immemorial vices of Turkish rule, I do not imagine there is much in the proclamation calling for special notice. The remaining provisions are founded principally upon sanitary grounds, or upon reasons of public order and safety, which require that stringent precautions should be adopted against the possible irruption into Cyprus of the worst characters of the Levant.

"I have hardly time at present to give you even the small information which I have been

able to collect on the subject of the currency of the island—a question which will require most careful handling. It must be an object of the government to keep as much as possible of English gold in the island, and, with the relative values of English and Turkish coins undetermined, there is at the same time a difficulty in conducting every commercial transaction, great or small, and a danger in attempting to obviate the difficulty by fiscal regulations. The value of the Turkish lira is generally estimated at 18s., and the value of the silver medjides at 3s. 7d.; that is to say, the lira is equivalent to five silver medjides and one English penny. But it is stated that, in different parts of the Turkish dominions, the lira is worth a considerable, though a varying, sum more than this in silver medjides, and it would hence happen, were our gold exchanged here on the basis of five medjides and one British penny to the lira of 18s., there would be a continual export of gold to those places where more medjides could be purchased for the money. As questions have been asked in England in regard to the sale of slaves in Cyprus, you will be glad to learn that, according to the unanimous testimony of the most reliable authorities, no slave has been sold publicly in Cyprus for many years. A report spread among the English in the town last Friday, the weekly market-day, that a slave had been sold in the market, but the story turned out to be ridiculous. The Turkish government does not allow the sale of slaves, and, eighteen years ago, I am informed, a firman of the sultan's gave to all slaves a right to liberty after seven years' service. There is a certain difficulty in executing this firman on account of the intensely secret character of Turkish domestic life, and pilgrims from Mecca have been in the habit of bringing slaves with them into the island; there is no possibility of proving that such attendants are slaves, for, if interrogated themselves, they will always give assurances that they are in the voluntary and paid service of a kind master. But even this domestic slavery exists to a very slight extent, and most of the Turks employ hired servants

"I will conclude my letter with a few remarks upon the climate of Cyprus. The people of England, to judge from the newspapers we have received, have been beset by a panic in regard to the unhealthiness of the island, which is certainly without good grounds. Of the two thousand three hundred men, including all the British regiments in camp at Chevlik, near Larnaca, the last returns gave a list of 19 sick only, and of these 19 most were disabled through slight accidents or indisposition wholly unconnected with climatic causes. It is true the sailors and marines of the fleet have suffered from the heat; but the only wonder is, not that they have suffered, but that they are not all dead. The sailor is sent to work upon shore, and very hard he works, throughout a day extending from four in the morning to eight at night, with a flat white cap upon his head, affording no shade at all to any part of him but the actual hair on his crown, which it covers, or with a gossamer straw hat, through which the sun's rays pierce as through muslin. There is little cause for surprise that men loading and unloading lighters of heavy bales throughout a long day in this condition should feel the effects of a burning sun. All the troops on shore have enjoyed excellent health.

"I asked a resident of Nicosia if he did not believe the climate to be very unhealthy? 'No,' he answered, 'and the evidence is in this, that, despite the dirt, the squalor, the narrow lanes, and the want of drainage, we have little sickness.'

"That there is little sickness among the people of Nicosia I believe to be a true statement, which I have heard confirmed by the medical officer who was here with the Naval Brigade, and who was frequently called to visit the people in their houses. There can be no doubt, that the heat is very great at times, but at times, again, we have had cold nights, and moderately cool days.

"It is not known when Samih Pacha will return to Constantinople, but it is unlikely that his presence will be required here much longer;



with him will go, probably, Bessim Pacha, and many other officials. No regret will be felt at their departure, not because there are any personal grounds for wishing them gone, but because there seems to be an impression that until all visible representation of Turkish rule is removed, there will be obstacles in the way of establishing uniform government and of disestablishing the old methods of action.

"To-day, the birthday of the Duke of Edinburgh, has been celebrated by a grand review of the troops encamped about Larnaca and at Chevlik.

"The permanent disposition of the troops is now completed. They occupy stations as follows:—At Larnaca are two companies of Bombay Sappers and the 9th Bombay Infantry. In the Chevlik Camp are F Battery, 2nd Brigade of Royal Artillery, the head-quarters of the 1st Bombay Lancers, the 42nd Regiment, the 101st Regiment, and the 71st Regiment, and one company of Madras Sappers. At Nicosia is the 2nd Goorkha Regiment, a squadron of the 1st Bombay Lancers, and the 31st Company of Royal Engineers. At Kyrenia, the 25th Madras Native Infantry. At Baffo, the 13th Bengal Infantry. At Limasol, the 31st Punjab Infantry. At Famagousta, the 26th Bengal Native Infantry."

In the middle of August the head-quarters were still near Nicosia, though the English were unable to live in the town itself. The fact had become manifest that we had gone to Cyprus at an unhealthy time of the year, and in a specially unhealthy year. Efforts were made in some quarters to conceal the amount of sickness amongst the troops; but the truth was known to those who kept their ears open. The correspondent of the "Daily News" at this time was Mr. Archibald Forbes, and he refused to keep back the real state of matters from his fellow-countrymen. His letters and telegrams were charged with details of the sanitary condition of the various regiments.

The writer already quoted continued his journal on the 14th of August:—

"Sir Garnet Wolseley, with his staff, as I have

already informed you by telegraph, have shaken off the dust of their feet against the walls of Nicosia, and are encamped some two miles from the town. The dearth of houses sufficiently large, or in any tolerable state of repair, rendered this change unavoidable. It would have been impossible efficiently to do business with the staff split up and distributed in the miserably built, small, and confined buildings in different parts of the town, which were the only available offices or dwellings. For sanitary reasons, too, departure from Nicosia was welcomed, for although exceptionally good health has been enjoyed here by all the officers, the pent-up streets bisected with runnels of water, which, though often clear and sparkling, gather, where impeded in their flow, into stagnant pools, and the familiar sight of refuse, and the total absence of drainage, could not afford strong hopes of good health. In the camp, it is true, the tents are somewhat like 'a pillar of fire by day,' but then the abbot of the monastery allows the use of his rooms for offices, and in the evening, when folds of light white cloud begin to sit upon the hills that lie away to the north, a cool wind comes from the setting sun, and the nights are chilly. Sir Garnet's tent and mess-tent, and the mess-tent of the head-quarters' staff, face south, and the other tents, in two lines to the south, facing inward, flank these on either side. Beyond, about half a mile further south, are encamped a troop of native cavalry and some Royal Engineers. The health of the troops, since I last wrote, has, I regret to say, become considerably worse,

"The Chevlik camp, near Larnaca, the station of the English regiments, has about ten per cent. of its men on the sick-list. Out of a strength of two thousand five hundred there are some two hundred and sixty suffering from light fever. Various theories are current as to the cause of this ill-health, and the evil nature of the climate is freely described. I believe, however, that this form of sickness is a natural result, not of a bad climate, but of the maintenance among Europeans, in a land of extreme heat, of habits suitable

to a temperate atmosphere. While the Marine Brigade were in Nicosia, the sailors might be seen any day playing cricket in the burning sun upon the dusty ramparts, and, as a consequence, most of them have been attacked with the fever. I am not sure that, among officers and sailors alike of our navy, there is not a certain spirit of bravado which urges them to the neglect of reasonable precautions. It is noticeable, at any rate, that soldiers are more carefully watched by their officers, but soldiers, too, are rash and careless. The conditions of their life in camp is, no doubt, most trying. They are wholly destitute of amusement; and in the heat of the day, being forbidden to go out in the sun, they must lie sweltering, eight in one bell tent, with the mercury in the thermometer marking one hundred and twenty under the canvas. Then when the fresh airs of the night blow, they inconsiderately expose themselves to the breeze and catch a chill, or, as they express it, 'get a shake of the wind.' I believe that the more the matter is considered, the more it will be found that, upon some such grounds as these, the explanation of the fever from which the troops are suffering will be found; the evil lies in rash disregard of the danger of chills and in unnecessary exposure to the sun. The heat of the sun of Cyprus is undoubtedly, and I believe always has been considered to be, excessive. People here will tell you that the island is far hotter than the mainland of Syria, and there is the memory of Martial's line—'*Infamem nimio calore Cyprum*'—to show the repute of the place in olden times.

"I told you, in one of my former letters, of signs of an intention to send back the native troops from here to India at once. There can be no doubt that such an intention was entertained at the time I wrote, though it was subsequently dropped. Now, there is no longer any doubt in the matter. The re-embarkation of the Indian troops has commenced; the detachments of them which had been sent to different parts of the island are being re-conveyed to Larnaca, and it is believed that, by the 21st

instant, the entire contingent will set sail. A report was in circulation, at one time, that the difficult conditions of a voyage by sea to India at this period of the year, had been regarded as an insuperable obstacle to the return of the troops until after October; but, whether for good or bad, the fears that were felt in regard to the monsoon and the extreme heat, and the battening down of decks, appear to have been surmounted, and the troops will go. What provision will be made ultimately for garrisoning the island is a question for speculation. One of the English regiments now here will, I believe, be removed—the one presumably which is first on the roster for foreign service—and will be sent on to another station. The island will then be occupied by no more than two regiments, which will be distributed in detachments in or near the capitals of the several districts. Were it possible for the English government to recruit a battalion of Turks from the mainland and to station them, commanded by English officers, in Cyprus, the scheme, I believe, would be a good one. The Turks are fine and trustworthy soldiers, and through the maintenance of a body of them in English pay, under the humanising rule of England, the repute of their good treatment and fortunate condition would spread far in the East, and would prove an effective instrument for the furtherance of respect and friendly feelings towards the British people.

"I regret to tell you that the peace and order of Cyprus have been disturbed of late by serious crime, and that in one district—namely, that of Papho—the calendar of offences is large. Three men are charged with rape and four with murder, and there is, in addition, a list of minor offences, including cattle stealing and burglary. The offenders appear, from their names, to be all Turks. In one case a Christian, the head man of the village, who had been collecting taxes, was set upon and murdered. The case, it is stated, has created intense excitement in the district, and it has become a question for Sir Garnet Wolseley to determine what means shall be taken for the punishment of the offenders.



The Turkish constitution of criminal courts in Cyprus is lamentably defective. There is a local criminal court in each district, before which accused persons are brought; but as this court has a jurisdiction only over cases which involve a sentence of imprisonment not exceeding six months, all serious offences are referred to the central criminal court in Nicosia. Even this court, however, the highest in the island, has no power to order the execution of the sentences it itself passes of imprisonment for over three years, but must refer them, if they are capital sentences, to Constantinople, and if they are less than capital sentences, to Rhodes, for confirmation. I have learnt on good authority that there are in gaol at Nicosia about twenty persons sentenced to death, whose cases are and have been for a long time under consideration at Constantinople. Both these, the worst malefactors and accused persons who have been sent for trial from the districts of Nicosia, are loaded alike with bars and chains of iron, and confined in a den of filth, which is a shame to civilisation. It is very plain that, for the punishment of offences committed in Cyprus since British occupation, this tardy and shocking justice must not be put in operation, and accordingly Sir Garnet Wolseley, it is understood, will issue a special Commission for the trial of the offences committed lately in the district of Papho. An ordinance will first be published, proclaiming in general terms that, whenever the High Commissioner sees fit, he will issue a Commission for the trial of such crimes as he may designate. The accused will be tried by the law of Cyprus, which has not been repealed; but the ordinance enacts that the rules of evidence and of procedure, so far as circumstances allow, shall be those known to English law. The Commission will be composed of Lieutenant-Colonel Brackenbury, R.A., the Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General, and of the Civil Commissioner, and the Assistant-Civil Commissioner of Papho, and will have power to summon to sit with them in court, and to have a voice in the declaration as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, the two Mussulman

and two Christian members of the local court, the 'Medjlis Dari;' but only the Commission will pass sentence. It is expected that arrangements for the holding of the court constituted by this Commission will be completed in some four or five days. Great difficulties occur in all matters of proclamation, for interpreters capable of translating English into Turkish, and even into Greek, are most scarce. A good interpreter who can write Turkish would hardly leave Constantinople for a smaller salary than £500 or £600 a year, and the government of Cyprus, it is stated, cannot afford that expenditure.

"In the district of Kyrenia also there have been lawless proceedings. At Panteleimon, a village twelve or thirteen miles from the town of Kyrenia, there is held a yearly festival lasting two days. The festival this year was held from the 6th to the 8th of August, and the kaimakan of the district, fearing disturbances, appealed to our Civil Commissioner to be allowed to proceed to that place with four Turkish policemen—zaptiehs—with the view of maintaining order. It happened that, in the course of the festival, the zaptiehs arrested a Greek who was brandishing a knife. Greeks then set upon the zaptiehs, and beat them badly. After this, the Greek priests begged the kaimakan to leave the village, asserting that they could not be answerable for his life. I fear that, for some time, reprisals of this sort must be apprehended. The zaptiehs are in many places detested by the Greeks, for they have been the police sent to enforce the payment of taxes, and taxes, and the rude circumstances of their collection, are the main grievances under which the Greeks have suffered. The exaction of taxes in kind is probably the worst system of taxation; the tax-gatherers come among the people and appraise the produce, and fix upon it an arbitrary quality hardly ever acknowledged by the peasant, and on that basis carry off their tithe. It is hardly to be wondered at that such a proceeding, before the eyes of a whole village, tends to bitter feeling and outbreaks. Every day it is expected that the High Commissioner will be able to re-

lieve himself of the presence of Samih Pacha and the other officials of the central government. On the arrival of Colonel Biddulph, who has been appointed Civil Commissioner of Kythrea, in which the town Nicosia is situated, the services of Bessim Pacha, the governor, were dispensed with; but Bessim and the others still remain. There is a difficult question connected with the departure of these officials from the island arising from the still unsatisfactory state of the accounts of the Turkish government. It was thought by this date the collection of the accounts should have been completed, but it is understood that Samih Pacha pleads, as an excuse for the tardiness of his staff, the fact that the late kaimakans of the several districts, with only one exception, having been removed from office and put upon their trial for peculation, the kaimakans in office at present are without much knowledge of their duties. It is by no means certain, however, that the Turkish government are not seeking to prolong the stay of their officials in the island, in order that they may carry away more than a legitimate amount of taxes. The whole system of government in Cyprus has been so lax that almost anything seems possible; what the corruption has been may be faintly inferred from the fact that the pay of the kaimakans of the district was one thousand five hundred piastres, or a few pennies over £8, 10s. a month. The Commission appointed to investigate the question of the land tenure of the island will assemble almost immediately. It is believed that almost all the waste lands are the property of the state, and that but a small proportion of them is in the hands of individuals. Should this prove to be so, there will be a large source of revenue for the British government in the sale of land, and the colonisation of the land, should suitable settlers be found, will be easy. On the other hand, it seems, from the terms of the Convention, that Great Britain has consented that all state property, no less than crown property, shall be held to belong to the sultan personally. Such a meaning can hardly be intended, for by it nearly the whole

island, with the exception of towns, villages, and the adjacent country, would be left to Turkey. What field the island will ultimately offer for commercial enterprise or speculation it is hard to say; but, for a long time to come, the prospect will hardly be encouraging. There is absolutely no one here to consume imported goods beyond such as are in common use, of which the supply is sufficient for the needs of the people. The handful of English officers in the island can make no market, and the promise of an influx of the class of population who might do so is remote. Mr. Thomas White, of Aldersholt, has been here, and, having expressed himself disappointed with the opportunities of enterprise afforded by the island, has returned to England.

"Lord Giffard, from his regiment in Ceylon, and Captain McCalmont, of the 7th Hussars, have arrived, and commenced their duties as aides-de-camp."

The insanitary condition of the island, and the disappointment in regard to its commercial importance, were speedily succeeded by a deadlock in the systems of justice and government which the English authorities had hoped to introduce. A fortnight later, the same writer mentions the occurrence of this new difficulty.

"A change of considerable import has lately come over the spirit of government in Cyprus. There has been a tacit suspension, if not a rescission, of all legislation, and much of the administrative machinery so far set up is at a standstill. The proclamation, which I informed you, in my letter of August 6th, was destined for immediate publication, has never been issued, and the law which it would have enacted, making desirable changes in regard to the reception and appreciation of testimonial evidence, imposing penalties on official corruption, and laying down certain port and shipping regulations, has, in consequence, not come into operation. The issue also of the Commission for the trial of criminals in the district of Papho, and the publication of the general ordinance, proclaiming the intention of the High Commissioner to issue from



time to time such Commissions have been suspended. The Commission, as I have already informed you, was withheld for a time, owing to the escape of the principal criminals against whom it was directed, but there is still sufficient crime untried in the districts to give work to a court, and yet no court has been constituted; and the Civil Commissioners have received instructions not to proceed, even within their limited powers, to the trial of grave offences, but to hold over the cases, and detain their prisoners, until further orders. Port and customs regulations, also, which have been lately looked for, have not appeared, although it has been found necessary tacitly to supersede some of the existing practices in regard to them. The practice, for instance, of securing exemption from duty for imported goods coming into Cyprus, by the prior payment of the duty in another part of the Ottoman dominions, say at Constantinople or at Smyrna, a fair enough proceeding while the revenues of Cyprus were Turkish revenues, is obviously incompatible with our administration of the government, and with our right to collect taxes, and has been disallowed actually, though by no formal law or ordinance.

"A consideration of this unnatural and suspensory state of government cannot fail to suggest that the practical assumption of full powers for the government of the island has encountered impediments. The question for solution is as to the sort of constitution we are to erect in the island, and the kind and origin of the laws which will be administered. A good deal of surprise, and a good deal of discontent, are felt among the English who have come to the island on account of their uncertain *status*, and it is easy to hear interrogations, conjectures, and misgivings, as to the probable establishment of English laws and procedure, or as to the possible confirmation of a large part of the Turkish codes. In the meantime, it is evident that the position of our administration here is as unsatisfactory, for the security of individual rights, as it is dangerous and perplexing to the cause of equable government. Quantities of goods con-

tinue to pour into the island, and the flow of souls seeking speculation, contracts, and employment under government, is not diminishing. Day by day more Englishmen are coming within the range of the law of Cyprus, and are acquiring a title under it to the protection of their property and trade. Causes of civil contention will arise, and the march of progress and civilisation will set its customary landmarks in broken contracts and repudiated bonds. Are two Englishmen going into litigation to invoke the Nizam law for their relief? Do they occupy, before the tribunals, the same ground as two Greeks or two Turks? And how stands an Englishman in commercial relations with a Greek or a Turk? May *Grecia mendax* dare in trade as well as in history, and deceive the ignorant and confiding Briton, who knows nothing of the law, and whose agreements, sales, and contracts, will be liable to circumvention by the astute and well-informed native? That such is the danger at the present moment no one can doubt. The laws of Turkey in Cyprus have not been altered, amended, or repealed, in one particular, and they are the sole laws in force in the island. No Englishman here knows what they are; and it thus happens that, in a territory under British administration, there exists that evil and obsolete state of things in which the law is unknown to the people whom it concerns. It is not necessary that the English in Cyprus should rise in revolution like the ancient Romans, and many other people of the primitive days, when society ordered by law was beginning to make its way, and clamour for their twelve tables, for their law to be made public and drawn from the hands of the privileged priesthood who possess it; but it is certainly desirable that some proclamation of the law should be made, even if it is but a proclamation and re-enactment of the law existing already.

"The continuation of the Turkish criminal law, though less a matter affecting the interests of each individual, will be found, I believe, to be open to serious objection, partly on the ground of its lenity, or of the lenient interpre-



LIEUT<sup>T</sup> GEN BAKER PASHA





tation given to it, and partly on the same ground that exposes the perpetuation of the civil law to censure—on the ground, namely, that the knowledge of it is in the hands only of one class of the people. There have lately been tried in Nicosia a number of prisoners accused of murder, of rape, and of murderous assaults. The assistant Civil Commissioner of the district has been present at the trials, and the sentences have received the approval of Sir Garnet Wolseley. It would not have been possible, under the present constitution of the island, for those sentences to have been altered by his excellency, even had there been good reasons for altering them, except by an exercise of arbitrary authority. For a measure of such energy there was no need; the sentences awarded were properly awarded, as far the law can be understood through interpretation, according to law; but they were sentences, in some cases, of extreme leniency. In one case, two brothers, Turks, broke into a house, ravished the occupant's wife, and stole his jewellery. The aggrieved man proceeded, as is the Turkish custom for the initiation of all proceedings, civil and criminal alike, by petition against the offender, addressing the Mudiriât, or local council, and praying for redress. Subsequently, these two brothers went to his house and called him forth. One of them commenced an attack upon him with a small knife; the other then joined in the assault with a large knife, and the unfortunate man was ultimately stabbed to death. No one can doubt that this was a brutal murder, yet the murderers, placed upon their trial, received sentences only of ten and fifteen years' imprisonment. The law, as far as I can understand, under which the sentence was passed, was an article of the Criminal Code, which lays down that a man who slays another without premeditation shall be condemned to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fifteen years. It is evident that the whole effect and meaning of this article depends upon the words which appear to be equivalent to 'without premeditation.' In the case I have described, these words were plainly interpreted in a sense which would

acquit of murder many of the worst murderers. I have not had time to examine the question thoroughly, and I should be unwilling to advance a final opinion as to the rules of law under which this interpretation was given, but by reference to another article of the code, it appears that the 'premeditation' is taken to mean a deliberate planning of a plot or intention. It is difficult not to believe that this body of law, which had its origin in some European code, has first borrowed terms, and then misunderstood them. The definition of murder, as a killing, with premeditation, seems to be nearly identical with the description of what constitutes murder known to English law; but when we come to the interpretation of the terms of the definition, the *malice prepense* which the English law will infer from a variety of circumstances, bears no similarity at all to the deliberate and studied plotting required by the Turkish code. Thus, the murderer of Turkey is absolved, where the murderer in England would be condemned to die. I fear I have been betrayed into a more or less technical and uninteresting dissertation, but without some such illustration it would be difficult to explain with sufficient clearness the discord which appears to exist between English and Turkish criminal law, and to show the reasons for which it would seem necessary that a system of law so favourable to crime should be subjected to careful criticism and amendment.

"In the midst of the somewhat weak condition of British government in the island which I have described, a show of government was made last Sunday morning in Nicosia, which was, I believe, as salutary to the prestige of English authority, as it was grateful to the natural pride of Englishmen. The convicts from the gaol were sent to Kyrenia, thence to be carried to different penal establishments in the Turkish empire. At about four o'clock in the morning, a body of one hundred Ghoorkas was drawn up with bayonets fixed outside the prison, and the convicts were marched out in parties of about twenty, through the Kyrenia gate of the town, to a space beneath the ramparts. The



zaptiehs (the police), and the Turkish soldiers there, bound them two and two, with ropes passing round their arms. A detachment of Royal Engineers occupied the ground, and between them and the flank of the ramparts the convicts were passed on from the gate to the spot where their arms were tied, and thence to an embrasure formed by a bastion, where their chains were removed. Freed from the chains they were again passed on, and formed into parties of sixty, close beneath the bastion. To each party was assigned a British officer, in command of a guard of fifteen Ghoorkas, with a file of Turkish police and soldiers. They were then marched off. Five mules, for the conveyance of the weak and sick, and donkeys, bearing panniers of water, followed each detachment. The road to Kyrenia lies through a mountain pass, and is, in distance, about sixteen miles. At the head of the pass, about eleven miles from Nicosia, a detachment of one hundred of the 42nd Regiment, which is stationed at Kyrenia, relieved the Ghoorka guard, who then returned to Nicosia. Colonel Baker Russell, C.B., was in command of the whole guard from Nicosia to Kyrenia. The marching out of the convicts from the gaol, their passing through the streets, the unshackling of the heavy chains from their limbs, and their formation into the parties of sixty, in which they were marched away, formed a strange and touching scene. These men have been kept in a lax and easy custody, they have been permitted to work, and to sell their work in the bazaars, and many times one has heard the clank of chains and seen the murderer passing through the streets unguarded, bearing back to prison the money for which he has sold the produce of his labour. So remunerative was the work of the convicts that, when they left Nicosia, they were owed some thousands of piastres, for which they had given credit, and which they were unable to recover. Their debtors were principally the zaptiehs, the police set to guard them—a strange fact, and one well illustrative of the discipline of Turkish government. These men had thus money to

give away, and, as they passed down the streets, or were halted near the gate, here and there a wife, or one or two little children, would run up to a prisoner, and he would put money into their hands. Many of the women wept and moaned, and all along the parapets to the ramparts there was a dense throng, mainly of Turkish women, looking tenderly down upon these hardened malefactors, whom they had long known, perhaps loved. From this line of veiled faces, as the parties marched away, rose a low, monotonous wailing. All the prisoners, without exception, bore themselves bravely. They were even full of cheerfulness and jokes. They are the worst criminals collected from different parts of the Turkish empire, and almost all have committed murder or rape. Yet the gentleness of human nature had not gone out of them altogether. They had small white pet dogs among them, with which they were loath to part, and which, on marching away, they bore in their arms. One great Nubian, as a party squatted down, waiting to be marched off, excited laughter and merriment by a tune he played them on a guitar.

“The Ghoorkas found the march to the pass most trying, and more than half of them fell out. Of the one hundred of the 42nd who formed the guard from the pass downward, twenty-five fell out, one from sunstroke, the rest from exhaustion, produced by the excessive heat of the sun. It was a matter of astonishment to every Englishman how the convicts, coming from the loathsome confines of their prison, stood the exhausted walk. Hardly one of them gave in. They were a magnificent body of men, undoubtedly, with fine physique, and many of them with fine faces, and their labour had evidently supplied them well with food, for they were stout and well filled out; but they had been long in a den of impure air, and without exercise but such as they got from supporting or dragging their chains. The chains as a rule were fastened round the waist, and passed thence down to the ankle, where they ended. But in one or two cases, the more desperate dragged a loose end of chain also. One hundred of these convicts

were embarked on Monday morning in her Majesty's ship *Black Prince*, which will convey them to the different Turkish ports to which they are to be distributed. Some go to Rhodes, some to Acre, some to Adana. The whole of the arrangements for the removal of the prisoners were admirably made and executed, and the Turkish officers, no less than the general populace, were deeply impressed by our discipline. It must be remembered that these prisoners were of the most dangerous class, and a year or so ago had made a determined and furious attempt to escape, in which many were shot, cut down, and maimed, and it was by no means certain that they would suffer themselves to be quietly removed.

"The heat continues to be intense, and the thermometer during the last week, in an hospital marquee in the general's camp, near Nicosia, has registered one hundred and thirteen Fahrenheit. It is believed that a favourable spot for a winter cantonment has been found at Matthiadis, among the northern spurs of the central range of mountains which traverses the island, and the company of Royal Engineers, who have been suffering somewhat from fever in the camp near Nicosia, will be moved there almost immediately. The 42nd, since they have been at Kyrenia, have recovered almost entirely from the effects of the fever which attacked them in the camp at Chevlik. I have no reason to change the opinion I have before expressed to you regarding the character of the climate. English troops will never be able to work much in the summer months, unless they are quartered high in the hills; and fatigue, exposure to the sun, and carelessness, will always tend to induce fevers; and to that extent the climate may be called unhealthy, but so far it has not proved itself malarious.

"A case of slavery has been reported in Nicosia. A woman has come forward, averring herself to be a slave, complaining of ill-treatment at the hands of her master, and demanding liberation. The Civil Commissioner of Nicosia has been instructed to institute the fullest

investigation into the circumstances of the case, and, should the woman's statement prove true, to take steps for her liberation, and for the punishment of the master who has ill-used her."

With regard to the health of the English troops, the same authority declared it to be quite certain that, in a large majority of the cases of fever that had occurred among the troops in Cyprus, exposure and work in the sun had been, if not the absolute cause, at any rate a predetermining, or an accompanying circumstance. "It is difficult," he continues, "among a large body of soldiers, whose avocations are more or less similar, to mark the difference of individual ways, but among officers, fewer in number and detailed for special duties, the facility of observation is greater, and it is a patent fact that, among these, the few sufferers from fever have been those who have had to work in the sun. To this line of argument, I may add the uniform opinion of the people of the island, who, when asked if it surprises them to see English soldiers so readily overcome by fever, reply emphatically that it does not, and that were they, too, to brave the sun so recklessly, the strongest among them would fail. In regard to the question of sun-fever turning into ague, it is quite true that, in speaking with perfect precision, this cannot be said to happen; a feverish condition of the body, produced by excessive solar heat, will not culminate or pass away, if protected in its natural course, in any form of ague. But it seems to me it is still allowable where aguish symptoms are seen to supervene, whether through the incidence of chills, or of the many other causes of ill-health to which the British soldier, in countries of great heat, is exposed, to hold that this mild change, after a few days' sickness, where a worse one might have come, is one to be welcomed as significant of a light form of fever. As against the theory that the fever here is malarious, are to be set some obstinate facts. The officers camping upon the same spot with the soldiers have hardly felt fever at all, in the head-quarters camp near Nicosia not at all, and the soil, both at the Chevlik



camp and near Nicosia, so far from requiring drainage, is dry to painful dustiness, and is devoid of all vegetation but a few thistles. I do not mean to advance, as my own, or as worthy of acceptance, the few opinions I have embodied in these remarks. I merely record, as far as I am able, what seem to me to be the ideas most current among many experienced authorities with whom I have conversed. In the meantime, the health of the troops has considerably improved. Their distribution, and the state of health among them, is as follows, on September 4th:—The 101st, who have been moved from the Chevlik camp and encamped nearer to Larnaca, had, by latest accounts, in hospital in their new quarters, thirty-three sick; the 71st, who are under canvas near Dali, had thirty-one sick; the six companies of the 42nd, which are stationed at Kyrenia, had forty-one sick; and the two companies of the same regiment which are at Baffo had nine sick; and the company of the Royal Engineers at Nicosia had, up to the last date when they were there, fourteen sick; they have since been removed to near Dali. In addition to those included in these numbers, there is a certain proportion of convalescents, of whom, as they have been on their way from one station to another, it has been difficult to keep count. The whole force in the island is taken to be about two thousand six hundred men, and the percentage disabled by sickness, is about nine per cent. of that number.”

Meanwhile the complicated and annoying difficulty in regard to the tenure of the land was occupying the close attention of commissioners to whom it had been referred. We will make one more extract from the correspondent last quoted, in order to explain the precise nature of England's interest in the matter.

“It is not known when the Land Commission, which is still sitting, will complete its labours. The facts with which it has to deal are of a most difficult character, and it is not probable that any satisfactory conclusion in regard to them will be reached until a survey of the island has been made. The business of the Commission

may be described shortly to be, in the first place, ascertainment of the law, as it has been practically applied in Cyprus, relating to the different tenures of land; and, in the second place, the determination of the extent of the various classes of land held under those tenures. Land, according to Turkish law, is divided mainly into five kinds, some of which comprise again subordinate divisions. There is (1) *Mulk* land, which is land in which the proprietor has full and absolute property or *plenum dominium*; (2) *Mirie* land, which is public domain, comprising fields, commons, and forests; (3) *Vacouf* lands, which are lands appropriated to certain pious uses; (4) *Metrouke* lands, which are lands never appropriated, but left for public use; (5) *Meval* lands, which are unappropriated lands lying beyond the reach of the human voice from villages, a distance which is estimated at about one and a half miles, or half an hour's travel. There are many sorts of lands of pious foundation included in the *Vacouf* lands, the tenure and uses of which are very complex. The lands of public use comprise two sorts alone, those subject to the use of all, such as public roads, and those subject to the use of certain districts or communities, such as stretches of public pasturage, of which one village or set of villages has the enjoyment. Of the *Mirie*, or public domain, there are no subdivisions; and it remains only to consider the varieties of *Mulk* land. *Mulk* land may be generally estimated as representing the equivalent of the fee-simple lands of English tenure. There are four main divisions of it—(1) Lands in the interior of villages and collections of villages; (2) Lands which have been alienated from the public domain, and made over to individual proprietors; (3) Certain tithe lands (*Uchirie*), which were divided after the conquest among the conquerors; (4) Those which at the same time were confirmed in the possession of the conquered (non-Mussulman) natives.

“The question of interest to England is as to how much of these various lands is, under the convention of the 4th of June, reserved to Turkey. A certain perplexity is created by the

convention at the very threshold of the investigation, through the use of the term crown lands, which it is stipulated remain in the sultan's possession. But it will be seen from the classification of the lands which I have here given, and which I have every reason to believe is correct, there is by Turkish law no such thing as crown land. The sultan may, of course, have purchased land, but such land will not be crown land in the sense of royal demesne. It will be merely land owned by the sultan in his character of a private individual. Apart from this difficulty, which may, perhaps, be regarded as more or less hinging upon a refinement of the sense of words, the matter at issue lies, I believe, in the species of *Mulk* land which is described as having been divided among the conquerors, and in the *Mirie* lands. That *Mulk* land, it is said, was some years ago taken back by the state to the expropriation of the proprietors. The state disestablished its feudatories, and their properties became once more property of the state, and this property and the *Mirie* lands or public domain, and the *Mevat* or unappropriated lands, form the whole amount of landed property to which Turkey can assert a claim. And from this must be excepted all that which has borne revenue to the state—that is to say, probably, in practice, all such as has been leased during the last five years, for no lands that have yielded revenue are, by the convention, to be deemed public lands. Thus it will appear that only the unleased and uncultivated public domain known as *Mirie*, or as *Mevat*, or, in other words, something equivalent to waste lands, can be claimed by Turkey as the Porte's share in the soil of Cyprus. Such, in a rough sketch, is, I believe, the state of the land laws by which will have to be determined what amount of territory in the island comes under the denomination of the terms state and crown lands used in the convention. But even were the admission of these general principles safely established between the two parties to the convention, there remains the immense difficulty of their practical application. Without a survey of all the lands of the island, and

some sort of inspection and ratification of titles, the determination of the questions at issue does not seem possible.

“There is also a matter of much importance, for which the convention appears to have made no provision. The matter is that of the reservation of minerals. It is probable, if not certain, that almost all the minerals of Cyprus lie in the mountain ranges that traverse the island, and are thus upon that waste land or public domain which it would seem must fall to the sultan's share. It cannot be supposed that England has intended to divest herself of the riches of unfathomable ore which it is believed the island possesses, and yet it is hard to imagine by what help she will herein succeed in clothing her nakedness. Even with a knowledge of these general outlines of the land laws, it is by no means easy to arrive at any particular information of an accurate character regarding the tenure of the land in Cyprus. Indeed, in popular estimation, it seems to be held that all the *Mulk* or fee-simple lands, owned by private proprietors, are truly state lands. It is not possible, from a consideration of the law, to believe this to be the case, and I imagine the confusion of ideas has arisen—if it has arisen out of any knowledge of law at all, and not out of complete ignorance—either from perverse rulings of the cadis in the interest of the state, as against individuals, or from a mistaken view of the sense of the law, which states that all *Mulk* land was land that, being state land, has been from time to time alienated; the origin of the tenure being thus confused in thought with its present conditions. All the forest lands are also said to belong to the state. There seem to be in law three classes of forests—those belonging to the state; those termed *Baltilyk*, which are enjoyed in common by a village or set of villages, and which may be called communal forests; and those owned by individuals. It is stated that in all Cyprus there are neither *Baltilyk* nor private forests, but that the state alone owns forest lands. And this is not improbably the case, for over communal forests, usufruct of the villages



was so large as to extend to complete demolition for use or sale, although the land might not be alienated, and it is likely, therefore, that these forests have been long ago destroyed. In the state forests also, villagers of the neighbouring villages enjoy a right of cutting timber for fuel, and for the repair of their houses and agricultural implements, and, apparently subject to the payment of certain dues, they enjoy a right also of cutting for sale and exportation. It is, perhaps, fairly open to argument, whether these forests, being thus enjoyed by peasants as a right incident to lands and habitations, from which taxes are raised, might not themselves be considered as incidentally contributing to the revenue, and, therefore, as belonging to Great Britain. These are some of the difficult points in the path of the government of Cyprus, and until they are passed safely, it will be hard to say more to applicants for land than *caveat emptor*. The prohibition on the sale of land, except in towns for *bona fide* building purposes, continues; this restriction is, no doubt, detrimental in many ways to the development of the island, but it is not easy to see a clear way to removing it without danger. The names of the sultan and the Porte are powerful, and even should their authority to sell be doubted, there will always be speculators ready to run the risk of bad titles, knowing that their eviction hereafter from lands guaranteed to them by the sultan, might be a course, if not dangerous to international amity, at any rate, beset with many difficulties. It will thus be seen that there is, at present, little opening in Cyprus for investments in land, or for expenditure in the development of mineral resources; and the condition of suspended progress must necessarily continue, until, by some express agreement in regard to many details, England and the Porte clear the horizon of these clouds.

"In affairs of government no change has occurred since I last wrote to you, and the island seems as though it were under a government with no governing power. Sir Adrian Dingli has returned to Malta, and Mr. Cookson, Consular

Judge at Alexandria, has come to fill the post of law adviser to the High Commissioner; but it is evident that he will have little occupation until the determination of the government, whatever it is, which is being waited for, is signified and carried into effect. In the meantime, in addition to the picture of possible difficulties, which it would be easy to paint as contingent on this state of affairs, some real rocks have appeared. The present is a busy time in Cyprus, for among agricultural people harvests are being garnered and tithes collected, and among merchants and shop-people the stimulus of our advent is still operative. And it happens thus that the court of justice at Larnaca has been struck with paralysis. The court consists of a *cadi*, and three other members, Mussulman, or non-Mussulman, and these members receive a salary of about £2 a month, or £24 a year. How it was ever, in times past, worth the while of any merchant or landowner to discharge the duties of a justice of the court at this rate of remuneration, it would probably be a breach of delicacy to inquire; but it is probable that a certain class of fees from suitors, not strictly defined by law, were found evocative of zeal. These incidental emoluments having now ceased under the supervision of an English officer as assessor in the court, and the calls of private business pressing, of the three members of the court, two have disappeared. One has resigned, and the other absents himself, and thus there is no court. The proceedings for supplying such vacancies, according to the existing law, are long and cumbrous, and, in the days of justice to which we have succeeded, were not probably ever put in operation. Here, consequently, is a court which practically dissolves itself, while there is no means of supplying its place. The Turkish laws have not been repealed, and are, therefore, still in force, and they supply no remedy for a condition of affairs which was, perhaps, never contemplated, or which, if contemplated, appeared as a matter of indifference. There can be no doubt that a pæan of universal satisfaction will greet the first enactment of the English government, both from Turk, Greek, and

Englishmen, for all alike complain of the paralysis of the present expectant uncertainty.

"It is not, however, to be imagined that in minor matters of administration the government has been inactive. Sanitary provisions in the towns have already, notably in the town of Larnaca, wrought much improvement. The organisation of the police force is also well advanced. Captain Grant, who had come out from England to undertake the command of the force, has unfortunately so suffered in health as to feel it necessary to resign his post, and return to England. Lieutenant-Colonel Brackenbury, R.A., has been appointed in his stead, and is actively at work. The force is to consist of five hundred men—three hundred and fifty marching men, and one hundred and fifty mounted. The foot police are to receive one shilling a day, and to find their own rations, while the troopers are to get two shillings a day, and find both their rations and forage for their horses. They will be required to supply their own horses, but should a man, enlisting, be unable to do so, his horse will be purchased for him, and paid for by stoppages from his pay. The force will wear the uniform of a West India regiment, of a Zouave character. There will be, for the present, six English officers attached to the force, but it is hoped that these, after a time, when the drill and organisation of the men is completed, will not be required, and that the Turkish officers will be found competent to fill their place. Recruiting commenced yesterday in Nicosia, with the most successful results. Some forty men were enlisted, all of very fine, and some of truly magnificent, *physique*. An oath, that they will truly serve the Queen of England in Cyprus, will be administered to them.

"The seat of government will probably be placed, for the winter, near the village of Matthiadi, low down on the northern slopes of the central range of mountains between Nicosia and Limasol. The summer quarters are likely to be far up in the hills of the same range, further to the west, on or near Mounts Troados and Olympos. Many persons, whose opinions are en-

titled to weight, assert with confidence, that if a fine and healthy situation in cool hills, at this short distance from the coast, can be found for summer residence, the station will become the summer station for a large part of the population of the Levant. It is stated that, from Alexandria, eyes are already fondly turned in this direction."

No one reading this account of the land question in Cyprus, and remembering the tenacity for which the Turkish character is notorious, will have been surprised to find that month after month passed by without providing a remedy for the evil. The Porte had made a good bargain with us, and was not disposed to construe it in a very generous spirit. The terms of the Anglo-Turkish Convention might well have been interpreted so as to give to England the full usufruct of the island, so long as it remained in her keeping. But the contrary view was argued so forcibly, that our government appeared to see no alternative except to buy, at a further heavy cost, the power of dealing with the pledge which Turkey had placed in our hands.

The anticipation, that Cyprus would become more habitable for Englishmen in the colder weather, was fulfilled. The health of the troops improved greatly as the winter approached; and it is clear that, by more judicious management, we shall be able, in the future, to avoid much of the distressing sickness which fell upon the first occupiers of the island.

It was only natural that Englishmen in general should display a lively curiosity in all that concerned the nature and history of this new acquisition of the crown; and a great amount of interesting information was accordingly assembled for the benefit of the reading public, within a few months after the meeting of the Congress. A few facts, in connection with the island, will not come amiss in the present work.

The earliest chapters of history contain a mention of this place, which was amongst the settlements of the Phœnicians,\* who derived from it

\* "The colonisation of Cyprus dates from the earliest age,



a supply of copper and gopher wood. The Hebrew king Solomon was indebted to its treasures when he built the first temple at Jerusalem. The Greeks established a colony on the island soon after the date of the Trojan War (about 1270 B.C.) After them came the Egyptians and the Romans; and Holy Writ informs us how the Apostle Paul converted the Roman pro-consul, Sergius Paulus, to Christianity. Cyprus had been famed in Greek mythology as the residence of Venice

and the mainland furnished it with men. It lies contiguous to three continents, and Phœnicia probably supplied the first swarm that settled on its shore. Then came an early Egyptian expedition or conquest, and its Phœnician settlers figure as tributaries from the isles of the Great Sea or Mediterranean to the Pharaoh Thothmes III. about the fifteenth century B.C. Later than this, Greek adventurers, who pried into every nook of the Mediterranean, wafted themselves and Homeric legends to the shores of Cyprus. According to their tales, after the Trojan war Agamemnon visited the island in no friendly spirit, although its monarch, Cinyras, had given a valuable and artistic corselet to conciliate the favour of the king of men. Teucer, the archer *par excellence* of the Greek hosts, founded, with his vagabond companions, another Salamis, and other Greeks alighted upon the coasts later than the days of Cinyras—a name suggestive of Semitic origin. The early worship of Aphrodite, carried on in a manner almost Babylonian, has left traces of its origin to the present day in the ethnographical type of its inhabitants. When the Assyrians, protected by iron armour, disciplined by a severe drill, and led by skilled officers, overran Syria and Phœnicia, the petty kings of Cyprus, terrified at the Assyrian march, proffered a hasty submission, and propitiated by daughters instead of armour the goodwill of the triumphant monarch. Sargon, about B.C. 720, was recognised by four or seven kings; and recorded, on a tablet found at Citiun, his sway over the island. Ten other petty princes sent tribute to Assurbanipal or Sardanapalus, the grandson of Sennacherib, for the conquest of Tyre had rendered Cyprus an easy prey to the victor. The next century and a half found Cyprus a dependency of Egypt, and so it remained till conquered by Cambyzes and added as one more satrapy to Persia. But the island still had its local princes, although under Persian sway. At Citiun and Idaliun the monarchs, if not Phœnicians as their names show, were a suite of kings named Azbaal, Baalmelek, Abdemon, Melekiatun, Pumiathon, who flourished, although Evagoras and Nicocles had a short interval of independence, and made for a while a successful stand and introduced a culture purely Hellenic into the arts and literature of Cyprus. The island, in fact, was divided into several kingdoms, and their mutual discord ultimately led to its fall. They assisted Alexander the Great, and were subdued by Ptolemy, and finally became an appanage of Egypt, and a convenient mint."—"Times," Aug. 21, 1878.

(Aphrodite), after she had sprung from the foam of the sea; and, though her altars were overthrown by the Christian converts, the peasants, for many generations, preserved the tradition of the old faith, and revered the Virgin Mary under the name of Aphroditissa.

On the collapse of the Roman empire, Cyprus fell to the lot of the emperors of the East, who ruled at Byzantium. The Saracens paid a visit to it in the seventh century. "In 1191, Richard Cœur de Lion, having been affronted by the reigning prince, landed at Limisso, and, in the course of a few days, subjugated the whole of the island, which he at first ceded to the Templars, but the year after sold for one hundred thousand ducats to Guy de Lusignan, ex-king of Jerusalem. Cyprus then entered upon a new epoch of prosperity; its wealth became proverbial; merchants and adventurers flocked to it from all quarters of the world. Castles and Gothic churches rose on the sites of ancient temples; Limisso and Famagousta became wealthy and flourishing cities; and for a time even Smyrna and Alexandria owed allegiance to the Frankish knights who had made Cyprus their home. The cultivation of cotton and the sugar-cane were introduced; Cyprian wines acquired a reputation they possess no longer; corn and timber formed valued articles of export."\*

In the fourteenth century the Genoese ravaged the island; and after them came the Egyptian Mamelukes and the Venetians. In 1570 the Turks made a descent upon Limisso, and the effeminate Venetians retired to the inland districts. "The Turks took Nicosia by storm, massacring its inhabitants, and then laid siege to Famagousta, which only capitulated after a heroic defence of six months, on condition of the garrison being sent to Crete, and the lives and property of the inhabitants being spared. But Mustafa Pacha treacherously broke the capitulation he had signed. Bragadino, the noble leader of the Venetians, was mutilated, and ten

\* "Cyprus: its Resources and Capabilities." By E. G. Ravenstein.

days afterwards flayed alive, his skin, stuffed with hay, being forwarded to Constantinople; the garrison and many of the inhabitants were massacred, or carried into slavery. Thus was inaugurated the reign of the Turks, who found Cyprus a prosperous island, having a million of inhabitants, but soon reduced it to a most pitiable condition.”\*

The family of the Lusignans mentioned above is not yet extinct, if we may believe the gentlemen who profess to be its present legitimate representatives. The claim of these several gentlemen was brought forward at the Congress of Berlin, and was specially urged to the English foreign minister, as soon as the Anglo-Turkish Convention had been made public. We will quote an account given by M. de Blowitz of this curious and even interesting episode.

“All who were at Berlin during the Congress will have remarked a gentleman who excited attention in all the diplomatic drawing-rooms. He was rather above the average in height, and very fine-looking, with long black hair, a clear high forehead, large deep eyes, a thick black beard, and a very fascinating smile. His voice was melodious, and his hands and feet betrayed his perfectly aristocratic origin. He had a mild, modest, rather melancholy bearing. He wore a loose dress of blue-black or dark moire, with wide sleeves, the hood of which, drawn over his head, left only his beard, his mouth, and his eyes visible, concealing his long hair and forehead. He wore a star of diamonds, representing the episcopal arms, surmounted by a royal crown. This gentleman was Korene Nar-Bey, Prince of Lusignan, Archbishop of Beshiktash-Constantinople, who had come to Berlin as the representative of Armenia at the Congress, and he was much esteemed by all who had occasion to meet him. When the Anglo-Turkish treaty was made known, Monsignor Korene Nar-Bey was among those who most applauded it. Placed by this treaty to a certain extent under English protection, the Armenians, or those who repre-

sented them, were delighted at the prospect of thenceforth being no longer solely under the influence of the Porte, and on this account alone Monsignor Korene would have rejoiced at the event which took Europe by surprise on the 8th July, 1878. But there was a personal and curious reason for his satisfaction, which will add a chapter to that mysterious tale which is always running parallel with history, and winds up by becoming part of it. Monsignor is the second brother of the younger branch of the Lusignans. His elder brother bears the names and titles of Guy de Lusignan, Prince Royal of Cyprus, Jerusalem, and Armenia, and his uncle, Louis de Lusignan, is spoken of in a document to be read below as his Serene Highness the Prince Royal of Cyprus, Jerusalem, and Armenia. I hasten to add that these titles do not imply pretenders, and that the two branches of the Lusignans in question have no intention of laying siege to Cyprus and re-conquering it. The titles of Prince Louis de Lusignan, who lives in St. Petersburg, seem to be officially recognised there. Prince Guy lives in Paris, in a modest hotel in the Avenue d'Eylau. He is a man of gentle and distinguished bearing, whose son is preparing, at a special school in Brest, to enter the French navy.

“These three Lusignans, on the 24th of July, sent the following address to Lord Salisbury:—

“My Lord—The Convention of the 4th of June just signed between Great Britain and Turkey, handing over Cyprus to the sceptre and administration of England, we beg your lordship to submit the following observations to her Britannic Majesty’s government:—As the descendants and lineal heirs of the Lusignan family, who bought the island of Cyprus from King Richard Cœur de Lion, and reigned there more than three centuries, uniting in their crown the kingdoms of Cyprus, Jerusalem, and Armenia, we have maintained the sacred rights which neither the unjust spoliation of the Republic of Venice, nor even the Ottoman conquest which followed, have entirely deprived us of. If the continual reclamations and protests of our

\* “Cyprus: its Resources and Capabilities.” By E. G. Ravenstein.



fathers did not lead to a satisfactory result under the occupations of the Venetians and Turks, we cherish the belief that, under the regular government of her Britannic Majesty, who everywhere protects and respects vested and well-founded rights, our rights will be respected and taken into consideration. The royal family, which we alone in the world represent, rest all their hopes on the high intelligence and spirit of justice of your lordship. They are convinced that her Britannic Majesty's government will seek in Articles 3 and 4 of the annex of the Convention of the 4th of June, 1878, the legal and easy means of an equitable remuneration with respect to them. Animated by this thought our nephew and brother, his Eminence Monsignor Korene Nar-Bey, Archbishop of Beshiktas-Constantinople, Prince de Lusignan, delegate of the Armenian nation at the Congress of Berlin, abstained from all personal protest at the time of the signature of the Convention, so as not to interfere with an agreement which it was well should be immediately consecrated. While, likewise, imbued with the spirit of concord and political wisdom of our nephew and brother, the Archbishop Prince de Lusignan, and accepting with his eminence the new state of things, we can only do so under the express reservation of our rights, to be claimed at the proper time. Confident in the equity of our cause, as well as in the loyalty and power of her Britannic Majesty's government, all the length we go at present is to beg you to acknowledge the receipt of the reservations advanced in this address.—We remain, &c., Prince LEON DE LUSIGNAN, Prince GUY DE LUSIGNAN; in our own name, and as mandatories of our uncle, his Serene Highness the Prince Royal of Cyprus, Jerusalem, and Armenia, LOUIS DE LUSIGNAN, resident in St. Petersburg, Rue Gontcharnaya, No. 8, by deed received in the office of Guillaume King, notary and witness for foreign and Bourse affairs, resident at No. 3, Place d'Isac, St. Petersburg.—Paris, 24th of July, 1878, 130, Avenue d'Eylau, Hotel de Lusignan.'

"I need scarcely say that, as yet, Lord Salis-

bury has not acknowledged the receipt of this address. I fear the signatories are men of little experience—men with that dreamy cast of mind to be found in the more or less distant descendants of bygone monarchies, engendered, as it were, by a faint, confused recollection of a splendour that was. I was inquisitive to see of what, in the minds of the Lusignans, consisted the rights they uphold, and in the name of which they protest, and in making my inquiries I came across a document which might figure appropriately along with the tales of the Arabian nights. Prince Louis de Lusignan, who lives in St. Petersburg, made, on the 8th of June last, the following declaration, which will produce, I expect, on all who read it, the same strange effect it made on me when it was solemnly read to me, and a copy handed to me on my asking for it, in order that I might place it as a contemporary curiosity before the reader:—

“‘St. Petersburg, June 8, 1878.

“‘I, Louis, Prince de Lusignan, make the following declaration. My late father, Christodoulo de Lusignan, Prince Royal of Cyprus, Jerusalem, and Armenia, by his will, drawn up in dueform, under date the 22nd of February, 1821, in favour of myself, his only son, bequeathed to me a fortune, composed as follows:—4,800,300 ducats (of Holland), 495,000 doubloons (of Spain), 170,000 mahmoudies, 200,000 toupies, 3,169,485 Spanish dollars, 600,000 silver roubles (of Russia). This sum, entrusted by my father to the keeping of the Metropolitan Athanasius, Bishop of Nicomedia, his brother-in-law, my uncle, and the receipt of which was acknowledged by a private letter on parchment, authentically signed by him, under date the 20th of December, 1820, was seized by the Turkish government on the 10th of April, 1821. Having, on this account, brought an action against the Turkish government, which circumstances, independent of my will, obliged me to suspend, and have hitherto prevented me from proceeding with, and, at the same time, having, by my declaration of this day, recognised the Princes, Leon

Youssef de Nar-Bey Lusignan, Guy Ambroise de Nar-Bey Lusignan, and Jean Korene de Nar-Bey Lusignan, as my relatives and cousins of the younger branch of our royal family, I give over to them, in my own name, as well as in that of my only son, Prince Michel de Lusignan, the fourth part of all sums, capital or interest, which, by their co-operation, may be recovered for me, charging them with the costs of the lawsuit, and I engage, so that they may be able to defend my interests, to provide them with a power of attorney in due form. Wherefore I deliver the present declaration in three original copies countersigned by me, and bearing the royal seal of the Lusignans.

“ ‘LOUIS DE LUSIGNAN, Prince Royal of Cyprus, Jerusalem, and Armenia.’

“The above is founded on the following document, which is as curious as the preceding:—

“ ‘In the name of the Holy Trinity, one and indivisible, the Father, the Son, and Holy Ghost, Amen. To his Highness, Prince Christodoulo de Lusignan. August Prince—In sending this day 50,000 ducats to your highness, I inform you of the amount of your capital in my charge. (Here follow the sums mentioned in the preceding letter). Of the two original autographs written by me on parchment, in the presence of your well-beloved heir, Prince Louis, I send one to your highness; the other remains with me—that is to say, in our treasury. You receive this original, as well as the 50,000 ducats, by our good friend Varda. May God preserve you in health!

“ ‘ATHANASIOS, Metropolitan of Nicomedia.  
“ ‘Constantinople, 29th of December, 1820.’

“It is hard to say what is most to be admired in these two documents, the enumeration of the fabulous treasure in question, the treaty between the two branches, or the action it is proposed to bring against the Porte, which can boast of so little money for the restitution of this mountain of gold.

“Now we know what the rights the Lusign-

ans appeal to are. The Anglo-Turkish treaty has called up the name of Cyprus again—a name which has always stirred up romantic echoes. To it has responded the voice of the Lusignans, whose cradle was France, and whose kingdom was Cyprus, and who are now asking England to give back, to the heirs of a royal race, the means of restoring their bygone splendour. What will be the consequence of this enterprise? Have those who are entering upon it the right to do so? But what strikes me, in this Lusignan family, is its suddenly leaving its retreat, and appealing to the sentiment of loyalty, which is one of the greatest qualities of the English people, in quest of a justice hitherto demanded in vain. The public will at least follow henceforth with interest this lawsuit of the Lusignans, and it will be interesting to see whether the English government will make any inquiries as to the legitimacy of their claim; whether Turkey will take any notice of it; whether the treaty of the 4th of June will help to restore splendour to a royal race, or whether these lines are the last which will be heard about it.”

The configuration of Cyprus is peculiar, and its geographical position is one which would give it considerable importance if its commercial activity could be renewed. It lies in an angle between three mainland shores, and is within easy reach of Europe, Asia, and Africa. It is only forty-four miles from the coast of Caramania in Asia Minor, sixty-two miles from Syria, two hundred and ninety miles from Port Said, and about seven hundred from Greece. The surface of the island is broken by two mountain chains, one on the north and one on the south, the intermediate country being occupied by a table-land, known as the Mesorea (“between the mountains”), which stretches from Pencliaia in the west to Famagousta in the east. Nicosia, or Levkosia, is in the centre of this plain. There are roadsteads at each of these towns, as well as at Larnaca, Limisso, or Limasol, Episkopi and Chrgsoko, but no harbour worthy of the name. The same remark will apply to these



roadsteads as to every other part and aspect of the island—namely, that much may be done by enterprise and capital to improve on the present condition of affairs, and to make Cyprus as convenient and serviceable as it is now valueless.

The soil of Cyprus is in many parts very fertile. The best authorities say that the central plain might be converted into a gigantic corn-field, whilst along the shores, or on the hill-sides, grow figs, dates, junipers, tamarisks, locusts, barberries, olives, as well as a considerable quantity of timber. In the summer, after a certain period, the sun scorches the land, and even puts a stop to vegetation; but this might at least be corrected by more efficient irrigation. There are no navigable rivers in the island, and the streams which are collected from the higher altitudes are scarcely allowed to reach the sea. Some are exhausted in watering the soil, others again sink into huge swamps, and assist in breeding fevers and agues. The draining of these swamps and salt lakes would immediately improve the sanitary condition of the place. If the English occupation continues, this will in all probability be done, together with the construction of a port, and many other things calculated to render the island profitable, habitable, and serviceable to us for the purposes contemplated by those who acquired it.

Cyprus is rich in minerals, and especially in copper, which was once obtained in large quantities, and which there is no reason to think exhausted. The copper mines were chiefly in the southern mountain range, and particularly in Mount Troödos. Iron, manganese, and other metals and precious stones, are also plentiful.

The antiquities of Cyprus are naturally of a very interesting kind, illustrating as they do so long and varied a history. Within the present century they have been examined by more than one traveller and archæologist; and the following sketch, taken from a writer in the "Times," will serve to show with what result:—

"The number of ancient objects of antiquity which escape the ravages of time is few; the greater part perish with the contemporary popu-

lation. The nobler metals, stones, porcelain, and earthenware, alone survive for centuries. Dress, furniture, books, and food, animal and vegetable products, are the ephemeral creations of life, and are not represented in archæology. Till the invention of currency relative age can only be determined by comparison with the remains of other nations, the date of which is known, or by the discovery of foreign objects mixed with native productions. Such imported objects are, however, few in number and of rare occurrence among the remains of Cyprus, although a lively trade was carried on by the Phœnicians, both in their own wares and Egyptian goods, some of which accompanied the Cypriote to his grave.

"The city of Larnaca, the ancient Citium, the capital of the Phœnician settlers, had, indeed, been explored before the excavations of General di Cesnola, yet he found there an interesting Phœnician sarcophagus, an alabaster inscribed vase of the same people, two painted earthenware wine jugs, with archaic figures of deer, terra-cotta figures of the ox-headed goddess, the supposed Hera or rather Aphrodite, sculptures of the Roman period, and terra-cottas from the temple of the 'Demeter of the shore,' besides the results of several hundred sepulchres. Dali, or Ipalium, was more productive, and eight thousand tombs were examined, from the Greek, only three feet and a half beneath the surface of the slope of the hill of the Necropolis, to the Phœnician, six feet and a half below them. These were entered by square passages leading to oven-shaped tombs, plastered with earth, which held either one or three bodies which had not been cremated, but laid with their heads to the east, or seated in their final abode. In these sepulchres were found painted terra-cotta vases of the sixth century B.C., one with a Phœnician inscription, copper weapons, a patera, on which was embossed in *repoussé* work a dance and a feast, like those of the 8th century B.C., discovered at Nimroud. The Greek tombs above them, only three feet and a half below the surface of the ground, held deposited in them glass vessels, and gold ornaments of a later style and terra-cotta lamps. At

Alambra, twenty miles from Dali, General di Cesnola discovered another cemetery, with vases of red or black ware, having incised patterns like those of Troy; and in the immediate vicinity sepulchres with animal-shaped vases, others with black figures, or patterns of animals, and Egyptian glazed ware.

"Athieno, the ancient Golgoi, had more important remains. There De Vogüé had discovered one or two sculptures and Cypriote inscriptions on the site; but in 1867 General di Cesnola unearthed a sarcophagus of Etruscan style, with reliefs of the myth of Perseus, a banquet, and Homeric hunt, its cover like a pent roof with lions couchant. Hence came also a silver patera of Egyptian or Phœnician style, with boats and bulls, marshes and papyri. At Aghios Photios he discovered a temple overloaded with statues of cream-coloured limestone, resembling Caen stone, but so well preserved that they had a uniform and modern appearance, and appeared to be of the same age and condition. Different in type, they followed, however, the political vicissitudes of Cyprus; some resembled the Assyrian or Persian school of art, and were distinguished by their plaited beards, their pointed caps, their Asiatic expression; others had an Egyptian type imitated from Nilotic sculpture, wearing the Egyptian crown of Upper and Lower Egypt, the peculiar Egyptian collar and royal apron. Their ample garments and regal paraphernalia show that they are due to a time when Idalium was ruled by Phœnician princes or Asiatic tributaries, who presented the statues of themselves or their masters to the shrines of Golgoi and Idalium. Although some have been ascribed to the period of Thothmes III., it is difficult, if not impossible, to trace a succession from that remote period to the more modest and probable time of Amasis II., in the 6th century B.C., when the island is known, and not suspected, to have been conquered by Egypt.

"The Phœnician sculptures are followed by others of early Greek art, representing deities and other mythological personages, or reliefs with subjects purely Greek, with contemporaneous

bearded figures of a pseudo-archaic style, satiric smiles on their countenances, laurel wreaths on their heads, and a later kind of drapery. These in turn are succeeded by figures of purely Greek art, with bearded faces, laurelled hair, and Greek drapery, some of which are evidently of the period of Evagoras and his successors, whose features they may portray. They are, however, not apparently as late as the Roman period. Neo Paphos had been probably explored, and Karavastasi, the ancient Soli, and capital of a monarchy at the time of Assurbanipal, only yielded Roman remains; other sites produced some antiquities in terra-cotta and marble, and Cypriote inscriptions. Nicosia, an important modern town on the site of an old one, was rich in terra-cottas, cylinders, and scarabæi earlier than five centuries B.C. At Amathus the sculptures, like the other Cypriote ones, had an early simplicity, and Hercules, draped in a lion's skin, was chiselled killing a lion not larger than a cat, a Phœnician or Philistine idea of the first labour recalling the admired *naïvete* of mediæval art. Amathus abounded in tombs. Those on its shores were oven-shaped, at the accessible depth of five feet, and of the Roman period. Older and square sepulchres abounded in the adjoining rocks. On the north side of the town were hundreds of well-built sepulchres, shaped like houses, fifty feet below the ground; and in one of them was found a beautiful sarcophagus, with reliefs of chariots and warriors, a satrap with his parasol, rude Ashtaroths or Aphrodites, and lion-clad Besas or Baals of the Persian period. Its roof-shaped cover, sphinxes, and ovolo moulding, announced the influence of Ionic art. At the same site were found porcelain Egyptian figures of the sixth century B.C., and a silver patera of Phœnician art, like those of Nimroud, with a siege, Egyptian gods, and emblems. But Greek as well as Phœnician antiquities were discovered at Amathus. If the site of Golgoi was rich in statues, that of Curium was prolific in jewellery, and it was here that General di Cesnola obtained the *toison d'or* of his collection. The tombs produced Phœnician ear-rings, but Curium had



received an Argive colony, and was under a local king, a Greek by name if not origin. Curium was more flourishing than Amathus, and of larger size. The treasures of its temple were almost intact, when Di Cesnola laid his hands on them. The jewels lay concealed in oven-shaped crypts, or *favissæ*, under a mosaic pavement, and had been deposited in four of these cells in times the most remote, and forgotten, till times the most recent. The list is too long to give, but in it are the bracelets of King Eteandros, the agate sceptre of some *anax* or monarch, ear-rings in shape of coiled snakes, and goats' heads, bracelets with rosettes like Assyrian, or penannular with lions' heads, rings with Egyptian scarabæi, gold necklaces with beads and drops, a patera with the papyrus pattern of Egypt, crystal vases, silver objects, bronzes, vases, all of great interest or surpassing beauty. In the temple of Apollo Hylates were found bronzes, figures of a Greek period, fragments of terra-cotta, some as late as the Roman empire.

"It must be regretted that this fine collection, which was offered to the British Museum, was not acquired at the time, but political and financial considerations prevailed at the moment, and prevented its sliding into the ornament room of the British Museum, as other purchases and excavations impeded the acquisition of the statues of Golgoi. Both of these Cypriote treasures of ancient art have crossed the Atlantic, and enrich the newly-founded Metropolitan Museum of Art at New York."

It is, of course, still too early to look for any material success from English rule in Cyprus. It would have been so even under the most favourable conditions; but the many unfortunate circumstances already enumerated have entirely prevented our countrymen from doing what their enterprise and industry would otherwise have enabled them to do. But it is very necessary that large advances should be made in the trade and revenue of the island if our occupation is to become a benefit to all parties.

It will be remembered that, in the Convention

by which Cyprus was handed over to us, we agreed to administer the island, and to pay to the sultan a yearly revenue equal to the average income of the previous five years. This average has been found to amount to eleven million four hundred and sixty-eight thousand piastres—a sum of about one hundred thousand pounds sterling. Hence, it will be seen, that the administration must be a burden upon us, even in a pecuniary sense, until we have increased the revenue very considerably. Moreover, it is useless to suppose that our income from the island can be derived in the same manner as it was derived by the sultan and his functionaries—always more or less corrupt.

An account of the customs and taxes in Cyprus, as they existed at the time of the transfer, will, therefore, be specially interesting to those who would estimate the mode and the extent in which the needful improvement should be effected. The following particulars were given by a correspondent of the "Standard," writing from Larnaca:—

"There must be a natural anxiety among English traders to know what are the custom-house arrangements of Cyprus before they trust their goods here. At present there is a difficulty in ascertaining what they are: things are in a transition state, and necessarily unsatisfactory. In fact, it is hard for the stranger to determine whether the dues belong to Turkey or Great Britain; the system of collection is Turkish—that is to say, bad; the officials, with the exception of an English custom-house officer, Mr. R. Robson, who has been sent out to control the department, are Turks of the average Turkish intelligence, underpaid, and therefore open to the blandishments of *backsheesh*. The staff is not only underpaid, but underhanded. For instance, take Larnaca, which is the commercial port of the island. There are a dozen coastguardsmen under the orders of a Bachi, one Mustapha Effendi. He is a personage in his way, the great man of the Preventive Service, and his monthly pay amounts to two hundred and fifty piastres; one hundred and se-

venty-five piastres, bear in mind, being equal to one English sovereign. The twelve men under his command receive as monthly stipend five piastres less than one pound sterling, that is to say, less than five shillings a week. Would it be human nature if the vision of these guards were not susceptible of cloudiness under the influence of a silver coin? The Turkish government has acted as if it were intentionally setting a premium on smuggling. These preventive men are supposed to patrol, half by day and half by night, along the shore in front of the town, and as far as the quarantine. To aid them in their duties there are three water guards. There used to be five, but the position of water guard is not so much sought after as that of Thames policeman. They row in the bay by night, and are better supplied with boats than salary. They have two of the former; their reward for this toilsome night duty—toil-some, if properly performed—is less than four shillings a week. No boatman with self-respect and an eye to the main chance will engage for the service. As these guards have neither uniform nor arms, their influence is not great, nor is their appearance imposing. Their jackets are of many colours, and of patches multitudinous. With the exception of this frail supervision over the bay there is no safeguard; the coasts are defenceless against Will Watch and his reckless companions. Making the impossible supposition, that I had a tight barque of blockade-running build and were to smuggling inclined, I would undertake to earn more in that way in a month on these coasts than at literature in a lifetime. Landing can be effected almost anywhere, and at any time, except in January and February, the two very bad months of the year; there are no white-crested rollers, no soap-suds billows breaking madly on a rocky coast as in the angry Atlantic. Here all is soft and insidious, a lullaby on velvet sands, or a swish of warm waters on shingle, and it is only at long intervals that the wind-god rebels and the clouds mass in sullen rack, and make night of day time, and the vexed Levant curls, and sweeps, and leaps, and charges

in Homeric rage, and plays shuttlecock with great ships and their cargoes. The Bachi, Mustapha Effendi, is conscientious; he feels that the coast is unprotected, and, I understand, he has asked the Civil Commissioner to restore to their position four mounted zaptiehs who had been formerly employed on surveillance duty.

“There is a Custom House at Larnaca, but there are no bonded warehouses attached. The building, a two-storeyed one, is on the quay, near the fort, and has a jetty in front, at which goods are landed for inspection. It is held at a yearly tenure, at a rent of four thousand seven hundred piastres, from a local proprietor. If we like, we can get rid of the proprietor, or he can get rid of us, at the end of March next, when the Turkish year expires. The officials in charge of the Custom House do not appear to have been up even to the Turkish standard of commercial morality. Abdul Havi Effendi, the late director of the establishment, was recalled to Beyrout last year on account of general discontent at his behaviour; he was sent to Jerusalem in disgrace, and, for aught that is known, may be now expiating his extortions in Jericho. Nobody was appointed to succeed him. The present director is Sami Effendi, who draws seven hundred and fifty piastres a month. Under him he has a set of *employes*—clerks, cashiers, writers, weighers, and examiners—whose pay varies from one hundred and fifty to five hundred piastres a month. Pretty fellows some of them must have been; two were recently dismissed, and one was in the habit of dismissing himself on the plea of illness. The office expenses of this Custom House are tolerably respectable. The officials manage to get through a considerable amount of paper, wax, petroleum, measuring-pots, pitch, and paint, nails and wood, tobacco wrappers and madapolams. The proportion of establishment charges to income is suspiciously similar to that obtained in our London so called workhouses in the Bumble epoch. The salaries and expenses for a year are but a trifle short of one hundred and seventy-five thousand piastres, or forty-four per cent. on the revenue collected. Fifteen hundred and



fifty piastres are allowed monthly to the staff of inspectors and clerks which looks after the tobacco monopoly at Larnaca and the sub-offices of Limasol, Famagousta, and Nicosia. The Custom House, excepting Sundays, is well nigh always open; the gates are unlocked at one hour after sunrise, and left ajar until six P.M., the hour between noon and one being allowed for meals, and the same space on Fridays (should there be no pressing business) between eleven and twelve, to permit the Moslems to attend the mosque. The tariff exacted is not unreasonable; eight per cent. *ad valorem* on imports and one per cent. on exports if to a foreign port, it is said; but has this tariff never been grossly abused? He would be a bold man who would answer in the negative. Invoices or bills of lading are not accepted as proofs of the value of merchandise, but the bales are poked and barrels curiously examined, and their dutiable value fixed according to local notions. These sometimes go under the mark, but in nine cases out of ten they go considerably over. I should like to be informed by what process of reasoning, *exempli gratia*, an ignorant insular Turk could make an appraisement of a Bedford plough, or a bottle of Kalydor, or a case of pocket filters. It will be recollected that I stated in a former letter that as much as fifty per cent. had been exacted on such products as the farmer desires to export. How, it will be asked, is that statement to be reconciled with the admission that one per cent. is the legal tax on exports? The answer is simple. Let us suppose the farmer wishes to send his wine to a foreign market. In the first instance, he has to pay his tithe on land produce; to that ten per cent. add another ten stolen by the tithe proctor. He has to pay ten per cent. on the wine; to that ten extra may be added for robbery by the collector; then there is ten per cent. on the vinegar, so that, in reality, the unfortunate agriculturist has to pay more than fifty per cent.

"There is one crying grievance in connection with the Custom House system, a grievance which throws wide open a gap to chicanery—namely, the exemption from imposts of certain

public institutions, and privileged individuals. Everything purporting to be for the use of mosques, convents, hodjas (teachers), and officials in the 'consular service,' is admitted free of duty. Consular service is a very elastic phrase, and may cover much underhand dealing. A vice-consul who may be a bachelor is permitted to import articles to the extent of fifteen thousand piastres, free. In the last Turkish year, goods to the value of one hundred and two thousand three hundred piastres, I am informed, were thus admitted, showing a loss of revenue at eight per cent. of eight thousand one hundred and forty-eight piastres, or some £80 sterling, at the current rate of exchange. If the island is to be made pay, these privileges must be curtailed, and jealously scrutinised. The entire duties collected in the Larnaca district for the year ending March 1st (old style) may be thus tabulated:—

		Piastres.	Paras.
Exports to Europe	...	86,509	15
Imports from ditto	...	138,539	9
Exports and imports to Turkey	...	175,660	38
		400,709	22

This represents a total of nearly £2,300 of our money. The cash actually in the hands of the Custom House authorities is given at about forty thousand piastres, including a receipt from Brigadier-General Watson, the late Civil Commissioner, for three hundred and thirty-three and one-third medjidies (3s. 6d. each), issued as pay to the Turkish troops, and about six thousand piastres in camés, or paper money.

"There is another exemption, in addition to that mentioned above, which was introduced by the governor, presumably to meet a pressing emergency; government stores are passed in free. That is right and proper, and in conformity with rule. But all articles ostensibly for regimental canteens, the property of private contractors, who are not always the most honourable or scrupulous of men, are likewise

passed in free, subject only to a restriction easily smoothed over. That, I think, is a mistake. It had its birth in his excellency's kindness towards the soldier, and zealous care for his interests. During the disembarkation of the troops on one occasion, some porter for the use of the 101st Regiment was stopped, upon which Sir Garnet gave orders that all stores intended for his command should be let in at once, without any vexing charge or formality. Considering that this was done to meet the exigencies of the moment, Brigadier-General Watson directed that such articles should be vouched for, either by a pass, signed by the commanding officers of the regiments, or by himself. The sooner this privilege is abolished the better, especially as there cannot be the slightest doubt that it is not the soldier, but the contractor, who is the principal gainer.

"Trade here will and must increase; it is calculated that receipts will average for the first quarter since our occupation at £150 a week, and at this period of next year that sum may be increased to £200 or more. Enlarged accommodation will be needed, and a burglar-proof and fire-proof safe to keep the money, should be procured, and a better staff of better-paid officials employed. Exemptions from taxation should be done away with at once, as far as is possible, and it should be clearly understood that the man who accepts a bribe secures a passport to gaol. Then there will be no room for disquietude, as to the vital point of receipts exceeding expenditure after we have paid to those who have mismanaged Cyprus, all that we have guaranteed to pay. Luckily in this, the commercial department of our possession, we have active and keen guardians of our interests in Colonel White and his hard-working deputy, Colonel Warren. The former in particular has much insight into these Custom House transactions, and has devoted some time and attention to mastering the subject.

"Herewith I subjoin a statement of the Tariff under the Turkish *regime* (which still holds I believe) on imports and exports:—

## IMPORTS FROM ENGLAND.

Article.	Value.		Duty.	
	Psts.	Ct.	Psts.	Ct.
Rice ... ..	...	...	<i>ad valorem</i>	
Iron (quintal, equal to 44 okes)	50	80	4	6
Ditto in sheets, ditto	...	86	30	6 90
Ditto, in bundles, ditto	...	51	80	4 14
Indigo, Bengal (per oke)	...	109	15	8 73
Indigo, Madras, ditto	...	49	40	3 95
Sugar (per quintal)	...	219	70	17 59
Umbrellas ... ..	...	...	<i>ad valorem</i>	
Coffee (per hundred okes)	...	776	00	61 28
Ditto, from Yemar, through Europe, ditto.....	947		35	75 78
Stock fish (per quintal)	...	80	70	6 45
Shot, ditto ... ..	...	156	15	12 49
All kinds of cloth ... ..	...	...	<i>ad valorem</i>	
Candles (per oke)	...	33	80	2 70
Copper sheets, ditto	...	18	80	1 50
Tin, white (two boxes containing 450 pieces)	368		30	29 46
Needles (per package, containing 50,000).....	252		30	20 18
Anison (oil) ... ..	...	...	<i>ad valorem</i>	
American cloth, per oke (from every bale to be deducted 10 okes).....	15		40	1 23

## IMPORTS FROM FRANCE.

Coffee (per 100 okes)	...	766	00	21 28
Sugar, ditto	...	260	50	20 84
Sugar, refined, ditto	...	209	25	16 74
Sugar, rough, ditto	...	165	80	13 26
Pepper (per oke)	...	5	65	0 45
Leather, ditto	...	21	00	1 68
Calf skin of any weight, 1 doz.	521	50	41	72
Calf skin, varnished, ditto	...	441	60	35 32
Umbrellas ... ..	...	...	<i>ad valorem</i>	
Candles (per oke)	...	16	00	1 28
Hats, straw ... ..	...	...	<i>ad valorem</i>	
Spirits ... ..	...	...	<i>ad valorem</i>	
Guns (for shooting) ... ..	...	...	<i>ad valorem</i>	

## IMPORTS FROM AUSTRIA.

Glass ware, white worked, per quintal... ..	103		00	8 24
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Article.	Value. Psts. Ct.	Duty. Psts. Ct.
Glassware, coloured or gild- ed, per quintal ... }	383 20	30 66
DUTIES ON EXPORTS.		
Cotton, per quintal ...	278 00	21 60
Hare skins ... ..		<i>ad valorem.</i>
Lamb and kid skins, per piece	3 10	0 24
Mutton and goat skins, per piece	6 30	0 20
Stockings ... ..		<i>ad valorem.</i>
Hides manufactured ...		
(This duty seems to have been abo- lished about a twelvemonth.)		
Haze nuts, per quintal ...	65 70	5 05
Bones, ditto ... ..	0 10	0 32
Sesame, per oke ... ..	1 50	0 12
All kinds of boards and timber		<i>ad valorem.</i>
Cheese ... ..		To be valued.
Shirts... ..		<i>ad valorem.</i>
Shirtings ... ..		To be valued.
Silk, per oke ... ..	108 50	8 68
Oil (olive), per quintal ...	140 00	11 20
Copper (old in pieces), per oke	9 30	0 74
Copper (used only), ditto ...	16 50	1 32
Mastic, 2d quality, from 15 } to 18 degs ... }	2 90	0 23
Wine (common), 1st quality...		To be valued.
Corn, per kilo... ..	15 30	1 22
Barley, ditto ... ..	4 10	0 43
Oats, ditto ... ..	4 10	0 43
Cocoons, per oke ... ..	74 50	5 96
Cocoons (double ones) ...		To be valued.
Cocoon seed ... ..	450 00	36 00
Wool ... ..		<i>ad valorem.</i>
String... ..		<i>ad valorem.</i>
Cyprus stuff for sofas and } cushions ... }		To be valued.
Cyprus stuff for mattresses, } rugs, and covers for }	10 00	32 paras.
tables, per piece ... }		
Cyprus stuff for bed-clothes, } bath-sheets, &c. ... }	13 30	1 6
Alizari, per quintal ... ..	133 30	15 66

"The taxes of the island under Turkish rule were raised from six sources. First, there are

the dimes, or tenths of all the agricultural produce raised. This was farmed out until six years ago to Constantinople bankers, who sublet it to other parties. In the Larnaca district it is now farmed by seven private individuals, who have paid for it eight hundred and twenty-two thousand piastres in gold. The tenths of barley, wheat, and oil, are taken in kind. Fruit is valued according to a yearly sale, and the tax paid in money. When, by arrangement, it is paid in kind, the tax-payer is obliged to bring his tax to the quay of Larnaca, or is charged five paras the kilo for its carriage.

"The second is a property-tax of four piastres (six of which make a shilling) per thousand piastres on the value of real estate, buildings, trees, or capital. This is collected by men who are paid four paras per piastre they collect, and ten per cent. by the people in addition to the amount of the tax. The people do not complain of this additional ten per cent., except when they receive violence from the tax-gatherer, which they often had occasion to do under the late *regime*.

"The third tax was a charge on income derived from rents of 40 piastres per 1,000. This was collected in the same manner as the preceding tax. The fourth charge was one of 30 piastres per 1,000 on trade profits. In Larnaca two-thirds of the collectors of this tax were Greeks. The fifth tax was for exemption from military service, and was a tax levied on Christians only, and one which they always cheerfully paid. It amounted to 5,000 piastres for every 180 Christian males. The sixth tax was a duty of one piastre on every forty realised by the sale of horses, mules, donkeys, camels, and cattle, and also a charge of a half para per oke and of two paras per kilo of 18,420 okes, levied from both buyer and seller. The remaining tax was one of 2½ paras per head levied on flocks and herds of sheep and goats, but only levied on animals a year old and upwards. This tax was the only one collected directly by the government, and gave no dissatisfaction. The burden of this scheme of taxation was not caused so

much by the amount of each separate tax, but chiefly by their overlapping one another.

"In order to give your readers some notion of the proportion of these taxes to one another, I quote the amount of each of them as levied in Larnaca in piastres:—

	Piastres.	Paras.
1. Dimes ... ..	822,000	
2. Property ... ..	221,897	24
3. Rent, &c.... ..	20,089	32
4. Trade ... ..	65,340	20
5. Military exemption ...	53,333	25
6. Sales of horses, mules, &c.	450,000	
7. Sheep and goats ...	200,000	

Or a total of 1,932,661 piastres 21 paras—equal to £19,326 sterling."

It is this system of taxation which the English have had to remodel, or at least to modify. The results are not yet manifest; but in any case it is certain that the increased revenues of Cyprus must come rather from a growing population and an expanding commerce than from any mere perfecting of a system.

## CHAPTER XXV.

### RUSSIA AND INDIA.

WE have already given such wide scope to these materials for a detailed history of the Turko-Russian War, and have touched upon so many side-issues and contributory circumstances, that it seems impossible to bring our work to an end without tracing the rise and progress of the last Afghan War, which manifestly had its origin and excuse in the contest previously waged in south-eastern Europe.

The principal motive, as has been constantly pointed out, for England's interference in the quarrel between Russia and Turkey, and for her determined participation in the settlement of the Eastern question, was derived from her position as a great Oriental Power. By virtue of her possession of India, England is an Asiatic

empire, as well as a European kingdom; and it would have been a short-sighted policy on the part of her rulers if they had remained indifferent to events which might have endangered her hold upon her great dependency, and which certainly threatened her communication with it. If we had not been masters of India, we could have afforded to look upon the fate of Turkey, and the aggrandisement of Russia in Asia Minor and Central Asia, with comparative indifference. We should have had no more immediate concern in the war than France or Germany; and though as a maritime nation of the first rank we should have had something to say concerning the Straits of Dardanelles and the Suez Canal, we might at least have borne with equanimity the southward progress of the Muscovites in all other respects.

It was our Eastern dependencies which gave us our right of intervention from beginning to end; and this right was acknowledged by all the European Powers, and, however unwillingly, by Russia herself. It was this fact which justified much that would otherwise have been unjustifiable, and explained many acts of our government whereof the justification is even difficult, or impossible to admit. The proclamation of the queen as Empress of India, the bringing of Indian troops to Europe, the occupation of Cyprus, the protectorate of Asia Minor, all these remarkable steps, barely consonant in themselves with the feelings and traditions of Englishmen, are intelligible when regarded from this point of view, even though we may consider that our ends could have been gained by other means.

It was not possible to doubt that the policy of Russia was injurious to British interests in the East; that her progress in the course which she had marked out for herself was dangerous for us; and that her rivalry with us in Asia was conscious and deliberate, if not maliciously hostile on her part. We need not suppose that the Russian government had seriously set its mind upon challenging our right of dominion over India, or that it contemplated the disturbance of our rule in that country. Yet it is quite cer-



tain that some wilder and more adventurous intriguers amongst the Russian diplomatists and generals entertained sinister designs in this direction; and especially during the acuter phases of the Eastern crisis, when our influence was cast into the scale on behalf of Turkey. Trouble was undoubtedly brewed for us, of malice prepense, when our government threatened to check the progress of the Russian arms in Europe; and it is only matter of history that preparations had at one time actually been made to menace our Indian frontier, if not to violate Indian territory.

One of our greatest dangers at this time, and one of the main hopes of the Russian intriguers, was the possibility that our Indian subjects or dependents might, in some instances, have been so corrupted and worked upon by the schemes of our enemy as to forget their allegiance to us, and make a serious effort to rid themselves of our domination. It would have been far from wise in us to overlook this danger, and to flatter ourselves that another Indian mutiny was impossible. There will always (it is much to be feared) exist amongst our feudatories in the East a spirit which adverse circumstances might convert into open rebellion; and upon this acknowledged weakness in our tenure of India the Russians manifestly counted. Of course it was absurd to suppose that General Kaufmann, with all the force which he could muster on the Oxus, could strike a blow at the overwhelming defensive strength of our Asiatic empire; and almost equally absurd to imagine that the Russian government would despatch an army sufficiently strong, or sufficiently well equipped, to make a deliberate descent upon India. But it was not a mere fancy to think that Russian intrigue might seek to rouse a portion of our subjects against us, and to foment an insurrection which Muscovite troops might ultimately assist.

Now it is known that the Hindoos and Mahomedans least favourably affected towards us have for some time past been accustomed to look to Russia, however foolishly, for the means of inflicting injury upon us. The simple existence

of this idea, idle as it may be, is a misfortune for us. We cannot turn round upon Russia and tell her that she must undo all the work in Central Asia which she has accomplished in recent years, even though this work is plainly the cause of much perilous excitement in our Eastern dominions. We cannot, if we would, annihilate Russia, or make her other than she is and has been; but the fact remains, that her advance in Central Asia for some years past has created for us a grave difficulty in India, which our statesmen must face and grapple with. Almost every Englishman will admit this truth; and difference of opinions will arise only as to the proper or the best methods of grappling with the danger. The question resolves itself into one of policy and justification; but the question exists in any case.

All these considerations were brought forcibly before us by the Russian invasion of Turkey in 1877; and each successive phase of the war cast a stronger light upon them. We had to consider, moreover, not only the peril of Russian aggrandisement in the East, and the remote possibility of a Russian attack upon India, but also the strong feeling of sympathy on the part of our Mahomedan subjects with their co-religionists in Turkey. This sympathy was very powerful throughout; and though it was not sufficient to warrant us in taking the part of the sultan in a quarrel where he was conspicuously the prime offender, it was certainly one argument the more why we should give Russia plainly to comprehend that there was a line beyond which we could not permit her to go.

This was the mood in which we found ourselves during the Turko-Russian war; and this was the spirit in which we insisted on bringing Russia before the Areopagus of Europe at Berlin. The course taken by our plenipotentiaries at the Congress, was adopted by them, with more or less consistency, for the purpose of securing the interests of England in the East, and of binding our rival by solemn pledges, such as would be comprehended in Asia no less clearly than in our own quarter of the globe.

To a certain extent we succeeded in our aim;

and we had some reason to believe, when the treaty had been drawn up, that the machinations of Russia, so far as they had been directed against ourselves, were at an end. But scarcely was the Congress over when England was astonished to hear of General Kaufmann's dealings with the Ameer of Afghanistan, and of the actual presence of a Russian embassy in Cabul. Many eyes, hitherto closed to Russian intrigue, were opened by this news; and no one was much surprised to hear that the English and Indian governments had taken steps to obtain an explanation of these facts both from Russia and from Afghanistan.

Before taking up the narrative of events from this point, it will be convenient to glance at the previous troubles with the native tribes on the north-western frontier of England, and the reasons which made it seem probable that Russian intrigue was in some measure responsible for the outbreaks.

As early as November 1877 we received particulars of Afreedee and Jowaki raids. In one of these the raiders were a party of Boriwal Jowakis, about forty in number. According to the "Pioneer," the surprise was effected under a bright moon. The military guard consisted of one Havildar and eighteen men, two of whom stood sentry while the others were asleep, some outside, some within a tent. The sentries were posted close to the tent, which was pitched thirty yards from the edge of a steep incline running up a broad torrent-bed. The Jowakis came silently up this bed, and mustered under the slope without warning. A volley poured into the tents was immediately followed by an onslaught with the sword. One sentry fell at the first fire, and two men sleeping outside were cut to pieces. Some who rushed out shared a similar fate. The Havildar was shot down and dragged some distance, when his throat was cut. Those of the guard within the tent kept up the fire, and the Afreedees now retreated. One of their number, while sheathing his weapon, dropped shot. The Havildar, one sentry, and two Sepoys, were killed. Five others were

mortally wounded, several less severely. The conduct of the villagers was reprehensible, and the circumstances were described as very suspicious. They neither afforded assistance nor attempted pursuit; moreover, all were absent next morning. Had they lent their aid, the raiders must have been cut off.

A Lahore paper observed, in connection with this, that there was a degree of irritation and excitement along the border which would not be checked without bloodshed. "The breaking out of a Border war this time," said this paper, "would mean a general rush to arms by every Pathan, Afreedee, and the like, possessing weapons. Fanaticism and foreign intrigue have been long at work fashioning their natural turbulence into a very mischievous engine of destructiveness."

All the border raids at this time were not so sanguinary; most of them, in fact, being mere excursions of robbers. In one of these some Jowaki's "found their way into a village adjoining the Kohat parade-ground, entered the houses and extorted hospitality, making the inhabitants cook for them. After being sufficiently refreshed they walked across the parade-ground to the church. Here they quietly collected all the bibles, prayer-books, hymn-books, and hassocks belonging to the Kohat devout, which constituted all the portable property within their reach. With these they loaded their village entertainers and retired gracefully."

Two expeditions against the marauders were sent across the frontier, and met with complete success. The tribes were unable to make any stand against artillery, and the complete destruction of Jammu and Bori, and of the other fortified hamlets in their territory, entirely cowed them. A large Jowaki council was held at Jammu on the 12th, the result of which was a determination not to treat as long as English troops remain in Jowaki territory; but the government, on the other hand, resolved not to withdraw the troops until the tribes sent in their unconditional and unqualified submission.

The following account supplies particulars of



an unfortunate affair in which Captain Swiney was killed :—"Captain Swiney, 17th Cavalry, and Trotter, Quartermaster-General, on the 20th November, at Fort Mackeson, received news of an intended raid by the Jowakis towards Shumshultoo, and proceeded there with fifteen of the 17th cavalry and infantry. They encountered the enemy and exchanged a few shots. Captain Swiney withdrew his force to the open plain, and having been followed by the Jowakis, proceeded to some distance and charged them. Swiney cut at an Afreedee and wounded him, but, as he passed, the Afreedee made an upward cut, and struck Swiney on the right arm, dividing the artery, and he died in the evening from loss of blood. The cavalry killed six Jowakis, and the infantry also killed some Aboo Kheyls, who were supposed also to have been implicated. No other casualty occurred on our side. The Afreedee who wounded Captain Swiney was killed at once by one of his regiment. Trotter got a ball through his saddle."

A despatch from the camp before Mackeson, dated December 8, said :—"On Thursday, the 6th inst., the Jowakis were driven from the villages on the right of the valley to the hills on the other side. While retreating they kept up a brisk fire on our skirmishers, taking advantage of the nullahs and rocks. The native infantry were soon in possession of the neighbouring hills, and the artillery kept up a constant fire on the retreating enemy. In the meantime the Sappers blew up the fortifications, but the houses were at first left untouched. On our side four men of the 14th Sikhs and one of the 27th were wounded and one killed. The loss of the enemy must have been severe, as several shells burst among them. On Friday the villages on the left were stormed. The 20th Native Infantry followed the enemy up to the top of the highest hill, killed several, and made some prisoners. On Saturday operations were commenced against the few remaining villages, which were taken and destroyed without very much opposition. By one o'clock the valley presented a very desolate appearance; the nume-

rous towers were no longer to be seen, and the villages were either smoking or in ruins. It is thought that now Bori has been destroyed the troops of this expedition would soon return to Peshawur."

The Jowakis were, in short, completely subdued, as well as the Afreedees; and this fact, coupled with the occupation of Quettah, on the south of Afghanistan, sufficed to show that the English were thoroughly on the alert. The effect of these movements was seen a few months later, when, according to the "Times of India," some of the independent tribes, such as the people of Tirah and Khyber, addressed the Ameer of Cabul, attributing the ruin of the Jowakis to him, as it was through his instigation and promises of aid that they commenced hostilities against the British government. They were further reported as having said that, if the Ameer did not now assist the Jowakis, he need not expect aid from them in maintaining the fort at Ali Musjid.

It was about this time, in the spring of 1878, that a remarkable character on the Indian frontier, the Akhoond of Swat, was reported to have died; and he deserves a mention here rather on account of his curious history than by virtue of any special influence exerted by him on subsequent events. A writer in the "Daily News" thus describes him :—

"The Akhoond of Swat is dead. The announcement has just appeared in the papers; but the words will be the same as a conundrum to most people. Few ever heard of an Akhoond, and Swat is about as unknown to the general reader as the Weissnichtwo of Herr Teufelsdröckh. To those who know India, and more particularly to the small number who are familiar with events in the north-west frontier during the last twenty or thirty years, the information which has just been telegraphed will be read with considerable interest. The Swat valley brings down a stream from the direction of the Hindoo Koosh, which water joins that of the Kabool River not far from Peshawur. In this region lived the Akhoond, one of the most won-

derful characters of the present day, a veritable old man of the mountains, a saint, whose shrine, or tomb, will henceforth be a noted place of pilgrimage, for journeys were made by thousands as acts of devotion to see him even while living, and reputations of this kind always increase after death. His power was the result of his sanctity, for he was only the chief of a small tribe in an inconsiderable valley, not much over twenty miles in extent. His fame was great among the Mahomedans, not only of the region where he lived, but over the whole of India as well. The eyes of our government were supposed to be constantly upon this man. On account of his great influence, he has been understood as being able to sway the Mussulman population, and to have instigated all our troubles with the hill tribes on the frontier. Our present little war with the Jowakis is not supposed to have originated without his hand having had a share in its cause. He was suspected of having had a good deal to do with the great mutiny of 1857; and the Wahabee conspiracies are laid to his door. As the chief centre of religious and political intrigue he has such a reputation that many believe him to have been about the most important personage during the last few years in India. We have heard lately a good deal about the Ameer of Cabul, and the Khan of Keelat, as dangerous powers on our borders, but it will be new to the reader to learn that both these rulers, particularly Shere Ali, had a pious fear of the Akhoond of Swat, for a word from him might have unsettled both in their possession of power. Last summer, when the war in the East began, efforts were made in India to excite the Mahomedan population to join in declaring a holy war. The Ameer of Afghanistan invited the Akhoond to join in a movement, and the fact that he refused, or at least received the offer with marked indifference, was considered by our Indian officials of so much importance that it was telegraphed to all parts of India as well as to England. Had this man declared for the Jikad, our government might have had some trouble on their hands. Such was the reputa-

tion of this wonderful old man. As there is still another prophet, to be sent by Allah before the end of all things take place, if the Akhoond had mounted a white horse, and declared himself to be the expected Imaum Mahidi, the Mahomedan population would, to a certainty, have accepted him as such. It would have produced a rising among the wild tribes of the Punjab and Afghanistan, and much trouble would have been the consequence. A man of this kind, living amongst a jealous and fanatic race of people, who are at the same time fierce and warlike, a man who was supposed to perform miracles and have the gift of prophecy; to whom nothing was hid; of whom every tongue spoke loud of his power and sanctity, was about as dangerous as a powder magazine to the district; and his departure from the scene is no doubt a relief to the commissioners of Peshawur, as well as the higher authorities at Calcutta."

Meanwhile the Russian force under General Kaufmann had been pushing southward from Tashkent; and it was evident to those who were behind the scenes that Russia really entertained for a time the idea of making a military demonstration against India. The control which the government of Russia has over the press, and the prohibition against Europeans travelling in Turkestan, enabled General Kaufmann to conceal his plans without difficulty, and if the Congress at Berlin had not concluded its labours, the first intelligence of the governor-general's hostile designs would probably have reached us in the shape of a Cossack sotnia bivouacking on the south of the River Oxus. The following account of the Russian expedition was written by a well-informed writer in the "Globe," who derived his facts from the Russian papers:—"On the 25th of April, General Kaufmann received instructions from the Minister of War, which led him to make military preparations on a large scale, and to issue an order of the day, on the 26th May, dividing the troops under his command into three *corps d'observation*, the principal one to assemble at Samarcand, the second at Marghelan, and the third at Petro-Alex-



androvsk, twenty miles from Khiva. The principal corps, commanded by General Troitsky, of the emperor's body guard, was composed of the 3rd, 5th, 6th, and 9th battalions of Turkestan, of a mixed battalion, comprising four companies of the local Ferghanah troops, of the 3rd battalion of the Siberian line, two companies of the Turkestan line, and an entire brigade of the Chasseurs of Turkestan. Besides these troops there were fifteen sotnias of Cossacks, five batteries of artillery, and a rocket corps. The whole of this force was ordered to concentrate at Samarcand, and to march in echelon upon Djam, fifty-five miles from Timour's city, and half-way to the Afghan outposts on the River Oxus. The Ferghanah corps, commanded by General Abramoff, a Central Asian officer of great experience, was composed of six companies of Chasseurs, two sotnias of Cossacks, six guns belonging to the Turkestan Mountain Artillery, and half a rocket corps. These troops were ordered to concentrate at the recently acquired Russian outpost at Marghelan, to traverse the Vouadil, and enter the valley of Kizil Su, and there await further marching orders from the governor-general. The third and last corps, that of the Amou Daria, comprised six companies of infantry, two sotnias of Cossacks, and four pieces of artillery, and was commanded by Colonel Grotenhelm. The order transmitted to Khiva was to the effect that the Amou Daria corps should follow the course of the River Oxus from fort Petro-Alexandrovsk as far as Tchardjoui, and thence pursue the course indicated to it by subsequent instructions from Tashkant. At the same time arrangements were made for supplying the expeditionary forces with an entirely new kit, and orders were given to the commissariat to serve out to the troops the customary excess of rations to prepare them for the campaign. Two days later, a supplementary order of the day was issued, in which General Kaufmann stated his intention of forming three ambulance corps, one for the Samarcand detachment, comprising one hundred and sixty beds, and two others for the Ferghanah and Khivan detachments, each com-

posed of fifty beds. The inspector-general of hospitals was also ordered to make the usual sanitary arrangements for an army entering upon a campaign.

"The above particulars are taken from the official 'Turkestan Gazette.' Later intelligence is contained in the 'Moscow Gazette,' the Tashkant correspondent of which writes on June 6th as follows:—'The long and patiently expected movement of the troops was initiated a few days ago by the order of General Kaufmann giving instructions to the commanders to prepare to march. The arrival of General Stolaitoff from St. Petersburg was the cause of the outburst of activity. On the 14th June the Turkestan Council held a meeting for the purpose of levying the necessary number of native arbas to accompany the troops, and an order of the day was drawn up appointing the officers to take charge of the field intendance of the army. The artillery, divided into small detachments, has already left Tashkant for the front. On the 12th of June the Engineer corps will take its departure, on the following day the Infantry will leave Tashkant, and on the 23rd the staff will proceed to Samarcand. The field-chest is daily expected, together with officials appointed by the Minister of Finance. As might be expected, the activity at Tashkant keeps every one astir with excitement. The barracks are crowded with soldiers, the fields outside the town are alive with pack horses and camels intended for the expedition, and every day complimentary dinners are given by the various regiments to each other to promote fellowship and good feeling before starting on the campaign.'

"Unless the particulars given by the 'Turkestan Gazette' are purposely erroneous, it is self-evident that General Kaufmann had no intention of undertaking a regular campaign against India. The forces enumerated in his order of the day of April 25th are an amusing commentary on the 'army of one hundred thousand men' which alarmists a few months ago were certain was going to swoop down upon India, in an ill-defined but successful manner,

from the deserts of Central Asia. The three *corps d'observation* which are now probably bivouacking on the southernmost frontier line of Turkestan, were too small in numbers even to penetrate to friendly Afghanistan, and at the same time keep open its communications with Tashkant. It is possible that, in the event of a war, Russia might have sent some officers to Cabul to have led the Afghans against us, but that she would have ever made the fatal mistake of appearing on the Indian side of the Hindoo Koosh with an insignificant force, which must have provoked comparison disastrous to her prestige, was a contingency against which General Kaufmann, with all his vanity, would have carefully guarded himself. The most probable explanation of the military movements in Central Asia is that the governor-general desired to give vent to the irrepressible ardour of his troops, who were burning with jealousy at the honours won by the army in Europe, by the semblance of a demonstration against India, and that he very likely thought it possible to take advantage of the opportunity to filch another slice of territory from the Khanates lying north of the Hindoo Koosh. The danger of complications arising between Shere Ali and ourselves through the pressure of a Russian demonstration at the ameer's rear is now over, but the second danger of Russia, finding an outlet for the exuberant ardour of her Turkestan troops, has now only begun. The three *corps d'observation* will return to their lonely desert forts with feelings of the keenest chagrin if no opportunity is given them of displaying their valour, and the fear is lest General Kaufmann, yielding to the aggressive tendencies in which he is cast, should embark upon some scheme of conquest or other, which would unfortunately arouse once more the angry passions of England and Russia with respect to the Central Asian question. That tempting invitations to open a campaign lie ready on every side, there can be no doubt. Khiva is not yet wholly annexed; Merv, though under the protection of Persia, is still a thorn in the side of Turkestan; Bokhara still remains to be conquered; to the

south of Ferghanah are fruitful Khanates, on which Russia looks with longing eye; and the Kulja question still remains a bone of contention, which at any moment could be converted by Kaufmann into a war of conquest against Kashgaria. The Eastern question is closed for the present, and it would ill befit the pacific assurances of the czar if his viceroy in Turkestan should revive those angry feelings which the general public of England and Russia fondly hope have ceased to exist between the two countries. Ten years ago, when the telegraph did not penetrate to the Russian possessions in Central Asia, it was easily possible for a Russian general to evade or disobey orders; but now, that the electric wire unites the extreme outpost of Marghelan with the Emperor's Cabinet in the Winter Palace, and each commander of the three Turkestan detachments is in direct and instantaneous communication with the St. Petersburg Ministry of War, it is to be hoped that General Kaufmann will not embark in any offensive undertaking that may disturb the good relations now existing between this country and Russia.

". . . About the 1st of June, Mr. Weinberg, well known for the many diplomatic missions he has undertaken to the khans of Central Asia on behalf of the Russian government, set out for Bokhara, armed with full powers to make arrangements for the passage of Kaufmann's army through the territory of the ameer. It had been intended, in order to save time, that he should hurry, courier-fashion, from Samarcand to Karshi on horseback, accompanied by a small Cossack escort, but, shortly after leaving the city of Tamerlane, he sprained his ankle, and had to proceed to Tcheraktchi in a country cart. At Djam the Russian envoy found the officials making large preparations for the reception of the troops that were shortly expected there from Tashkent. The badness of the road between Samarcand and the Bokhariot frontier greatly retarded Weinberg's progress, but at the end of thirty-six hours he safely reached Tcheraktchi, where the ameer's own carriage was ready waiting to convey him



to Karshi. The 'Turkestanski Vedomosti' does not say how long it took the envoy to complete the rest of the journey—though, as Vambéry did the distance from Samarcand to Karshi in two days and a half, it is to be presumed that it occupied about 24 hours—but goes on to say that, having safely arrived at his destination, Mr. Weinberg had an interview with the Ameer on the afternoon of the 3rd of June. At this conference Mr. Weinberg, attended by Staff Captain Schlichten, presented the Ameer with a letter from the governor of Turkestan, and, after a few friendly assurances, proceeded to state that, owing to the position of political affairs, it would be necessary for the forces of Russia to march to the upper part the of River Amou-Daria, and that General Kaufmann, relying upon the friendly feeling of the Ameer, so signally displayed during the march upon Khiva, trusted that during the passage of his troops through the Ameer's territory, they would receive every possible assistance from the Bokhariot authorities, and that the native officials would co-operate with the Commissariat in collecting supplies for the army. It would seem, according to the semi-official 'Vedomosti,' that the prospect of the Russian troops occupying his territory in the same manner that Europe has witnessed in the case of Roumania, was not altogether pleasant to the Ameer's feelings, for the organ of General Kaufmann goes on to say that, during the announcement of Mr. Weinberg, Seid Mozaffar displayed the 'greatest agitation.' This, however, towards the end of the interview, he managed to suppress, and, in reply to the envoy, he stated, 'without apparent hostility, that he was quite ready to fulfil the wishes of the general-governor of Turkestan,' and that he would do his utmost, by every means in his power, to render himself useful to the army in its passage through his Khanate. At the same time, in putting his country at the disposal of General Kaufmann, he placed every reliance on the friendly disposition which Russia for some years had manifested towards him. It is probable that the conversation between the envoy and the Ameer was fuller than that recorded by the

'Vedomosti,' or that the unpublished letter of General Kaufmann contained particulars of the object in view in passing through Bokhara to the River Oxus, for Seid Mozaffar proceeded to question Mr. Weinberg respecting 'the manner in which the Russians intended to conduct matters with Cabul.' In reply to this, 'the envoy thought it indispensable to state frankly that the governor-general entertained no hostile views against Afghanistan, and was meditating an embassy to be sent to Shere Ali, and that his relations with the Ameer of Cabul would depend upon the results of this mission. They would, however, be one of two things, either friendly or hostile, and would be governed by the attitude of Shere Ali, against whom at present Russia entertained no prejudice whatever.' After a further conference of half an hour, Mr. Weinberg rose to take his departure, upon which the Ameer begged him to repeat his interview the next day, in order to have some more discussion and explanations on the subject."

In connection with the same group of events, we may reproduce the following communication from the well-known Oriental publicist, M. Vambéry, a writer intimately acquainted with Central Asia, and a warm critic of Russian policy :—

"The persistent reports of a Russian military movement in Central Asia which, for some days past, have appeared in the newspapers, deserve more serious attention than, generally speaking, and, bearing in mind the unreliability of rumours which come to us from the far East, such stories merit. . . . According to the latest number of the official 'Turkestan Gazette' that has reached Western Europe, the special Tartar diplomatist, Herr A. A. Weinberg, had been sent by General Kaufmann to Bokhara, to inquire of the Ameer, Mozaffar ed-din Khan, whether, in the event of a campaign along the upper course of the Oxus (*kwerchowjam* Amu-Darji), he was willing to afford the Russian government opportunities for procuring supplies—that is, whether he will allow the officials of the Russian Commissariat to purchase corn, flour, and other

provisions, in his territory. The official journal reports quite naively—‘The good Ameer was quite taken aback and perplexed by this communication, and asked, what exactly did the Russians purpose doing with the Ameer of Cabul? Did they mean to bring him to reason, or were they thinking of moving, in conjunction with him, against some other Power—for example, the English?’ The answer of Herr Weinberg, given with proper diplomatic reserve, was, ‘General Kaufman does not entertain the slightest feeling of hostility against the ruler of Afghanistan; he even thinks of sending a friendly mission to him; and it will depend exclusively on Shere Ali Khan himself to determine the direction which the relations between himself and Russia will take—that is, whether they shall incline to peace or war.’ These are the *ipsissima verba* of the Russian envoy at Karshi; for it was there he was received by the Ameer on June 2nd. And it is hardly necessary to add that the Seyid Mozaffar ed-din, as if he had been struck by a blow, hastened to protest his complete submission, and promise that he would allow as much flour, fruit, and other requisites, to be purchased as the Commissariat officials may desire. The merchant Iwanoff was forthwith authorised to make the necessary purchases for the Russian division of Amu-Daria.

“So far the facts are indisputable, being vouched by official authority. From them it is evident beyond any doubt that the Russians are beginning in thorough earnest to move into the interior of Asia, that they are quite ready to commence operations, and that a surprise is being prepared in that quarter. The only question is—Against whom are these preparations directed? Is it Afghanistan, or is another aimed at through Afghanistan? Or is it yet a third power—viz., the Chinese in Eastern Turkestan, who have conquered Kashgar, and, as is well known, are now ravaging that country in a most shameful and cruel manner? Have they brought the philanthropic Muscovites upon themselves by their shocking inhumanity? The newspapers, indeed, declare this to be the real

object, but it seems to us neither possible nor probable. We rather incline to think that the Russians have in view, in the immediate future, neither Afghanistan nor India, but something which is a stepping-stone to this latter—viz., the possession of Merv. By the acquisition of this important halting-place they hope to anticipate the arrival of the English in Western Afghanistan, and to test the declaration of a former English minister for foreign affairs—‘If the Russians approach Merv, we must abandon our attitude of indifference.’ Besides, they would thus hope to oppose a *contre-coup* to the Anglo-Turkish convention, for which, there is good reason to believe, the Russians were quite prepared beforehand.

“It is impossible to refuse the praise of great cleverness to this latest move of Russian diplomacy; but one may be permitted to doubt whether it is destined to be crowned by success. Merv itself can, indeed, be occupied without much difficulty by a well-delivered *coup de main*. We already hear, without any concealment, of the movement of the army corps of the Amu-Darja. We may then assume that it is advancing from Tshihardshu, under the command of Colonel Grotenhelm. It will probably have a few skirmishes with the Tekke-Turkomans, after which it can easily seize Merv. For Merv can be reached from Tshihardshu in four days—a period within which neither Shere Ali (whose frontier at Herat is eight days distant from Merv) nor still less the English from Quetta would be able to come up and strike the Russian flank.

“It is possible that, while these lines are being written, Merv is already in the hands of the Russians. It is more probable that they have only commenced their march thither. Upon one point, however, we think we do not deceive ourselves. The Congress has worked almost by steam to secure the peace of the world; but it need not be too proud of its work. For the first rifle-shot fired in Central Asia will find an echo in the renewed roar of cannon in Eastern Europe.”



As we subsequently discovered, the ostensible agreement between Russia and England, concluded even before the Powers met in Congress at Berlin, did not suffice to arrest General Kaufmann's march, nor to prevent the Russian mission from proceeding to Cabul, and inflaming the Ameer against his English neighbours.

## CHAPTER XXVI.

### THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER.

THE most vulnerable part of the frontier of British India, as our readers will scarcely need to be reminded, is the sinuous line stretching from the Pamir plain, near the Victoria Lake, where the boundaries of Kashgar and Afghanistan meet, down to Cape Monze, ten miles west of Kurrachee—a total length of about a thousand miles. Opinions differ very widely as to the strength of this frontier for defensive purposes. This difference plainly appeared during the discussion which arose over the policy of activity pursued by Lord Lytton; but it is manifest in any case that the security of British soil depended entirely upon the condition and disposition of the hill tribes, and especially of those which were nominally under the authority of the Ameer of Afghanistan, and the various Khans of the neighbouring country.

A few facts in reference to these frontier tribes will enable us to form a clearer judgment on the policy adopted by the Anglo-Indian government, as well as to comprehend the events of the recent invasion of Afghanistan. We may borrow these facts from a valuable paper contributed to the "Times" of November 15th, 1877.

The tribes inhabiting the frontier fall under three divisions, the idolatrous Kafres and other tribes of the countries of Afghanistan, opposite the Cashmere frontier, the Pathan or Afghan tribes opposite the Punjab frontier, and the Belooch and Brahoe tribes opposite the

Scinde frontier. "In maps the frontiers of Afghanistan and Beloochistan are made to march with those of British India from Victoria Lake to the Indian Ocean, and all these tribes are included within the borders of either Afghanistan or Beloochistan. But they all claim independence, and in Afghanistan are absolutely independent and under no rule whatever except that of their own chiefs, who are seldom obeyed one instant longer than is convenient. Indeed, the only authority revered by the Afghan or Pathan tribes on our north-west frontier is that of the Akhoond of Swat, who accidentally gained his ascendancy over them through his reputation as a saint. There is probably cordial good-will as well as sound judgment in his endeavours to prevent the tribes quarrelling with the British government, but they have generally followed the bent of their instinctive inclinations, even when opposed to his express commands, and he is now seventy-four years of age. Badakshan and Kunduz only yield obedience to the Ameer of Cabul when he can back his demand by force, but he scarcely even pretends to claim the allegiance of the Kafre tribes of Kafrestan and Chitral, and of the Yusufzai tribes about Peshawur, of the Afreedees about Kohat, and Wuzerees about Abbotabad, and other Afghans or Pathans on the north-west frontier. The Kafres give us no trouble, and the Beloochees and Brahoes, for whose good conduct we have under the Scinde frontier system held the Khan of Khelat responsible, have during the past forty years seriously troubled us only once, when, a few years ago (1870), it was attempted to force the Punjab frontier system on Scinde. But the Afghan or Pathan tribes on the Punjab frontier have always been a source of disquietude, and, during the last twenty-eight years, we have had to undertake no less than twenty-eight expeditions against them. While the Bolan Pass has for forty years been closed only once, and all through our own blundering, in 1870, the Kyber Pass has never once been open for more than a few weeks at a time since we annexed the Punjab in

1849. The Ameer of Cabul cannot keep it open, and we shrink from undertaking the task—a very easy one for us—for fear of giving offence at Cabul; and so the trade between the Punjab and Afghanistan has to seek out the more difficult routes to the north of the Kyber, and between the real Kyber Pass and the Cabul river. When, therefore, we talk of our difficulties with the frontier tribes of India, it is the Afghan or Pathan tribes on the Punjab frontier who are more particularly meant, and it is the Punjab frontier which is regarded in India as specially the north-west frontier. It is practically our only Indian political frontier.

“The Kafres, numbering possibly (it is a mere guess) some one million souls, inhabit the slopes of the Hindoo Koosh west of the Chitral valley, down to the Cabul river. They have never been subdued by the Afghans, but have supplied them with some of their best soldiers and generals. Their language has no affinity with the Persian, or Turkish, or Arabic, but with the Sanskrit, and they are thought to be the remains of the primitive Aryan race. When Conolly was at Jellalabad, an Afghan attendant came rushing into his tent one day, exclaiming, ‘Here they are, sir. They are all come—all your relations.’ Conolly, amazed, looked up, and saw it was a party of Kafres who had come to visit him; and his attendant, pointing to their white skins, added, ‘There, don’t you see them, your relatives the Kafres?’ They are remarkable for their fair complexions and blue eyes, for the strength and courage of their men, and the great beauty of their women, and for their drunken and dissolute lives. But they are jovial, hospitable, law-abiding, and famous among all the tribes around for their truthfulness, and the good faith with which they keep every compact they enter into. They are gross idolaters, but their idolatry, while closely allied to Hindooism, is not exactly the Hindooism of India. They are always at deadly and irreconcilable feud with their Mahomedan neighbours in the Swat Valley, and a young Kafre cannot marry until he has slain a Mahomedan. Some of their customs

have the true primitive character. If a young man falls in love with a girl, he shoots an arrow into the house of her parents or guardians, taking good care that it injures no one; and he then goes and tells one of the head men of the village what he has done. The girl’s father, or master, if she be a slave, having found the arrow, goes out to ask among his neighbours if of them know who has discharged it into his any house. Then the confidant of the lover comes forward and makes known the name of the young man, and proposes to the tribe that the girl be given to him in marriage; and if they agree, which is generally done, they fix the amount of dowry, which must be paid by the lover before the marriage; and if he cannot pay it, the tribe subscribe among themselves and pay it for him. Beside their great ethnological interest, as the possible progenitors of the English race, the Kafres are of the highest political interest to us as holders of the Chitral Pass from Kunduz, Badakshan, and Wakhan, and from the Pamere Steppe down the Kunar Valley to Jellalabad, and by a branch route across the Swat Valley to Peshawur. Yet no Englishman has ever been sent to examine this country, and the government of India has always prevented our missionaries going into it, for fear of offending the Yusufzai clans of Swat. Excepting the Beloochees and Brahoes, there are no tribes on our north-west frontier it is so important to attach to us, from their orderly and peaceful habits, and the fact that the southern slope of the Baroghil (Chitral) Pass from the Oxus Valley and Kokand, over the Hindoo Koosh to the Indus Valley, is entirely in their hands. The policy of extending the boundary of the Maharajah of Cashmere’s territory to the Chitral Pass, has, however, been from time to time considered, and would probably prove the best arrangement for reducing the Yusufzai to peace and order.

“The Afghans style themselves the Bani Israel, or Sons of Israel, and claim descent in a direct line from Saul, or Malik Twalut. Saul had two sons, Barakiah and Iramia (Jeremiah), and the latter a son named Afghana. When Bakht-u-



nasr (Nebuchadnezzar) took the children of Israel into captivity, the tribe of Afghana, on account of their obstinacy in maintaining the Jewish religion, were driven into the mountains about Herat, where, rapidly increasing, they extended their migrations eastward into the Cabul Valley and along the right bank of the Indus to the confines of Scinde and Beloochistan. This is the constant tradition of all the Afghan historians. Living among idolaters, many of their tribe fell into idolatry; and in the ninth year after the announcement by Mahomed of his mission, and more than one thousand five hundred years after the time of Solomon, the Afghans for the first time heard of the advent of a new prophet through a fellow Israelite, who, having been convinced at Medina of the truth of the new religion, sent a message to his countrymen at Herat and Cabul to come and examine the doctrines of Mahomed for themselves. They accordingly sent six of their chief men under a leader called Kish, to Medina, where they at once embraced the new religion and returned to Afghanistan to proselytise their fellow-countrymen; and in the course of a few years a large proportion of them became Mahomedans. Subsequently, the number of converts was greatly increased through the powerful influence of the Saracens, who invaded Persia and Turkestan, and swept through Afghanistan in their plundering incursions into Hindustan. But a great many resisted to the last, and there is a tradition still current among the Afghans that the Kyber Hills were inhabited, until a comparatively recent period, by a colony of Jews. The term Pukhtun, corrupted into Pathan—said to have been conferred on Kish by Mahomed himself—has since been adopted by the Afghans as a national designation, and is the name by which they are known by the natives of India. Indeed, in Afghanistan the term Afghan is now applied only to the direct descendants of Kish. But the tribes which the Afghans reject as not of the same lineage as themselves, because they cannot prove their register in the same genealogy, are, nevertheless, allowed to be of the same

stock as the predominant race; and these tribes call themselves indifferently Afghans, or Pathans, and Bani-Israel. The true explanation of the nominal distinction between Afghans and Pathans is probably this: that in the time before the appearance of Mahomed the entire Afghan nation derived their descent and title from Afghana, the grandson of Saul. But as soon as the new religion became known, the first converts, who were of the family of Kish, reserved to themselves the proud designation of Afghans, and ignored altogether as Afghans the tribes inhabiting the eastern boundary of the country, who did not adopt Mahomedanism for a long series of years after it had been embraced by the tribes about Cabul and Herat. The principal tribes are the Duranee, Tarins, Kakars, Gilzæ, Provindahs, and others, of Afghanistan proper, and on the north-west frontier, the Yusufzæ, numbering altogether 73,000 fighting men; the Afreedees 20,000, and the Wuzerees 30,000.

“The Yusufzæ include the Bæzæ and Akozæ, of the Swat Valley and western slopes of the Black Mountain; the Chagazæ, who inhabit both banks of the Indus above Buneer and Umbeela; the Hasanæ, also of the Black Mountains; the Mada Khel (Clan), who inhabit the north slopes of the Mahaban; the Amazæ of the Sudum Valley; the Khuda Khel, who inhabit the south slopes of the Sarpatai Mountain; and the Ranizæ, inhabiting the west end of the Swat Valley. The Jadrans of Mount Mahaban are a tribe of Pathans 2,000 strong; the Utman Khel, of the Tira Valley, are 500 strong; and the great Pathan tribe of the Momands, whose country extends from the Swat border to the Cabul river, are numbered at 10,000 fighting men. The Afreedees inhabit the lower and easternmost spurs of the Sufaid Koh range, to the west and south of the plain of Peshawur. They are divided into five clans, the Meta Khel, which has wandered into India and been lost sight of; the Miri Khel, which has died out; the Adam Khel, of which the Jowakis, who are at present giving trouble in the Kohat Pass, are a sub-

division ; and the Ula Khel and Aka Khel. The Pathan Orakzae, who dwell next below the Afreedees, are 28,000 strong ; the neighbouring Zæmukhts, 4,500 strong ; the Turis, of the Kuram river, who are not considered Pathans, but Mogols, are 500 strong ; and the Dawaris of Dawar are said to be 5,000 strong, but they are the most degraded, cowardly, and contemptible of all the frontier Afghan tribes. The Wuzerees are the robbers of the Gomul Pass, and other parts of the Sooliman range, and, in fighting men, are even stronger than the Afreedees, and second only to the Yusufzae. The Batanees, Shoeranees, and Ushtaranees, dwell on the outer skirts of the Wuzeree Hills, adjoining the southern side of Bunnoo and the northern limits of Dera Ismael Khan. The Belooch frontier tribes, further south, include the Kasranees, north of Dera Ghazee Khan, 1,000 strong, and the Bozdars, 4,000 strong ; the Kutrans, said not to be Beloochees, but Pathans, 4,000 strong ; the Kosahs, 500 ; and the Lagharees, 3,000, always a loyal and well-affected tribe towards the British, all opposite to Dera Ghazee Khan. The Gurchanees are a debased and thieving set, about 2,000 in number, and the Murrees, a strong warlike tribe of 5,000 fighting men, and the Bugtees, 1,000 strong, are subjects of the Khan of Khelat. These Belooch tribes are said to have originally come from the neighbourhood of Aleppo, and are undoubtedly Arabs. The Brahoe tribes, the dominant race in Beloochistan, are conjectured by some to have landed in the Mekran from Abyssinia, but are said by others to be Mongols. The Cutchees, or aboriginal inhabitants of the plain of Cutchee, are Goths, and of the same stock as the Hindoo Jats, but are Mahomedans and not Hindoos like their tribe fellows in India. According to Professor Rawlinson, the term Belooch, written by Persian authors—for the Beloochees have no written language of their own—Bilush, is derived from Belus, king of Babylonia, the Nimrod of Scripture, the son of Cush. The Persians name the Beloochees Kūch wa Bilūsh, and adjoining the country of the Beloochees to the east of Cutchee,

The Belooch and Brahoe tribes are far inferior to the Afghans in appearance, but, as fighting men, they are quite their equals, and, unfortunately, also in their characteristic vices. The government of each tribe is a most complete democracy, which is split up into as many factions as there are families and almost individuals. Each section of each tribe has its own quarrels and supports its own chief, whose tenure of authority is of the most precarious nature, raised to power to-day only to be deposed to-morrow. There is no people in the world more turbulent and less under control ; the love of fighting and plundering and disorder is stronger in them than all the other Eastern people, and, indeed, their courage is almost their sole virtue. Honour and patriotism have no meaning for them ; their avarice and cupidity are extreme ; and for gold they will betray the most sacred engagements, sworn to on the Koran, and sealed by their own signet-ring. They submit only when they must, and then with abject docility. They are perfidious, cruel, and treacherous, and are stained by indulgence in vices of unspeakable enormity. But it is evident that their national degradation has been very much owing to the force of circumstances,

“Both the Afghans and the Beloochees are, physically, remarkably fine races—tall, robust, well-formed, and active. The Afghans have extremely handsome faces, and the beauty of their women is often of a dazzling brilliance. The Afghan women of some of the frontier tribes go unveiled. When they meet a man coming along a road the more elderly look down modestly and pass on ; but the younger women turn their backs to him and stand still until he has gone by. This coy attitude has proved fatal to the peace of many an English young subaltern, who has found it impossible to pass the enchanting apparition in his path. Both races are hospitable, and when once forced to settle down to industrial pursuits develop an astonishing aptitude for trade. The comparative peace of Beloochistan during the past forty years has certainly had the effect of making the



Beloochees and Brahoes more peaceful and orderly, and more trustworthy. John Jacob, like Outram among the Bheels, was a great civiliser of these savage and predatory frontier tribes.

"The Punjab officials have always encouraged the claims of the Punjab frontier tribes to independence of the Ameer of Cabul, or at least have steadfastly ignored the Ameer's nominal sovereignty over them, and never attempted to make use of it in keeping the peace of the border. They have always affected to treat the tribes as a useful 'buffer' between the Indian government and the Ameer of Cabul, and the tribes themselves have only been too glad to play off the one power against the other; and so they are at present under no responsible sovereignty whatever. We refuse to become responsible for them ourselves, and we decline to recognise the Ameer's authority over them, which he, indeed, has not the power to enforce without our cordial co-operation. When they make a sudden plundering raid into our territory, we undertake an expedition against them, and thus, as before stated, we have undertaken twenty-eight expeditions against them in twenty-eight years. Sometimes we submit to pay them black mail, to make them cease from troubling us. This is the Punjab frontier system. In Scinde John Jacob insisted on treating the border tribes as subjects of the Khan of Khelat. His authority over them was only nominal, and was denied altogether by the more powerful tribes, but the Scinde officials always insisted on acknowledging it themselves, and on the tribes recognising it, and with the most beneficial results. But, in 1870, it was resolved to introduce the Punjab system in dealing with the too-powerful Belooch tribes of the Bugtees and Murrees, whose country, although within the borders of Beloochistan, lay partly on the Scinde and partly on the Punjab frontier. These tribes had become disorderly, and could easily have been reduced to submission by the khan, had we supported him; but the government of India insisted on dealing with them, on the Punjab system, as practically independent, and the natural result

was not only to throw the Belooch frontier into ferment, but to embroil our own officials with each other, and bring our own frontier policy to a complete dead-lock. The Bolan Pass was stopped, and in a very short time Beloochistan would have reverted to its pristine condition of utter barbarism and disorder. Fortunately, however, the Indian government soon saw its mistake, and the khan the evil of the advice on which he was secretly acting, and gradually, during the past three or four years, we have succeeded in re-establishing friendly relations with Beloochistan. It is now proposed to place the Scinde and Punjab frontiers under one system, which would be administered by a single commissioner, directly responsible to the viceroy and governor-general, instead of, as at present, by two separate commissioners, respectively subject to the lieutenant-governor of the Punjab and the governor of Bombay. We know too little yet of the details of this proposal to be able to discuss it with any profit here, but it is evident that it is highly necessary to introduce some unity of purpose into our management of the Trans-Indus tribes, and that the perennial condition of plundering and anarchy in which we have been content for twenty-eight years to leave the Punjab frontier, and which has only been aggravated by the Punjab system of retaliatory petty expeditions and corrupt subsidies, is not only an opprobrium, but a standing menace to the government of India. If it be true that foreign intriguers have, since 1870, visited Cabul, Candahar, and Khelat, and even attempted to visit Cashmere, we have certainly done our best to create a state of matters on the frontier which should, most naturally, invite their presence there.

"After all, as has been well said by a high authority on this question, things are not worse in the Trans-Indus Hills than they were in the Highlands of Scotland before General Wade began his roads in 1746, and it will not be by military chastisements, so much as by making roads up to and through the hills of the Yusufzai, Afreedees, and Wuzerees, that these lawless tribes

will be finally brought under the civilising influences of peace and prosperity, and a present dangerous gap in our north-west frontier be slowly built up into an impregnable bulwark against every possible enemy. To be completely successful, we want a better understanding with Shere Ali. Our relations with him have unfortunately assumed a most ambiguous, and even semi-hostile character, and the sooner he is disabused of his suspicions against us the better both for him and us. It should not be difficult to convince him that we harbour no designs against his independence—that it is, in fact, our interest that he should be absolutely independent. What we want are the best possible neighbourly relations with him, and a friendly treaty, such as Sir Herbert Edwardes negotiated with the Ameer in the year 1855. Special arrangements should also be made for keeping the Kyber Pass permanently open to the commerce with Central Asia. It has, too, been suggested that, if at the same time the Maharajah of Cashmere were allowed to occupy the Baroghil Pass, the Chitral Valley would also be opened up to commerce, which would then have a second route, besides the great Bamian Pass, into Central Asia. These are practical details for the consideration of the responsible officials on the spot. But the security, however brought about, of the north-west frontier, has now become a matter of concern to all Englishmen, and the problem of its pacification, however trying, must no longer baffle the skill and patience of our Indian political officers, who, we may be sure, have lost none of their high traditional capacity for the civilising arts of imperial rule.”

For many years past the Indian government had turned its attention to the Afghan question. The importance of maintaining such relations with the Ameer that at least the Russians should not possess a superior influence to our own, had been fully recognised; but the different viceroys and councils, up to the time of Lord Northbrook, had been agreed in the opinion that a policy of non-interference was the wisest that could be pursued. They did not fail to adopt such mea-

asures as seemed calculated to secure the amity of the Afghan ruler; and, in so far as these measures were unsuccessful, and the danger presented itself of an eventual rupture with him, they faced the possibility of another Afghan war.

“With this eventuality in view, they neglected no opportunity of informing themselves as to the condition and strength of the Afghans; and some part of the information obtained by them is included in the foregoing sketch. Meanwhile it appears that the Russian government was adopting a similar course; and in one or two respects the knowledge acquired by their military department was more succinct and valuable than our own. The following sketch of the people of Afghanistan is taken from the records of this department. It is particularly serviceable as indicating the approximate fighting strength of the various tribes.

“Afghanistan includes an area of 10,000 geographical square miles, with about 6,000,000 inhabitants. The sparsity of its population may be concluded from the fact that Germany, on the same area, supports over 40,000,000 people. The population of the various provinces will be seen from the following:—

#### “I. CABULISTAN.

“1. Cabul.—District of Djellalabad, Cabul, Gazni, and Kuram, 900,000 inhabitants.

“2. Kafiristan (semi-independent).—District of Kona, 100,000 inhabitants; principality of Kashgar, 60,000; Badjour, 50,000; Navasai, 10,000; and Dir, 100,000; Ligue Utman Kheilei, 50,000; Ligue Momund, 75,000; district of Swat, 210,000; Bunir, 326,000; and Kyber, 100,000; Northern Cabul, 1,000,000.

#### “II. HESAR.

“1. Province of Hesar.—District of Yokikhohir, 10,000 inhabitants; Desandshi, 10,000; Ser Djeng, 15,000.

“2. Province of Puskt-kug.—District of Dekudi, 10,000 inhabitants; Bolgor and Kydelav, 150,000.



### "III. KHORASSAN.

"1. Province of Kandahar.—District of Ferra, 130,000 inhabitants; Kandahar, Hirish, and Kelat Gildshi, 900,000.

"2. Province of Herat.—District of Gurian, 100,000 inhabitants; Sabsor, 80,000; Bakna, 32,000; Karrukh, 20,000; Obe, 12,000; Herat, 60,000.

"3. Herat Dependencies.—District of Kale No, Murgab, and Pidshe (Hissare tribe), 145,000 inhabitants; Tivere, 64,000; Deria Dere, 25,000; Djevedje, 8,000; Rades, 25,000. Firus Kugi Tribe—Dersi, 10,000; Kutche, 10,000; Tchekcheran, 20,000; and Doublet Yar, 13,000.

### "IV. TURKESTAN (SEMI-INDEPENDENT).

"Khanate of Maimene, 100,000 inhabitants; Andkuiand Shibberyan, 60,000; Aktche, 10,000; Balkh and Seri Put, 64,000; Khulm, 300,000; Kundus, with districts of Talishen and Khasret Isman, 400,000; Badakshan, —.

### "V. SEISTAN, 280,000.

"All these figures are only approximate.

"More important than territorial division is that of races and tribes. There are nine distinct races in the country—Afghans, Tadshiks, Kizilbashi, Hesari, Usbeks, Hindoos, Djat, Kaffirs, and Arabs.

"The Afghans, or Patan, or Pushtu, who are the dominating race, are about 3,000,000 strong. They are divided into five tribes or 405 clans (kheil), the clans being subdivided into numerous families. 277 clans call themselves Afghans, the remaining 128 preferring the patronymic of Pakhtan. All boast of deriving their descent from the ten tribes of Israel, a claim not altogether substantiated, but in favour of which a good deal of evidence has been alleged.

"The five great tribes are:—

### "I. AFGHAN.

"Batānai, 25 clans; Matta, or Gilsai, 52 clans; Gurgustai, 95 clans; Sarabanai, 105 clans.

### "II. PAKHTAN.

"Karanai, 128 clans. Total, 405 clans.

"Though spread over the whole country, the bulk of the Afghan population live in the eastern and south-eastern provinces, being inveterate mountaineers, and preferring the lofty hills on the Indian frontier to any more profitable and convenient residence. Of those living in the adjoining valleys some are in the habit of nomadising on British territory part of the year.

"In the north-east the principal clans are the following:—The Shinvar, in the valley of the Kame, a tributary of the Cabul, are almost entirely independent. The Tarkalanai, in the south-western basin of the River Pendjkor, are divided into the three principalities of Badjour, Birakhul, and Navassa, and sending 10,000 armed men into the field, may be estimated at 80,000 souls. The numerous clan of the Yusufzai, residing in the corner formed by the junction of the Cabul and Indus rivers, is divided into many families. Of these the Khavdazai occupy the greater part of the Pendjor Valley, forming the principality of Dir, which has sixty-two villages, capable of turning out 20,000 riflemen. The Khavadazai also live on the right bank of the River Swat, where they have fifty-four villages, and muster 17,000 rifles. The left bank of the River Swat is held by the Baizai, another branch of the Yusufzai, divided into the Ranizai (52 villages and 12,000 rifles), and the Babuzi (70 villages, 18,000 rifles). Both these branches are governed by separate khans. Between the rivers Kame and Swat, on the left bank of the Kabul Darya, there are the less important subdivisions of the Gandjianai, Darudzai, Mohamedzai, and Halilai. The Utman Kheilei, in the lower part of the same valley, form a fraternity having the command of 10,000 rifles. The Upper Momunds, south of Badjour and the Utman Kheil league, extend as far as the Kabul Darya, and on the right bank of the river reach up to the Kyber hills. They have 25,000 families and two khans. The British territory south-east of these, between Indus, Kabul Darya,

and the hills is inhabited by different branches of the branches of the Yusufzai about 15,000 strong, with 30,000 rifles. North of this outlying tribe, in the more or less independent district of Bunair, we have the Malezai branches of the Yusufzai. They are subdivided into the Salarzai, Djidasai, Ashaisai, Hehelsai, Nurzai, Suhmlai, Khudo Kheil, Jadun, Otmanzai, and Amazai. Part of the Douletzai live in the same neighbourhood. The whole population of Bunair is distributed over 111 villages, and can turn out up to 65,000 armed men.

"South of the Kabul Darya, in Cabulistan and the Pendjab Hills, lining the Indus Valley, the Tarnokhi muster 6,000 rifles. The Afreedee, the most numerous of the border tribes, spending the greater portion of the year on the Cabul Hills, and descending only in summer into the Indus Valley, glory in the possession of 15,000 armed men. To them belong the Kyber and Shinvari people, famous for their martial and savage characteristics. Protected by the Kyber Hills, they are entirely independent, and receive from 10,000 to 20,000 rupees a year from the Cabul government as a consideration for allowing caravans to pass. Some thirty years ago there were counted as many as 20,000 rifles in and near the Kyber Pass. The Kyber men are divided into numerous sections, each of them having a separate khan, and refusing to acknowledge any superior authority. Among the more prominent branches of the Afreedee, the Jowaki, the Zaka-Khel, the Galli, and the Adam Kheil, deserve to be mentioned. The Lower Momund (12,000 armed men) occupy the south-western corner of the district of Peshawur. The strip of land separating the British districts of Peshawur and Kohat takes its name from the Khattak, who, notwithstanding their 15,000 rifles, lead a pacific agricultural life. The Orakzai inhabit the Ganga Valley south-west of Kohat and the Tirak Valley. West of them there are the Bangash, in the valley of the Miranzai and part of the Kuram Valley, within the boundaries of Cabul. South of the Kuram Valley, between the districts of Bannu and Tak, the

country is infested by the robber tribes of the Batani (5,000 rifles), living partly on English, partly on Cabul territory. The Soliman Hills (Takhti Suliman, Anglice the throne of Solomon), in the south-eastern extremity of Afghanistan, harbours the three martial brotherhoods of the Shirani, Ushterani, and Kazrani. The Shirani, 10,000 rifles, make constant inroads into the valleys, and, up to the pacification of the country by the English, were the terror of the whole region. They live in the direction of Deri Ismail Khan. The Kazrani have about 5,000 rifles, and are less warlike.

"West of these, and still included in the Cabul frontiers, there is the extensive district of Dour, reaching from the River Gomel to the River Kuram, and inhabited by the Vezir people, divided into the three branches of the Makh-sud, the Vezir in the south, the Deveshkel in the centre, and the Kabulkel in the north. The Vezir are a powerful and independent race, mostly nomads, leading a pastoral life, staying in the hills in the summer; the winter entices them down to their Indus Valley. The principal centres are the towns of Kanagoram and Makeen. The upper valley of the Kuram is inhabited by the Turi and Jaji, of the Pakhtan division of the people. Further down the valley we meet with a portion of the Zuimucht, whose principal mass reside south-west. The mountainous district of Khost, south of the Kuram, is the property of small hill tribes—the Driplara, the Drikuti, Mattu, Gurbus, Torazi, and others.

"The powerful clan of the Gilzai, or Gildji, with numerous subdivisions, are the owners of the Khelat-i-Gilzai region. Their southern frontier is formed by the Durani country, extending to Kandahar. The environs of Kandahar and Gasni include also the Ashaksai and Nurzai, and others whose territories are less clearly divided.

"Of the branches of the Afghan people living in the western parts of the kingdom we know but little. The most numerous are the Burdurani. The Bareksai, to whom belongs the Khan, have 60,000 families, and accordingly are one of the strongest Afghan tribes.



"Next to the Afghans, the Tadjiks are the most numerous race in the country. They are the aboriginal element in the western provinces, and being a sedentary people, are called Tadjik —i.e., peasants, in contradistinction to the Turk or warrior. They are now divided into a sedentary portion calling themselves Parsivan or Parsi Zeban, and nomads known as Aimaks. The latter wander about in the hills surrounding the upper basin of the Kheri Rud, and are mixed up with the Turkish tribes who immigrated under Djinghis and Timur. Of these mixed tribes we know the Tchar Aimak, the Djemtchidi, the Firus, Kugi, Teimuni or Tegumi, and the Zuri. Cognate to them are the Timurs, formed by Timur Shah out of the heterogeneous mob of his camp towards the end of the last century. The Teimuns are settled in the three districts of Teivere, Derya Dere, and Djevdja, each having a separate khan. Up to 1844, when the ruler of Herat transplanted 45,000 to the country adjoining his capital, they were estimated at 10,000 souls. The Teimun territory is situated on the southern declivity of the Sakh Kug Hills, and was anciently called Gur. The Zuri is an insignificant clan. The Firus Kug formerly lived further west in Persian Khorasan, but were transferred by Timur to their present settlement in Herat. They are now divided into five branches, with five chiefs, living in the forts of Kades in the Derzi, Kutche, Tchektcheran, and Doulet Yar, situated in the upper valleys of the Kheri Kud and Murgab. Kades was subjugated in 1844 by the Hezarai, but the other branches remained independent. The Zuri and Djemshidi, formerly potent and respected, now occupy the small territory in the Murgab, to which they emigrated in the heroic period of Persian history. Their khan resides at Bala Murgab, whence many raids are undertaken into neighbouring lands. The sedentary portion of the Tadjiks are numerously represented only in Cabul Kugistan, in the Valleys of Gorbend, Pendjir, and Nidgour, where they amounted to 40,000 families at the beginning of this century. They are warlike, almost entirely independent, and di-

vided into small fraternities under the direction of special khans. The Tadjik branch in Logar, 8,000 families strong, is distinguished for its bravery. In the other parts of Afghanistan the Tadjiks are more or less mixed up with the Afghans, living sometimes in Afghan villages, sometimes in separate colonies, under the direction of Ketkhuds or Elders. In these parts they have no landed property, but rent land from the Afghans, and altogether occupy a very inferior position. In the towns they are a gentle, hard-working race, and take to trades which the Afghans despise; in the villages, they are justly famous for the excellence of their husbandry. Many of these Cabul Tadjiks serve in Anglo-Indian forces, where they are called Turks, and enjoy a good character. The Tadjiks also form the original population of the Badakshan region, where they are divided into the three groups of Raman, Shagnan, and Vashan. John Wood regarded the Tchitrael and Kafir people also as Tadjiks; but these being undoubtedly of different extraction, the Persian origin of the Badakshan Tadjiks must be very problematic.

"The third race enumerated in our list are the Kizilbashi, transferred by Nadir Shah from Persia to Cabul in 1737. They are a medley of Persians and Turks, of the Djevanishir, Afshar, and Muradchini tribes, who speak Persian, and, indeed, are Persian in every respect. They have an influential colony at Cabul, and are accounted the best instructed part of the population.

"The Hazarah, according to some, are Mongols, introduced by Djinghis Khan; according to others, Turkish Usbeks of the Berlas tribe, formerly nomadising near Shakhrisabak. Timur, in the year 799 of the Hedshra, despatched a thousand families of this tribe to the valley of Badgis, on the Upper Murgab, where they were called Hezarai or 'Thousanders.' Thence they extended as far as Cabul on the east, and Kherikud on the west. Their division into tribes and clans is very complex. . . .

"The Hindoos belong to the Kshatra or warrior caste, are 300,000 strong, and live chiefly in the towns.

"The Djat, also about 300,000 strong, of unknown origin, are probably aborigines. They are scattered over the whole country.

"The Kafirs, or Siahposh, about 150,000, live on the slopes of the Hindoo Koosh, in Northern Cabulistan. Of Caucasian type, their origin remains to be explained. They are divided into the clans Kati, Pashagar, Pandu, Vama, Mandukh, Samadjil, Tapakol, Tchanak, Dutan, Sachao, Katar, Kemler, Kamus, Aekin, Ashpin, Vadin, Vaikal, and Siyagbush. The Svat, Tchitrals, and Safi, belonging to the aboriginals, border upon the Kafirs. They are said to number no less than 500,000 souls.

"The Arabs, known as Seids, or descendants of the prophet, form a compact mass in the district of Konar, in Northern Cabulistan. They are also found dispersed over the other districts, like Armenians and Jews.

"The Afghan tribes frequently intermingle, and increase or decrease according as families forsake their old associations to form new ties. Wars and feuds frequently result in the forcible transfer of tribes, or parts of tribes, to new localities, when embodiment with other tribes usually ensues. The tribes are least distinct in the towns. In some of them only one-fifth of the population are Afghans, four-fifths consisting of Tradjiks, Hindoos, Jews, Persians, &c.

"The most densely inhabited parts of the country are the valleys of the Cabul and Koorum, with their tributaries. In the Steppes occupying a considerable portion of the southern provinces people crowd round the rivers, leaving the rest of the country empty. The regions bordering on Beloochistan are the least inhabited. The inhabitants live mostly in villages, isolated tenements being rendered impossible by the frequent wars. The villages, always of considerable size, and surrounded by walls, frequently—especially in Northern Cabul—have up to 3,000 houses.

"Of the most important towns, Cabul has 60,000 inhabitants, Kandahar about 40,000, Herat 45,000, Maimene 18,000, Balkh 17,000, Gami 15,000, Andkui 15,000, Khulm 15,000,

Jellalabad 1,000, Dushak 10,000, Kalgilsie 10,000, and Sheich Nassur 9,000.

"The inhabitants are almost exclusively Sunnits, the Hazarah and Kizilbashi alone being Shiah. The small number of Armenians in the country profess Christianity. The Hindoos and Siahposh follow a nondescript religion which is very little known, but seems to have affinities with Shamanism. Altogether, there are about 800,000 Pagans in the country."

To understand the nature of the quarrel which broke out between the Anglo-Indian government and the Ameer, it is necessary to study the despatches and other papers on the subject which have been issued by the India Office. The Afghan Blue-book published in November, 1878, enables us to do this; and without going over the whole ground we may extract the pith of this correspondence.\*

The first regular treaty between ourselves and the Ameer was concluded by Colonel, afterwards Lord Lawrence, in 1855, with Dost Mahomed, during the viceroyship of Lord Dalhousie. It simply bound England, or rather the East India Company, "to respect those territories of Afghanistan now in his highness's possession, and never to interfere therein;" whilst Dost Mahomed bound himself in the same terms, and engaged to be "the friend of the friends, and enemy of the enemies" of the Company.

Lord Dalhousie was succeeded by Lord Carnarvon; and in the year 1857, an agreement was signed at Peshawur between Dost Mahomed and Sir John Lawrence, Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, and Colonel Edwardes, Commissioner of Peshawur, on the part of the East India Company. We were then at war with Persia. The Shah had taken possession of Herat, and had "manifested an intention to interfere in the possessions of Dost Mahomed." The East India Company, therefore, in order to aid the Ameer "to defend and maintain his present possessions in Balkh, Cabul, and Candahar,

\* These Papers are summarised in the "Times" of Nov. 29, 1878, from whence the summary in the text is abbreviated.



against Persia," agreed "out of friendship" to give the Ameer one lac of Company's rupees monthly during the war with Persia, on certain conditions. The fourth of these was—

"British officers, with suitable establishments and orderlies, shall be deputed, at the pleasure of the British government, to Cabul or Candahar or Balkh, or all three places, or wherever an Afghan army be assembled to act against the Persians. It will be their duty to see generally that the subsidy granted to the Ameer be devoted to the military purposes for which it is given, and to keep their own government informed of all affairs. They will have nothing to do with the payment of the troops or advising the Cabul government, and they will not interfere in any way in the internal administration of the country. The Ameer will be responsible for their safety and honourable treatment while in his country, and for keeping them acquainted with all military and political matters connected with the war."

Other conditions were to the effect that the Ameer of Cabul should appoint and maintain a vakeel at Peshawur; that the subsidy should cease from the date on which peace was made between the British and Persian governments, or at any previous time, at the pleasure of the governor-general of India; that whenever the subsidy should cease the British officers should be withdrawn from the Ameer's country; "but, at the pleasure of the British Government, a vakeel, not a European officer, shall remain at Cabul on the part of the government, and one at Peshawur on the part of the government of Cabul." The Ameer was to furnish a sufficient escort for the British officers from the British border when going to the Ameer's country and to the British border when returning; and in the spirit of the Treaty of March, 1855, which was to be in no way superseded by the agreement to 1857, the Ameer engaged to communicate to the British government any overtures he may receive from Persia, or the allies of Persia, during the war, or while there is friendship between the Cabul and British governments.

Lord Elgin, writing to Sir Charles Wood from Simla, July 28, 1863, upon the death of Dost Mahomed, encloses a letter from Shere Ali, notifying his succession, but adds that a contest for power between the sons of the late Ameer seems imminent, and that it is his "intention to await further information from Afghanistan before taking a formal step in acknowledgment of" Shere Ali. Some time before the Dost's death, Shere Ali had, on the death of his elder brother, been recognised as heir-apparent by Lord Canining's government, Lord Lawrence being then Chief Commissioner of the Punjab. This is the communication sent by Shere Ali to Lord Elgin. It is dated June 12, 1863:—

"(After compliments) I beg to inform your excellency that as death is the common lot of man, my revered father, fourteen days after the capture of Herat and its dependencies, died of a chronic illness at sunrise on Tuesday, the 21st of Zeelhej (9th of June). In accordance with the wishes of my father to give intimation to your excellency of everything, whether trifling or important, I beg to apprise you that as long as I live I will, please God, follow the laudable example of my father in maintaining the strong ties of friendship and amity subsisting between the British and this state. I trust that your excellency, setting your mind at ease in every respect, will continue to gratify me from time to time with gracious letters. I have thought it expedient to stay here a few days in order to appoint a ruler of Herat and to make boundary settlements, and afterwards I will take my departure to Cabul."

As Russia advanced in Central Asia, both the Indian government and the Ameer became anxious. A weighty memorandum was written, in 1868, by Sir Henry C. Rawlinson, in which he traced the progress of our rivals. A portion of this paper, which has often been referred to by men of very opposite ways of thinking, will be interesting to our readers. Sir H. C. Rawlinson thus notices a point of importance to the true appreciation of the Central Asian question, and probably also to the true appreciation of some

Eastern questions of more recent date—"the relation which exists between the local commanders and the central government at St. Petersburg:"—

"Russia has always attributed to her military chiefs a degree of power in influencing the national policy which in this country we find it difficult to realise. She used to explain the slow progress that was made in subjugating the Caucasus by pointing to the self-interest of the army, which forbade the premature closing of so fertile a source of promotion and honours. The same antagonism of feeling between the civil and military authorities is said to have existed in Turkestan from the first outbreak of hostilities. General Tchernayeff, the captor of Tashkend, was recalled from his command, avowedly in consequence of the aggressive character of his policy; and, a few years later, his successor, Romanofshi, was deprived of all military rank for the similar offence of having invaded the Bokhara territory against orders. General Kaufmann, too, is likely to be publicly rebuked for his recent brilliant success. But are these marks of the emperor's displeasure real, or are they intended merely to satisfy the clamours, of a peace party in Russia and to anticipate foreign complaint? It is well known that Tchernayeff, notwithstanding his apparent disgrace, received a diamond-hilted sword from the emperor, as the conqueror of Tashkend, and Romanofski is understood to be about to be restored to his full rank and honours. General Kaufmann, also, is pretty sure to be rewarded for his military achievements, at the same time that he is reprimanded for his undue political activity; the result of this double action being that, while Russia maintains—or, at any rate, claims to maintain—her character for moderation and unselfish views, and while she also respects the feelings of those politicians who honestly believe her territorial extension to be a source of weakness rather than of strength, her progress, nevertheless, is as constant and uniform as if she were really the grasping and unscrupulous Power which her enemies represent her to be."

Sir Henry then forecasts "the position which, on the soberest calculation, Russia may be expected to occupy at the close of ten years from the present time, and supposing that during this period we abstain from all active interference against her." It will, he thinks, "be something as follows;" and a contrast of the actual results in 1878 is full of interest:—

"The Caspian and the Aral will be connected either by a railway or by military roads, protected by forts, and amply furnished with water and supplies. Turkestan will thus be brought into easy and direct communication, not only with the Caucasus, but with the Russian cities on the Volga, and even with St. Petersburg. The independent Uzbek governments will have ceased to exist, and in their place will have been established Russian provincial governors, the seat of central authority being probably at Bokhara. The country will be administered under the joint control of Russian and native officials, according to the system which has long been successfully practised in the Trans-Caucasian provinces. Mahomedanism will be respected, though the extravagant bigotry and fanaticism of the Bokhara priesthood will, no doubt, have been retrenched. Trade will prosper; man-stealing, the present bane of the country, will be suppressed; cultivation will be increased; and the condition of the people generally will be improved. The mouths of the Oxus and Jaxartes will have been dredged and deepened, and flotillas of steam-boats will have been established on both rivers. The strength of the permanent garrison will be regulated by the wants of the country, as well as by its resources. At present, 16,000 men are sufficient to hold the extent of country which Russia has subdued, and which is scarcely a third of that which will ultimately come into her possession. The future garrison, therefore, when Khiva and Eastern Khokand have both fallen in, and Turkestan is bounded on the south by the Oxus, can hardly be estimated at less than 40,000 men, of which 5,000 could be allotted to Khiva, 15,000 to Khokand, including the populous cities of the valley of



Fergháneh, and 20,000 to Bokhara and its dependencies; and there can be little doubt that the resources of the country would be ample to meet this amount of military expenditure."

The implication of Russia in Afghan affairs he regards, even in 1868, as no longer a matter of speculation. "She has an Afghan contingent in her service, commanded by a grandson of Dost Mahomed." In Bokhara she "is the mistress of a country which, on more occasions than one, has been the arbiter of the destinies of Cabul." The idea of invasion through this Russian connection with Cabul may be dismissed, Sir Henry thinks, as "almost chimerical." If a foreign army "ever does descend upon the Indian frontier, it will be by way of Herat and Candahar, where the roads are open and traverse districts that have been called 'the granary of Asia,' and not through the sterile and difficult passes between Cabul and Peshawur;"—

"The presence of Russia will make itself felt in a less obtrusive, though, perhaps, in a not less effective way. If she established a mission at Cabul—and she can hardly do less, should we fail to pre-occupy the ground—the effect of such an establishment will be at once perceptible in India. The intrusion, indeed, of a foreign European element within the restricted circle of our Indian relations will of itself exert a disturbing influence through the country of a most mischievous, and even dangerous tendency. Already the Maharajah of Cashmere, taking offence at our efforts to promote trade by insisting on a reduction of the transit duties in his dominions, has been negotiating with the authorities of Tashkend, and urging them to appoint commercial agents at Yarkend, on the immediate frontier of Thibet; and, if the Russians were more accessible, his example would be followed by scores of others. There can, indeed, be no doubt that if Russia once assumes a position which, in virtue either of imposing military forces on the Oxus, or of a dominant political influence in Afghanistan, entitles her, in native estimation, to challenge our Asiatic supremacy, the disquieting effect

will be prodigious. Every chief throughout Northern India who either has, or fancies he has a grievance, or who is even cramped or incommoded by our orderly government, will at once commence intriguing in the hopes of relieving himself from our oppressive shadow. It is not that the natives of India, whether Mahomedans or Hindoos, have any particular affection for the Russians, or believe that their rule would be more kindly and beneficial than our own. On the contrary, the followers of the Prophet everywhere regard the Russians as more incorrigible infidels than the English, from their uncleanly habits and their supposed worship of pictures; but, on the other hand, the approach of a rival European power betokens change, and to the active, gambling, reckless spirit of Asiatics, change is always exciting and agreeable."

A still more important point of view is "the means of political leverage" against us which her new position would give to Russia, supposing "that, owing to complications in Turkey, it should be the policy of Russia to weaken and embarrass us—to find, indeed, such employment for our armies in the East as should prevent our active interference in Europe." Are we, then, Sir Henry asks, "justified in allowing Russia to work her way on to Cabul unopposed and there to establish herself as a friendly power, prepared to protect the Afghans against the English?" He thinks it our bounden duty to step forward and forestal the attempt of Russia to establish her influence at Cabul:—

"It is asserted by many authorities fully competent to form an opinion, that if, in deference to Dost Mahomed's nomination, we had acknowledged and assisted Shere Ali Khan from the commencement, continuing to him the same subsidy which we had granted to his father, and according him our general support, he would have summarily suppressed the opposition of his brothers and nephews, and would have retained his power unbroken to the present day. Another opportunity now presents itself. The fortunes of Shere Ali Khan are again in the ascendant. He is already in pos-

session of Herat, Candahar, and Ghazni, and is expected, either in person, or as represented by his son, Mahomed Yakoob Khan, to be soon installed at Cabul. He should be secured in our interests without further delay. Provided that he is unentangled with Russia, the restoration of his father's subsidy, and the moral support of the British Indian government, would probably be sufficient to place him above all opposition, and to secure his fidelity. If he has been already tampered with, his expectations, of course, will be higher. It may, indeed, be necessary to furnish him with arms and officers, or even to place an auxiliary contingent at his disposal; but whatever the price it must be paid, of such paramount importance it is to obtain at the present time a dominant position at Cabul, and to close that avenue of approach against Russia. Whether the time is come for the re-establishment of a mission at Cabul, charged with the distribution of the subsidy and the direction of our quasi-protectorate of the country, is a question that can only be decided on the spot. It is a position that we must inevitably occupy sooner or later, unless we are prepared to jeopardise our Indian Empire. . . .

"Any one who traces the movements of Russia towards India on the map of Asia, cannot fail to be struck with the resemblance which these movements bear to the operations of an army opening parallels against a beleaguered fortress. The first parallel would thus be the Russian frontier of twenty years back, stretching from the upper end of the Caspian, by the Orenburg and Siberian lines, northward of the steppe, to the Irtysh. This may be considered strategically as a mere line of observation. The second parallel, which would constitute her line of demonstration, would be the frontier which she is now preparing to take up, and which, according to Romanofski's plan, would be drawn from Krasnovodsk Bay, about the centre of the Caspian, south of Khiva, to the Oxus, and along the course of that river to the Pamir plateau, thus including the whole of the Uzbek territory, and placing at her command the entire water-

way of the Oxus and Jaxartes. This parallel is above one thousand miles in advance of the first line, but it does not directly menace India, inasmuch as the intervening Afghan mountains constitute a strong military defence. The third parallel, which would be the natural result on the preceding preliminary operations, and which, if Russia survive revolution in Europe and catastrophe in Asia, she will assuredly some day attempt, would be drawn from Asterabad, at the south-east corner on the Caspian, along the Persian frontier to Herat, and from thence through the Hazareh uplands to the Oxus, or possibly by Candahar to Cabul. Established upon such a line, her position would, indeed, be formidable. Troops, stores, and material, might be concentrated to any extent at Asterabad. The country between that port and Herat is open and admirably supplied. A line of military posts would connect the two positions and effectually control the Turcomans, thereby conferring an essential benefit on Persia, and securing her goodwill and co-operation. Herat has been often called 'the key of India,' and fully deserves its reputation as the most important military position in Central Asia. The earthworks which surround the town are of the most colossal character, and might be indefinitely strengthened. Water and supplies abound, and routes from all the great cities to the north, which would furnish the Russian supports, meet in this favoured spot. In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that, if Russia were once established in full strength at Herat, and her communications were secured in one direction with Asterabad through Meshed, in another with Khiva through Merv, and in a third with Tashkend and Bokhara through Mymeneh and the passage of the Oxus, all the forces of Asia would be inadequate to expel her from the position. Supposing, too, that she were bent on mischief—and it is only hostility to England that would be likely to lead her into so advanced and menacing a position—she would have the means of seriously injuring us, since, in addition to her own forces, the unchallenged occupation of Herat would place the whole



military resources of Persia and Afghanistan at her disposal."

Russia, adds Sir H. Rawlinson, has only to point to India as the traditional plunder ground of Central Asia, as the prize which has ever rewarded the victorious hordes rushing down from the northern mountains, and she at once enlists their passions in her behalf:—

"Such visions possess irresistible attractions for them, and would always, unless counterbalanced by some special considerations, incline them to side with the invader rather than the invaded. It is thus quite within the bounds of possibility that some years hence, if Russia found herself engaged in another war with us, she might launch upon India, from her Herat base, a force of fifty thousand Persian *Sirbaz*, disciplined and commanded by Russian officers, and thus fully competent to cope with our best native troops; supporting such a force with twenty thousand Turcoman and Afghan horse, than whom there is no better irregular cavalry in the world; and, if she were really in earnest, detaching also a small auxiliary body of her own picked troops, to give strength and consistency to the invading army. Now, an attack of this nature might not lead to any serious result—might not jeopardise, that is, our hold upon India; for our garrisons, reinforced from England, would probably be equal to the emergency; but, at any rate, we should have to fight for our lives, and should be quite powerless to strike a blow against Russia in return. Are we justified, then, in disregarding this danger merely because it is remote? Ought we not rather, while there is yet time, to provide against the possibility of being thus taken at a disadvantage?"

He strongly advocates more friendly and intimate relations with Persia, without whose support Russia could not establish herself at Herat and keep up her communications. In conclusion, he sketches the following "remedial measures," in addition to a fortified outwork at Quetta —

"Shere Ali Khan should be subsidised and strengthened at Cabul, our position at that capi-

tal being rendered as secure and paramount as would have been Burnes's position at the court of Dost Mahomed Khan in 1847, if he had been supported by the full weight of Lord Auckland's authority and resources. The next step should be to recover our lost ground in Persia, so as to prevent the possibility of Russia making use of that country as an instrument to facilitate her own advances towards India. Locally, also, our communications with the Afghan frontier, considered especially as military lines, should be completed and improved. It is a crying reproach to us that, up to the present day, no progress should have been made in laying down a railway from Lahore to Peshawur, and that we should still be dependent on the dilatory and uncertain Indus navigation for our communications between Mooltan and the sea."

The majority of the Anglo-Indian authorities, however, disagreed with Sir H. Rawlinson's views; and the home government had apparently established our relations with Shere Ali on a basis of non-intervention, in which Lord Northbrook, with some reservations, concurred.

Early in 1873, the Ameer, alarmed by the Russian invasion of Khiva, began to press for English aid. In the course of a conversation with the English *vakeel* or representative "secretary" in Cabul, Shere Ali was reported to have made use of the following words:—

"I am at a loss to surmise what great difficulty has given rise to the deliberations which have taken place the second time between the British and the Russian governments about the northern boundary of Afghanistan. It cannot be concealed that it is impossible for the Russians to remain always firm in their negotiations. For instance, they could not remain firm in their engagements about the Crimea even for a short period. My anxiety, which I feel on account of the Russians, will never be removed unless the British government adorns the Afghan government with great assistance in money and ammunitions of war for the troops, and unless great aid is given for the construction of strong forts throughout the northern Afghan border.

And, further, if an emergency arises for the Afghan government to oppose the Russians, such opposition cannot take place without the co-operation of the disciplined troops of the British government. Should the British government desire that I should at once organise the Afghan troops and make arrangements for the security of the border against the Russians on a favourable occasion, I think it is impossible to do so. No person has attained his object in this world immediately. It is plainly obligatory on the British government to show their cordiality in this matter before anything happens. It is rather advisable that the British government, for its own and my satisfaction, should set apart some property, either in India or in Europe, for my support, in order that if, which God forbid, a serious difficulty constrains me to quit Afghanistan, I may retire there with my family and children and find both accommodation and maintenance there; and after this reassurance I will work with zeal and high spirit day and night for the security of the border of Afghanistan, which is in truth the border of India. Time has approached very near when the Russians, after taking possession of Urganj and Merv Shahjehan, will make communications for exercising some influence in my kingdom. It is as clear as daylight that as soon as the Russians will take possession of Merv Shahjehan, the Turcomans will necessarily take refuge in Badghees in Herat; and if they do not desist from their misbehaviour—viz., from causing injury to the Russians from time to time—the Russians will undoubtedly send messages to the Afghan government that either the Turcomans should be prevented from aggression, or permission should be given to them (the Russians) to punish these hostile tribes. Under these circumstances such difficulty will present itself to me that even the British government, with regard to the interests of the Afghan and English governments being identical, will have to adopt very serious measures for its removal. Koshad Khan, Chief of Merv Shahjehan, has sent his son to me undoubtedly for this reason, that should the people of

that territory be unable to oppose the Russians, the Afghan government may not prevent them from seeking shelter in Badghees. It is well known that, if in the event of the Turcomans being overcome by the Russians, they wish to come to Badghees, the Russians will not withhold themselves from going in pursuit of them. The Russians can be opposed merely by the means above noted. Besides this, as the British government has approved of the cession of the fertile territory of Seistan proper to the Persian government, this decision will one day cause so much injury to Afghanistan that it will not be surprising if its effects will at the end spread as far as India, as there is a straight road from Merv Shahjehan to India *via* Seistan. There will, therefore, be no person throughout this road to oppose the Russians as far as the border of India. The injury which will be caused to Afghanistan by the recent decision of the Seistan question is more clear than the light of the sun, and I cannot, therefore, in my opinion, accomplish the provisions of this decision. The British government should take my views and reflections into most careful consideration, and be kind enough to sympathise with Afghanistan, otherwise I have not at all received any peace of mind whereon I can place perfect reliance and remain quiet or free from anxiety. Should the British government intentionally overlook this matter with a view to temporising for a few days, it is their own affair, but I will represent my circumstances in a clear form in detail without time-serving hesitation."

To this plain speaking, the British vakeel could give no reply. "As I had no authority to give any answer to the ameer in such most important matters, I could not but remain silent." On July 12th, 1873, Lord Northbrook held his first conference at Simla with the Cabul envoy, Syed Noor Mahomed. In the course of the interview the viceroy alluded to the communications with Russia as to Afghanistan, and said that "the British government considered the result of those communications to be advantageous to the ameer for the following reasons:—



"The Russian government had given positive and repeated assurances to the effect that they considered Afghanistan 'completely outside the sphere within which Russia may be called upon to exercise her influence,' and had stated that 'no intervention or interference whatever, opposed to the independence of that state, enters into its intentions.' These assurances, however, left the boundaries of the ameer's possessions undefined, and, so long as they remained so, there was the possibility of differences as to the precise territories to which the assurances applied. Russia had now accepted the definition of the northern and western boundaries proposed by the British government, who became thus a party to the settlement, and interested in maintaining the integrity of the frontier. The British government would be prepared to use their best endeavours to maintain the frontier intact so long as the ameer or the ruler of Afghanistan follows their advice as regards his external relations, and abstains from encroachments and aggression on his neighbours. If, for example, troubles should arise, and the boundary in question were violated by neighbouring countries, or by any tribes under Russian influence, the natural course would be for the ameer to refer to the British government, and every effort would be made by that government to bring about a satisfactory settlement.

"His excellency wished it to be clearly understood by the envoy that the influence proposed to be exercised by the British government referred to the external relations of Afghanistan alone, and that no interference was contemplated in the internal affairs of that kingdom. The ameer, continued his excellency, must be well aware that, occupying, as Afghanistan does, an intervening position between the British and Russian dominions, it was important for the interests of India that she should be both a strong and an independent state.

"His excellency the viceroy observed that if, in the event of any aggression from without, British influence were invoked and failed by negotiation to effect a satisfactory settlement, it was

probable that the British government would, in that case, afford the ruler of Afghanistan material assistance in repelling an invader. Such assistance would, of course, be conditional on the ameer following the advice of the British government, and having himself abstained from aggression.

"When his excellency had concluded the above remarks, the envoy observed that the ameer, as well as the people of Afghanistan, were fully aware that the influence of the British government would be exercised solely in the interests of Afghanistan, and that no interference in the internal affairs of that kingdom was to be anticipated.

"The rapid advances made by the Russians in Central Asia had, he said, aroused the gravest apprehensions in the minds of the people of Afghanistan. Whatever specific assurances the Russians might give, and however often these might be repeated, the people of Afghanistan could place no confidence in them, and would never rest satisfied unless they were assured of the aid of the British government. The envoy continued that he fully appreciated the nature of the communications that had been made to him at the present conference, but he wished to reserve any further discussion of the subject for a future occasion."

Another interview followed on the 30th of July, 1873, and, meanwhile, the telegrams already given had been exchanged with the home government, showing the ameer's alarm at Russian aggression, and his dissatisfaction "with general assurances." At the second interview, just mentioned—

"His excellency, the viceroy, replied that the British government did not share the ameer's apprehensions, but that, as already mentioned in the previous conversation, it would be the duty of the ameer, in case of any actual or threatened aggression, to refer the question to the British government, who would endeavour, by negotiation, and by every means in their power, to settle the matter, and avert hostilities. It was not intended, by insisting on such

previous reference to the British government, to restrict or interfere with the power of the ameer, as an independent ruler, to take such steps as might be necessary to repel any aggression on his territories; but such reference was a preliminary and essential condition of the British government assisting him. In such an event, should these endeavours of the British government to bring about an amicable settlement prove fruitless, the British government are prepared to assure the ameer that they will afford him assistance in the shape of arms and money, and will also, in case of necessity, aid him with troops. The British government holds itself perfectly free to decide as to the occasion when such assistance should be rendered, and also as to its nature and extent. Moreover, the assistance will be conditional upon the ameer himself abstaining from aggression, and on his unreserved acceptance of the advice of the British government in regard to his external relations. The envoy said that, both in conversation with the foreign secretary, and at the present interview, he had explained his views on the subject and his objections on certain points, and the matter would now be laid before the ameer for his consideration.

"Two points in connection with the promised assurance were then brought forward by the envoy. He requested, in the first place, that, in the event of any aggression on the ameer's territories, the British government would distinctly state that they would consider such aggressor as an enemy.

"His excellency said that, in diplomatic correspondence, such expressions were always avoided as causing needless irritation. In his excellency's opinion, the assurance above given should be sufficient to satisfy the ameer as to the light in which any aggression would be considered by the British government.

"Next, the envoy pressed that the contingency of aggression by Russia should be specifically mentioned in the written assurance to be given to the ameer.

"To this his excellency replied that, setting

aside the inexpediency of causing needless irritation to a friendly Power by such specific mention, the suggestion was one that could not be adopted, inasmuch as it implied an admission of the probability of such a contingency arising, which the British government are not prepared to admit in the face of the repeated assurances given by Russia.

"The envoy then asked what reply should be given by the ameer to the request which the Turcomans had preferred for advice as to the attitude they should assume to the Russians, who had demanded a passage for their troops through the Turcoman territory.

"His excellency replied that the advice given by the foreign secretary was correct. The Turcomans were robbers and kidnappers, and the cause of a large portion of the mischief in Central Asia. The ameer would do a most unwise thing to make himself responsible for such people in any way whatever. Of course, amicable answers should be returned to friendly letters from them, but the ameer should in no way make himself responsible for them, or countenance their lawless proceedings, or any opposition on their part to the march of Russian troops.

"The envoy, concurring in the wisdom of this course, said he would let the foreign secretary see the letter he proposed to send to the ameer."

The balance of parties in England having been disturbed in January, 1874, a Conservative government acceded to power, and a new policy was at once inaugurated in India. It was determined to cast aside the old policy of non-interference, and to establish British influence more firmly in Afghanistan. On the 22nd of January, 1875, Lord Salisbury addressed the following despatch to the viceroy:—

"My Lord—Her Majesty's government have followed with anxious attention the progress of events in Central Asia and on the frontiers of Persia and Afghanistan. Though no immediate danger appears to threaten the interests of her Majesty in those regions, the aspect of affairs is sufficiently grave to inspire solicitude, and to suggest the necessity of timely precaution.



"In considering the questions of policy which arise from time to time, her Majesty's advisers cannot but be struck with the comparative scantiness of the information which it is in your excellency's power to supply. For knowledge of what passes in Afghanistan and upon its frontiers they are compelled to rely mainly upon the indirect intelligence which reaches them through the Foreign Office.

"Your excellency maintains a native agent at Cabul. I am informed that he is a man of intelligence and respectability. But it appears to be very doubtful whether he is in a condition to furnish you with any facts which it is not the ameer's wish that you should receive. Even if you could rely upon the perfect frankness of his communications, it is not likely that any native agent would possess a sufficient insight into the policy of Western nations to collect the information you require. One of the principal qualifications for this function is the neutrality of feeling in respect to religious and national controversies, which only a European can possess. Of the value of the Cabul Diaries different opinions are expressed. It is obvious that they are very meagre, and doubts have been thrown upon their fidelity.

"Her Majesty's government are of opinion that more exact and constant information is necessary to the conduct of a circumspect policy at the present juncture. The disposition of the people in various parts of Afghanistan, the designs and intrigues of its chiefs, the movement of nomad tribes upon its frontier, the influence which foreign Powers may possibly be exerting within and without its borders, are matters of which a proper account can only be rendered to you by an English agent residing in the country. There are many details, moreover, a knowledge of which it is material that the military authorities should possess, and with respect to which it is not to be expected that a native agent would be either able or willing to collect for your government trustworthy information.

"I have, therefore, to instruct you to take measures, with as much expedition as the cir-

cumstances of the case permit, for procuring the assent of the ameer to the establishment of a British agency at Herat. When this is accomplished it may be desirable to take a similar step with regard to Candahar. I do not suggest any similar step with respect to Cabul, as I am sensible of the difficulties which are interposed by the fanatic violence of the people.

"The ameer has more than once, in former years, expressed his readiness to permit the presence of an agent at Herat, and it is, therefore, not possible that, if his intentions are still loyal, he will make any serious difficulty now. But if he should do so, your excellency will doubtless point out to him that the interest which her Majesty feels in the integrity of Afghanistan makes it essential that she should be able to receive, from the observations of her own officers, warnings of dangers that may threaten it.

"I have dwelt upon the importance of an English agency at Herat exclusively for the sake of the information an English officer might collect. But it will have other material, though more indirect results. It will be an indication of English solicitude for the safety of our allies, and may so tend to discourage counsels dangerous to the peace of Asia.

Lord Northbrook's reply (dated June 7, 1875) reviews the situation at considerable length, and concludes as follows :—

"After a careful consideration of the information which we have collected as to the disposition of the ameer, and of the probable result of pressing him to accept a British agent at Herat, we remain of the opinion which we expressed to your Lordship by telegraph on the 18th of February last, that the present time and circumstances are unsuitable for taking the initiative in this matter. We recommend that no immediate pressure be put upon the ameer, or particular anxiety be shown by us upon the subject; but that advantage be taken of the first favourable opportunity that his own action or other circumstances may present for the purpose of sounding his disposition, and of representing to him the benefits which would be derived by

Afghanistan from the proposed arrangement. The object in view is, in our judgment, more likely to be attained by taking this course than by assuming the initiative now. In the meantime we shall neglect no opportunity of obtaining full information respecting events in Afghanistan by such means as may from time to time present themselves. . . . .

"Much discussion has recently taken place as to the effect that would be produced by a Russian advance to Merv. We have before stated to her Majesty's government our apprehension that the assumption by Russia of authority over the whole Turcoman country would create alarm in Afghanistan, and we think it desirable to express our opinion of the course which should be adopted if it should take place. It would then become necessary to give additional and more specific assurances to the ruler of Afghanistan that we are prepared to assist him to defend Afghanistan against attack from without. It would probably be desirable to enter into a treaty engagement with him; and the establishment of a British resident at Herat would be the natural consequence to such an engagement and of the nearer approach of the Russian frontier.

"We think that these would be the measures best calculated to avert any dangers that may ensue from a Russian advance to Merv, and that they should be adopted when the necessity for them arises. The observations addressed on this subject by the Earl of Derby to Count Schouvaloff appear to us to indicate the policy which should be pursued by the government of India, and we have before stated our opinion, that the more clearly Russia is given to understand the position which we have assumed towards Afghanistan, the greater will be the probability of the maintenance of peace. To anticipate the Russian occupation of Merv by any active measures or specific treaty engagements would, in our opinion, be more likely to prejudice than to advance the interests of her Majesty's Indian empire.

"We attach great importance to the moral and material advantages which are derived from

maintaining friendly relations with Afghanistan; and we would impress upon her Majesty's government our conviction that such relations will best be secured by a steady adherence to the patient and conciliatory policy which has been pursued by the government of India for many years towards Afghanistan, and by making every reasonable allowance for the difficulties of the ameer, even if he should be reluctant to accede to the views which we may entertain as to the measures which may be advisable equally for his own interests and for those of British India."

Lord Salisbury replies to this despatch in another, dated November 19th, 1875. Referring to the question whether a British officer should be stationed at Herat, Lord Salisbury says:—

"The question has been clothed with an importance it never possessed before by the recent advances of Russia, which have placed her outermost posts in some places almost on the frontier of Afghanistan, in others upon roads which lead to it by easy and well supplied marches.

"As the proximity of Russia to Afghanistan becomes closer and more established, the danger which is to be feared, whatever its extent may be, will probably take one of three forms. Russia may, by terror or corruption, obtain a mastery over the ameer, which will detach him from English interests, and leave to her choice the moment for penetrating to any portion of the country. Or, secondly, if she fails to shake his loyalty, his hold on power may be destroyed by internal disorder, and Russia, by establishing her influence over the chiefs who may become dominant, may secure the same advantages as would have resulted from the adhesion of the ameer himself. Or, thirdly, if both the ameer and his sirdars remain insensible to the suggestions of the Russian agents, they may, by some imprudence, come into collision with the frontier forces of that empire, and afford a pretext for the exaction of some territorial penalty.

"The general tendency of the information you have furnished to me is to the effect, that no apprehension of the first alternative need be felt. Your excellency and your most experi-



enced officers appear to be convinced that the ameer's dislike to the presence of any British representative in his dominions does not furnish ground for inferences unfavourable to his loyalty. But, whatever confidence present circumstances may justify you in entertaining, the well-known peculiarities of the Afghan character forbid the omission of such a contingency from any computation of the probable result of a close neighbourhood between Russia and Afghanistan.

"The second and third alternatives appear, unfortunately, from the papers you have forwarded, to be still less beyond the range of probability. The fiscal corruption to which the Cabul Diaries bear testimony seems, according to the Candahar Diaries, to have produced the natural result of excessive taxation and consequent discontent. Captain Cavagnari speaks to an amount of oppression in the province of Balk which may probably lead to a revolt on the first favourable opportunity; and Goolam Hossein anticipates the breaking out of serious disturbances before long, in consequence of the irritation of the Ghilzai Sirdars. Even, therefore, if the ameer's loyalty could be counted on for an indefinite period, a field would still be left for foreign intrigue, dangerous alike to the ameer's power and to the interests of Great Britain. . .

"On all these grounds, her Majesty's government continue to attach very serious importance to the presence of a British agent in Afghanistan. I do not gather that your excellency is inclined to differ from this judgment. But, in your opinion, the moment for giving effect to it will not arrive until the advance of Russia is further developed, and its forces have occupied Merv. In this opinion it is impossible for her Majesty's government to concur. If ever the Russians should accomplish the permanent occupation of Merv, the opportunity would possibly have passed by when representations to the ameer could be made with any useful result; for the influence of your government at Cabul, already enfeebled, would, for such a purpose, have in a great measure disappeared. The ameer has

watched the steady progress of the Russian arms, scarcely impeded by such resistance as the governments of his own race and creed have been able to offer. He has warned the British government that one advance would follow another, and his prediction, disregarded when made, has been shown by the issue to be true. If, in spite of all promises given and confidence expressed to the contrary, the Russians should advance to Merv, the ameer will conclude, until at least the contrary has been established, that no power exists which is able to stay their progress. He will then be hardly induced to consent to an arrangement which may cause him to lose favour in the eyes of a neighbour whom he esteems to be the strongest.

"I gather from your letter under reply that the principal objection felt by you to an immediate effort to obtain the consent of the ameer to a British agency in Afghanistan is the fear that the effort would be vain. You apprehend that a refusal might lower the estimation of British power among the Afghans, and that England might be placed in an embarrassing position whenever it might hereafter be desirable to persuade the Russian government of the existence of a real British influence at Cabul."

In short, the home government suggested, "as a first step," that the ameer should be required to receive an English resident in Cabul, reserving future steps for future consideration.

Lord Northbrook and his advisers retained their opinion, and, in a despatch to the Secretary of State, dated January 28th, 1876, concluded thus:—

"It is in the highest degree improbable that the ameer will yield a hearty consent to the location of British officers in Afghanistan, which the mission is intended to accomplish; and to place our officers on the ameer's frontier without his hearty consent would, in our opinion, be a most impolitic and dangerous movement. Setting aside the consideration of the personal risk to which, under such circumstances, the agent would be exposed, and the serious politi-

cal consequences that would ensue from their being insulted or attacked, their position would be entirely useless. They would be dependent for their information on untrustworthy sources. They would be surrounded by spies, under the pretext of guarding them, or administering to their wants. Persons approaching or visiting them would be watched and removed, and, though nothing might be done ostensibly which could be complained of as an actual breach of friendship, the agents would be checked on every hand, and would soon find their position both humiliating and useless. Such was the experience of Major Todd at Herat, in 1839, when his supplies of money failed. Such was the experience of Colonel Lumsden when he went to Candahar in 1857, as the dispenser of a magnificent subsidy.

"A condition of things like this could not exist for any length of time without leading to altered relations, and possibly, even in the long run, to a rupture with Afghanistan, and thereby defeating the object which her Majesty's government have in view. We already see the fruits of the conciliatory policy which has been pursued since 1869 in the consolidation of the ameer's power and the establishment of a strong government on our frontier. The ameer's not unnatural dread of our interference in his internal affairs, and the difficulties of his position, as described in our despatch of the 7th of June last, combined, perhaps, with the conviction that, if ever a struggle for the independence of Afghanistan should come, we must, in our own interest, help him, may have induced him to assume a colder attitude towards us than we should desire. But we have no reason to believe that he has any desire to prefer the friendship of other Powers. We are convinced that a patient adherence to the policy adopted towards Afghanistan by Lord Canning, Lord Lawrence, and Lord Mayo, which it has been our earnest endeavour to maintain, presents the greatest promise of the eventual establishment of our relations with the ameer on a satisfactory footing; and we deprecate, as involving

serious danger to the peace of Afghanistan, and to the interests of the British empire in India, the execution, under present circumstances, of the instructions conveyed in your lordship's despatch."

Lord Salisbury, on the 28th of February, 1876, sent to the viceroy instructions in regard to the affairs of Afghanistan and Khelat, suggesting a temporary or special mission to Cabul. He adds:—

"The Russian ambassador at the Court of St. James's has been officially informed by her Majesty's principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that the objects of British policy as regards Afghanistan are—'1. To secure that state against aggression; and, 2. To promote tranquillity on the borders of that country, by giving such moral and material support to the ameer, without interfering in the internal affairs of his country, as may enable her Majesty's government to prevent a recurrence of the disturbances and conflicts between rival candidates for power among his own family, or the meers of the different provinces.'

"Her Majesty's government would not, therefore, view with indifference any attempt on the part of Russia to compete with British influence in Afghanistan, nor could the ameer's reception of a British agent (whatever be the official rank or function of that agent) in any part of the dominions belonging to his highness afford, for his subsequent reception of a Russian agent similarly accredited, any pretext to which the government of her Majesty would not be entitled to except as incompatible with the assurances spontaneously offered to it by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg. You will bear in mind these facts when framing instructions for your mission to Cabul. To demands which you have no intention of conceding, your agent will oppose a frank and firm refusal. You will instruct him to prevent such demands from becoming subjects of discussion. Others which, under certain conditions, you may be willing to entertain, he will undertake to refer to your government, with such favourable assurances as may induce the



ameer to recognise the advantage of facilitating, by compliance with your wishes, the fulfilment of his own.

"If the language and demeanour of the ameer be such as to promise no satisfactory result of the negotiations thus opened, his highness should be distinctly reminded that he is isolating himself, at his own peril, from the friendship and protection it is his interest to seek and deserve.

"In the year 1873, Lord Northbrook gave to the envoy of the ameer the personal assurance that, in the event of any aggression upon the territories of his highness which the British government had failed to avert by negotiation, that government would be prepared 'to assure the ameer that they will afford him assistance in the shape of arms and money, and will also, in case of necessity, assist him with troops.'

"The terms of this declaration, however, although sufficient to justify reproaches on the part of Shere Ali if, in the contingency to which it referred, he should be left unsupported by the British government, were unfortunately too ambiguous to secure confidence or inspire gratitude on the part of his highness. The ameer, in fact, appears to have remained under a resentful impression that his envoy had been trifled with, and his attitude towards the government of India has ever since been characterised by ambiguity and reserve.

"If, therefore, Shere Ali be frank with your envoy, he will probably renew to him the demand, addressed in 1873, through his own envoy, to Lord Northbrook, 'that, in the event of any aggression on the ameer's territories, the British government should distinctly state that it regards the aggressor as its enemy; and, secondly, that the contingency of an aggression by Russia should be specifically mentioned in the written assurance to be given to the ameer.'

"To answer this renewed demand in terms identical with those of the answer formerly given to it would prejudice, instead of improve your relations with the ameer, by the evasion of an invited confidence.

"Her Majesty's government are, therefore,

prepared to sanction and support any more definite declaration which may, in your judgment, secure to their unaltered policy the advantages of which it has been hitherto deprived by an apparent doubt of its sincerity. But they must reserve to themselves entire freedom of judgment as to the character of circumstances involving the obligation of material support to the ameer, and it must be distinctly understood that only in some clear case of unprovoked aggression would such an obligation arise.

"In the next place, they cannot secure the integrity of the ameer's dominions unless his highness be willing to afford them every reasonable facility for such precautionary measures as they may deem requisite. These precautionary measures by no means involve the establishment of British garrisons in any part of Afghanistan, nor do her Majesty's government entertain the slightest desire to quarter British soldiers upon Afghan soil; but they must have, for their own agents, undisputed access to its frontier positions. They must also have adequate means of confidentially conferring with the ameer upon all matters as to which the proposed declaration would recognise a community of interests. They must be entitled to expect becoming attention to their friendly counsels; and the ameer must be made to understand that, subject to all fair allowance for the condition of the country and the character of the population, territories ultimately dependent upon British power for their defence must not be closed to those of the queen's officers or subjects who may be duly authorised to enter them.

"Her Majesty's government are also of opinion that the establishment, if possible, of a telegraph from some point on the Indian frontier to Cabul, *via* the Kuram Valley, is an object deserving of your consideration; and the permanent presence at the Viceregal Court of a properly accredited Afghan envoy is much to be desired, as a guarantee for the due fulfilment of counter-obligations on the part of the ameer, and the uninterrupted facility of your confidential relations with his highness. Subject to these

general conditions, her Majesty's government can see no objection to your compliance with any reasonable demand on the part of Shere Ali for more assured support and protection, such as pecuniary assistance, the advice of British officers in the improvement of his military organisation, or a promise, not vague, but strictly guarded and clearly circumscribed, of adequate aid against actual and unprovoked attack by any foreign power. Such a promise, personally given to the ameer, will probably satisfy his highness, if the terms of it be unequivocal. But her Majesty's government do not wish to fetter your discretion in considering the advantages of a treaty on the basis above indicated."

It will be seen from these despatches that the home government had a distinct policy in regard to Afghanistan, long before the Congress of Berlin; and the chief question was one as to the fittest time for carrying it into execution. Lord Lytton was entirely at one with the government, and kept his object steadily before him in his dealings with the ameer. In May, 1877, Sir Lewis Pelly had an important conference with an envoy of Shere Ali's at Peshawur. This conference was closed by Sir Lewis Pelly, after the ameer's envoy had shirked an answer to the British proposals, on the ground that he had no sufficient authority from his master. In regard to this, Lord Lytton wrote:—

"Apparently the ameer, whose object was still to gain time, was much surprised and embarrassed by this step. At the moment when Sir Lewis Pelly was closing the conference, his highness was sending to the Mir Akhor instructions to prolong it by every means in his power; a fresh envoy was already on the way from Cabul to Peshawur; and it was reported that this envoy had authority to accept eventually all the conditions of the British government. The viceroys were aware of these facts when he instructed our envoy to close the conference. But it appeared to his excellency that liabilities, which the British government might properly have contracted on behalf of the present ameer of Cabul, if that prince had shown any eagerness to de-

serve and reciprocate its friendship, could not be advantageously, or even safely accepted, in face of the situation revealed by Sir Lewis Pelly's energetic investigations. Under these circumstances, the prolongation of the Peshawur conference could only lead to embarrassments and entanglements best avoided by the timely termination of it."

In the following October, Lord Salisbury wrote a despatch which had the effect of hastening the approach of the crisis. This document is given below:—

"My Lord—1. Her Majesty's government have considered, with the attention due to the importance of its contents, the secret letter of your excellency's government, No. 13, dated the 10th of May last, reporting the transactions which preceded the conference lately held at Peshawur between Sir L. Pelly, on behalf of your government, and Syud Noor Mahomed Shah, prime minister of the ameer of Cabul, the course of the discussions which then took place, and the views of your excellency in council in regard to the results of the conference and your future relations with the ameer. 2. Before making the general observations which are suggested by the papers under notice, it is my agreeable duty, on the part of her Majesty's government, to convey to your excellency their full and cordial approval of the proceedings of your government, their high sense of the patience and discrimination shown by your excellency throughout the negotiations, and their entire satisfaction with the manner in which, under your excellency's instructions, the discussions with the Afghan envoy were conducted by Sir L. Pelly. 3. The considerations which led her Majesty's government to desire the presence of British officers at certain points on the frontiers of Afghanistan were set forth at length in my despatches addressed to your excellency's predecessor on the 22nd of January and 19th of November, 1875, while the instructions furnished to your excellency under date the 28th of February, 1876, in regard to frontier matters generally, placed you in possession of their views



as to the manner in which the requisite negotiations with the ameer might most conveniently be commenced, and authorised you to make concessions to his highness, which, it was known, had in former years been greatly desired by him, and which could not fail both to strengthen his own power and promote the permanent interests of his dynasty. 4. When vesting your excellency with discretion to offer to the ameer large pecuniary aid, a decided recognition by the British government of the order of succession established by him in favour of his younger son, Abdullah Jan, and an explicit pledge, either by treaty or otherwise, of material support in case of unprovoked foreign aggression on his territories, her Majesty's government were justified in hoping that advantages so great would be accepted by the ameer in the spirit in which they were offered, and that his highness would not hesitate to allow to their agents unrestricted access to positions in his dominions where their presence would not, even in appearance, prejudice his personal authority, and where they would be favourably situated for acquiring early information of any circumstances which might threaten disturbance to the independence or tranquillity of his dominions. 5. But, while holding this reasonable expectation, her Majesty's government did not disguise from themselves that, of late years, the conduct of Shere Ali had been such as to indicate a possibility that, owing either to confirmed disbelief in the sincerity of the British government, or to doubts of its ability, the ameer might reject the proposals which you were authorised to make to him. This contingency rendered it desirable to proceed with caution, but, in the opinion of her Majesty's government, afforded no sufficient reason why the necessary overtures should not be made; on the contrary, it seemed to them in the highest degree expedient that the real sentiments of the ameer should be ascertained beyond doubt. 6. Upon this point the history of the events reported in the letter under reply is unhappily conclusive, and demonstrates but too plainly how erroneous was the opinion expressed so recently

as the year 1875 by Sir R. Pollock, the commissioner of Peshawur, that 'no unfavourable change had occurred in the disposition of the ameer.' Shere Ali's confidential envoy stated explicitly that his master had 'now a deep-rooted mistrust of the good faith and sincerity of the British government,' and ample confirmatory evidence of this fact has been furnished by the refusal of the ameer to receive at Cabul or elsewhere the temporary mission which you proposed to send to him; by his obstinate objection to accept the principle of free access for British officers to Afghanistan as a preliminary to negotiations plainly declared to have for their object arrangements which had been pressed for by his highness in 1869 and again in 1873, and by the attitude of positive hostility which he assumed while the discussions between his envoy and Sir L. Pelly were proceeding at Peshawur. 7. It would be futile to discuss the causes which may have led to this complete alienation of the ameer, or to speculate how far, and in what proportions, it may be attributable to the circumstances upon which Syud Noor Mahomed Shah dwelt with so much persistence, to imperfect appreciation of the political situation in Europe and Asia, or to foreign intrigue. Your excellency judged correctly that, the fact having been established, continuance of the negotiations was unlikely to lead to permanently satisfactory results, and, in taking advantage of the opportunity afforded by the death of the Afghan envoy to close the conference, you adopted the procedure which was, in all respects, the most expedient. 8. Although that cordial agreement between the British and Afghan governments, which is so much to be desired in the interests of both Powers, still remains, therefore, to be effected, her Majesty's government cannot regard the result of recent proceedings as either unimportant or unsatisfactory. The position of the British government towards that of the ameer has been clearly defined. His highness has now been informed, in unmistakable language that under the terms of the treaty of 1855—which alone of the two treaties contracted between the

British and Afghan governments has a character of perpetuity—the British government has incurred no liabilities whatever on his behalf; and it has been distinctly intimated to him that, neither by Lord Mayo, in 1869, nor by Lord Northbrook, in 1873, was any assurance given of unconditional protection, nor any obligation contracted towards him which was not dependent on his future conduct towards the British government and his own subjects. Any illusions therefore which Shere Ali may have entertained upon this point have been effectually dissipated. He has further learned that the British government will not undertake the formal responsibility of assisting him to defend his country from the attacks of external foes, or of supporting his dynasty against sedition, unless British officers are allowed to reside on the frontier for the purpose of acquiring information for communication to their government, and unless his highness is himself prepared to receive, when necessary, the confidential agents of the viceroy of India. 9. To both the parties of them, therefore, the recent negotiations may prove to have been beneficial. The British government has for the first time become acquainted with the real sentiments with which it is regarded by a ruler as to whose disposition it was important there should be no uncertainty, and can regulate its policy accordingly; the ameer, on his part, now knows the precise terms on which we may obtain the support of the British government for himself and his heir. In the opinion of her Majesty's government, his highness may well be left for a time to reflect upon the knowledge which he has acquired. There are already indications of a change for the better in the attitude of the ameer. Her Majesty's government trust that the improvement may be progressive, and that his highness may ere long awake to the fact that, while his interests are bound up with those of the government whose alliance he has lately rejected, the converse proposition is by no means equally true. This result may, in the end, be most speedily attained by abstention for the present, on the one hand, from any hostile pres-

sure on his highness, and, on the other, from any renewed offer of the concessions which have been refused. 10. The policy of her Majesty's government towards the ameer under present circumstances has, indeed, been anticipated by your excellency in the assurance conveyed to the Afghan envoy by Sir L. Pelly under your instructions, that 'while repudiating all liability on behalf of the ameer and his dynasty, the British government will continue as heretofore to respect his independence and authority throughout those territories which, up to the present moment, it has recognised as being in the lawful possession of his highness, and will abstain from interfering therein so long as the ameer, on his part, no less scrupulously abstains from every kind of interference with tribes or territories not his own.' Her Majesty's government would have been glad had the ameer, by a cordial acceptance of the propositions made to him, allowed them to substitute for the attitude of indifference indicated by the terms of the above assurance one of hearty co-operation for the protection of common interests. The integrity of the ameer's dominions is liable to be menaced either by direct foreign attack or by the results of domestic discord. Foreign aggression may not be, and probably is not, at all imminent, though the prospect of it has more than once, in recent years, excited the fears of the ameer; but danger from the members of his own family must be ever present to the mind of his highness, who can scarcely reckon with confidence upon immunity from it during his lifetime, and must be well aware that it is certain to ensue upon his death. 11. The independence of Afghanistan is a matter of importance to the British government, and, as an essential part of arrangements for its protection, her Majesty's government would still be glad to station agents upon whom they could rely at Herat and Candahar. In the event, therefore, of the ameer, within a reasonable time, spontaneously manifesting a desire to come to a friendly understanding with your excellency on the basis of the terms lately offered to, but declined by him, his



advances should not be rejected. If, on the other hand, he continues to maintain an attitude of isolation and scarcely veiled hostility, the British government stands unpledged to any obligations, and, in any contingencies which may arise in Afghanistan, will be at liberty to adopt such measures for the protection and permanent tranquillity of the north-west frontier of her Majesty's Indian dominions as the circumstances of the moment may render expedient, without regard to the wishes of the Ameer Shere Ali or the interests of his dynasty."

We now pass on to the time when the Indian and English government became aware of the Russian embassy to Cabul, and of its actual arrival there. On the 7th June, 1878, the viceroy sent a telegram to London, announcing that, according to reports, the ameer had been informed that a Russian agent was about to visit Cabul. Other telegrams followed, and on the 30th July, 1878, the viceroy telegraphed as follows:—

"British native medical officer lent some time ago to ameer, returned on leave to Peshawur, the 21st instant, reporting that Kauffmann, with troops, had reached Karki, and was personally proceeding to see the ameer. Afghan officials at the Oxus tried to stop him, pending ameer's orders, but he declined to obey them. Ameer thereupon sent orders forbidding opposition to Russian officers. Native doctor heard ameer tell his minister in durbar, 7th July, that Kauffmann, or officer of equal rank from Tashkend, had crossed Oxus on road to Cabul, refusing to be stopped. I refrained from telegraphing this information to you, pending confirmation. Have now heard from Peshawur reported arrival of Russian officer at Cabul, with large military escort. This, of course, cannot be Kauffmann, and may be a native of rank in Russian service; though all accounts, as yet, point to European officer. If such mission be authenticated I will telegraph again. It will be difficult to act or instruct frontier officers without definite indication of views of Cabinet on such conduct on part of Russia and ameer, having regard to Russia's formal promises and ameer's refusal to receive

British mission in any shape. What I shall then require to know without delay is, whether this will be treated by her Majesty's government as an imperial question with Russia, or left to us to deal with as a matter between ameer and government of India. In latter case, I shall propose, with your approval, to insist on immediate suitable reception of European British mission. I will communicate with you further on measures which may in this contingency become necessary for securing due permanent preponderance in Afghanistan. The alternative would be continued policy of complete inaction, difficult to maintain, and very injurious to our position in India."

On the following day the viceroy telegraphed as follows:—

"Following message received to-day from Peshawur: 'Three special messengers from Cabul have just arrived. They left Cabul nine days ago. Three Russians, in European costume, have reached Cabul, accompanied by Cossacks and Uzbek horsemen. Sirdar Ibraheem Khan was sent to meet them. The chief of mission talks Persian, but not fluently. Kauffmann is called Gobernats. This officer is called Gobernah. Last part pronounced shortly. One messenger speaks of him as Deputy-Governor-General. Possibly it may be General Abramoff, Governor of Samarcand.'"

To these announcements the following reply was sent on the 1st of August:—

"Your telegrams relating to Cabul received. Make yourself certain of the facts before insisting on the reception of British envoy. Perhaps you might send a native to ascertain whether Russians are really there, and telegraph to me when the truth is known."

On the 19th of August the government of India sent the following despatch to Lord Cranbrook:—

"My Lord—With our despatch No. 53, dated 5th August, we forwarded telegraphic reports and correspondence regarding the arrival and reception at Cabul of a Russian mission to the ameer, and we promised to report hereafter the

course of these events and our proceedings in dealing with the situation. 2. We have now the honour to forward copies of telegrams from the Deputy-Commissioner of Peshawur, which report the further proceedings of the Russian mission at Cabul. It will be seen that the Russian envoy was received in durbar on the 26th July, and is said to have presented two letters to the ameer—one from his Imperial Majesty the Czar, and the other from the Governor-General of Tashkend. At a second interview, on the 2nd or 3rd August, the ameer handed to the envoy a written reply, the contents of which are not known, and which was immediately despatched by special horsemen to Russian Turkestan. 3. On receiving your lordship's approval, by telegram, of our proposal to depute a British envoy to Cabul, we offered the appointment to Sir Neville Chamberlain, who has accepted it. He will be accompanied, for political duties, by the officers named in the margin (Major P. L. N. Cavagnari, C.S.I., Major O. B. C. St. John, R.E., Captain St. V. A. Hammick, and a medical officer), and by an escort of 250 sabres. The mission will start very early in September, and we enclose a copy of the instructions issued to the Punjab government, requesting that the necessary preparations may be made with the utmost despatch. We have also decided to send a special native emissary to the ameer in advance of the mission, in order that his highness may have due notice beforehand that the envoy is coming, and that the necessary arrangement may be made for his passage through Afghan territory. For this duty we have selected Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan, C.S.I., formerly British agent at Cabul, who will leave Peshawur on the 23rd August. We enclose copy of the letter from his excellency the viceroy to the ameer, which the Nawab will present to his highness upon his arrival at Cabul.—We have, &c.,

LYTTON,	W. STOKES,
F. P. HAINES,	A. R. THOMPSON,
A. J. ARBUTHNOT,	R. STRACHEY,
A. CLARKE,	S. J. BROWNE."

On the 14th of August the viceroy addressed the following letter to Shere Ali:—

"From his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India to his Highness Ameer Shere Ali Khan, Wali of Cabul and its dependencies.

"The authentic intelligence which I have lately received of the course of recent events at Cabul, and in the countries bordering on Afghanistan, has rendered it necessary that I should communicate fully and without reserve with your highness upon matters of importance which concern the interests of India and of Afghanistan. For this reason I have considered it expedient to depute a special and confidential British envoy of high rank, who is known to your highness, his Excellency General Sir Neville Bowles Chamberlain, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Knight Grand Commander of the Most Exalted Order of the Star of India, Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army, to visit your highness immediately at Cabul, in order that he may converse personally with your highness regarding these urgent affairs. It appears certain that they can be best arranged for the welfare and tranquillity of both states, and for the preservation of friendship between the two governments, by a full and frank statement of the present position. This letter is therefore sent in advance to your highness by the hand of Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan, C.S.I., a faithful and honoured sirdar of my government, who will explain all necessary details as to the time and manner of the envoy's visit. It is asked that your highness may be pleased to issue commands to your sirdars and to all the other authorities in Afghanistan upon the route between Peshawur and Cabul, that they shall make, without any delay, whatever arrangements are necessary and proper for effectively securing to my envoy, the representative of a friendly power, due safe conduct and suitable accommodation according to his dignity, while passing with his



retinue through the dominions of your highness. I beg to express the high consideration I entertain for your highness."

Owing to the death of the heir apparent to the Cabul throne, the departure of Sir Neville Chamberlain was postponed. On the 7th of September the viceroy again wrote to Shere Ali, announcing that the mission was about to start, and expressing sympathy with the ameer for the loss he had sustained.

An account of the rejection of Sir N. Chamberlain's mission is contained in a despatch from the India Council to Lord Cranbrook, dated September, 26th :—

"My Lord—We have regularly transmitted to your lordship, by telegraph, reports of our proceedings taken in pursuance of our resolution to depute Sir Neville Chamberlain upon an urgent and important mission to the ameer of Cabul. And we now enclose the further telegrams up to the recall of the mission. 2. Sir Neville Chamberlain reached Peshawur on the 12th of September, and placed himself in direct preliminary correspondence with the ameer's officers stationed upon the frontier, to whom it was necessary to give notice of his movements, and from whom their instructions had to be elicited. The general tenor of this correspondence, with the principal events and circumstances attending the departure of the mission from Peshawur, and its withdrawal in consequence of the armed resistance offered at Ali Masjid by the ameer's officers, have been reported to your lordship by our telegrams. 3. We have now the honour to enclose papers, giving in detail the course of these affairs as they occurred after Sir Neville Chamberlain's arrival at Peshawur, and upon his intimation to the Afghan officials that he desired a passage to Cabul. The information which had been received early in September, from Cabul, clearly indicated the desire of the ameer to withhold any decisive expression of his intentions regarding the reception of the mission, his object being to keep the mission waiting indefinitely. But it had been plain from the first that a procrastinating and ambiguous policy on

his part, which had been anticipated with certainty, would, unless at once put aside, assuredly involve the mission in discredit and ultimate defeat. Sir Neville Chamberlain was therefore authorised to send early notice to the Mustaufi that the refusal of the free passage would bring matters to an issue. 4. It was, moreover, essential, in order that there might be no subsequent shifting of responsibility, that the ameer's officers upon the road to Cabul should know what had been written to the Mustaufi, in time for taking orders from head-quarters before the mission should leave British territory. But as the communication of this notice to the ameer's minister and officers disconcerted and crossed whatever plans for temporising may have been entertained by them at that time, it unavoidably gave offence to his highness; and the reports that the passage of the mission would be refused and resisted grew stronger and multiplied. The government of India were, nevertheless, reluctant to afford to the ameer even the slight ground for umbrage which might be taken at our arranging separately with the independent tribes who hold the entry to the Kyber Pass, for the safe conduct of the mission through their lands, before the ameer's dispositions had been fully ascertained. Faiz Muhammad, who commands at the fort of Ali Masjid in the pass, was therefore asked whether he would give the necessary guarantee. On this point, however, the reply was that no orders had been received; although an officer of the ameer's had already come express to Ali Masjid with secret instructions, and had returned. On the 15th September Sir Neville Chamberlain addressed to Faiz Muhammad the letter (of which we enclose copy) conveying a formal summons to him to allow passage to the mission, and subsequently informed him that his answer would be expected after the arrival of the Mir Akhor, a confidential officer of the ameer in charge of frontier affairs. The Mir Akhor arrived on the 18th, but no satisfactory reply was received, and Sir Neville Chamberlain's proposal to put the intentions of the ameer to a practical test was at last approved

of. 5. This being the state of affairs the entire mission moved from Peshawur to Jamrud on the morning of the 21st, and Major Cavagnari, accompanied by the two native gentlemen who had joined the mission, advanced with a small escort in the afternoon to Ali Musjid to demand a passage. He was conducted to the fort by the chiefs of the Kyber tribes, who had agreed, at the risk of incurring the ameer's hostility, to bring our officers face to face with the ameer's commander. The result was completely decisive. Faiz Muhammad not only opposed an absolute and repeated refusal to the demand for a passage, but made all preparations for supporting his refusal with all the armed force at his command; and it is known that the garrison had been hastily reinforced for the occasion. The Mir Akhor was in the fort, but did not appear at the personal interview between Major Cavagnari and Faiz Muhammad, which lasted long; though he is understood to have been watching the proceedings. Major Cavagnari finally returned to Jamrud; and upon receipt by telegraph of Sir Neville Chamberlain's report of the affair, the viceroy at once directed him to return to Peshawur. 6. It is to be regretted that this final endeavour on the part of our government to arrive at some definite understanding with the ameer of Cabul should have been thus met with repudiation and affront. We submit, nevertheless, that the situation of affairs and their tendency left us no choice but to make the attempt, and that we employed the only method which offered any chance of success. The obviously growing estrangement of the ameer, his attitude toward us of exclusion and scarcely veiled hostility during the past twelve months, and his disregard of the amicable overtures made to him in 1876-7, gave to his formal reception, in August last, of Russian emissaries, the character of a grave political declaration. It appeared quite possible, however, that the significance of this event might have been overrated or misconstrued in India, or that the ameer himself might be induced, by timely diplomatic representations, to realise the gravity of his action, and to ap-

preciate its inevitable effect upon his relations with our government. But the only hope of clearing up any such misunderstandings, or of bringing our legitimate influence to bear upon the ameer, lay in the renewal of direct personal intercourse with him through a British envoy. And there appeared to be no way left open by which this end could be attained other than the simple and straight course of despatching a mission immediately to Cabul. To have asked the ameer whether he would receive the mission, and to have awaited his time and pleasure, would have been a futile repetition of an experiment which had failed already. The repulse of Sir Neville Chamberlain by Shere Ali at his frontier, while the Russian emissaries are still at his capital has proved the inutility of diplomatic expedients, and has deprived the ameer of all claim upon our further forbearance.

We take the following scene from the description of Major Cavagnari's interview with the commandant of Ali Musjid:—

"Major Cavagnari then asked whether, under these circumstances, the sirdar would oppose the passage of the mission, and the sirdar said that he would most certainly do so. In fact, the sirdar never flinched from first to last, but gave us distinctly to understand that he would oppose the passage of the mission by force, and that it was only a waste of time to argue with him."

"Major Cavagnari then said to the sirdar, 'You are a servant of the ameer, and you take upon yourself to stop a mission going to him from the British government, with which he has long been on friendly terms. How do you know that the ameer himself will not be very angry with you for doing this?'

"The sirdar replied, 'What friendship is there in what you are doing now? If the ameer had given me orders, I would have gone down to Jamrud to meet you and bring you up the pass; but now you have come here on your own account, and bribed the ameer's servants to give you a passage. You are setting Afreedees against Afreedees, and will cause strife and blood-



shed in this country, and you call yourselves friends !'

"The Afreedees who were standing round us applauded this speech ; and it would not have been prudent to have continued to converse in this tone. Therefore Major Cavagnari said to the sirdar 'We are both servants—you of the ameer of Cabul, I of the British government. It is no use for us to discuss these matters. I only came to get a straight answer from you. Will you oppose the passage of the mission by force ?'

"The sirdar said, 'Yes, I will, and you may take it as kindness, and because I remember friendship, that I do not fire upon you for what you have done already.' After this we shook hands and mounted our horses, and the sirdar said again, 'You have had a straight answer.' "

At length, on the 19th of October the viceroy received a letter from the ameer, in reply to his suggestion of a British mission, couched in the following ambiguous terms :—

"Your excellency's despatch regarding the sending of a friendly message, has been received through Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan ; I understand its purport, but the Nawab had not yet had an audience, nor had your excellency's letters been seen by me when a communication was received to the address of my servant Mirza Habibullah Khan, from commissioner, Peshawur, and was read. I am astonished and dismayed by this letter, written threateningly to a well-intentioned friend, replete with contentions, and yet nominally regarding a friendly mission. Coming thus by force, what result, or profit, or fruit could come of it ? Following this, three other letters from above-mentioned source, in the very same strain, addressed to my officials, have been perused by me. Thus, during the period of a few days, several letters from that quarter have all been before me, and none of them have been free from harsh expressions and hard words, repugnant to courtesy and politeness, and in tone contrary to the ways of friendship and intercourse. Looking to the fact that I am at this time assaulted by affliction and grief

at the hand of fate, and that great trouble has possessed my soul, in the officials of the British government patience and silence would have been specially becoming. Let your excellency take into consideration this harsh and breathless haste with which the desired object and place of conference have been seized upon, and how the officials of the government have been led into discussion and subjection to reproach. There is some difference between this and the pure road of friendship and good-will. In alluding to those writings of the officials of the opposite government which have emanated from them, and are, at this time, in the possession of my own officials, the latter have, in no respect, desired to show enmity or opposition towards the British governments, nor, indeed, do they with any other Power desire enmity or strife ; but when any other Power, without cause or reason, shows animosity towards this government, the matter is left in the hands of God and to His will. The esteemed Nawab Gholam Hussein, the bearer of this despatch, has, in accordance with written instructions received from the British government, asked for permission to retire, and it has been granted. Dated Sunday, 6th October."

The Indian Council regarded this letter as derogatory to British dignity, and desired at once to take hostile measures against the ameer. Lord Lytton telegraphed home, on the day of its receipt, in the following terms :—

"Special council assembled to-day for consideration of ameer's letter. Following measures proposed :—

"1. Immediate issue of manifesto, defining cause of offence, declaring friendly disposition towards Afghan people, reluctance to interfere in their internal affairs, and fixing sole responsibility on ameer.

"2. Advance into Kuram valley on completion of force now collecting at Thal.

"3. Expulsion of ameer's garrison at Kyber pass.

"4. Advance from Quetta on Peshin, if necessary, to Candahar.

"Advantages of delay none ; disadvantages

obvious. Distrust of our resolve to act already prevails widely; will increase daily, much raising ameer's *prestige*, lowering ours. Shall lose present opportunity of securing adherence of independent tribes.

"We therefore urgently request immediate sanction to measures stated above."

The Home government, however, were not prepared to act with so much haste, but were willing to give Shere Ali another opportunity of assenting to the English demands. Some doubts were expressed as to the spirit which had prompted the ameer's letter; though the Indian government did not share them. Lord Lytton himself telegraphed a criticism of the style of these words. He said:—

"The ameer's present letter, written after a month's deliberation, leaves still unanswered my amicable proposal of August 14, contains no apology for public affront to British government, and indicates no desire for proposed mission or improved relations. In the opinion of Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, Sir N. Chamberlain, Mr. Lyall, and all persons here familiar with Oriental style, the tone of the letter is intentionally rude, and conveys a direct challenge. It will certainly be so regarded by all our native subjects, as it was written after the ameer had been informed through Nawab of affront at Ali Musjid, and light in which we view it. Any demand for apology would now, in my opinion, be useless, and only expose us to fresh insult, while losing valuable time. I will telegraph in detail proposed reasons this afternoon after special council."

Lord Cranbrook, however, replied on the 25th, after the matter had been discussed by the Cabinet:—"Do not consider matters to be at present ripe for taking all the steps you mention in your telegram, October 19th.

"Am of opinion that before crossing the frontiers of Afghanistan a demand, in temperate language, should be made for an apology and acceptance of a permanent British mission within the Afghan frontiers, and that a reply should be demanded within a time sufficient for the

purpose. Send by telegram text of your letter before it is despatched. In the meantime the massing of troops should be continued and adequate forces assembled at the various points at which attack would be made in case of war. There must be no mistake as to our show of power to enforce what we require. This *locus penitentiae* should be allowed before hostile acts are committed against the ameer."

The majority of Anglo-Indians were much annoyed by this excessive long-suffering, as they considered it, on the part of the English government, believing that the delay in resenting the affront of Ali Musjid would be misconstrued by the Afghans, and would result in strengthening the opposition to our advance. But on the 30th of October Lord Cranbrook telegraphed to Lord Lytton as follows:—

"Text of letter, as approved, to be sent to the ameer: I have received and read the letter which you have sent me by the hands of my sirdar. It will be in your recollection that immediately on my arrival in India I proposed to send you a friendly mission for the purpose of assuring you of the good-will of the British government, and of removing those past misunderstandings to which you have frequently alluded. After leaving this proposal long unanswered, you rejected it on the grounds that you could not answer for the safety of any European envoy in your country, and that the reception of a British mission might afford Russia a pretext for forcing you to receive a Russian mission. Such refusal to receive a friendly mission was contrary to the practice of allied states, yet the British government, unwilling to embarrass you, accepted your excuses. Nevertheless, you have now received a Russian envoy at your capital, at a time when a war was believed to be imminent, in which England and Russia would have been arrayed on opposite sides, thereby not only acting in contradiction to the reasons asserted by you for not receiving a British mission, but giving to your conduct the appearance of being actuated by motives inimical to the British government. In these circumstances, the British government re-



membering its former friendship with your father, and still desiring to maintain with you amicable relations, determined to send, after such delay as the domestic affliction you had suffered rendered fitting, a mission to you under the charge of Sir Neville Chamberlain, a trusted and distinguished officer of the government, who is personally known to you; the escort attached to his mission, not exceeding two hundred men, was much less numerous than that which accompanied you into British territory, and was not more than was necessary for the dignity of my envoy. Such missions are customary between friendly neighbouring states, and are never refused except when hostility is intended. I despatched by a trusted messenger a letter informing you that the mission accredited to you was of a friendly character; that its business was urgent, and that it must proceed without delay. Nevertheless, you having received my letter, did not hesitate to instruct your authorities on the frontier to repel the mission by force. For this act of enmity and indignity to the Empress of India in the person of her envoy, your letter affords no explanation or apology, nor does it contain any answer to my proposal for a full and frank understanding between our two governments. In consequence of this hostile action on your part, I have assembled her Majesty's forces on your frontier, but I desire to give you a last opportunity of averting the calamities of war. For this it is necessary that a full and suitable apology be offered by you in writing, and tendered on British territory by an officer of sufficient rank. Furthermore, as it has been found impossible to maintain satisfactory relations between the two states unless the British government is adequately represented in Afghanistan, it will be necessary that you should consent to receive a permanent British mission within your territory. It is further essential that you should undertake that no injury shall be done by you to the tribes who acted as guides to my mission, and that reparation shall be made for any damage they have suffered from you; and, if any injury be done

by you to them, the British government will at once take steps to protect them. Unless these conditions are accepted, fully and plainly, by you, and your acceptance received by me not later than the 20th November, I shall be compelled to consider your intentions as hostile, and to treat you as a declared enemy of the British government."

No reply was vouchsafed by the ameer to this letter, and hostilities were commenced by the English on the 21st of November.

Before we trace the progress of the Afghan war, we will conclude these extracts from the Afghan Blue-book by portions of a despatch from Lord Cranbrook to the viceroy, dated November 18th, 1878, summarising the whole course of the relations between England and Afghanistan; after which we will add certain despatches from and to Lord Salisbury, recording the assurance given by Russia to England in regard to the Cabul mission.

Lord Cranbrook, after referring to the state of matters on Shere Ali's accession to the throne, continued—

"5. The views of her Majesty's government of that day on the subject of their relations with Afghanistan were in complete harmony with those of Lord Lawrence. They did not desire to exercise active influence at Cabul, nor to interfere in the conflicts then rife between contending parties in Afghanistan so long as those conflicts did not jeopardise the peace of the frontier. This policy was, therefore, adhered to, although not without some inconvenient results, during the civil war which raged for so many years after Shere Ali's accession, and might not unreasonably be thought suited to the circumstances of the time. But the final and unaided success of the ameer in regaining his throne in the autumn of 1868, in some measure changed the position of affairs, and, in the opinion both of Lord Lawrence and of her Majesty's government, justified some intervention in his highness's favour, and the grant to him of such assistance in money and arms as appeared conducive to the maintenance of his authority.

"6. The policy followed by Lord Mayo's administration in its dealings with Afghanistan was to a considerable extent in accord with the course of action thus finally adopted in the autumn of 1868 by his predecessor. While, however, Lord Mayo did not deviate in any material degree from the attitude of non-interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan which had been so long maintained, he recognised Shere Ali as the *de jure* as well as the *de facto* ruler of that country, and, in a letter addressed to that prince, engaged to view with severe displeasure any attempt on the part of his rivals to disturb his position. This step, added to the marked personal influence obtained by Lord Mayo over the ameer, was sufficient at the moment to remove a certain feeling of resentment which had been generated in his mind by the apparent indifference shown by the British government to the result of his struggle for power, and, at the same time, rendered his highness's position at Cabul more assured than that of any previous ruler.

"7. The advances of Russia in Central Asia had not, up to this period, assumed dimensions such as to cause uneasiness to the Indian government. Lord Mayo agreed, therefore, in the views of his predecessor, that the best means of averting interference on the part of Turkestan authorities in the affairs of Afghanistan would be by a frank interchange of views on that subject between the government of her Majesty and that of the czar. Her Majesty's government had independently arrived at the same conclusion, and early in 1869 initiated friendly negotiations at St. Petersburg, which terminated in a very distinct understanding on this subject, and in the recognition by the czar's government of the limits of the ameer's territories in complete accord with the wishes of Shere Ali and the British government.

"8. The policy of his predecessors was that substantially followed by Lord Northbrook, although the rapid development of events in Central Asia was gradually increasing the difficulty of abstaining from closer relations with the ruler

of Cabul. The capture of Khiva by the forces of the czar in the spring of 1873, and the total subordination of that khanate to Russia, caused Shere Ali considerable alarm, and led him to question the value of the pledges with reference to Afghanistan which had been given by his Imperial Majesty to England, and which had been communicated to his highness by the British government. Actuated by his fears on this score his highness sent a special envoy to Simla in the summer of that year, charged with the duty of expressing them to the government of India.

"9. Finding that the object of the ameer was to ascertain definitely how far he might rely on the help of the British government if his territories were threatened by Russia, Lord Northbrook's government was prepared to assure him that, under certain conditions, the government of India would assist him to repel unprovoked aggression. But her Majesty's government at home did not share his highness's apprehension, and the viceroy ultimately informed the ameer that the discussion of the question would be best postponed to a more convenient season. The effect of this announcement on his highness, although conveyed in conciliatory language, was not favourable; the policy which dictated it was unintelligible to his mind, and he received it with feelings of chagrin and disappointment. His reply to Lord Northbrook's communication was couched in terms of ill-disguised sarcasm; he took no notice of the viceroy's proposal to depute a British officer to examine the northern frontier of Afghanistan; he subsequently refused permission to Sir Douglas Forsyth to return from Kashgar to India through Cabul; he left untouched a gift of money lodged to his credit by the Indian government, and generally assumed towards it an attitude of sullen reserve."

Lord Cranbrook then justifies the change of policy adopted by the Conservative government in 1874:—

"11. In view of these interests, and of the responsibilities which had morally devolved upon the British government in behalf of Afghanistan; looking also to the imperfect information



available in regard to the country in respect to which those responsibilities had been incurred, Lord Northbrook's government had, in 1873, expressed the opinion that the temporary presence in Afghanistan of a British officer, as then proposed by them, might do much to allay any feelings of mistrust lingering in the minds of the Afghan people, and might at the same time prepare the way for eventually placing permanent British representatives at Cabul, Herat, and elsewhere. Encouraged by this opinion, her Majesty's government came to the conclusion that, although Lord Northbrook's efforts to attain the desired object had not met with success, the time had come when the measure thus indicated could no longer with safety be postponed. Your predecessor in council had, indeed, while appreciating all the advantages to be anticipated from it, frankly represented to her Majesty's present advisers the difficulties attending the initiation of it; he believed the time and circumstances of the moment to be inopportune for placing British agents on the Afghan borders, and was of opinion that such a step should be deferred till the progress of events justified more specific assurances to Shere Ali, which might then be given in the shape of a treaty, followed by the establishment of agencies at Herat, and other suitable places. Her Majesty's government, however, were unable to agree in this view; they deemed it probable that, if events were thus allowed to march, without measures of precaution on the part of the British government, the time would have passed when representations to the ameer could be made with any probability of a favourable result; and they considered it important that the actual sentiments of his highness, in reference to which different opinions were held by different authorities, should be tested in good time.

"12. Accordingly, on your excellency's departure from England to assume the viceroyalty, her Majesty's government instructed you to offer to Shere Ali that same active countenance and protection which he had previously solicited at the hands of the Indian government. It was

clearly impossible, however, to enter into any formal engagement in this sense without requiring from the ameer some substantial proof of his unity of interests with the British government. While her Majesty's government, therefore, authorised your excellency to concede to his highness substantial pecuniary aid, a formal recognition of his dynasty, so far as it would not involve active interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, and an explicit pledge of material support in case of unprovoked foreign aggression, you were directed not to incur these heavy responsibilities unless Shere Ali, on his part, was prepared to allow a British agent, or agents, access to positions in his territories (other than at Cabul itself) where, without prejudicing the personal authority of the ruler, they could acquire trustworthy information of events likely to threaten the tranquillity or independence of Afghanistan."

The despatch concludes in these terms:—

"23. In reporting to her Majesty's government the forcible rejection of your friendly mission, your excellency expressed the conviction of the government of India that this act deprived the ameer of all further claim upon the forbearance of the British government, and necessitated instant action. Her Majesty's government were, however, unwilling to accept the evasive letter brought from Cabul by the Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan as Shere Ali's final answer to your government, and determined to give him a short time for reconsideration. While, therefore, her Majesty's government acknowledged, as binding on them, the pledges given by Sir N. Chamberlain to the friendly chiefs and people who undertook the safe conduct of his mission, they decided to make an effort to avert the calamities of war, and with this object instructed your excellency to address to his highness a demand, in temperate language, requiring a full and suitable apology within a given time for the affront which he has offered to the British government, the reception of a permanent British mission within his territories, and reparation for any injury inflicted by him on the tribes who

attended Sir N. Chamberlain and Major Cavagnari, as well as an undertaking not to molest them hereafter. These instructions were at once carried into effect by your excellency's government, and the ameer has been informed that, unless a clear and satisfactory reply be received from him by the 20th of November, you will be compelled to consider his intentions as hostile, and to treat him as a declared enemy.

"24. It only remains for me to assure your excellency of the cordial support of her Majesty's government in the onerous circumstances in which you are placed, and to state that I have received the commands of her Majesty to publish this despatch for the general information of the public, in anticipation of the papers connected with the important question with which it deals."

Meanwhile our government had exacted from Russia satisfactory explanations and retracts in regard to her conduct in Afghanistan. On the 19th of August the Marquis of Salisbury sent the following despatch to Mr. Plunkett, at St. Petersburg :—

"Sir—From telegraphic despatches received from the government of India, it appears that intelligence has reached the viceroy that a Russian force under General Kauffmann has proceeded as far as Karki, a short distance to the north of the frontier of Afghanistan, and that a Russian mission, headed by General Abramoff, Governor of Samarcand, has gone on to Cabul, where it has been received by the ameer. It is scarcely necessary to recapitulate the occasions on which Prince Gortschakoff has disclaimed any intention on the part of the Russian government to interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan. The assurances given by his highness in this respect have been numerous and explicit, and have been renewed at a very recent date. On the 24th February (7th March), 1869, his highness wrote to Baron Brûnnow as follows :—"Vous pouvez donc, mon cher Baron, réitérer au principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique l'assurance positive que Sa Majesté Impériale considère l'Afghanistan comme entière-

ment en dehors de la sphère où la Russie peut être appelée à exercer son influence. Aucune intervention ou ingérence quelconque contraire à l'indépendance de cet Etat n'entre dans ses intentions. On the 28th of January, 1874, Lord A. Loftus reported that, in a conversation with the Russian chancellor, his highness had repeated to him that, "as regards Afghanistan, the Imperial government considered that kingdom to be beyond the sphere of their political action, and that, happen what might in the internal state of that country, the Imperial government would not interfere." In a despatch addressed to Count Brûnnow, which was communicated, to Lord Granville on the 17th of February, 1874, Prince Gortschakoff wrote :—"J'ai réitéré à Lord A. Loftus l'assurance positive que le cabinet impérial persist à considérer l'Afghanistan comme entièrement en dehors de sa sphère d'action"—a declaration which was quoted in a memorandum inclosed by the prince in a despatch to Count Schouvaloff, and communicated to Lord Derby on the 11th May, 1875. Finally, on the 3rd (15th) February, 1876, the chancellor gave the following instructions to the Russian ambassador in London :—"Veuillez dire à son excellence, d'ordre de notre auguste Maître, que nous adhérons entièrement aux conclusions d'après lesquelles en maintenant, de part et d'autre, l'arrangement convenu quant aux limites de l'Afghanistan, qui demeurerait en dehors de la sphère d'action de la Russie, les deux cabinets considéraient comme closes les discussions reconnues peu pratiques relatives à la zone neutre et à la zone intermédiaire." It is only necessary to mention further that, as reported by Sir A. Buchanan, then her Majesty's ambassador at St. Petersburg, on the 2nd of November, 1869, Prince Gortschakoff expressed to him his concurrence with the late Lord Mayo's views, that Russian agents should not visit Cabul. The Russian government has thus, during the last ten years, stood pledged to an attitude of absolute non-intervention in the affairs of Afghanistan. On the other hand, the policy of the British government towards that state has confess-



edly, and with the concurrence and approval of Russia, been shaped, during the same period, in an entirely opposite sense ; it has been, in fact, to exercise a proper and legitimate influence at Cabul ; to encourage Shere Ali in a peaceful policy towards his neighbours ; to respect his independence ; and whilst accepting no further responsibility in regard to his action than to press on him, when needful, our friendly advice, to protect him from foreign interference and aggression. In other words, whilst Russia has bound herself to abstain from exercising influence of any kind in Afghanistan, the policy of her Majesty's government has been, in the interests of peace, to exercise an influence which should be unchallenged and paramount. The government of Russia have given that of her Majesty no reason to suppose that they had departed from the line of policy thus indicated. On the contrary, when inquiries were recently made by Lord A. Loftus, as reported in his despatch of the 3rd ultimo, M. de Giers emphatically denied that any such mission as is now spoken of had been sent, or was intended to be sent, to Cabul, either by the Imperial government or by General Kaufmann. But the circumstantial reports now received from India, corroborated as they are from other sources, are of a nature which it is impossible for her Majesty's government to ignore or overlook. Assuming the truth of the facts reported, it would appear that a Russian mission has found its way to the ameer of Cabul, who has received it either willingly or under pressure. This mission is said to be backed by four Russian columns, aggregating some 15,000 men, moving through the Turcoman country and on the line of the Oxus, and so directed that the ameer may not unnaturally consider them as offering a menace to the safety and integrity of his dominions. I must therefore request you to mention these reports to Prince Gortschakoff, and to inquire whether there is any foundation for them. You will not conceal from his highness that proceedings of the kind referred to would cause uneasiness in India, and dissatisfaction in this country, and

should it prove that there is any truth in the statement that a Russian mission has proceeded to Cabul, you will express the hope of her Majesty's government that it may be at once withdrawn, as being inconsistent with the assurances so frequently received from his highness."

On the 13th of September, Mr. Plunkett sent to Lord Salisbury the following reply from M. de Giers :—

"I have not until to-day been able to reply to the note you did me the honour to address to me, dated the 19th (26th) instant, which reached me during my journey. While acknowledging the perfect accuracy of the quotations made in that document, I can only confirm what I have already had the honour of saying to you—that the dispositions of the Imperial government in regard to the Central Asian question, of which those quotations reproduce the expression, have necessarily been affected by the political condition in which we were placed by the attitude of England during the recent crisis in the East. But, under the present circumstances, those dispositions are the same as formerly, and are not of a nature to give rise to any distrust on the part of the English government. I should add that the mission, which you erroneously attribute to General Abramoff, is of a provisional nature, and one of simple courtesy ; it cannot, therefore, interfere in any way with the pacific assurances which you mention. I trust that the explanations which M. Bartholomei has already been charged to give to Lord Salisbury on this subject will have sufficiently explained the situation."

In a despatch, dated St. Petersburg, August 14, Mr. Plunkett says he obtained an assurance from M. de Giers, which the latter repeated twice, 'that all the special measures which had been, taken in Central Asia, and which, M. de Giers said, Russia had as much right to take, in view of the impending risk of war, as Great Britain had had to bring Indian troops to Malta, had been stopped ; and he asserted positively that, at the present moment, no military measures

whatever were being taken which could give umbrage to her Majesty's government. I said that I was glad to receive these assurances as regards the stoppage of all military movements; could his excellency give me equally satisfactory assurances concerning those political steps which had been commenced in view of complications with Great Britain? M. de Giers at once replied, 'Everything has been stopped. The political as well as the military precautions which we thought ourselves justified in taking against you—everything has been stopped.'

A note from the Foreign Office, transmitting a copy of M. de Giers' reply for the information of Lord Cranbrook, says:—"Lord Salisbury infers from M. de Giers' note that his excellency acknowledges that all the former assurances of the Russian government in regard to Afghanistan have now recovered their validity." Writing to Mr. Plunkett on the 30th September, Lord Salisbury says:—

"In the note from M. de Giers of the 27th August (8th September), of which copy is enclosed in your despatch of the 13th instant, reference is made to explanations which the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in London had been instructed to offer in regard to the recent proceedings of the Russian authorities in Central Asia. The communications made by M. Bartholomei have been generally to the same effect as what has been stated by M. de Giers. He has stated that the military and political measures adopted in Turkestan were actuated by the necessities of the situation caused by the state of affairs in regard to Turkey, and were called forth especially by the attitude of Great Britain towards Russia. General Kauffmann's proceedings, he said, must therefore be regarded as the result of a course imposed upon him by the force of circumstances. As I had spoken to M. Bartholomei of a letter from the emperor, which was supposed to have been transmitted to Shere Ali Khan, he asked the Russian government for information on the point, and subsequently said he was authorised to state that there had never been any question of sending such a letter."

A strong opposition to the Afghan war was manifested in this country, and public opinion was widely divided on the policy of the government's action. Those who had persistently objected to the course taken on foreign questions by Lord Beaconsfield's Cabinet saw in this new quarrel only another development of a spirit which they believed to be injurious to the best interests of England. They maintained that the rupture with the ameer had been rather courted than avoided, and that the invasion of territory was prompted by aggressive designs which had not even the excuse of being based upon experience and wisdom.

If Anglo-Indians, or the most eminent amongst them, had been unanimous in the conclusion that the north-western frontier needed to be strengthened in the direction of Afghanistan, no doubt there would have been a more harmonious feeling in regard to the action which was being taken by the viceroy and the Cabinet. We should have heard less opposition to the demand addressed to Shere Ali; and his rejection of our mission would have been held by every one amply sufficient to justify a march to Cabul. But it was not so. Men like Lord Lawrence and Northbrook, who had occupied the highest stations in India, did not hesitate to take the extreme course of declaring their opinion that the war was both unnecessary and unjust. An "Afghan Committee" was formed, with Lord Lawrence at its head, for the purpose of informing public opinion on the question, and of demanding that the government should at least postpone its action until Parliament had been summoned to discuss the new departure in the Cabinet's policy.\*

On November 27th the committee held a meeting, at which the following resolutions were moved by Mr. Fawcett, M.P., seconded by General Colin Mackenzie, C.B., and unanimously adopted:—"That this committee, which was formed for the purpose of eliciting an expression of public opinion in favour of the summoning of Parliament before a declaration of war against Afghanistan, deeply regrets the refusal of the government to consult the country through its representatives before declaring war against the ameer, and before invading his territories. The committee desires to express



The warmth of the feeling elicited on this occasion may be judged from a letter written by the Earl of Shaftesbury to the committee, which had invited him to add his name to its list. His lordship wrote on the 25th of November:—

“Gentlemen—You did me the honour of requesting me to join your committee. I ventured at the time to decline the offer, and I did so for this reason, among some others, that her Majesty’s ministers were entitled to forbearance and to the right of announcing themselves, without external pressure, both their policy and the grounds on which they acted.

“But the government, in their despatch to Lord Lytton, have now stated their entire case at their own time and in the full exercise of their judgment. They have no more facts to adduce, and no more arguments to urge in justification.

“The forthcoming papers may possibly abate their claim to public approval, but they cannot possibly improve it, unless it should be found (which is most unlikely) on the perusal of the documents that Lord Cranbrook omitted some matters of importance to the position of himself and his colleagues.

“They may have cause for dissatisfaction, and even for displeasure, but they have no cause for war. In the matter, moreover, of dissatisfaction and displeasure, the ameer too may have had a cause as good as theirs, and the answer given in 1873 to a prince of so haughty and vindictive a race may have roused his feelings to a high point of hostility. But until we shall have read the promised Blue-book, we can give no judgment whatever on the conduct of the administration of that day.

“The ameer has, in every aspect and sense of justice, a right to refuse permission for an envoy to reside at his court. We ourselves should re-

its satisfaction at the prospect of the early meeting of Parliament, and, in view of the full discussion which will then take place, is of opinion that for the present it is unnecessary that the committee should take any action beyond printing and circulating such information on the Afghan question as may from time to time be deemed desirable.”

sent, and most proudly too, a message from the ameer, that he intended, whether the viceroy approved it or not, to send a vakeel to represent him in Calcutta. Where, and what, is the difference? If the viceroy plead the necessity of procuring information, and his fears about a “Russian influence,” the ameer might plead, with similar force, that he also was desirous to know what was going on, and that he, too, had his apprehensions about a complete or a partial annexation.

“It is a right that we acknowledge as appertaining to all sovereigns and republics. The existing ministry would never dare to say to the czar, to Marshal MacMahon, or the President of the United States, ‘receive this man or that, and unless you acquiesce we will cross your frontier, ravage your territory, and exact by violence what you will not give to us of your own free will.’

“Such treatment, then, of the ameer, a feeble and comparatively insignificant power, is not only not a generous, but it is absolutely an oppressive act.

“But it is further maintained that we have been exposed to an insult. Possibly we have, but if so we have brought it on ourselves.

“Suppose for the sake of argument that it is an insult; is every insult to be avenged by blood, and all the woes and sufferings that follow both sides in the train of war? Is our dignity so childish and unreal, that it cannot endure a single rebuff; and our spirit of Christianity so feeble, that we will not endure it?

“But we hear in reply that the insult was so public, so conspicuous, and so perpetual, moreover, in the presence of native princes, that forbearance is next to impossible. But who made it thus public—thus conspicuous? Was it not they who despatched such a vast and ostentatious mission to a prince who, everybody knew, was determined to reject it?

“The insult was nearly as much on our own part as on his. To send, without his previous consent, an embassy of that character to a haughty, uncivilised, independent, and angry

ruler was an act of despotic and offensive patronage sufficient to affront a man of a far less lively temperament. To send it against his consent was an act of aggression, which had, and which has, all the air of seeking an occasion of quarrel to terminate in war, victory, and a scientific frontier.

"Have we any right, except the right of the more powerful, to demand a 'rectified frontier' for the preservation of our empire? The very frontier that we would exact from the ameer as essential to our safety, he might, on his side, urge as essential to his own, and with greater force, being, as he is, in long-established and acknowledged possession.

"There is but one way of governing India, and that way is in the exercise of justice all round. The observance of justice by an absolute Power would be a grand spectacle even to Western nations, but to Eastern nations (so little used are they to that sort of thing), it would appear to be a message directly from heaven.

"The people of England must weigh well whether such a war is legitimate in the sight of God and man. Their responsibilities are tremendous; and let them remember, that it is not success in the field, nor a vote of the majority in the House of Commons, that can rescue a course of action such as this from being a monstrous sin."

Parliament was actually convoked for a short sitting on the 5th of December, 1878. The invasion had already begun, and the policy of the government irrevocably inaugurated. It was, of course, open to either house to pass a vote of censure on ministers, or even to stop the supplies. So far from this being done, the action of the Cabinet was endorsed by large majorities both in the Lords and in the Commons.

The Opposition made their protest; but they were not backed in the constituencies with sufficient vigour to destroy the moral effect of the parliamentary votes.

## CHAPTER XXVII.

### THE AFGHAN WAR.

THE British government, it will be remembered, had allowed to Shere Ali twenty days of grace, after the rejection by his officer at Ali Musjid of Sir Neville Chamberlain's mission. During the first two-thirds of November, the viceroy and his council waited, impatiently enough, for the ameer's reply to the letter which had been sent to him; and, in the meantime, they busied themselves over the military preparations necessary to make the movements of our troops as effective as possible when the time for action arrived.

No reply came from Shere Ali, who, it is now known, was obstinately resolved to defy the power of England, and to confide in the promises of Russia. Consequently, at daybreak, on the 21st of November, orders were given to the three columns of the expedition to cross the frontier; and thus the Afghan war commenced.

There can be no doubt that General Rasgonoff, the leader of the Russian embassy in Cabul, had given the unfortunate ameer to understand that he would have the ultimate support of the czar; and it would appear to be equally certain that all such assurances, made subsequently to the Congress of Berlin, were hazarded by the Russian intriguers without the authority of their government, and simply in the hope that a conflict between England and Afghanistan, such as they were fomenting, would in some way or another turn to their advantage.

According to information which reached us from a Berlin authority, who had access to sources of news in Russia itself, the hallucination of the ameer on this point was complete. Thus it was stated that, shortly before the outbreak of the war, Shere Ali called an assembly of the Afghan chiefs to Cabul. Two hundred



and fifty chiefs appeared. "On the day assigned for the meeting, Shere Ali entered the hall at the head of a large and brilliant suite, and made a speech on the relations between Russia, England, and Afghanistan. Russia, he said, having always been friendly to Afghan traders at the fairs of Orenburg, &c., he—Shere Ali—had thought it his duty to give respectful reception to the embassy the czar had sent him. He relied upon the friendship of Russia, whose power, greatness, and right, would be explained to them by the Keeper of the Great Seal." After this the dignitary mentioned read a lengthy memorial on the riches and military strength of the Russian empire. He then complained of injuries received at the hands of the British government, closing his speech with these words, "Return to your brethren, sharpen your swords, and saddle your horses. Be ready, when I call you, to make war against the enemies of our countries." After this the assembly had held two more sittings to discuss military resources and tactics; and there seemed to be every reason to believe that the war would be prosecuted by the Afghans with great vigour.

The arrangements made by the English commanders for the expedition to Cabul, were very complete and judicious; and, as it turned out, they were successful in bringing the campaign to a decisive issue with far less bloodshed than could have been expected. The following letter in the "Daily News" from Mr. Archibald Forbes, who had gone out to represent that paper, was written on the eve of the commencement of operations; and it will serve to give the reader a clear idea of the earlier stages of the campaign.

"Troops for the invasion of Afghanistan are concentrating on three sections of the frontier of that territory—in the Peshawur Valley, *vis-à-vis* to the direct line of advance on Cabul, through the Kyber Pass; at Kohat and Thull, with a line of invasion up the Kuram Valley, and across the Shutur Gardan Pass upon Cabul; and at Quetta and Mooltan, with the former place as a final base, and a line of invasion over Candahar, Kilat-i-Ghilzie, and Ghuznee. In the

contingency of hostilities, it may be worth while to speculate on the probable *métier* of each of these three bodies. I have neither asked for, nor received any official enlightenment on this subject, and such observations as I venture are merely those which occur to me from a study of the circumstances.

"The impossibility of reaching Cabul this year by any route may be assumed—that is to say, the impossibility is not indeed absolute and inexorable, but is relative. The Russians last winter crossed the Balkans amid conditions quite as arduous as any which we might expect to encounter on a winter march on Cabul. But the Russian soldiers were children themselves of frosts and snows, and to the Russians celerity of movement was invaluable. Our native troops have little seasoning to extreme cold, and must experience heavy loss and suffering marching in winter in an inclement region. Nor is the object to be gained worth the suffering and the risk entailed in the prosecution of a winter campaign in Afghanistan, unless, indeed, in the contingency of events, of which at present the likelihood is small. The force massing in the Peshawur Valley may be taken as amply adequate for the forcing of the Kyber Pass, no matter in what strength the troops of the ameer may occupy that defile. It might be hoped, indeed, that they do so in great force, as in proportion to the strength of the opposition would naturally be the effect of overcoming it. The tribes to whom, and not to the ameer, belongs the pass and the territory about it, are reported to be friendly to us, and from their character it is tolerably certain that they are chronically disposed to be friendly to whomsoever pays them best. They have made a virtue of necessity, and consented to the garrisoning of Ali Musjid and the contiguous region of the pass by the troops of the ameer, who are reported to hold the fort and its vicinity in considerable but uncertain strength, but to be suffering so severely from the unhealthiness of the spot and the poisonous water which it yields, as to be dying in large numbers, and deserting in yet greater.

The difficulties of the Kyber Pass I have found detailed with most minuteness in Major Hough's 'Narrative of the march and operations of the army of the Indus in the expedition to Afghanistan in 1838-9.' He passed through the pass with Sir W. Cotton's force on its return march from Cabul to Peshawur, and furnishes minute notes of the obstacles, both natural and artificial, which then existed. The Kyber Pass, he tells us, is twenty-eight miles in length, from its entrance two miles beyond Kuddum to its débouche close to Dakka, and, excluding the valley of Lalabeg, six miles long by  $1\frac{1}{4}$ , there are twenty-two miles of the pass which can be commanded, and in which there are few places where an army advancing could find cover. Owing to the friendliness of the Kyberees, opposition need not be anticipated until an advancing force reached the vicinity of Ali Musjid, about eight miles from the entrance to the pass; and the physical difficulties of this portion of the road, although described by Hough as considerable, are no worse than when Wade and Pollock overcame them in the face of opposition. Of Ali Musjid itself he writes:—'The fort of Ali Musjid is situated on a hill on the left, coming from Peshawur. Its elevation above the level of the sea is 2,433 feet, or 940 feet below the level of the summit of the pass further on at Sundee Khana. The fort is about 150 feet long and 60 feet wide, but the whole of the enclosed place is about 300 by 200 feet. There are three hills within from 200 to 300 yards of the fort, on which there were posts. The width of the pass here is about 150 yards. On the opposite side the hills are not high. In the centre of the pass below is a *sungah* (entrenchment). There were likewise *sungahs* on the hills opposite the fort. In the fort of Ali Musjid there is no water, but there is a covered passage leading down to a well.' The reduction of Ali Musjid, with the help of the long-ranging artillery at the command of a general commanding a British force, could not be a matter of serious difficulty; and I venture to think it may be assumed that Ali Musjid is at our mercy whenever it is thought

fit to advance upon it. Beyond the fort, the physical difficulties of the road increase, and if opposition were maintained after the reduction of Ali Musjid, the passage of this section could scarcely fail to entail some loss. The pass contracts greatly, and in one place is not above 40 or 50 feet wide, including the bed of the rocky stream. It gradually widens to 70 feet, and then is reached the valley of Lalabeg, which is cultivated, and contains small villages. The valley is six miles long, and beyond it there is an ascent for some three miles, with the road and country fairly open, to the top of the pass, at an elevation of 3,373 feet, whence is a descent of two miles, with an average fall of one in fifteen, to Sundee Khana, a village around which there is some cultivation, in a section of the pass about a quarter of a mile wide. Some of the pitches in this two miles of descent are very steep. Major Hough, coming the other way, and therefore ascending, described one section of 150 yards as 'difficult to walk up.' The top of the pass, observes Major Leech, offers an admirable position for a fort, 'which could enfilade with the most destructive effect both the road from Dakka and that from Lalabeg (coming from Ali Musjid). From the top of the hill a fire could be thrown on the winding road coming up to it, while it commands more directly the road going down from it toward Lalabeg,' that is to say, the road by which must ascend a force marching from Ali Musjid. It may be assumed that the ameer has fortified this position, and the above account would make it, if resolutely held, perhaps more formidable than Ali Musjid itself. From Sundee Khana, the elevation of which is 2,488 feet above sea level, the distance to Dakka is nine miles. The hills on either side of the pass, which varies from 100 to 200 feet breadth, and is on the descent as troops march towards Cabul, are precipitous, but not high; they are covered with stunted bushes. For about half the way the road is good; in the latter part it is the bed of a mountain torrent, with several sharp turns, and it lies over beds of rude stones. Hough describes this as a hard march.



Dakka is at the debouchement of the Kyber Pass proper; the road here joins the valley of the Cabul river. At Dakka there are two walled villages. Hough describes the ground at Dakka as covered with an efflorescence of soda for some distance from the river, the ground being in consequence very damp; the surrounding land is covered with stones and hard sand. Nevertheless, 'Dakka has about two hundred families, and the place can furnish supplies for a considerable body.'

"Across the river from Dakka is Lalpoora, the elevation of which is only one thousand four hundred and four feet. Here was the fort of Saadret Khan, the most powerful of all the petty chiefs in this part of the country. In the next march of nine miles long, from Dakka to Huzarnow, occurs the pass or defile of Khoord Kyber, or the Little Kyber. Of it Hough says—'The defile is very narrow, in some places not admitting of two horsemen moving abreast. It is about three-quarters of a mile long. It is more like a deep narrow ravine, with high banks in some parts. We found the road through it good, and the gradients in it not difficult. But if the heights were occupied by troops it would stop the advance of any force until the enemy were dislodged.' Huzarnow is a cluster of villages, with a good deal of cultivation around them. There is good grass and grazing for cattle. From Huzarnow to Chardeh is a march of  $11\frac{3}{4}$  miles, chiefly over a plain, with a fair road, although sandy and stony in places. Then from Chardeh to Ali Boghan is a march of fourteen miles, for a little way through cultivation, but nine miles of this journey is across a wide barren valley or stony desert, called the *Soorkh-Deukor*, where, in the months of April and May, the deadly simoom prevails.' Chardeh is one thousand eight hundred and twenty-two feet, Ali Boghan one thousand nine hundred and eleven feet above sea level. There are no difficulties in the march of  $6\frac{3}{4}$  miles from Ali Boghan to Jellalabad, the fortified town so stoutly defended by its 'illustrious garrison' of Sale's brigade

in 1841-2. Jellalabad is one thousand nine hundred and sixty-four feet above sea level. Hough speaks of it as 'a small, dirty place, with mud walls, round towers, narrow streets, and a population of about two thousand;' but its fortifications are believed to have been greatly strengthened lately.

"From Jellalabad to Sultanpore (nine miles), from Sultanpore to Futeeabad ( $7\frac{1}{2}$  miles), and from Futeeabad to Gundamuck (twelve miles—I give Hough's marches), the difficulties of the roads are not serious. Both at Futeeabad and Gundamuck there are cultivation and villages. Gundamuck is four thousand six hundred and sixteen feet above sea level. Hough found great fertility in October on the next march of thirteen miles to Soorkh-ab, especially about the valley of Hiparak, which has many orchards, vineyards, and cornfields, on the bank of the river; but then recommence the passes and ravines, first the terrible but short Jugduluck, and further on the Khoord Cabul, close to which at the village of the same name the height above the sea level is seven thousand four hundred and sixty-six feet. There is no occasion to recapitulate Hough's details concerning the difficulties of these defiles; the cold renders them impracticable in the winter season. 'The streams'—he says, and he traversed the Khoord Cabul on the 16th of October—'the streams were frozen in many places, and as the water splashed upon our cloaks it froze upon them. On getting out of the pass to a spot where the sun's rays fell on it I saw a trooper of the 1st Bombay Cavalry who was nearly frozen.' Havelock writes of the same march, 'As the water splashed our horses' legs and their riders' boots it was congealed in a few seconds. Sir Willoughby Cotton was protected from the cold by a long hussar cloak, which dipped in the stream as he forded. The blue cloth and red shalloon of this good defence against the weather was soon decorated with a border of ice a foot in width, the weight of which literally tore off five buttons. . . . . On the eminences which we ourselves had scaled we found the bodies of three of our unfortunate

followers, who had died from the effects of the intense cold.' This was in the middle of October; imagine the horror of the cold in December and January. It is folly to cite the precedent of the Russian conquest over the Balkans in the dead of winter! The conditions are so different that no comparison can be instituted. The height of the Khoord Cabul is two thousand feet more than the height of any of the Balkan passes. It is not wholly a question of men and horses and artillery; the question of supplies must be taken into consideration. The country crossed by the Russians was not sterile, or hostile; they were among villages and friends. In every case, they had a base of supplies in the plains at no great distance. Elena and Tirnova, open and easy of access, lay behind the route through the Hankoj Pass. Gabrova is within six miles of the summit of the Schipka. Etropol and Orkhanie were towns, with open roads in their rear. But a British force pushing through the passes to Cabul in the dead of winter must have its base of supplies on Peshawur. It must carry supplies with it not only for the march, but for the period of halt, after its completion, till the snow melt and the ice gives. Its *etappen* line lies through a region, perhaps bitterly hostile, and certainly the abiding place of men whose trade is robbery, and whom only *force majeure* can repress from robbery. Finally, the Russians in their winter crossings of the Balkans were between the devil and the deep sea. If they did not achieve this feat, whose gallant endurance I should be the last to impugn, it was all but certain—how certain few have any conception—that interposition would wrest from them the reward of their toil and their loss. No such strait urges us forward. The inexorability of our advance is not deteriorated by its delay until the spring. And there faces us the realisation that we must suffer no check. We may delay, but we cannot afford to essay and to fail.

"I assume it, then, as certain that there will be no attempt to reach Cabul while the winter lasts. But this postponement need by no means

entail absolute inaction on the part of the Peshawur Valley force. There is nothing to hinder it, or a part of it, from forcing the Kyber, reducing Ali Musjid, and keeping open the great gate once driven open. With the Kyberees friendly, no numerous force need be maintained in or beyond the pass during the winter months. There are here advocates for an advance as far as Jellalabad, leaving a strong brigade there during the winter. This line of action certainly has its advantages, but to Jellalabad is a long journey for supplies, involving premature weakening of transport animals. To trust to the adjacent region for supplies might occasion troubles with the inhabitants. It would seem a wiser course to keep a detachment projected only as far as the Dakka-Lalpoora Valley. It could be easily fed from below. In the intervals of bad weather, the road through the pass might be improved, and there might, in advance of the upward march of the main column in spring, be accumulated a considerable advance *dépôt* of provisions for man and beast on the further side. I venture to think this, in the event of hostilities, will be the rôle of the Peshawur Valley force. In the spring time about the middle of March, complete in its supplies and transport, its soldiers well of the fever which is now filling the hospitals, its march will begin through the already opened portal, and the action of the autumn will have given it the advantage of fearing no opposition until it is close on half-way on its road to its destination.

"The Kuram Valley force, with its base on Kohat, is not more likely to achieve great things until the spring. From Thull the way lies easily open to it into the valley, whose principal chief is friendly, and, indeed, has joined General Roberts at Kohat. Near the head of the valley lies the Kuram fort, the reduction of which cannot be a difficult operation. But then comes the difficult Pewan Pass, with an elevation of nearly eight thousand feet, and a few marches further on the Shutur Gardan Pass, yet more difficult and more elevated. The advance



of the season admits of an attempt to surmount neither of these, so the Kuram Valley force may be expected to winter quietly in the valley which gives it its name, perfecting its means of transport, and laying in stores of supplies. At present the Afghans are reported in force in the Pewan Pass. No doubt General Roberts will do his best to keep them there as long as possible, exposed to the inclemency of the weather, by making demonstrations of an intention to cross; and a winter on the Pewan Pass must be very trying, even to Afghans. When the spring comes, the Kuram Valley force will advance on Cabul in concert with the Peshawur Valley force. At the foot of the Pewan, General Robert's command, when he begins his march in the spring, will be nearer to Cabul than any other section of the British army of invasion. He may have the good fortune to be the first to see the towers of the Bala Hissar, as he wheels round from the Shuturgardan defiles with his face set towards the north; and as he reaches the vicinity of the Afghan capital from the south, the head of the Peshawur Valley force ought to be deploying from the Khoord Cabul Pass to co-operate with him in the reduction of the ameer's chief city.

"The operations of the Quetta force, under the chief command of General Stewart, cannot, any more than those of the other two columns, begin operations in earnest before the spring. Even with the road to Quetta in our hands, supplies laid down *en route*, and Quetta garrisoned by British troops, the advance thereto from the Indus must be a protracted operation. The advance of 1839 was from Shirkarpoor, over Dadur upon the Bolan Pass, and so to Quetta, a distance considerably over two hundred miles, of which quite two-thirds were through a desert furnishing no supplies. The route now being followed by General Biddulph's force, which the division under the immediate command of General Stewart will probably follow, lies considerably more to the north, but no doubt more than one route will be followed. The Indus will be bridged a little distance below the junction of

the Chenab, probably opposite to Khanpur, and a line of railway laid down from that station to the bridge. General Biddulph and his troops are on the march over Rajanpore, taking the route due west, through Dundewalla and Dera, upon Lehri, and so to Dadur, and on through the Bolan to Quetta, which he expected to reach about 2nd of November. Of the difficulties encountered there are various accounts, but it is estimated that, by the end of November, General Biddulph's force, with supplies for six months, will have been concentrated at Quetta. But there has to follow General Stewart's division, which is now only gathering at Mooltan, and a considerable time must elapse before that force is concentrated at Mithankote, on the other side of the Indus, ready to commence the long march on Quetta. A route for it is advocated, considerably to the northward of that being pursued by Biddulph—a route which Havelock writes of in 1839, by Hurund, Chahar, Chotiali, and Tull, striking into the Pisheen Valley, beyond Quetta, and so avoiding the Bolan Pass. Whichever road be taken I calculate, looking to the difficulties of the season and of the march, that it is impossible for Stewart to be in the neighbourhood of Quetta, in readiness for an advance on Candahar, before the middle of January. Sir John Keane's army, in 1839, covered the ground between Quetta and Candahar in fifteen marches, but, by reason of the halts necessary to allow the successive brigades to work their tedious way through the Kojuk Pass and then to close up, the actual time occupied on the march was thirty days. Owing to the diminished number of camp followers, General Stewart's army may be expected to march more quickly; but in all probability February will be well spent before that gallant officer sights the white buildings of Candahar from the elevation laved by the waters of Khooshab. From Candahar his march on Cabul is subject to so many contingencies that it would be futile to attempt to calculate its duration. It is reported that the ameer has no intention to defend Candahar, and that, as in 1839, it will be entered without opposition.

But between Candahar and the capital lie the fortresses of Khilat-i-Ghilzi and Ghuzni, the latter of which is reported as in a formidable state of defence. Keane having quitted Candahar on the 27th June, reached Cabul on the 6th of August, halting at Ghuzni from the 21st to 30th of July. With good fortune and alacrity on the road, and a speedy crumbling of the defences of Ghuzni before his formidable siege train, Stewart may be reckoned as likely to reach the vicinity of Cabul before or about the middle of April.

“Our Indian army, in the nature of things, must be accompanied by *impedimenta* infinitely greater than a European army; but these are now to be reduced within reasonable bounds. General Biddulph has published his scale—which he terms ‘very liberal’—of camp equipage, baggage, and followers, and this scale, having been approved of by the government, will, no doubt, be adopted in the other columns. As regards camp equipage, general officers are restricted to 200lb., commanding officers and heads of departments to 150lb., all other European officers, 80lb.; native officers, 40lb.; British soldiers, 22 men to one Sepoy’s half company tent; native soldiers, one company to have two ditto; British hospitals, one tent to 8 sick; native hospitals, one tent to 12 sick, the allowance of hospital tents being calculated on 10 per cent. of the strength. Followers will find close quarters with 50 of them in one tent, calculated for half a company of Sepoys. There will be a mess tent for every eight officers. Baggage allowances are equally ‘liberal.’ General officers are to have 160lb., commanding officers and heads of department 120lb., all other officers 80lb., native officers 40lb., British non-commissioned officers and men 30lb., native ditto 20lb. Each troop or company (British troops) is allowed 240lb. cooking utensils each, ditto native troops 160lb., each officer 80lb. Followers, although much curtailed, are still a miscellaneous host. Each officer has one personal servant, and two others for each authorised charger—one extra servant for every three officers. Native officers have a

servant between two. There are four cooks to each company of British soldiers, two to each company of native. Each cavalry horse has a grass-cutter, or one horse tender and one pony to every two horses. There are ten syces or grooms to every hundred troop horses; two water-carriers each with a bullock for each company British troops, one for each company of natives. There are doolies, each with six bearers, for ten per cent. of British troops, and ‘dandies,’ a species of doolie, with four bearers each, for the same per centage of native troopers. In addition to all this, there are sweepers, muleteers, camelmen, hospital establishment, and the bazaar.’

“I ought to mention that General Stewart’s artillery is to be increased by two field batteries of the Bombay establishment, presently doing duty in Scinde, which will give the ‘Quetta army’ its full complement of this arm. It is also intended to use Gatling guns, of which there are twelve now in India, two to be detailed to each mountain battery. The strength already communicated is to be increased by a division of Bombay and Madras troops, which is to be utilised for keeping open the communications between the Indus and Quetta and onward as General Stewart advances; a reserve of indefinite strength is also, I understand, to be collected at Mooltan.”

Mr. Forbes was over-cautious in his estimate of what might be effected by the English troops in the winter season. It is true that no attempt was made to reach Cabul, but the native Indian levies did some very good fighting and marching on the snow-covered mountains.

As soon as it was known that the ameer had disdained to reply to the last English note, on the 21st of November, the viceroy issued a proclamation to the people of Afghanistan, assigning reasons for commencing hostilities. The viceroy reviewed Shere Ali’s conduct after succeeding to the Cabul throne. Owing to the then unsettled state of Afghanistan, assistance was given by the British government in money and arms. The assistance was increased uncon-



ditionally when the ameer visited the viceroy at Umballa, at his own request, and was courteously received and honourably entertained. Further proofs of the good-will of the British government were then also shown.

"For all these gracious acts, the proclamation stated the ameer had rendered no return except active ill-will and open discourtesy, of which instances were given, such as his closing to British subjects and commerce the road between India and Afghanistan; maltreating British subjects; permitting British traders to be plundered with impunity within his jurisdiction; and using cruelty, and putting to death, subjects of his own on the mere suspicion that they were in communication with the British government.

"The proclamation further stated that the ameer by words and deeds tried to stir up religious hatred against the English and incite war against the Indian empire; that, having excluded British officers from every part of his dominions, he refused to receive a British mission; that he left unanswered friendly communications addressed to him by the viceroy, and declined amicable intercourse between the British government and himself, but, nevertheless, received formally, and publicly entertained at Cabul, an embassy from Russia at a time when such an act derived special significance from the course of events in Europe, and the attitude of England and Russia in relation to those events; that the ameer had done this well knowing that the Russian government had engaged with England to regard Afghanistan as beyond the sphere of Russian influence; and that finally, while a Russian embassy was still at Cabul, the ameer had forcibly repulsed, at his outposts, an English envoy of high rank, of whose coming he had timely notice.

"The British government, anxious to avoid war, offered an opportunity to the ameer to avert the consequences of these insults, an opportunity he refused to avail himself of. All the friendly efforts of the British government, after being persistently repulsed, were now met with open indignity and defiance. The ameer,

mistaking forbearance for weakness, had deliberately incurred the just resentment of the British government. With the sirdars and people of Afghanistan the British government had no quarrel, and desired none, but wished to respect their independence, and would not willingly injure or interfere with them; but the British government could not tolerate interference on the part of any other power in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. The responsibility rested on Shere Ali alone of having exchanged the friendship for the hostility of the Empress of India."

Simultaneously with the issue of this proclamation, the English columns advanced into the ameer's territories, on Thursday, Nov. 21st.

The first column, under General Browne, which had its first base at Peshawur, advanced rapidly into the Kyber district, with his head-quarters' staff, and a brigade of the First Division, towards Ali Musjid, bent on at once effacing the memory of Sir Neville Chamberlain's repulse. There had been a good deal of talk about the preparations which the ameer had made for offering a formidable resistance at this point; and the general had consequently neglected nothing in the way of precaution. Every confidence was reposed by the authorities in this commander, for General Browne had the character of a careful and cautious, as well as an intrepid officer.

A sketch of the career of General Browne, from the "Times" of Nov. 5th, may be interpolated here, before we proceed to describe his successful attack on Ali Musjid:—"The appointment of Lieutenant-General Sir Samuel Browne, V.C., C.B., K.C.S.I., to the command of the troops now being massed in the Peshawur Valley, will be hailed with satisfaction by every one who knows or who has served under that distinguished officer. Brought up in the 46th Bengal Native Infantry, the regiment which had the honour of training Speke and Grant, Sir Samuel served with it throughout the Punjab campaign, being present at the passage of the Chenab, the affairs of Ramnuggur and Sadoolopore, and the battles of Chilianwallah and Goojerat.

An active enthusiastic officer, an ardent sportsman, a brilliant and fearless horseman, the young subaltern soon attracted the attention of his superiors, and on the organisation of the Punjab Irregular Force was offered and accepted an appointment in the 2d Punjab Cavalry, to the command of which he shortly after succeeded, and which he retained until 1864, when the enforced retirement, owing to wounds, of Sir Neville Chamberlain from the command of the Frontier Force, caused that of the Guides to fall vacant. Colonel Browne was then nominated to the prize of the Indian Army. With the 2d Punjab Cavalry, in Dec. 1852, Captain Browne served in the operations against the Oomurzae Vaziris on the Bunnoo frontier, when he was mentioned in the despatch of Major John Nicholson; in the Bozdar Expedition, under Sir Neville Chamberlain, Captain Browne was again mentioned. On the outbreak of the mutiny, a squadron of his regiment, under Lieutenant Dighton Probyn, was detached to Hindostan, and in the siege of Delhi and later affairs between that city and Lucknow, earned for its young commander a Brevet Majority and Victoria Cross. But the services of Captain Browne were too valuable to be wasted in guarding the frontier, and early in 1858 he received the welcome orders to march down to join Sir Colin Campbell's army. At the siege and capture of Lucknow, the affairs at Coorsee, Roowiah, Allygunge, and Battle of Bareilly, he commanded his regiment, and then being detached in charge of a small field force, consisting of the present 24th Punjab Infantry and a couple of companies of Rifles, planned and executed a brilliant attack on the rebels strongly posted at Sirpooah on the 31st of August, 1858. The enemy were defeated with great slaughter, their camp and guns falling into our hands. For this action Major Browne was awarded the Victoria Cross for having, in the cold words of an official despatch, 'while advancing upon the enemy's position at daybreak, pushed on with one orderly sowar upon a nine pounder gun that was commanding one of the approaches to the rebel position and attacked

the gunners, thereby preventing them reloading and firing upon the infantry who were advancing to the attack. In doing this a personal conflict ensued, in which Major Browne received a severe sword cut on the left knee, and shortly after another sword cut, which severed the left arm at the shoulder, not, however, before he had succeeded in cutting down several of his assailants." Had it not been for the heroism of two Sikh orderlies, Jamiyat and Shere Singh, the 2d Punjab Cavalry would have had to deplore the loss of their brave leader, who for his conduct received, besides the Victoria Cross, the Companionship of the Bath and a Brevet Lieutenant-Colonelcy. Until 1864 Colonel Browne retained command of his original regiment, when he was promoted to the Corps of Guides; and in 1869, on the Peshawur Brigade falling vacant, he succeeded General Donald Stewart in that post, relinquishing it on promotion to Major-General two years afterwards. In 1875 General Browne was selected to accompany his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales to India; and for his services in connection with the Royal visit was, in conjunction with his quondam Adjutant Dighton Probyn, selected for advancement to the knighthood of the Star of India. In the ranks of the 2d Punjab Cavalry and Guides, the name of "Sham Broon" is worshipped, and his fame as a daring cavalry leader, as a warm-hearted, kind commanding officer, as a marvellous shot, has spread from the Indus to the Sutlej, from the Kyber to the Baman. The Sikh sowars of the 2d will not readily forget the gallantry of their commander at Sirpooah, nor do the Afghan troopers of the Guides fail to remember the rugged soldier who trained them so well in the fort of Hoti-Mardan. After the prince's visit Sir Samuel Browne was nominated 'Director of Remount Operations,' and on the Lahore Division falling temporarily vacant, owing to the absence on sick leave of General Donald Stewart, he once more succeeded that officer. Unfortunately, just about this time, the government of India was deprived of the services of Sir Edwin Johnson,



the military member of the Viceroy's Council, who was compelled to take sick leave to England, and the choice of a successor fell on Sir S. J. Browne, whose wide experience of mountain warfare, and intimate knowledge of the Afghan people, peculiarly qualified him to advise Lord Lytton at this crisis."

To return to Ali Musjid, and the morning of the 21st of November. General Browne advanced with his brigade to a front attack on the fort, whilst he sent Brigadier General Macpherson, in command of two brigades, by a circuitous route to outflank the garrison, and, if possible, to cut off their retreat. It was not until near noon that General Browne came within sight of the fort. He at once occupied the Shagai ridge, over against Ali Musjid; and then an artillery duel at once began, and was kept up with some spirit for about four hours. The Afghan guns are said to have been well served, and they inflicted some damage upon the British troops; but they were eventually silenced by the forty-pounders from the English batteries. Meanwhile the brigade was pushed close up to the front, under General Appleyard; but as there was no sign of General Macpherson's arrival in position, the attack upon the fort was delayed, and night fell before it could be delivered.

The reader will be interested by the account of this first movement, and of its success on the following morning, as given by Mr. Archibald Forbes, who represented his paper as efficiently at this moment as he had done in the earlier stages of the Turko-Russian War. Writing from "Ali Musjid Camp," on Nov. 23d, Mr. Forbes said:—

"I have written not a few campaign letters under conditions of difficulty—on the battlefield, behind a hedge in a retreat, on the top of a railway carriage of a slow moving military train, and in an hospital, amidst the groans of the wounded and dying. But I don't think I ever tried to write a letter under more difficult conditions than those which accompany the penning of this one. Last night I found quarters of a sort in one of the tents of the Afghan en-

campment at the fort of the rock at Ali Musjid. These tents are full of all sorts of things, food, warm clothing (in a very dirty condition), birds in cages, pots, pans, and wooden bowls. The camp is supposed to be guarded from pillage by a couple of Sepoy sentries, but through it is the line of march of the whole force to the front. A detachment of Sikhs has been halted within its precincts waiting for the order to advance, and they are making the most of their time. I am in a state of siege, and every minute have to repel forcibly, and with forcible language, assaults made on my fortress. In a moment of incaution, while we had gone to look for some breakfast, the bedding of my companion disappeared, and I returned just in time to save my precious saddle-bags. If, then, an incoherency and want of connection should be particularly perceptible in the few sentences I shall have time to pen, let the above furnish the explanation.

"A military camp in India, unless it is a standing camp, presents a scene of confusion bewildering to one accustomed to the trim regularity of European camps. But General Sir Samuel Browne's camp at Jumrood on the evening of the 20th was a puzzle even to the most accustomed to Indian warfare. Head-quarters were all about everywhere, fresh men were continually joining and pitching their tents in the first spare place of ground they could find, then they wandered away in search of orders, and got wholly lost, unable to find either the source of orders or their own tents. The 2nd Brigade had paraded on an open space ere yet darkness had fallen, and its admirable appearance was the theme of universal praise. The Guides, under their gallant Colonel, Jenkins, went off as the advance guard, followed by a wing of the 17th British Infantry; and to the strains of inspiring music, the rest of the brigade, consisting of that splendid regiment, the 1st Sikhs, the rest of the 17th, and a battery of mountain guns, marched swiftly out of camp into the fast-falling darkness, the veteran brigadier, Colonel Tytler, tramping on foot at

its head. Its orders were to march away to the north-west, and bivouac for the night at a place called Lashora, at the head of a glen piercing the hills. At dawn it was to continue its march, climbing up, by the north side of Rhotas Peak, the great hill flanking the right of our advance up the pass on Ali Musjid, and coming down on a place called Kheti-Khesti, at the head of the defile beyond Ali Musjid; reach that spot, if possible, in time to block the Afghan retreat from Ali Musjid. At 2 A.M. the 1st Brigade, under the command of General Herbert Macpherson, marched out, consisting of the 4th Battalion Rifle Brigade, the 4th Goorkhas, and the 20th Bengal Native Infantry. It was bound also for Lashora, and was to follow the 2nd Brigade as far as a place called Suppre, on the north of the Peak of Rhotas, then it was to bend to its left, climb the Rhotas Peak, and pressing on crown the precipice of Rhotas, flanking the right of the main advance, and by clambering down, if possible, into the Kyber glen, bring a flanking fire to bear on the defences of Ali Musjid. The main advance, consisting of the 3rd and 4th Brigades, and the cavalry, was to depend materially on the successful achievement of the work assigned to them, and of the expected co-operation of these two detached brigades. In other words, the key-note of the strategy was the right *denouement* of a somewhat complex combination. Now, in warfare, combinations are always ticklish things; in an unknown, but assuredly difficult country, the device of a combination was fraught with the possibility, if not indeed, the likelihood of mischance.

"The morning of the 21st dawned cold and clear, but, long before the earliest grey dawn, the camp was all astir. Ponies were being saddled, and the saddles behind and before loaded with blankets, for the camp was not to follow immediately, and there was the certainty of a bivouac for two nights—perhaps for an indefinite period. Captain Mure, on whom devolved the thankless task of caterer for the head-quarter mess, had been in force on the previous evening with a gigantic and savoury

Irish stew, and he was again this morning successful with a rough, up-standing breakfast of tea, beef, and hard-boiled eggs. Then the march began, when the broad daylight had illuminated the mouth of the pass and the intervening region. There is a little clear space among the boulders flanking the road from Jumrood Fort and the mouth of the pass. Immediately in our front was the village of Jum, and its adjacent shrine overhung with acacia trees, and between the village and the shrine passed the narrow roadway. The general, with his staff, sat here on horseback to watch the march-past of the advance guard. As the wing of the 14th Sikhs, that led the advance, strode past with a long, swinging stride, the sunlight broke out and lit up with a golden glory the brown gully and grey crags of Sarkai and Rhotas. In the rear of the Sikhs, there marched a wing of the 81st Queen's, then came two companies of Native Sappers, with their mules laden with their tools, and then followed them Mander-son's fine troop of Horse Artillery (I.C.). This completed the advance-guard, which was under the personal command of Colonel Appleyard, the soldierly brigadier of the 3rd Brigade. Then followed, close behind, Dyce's mountain battery, which was to have gone with the 1st Brigade; but this the difficulties of the ground on that brigade's march had prevented, and so it formed part of the direct advance. In rear of it came a motley horde of doolie bearers and followers, all marching with drawn tulwars held religiously at the 'carry;' they had been served out with these for protection, but they had received no scabbards, only the naked tulwars. Behind these came Maggennis's battery of nine-pounders, then the forty-pounders under Wilson, and the rest of the 3rd Brigade. The 4th Brigade followed.

"Having watched the defile past for some time, the general went to the front, and there was a long rough canter till the head of the column was reached. Little knots of gaunt, squalid Afreedees stood on the hillocks by the wayside, and watched with keen eyes the novel



array of disciplined soldiery. Close to the mouth of the pass, three miles from Jumrood having been traversed, a picquet of the Afghans became clearly visible, cavalry men in red coats, perched on the top of an isolated peak, about three miles to our front. The Sikh advance, which had temporarily halted, was ordered forward, keeping the roadway along the bottom of the hollow, and the wing of the 81st followed in its track. At length the door of the Shadi Bhugiar Pass was reached and penetrated, the general leading the way. He pushed his pony up the steep isolated knoll that stands in its throat, and from beside the old tower on its summit scanned the scene in front. All that was seen of interest was the red-coated picquet on the peak in advance, quietly watching us. Upon the top of Rhotas, on our right, had been visible all along another picquet, whose camp fire had, during the night, glowed up against the dark sky. Behind there was a nasty grip, leading down into the level bed of the nullah. In view of the possibility of getting as soon as possible a long shot at the Afghan picquet, two of Manderson's horse artillery guns had been ordered forward under Captain Walsh. These were handsomely stayed down the grip with guy-ropes, and came along the bottom at a hard gallop in the true horse artillery style. Just where Mackeson's road leaves the bed of the hollow we had a nearer view of the enemy's picquet up on the peak of Koti Givat in our front, but it was still out of range of the guns. In the hollow the artillery waggons were left behind, only the guns coming forward along Mackeson's road. This road winds up the left face of the hollow till, by a gradual ascent, the summit is reached. Originally well engineered, and properly built, it remains in excellent preservation, its parapet still coated symmetrically with cement. Only in places have the hill torrents scored it, and near the top, the bridge known as 'Mackeson's bridge,' originally destroyed by the hill men, to hinder Pollock's advance in '43, is still unrepaired, but the gap has been filled up and made practicable with earth

and gravel. A hundred men of the 81st and the mountain battery, instead of ascending by Mackeson's road, held on up the bed of the hollow, acting as covering to the right flank of the main advance, and sweeping the projecting under features of the great Rhotas mountain. Soon after the head of Mackeson's road was attained there occurred a very bad bit of road—a steep ascent in a trench cut by art or nature through a narrow ridge. The mountain torrents had cut up the roadway, and Walsh's guns stuck in the gap for a little while, but ultimately surmounted the difficulty. Above this the ground opened out into a sort of rugged table-land, studded with low knobby hills and ridges; and on it our advance-guard deployed into skirmishing order, pressing forward rapidly. The skirmishers crowned a low-lying ridge, from the top of which the Afghan picquet was visible, distant perhaps a thousand paces. It had deployed, and the men had sent their horses to the rear, behind cover. About ten o'clock our Sikhs and the 81st detachment opened fire against the straggling party of the Afghans. There was some response—nothing to speak of; and the Afghan people quickly fell back, when the bugles sounded 'cease firing,' and the skirmishing advance was continued.

"At the top of this ridge the view of Ali Musjid first opened up to us. It stands on a precipitous isolated crag, everywhere naturally more or less scarped. Its summit either is level by nature or has been levelled by art, and on this summit is built the fort, covering entirely the flat surface. Roughly it is a square, with circular bastions at each corner, and one large one in the centre of its front looking down the pass, and there is a prolongation of the curtain down to a detached square tower on the slope of the crag opposite the Kyber glacis. It is built of rough stones, uncemented, and partly faced with mud, and as a fortification has no pretensions, although its natural strength is very great. The engineer who constructed the works, whoever he was, had a very fair notion of making a defensive system with the

means at his disposal. A great hill rises immediately behind Ali Musjid fort, its face almost precipitous. In front of it rise three isolated peaks; one—being the one to the proper left—is that on which the fort is built. The centre of the three is less precipitous, and was crowned by a rough stone work. The third has a steeply sloping, but practicable natural glacis in its front and on both flanks, but its top is quite precipitous, and here the Afghans had another work and two guns. I should have said that there were three guns in Ali Musjid, one on each bastion and one on the intermediate peak. From the right rear of the right hand peak a sort of ridge ran backward, touching or all but touching the steep face of the great hill in the rear of the whole position. At the point of juncture the Afghans had one gun in position. The three heights, connected after a fashion by stone breastworks, constituted a sort of defensive curtain, facing down the Kyber Valley, where it opens out at Lala Chena, and sweeping also the adjacent lower slopes and ridges bordering it. It gave cover also to alternative lines of retreat, one from the left rear, through the Kyber gorge, the other, which in the sequel they found the advantage of, by their right rear up a steep, rising hollow into the mountains. There were further defences. Down below Ali Musjid, on the waterside, there was a gun sweeping the meadow land below the fort, and a little way up the crag on the other side of the stream, on a mere ledge, there were three more guns, while there was yet one other gun in a regular eyrie higher up on the same side. The whole face of the position was studded with *sungahs*, or raised shelters of rude stone work, which the Afghan sharpshooters held with extraordinary tenacity up till nightfall.

“I return now to the narrative of the day’s work. Our skirmishers pressing on found the Afghan skirmishers in weak force in the Shagai ridge, whence a spattering fire soon dislodged them. There was one horseman who excited the admiration of us all. He rode slowly up and down in front of a ruined tower, with an

aspect of the most perfect unconcern, while a perfect hailstorm of bullets was sent in his direction. The range was a longish one, and the shooting of our men was no doubt disturbed by the long scrambling climb they had undergone. Anyhow, they could not hit this audaciously gallant Afghan, who, with a contemptuous salaam, finally turned and rode, with elaborate slowness, out of sight. Moving on, our advance gained the bluff, overlooking the narrow cultivated valley-land of Lala Chena, with its abandoned village on the further side of the stream. The section of road leading down into this valley-land, through which the Kyber stream flows on a broad shingly bed, is extremely steep, narrow, and rugged. The guns could not go down until the sappers had improved it, and they were brought up for this purpose. Their officer pronounced that it would require an hour’s labour before he could make it practicable, but in the meantime an easier, although more circuitous route was discovered. Our skirmishers swarmed down into the valley and crossed the stream, occupied the abandoned village of Lala Chena, and pressed on to the high ground above it. Walsh’s two guns came up, and, while we waited here for the forty-pounders, they were ordered to open fire on the fort, the range being about two thousand five hundred yards. Their practice did not at first sight seem very successful. Their shells for the most part failed to reach the fort, striking and exploding downward on the steep scarp in front of it. Their fire was, however, only *pour passer le tempe* till the forty-pounders should come up, and a messenger sent to the rear brought back word that they could scarcely be in position till an hour should have elapsed. It was at twelve o’clock that, according to the general’s expectation, Macpherson’s co-operation might be anticipated from the top of the precipice of Rhotas to our right of Ali Musjid, and the big guns would thus arrive just in time effectively to accentuate the combination. In the meantime a wing of the 14th Sikhs was sent forward to our right front, to feel their way over the successive



ridges projecting from about the base of Rhotas and constituting its lower features. In reply to the first shot fired by Walsh, a shell was fired from Ali Musjid that burst high in the air; but the second shot fired from the fort passed close over the heads of the staff on the bluff, and fell among some Sikhs a hundred yards behind. It was a blind shell; had it exploded it would have done some damage. As it was, it was exhumed and became the property of Colonel Waterfield, the Commissioner of Peshawur. Henceforth, in reply to Walsh's fire, the shooting from the guns of Ali Musjid was admirable; the range had evidently been correctly ascertained beforehand, and every shot fell close to us as we lay behind the knolls of the bluffs. At twelve o'clock the first forty-pounder came into action a little way in our rear, and Magennis's nine-pounders also threw in an occasional shell. Our fire was directed at all three of the enemy's main positions, but chiefly at Ali Musjid, and the dilapidated condition of that fort when we occupied it next morning proved that the fire had been much more efficient than we had imagined. Under its pressure the fire of the Afghan guns abated, and we had hoped that it was all but wholly silenced.

"But the day was advancing, and Macpherson on our right had made no sign. Anxiously were the cliffs of Rhotas scanned, but to no purpose. The waggons of our guns had been left behind, and their ammunition was waning ominously. We could not maintain this artillery fire indefinitely, and the question came to be what to do. It was now two o'clock. Macpherson was dumb and invisible. The effort had to be made by the two brigades with us, the third and fourth, or not at all. It was determined to attack. Appleyard took his 3rd Brigade on to the heights, on the left of the Kyber Valley, with intent to press forward and assail the right flank of the enemy's position by a turning movement. The 4th Brigade, with which General Browne remained, moved forward over the rocky ridges, direct in our front, confronting Ali Musjid, and having the potentiality of

working round upon its left. The operations took time, owing to the difficulty of the ground and the distances to be traversed. Caution, too, was the order of the day, in the lingering hope that Macpherson's co-operation might yet make itself felt; and our advance, at all events as regards the 4th Brigade, was not pushed energetically. The all but exhaustion of our artillery ammunition prevented the infantry advance from being covered by an energetic artillery fire. The Afghan position developed unexpected power of defence. Their guns, that had appeared to be silenced, re-opened, and with effect; fresh batteries, as the occasion arose for their employment, came into action. It was clear that an infantry attack, unsupported by proper artillery fire, must entail heavy loss; a loss unjustifiable in the all but certainty that, with the delay of a day, the co-operation of the two detached brigades would come into play. Major Cavagnari gave it as his opinion, from his knowledge of Afghan character, that, if we spared ourselves the loss and risks of an infantry assault, we should find Ali Musjid abandoned by the morrow's dawn; and it became apparent too that an infantry attack, if carried out at all, must, towards its closing stages, be conducted in the dark, over, too, unknown and precipitous ground. Under these circumstances it was reluctantly determined to desist for the night. Manderson's troop of horse artillery, which, following the bed of the stream, had come within direct view of the right flank of the enemy's position, and had come into action against it, was ordered back into cover. It had met with some casualties; one man and one horse had been killed, several men had been wounded. Lord William Beresford, one of Sir Sam's aides, was entrusted with the arduous and dangerous duty of descending from our height on the right bank, crossing the valley swept by the artillery and infantry fire of the Afghans, and ascending to the eminence on the left bank, to inform Appleyard of the resolution to desist from further action. Lord William successfully carried out the duty and Appleyard halted. But a portion

of his brigade was far in advance. Detachments of the 14th Sikhs and 27th Native Infantry had pressed on, and in the grey of the twilight were fighting their way up the steep grassy slope on the peak above which was the enemy's right flank position. In vain did the bugle sound the recall; its strains were borne unavailingly down the wind. The Afghans, behind their breastworks of stone, fought every step of the ascent, while the artillery of their left enfiladed the advance of our men as they struggled onwards and upwards. The end was disaster relieved by devoted bravery. A young officer of the 27th, by name Maclean, had rushed on with a handful into a spot where he found himself in deadly trouble. He called back for assistance with urgent vehemence to his support, commanded by Major Birch, in command of the 27th. That officer would not hear in vain the entreaty of his subordinate. He rushed forward, only to fall, shot dead in the effort. Those to whose succour he advanced fell back, and the gallant major's body remained abandoned out to the front. One of his young officers—a lieutenant, of whom every one speaks well, Fitzgerald by name—would not have it that his chief's body should be left there to the mercy of barbarians. He called on the men of his own command to follow him to its rescue, but they hung back. In angry despair, he called for fifteen volunteers from an adjacent detachment of the 14th Sikhs, and the appeal was nobly responded to. Fitzgerald and his Sikhs sallied out. He was twice wounded ere he reached Birch's body, but he raised it, and was aiding in its removal when a third shot killed him. Most of the gallant Sikhs fell around him. They had to be left where they fell; the Afghan fire was no more to be faced. Both the bodies were found yesterday morning unharmed, and at sun-down yesterday Birch, and his gallant subaltern, found a soldier's grave under a tree close by the head-quarter camp at the foot of Ali Musjid, the whole head-quarter staff paying by their presence fitting honour to valiant comrades who had fallen gloriously with their faces

to the foe. The advance with which they had pressed forward was subsequently withdrawn nearer to Appleyard's main body, and outposts were established for the night.

"The general bivouacked behind a rock on the height whence he had witnessed the concluding scenes of the day's operations. It was an anxious night, and there was little sleep for anybody. If Macpherson should give no sign in the morning, and if Cavagnari's speculation should not be justified, nothing remained but to go at the place and let the blood flow. Farwell, Appleyard's brigade-major, came scrambling across to us in the dead of night for orders. Then came Appleyard himself, his energy unquenched by his gallant toil of the day before, for he was ever with the first advance, and his tidings were somewhat sombre. His men had run short of ammunition. The place was grimmer to look at and to storm when viewed close at hand than from a distance. Many of his fellows had no food, and were in places where no food could reach them. And the guns, too, were short of their food; so that till the waggons should come up with ammunition their action must be restricted. Day broke, but the fighting did not recommence. A trader had been brought in, attempting to pass the foreposts, with information that word had reached Ali Musjid in the night of Tytler's approach to Kheti-Khesti, and that he had seen a large portion of the garrison escaping up the defile to avoid being trapped. Our glasses showed us the guns abandoned, and straggling parties leaving by the rear of the enemy's right, making their way up into the mountains. But still the general hesitated to take any decisive step. He was waiting for ammunition and for the execution of orders which would set his more distant troops in motion. We all went forward to a ridge which commanded the Afghan camp on the level by the bank of the stream under Ali Musjid. That seemed empty—the canvas fluttered in the wind in the untenanted camp. A few people were seen about the gun near the camp. Major Cavagnari averred they were country people looting. Still



the head-quarter remained up on the crag, to spy through glasses, to speculate, and to look serious. Then there arose a cry that a horseman was riding up to us, waving a white handkerchief. Was this an Afghan bearing offer of surrender? He drew nearer, and plainly was a Briton. As he sprang from his horse after his long scramble up the ridge in front of us, we recognised young Chisholme of the 9th Lancers—one of our unattached loafers. Being unattached, and having no duty, this enterprising young one had embarked on a tour of investigation on his own account. He had prowled up the bed of the stream, and had 'stalked' Ali Musjid. He had not found the vicinity abandoned. He found at the foot of the hill a handful of native sappers and a couple of officers. Colonel Appleyard was the first man to enter Ali Musjid. Chisholme was made welcome as the bearer of glad tidings, and we scrambled down the face of the crag, crossed the meadow, splashed through the stream, and stood by the Afghan gun on its margin under the beetling crag of Ali Musjid. Enfields lay about, ammunition of all kinds abounded, dead Afghans lay here and there in the hollows. The flimsy tents were full of food and clothing. A number of prisoners were brought in, who evidently expected to be shot on the spot. We found placidly sitting, chewing chupatties, some half-dozen peaceful residents of Ali Musjid, who, not being Afghans, had not run away. . . . . The general entrusted me with several telegrams, giving the good news to the viceroy and commander-in-chief, and away I rode back along our weary track of yesterday. Returning in the afternoon, I found the general established in one of the Afghan tents, and all the troops bivouacking in the valley below him. There is little to add to the telegrams already despatched. The march this morning onward is somewhat delayed till supplies arrive. Macpherson came into camp this morning. He had been long *en route*. The edges of the Rhotas precipice had proved inaccessible, and his march on the 21st had proved so arduous that he had to halt at Suppri. Yesterday he marched all day, and at

length has entered the defile some distance above Ali Musjid. Tytler's brigade is at Ali Musjid. The general has gone on with part of the troops; the rest march in the course of the day. The halt for to-night is at Lala Beg. To-morrow we expect to cross the Lundi Khana ridge, and reach Dakka, where it is believed two brigades will remain for the winter, the rest of the force returning to Peshawur."

The expedition was not destined to limit its advance to Dakka, nor was any portion of Gen. Browne's force to return to Peshawur. The writer of the letter just quoted could not foresee, even after the fall of Ali Musjid, that the resistance of the Afghans could be so feeble.

General Tytler had cut off a few of the retreating garrison, and others were fallen upon and plundered by the Afreedees, who were our allies in so far as they stood ready to attack whichever side might get the worst of the fighting. A number of prisoners were taken by the English, and sent to Peshawur, where they were well treated, and for the most part released, with sufficient money to enable them to reach their homes.

Meanwhile General Browne determined to push on, first to Dakka and then to Jellalabad. He had to pass through the country of the Mohmunds, a tribe supposed to be disaffected towards Shere Ali. Indeed, it was generally believed that English agents had already been on the spot, and secured the good-will of these people, who were not proof against a judicious use of gold. Dakka was occupied on the 23rd of November, and, during the next few days, not only Mohamed Shah Khan, chief of the Mohmunds, but also the head men of the Khoord Kyber tribes, came to the English head-quarters and tendered their submission. Amongst the loyal Afghans, who fled before the advance of our troops, was the Mir Akhor, the master of Shere Ali's horse, who fled from the Kyber into the Chura Pass, and attempted to restore the fortunes of his master.

We may let Mr. Archibald Forbes continue his account of General Browne's advance. On

the 28th of November he wrote:—"On the 22nd, in a windy tent at Ali Musjid, in the midst of a scene of wild disorder, I wrote a hurried letter for the last mail, which I trust may have reached its destination. On our arrival at Dakka, two days later, an hour offered for the inditing of yet another letter, which it was hoped might with luck be in time for the same mail, and so, in however perfunctory a manner, bring down the story of the expedition up to our entertainment of that expedition's interim goal. I made the most energetic use of my hour, and did despatch a letter of a kind. That letter, in company with despatches from the political officer to the viceroy, and from the general to the commander-in-chief, of telegrams to English papers, and of letters to quiet English homes, is now somewhere among the hills of Afghanistan. The ancient hillman who carried the bag, and who was accompanied by an escort, lost sight of that escort about the foot of the Lundi-Khana Pass, and came back to Dakka the same night with the tale that he had been fired upon and robbed of the mail-bag by a handful of prowling hillmen, who had intercepted him. His escort had gone through without having been interfered with. If the escort had carried the mail, it with them would have passed safe.

"It is fitting that two corrections should be here made of statements made in my letter which went forward by last mail recounting the details of the attack on Ali Musjid. I sent you what was told me circumstantially, and, to all appearance, on trustworthy information; but I have since learned beyond question that I have done injustice to a regiment on whose conduct no shadow of aspersion deserves to rest. Late in the afternoon of the 21st, a detachment of Appleyard's command—the 3rd Brigade—was pushed forward against the right front of the Ali Musjid position. The advance consisted of a party of the 27th N.I. on the left, under Major Birch, the gallant commander of the regiment, having on the right a party of the 14th Sikhs, under Captain Maclean. In support was a larger party of the 27th, under Captain Swetenham.

In reserve, considerably in the rear, was a part or the whole of the 81st Regiment. Lord William Beresford, carrying General Sir Samuel Browne's order for a cessation of the advance to General Appleyard, had crossed the shot-swept bed of the Kyber, had climbed the hills on which rested the left of our deployment, and had delivered his message. The bugles had sounded the 'retire,' repeated over and over again, in the anxiety that their message should be heard by the advance in the teeth of the swift wind that was sweeping down the valley. Swetenham heard the call, but, with an acceptance of responsibility which does him perhaps more credit than would the successful command of a forlorn hope, he dared to disobey it, for the sound had not reached Birch and Maclean out there to his front on the steep slope trending up to the Afghan position. They had been bidden to go on, and they were pressing on with a valiant persistence that had concern only for the object they were bidden to attain. Had Swetenham obeyed the recall he would have left them to their fate, and he held that his higher duty was to disobey and follow the fortunes of his advance. The Afghans and our people were exchanging a hot fire at a distance of about seventy yards. Birch, with a mere handful of his Punjaubees, was leading to the left; Maclean was to the front on the right with a few of his Sikhs. Birch was shot and fell. His subaltern, Fitzgerald, who was a little way behind him, went forward to rescue his fallen commanding officer. Fitzgerald either had been already, or was wounded in going forward; but the wound was not of a character to stop a brave man from a valiant enterprise. Maclean called out to him to ask whether he was badly hurt. He replied that he was indeed wounded, but felt able to go on in pursuit of his undertaking. 'I'm all right,' was the brave, simple way, the stout-hearted young Irishman put it. He reached his chief, only to fall over his body with a bullet through his body. And there they had to leave the two dead officers till the next morning, for the Afghan fire was close and thick, and Swetenham rightly judged that duty, rather than



sentiment, should be his guide, and that his care should be to remove the wounded. What I desire to make plain is especially that, according to the authentic information I now have, there never was any hesitation on the part of his Punjaubees of the 27th to follow Fitzgerald; that he never made to them an unresponded-to appeal; and that he had not to, and did not, appeal to the 14th Sikhs for volunteers to support him in the work he had set himself, unhappily with result so sad, of rescuing his fallen chief. Both regiments, according to overwhelming testimony, behaved equally well; and I make no apology for this long explanation of the real facts in correction of my previous statement, because I feel equally that there can be no greater hardship to a regiment than any detraction from its fighting merit, and that there can be no pleasure to brave men to have their prowess lauded at the expense of comrades of equal constancy and valour. The other error of my previous letter which I desire to correct is that the field battery (E 3, R.A.) engaged was spoken of in that letter as 'Magennis's battery,' whereas it should have been styled 'Hazlerigg's battery.' Major Magennis commands C 3, R.A., which is in the second division of the Peshawur Valley force, and had not the good fortune, therefore, to be engaged on the 21st instant.

"The Afghan dispositions for defence must have been made by some one possessed of considerable military knowledge. Not only was the position as a position well chosen, but its natural advantages were utilised to the utmost of the defensive appliances at disposal. There was no part of the chain of three peaks constituting the position whence a cross fire of all arms could not be delivered against an effort directed at any individual section. The excessive labour which must have been expended in arming the position moved one's surprise and admiration. Guns had been hauled up precipices, and great stores of ammunition accumulated about them. One three-gun battery on the proper left of the Kyber stream was perched on a mere ledge about half-way up the face

of a beetling crag, and its guns covered the level sweep along which lay the only line of approach to the Afghan camp at the mouth of the defile commencing at Ali Musjid. In rear of the chain of peaks were narrow sheltered hollows and slopes, which were utilised as camping grounds, lying so close under the shelter of the covering curtain that our fire could not touch them, and capable of affording safe cover for large reserves for resisting an actual assault upon the face of the position. Regarding the difficulties of the approach to Ali Musjid, I continue, as the result of more deliberate inspection, to entertain the opinions I have already expressed, that they are by no means serious when confronted by steady troops under skilled leadership. But of the Ali Musjid position itself, one must speak in far other language, and the longer and the closer one looks at it, the more his respect for it grows. Its vulnerability on the right, either a further extension of the continuity of the position, or the taking up of an isolated flank position, would go far to obviate. Resolutely held, the storming of it could be accomplished, if at all, only with great loss; and artillery fire brought to bear on it for ever could do no more than smash the stone-work that crowns the peaks, but that is no essential contribution to the defensiveness of the position. We have ample reason to congratulate ourselves on its evacuation, and on the consequent absence of necessity for carrying it by assault, and it is fair that it should be borne in mind that the evacuation of it was brought about, not casually, but by successful strategy deliberately planned. The presence of the head of Tytler's brigade at Kheti-Khesti, on the Afghan line of retreat, was the argument which the Afghans found convincing in favour of evacuation.

"For some three miles above Ali Musjid the defile has a terrible sublimity of aspect. The road—but the word is a misnomer, for there is no road—lies along the bed of the Kyber stream. Nowhere is the defile excessively narrow, and nowhere does the river-bed exhibit serious difficulties of thoroughfare; but the precipices, which

are in reality the scarp faces of mountains, hem in the gorge, in places actually overhanging it, so that from their summits rocks might be hurled down into the tortuous river-bed. The walls are so lofty that the sun's rays hardly ever enter this sullen chasm, and it is only when it has been passed that one breathes freely. At Kheti-Khesti there is a ruined village, which, like all other hill villages, has been fortified after a fashion. The pass opens out, there are a few small stony fields, a pond fringed by some stumpy trees, and here and there is a patch of scrubby grass. Just below Kheti-Khesti is the source of the Kyber—a well at the foot of a rock, out of the heart of which the clear cold water comes bubbling. It is this rock which is said to be impregnated with the antimony which is the traditional bane of the Kyber water. The aspersion is the result of an analysis by a Dr. Reid, made in 1839, but it has been characterised as erroneous; nobody with us has as yet, so far as known, made an analysis. On our way up to Kheti-Khesti we had passed several parties of soldiers of the Rifle Brigade, forming part of Macpherson's command, on their way to visit Ali Musjid, having obtained leave. The share of the turning operation allotted to Macpherson has already been explained in detail. In part he failed to accomplish the task assigned him, owing to the insuperable difficulties he encountered. He reached, indeed, the peak of Rhotas, only to find the position there abandoned; but when he attempted to advance to the edge of the Mooltanee ridge opposite Ali Musjid, and thence co-operate in the attack on that position, he found that the region was inaccessible, and the only alternative was to grope his way along till, in the course of the afternoon of the 22nd, he found a gap, through which, with immense difficulty, it was possible for him to descend into the main defile above Ali Musjid, about midway between that place and Kheti-Khesti. He estimates that, on the 21st, he marched, or rather climbed, a distance of close on twenty-five miles, and it is aggravating that all this arduous labour should have been under-

gone by soldiers burning for a share in the fighting, without an opportunity having afforded itself for the firing of a single shot. At Kheti-Khesti we found the greater part of General Tytler's brigade encamped, resting after the fatigue of the protracted and exhausting march it had undergone in effecting the turning movement, the success of which questionless brought about the evacuation of Ali Musjid. Its experiences of the difficulties of the Rhotas range were hardly less formidable than the difficulties which had proved insurmountable by Macpherson's brigade. At Suppri, where the two brigades had diverged, Colonel Jennings, of the Guides, had obtained permission from General Tytler to precede the slower advance of that officer's main body with a detachment of some five hundred men, partly Guides, partly men of the 1st Sikhs. This detachment, pushing on rapidly, had scrambled down into the Kyber hollow at Kheti-Khesti by the precipitous bed of a hill torrent, whose boulders and precipices, looked up to from below, seem too difficult even for goats. Jenkins's people could not get down on foot; they partly slid down in a less dignified, but more practical attitude, partly clambered on hands and knees. Near the foot Jennings sent his men to right and to left along the under features, but did not at once descend into the level space, or throw a party across it into the broken ground on the opposite side. A tried and bold frontier officer, Colonel Jenkins, may be trusted to have had good reason for refraining from either of these steps; but it seems none the less certain that the not doing so lost him the good fortune of capturing the commandant of Ali Musjid, with probably most of his superior officers. Jenkins got down on to the lower crags on the right of the pass about four o'clock, and about an hour later small detached parties of mounted Afghans came up the pass at a rapid pace. Fire was opened on these, and some execution was done. A few horses were killed, and about twenty were taken. Of these the riders, for the most part, observing in advance Jenkin's fire, had dismounted, and scrambling up a steep glen on the



left, made up into the mountains. A few were knocked over by his fire. Others, however, ran the gauntlet of it, and got clear away. One man, whose horse had been shot under him, came up to Colonel Jenkins's position, moving steadily through the bullets that whistled about, and, saluting, gave himself up. He had been a sowar in one of our native cavalry regiments, and had been forced to take service in the ameer's army, a service for which he expressed the most cordial disgust, for, although he had been made an officer, he received no pay, and was compelled to serve against his will. It was he who reported that the 'General Sahib' was ahead, and had been one of those who had ridden through the fire. But he does not seem to have known whether this 'General Sahib' was or was not the Mir Akhor, the high officer whom the ameer had sent down shortly before to encourage the garrison of Ali Musjid and to take the chief command there. The Mir Akhor was reported to be an old man, unable to travel rapidly. If so he could hardly have galloped a horse over rough ground under a heavy fire, and many hold the belief that he was among the number of those who escaped from Ali Musjid the other way, from out behind the right of that position up the glen, by which a path leads across into the Chora Pass, the route along which has its western *debouche* at Jellalabad. I ought to add, as furnishing a curious illustration of frontier soldiering, that Colonel Jenkins, finding the *ci-devant duffadar* of Afghan cavalry willing to take service with him, enlisted him on the spot in the ranks of the Guide cavalry. Mounted on one of the captured horses, he rode the next day's march, and was found useful as a guide when the Guide cavalry in the evening went on from Lundi Khana to take possession of the abandoned Dakka.

"I remained at Ali Musjid behind the head-quarter staff to write a letter for the mail, and had not set out until the afternoon of the 23rd. The general had gone forward in the morning with the 16th Sikhs, the 10th Hussars, and Manderson's Horse Artillery, picking up the

Guide cavalry as he passed Kheti-Khesti. It had been his intention to halt for the night in the upper portion of the Lalabeg Valley, and Captain Hill, of the 2nd Gourkhas, an old Cyprus friend, now acting with this force as Provost-Marshall, and myself jogged easily along, now passing a regiment halted to rest, now threading our way through a tangled knot of baggage camels, now diverging a little way to look at one of the nearest of the numerous fortified villages that stud the bottom and lower slopes of the long narrow trough of Lalabeg. The pass was no more a pass. There were little fields around us whose chief crop seemed stones, but on whose surface careful investigation showed a few green blades. A few cattle and an occasionally handful of sheep browsed on the rocky pasture land tended by boys or women, but for the most part the villages were abandoned. When one speaks of a 'village' the term must not be construed in its western significance. A hill-village of this strange region is *sui generis*. All you see of it from the exterior is a mud loopholed wall in the form of a square, with a tower—round or square, also of mud, and also loopholed, rising at one corner. Sometimes there are two towers. The means of ingress is furnished by a single door of heavy wood. As I failed anywhere to find an open door, I can give no account of the internal arrangements of one of these fort-villages. Probably these are primitive enough, but although the fortifications show how bitter must be the blood feuds between neighbours, and how utterly lawless and unsettled must the communities be, yet the attempts at tillage gave to the Lalabeg Valley an aspect of rude prosperity which was welcome indeed after the forbidding crags, beetling precipices, and brown barrenness which had constituted our previous experience of this hill country.

"We rode on till the afternoon was far spent, but saw no indications heralding an approach to Sir Sam Browne's camp. At the head of Lalabeg we passed the 10th Hussars, forming up on a plateau on the left of the road, and their re-

port was, that there was a bad place in the road in front, where one of Manderson's guns had come to grief, and that the road thus being blocked, the 10th and the Horse Artillery would probably halt here for the night. The general and his Sikhs had, however, pushed on, water being scanty, and how much further in advance they were nobody knew. All through Lalabeg there had been a gradual but decided ascent, and the rocky ridge in front of us shutting it in was the 'Khotul,' or crest of Lundi Khana, a position of singular natural strength, where there had been some apprehension that the Afghans had made preparations for a further stand. On several peaks of the ridge there are the ruins of extensive stone forts, and I doubt not that in the remote past this position was as formidable by art as it is by nature; but the fortifications are crumbling, and it remained for us to cope only with the natural difficulties. These were great. The road diminishes to a mere tortuous track, very arduous for wheels. Major Manderson, conducting it himself, had got his first gun past a very awkward corner overhanging a ravine, but his second gun had overturned just at the corner. Fortunately it had not fallen over the precipice, else probably the gun would have been lost. The two wheel horses had fallen on their backs in the overturn, and one overhung the precipice; the centre horses hung by the traces against the face of the crag; the leaders kept their footing on the track beyond the sharp bend. The wheel driver's horse had fallen on him, and the man was seriously hurt. The driver of the centre pair had scrambled up like a cat out of his danger when it had seemed inevitable that he must go down the precipice. But there was nothing for it but to cut away one wheel horse and the two centre horses, and let them roll down the precipice into the dry stony bed some eighty feet below. One horse was killed outright in the fall, the two others did not seem much hurt, and, picking themselves up, began to search for grass; but one had to be shot afterwards, and the other turned out to be seriously damaged.

Manderson had to extricate his guns, and halt in rear of this difficult bit of road until the sappers could make it practicable; but the 10th Hussars went on, and, overtaking the general, bivouacked in his camp in the valley at the foot of the ridge. For about a mile beyond the scene of Manderson's accident we found the road simply abominable, and we were moved to wonder how, before Mackeson had done anything to it at all, it had been possible for Sir Willoughby Cotton to bring not only his guns but his buggy back from Afghanistan by this route. But the bad place presently was succeeded by a stretch of capital road, blasted and cut into the face of the steep hills by Mackeson's artificers, and, except for a little superficial roughness, as good as when made nearly forty years ago, although during all the interval no heed had been given to keep it in repair. From the 'Khotul,' or ridge of Lundi Khana, down into the valley beyond, is a distance of a little over two miles, and in this distance there is a descent of about two thousand feet, but so well has the road been engineered that the fall is now here inconvenient. We reached the valley just at sundown, to find the general with the 14th Sikhs, which acts with the Guide cavalry, and was the only regiment he had brought on with him in bivouac on a stony little plain, on the margin of a little brook that skirted the base of a lofty crag, crowned by a rambling old fort in a state of decay. The Hussars came up just as darkness was falling, and took up a position close to the head-quarter camp. Tidings had arrived that the Afghans had abandoned Dakka, and that their cantonments there were being looted and about to be burned by the Mohmunds of Lalpoora and the surrounding hill country; so the general had sent on the Guide cavalry to occupy the place, and prevent its destruction. The distance of the Lundi Khana camp from Ali Musjid is over thirteen miles, and to Dakka is eight miles further, so that the Guide cavalry had had a hard day's work. Their onward march, too, had its risks, for the better part of it was in darkness, through a country not even nominally



ally friendly, and full of opportunities for ambushes. But they experienced no opposition, and on reaching Dakka found that most of the Mohmunds, having heard of their approach, and having carried off from the cantonments almost everything portable, had made themselves scarce."

Meanwhile a part of General Browne's column had been left behind at Ali Musjid, in order to garrison the place, and to secure the line of communications. The latter was by no means an easy task, for the whole country was infested by lawless plunderers, who gathered together in bands of from a dozen to two or three hundred, and indiscriminately attacked all who appeared to be at their mercy. The English troops were greatly harrassed by these petty attacks, and at one time there seemed to be a danger lest our communications should be effectually severed. It became necessary to make examples of these marauders; and various tribes and "villages" were punished for their misdeeds. Mr. Forbes gives a humorous account of one of these acts of retribution, which he describes as the "battle of Kuddum." Kuddum, a few miles from Jumrood, was a village, inhabited by a hill tribe, known as the Kookey Khails; and these men, after the capture of Ali Musjid, made several night attacks on isolated posts, on convoys, stragglers, signallers, grass-cutters, and whenever an opportunity presented itself. It was, therefore, determined to punish them.

On December 1st, writing from Jumrood, Mr. Forbes said:—"The army that went out against Kuddum consisted of two divisions. The first, or active division, consisted of perhaps fifty tatterdemalion-looking miscreants, variously armed. To this contingent attached the sonorous appellation of the 'loyal Kookey Khails.' The three bandits on wretched ponies were the Maliks, or headmen; the horde of squalid footmen were their henchmen, the other villagers. This band was to act, and awaited the signal to move on a knoll a little distant from the village. The force whose proud task it was to give a 'moral support' to these savages consisted of a column

in which all arms were represented. There was a troop of native cavalry, a company of native infantry, a mountain battery, and a company of British infantry. I forbear to designate more categorically these details, or to give the names of the officers in military charge, out of respectful sympathy for soldiers engaged in obedience to orders, and therefore not responsible for the humiliation of their position. Major Cavagnari engaged in the zealous performance of his duty according to the lights of 'frontier policy,' and on whom individually I would not be understood as conveying the slightest reflection, conducted the operations, the military force, as also the tag-rag and bobtail whom it countenanced, being under his directions.

"The column left Jumrood soon after noon, and marching for some distance up the river-bed, gained finally the reverse slope of the low ridge looking down on Kuddum from the north. The men lay down awaiting orders; the officers stood about the summit to watch the operations of our 'allies.' Their rôle was to burn the fortified dwellings, or 'bourjes' of the malcontents, of whom it appeared there were four families. Negotiations with these on a 'tribal footing' had been attempted, and had failed. Had the malcontents paid the fine imposed on them by the Maliks, they and their abodes would have gone scatheless, and the distant and uncertain 'imposition of revenue' on the tribe would have constituted the sole retribution for the treacherous murder of British soldiers. But the malcontents had contemptuously refused to pay a fine, and so their residences were to be destroyed. Due notice of intentions had been given, and the malcontents had removed all their belongings.

"The commencement of hostile operations was not imposing. The Maliks, and their crew of banditti, marched in a long straggling line up to the hillock on which stood the 'bourj' first doomed to destruction. Close by it they halted and squatted down, engaged, as it seemed to me, in a friendly consultation with its male inmates. The women of the latter were visible in the enclosure surrounding the tower, apparently in the

possession of perfect equanimity. The rest of the villagers sat listlessly about their isolated dwellings, or lounged with easy indifference over the mud walls constituting their cattle enclosures. A total absence of excitement—I had almost said of concern—was the leading characteristic.

“The consultation appeared to break up, and sundry figures, from bourgeois as well as from that around which our allies were squatting, were observed to be taking their leisurely way across the bed of the stream, toward the edge of the low table-land beyond. These were the psuedo-Ishmaelites going out into the desert. It appeared that they had hardened their hearts, and refused point blank to pay the fine imposed by the Maliks, on whom fell thus the compulsion of originating blood-feud by causing their neighbours’ thatch to smoke.

“But the ruthlessness of the blood-feud being as yet in embryo, there was no sort of hurry or flurry about the business in hand. Our allies sat down and waited—some smoked—while the women of the malcontents leisurely bundled their last rags together, slung their brown brats on their hips, and drifted away after their masters across the bed of the stream. Then our allies arose in their might, and set fire to the thatch of their hapless co-villagers’ habitation. There was smoke enough to engender any amount of blood-feuds, and presently there was fire; but all that could burn were merely some reeds used for thatch, and a few wretched rafters. The solid stone walls laughed at the flames, and all the furniture and belongings had been removed. Our allies having made this blaze, sat down on the hillock to look at it. Presently a volley was fired by the malcontents who had collected on the edge of the table-land, on the other side of the stream. The volley was fired apparently in the direction of our allies, who, gathered on the hillock, in a dense clump, afforded, at a distance of about three hundred yards, as good a mark as the proverbial haystack at ten paces. I need not say that the volley did no execution, nor did the spattering fire,

delivered with much semblance of animation as our allies leisurely went through the formality of getting under cover. The dictates of common decency demanded that they should return the fire—had we not supplied them with arms and ammunition? Accordingly, having taken up cover, they blazed away in the direction of the slowly retreating malcontents, who sauntered off, popping innocuously as they departed.

“A volley from the Martini-Henrys carried by the English soldiers in the supporting column might have told against the malcontents before they broke up from the edge of the table-land; but it had been omitted to get the English soldiers into position for the chance of such an opportunity; and by the time they could be brought up, the opportunity had dwindled away. Presently, however, a chance seemed to offer for the use of mountain guns against a knot of men who had congregated behind a breastwork. But there had been an omission to order the mountain guns into position and readiness for action, and by the time they could be brought up and got ready to be fired, this second opportunity had all but passed away. A few rounds were thrown away from the Martini-Henrys, and two well aimed but ineffectual shots were fired by the mountain battery; this comprised the share of the supports in the active operations of this glorious day.

“Our allies proceeded to burn the thatch and rafters of the residences of the remaining malcontents. But the head of one offending family became wise at the eleventh hour. The moment for his conflagration had all but arrived, when he followed the illustrious example of the coon, and informed the Maliks that he would come down, and that they need not fire. In other words, he paid the fine imposed for tribal disobedience, and was left in peace to enjoy his plunder, and to ruminate over his blood-guiltiness. This man was reported the leader of the malcontents who had attacked our picquets, and assailed our communications. On his hands is probably the blood of the slaughtered signaller. But, under the peculiar operation of ‘frontier



policy,' he, having paid up the money-penalty inflicted by his tribe for his breach of tribal loyalty, flourishes serenely and suffers no further punishment for his murdering and plundering than that involved in his share of the remote and problematical 'imposition of revenue.' I don't know whether he adds a sense of humour to his other characteristics, but I could not help picturing him smiling, with sardonic grimness, up at the British column on the heights above, strong, indeed, in the potentiality of inflicting righteous punishment, but their strength degraded to a miserable impotency by 'frontier policy.'

"When all the burning was done, it was proposed to blow up the stone-work of the gutted towers; but it is needless to state that there were no appliances for such a purpose. 'Our allies' joined us on the height, each face bearing an aspect of complacent smugness that was extremely edifying and comforting. The army then marched back to Jumrood. The same night a sort of night attack, after the yelling, scrambling, noisy, innocuous manner of these hillmen, was made on that camp, and the attack is said to have been made by the Ishmaelites whom our allies had burnt out in the morning. If this were indeed so, it conclusively establishes that the hillmen have a keen sense of humour, and that our 'frontier policy' is a favourite butt of that humour. I had read of the frontier policy of such men as Nicholson and Mackeson, and that the hillmen so feared the former that they made a god of him, and still worship his name while they tremble at it. The hillmen, to do them justice, are not an abject race; but I can conceive of no race so abject as to tremble at the policy of which the battle of Kuddum, as I have told it without bias or exaggeration, is an exemplification, not apparently regarded as exceptional.

Meanwhile the other two columns were making a slower, but an equally sure and safe advance. The Kuram force, under Major-General Roberts, which had been assembled at Thall, in the Kohat district, crossed the frontier on the

morning of the 21st of November, and at once took possession of a small fort, which had been deserted by the Afghans. From hence the troops marched eight miles further, and occupied a second fort, at Ahmedshama, from which the enemy had retreated on the same morning. Here General Roberts halted for a time, and, convoking an assembly of the hill tribes, made arrangements with them respecting the future supply of forage and fuel.

It was not thought probable that any notable advance would be made by this column during the winter season, which was already very severe, and which rendered almost impassable what was a very difficult route in the best of times. Military critics spoke of the Kuram fort as the furthest point which General Roberts was likely to reach before the spring; and they very reasonably pointed out that the Peiwar Khotal Pass was virtually impregnable, if well defended by an adequate number of determined men. Most of these calculations were upset by the skill of the general, and the gallantry of his troops.

A correspondent with this column, writing to the "Times" from the camp at Thall, on the 28th of November, gives some indication of the position of affairs one week after the crossing of the frontier. "Nearly two months," he says, "have now passed since the first detachment of troops destined for the column to be assembled in the Kuram Valley arrived at this place. The excitement and enthusiasm, which were only natural to all of us, on hearing that we were at last in a fair way to attain the end and object of every true soldier's desire, soon wore off, and we settled down almost immediately to the very commonplace routine of camp life. The two regiments forming the first detachment mentioned above, and both belonging to the Kohat garrison, were the 5th Punjaub Infantry, and the head-quarters and wing of the 5th Punjaub Cavalry. The distance from Kohat to Thall is sixty-four miles, and this was traversed in four marches. The road and scenery are much the same as on most other parts of the frontier, the

principal characteristics consisting of an interminable series of moderately high hills, enclosing valleys of from one thousand to three thousand yards in breadth. These hills are completely devoid of any vegetation more picturesque than the wiry camel-thorn, and bristling 'mazra,' or dwarf palm. Not a tree beyond their whole line relieves the dull monotony of the landscape. The valleys are generally cultivated, although it seems wonderful how they can be so fruitful, as the ground in its natural, untilled condition, would appear to be incapable of producing anything more edible than stones. This, at least, would probably be the impression left on the mind of any one coming out here at this season of the year. But such is not the case. I had an opportunity of seeing a part of the country in the spring, and the transformation scene was complete. The road passed through miles and miles of wheat and barley, smiling in the bright sunlight and nodding to the breeze, and each little breath of air, as it was wafted gently over the rich valley, brought with it the delicious fresh smell of the field.

"A battery of Horse Artillery and another regiment of Native Infantry soon joined the first detachment. It really is wonderful how the gunners manage to get their guns and waggons over such impracticable ground. Of course, there had been a certain amount of preparation made in the way of road-making; but the executive engineer of Kohat had very short notice given him, and had great difficulty in getting the coolies to do any substantial work. How English people would laugh if they saw the native of this part of the world at work on a road. One spade can only be worked by two men, and the labour is divided in the following comical manner:—One man holds the spade by the handle, and scrapes and shuffles the stones and sand to the side of the road, while the other, with a rope tied round the lower part of the handle, next to the blade of the spade, stands in front of him, and assists him in his labours by pulling the rope, which, of course, drags the spade towards him. While on this subject I

may also observe that the Bombay coolies, when first presented with wheel-barrows, used to carry them on their heads, and it was with the utmost difficulty they were eventually induced to put them to their proper usage. No wonder, then, as I said before, considering the amount of actual labour performed in a day by two coolies (it is impossible to calculate the amount done by one man, for reasons as above) that the road was not quite as fit as it might be for wheeled traffic when the Horse Artillery marched over it. Anyhow, they turned up all right, and although their horses were a little too fine drawn, yet they seemed a powerful, big-boned lot as a rule, and capable of dragging the handy little nine-pounder over almost any ground, if necessity required. The next regiment to arrive was the 5th Goorkhas. A more remarkable type of man than a Goorkha does not exist. In the first place, they are all hill men, and, therefore, invaluable in any frontier warfare. Their absurdly small stature is compensated for by their great daring, activity, and courage. Their principal idea of happiness is bloodshed; but, at the same time, they only exhibit this temperament on service, and at all other times, when their passions are not roused, they are the most charming and good-natured set of people of any natives of India. They laugh and chaff and enjoy a joke like an Englishman, and, I believe, are not too particular about caste. Each man, besides his ordinary soldier's equipment of a rifle, carries a kind of sword, or rather dirk, called a 'cookery.' Their curved blades are always kept as sharp as a razor, and the astonishing rapidity with which they can clear a space for an encamping ground proves how ably they can use this, their natural and national weapon of defence, or rather attack. Their cast of feature is almost Chinese. During the frontier campaign, this time last year, against the Jowaki Afreedees, they are said to have told their non-commissioned officers that if the general commanding would only give half the regiment leave to go off independently into the hills for a few days they would guarantee to return in less



than a week, having killed or captured every Jowaki in the country.

"For some time after this we all remained encamped on one plain and more or less in line. Two of the regiments had their bands with them. The confusion of sound at *reveille* in the morning and tattoo at night was most peculiar. As we were all ordered to keep one regular camp time, the natural consequence was that each trumpeter and bugler blew off his own particular regimental call at the same instant. There also appeared to be a certain amount of rivalry as to who should get the first start. Along the front of the whole encampment ran a low ridge on which the quarter guard of each regiment was posted, and standing at this point you could see the Kuram river, which at Thall divides our territory from that of the ameer, sweeping along the middle of its bed with great velocity. Even at this season of the year it runs at a speed of ten miles an hour and is a very awkward stream to ford, and when the rains come on would be quite impassable for days. On the opposite bank appeared the first signs of the ameer's rule in the shape of a fort. I say a 'fort,' because it looks like one, and was evidently built with a view of being made defensible in case of need. Its shape is square, with a tower at each angle, and one in the centre. Its name is the somewhat uneuphonious one of 'Kapuylangi;' but its uses, up to the present, have been only those of peace. It is a 'Thana,' or, in other words, a sort of police-station, where the government officials of the ameer raise a toll on each camel coming into British territory from Cabul at the rate of four rupees a head. This ought to prove a very fair source of income to the ameer considering the number of camels that come in through Kohat and Bunnoo laden with boxes of Cabul grapes. These grapes are large and white, and are very neatly packed, each grape separately, in small, round boxes, containing three layers a piece. Each layer is divided by a surface of cotton wool. The price of a box is about 8d., or three for a rupee (supposing a rupee and 2s. as equi-

valent!). The garrison of this post consists, I believe, of about eighty men. Of course, until war was actually declared, no one was allowed to cross the river. One afternoon I went with another officer to have a closer inspection of the Thana. We rode along the left side of the bed of the river, which at this season of the year is all dry shingle, except an occasional quicksand, which, however, one very soon gets to know the look of, with a view to avoid it, as the Yankees say, like a rattlesnake. We soon got opposite to the Thana, and pulling up our ponies got out our field-glasses for a look. This, I think, must have been the first experience of our friends on the other side of a reconnoitring party. About thirty of them turned out of the fort and came down to the edge of the high bank on which it is built. They were apparently unarmed, but presently we observed two men detach themselves from the rest and move down the bank. A flash of light betrayed to us the barrel of a musket sparkling in the sun. Its owner, who seemed in a very accurate position for shooting, crouched under a bush at the very edge of the bank. We now reflected that it was about time to retire, as the temptation to them might become a little too strong, and I cannot imagine a more inviting mark than a man standing straight in front of you with his arms raised up in the position that they are when looking through a field-glass. We made a graceful movement in another direction. It was slow and dignified, but retrograde. Poor fellows, where are they all now? When the column crossed the river the other day there was not a sign of any of them except three little children left behind in their hurried flight. . . .

"One has little idea of the vast arrangements that have to be made in the way of commissariat supplies and carriage before a force can be moved. Even for this comparatively small column of only about six thousand men supplies and carriage on a gigantic scale have been collected; and one cannot help wondering what it would be for an army of eighty thousand or one hundred thousand. Thousands and thousands of

bags of grain are collected here and placed in an enormous enclosure under a commissariat guard. Lines of camels stretching literally for miles stream along the roads, going up to the front or simply coming back from grazing. It is on these occasions that one observes how completely helpless and resourceless British troops are compared with native. One squadron of British Cavalry apparently requires more carriage than half-a-dozen regiments of Irregular Cavalry. There is no doubt about it that the Britisher is made uncommonly comfortable at all phases of his soldiering; but he is, after all, well worth it, and each death represents a loss of at least £100 to the state.

"We have had only three exciting events in camp up to the time of the advance. One was the building of the bridge over the Kuram river, a work of no inconsiderable difficulty, but which was ultimately successfully accomplished under the superintendence of a very hard-working and able young engineer officer. The second was the death of a syce, or native horse attendant. The third, the murder of a Goorkha. The syce was shot through his own carelessness. Several convoys of grain, under a military escort, had come up from Bunnoo to Thall along the bed of the Kuram river. Although Bunnoo and Thall are both in British territory, yet some of the intermediate country is independent territory belonging to the Cabul-kheyl Waziris. It appears that these men, though disposed to be quite friendly with us, had their feelings slightly ruffled on account of permission for our convoy to pass through their territory not having been formally asked for, through some inexplicable misunderstanding with the civil authorities on this side. The result was, that seeing a syce walking along all alone, a long way behind the convoy, which he had no business to separate himself from, one of the Cabul-kheyls fired and killed him. The assassin was eventually handed over to us, and though we were unable to punish him for the murder, as he belonged to independent territory, yet, in earnest of good faith, his tribe paid a sum of Rs.300 to the family of the syce. The mur-

der of the Goorkha remains a mystery to this day. These daring little men are most energetic fishermen, and it is supposed that he either crossed the river, although strictly contrary to orders, unable to resist the seductive appearance of some nice quiet pools on the other side, or else that, going too deep into the river on this side, he lost his footing and was swept across. The day after he had disappeared every effort was made to find him. A small party of the 5th Punjaub Cavalry searched the ground most carefully, and in every likely place, until night-fall, but without success. Two days afterwards his body was found, terribly gashed and mutilated, two or three miles down stream on the other side of the river. From this it appears that he had crossed the river in safety, but was so absorbed in his fishing that some enemy must have lurked up in his rear and cut him down before he could defend himself. Of course no notice could be taken of this. War, as we all know, was about to be declared in a day or two, and naturally the cold-blooded Afghan, who also knew that we should be at open enmity with him almost immediately, saw no harm in seizing an unlooked-for opportunity of striking a blow successfully while he could."

Another correspondent of the same paper is more circumstantial in regard to the movements of General Roberts's column during the first days. His brief diary of events will bring us up to the end of November, when the English troops found themselves at the foot of the Peiwar Pass. Writing on the 27th, from Mahomed Azim's Fort, he says:—

"In order to give a correct idea of the situation of this column, I must give a brief *resume* of our doings since the 20th inst. On the afternoon of that date General Roberts, at Thall, received the long-looked-for news that he was to advance the following day, cross the Kuram and open the ball in this direction. The regiments were, with the exception of the 2nd Battalion 8th, in good health, all longing to be chosen for the attack on the little fort of Kapuyangi, which frowned at us from the other side of the river. The bridge



over the stream was finished on the afternoon of the 20th, the commissariat stores were well up, and the best part of the warm clothing for followers was in, so we were well prepared for whatever the morrow might bring. That this column was fairly prepared to advance was mainly owing to the indefatigable exertions of our general, whose early training and knowledge of staff work in the field peculiarly fit him for making the arrangements for this kind of force. The plan of attack for the 21st was that the squadron of the 10th should cross the river just before dawn by a ford about a mile above Thall, and then advance by a path screened by hills from the view of the fort, and debouch into the plain to the north-west, and thus cut off the retreat of the garrison. At the same time, the 29th Native Infantry Regiment and No. 1 Mountain Battery were to advance by the bridge and make a direct attack on the fort; the 12th Bengal Cavalry to cross by a ford just above the bridge and swing round over the plain to the left of the 29th, and support, if necessary, the squadron of the 10th.

"November 21.—As the first streak of light opened up the scene we could see from the heights on the left bank of the stream the squadron of the 10th just appearing on the plain below, the 29th beginning to cross by the bridge, and the Mule Battery and 12th Bengal Cavalry all ready to advance. When dawn had fully broken the plan of attack was developed and the fort completely surrounded. It was a very fine scene, the sun rising behind us, and the mist hanging thick over the river and in streaks over the plain. In front, range after range of hills could be seen stretching far away into the distance, and culminating in the Safeid Koh, the cavalry and infantry advancing to the attack, all aiding to render the scene most striking; more especially if you add that after weeks of weary waiting the Rubicon was at last to be crossed. There was only one thing wanting—an enemy. The fort had been evacuated in the night, and when we entered three small children were its only occupants. It was satisfactory, however, to see

how well the plan of attack had been timed and carried out, though the columns were separated by a range of hills and one road, which was traversed in darkness, quite unknown to any one but the native guide. The general on arriving at the fort at once ordered all the cavalry to advance under Colonel Gough towards Ahmed-a-Shamu Fort, with the view of catching up the enemy, the 29th and No. 1 Mountain Battery to follow as quickly as possible. We made our way as well as we could along the rocky paths, leading through one long defile, with position after position on either side, where a few resolute men well handled could have finished us off at any moment. Our guide, mounted on a trooper's horse, silently led the way. At last he informed us that if we would climb to the top of the ridge in our front we should see the Ahmed-a-Shamu Fort in the plain below. So, dismounting, six or seven of us went up and then had a fine view of the Kuram Valley and the fort, which appeared a very similar one to that at Kapuyangi. It further resembled Kapuyangi one in that it was deserted. So thus two forts came into our possession without a shot being fired. They will prove most useful as depots for supplies. The general arrived on the plain with the Mule Battery on the 29th, and ordered them and the cavalry to encamp for the night close to the fort, while he himself with the Head-quarter Staff returned to Kapuyangi by another route, spending the afternoon in trying to discover an alternative road for the artillery to advance by, as the one we had travelled over in the morning would take weeks to put in order. We were successful in our search.

"November 22.—The 23rd Pioneers crossed the river and at once set to work to make the road between Kapuyangi and Ahmed-a-Shamu. The Pioneers are a very fine regiment; the men can turn their hands to anything, as they look all over like business, whether for road-making or fighting. This day the 1st Brigade crossed the river and encamped at Kapuyangi.

"November 23.—Head-quarters moved on to Hazir Pir, about twenty two miles from Kapu-

yangi. The road is along the river the whole way. For the first sixteen miles the route is nothing better than a defile; after that the valley opens out, and at Hazir Pir we encamped on a fine open plain. It was a long march, and our native followers were nearly dead before they reached camp. On this day the squadron of 10th Hussars, 29th Native Infantry, 12th Bengal Cavalry, and Mule Battery reached Hazir Pir, the 1st Brigade Ahmed-a-Shama, and the 2nd Brigade crossed the river and encamped at Kapuyangi.

"Foot of Peiwar Pass, Nov. 29th. On the 24th of November the advanced party pushed on again to the southern end of the Darwaza Pass. The road led through a fine open valley. The valley was quite destitute of villages, which was curious, as the ground looked very fertile, and can only be accounted for by the extreme uncertainty of tenure of property. All the people of the country through which we have passed as yet seem to rejoice at our advent, having a thorough hatred of the ameer and his tax-collectors. We push on again on the 25th through a narrow, difficult pass, and after about fourteen miles of marching see Mahomed Azim's fort below us in the plain. The fort is situated on rising ground to the north of the Kuram stream, and, unlike all the others we have seen, is not commanded by adjacent hills. As the advance guard approached the stream hundreds of villagers came out to welcome us. I never have seen such a cut-throat-looking lot. The general, with the advance guard, followed by several hundred of these ruffians on ragged ponies, proceeded to inspect the fort. The enemy had left one dismounted gun in the fort. The whole place had been looted by the villagers, and we caught some of them in the act of carrying away beams. This was at once stopped and a guard put over the place. The fort is built on the usual principles, four sides with towers at each angle; but this one was much stronger than the other two we have taken, and had an outer wall and a ditch. The enemy had evacuated the previous day, taking with them twelve guns,

and the inhabitants assure us they can never get these pieces over the pass. This is indeed good news, for after the capture of twenty-two guns by the Kyber column we are most anxious to do something in the same line. Unfortunately, all our followers are completely knocked up, and we must wait for our two brigades to come up. This is very tantalising, as one cannot believe that they will not be able to get these guns up the Peiwar Pass, and once in position there they will, no doubt, give us some trouble. After a very cold night, we start as soon as the sun is well up with two squadrons of the 12th Bengal Cavalry on a reconnaissance towards the Peiwar Pass. We can see the pass quite plainly from our camp, and every one is of opinion that our maps are wrong, and that the distance is not nearly so great as laid down. After advancing for about seven miles over the plain, we had to admit that the maps were right, and that the foot of the pass is quite eighteen miles from our camp. We advanced to within four miles of the pass and could distinctly see three regiments, with several guns, halted for the day at the end of the plain. It was rather hard to retire, and one could see that Colonel H. Gough, V.C., was dying to make a dash at the enemy. But General Roberts wisely restrained him, and, after a good look, we returned to camp with a firm belief that the guns would fall into our hands whenever we were prepared to advance. The enemy, as they retired, fired all the villages at the foot of the hills. The 1st Brigade, consisting of 2nd Battalion 8th, 5th Punjaub Infantry, and 2nd Punjaub Infantry, under Brigadier General Cobbe, arrived in camp on the 26th, very much done with the long march through the Darwaza Pass. The following day the 2nd Brigade and the guns (field artillery and  $\frac{1}{2}$  G. 3) came up. The whole division is now complete, and the advance is ordered for the 28th. At 4 A.M. on the 28th all our tents are struck, and in bitter cold we start for the Peiwar Pass. The cavalry lead the way and send out vedettes far into the distance, covering the whole division, which marches by two routes; the 2nd



Brigade proceeding by a path leading along the foot of the hills which bound the plain to the north, and the 1st Brigade taking the more direct road. The pass bears as near possible north-west from our camp. By 11 A.M. we are within four miles of the pass and learn that the enemy is making desperate efforts to get his guns up the hill. The 29th Native Infantry, and the 5th Punjab Native Infantry, are at once directed to the west in order to turn the heights on that side of the pass and take the enemy on the left flank. The remainder of the 1st Brigade was in support. The 2nd Brigade, which had fallen rather behind, was ordered to make the direct attack on the pass. By 3 P.M., the skirmishers of the 1st Brigade came into action, but we were too late to stop the guns reaching the top of the pass, and they at once opened a brisk and very accurate fire upon us. Our men were completely done by the march, so General Roberts determined to halt for the night. Casualties, one officer and six men wounded, and one man of the Mule Battery killed. All the bullets which have been extracted are for Enfield rifles, so our friend Shere Ali is using the weapons that we so kindly gave him some few years ago. It would never have done to have attempted to take the heights that night, as the position is one of great strength, and the men defending it were evidently well handled. We shall want quite two days to recruit and rest our men."

It was not long before a very notable success was gained by the Kuram column. On the 1st of December, General Roberts remained quiescent, partly in order to give time for his supplies to come up with him; for he had himself hurried forward with great haste in the hope of overtaking the retreating Afghan force, before it could take refuge in the mountain pass. On the same night, however, he executed a brilliant plan, whereby he made himself master of the very strong position of the Afghans, and at once put an end to all regular opposition in that direction. This he effected by taking a portion of his force over the Sapingawai Pass, on the night of the 1st of December, so as to take the

Afghans in flank, at a point which they had believed to be wholly inaccessible to an army; whilst he simultaneously ordered a front attack to develop as soon as the flank movement had revealed itself.

General Roberts sent a brief account of this victory to the viceroy at Lahore in the following terms:—"Peiwar Kotal, December 3rd. I turned the enemy's position by a flank march over the Sapingawai Pass on the night of the 1st instant. The road was extremely difficult, and the distance longer than was expected. We reached the enemy just at daybreak, and took them completely by surprise. The 72nd Highlanders and 5th Goorkhas drove them successively from their several positions, both regiments vyeing with each other. The turning force then tried to reach the Peiwar Kotal, but owing to the difficulties of the ground, and the densely wooded hills, the assault of the Kotal could not be delivered from that side. I therefore decided to withdraw the troops from this line, to place the column threatening the enemy's rear, and to attack the Kotal this morning.

"The movement, aided by the efficient working of the 8th Foot, and 5th P. I. from the direction of our camp, had the desired effect of driving the enemy from the Kotal, which our troops occupied about 4 P.M. The enemy had been reinforced by four regiments of infantry from Kushi the previous evening, and made a very obstinate resistance. The artillery especially was well served. Their defeat was complete. They are reported to have lost heavily. We have got fifteen guns and a large quantity of ammunition. Two or three guns in addition have been abandoned on the hills, and will be secured.

"Our loss, considering the nature of the country, and the numbers opposed to us, was moderate. Two officers, Captain Kelso, R.A., and Major Anderson, 23rd Pioneers, killed; General Cobbe, and Lieutenant Munro, 72nd Highlanders, wounded—neither very severely. The number of soldiers killed and wounded is about eighty. The troops underwent great exertion

and exposure, very trying at this season. All behaved as soldiers should, and are in excellent spirits.

"The wounded are being sent into Kuram. I hope to move on towards Shutar-Gardan on the 5th inst."

In connection with this engagement, a correspondent with the Kyber force related a curious story which had been brought in by a reconnaissance party. It seems that merchants coming from Cabul had met groups of the ameer's soldiers retreating from Peiwar Kotal; some were almost naked, a few had arms, and they were in straggling groups. These men had crossed the Suffoid Koh by some of its passes, and they reported a great victory over the English. "According to their account, they had killed over a thousand of their enemies, but they acknowledged that it had been a hard fight, and that they had lost about five hundred. When asked why it was they had run away, they said that some other tribe at enmity with them came in behind, just at the moment of victory, and began to loot their camp, and they had to turn back on them, and were then forced to run away and leave the place. This will no doubt be the tale they will tell at Cabul when they get there. One would like now to hear what was the Cabul version of the Ali Musjid affair." From other sources we know that the fugitives carried tales of victory to Cabul, which were repeated to the Russians in Tashkend, and even partially believed by the latter.

A regrettable incident attended the execution of this movement. The flanking force, which was sent over the Sapingawai Pass on the night of the 1st, was ordered to proceed in the greatest silence. It was manifestly important that the enemy should be taken completely by surprise, and should not receive the slightest indication of our approach. As the force drew near to the ridge behind which the Afghans were encamped, two shots were suddenly fired from one of the native regiments, which was leading the march. The force was immediately halted, and an English regiment was ordered forward into

the first position; after which the advance was continued. An inquiry was subsequently made; and one man, to whom the act of treachery seemed to be brought home, was shot.

General Roberts continued his march, and reached the Khost Valley on the 6th. Here the deputy-governor of the province, and some of the maliks, or native chiefs, came into the camp and made their submission. But it was evident that the people were not entirely friendly. The Afghans collected round the English force in considerable strength, and looked very threatening. On the 7th, as it appeared that a night attack was intended, General Roberts thought it wiser to choose his own time and method of fighting, and he therefore fell upon them in three columns, and cut them to pieces. As the Afghans retreated, Major Stewart, with a detachment of the 5th Punjaub Cavalry, charged upon a large number of them, and routed them with heavy loss. On the English side the casualties were very few, including only two men killed, whilst the number of killed amongst the Afghans was very large. General Roberts has been blamed for his conduct on this occasion; and indeed some accounts have represented the affair as a simple butchery, barely relieved by self-defence on the Afghan side. Mr. Macpherson, the correspondent of the "Standard," sent home a graphic account of the engagement, thereby giving offence to certain of the authorities; and he was soon afterwards sent to the rear, whilst the general appointed his aide-de-camp to furnish the "Standard" with information! Of course the editor of this paper declined to make use of these letters; but the government felt it necessary to ask General Roberts for an explanation of his conduct in expelling representatives of the press from his camp.

The same general soon afterwards incurred a certain amount of criticism in England by the haste which he displayed in detaching the Afghan chiefs from their allegiance to the ameer and declaring to them that they would thenceforth be subjects of her Majesty. As it was certain that the general would not have ventured



on this step without authority, the annexationist policy of the English government was now considered to be admitted.

As to the nature of this policy, the "Times" had some valuable observations, which may be quoted with advantage :—

"On the 26th of December, General Roberts, in full durbar at the Kuram Fort, formally announced to the assembled chiefs the annexation of the valley by the British, and informed them that they were henceforth to look to the Empress of India as their sovereign, for the rule of the ameer had passed away for ever. Thus the plans foreshadowed by Herbert Edwardes and Peter Lumsden a quarter of a century ago have become realised, and the Kuram district incorporated with the Indian empire.

"In the old days of the Durani monarchs the Afghan district of Kuram embraced the three adjacent valleys of Kuram, Khost, and Dawar. It was bounded on the north by the Sufaid Koh, on the west by well-defined ranges leading from the Peiwar Hill to the Pir Ghul in Vaziri territory, on the south by the Razmak range, and on the east by the plains of Bunnoo. According to the notes just published by Mr. James Wyld, as an accompaniment to his very valuable map of Central Asia and Afghanistan, these valleys were fairly easy of access from Cabul. Kuram was entered by the route now well known to all *via* the Shutar-Gardan and Peiwar Passes; from the eastern foot of the Peiwar a road practicable for caravans ran in a south-easterly direction to the government fort in Khost. Dawar was entered by a road through Urghunj from Ghuzni.

"The news we have recently heard that General Roberts is about to enter Khost at the head of a brigade confirms the views we have always insisted on as to the necessary occupation of that valley, and points to the fact that the Kuram district, when annexed to the British dominions, will not designate merely the valley of the Kuram river, but will embrace the wider tract from the Sufaid Koh to the Vaziri Hills, from north to south measuring about seventy-five, from east to west sixty-five miles. The total population

numbers about one hundred and twenty thousand souls. Sir Herbert Edwardes, who wrote with a most graphic pen, gave a brilliant account of the Kuram Valley, with its smiling green fields and pleasant orchards, through which the stream, clear and crystal as the snows from which it draws its life, followed its tortuous course. The chief crops of Kuram are rice, wheat, cotton, and barley; the fruits are apples, pomegranates, walnuts, melons, quinces, apricots, and grapes; the vegetables, pumpkins, melons, cucumbers, carrots, and turnips.

"More than one high Indian authority in days gone by, when the rectification of the frontier was not the question of the moment, has advocated the acquisition of the valleys of Khost and Kuram, and locating there a force of from four thousand to five thousand men. It was then argued that by taking charge of these districts we could afford to pay the revenues to support the ruler of Cabul, and thus relieve him of the burden of keeping up the military force required in the valley. The advantage of such an occupation would be that it would place us in close proximity to Cabul and Ghuzni, and would enable us, should war subsequently break out, to move rapidly on the capital of Afghanistan. It is further advantageous, inasmuch as our presence in alliance with the existing government would give it an immense moral and physical support. Without crossing any chain of mountains—for it must be remembered that the road from Kohat to the Peiwar is over a level country—we secure a position which would prevent any Power from contemplating the advance of an army by either the Kyber or the Gomal, for the flanks and rear of such a force would be directly exposed to our attacks from Kuram or Dawar. Turning to the commercial aspect of the case, it may be assumed that the Povindah caravans, instead of following the lengthy route from Ghuzni *via* the Gomal Pass and Dera Ismail Khan to the railway at Chichawatni, exposed for upwards of two hundred miles to the attacks of the Vaziris, would prefer the shorter route through Kushi, and the Kuram to

the rail at Rawal Pindi. The greater portion of the road would run through our territory, and would be consequently safe. The one hundred miles from the Shatar-gardan to Ghuzni is Ghilzai country, and as many of their clans are Povindahs, their hostility need not be dreaded.

Of Khost but little is known, except that its people are much given to agriculture, are somewhat fanatical, opposed to the Durani rule, and the country is very fertile. It is believed that no Englishman has visited it. Dawar is an extensive and fertile valley about fifty miles in length, and from three to twelve in breadth. It is watered by the Tochi stream, which, rising in the Jadran hills to the west, flows the entire length of the valley; it enters our territory about ten miles south-west of Bunnoo, and there takes the name of the Gambila. The soil is a rich loam, and is highly cultivated, the principal crops being rice, wheat, barley, Indian corn, and sugar cane; the value of the annual harvest is estimated at a lac of rupees. Forage and firewood are also abundant. The people of the valley have more than once expressed a desire to be placed under British protection; but during the treaty negotiations of 1855 Dost Mahomed's envoy urged that the valley had once formed a part of the Durani empire, and that he now wished to assume sovereignty over it. In spite of the opposition of Major John Nicholson, the viceroy acceded to Dost Mahomed's request, and Dawar consequently was recognised a part of Afghanistan. In 1870 the Dawaris made themselves obnoxious by giving shelter to a section of Vaziris who were in open arms against the British, and, as they refused to surrender the insurgents or to pay the fine imposed on them by the political authorities for their contumacious conduct, a force under Brigadier-General C. P. Keyes, C.B., moved rapidly into their valley, and stormed their principal village, when the headmen tendered their submission and paid the fines. The village of Haidar-khel was burnt as a further token of our displeasure. From what was seen of the valley during this expedition it was conjectured to be one of the richest strips

of territory bordering our frontier, and it will financially as well as strategically prove a valuable acquisition."

Questions on the subject of General Roberts's action were put and answered in Parliament. The government then admitted, in so many words, that they did not intend to restore to the ameer, or to any other ruler at Cabul, the portions of Afghanistan territory which had been occupied. The advance of the three columns represented so much annexation; the new "scientific frontier" of India was an accomplished fact.

Meanwhile, in the first week of December, the ameer's reply to Lord Lytton's last despatch, which ought to have reached the viceroy by the 20th of November, actually turned up. It was delivered at Dakka, where Major Cavagnari was, on the 2nd of November; but the delay was accounted for in a very simple manner. Mr. Forbes telegraphed from Lahore on Saturday, the 7th of December, as follows:—

"Extraordinary tidings have reached us, the outcome of which it is impossible to prognosticate. The substance of a letter from the ameer has been received at the front, and telegraphed to the viceroy. First, let me recite the professed history of the letter. It bears date the 19th ult., and it is said that the bearer, the ameer's aide-de-camp, reached the vicinity of Ali Musjid on the 21st ult. during the fighting, and scared thereat returned in haste to Cabul. The ameer was very angry, and re-despatched the letter, the contents of which the viceroy has now received. The ameer professes to have no quarrel with the British Power. On the contrary, he is full of friendliness, and willing to receive a mission, which must be, however, limited to twenty people. There are other stipulations, and the general tone is sullen, and wanting in courtesy. Whether the story of the letter's vicissitudes be true, or invented as an excuse for the ameer's yielding in the face of force, is a matter of conjecture."

On the next day, the same writer continues:—"The translated text of the ameer's letter



will first be published in England, but a *précis* was officially communicated for publication last night.

It is a question of taste whether, in an official communiqué, an explicit expression of belief, that the ameer is a liar and a knave, is seemly or dignified. The external evidence in proof of such an aspersion seems defective, while the internal evidence is dead opposed. The story told by the emissary who brought the letter to Dakka on 30th ult. is the following:—He left Cabul on the 19th. At Jellalabad, *en route*, he heard tidings of the Ali Musjid reverse. Conceiving that the event might alter the views of the ameer he left, according to his own story, the letter at Jellalabad, hastened back to Cabul and reported himself to the ameer. He states that the ameer, angry at his return, ordered him off immediately to take up the letter left at Jellalabad, and convey it to Major Cavagnari at Dakka.

“The internal tone of the ameer’s communication seems scarcely to bear out the hypothesis that the writer had knowledge of an important disaster. It has rather the flavour of apprehension than the consciousness of an inflicted blow. Information reached the viceroy on the morning of the 2nd instant of the delivery of the letter at Dakka; but the letter, being addressed to Major Cavagnari, was not opened till the return of that officer to Dakka on the 3rd instant. A *précis* of the contents reached Lahore on the 4th instant, and, being immediately telegraphed to England, it follows that the Cabinet were possessed of this important information prior to the delivery of the queen’s speech, and were conscious of the unreal, if not farcical character which ignorance of its tenor imparted to the subsequent debates.

“There is so little expression in the ameer’s letter of any willingness to comply with the viceroy’s specified demands that, had it been received before the actual commencement of hostilities, it would not have caused their arrestment or postponement; *a fortiori* its tardy receipt will have no direct influence towards the

modification of active operations. These will proceed, it is possible, indeed, with greater activity on account of the manifestation of Afghan irresolution. Efforts will be directed to acquire as much as possible in hand, while as yet the condition of non-submission endures; and you may take as assured the continuation of General Browne’s advance to Jellalabad. The small temporary mission, the ameer expresses himself willing to accept, is specified in the letter as twenty or thirty persons.”

The ameer’s reply to the ultimatum was found to be in the following terms:—

“Be it known to your excellency, that I received and read from beginning to end the friendly letter which your excellency has sent in reply to the letter I despatched by Nawab Gholan Hussan Khan.

“With regard to the expressions used by your excellency in the beginning of your letter, referring to the friendly character of the mission, and the good-will of the British government, I leave it to your excellency, whose wisdom and justice are universally admitted, to decide whether any reliance can be placed upon good-will if evidenced by words only; but if, on the other hand, good-will really consists of deeds and actions, then it has not been manifested by the various wishes that have been expressed and the proposals that have been made by British officials during the last few years to officials of this God-granted government; proposals which, from their nature, it was impossible for them to comply with.

“One of these proposals referred to my undutiful son, the ill-starred wretch Mahomed Yakoub Khan, and was contained in a letter addressed by the officials of the British government to the British agent then residing at Cabul. It was written in that letter that, if ‘the said Yakoub Khan be released and set at liberty, our friendship with the Afghanistan government will be firmly cemented, but that otherwise it will not.’

“There are several other grounds of complaint of a similar nature, which contain no evidence

of good-will, but which, on the contrary, were effective in increasing the aversion and apprehension already entertained by the subjects of this God-granted government.

"With regard to my refusal to receive the British mission, your excellency has stated that it would appear from my conduct that I was actuated by feelings of direct hostility towards the British government. I assure your excellency that, on the contrary, the officials of this God-granted government, in repulsing the mission, were not influenced by any hostile or inimical feelings towards the British government, nor did they intend that any insult or affront should be offered; but they were afraid that the independence of this government might be affected by the arrival of the mission, and that the friendship which has now existed between the two governments for several years might be annihilated. A paragraph in your excellency's letter corroborated the statements which they have made to this government.

"The feelings of apprehension which were aroused in the minds of the people of Afghanistan by the mere announcement of the intention of the British government to send a mission to Cabul, before the mission had actually started or arrived at Peshawur, have subsequently been fully justified by the statement in your excellency's letter, that I should be held responsible for any injury that might befall the tribes who acted as guides to the mission, and that I should be called upon to pay compensation for any loss they might have suffered; and that if at any time those tribes should meet with ill-treatment at my hands, the British government would at once take steps to protect them.

"Had these apprehensions proved groundless, and had the object of the mission been really friendly, and no force or threats of violence used, the mission would, as a matter of course, have been allowed a free passage, as such missions are customary and of frequent occurrence between allied states.

"I am now sincerely stating my own feelings when I say this government has maintained,

and always will maintain, the former friendship which exists between the two governments, and cherishes no feeling of hostility and opposition towards the British government.

"It is also incumbent upon the officials of the British government that, out of respect and consideration for the greatness and eminence of their own government, they should not consent to inflict any injury upon their well-disposed neighbours, and to impose the burden of grievous troubles upon the shoulders of their sincere friends; but, on the contrary, they should exert themselves to maintain the friendly feelings which had hitherto existed towards this God-granted government, in order that the relations between the two governments may remain on the same footing as before; and if, in accordance with the custom of allied states, the British government should desire to send a purely friendly and temporary mission to this country, with a small escort not exceeding twenty or thirty members, similar to that which attended the Russian mission, this servant of God will not oppose its progress."

## CHAPTER XXVIII.

### THE RUSSIAN REPULSE.

OF course Shere Ali's letter came too late to have any effect upon the viceroy, or the home government. Meanwhile great events were in train, and by the middle of December, news arrived that the ameer had quitted his capital, taking with him his wife, family, and attendants, and a considerable amount of treasure. For some time past he had been known to be in a desperate condition, unable to induce the nation as a whole to make war on the English, and utterly disappointed in his hope of Russian assistance. He now fled to Balkh, in the company of the remaining members of the Russian mission. He expressed the intention of visiting Europe, or at least St. Petersburg, in order to



put his quarrel with England before the governments of the west.

Before he left Cabul, Shere Ali set his son, Yakoob Khan, at liberty; and the latter, cruelly as he had been treated by his father, seems to have remained loyal to him as long as he lived. He did his best to strengthen and encourage the army, urging the generals to carry on the war for the defence of the country; but in this he had no success.

The ameer proceeded to Mazar-i-Sherif, on the Oxus, opposite to Tashkend, and there awaited a message from General Kauffmann, in regard to his intended journey. The Russian general had to telegraph to Prince Gortschakoff for instructions; and he soon found that he had gone too far in the matter to please his friends at home. The Russian government had their hands full in Europe, and were just now anxious to be on good terms with England. Therefore General Kauffmann's intrigues were disowned; and there was nothing for it but to confess to the Afghans that the czar would give them no help against England.

We have already seen something of the Russian plot in Afghanistan; and a few further particulars may here be added, in order to make the subject clearer. At the very time when Shere Ali was vainly appealing to the Russians, the St. Petersburg "*Golos*" published a letter, dated Cabul, Oct. 13th, describing the cordial reception of the Russian embassy, and the progress of the negotiations between the mission and the ameer, which (so the writer states) terminated in the conclusion of a convention between Russia and Afghanistan. The convention related to the administration of Afghanistan generally, to the question of the succession to the Afghan throne, and to the recognition, on the part of Russia, of the existing *regime*. No offensive and defensive alliance was concluded, but Russia bound herself to support morally the integrity and independence of Afghanistan. The ameer had asked General Stolietoff for advice regarding the reception of the English mission. General Stolietoff replied in an evasive manner,

but gave the ameer to understand that the simultaneous presence of embassies of two countries which were almost in hostile relations would be inconvenient. The ameer then decided to refuse the English mission.

When General Stolietoff was recalled, with part of the Russian mission, General Rasgonoff was left behind; and there were many who suspected that Russian officers, if not Rasgonoff himself, assisted the Afghans at Ali Musjid and Peiwar Khotal.

The "New York Herald" was represented at Tashkend by M. de Woestyne, who sent several very interesting accounts of conversations which he had held with the Russians. The following is his account, in the American style, of an interview with General Kauffmann, dated Tashkend, January 2nd:—

"Arrived here on Monday. Breakfasted with General Kauffmann. Was present on Tuesday at a farewell interview between him and four emissaries of the ameer. Kauffmann categorically declared that the czar absolutely refused to intervene in the affairs of Afghanistan. They left immediately, and on the 15th of January will rejoin the ameer at Mazaricheriff. I dined with Kauffmann the same day. The following is a summary of the conversation I had with him on the affairs of Afghanistan:—

"Question: I desire to go to Babour. Will you give me facilities?

"Answer: Useless. Events have progressed during your journey. The ameer has quitted Cabul, leaving his son to negotiate with the English.

"Question: Then the war is at an end?

"Answer: No, for the ameer may disavow his son's acts, although of all Asiatics I have met he is the least untruthful.

"Question: Why should he disavow the son's acts?

"Answer: To recommence the war, which is very heavy for the English—too cold in winter, and the heat insupportable in summer. Results absolutely *nil* up to the present, for the English only gained thirty miles of territory, and that

owing to the money given to the mountaineers, Afghan tribes who would fall upon them at the first reverse.

“Question : Do you believe the English will experience reverses ?

“Answer : They have experienced several already, which have been concealed by their journals. I myself am ignorant of them, for news by way of England only reaches me fifteen days before direct information from Cabul through General Rasgonoff. For instance, the last letter from the ameer that you see there says that ‘in my last engagement the English were victorious on the second day only, after a complete defeat the first day.’ The fact was carefully concealed by the English journals.

“Question : How does it happen the English were beaten the first day and victorious the second ?

“Answer : By bad generalship, the ameer had scattered troops, to have some everywhere ; consequently they were in force nowhere. Thus, in the last battles, the English having sixteen battalions, had only to fight, on one occasion, four Afghan battalions, and on another five, and although the English would have been beaten the first day if the troops had not been scattered, the ameer, having at his disposal ninety battalions, would have had immediate reinforcements, and the English checks would have become disasters. This is unfortunate for the Afghans. They are excellent soldiers, but wretchedly commanded.

“Question : It is rumoured in Europe that the Afghans are directed by Russian officers ?

“Reply : I learned that by Lord Loftus saying at the Chancellerie in St. Petersburg that the ‘Journal de Caboul’ had announced the arrival of my aide-de-camp. To that I replied I had been long in relations with the ameer through a native horseman, whom the ‘Cabul Journal’ mistook for my aide-de-camp.

“Question : To return to the war. What’s the actual situation ?

“Reply : The ameer has left his son at Cabul, and retired north four hundred and fifty miles,

as far as Mazaricheriff, close to our frontier. The last letter received from him, dated the 9th, announced that he would quit Cabul in a couple of days. He arrived at Mazaricheriff probably on the 31st, and was to write here immediately. I shall know his intentions about the 15th, and would advise you, therefore to delay your departure, so as to learn with certainty the residence of the ameer. You would lose nothing by the delay, for you can keep informed of all the events occurring in Afghanistan through General Rasgonoff, who was kept waiting whilst the Afghan ambassador was taking his leisure at Tashkend. Rasgonoff was literally a prisoner, and I have still to learn whether, notwithstanding the departure of the ameer from Cabul, Rasgonoff will be permitted to return. The Afghans are very susceptible, and do not like to have witnesses to their disasters. It is possible, again, that they would receive you badly, perhaps imprison you. Who would say, then, when you would be permitted to return ? European influence is powerless there now, the more especially as I have just declared that Russia will not intervene. I own this duty was very painful to me.

“Question : The embassy that came to solicit your aid is to leave to-day. I should like to follow it.

“Reply : I thought of it during the conference, but observing the manner with which my refusal was received, I renounced the idea. I declare to you I should feel it my duty to prevent your departure. Acting in the interest of your journal, your mission would be a failure if you could not correspond with it.

“Question : To sum up. The Afghans are beaten, the English are victorious. Will they not advance ?

“Reply : No ; in order to avoid disasters such as occurred to them in 1842.

“Question : And should the Afghans violate the treaty made by Yakoob Khan, where will be the solution ?

“Answer : There will be none, for the ameer recommencing a war difficult and almost impos-



sible for the English, the latter can derive no more advantage from it than they have obtained at present, and that is—absolutely nothing.”

The same correspondent wrote on the 5th :—

“Kauffmann has received from Cabul a letter from Rasgonoff announcing the following facts:—Rasgonoff has left Cabul with the ameer and all his battalions for the Russian frontier. On leaving, the ameer sent letters to all the English generals, saying he had left powers with his son, Yakoob Khan, who refused to negotiate, and that he was on his way to St. Petersburg to submit his differences with England to the emperor. Kauffman telegraphed to Gortschakoff for instructions, in the event of the ameer crossing the frontiers. Up till to-day reply not arrived. Kauffmann has advised the reception of the ameer. Rasgonoff also states that, wherever the English have passed in Afghanistan, they have distributed money to the natives at the rate of six dollars to each male and female.”

The unfortunate ameer stayed at Mazarichriff until his death, which occurred in the early spring. This unexpected end to the career of the ill-fated son of Dost Mahomed was ascribed to a gangrene, for which he had been treated by the Russian doctor accompanying the mission, as well as by native doctors. The event was followed by slight disorders, which ended in the establishment, at all events for a time, of the authority of Yakoob Khan.

England's difficulties were not greatly lightened by the death of Shere Ali. It became necessary for us to decide whom we would favour for the throne of Cabul, the occupant of which must, of course, be one on whose friendship we might count. The following comprehensive estimate of the situation, written after the ameer's flight, but before his death, is from the “Daily News”:—

“We do not now know who is the actual person in authority at Cabul, nor whether any person possesses any authority at all. We can make no settled treaties, and enter into no regular agreements. If we hold negotiations with Yakoob Khan, his father may refuse to acknow-

ledge the validity of the prince's acts, and may induce the Russians to embrace his cause. If we try to make terms with the fugitive ameer himself, the sirdars and people of Afghanistan may disown his right to rule over them, and may propose some new sovereign of their own. Whatever claimant we recognise as ameer, we shall find equal difficulties beset our path, and we shall be lucky if we escape the perilous attempt to place a feudatory of England upon the throne of Cabul in the face of Afghan opposition, which cost us so dear in 1842. In fact success has been almost more dangerous for Lord Beaconsfield's Cabinet than failure, because it lays upon their shoulders the awkward burden of finding a stable government to replace that which they have so recklessly shattered to pieces. Accordingly, it becomes worth while to review the position of the various princes who may possibly lay claim to succeed the fugitive Shere Ali, should his flight be really equal to an abdication in the eyes of his own people and of the British authorities, who will become the *de facto* arbiters on their supposed rights.

“The Afghan kingdom, as it stands at the present day, is a mere fragment of the old Durani empire of Ahmad Shah. That great military leader, the destroyer of the Mahratta power in India, and therefore the indirect founder of our present British dominion over the territories of the Moguls, belonged to the Sadozai tribe or family, and was chosen as ruler by the Afghan chiefs after the murder of Nadir Shah, in 1747. It is necessary to go thus far back into the origin of the now exiled dynasty in order properly to comprehend their relations with the present reigning house. The family of the Sadozia continued to reign, first at Candahar and then at Cabul, for nearly a century. Timur Shah, the son of Ahmad, died in 1793, and left twenty-three sons, a fairly large family even for an Oriental Prince with an unlimited right to espouse as many wives as suits his fancy. The brothers did not agree among themselves, and the usual fraternal quarrels took place between them for the sovereignty. In the general scram-

ble, Zaman Mirza, the fifth son, first succeeded in establishing his authority after the loose Afghan fashion, and he was followed in rapid succession by his two brothers, Shah Soojah and Mahmood. Under these rulers the Barakzai family, to which Shere Ali belongs, held all the real power, being a kind of Eastern mayors of the palace to the fainéant Sadozai rulers. But in an evil hour Mahmood, dreading the power of his minister, Futteh Khan, the head of the Barakzai brethren, entrapped him to his tents by stratagem, and put him to a most cruel death. Blood-feuds are always strong amongst the Pathan race, and the brothers of Futteh Khan rose into open rebellion, to avenge their kinsman's murder. They drove the Sadozai royal family into Herat, usurped the supreme authority for their own house, and divided the remainder of the kingdom among themselves. Ghuznee fell to Dost Mahomed, the most famous and most energetic of the twelve; for the Barakzai family boasted originally at least thirteen sons, besides an unknown number of daughters, the latter personages being of but little account in an Eastern harem. The hill tribes, however, remained staunch in their adherence to the old royal house of the Sadozai, and especially, after the fashion of the hillmen, to the highest bidder, who happened in this case to be the luckless Shah Soojah.

"Dost Mahomed gradually got into his own hands all the power of the Barakzai family, and became sole ruler of what remained of the old Durani empire. For the Sikhs or others had all this time been filching away bit by bit of the Indian dominions from the divided sovereigns of Cabul; so that at last, after losing Cashmere, Sind, and the Punjaub, the conquest of Peshawur by Runjeet Singh, in 1823, restricted Dost Mahomed's territory to the present comparatively narrow limits of Afghanistan. The story of our subsequent interference in Afghan affairs, and our rash and inconsiderate espousal of the Sadozai cause in the person of Shah Soojah, does not need to be told again. Our attempt to seat the Sadozai prince on the

throne of Cabul proved an utter failure: we were unable to protect our candidate after placing him in the capital of his fathers, and a popular insurrection drove out our garrison and assassinated the unhappy Shah Soojah. His son, Shazada Shahpur, was titular king of Cabul for a few days after the father's murder, and he now resides at the British town of Loodiana, in the Punjaub, where he keeps up a sort of exiled court. As representative of the old Sadozai dynasty, Shazada Shahpur may be regarded as the Comte de Chambord of Afghan politics, the embodiment of the impracticable legitimist principle. His claim is not without historical interest, but it possesses, we may hope, little practical importance. He has no doubt certain aspirations of his own in reference to the throne; but he lives as a pensioner of the British government, and he is not likely to risk the loss of his only revenues by urging his supposed claim inopportunely. There is very little probability that any English Cabinet will burn its fingers again with the Sadozai family, and, although it would be hard to predict what measures a fanciful viceroy, with high-flown notions of royal right and imperial magnificence, might urge upon the home authorities, it is very unlikely that Lord Beaconsfield would so far mistake the temper of the English people as to repeat the blunders of 1842.

"Turning to the more practical claims of the Barakzai house we find some half-dozen possible pretenders to the throne within the family of Dost Mahomed itself. When the founder of the line died in 1863, he left as numerous a progeny as most of the other Afghan princes; but three of his sons especially demand notice from our present stand-point. Wherever polygamy exists, hereditary succession is always complicated by the question of the relative rank among the various wives; and Dost Mahomed wished one of his younger sons, the present or late Ameer Shere Ali, the first-born of his chief wife, to be his successor. Two sons by an elder wife, however, Mahomed Afzul Khan and Mahomed Azim Khan, disputed the succession with Shere



Ali Khan, and each of them held the throne for a while against him. Both these brothers are now dead; but Afzul Khan, the elder, has left one able and ambitious son, Abdul Rahman, who may be regarded as the most legitimate direct representative of the Barakzai line. Abdul Rahman's life has been passed in continuous opposition to his uncle, Shere Ali, whom he not unnaturally regards as a usurper. He has always found the chief support to his cause in the wild dependencies of Cabul which lie north of the Hindoo Koosh and the Paropamisus, and bear the name of Afghan Turkestan. Hence, in 1865, he marched against Cabul with a mainly Turcoman army, defeated his uncle in an open battle, and released his father, Afzul Khan, from the prison into which he had been thrown by Shere Ali. Further quarrels, however, arose between the various members of the successful party itself. Azim Khan ousted his brother Afzul from power, and Abdul Rahman was once more thrown into opposition. Opposition in Afghanistan is carried on with fire-arms, and after some side-play with Shere Ali, whom the nephew twice defeated in the interest of his other hostile uncle, Abdul Rahman broke entirely with Azim Khan, when the latter assumed the title of ameer on the death of Afzul. Retiring to Turkestan, the ostensible head of the Barakzai family saw Shere Ali recover the throne, and at last took refuge in Khiva. There he has endeavoured to interest the Russians in his favour, and he may now not improbably cast in his lot with the uncle whom he has so pertinaciously opposed, or endeavour to patch up a reconciliation on the term of being acknowledged as the ameer's successor.

"Shere Ali himself has left behind him two or three of his own descendants, with certain rather involved and dubious claims to the throne. His eldest and favourite son, Mahomed Ali, is long dead, having fallen in battle against the forces of Afzul Khan and Abdul Rahman in 1865; but a grandson, Ahmad Ali, still lives, being now a young man of about nineteen, which is a far more mature age amongst the Afghans than in European countries at the pre-

sent day. According to our ideas of primogeniture, Ahmad Ali has the best right to succeed of any among Shere Ali's sons or grandsons; but in accordance with Mahomedan law, the eldest-born of the chief wife, that is to say, the lady of highest rank in the harem, takes precedence over his elder half-brothers by inferior wives. Nevertheless, there are good grounds for believing that the ameer has lately regarded this representative of his favourite son, who lost his life fighting in his cause, as the best claimant to the succession, so far as his own intentions were concerned; though it must always be remembered that, even apart from revolution or foreign intervention, the mere wishes of a deceased ruler go for very little in settling the inheritance of the throne. Every vacancy by death or otherwise is the signal for a general scramble, in which he has the best right who hits the hardest, and keeps the most unscrupulously.

"Next to the son of Mahomed Ali would rank, in order of primogeniture, among the ameer's sons, Sirdar Mahomed Ibrahim Khan, who, however, never cut any remarkable figure in Afghan politics; a fact which perhaps speaks well both for his honesty and his good sense. His younger brother, Yakoob Khan, now a man of thirty, has always come more prominently forward in the affairs of Shere Ali, having been mainly instrumental, by courtesy at least, in bringing about the counter-revolution of 1867, which replaced the ameer in authority at Cabul. Three years later, however, when the ameer pitched upon Abdoollah Jan as his successor, Yaboob Khan, considering his services ill requited, broke into open rebellion, and attempted to seize the throne for himself. He was foolish enough, however, to yield to the promises and entreaties of his father, who cajoled the unhappy young man, then only just twenty-one, into surrendering at Cabul, and then at once flung him into prison. There he lay till the rapid march of events in the last few months compelled the ameer to release him, and finally to leave the reins of power—if such an expression can be ap-

plied to the loose overlordship of a Pathan community—in the hands of his injured son. Yakoob Khan has thus passed the nine best years of his manhood in prison; he is currently reported to have suffered both in mind and body from his long and rigorous confinement; and he is hardly likely, in any case to have very clear or wise views as to the relations of Afghanistan with the English and the Russian governments respectively.

“Abdoollah Jan, mentioned above as the original stone of stumbling over which Yakoob Khan fell, was, according to Mahomedan custom, the rightful heir of the ameer. Though much younger than his brothers, he was the son of the wife of highest rank, the daughter of Meer Afzul Khan, himself a member of the Barakzai family. After Yakoob Khan's revolt, the ameer selected this favourite son as his successor, and formally announced the fact to his sirdars in 1873.”

Meanwhile Sir Samuel Browne had been making all necessary dispositions for the advance of his column on Jellalabad, the town which had been held so gallantly, thirty-five years before, during the disastrous defeat of the English column in its retreat from Cabul. He advanced about the middle of December, reached Basawul on the 17th, Ali Baghan on the 19th, and Jellalabad on the 20th. It was at this moment that the flight of the ameer from Cabul was credibly reported to Major Cavagnari, the political officer who had accompanied General Browne's headquarters. At the same time came information of the death of the Mir Akhor, the Afghan master of the horse, who had been regarded by the English as one of the most formidable generals opposed to us.

A correspondent writing from Basawul to the “Daily News” mentions some of the first rumours from Cabul, showing the reluctance of the Afghans to fight the English, and the consequent difficulties of the ameer. He says:—

“The party of Ghoorkas and the mountain battery which left here to *avenge* the death of the grass-cuts (*‘grass-cut’* is a grass cutter; each

horse has such a man, who goes out to cut grass for it; the word is always pronounced as here given) and the sowars, mentioned in a previous letter, were joined at Dakka by a detachment of the 17th Regiment (*‘Queen’s’*). The whole were put under the command of General Tytler, and were on the march among the hills all Monday, and on Tuesday morning they came upon a village, which, with the exception of some few fowls, two calves, and an old woman, was empty. This village was burnt, and two of its towers having been blown up with gunpowder, they returned to Dakka, the Ghoorkas and guns coming back here again.

“*‘Bazaar gup’* means, as near as can be, what we at other times express by the word *‘shaves.’* It is the gossip of the market place, and may be as idle and unreliable as gossip usually is, or it may turn out to be very near the mark. In India it very often occurs that the people in the bazaar know of important events before the officials receive the news. One bit of *‘gup’* from bazaar came in the other day. It was from a traveller from Cabul, who reports that Shere Ali was wanting the people to fight for him, but they were saying in reply, “Why should you fight the English? They have been your friends; they gave you arms, ammunition, and money. You should make friends of them instead of enemies. If you fight with them they are certain to conquer. No, we don't want to fight the English.” And the feeling thus expressed on the part of the Afghans was so strongly given out that the ameer said he would leave Cabul and fly to Turkestan. Probabilities from being repeated in gossip often grow into accepted facts, and this is most likely the case in this instance, for it is one of the supposed ways by which Shere Ali may solve the difficulty at last; and when his case gets desperate, instead of giving in to us he may go over to his new friends, the Russians, and from that direction he might have the high satisfaction of acting the part of a thorn in our side for the remainder of his life. This arrangement might also suit the plans of the new rulers of the Khanates, to whom the



thorn might be a very useful instrument. The bazaar gup does not deal with the case thus far, but it has thus been speculated upon in higher regions, and the gup is only the echo of one of the guesses as to how the 'Afghan difficulty' may end."

Though the English frequently had to punish the thieves and marauders of the lawless country through which they passed, as in the case mentioned above, yet they received a great deal of kindness from the native populations. Thus the same correspondent continues:—"There is no news from the Kyber of stopping the commissariat or looting luggage. Those passing through from Dakka to Jumrood do so now in safety. At Besawul here one has no more idea of danger than you would have at Charing-cross or St. Paul's; indeed, less so, for we have here no Pickford's vans or cabs to make the crossings a matter of cautious movements. I had an experience of the friendly conduct of the people hereabouts the other day, on a visit made by a few of us to Pesh Bolak, a place estimated to be about seven miles from here. It is an important town or village, and is a centre of trade in this region, and it is interesting as the spot on which we quartered troops during the first Afghan war, remains of their occupation being still visible. Although we experience no danger, yet it would not be allowed for any one to go out seven miles into an enemy's country without an escort, so a small detachment of both infantry and cavalry were sent with us. The road from this place goes very nearly due west, and when we clear the hill close to the camp a very large plain extends before us. It is not exactly a plain, for it is not quite level; it ascends gently towards the Suffaid Koh range, and you soon find that it is nothing but a vast strata of water-worn boulders which have been swept down by the rains, and the conclusion is most evident that the streams do not invariably keep to their beds on such occasions, but have a wayward mode of rushing all over the ground, carrying these boulders with them. Over this stony slope there are a few shrubs and plants

growing; but they are very few, and nearly the whole way from our camp to Pesh Bolak might be described as a desert of stones. As we ride over this ground the Suffaid Koh range is right ahead, and prominently before us is the mass, which at this point seems the highest in the range, called Morgha. The natural translation of this word to an ear familiar to Hindostan would be 'The Cock,' but the natives here do not accept that as the meaning, but say that it signifies 'a ridge.' It is fourteen thousand, six hundred and eighty feet high, but there is another peak further to the east, not visible as yet to us, named Bahin Sikran, which is given as fifteen thousand six hundred feet. Pesh Bolak is a collection of villages, each with its walls and towers, and in approaching it any one who has seen Bologna would be struck with a certain amount of resemblance. The Appenines do not stand out so grandly as the Suffaid Koh range, still the one suggests the other in this case. On getting nearer, Pesh Bolak ceases to have any appearance of identity with the Italian city. The great mud walls and towers of each village, all standing out in light grey, suggests, on a nearer inspection, that they are new model prisons, or that they might be county workhouses, is an idea which would occur to any one. These towers are raised to command the fields of the villagers, as well as to flank the walls, for when the crops are about ripe sentries have to keep watch, jezails in their hands, to prevent pilfering of the crops by the people of the other villages. Each community is thus in a perpetual condition of war with its neighbours, and they have been so for ages back. A stream of some size passes through this collection of fortified villages, and on the eastern side they are Shinwaries, on the western Tajiks. The ruins of two towers were pointed out to us, one on each side of the stream, which has a broad stony bed at the place; and it was explained that the two tribes kept guard over each other from these towers, armed with the jezails, or usual long guns of the country. From this it will be seen that village is armed against village, and tribe

against tribe. Pesh Bolak is on the western side of the stream, and its population is Tajik. As we reached the door of the place the inhabitants began to pour out to look at us, and they brought us seats, and the khan, or chief, came and made his salaam. We sat there for some time in the centre of a considerable crowd of Pesh Bolakians, who watched every movement. Women in dark blue dresses could be seen in the distance, equally intent on seeing how we were dressed, and what we did. We were told that the khan had ordered food to be got ready for us, and in a few minutes tea and boiled eggs were produced. After helping ourselves to this refreshment we proposed going to see the old cantonments which our troops had occupied in the former Afghan war, but we were told that more food was being prepared for us. As we did not like to appear as slighting their hospitality, we proposed that we would make our visit, and that the food would be ready when we came back. The place was only about half a mile further on to the west, and four mud walls, with the usual towers at each corner, exactly similar to the other villages, was the spot pointed out to us which had been the quarters for the troops; and in a field near there still stands a bit of mud wall which was used by them as a rifle-butt. There was a Major Ferris who commanded, and when he was threatened with an attack by the Shinwaries and evacuated the place, the proceedings had been evidently done in such haste that he forgot to bring off his sister with him, and she had taken refuge at last in an oven, where she was found by the Shinwaries. A ransom of Rs.500 was ultimately paid for her. On our return we found some more food ready, and stopped just to taste it, after which we made our salaam to the khan, and rode back to Basawul. This slight account of our trip will give some notion of the feelings of the native population in the region around Jellalabad. This is not an isolated case; officers going to other villages have had similar treatment."

General Browne had heard beforehand that

Jellalabad was evacuated by the Afghans; and accordingly his entry into the town on the 20th of December was quiet in the extreme. Here the English were destined to remain many weeks, whilst negotiations proceeded with the authorities at Cabul. A number of Afghan chiefs made their submission, and friendly assurances were received even from the sirdars in the capital; but Yakooob Khan steadily declined to accept the terms proffered to him by Major Cavagnari. In the meantime, the officers and soldiers continued for the most part inactive.

On the 1st of January, the queen's proclamation as Empress of India was commemorated, and the ceremony is described by a correspondent in the following paragraph:—

"We have had a parade of all the troops, in order to commemorate the queen's new title of the Empress of India, which was proclaimed on the 1st January, two years ago, at Delhi. It has been ordered that a parade of the troops at each station in India is to be held on the first day of the year, in order to remind the people of India that the queen is an empress. The whole force here turned out in the morning, and were drawn up in line close to the camp on the south. There were in all, about three thousand men under arms, and they made a goodly show extending away on each side, almost disappearing in the horizon at each end. General Sir Samuel Browne and staff rode up to the saluting post a little after 11 A.M., when a royal salute of thirty-one guns was thundered over the plain of Jellalabad. It may be necessary to explain that some rajahs are entitled to twenty-one guns, hence the reason that a royal salute is now in India extended to ten guns more. After this, Sir Samuel Browne called out, and the word was passed along the line, to give three cheers for the queen. Sir Sam then took off his helmet and led with the 'Hip, hip, hip—Hurrah!' All the staff did the same, and the whole extended line of troops followed. The British 'hurrah' is foreign to the native troops, but some of them have picked it up, and can give it with good lungs and enthusiasm. On



this occasion the sound halted here and there, but was at last taken up; and the cheer from the Frontier Force Brigade—it being on the extreme left of the line—came over the plain to our ears as if it had been the echo of the first great shout. After this came the march past, and every one returned to camp.

“At two o’clock a *darbar* was held, also, as officially explained, to commemorate the same day. This took place in Major Cavagnari’s large tent. The *kanants* at one end had been removed, and carpets extended outside, so as to accommodate the crowd. All the chiefs of the locality were collected, as well as their retainers; and a good sprinkling of native officers belonging to the Sikh and Punjaub regiments gave variety to the picturesque groups. As is usual on such occasions, the portion of the tent on the left-hand side was reserved for European officers, and this space was well filled with very various uniforms. General Sir Sam Browne arrived and took the central chair. General Macpherson sat on his left; while Major Cavagnari, as political agent of the government, sat first on the right; on his right, again, was the chair of Mr. Jenkins, assistant to Major Cavagnari. The chiefs were introduced to Sir Sam Browne, and presented their *nuzzers*; but, the political department not being able as yet to boast of a *Tosh-Khana*, the usual presents, or *killuts*, were not given in return. It was explained why this part of the ceremony had to be done without, for a *darbar* is not complete unless the *Cashmere shawls*, *khin-khob*, or cloth of silk and gold, and various articles, are presented to each person as an acknowledgment of their *killuts*. A long address had been prepared, which was repeated in English by Major Cavagnari, and then read out in *Farsee* to the *khans*, who watched the reader very attentively, as if careful not to lose a word of it. The matter was so far a repetition of Lord Cranbrook’s dispatch, and conveyed to many of those dusky chiefs the first glimmering of the avowed reasons for which the war has been made. If any of them have been converted by the many reasons and explanations

of the address, and have become *Jingoes*, they will have an advantage over the British *Jingo* when enforcing their arguments on those around—and that is, in their long and sharp *charras*, which come out on the slightest provocation in this lawless land. Sir Sam addressed the chiefs in *Hindustanee*, and expressed his satisfaction that so many had come in and acknowledged the authority of the government, and he could assure them that they would never suffer from ‘*zoolum*,’ or oppression, while under the sway of its representatives. This is all very well; but I should prefer not being one of these *khans* if *Shere Ali* or *Yakoob Khan*’s power should be restored again to this region. *Zoolam* would perhaps be a very mild thing in comparison with what these gentlemen might have to suffer.

“It is a significant fact that at the commemoration of the day on which the title of *Empress of India* was proclaimed, the title itself was officially ignored. At the parade General Sir Sam Browne did not call for three cheers for the *Kaiser-i-Hind*, but for ‘*The Queen*.’ Sir Sam Browne, from a long experience in India, is perfectly familiar with the language, but *Kaiser-i-Hind* is an outlandish word, and does not come familiar to his tongue, or to the tongue of any one in India. What astonished me still more was to hear, in the Persian version of the address to the *khans*, that *Kaiser-i-Hind* was not used, and in its place the old official *Malika-i-Mu’ Azzuma* was given.

The effect produced by the news of the *ameer*’s flight is indicated by the same correspondent:—

“Every one here is now satisfied that the war is at an end. For some time back news has been coming in that the troops of the *ameer*—or of *Yakoob Khan*, which is the same thing—are melting into air. On the 28th ultimo three men passed through *Jellalabad* going to their own homes. They had been soldiers of the *ameer*, and their regiment with three others had entirely broken up. According to their story *Yakoob Khan* had sent out money to pay up the regiments, but functionaries were sent after them to demand of the officers, before the

money was given, that they would answer for the fidelity and future services of the men after they were paid. To this the officers replied that they could only be answerable for their own fidelity, but not for that of the soldiers. On this the money was taken back to the treasury, and the four regiments at once dispersed. If the whole army of Cabul is not out of existence it must be very nearly so. Of course this has led to rumours that Yakoob Khan is coming in to treat for terms, and already some of the Indian papers announce that he has reached Jellalabad. If this is so, Cavagnari is keeping him carefully out of sight, and must intend some grand *coup de theatre* with him. In a letter from Basawul, dated 17th December, I gave, only as 'bazaar gup,' the rumour that Shere Ali had gone off to Turkestan. It now turns out that that was quite correct, and the 'shave' on this subject given in that letter must have been one of the first hints of the event. Major Cavagnari gives it that he left on December 16th. Some of the Indian papers put it on the 10th. If Major Cavagnari is right, and we may suppose he ought to know better than any one, a comparison of dates in this case will illustrate how quick a bazaar in this part of the world gets its intelligence. A London daily paper, with the telegraph at its command, could scarcely beat the above in procuring its news.

"Some men turned up here the other day from Herat. They had seen some of the Russians connected with the mission which Shere Ali took it into his head to honour. These men were giving their opinions of those Russians, and comparing them with ourselves, and the comparison is very flattering. They said that the Moscovs were 'bahut choxa'—that is, very little—and held their hands about the height of our shoulders above the ground, and said, 'ixna buira,' or as large as this. They were complimentary at the same time, and it would be as well not to place too much faith in this flattering tale.

"The Hindoos in Jellalabad say that if we had come in summer instead of winter, we

should have had a much harder fight with the population on each side of our line of march. Their explanation is this:—Had it been the warm season, all the families could have been sent into the mountains with grain and whatever of value could be carried off; and then the men would have been free and able to rise *en masse*. They could have harassed us in great numbers on all sides, and acted in a very different way from what they have done with their women and children at our mercy. The same people say that when the summer comes we may have to encounter this state of things. This theory has been propounded to some of the soldiers of the native regiments, through whom it has filtered to my ears. I do not believe in this danger, but, as the Hindoos who belong to this part of the world know the Mahomedan inhabitants much better than we do, I merely chronicle their opinions. Thieves have troubled the camp, and during the dark nights they carried off considerable booty, particularly from the tents of the 10th Hussars. The sentries had to be increased, and the other night a marauder came to grief. He was one of a gang who came creeping along with their shoes off, and the outer sentry allowed them to pass, and thus got them snared; however, they all got off, except one, who was so badly wounded that he died in about a quarter of an hour. This lesson has had its effect, for no more thefts have been reported, and the sentries have seen no more prowling about at nights.

"A number of reconnaissances have been made with the cavalry, but they have not been of much importance. An expedition under command of General Macpherson is an exception. He went off with a party to inspect the ground to see if a better road could not be got between this and Charden, the place two marches back from Jellalabad. On the north of the great stony plain we passed, on the march from Charden to Alybaghan, there is a range of mountains. We had to get round the west end of the range, but the Cabul river does not follow by that line; it flows through a gap at the east end, along which we knew there was a footpath



but not wide enough as a road for our army. It is nearer than the road we took by some miles, and it avoids the desolate plain, which is like a hot frying-pan in the summer months. Major Tanner, who is doing a most elaborate survey of this country as we go along, went with the party, and according to his account the gorge through which the river flows is called Girdi Kas, and the highway from Cabul at some former time passed through it. He found considerable remains of the ancient Badshah-i-Rah, or the imperial-road, constructed of masonry. It is still known to the natives under the name just given; but to what Badshah or date it belongs, Major Tanner has not been able as yet to settle. Neither can he speak with certainty whether it was a Delhi Badshah or a Ghuznee one who made such a good road. At the same place there are the remains of the old canal for irrigation, which is about forty feet above the road, and the tunnel still exists by which it passed under the end of the range of mountains; and, according to Tanner's account, as he has picked it up from the natives, by it the great stony plain was at one time irrigated and covered with cultivation. This bit of information is not at all to compare in interest to an account of a battle or the flight of Shere Ali Khan; but it will show what this country might become if it had a settled and enlightened government, and it will at the same time illustrate what I said—that there are evidences all round that the country has retrograded and fallen back from a higher civilisation to a lower one. For some days back there has been a demand for men to make hurdles, and a race-course is coming into existence somewhere on the north-east of the camp. We are to have steeple-chases, and games for the men are in the programme. Beautiful weather—no rain as yet, but still cold at nights. Trenching, to carry off the rain, is going on all over the camp."

Whilst the Kyber and the Kuram columns had been thus distinguishing themselves, the Quetta column, under General Biddulph, had not been idle. Its earlier movements were somewhat

delayed by the necessity of waiting for the advance of General Stewart, chief in command, who had been assembling a reserve division at Mooltan, and who hurried forward during the depth of winter, along a most difficult road with very creditable speed. General Biddulph, crossing the frontier on the 21st of November, moved upon Pishin without opposition, and pushed on in the direction of Candahar. This famous city was supposed to be strongly defended, and few expected that it would be easily taken. But the successor of the other two columns had so daunted the ameer's generals and troops that it became manifest, even before General Stewart had come to the front and assumed command, that no great stand would be made at this place.

On Jan. 8th Stewart was at Kushab, a short march from Candahar; and there he learned that the governor of the city, with most of the Afghan functionaries, had fled on the previous night towards Herat, after disbanding the troops. The deputy-governor sent in his submission to the English general, who at once arranged for his force to march through the city. This was accomplished on the 9th, the troops passing along the principal thoroughfares, and halting on the Ghazni road, at the other side of Candahar.

The natives were quiet on the whole, and submitted to the English occupation; but the fanaticism of a few gave us no little trouble. A day or two after the entry Major St. John was fired at, and Lieutenant Willis mortally stabbed, whilst walking through the streets. But practically, the work of General Stewart, like that of Browne and Roberts, was almost complete. Short of a march on Cabul there was little further for him to do. He did indeed send a strong detachment under General Biddulph to Girishk; but Candahar remained his head-quarters for a considerable time.

The general position of affairs towards the end of January is well defined in a letter from the "Times" correspondent at Calcutta, dated the 26th of the month, which at the same time will serve to summarise the results of the English invasion of Afghanistan.

"The mystery in which the intentions of the ameer and Yakooob Khan have so long been shrouded still continues. The hypothesis that the ameer never intended abdicating, and that Yakooob Khan has never possessed any independent authority, finds increasing favour. The latest accounts, now some eighteen days old, indicate that the ameer is, or at the date of the intelligence was, at Balkh. It is not likely that he ever seriously contemplated betaking himself as a refugee to Russian territory. As for the future, his intentions can at present only be conjectured. His present dubious attitude may be the result of a hope, not yet quite abandoned, and which his Russian friends may desire to keep alive, that he will yet be actively assisted by Russia. As for Yakooob Khan, the only sign he has lately given does not support the idea that he is actuated by a desire to approach the British government in an amicable way. He is reported to have taken advantage of the absence of certain Ghilzai chiefs who had gone to the British camp at Jellalabad to possess himself of one of their forts at Tozeen. The effect of this is likely to be to draw the Ghilzai chiefs more decidedly to our side. As repeatedly said, they have long been alienated from the ameer. They hate him, and know the fate which would probably await them if the ameer returned to Cabul with a Russian army at his back. No state of feeling could be more favourable to us.

"Notwithstanding some press rumours of an early advance of the Jellalabad force upon Cabul, no serious movement of the kind is probably contemplated. General Roberts is still sufficiently engaged in settling and conciliating the independent tribes on his left flank, and it is most unlikely that an advance of the Jellalabad force towards Cabul would be commenced without General Roberts' strenuous co-operation. Some small desultory movement in advance may indeed have been proposed, with the object of getting nearer the Ghilzai chiefs and encouraging them to take a pronounced part in our favour by securing some of the onward passes. Undoubtedly there is a general impression in the

best-informed quarters, that a strong brigade, boldly pushed forward, might enter Cabul without serious opposition on the part of the ameer's regular army, which, indeed, now hardly exists, while the people generally are friendly towards us. Would, however, the political game we are playing be advanced by such a move, even if it were entirely successful? Our object, it is understood, is to have a strong, neighbourly, but independent Afghanistan. Would a hasty move upon Cabul, and the downfall of the fabric of the Afghan government as it still exists, contribute to that end?

"Meantime General Stewart has despatched General Biddulph with an adequate force to occupy Girishk, on the Herat road, and secure the left flank. So much respect seemed due to the ten regiments at Herat which still adhere to the ameer's cause, though probably the apprehension on their part of an attack from Persia will suffice to keep them stationary there. General Stewart himself, after detailing a suitable garrison for Candahar, under Brigadier-General Nuttall, has marched towards Kalat-i-Ghilzai.

"The last letters received from Jellalabad report that the people there are quiet, but unwilling or unable to furnish supplies till the spring crops have been gathered. In the camp rain is now desired in the interest of future supplies for the army, but none has fallen. Indeed, the want of rain over the whole of Upper India, including the Punjaub and trans-frontier districts, is deplorable.

"Public opinion, perhaps, hardly gives full credit to Sir Frederick Haines, and his Adjutant-General, Lumsden, for the part they have played in planning and organising the present campaign. The viceroy's military council was weak in the military element at a very critical time. Sir E. B. Johnson, the military member, was invalided in England, and was temporarily succeeded by Sir Samuel Browne, a rough and ready general it is true, but with small experience as a councillor. Sir Samuel Browne's removal to a command in the field, brought in Sir Neville Chamberlain, than whom no safer or bet-



ter adviser could have been desired. His influence was at once beneficially felt, but meanwhile it is probable that some wild counsels had almost prevailed, and that we were in danger of beginning the campaign with forces which the result has shown would have been quite inadequate. It is in this respect that Sir Frederick Haines and General Lumsden have rendered such important service. The former had to play the unpopular part of demanding that the preparations for the campaign should be on a larger and more expensive scale than the viceroy and his civilian colleagues thought necessary. His firmness carried the day. General Lumsden, too, possessed the almost unique advantage of a personal knowledge both of a considerable part of Afghanistan, including the Kuram, and of the character and disposition of the chiefs and the people. It is probably, therefore, to him and to Colonel G. Pomeroy Colley, private secretary to the viceroy, that the conception of the strategical importance, in an advance upon Cabul, of the Kuram Valley, and of the possession of the Peiwar Ridge, is due. It is clear from the strenuous efforts he made for its defence—far greater than those put forth upon the side of the Kyber—that the ameer recognised in the Kuram route his most vulnerable point. There is now little doubt that the command of the Peiwar gives also virtual possession of several defensive positions within a range of thirty miles from that point up to the crest of the Shutar-gardan Pass. All of these can probably be turned in succession by a flanking movement directed either along the crest of Suffaid Koh, on the right, or along passable roads leading from the Khost Valley to Shutar-gardan on the left. The most unpractised eye will see by a glance at the map how completely the triple combined advance by the three columns from the Kyber, the Peiwar, and Candahar, must paralyse any resistance that the ameer can yet offer at Cabul. Much as every patriot must deprecate, in the true interests of England, such an advance, it is gratifying to think that, if necessity forces it upon us, the feelings of the Afghans are not likely to be embittered by a protracted sanguinary contest on Afghan soil.

tered by a protracted sanguinary contest on Afghan soil.

"Some injustice has been done to the government by the premature condemnation of its rejection of the project of a railway from Sukkur to Dadar. The problem was to get six months' supplies for the Candahar force forwarded to Dadar before the route was closed by the annual flooding of the Indus. This, it is expected, will be accomplished, but by camel carriage instead of in part by rail. With the time and means at disposal, the railway might, perhaps, have been carried about one-third of the way—say eighty miles; but even this could not have been relied on, and meanwhile it would have been imprudent to suspend the purchase or hire of a single camel. Financially, therefore, little would have been saved. It is, besides, quite possible that a better permanent route to Quetta may be found than through the Bolan Pass. Much is hoped for from the very direct route leading from Dera Ghazi Khan, *via* Chutiali to Peshin, through the country of the Cabul Pathans, who are subjects of the ameer. There is, however, no certainty that the use of this route would be unopposed. A second small war, engaging, perhaps, a large force of troops, while the present war with the ameer continues must not, of course, be risked. This explains the delay in utilising the Chutiali route. As showing, however, that the government is fully alive to the necessities of the case, it must be noticed that energetic means are being taken to open a totally new route from the sea at Sonmeanee Bay through Beloochistan to Quetta. This route, like the last, avoids the Bolan Pass, and has the further great advantage of affording an untouched supply of camel forage. Sir Richard Temple is on his way to Sonmeanee Bay, whither commissariat and political officers have already preceded him. The well-known energy of the former, and Major Sandeman's great influence with the Khan of Khelat, will probably succeed in make this route speedily available. The country which this route traverses is calculated to yield about eight thousand camels, and the transport of supplies

could probably be arranged by means of contracts entered into with the leading chiefs of the country.

"The latest accounts report that the seizure of the Ghilzai fort above referred to, which was accompanied by the capture of several of the chiefs' families, had so incensed the whole tribe that any of its members previously at Cabul have now left in company with all the Kohistanis. Active hostilities against Yakoob Khan have, it is further stated, actually commenced. Your special correspondent in the Khost telegraphs, under date the 23rd of January, that a cavalry reconnaissance, undertaken the day before to the west, could find no trace of the Mangals, who are collecting and threatening to attack our camp by night. The camp is in a strong, intrenched position, and should the attack come there is no doubt of the result. There are doubtful rumours of fresh Afghan troops coming to the Khost and the Peiwar. The weather is splendid, though some snow has fallen and the nights are cold. The health of the troops is good.

"Major Cavagnari reports that the Mir Akhor is dead, his body having been brought in for burial to Marhez. The Cabul troops have been removed from their usual quarters into the new cantonments at Sheralf, where it is supposed desertions will be more checked. The Besawal troops have made a small expedition against the Miyank-hel marauders, in which some cattle were captured. General Stewart reports that the road to Ghazni is apparently open, and that the people are friendly and bring in supplies."

At this point we may break off our narrative of the English conquest of Afghanistan. The rest is matter of familiar history; but that which has been recorded is all which need be said of the Afghan War as arising out of and connected with the Turko-Russian War. The policy pursued by Russia in 1877 drew us into the borderland which intervenes between our ancient possessions in India and the czar's new dominions in Central Asia. Our immediate interest in this "scientific rectification" of the north-western

frontier ceases at the point when Russian influence was excluded from Afghanistan by the policy of English statesmen and the valour of English troops.

The thoroughness of this exclusion is well signified by the diplomatic correspondence on the subject which passed between the Russian and English governments in the month of December, 1877.

On the 13th of that month, the Marquis of Salisbury wrote as follows to Lord A. Loftus, then the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, giving an account of a conversation he had had on the 10th December with Count Schouvaloff:—

"Count Schouvaloff mentioned to me, in the course of conversation on the 10th instant, that though the Russian envoy who had been sent to Afghanistan had been recalled to Russia, the Russian mission still remained at Cabul. I expressed great surprise at this statement, which was entirely new to me, and which I was convinced would be as new to my colleagues as to myself. I pointed out to him the untenable position taken up by the Russian government, who admitted that the despatch of a mission had been an infraction of the understanding existing between the two countries only justified by the probability of war, but who now continued to maintain the mission long after friendly relations had been fully re-established; and I earnestly urged upon him the expediency of withdrawing the mission, the continued presence of which was entirely at variance with the engagements which were still in force between England and Russia. His excellency admitted that the course followed by the Russian government was abnormal. He asked me whether I admitted that we had engaged to respect the independence of Afghanistan, basing his contention that such an engagement had been made by us upon the memorandum contained in Lord Derby's despatch to Mr. Doria of the 25th October, 1875. I said that all the engagements which we had taken, or which the Russian government had taken in that correspondence, I regarded as still binding; but I could not admit that the words



used by Lord Derby went so far as to make the maintenance of the independence of Afghanistan a matter of engagement on our part towards Russia. The discussion was renewed yesterday. His excellency intimated to me clearly that it was the intention of the Russian government forthwith to withdraw their mission. At the same time, he again asked me whether he might consider the understanding formerly arrived at with respect to Central Asia to be still in vigour; and whether we admitted that the recognition of Afghanistan as an independent state under British influence formed part of the understanding. He relied especially upon the language of the memorandum of 1875. I could only repeat that England would adhere to all the undertakings she had given. The memorandum did not, however, in our judgment bear the construction which he placed upon it, and therefore I could not admit that we were under any engagement with respect to the independence of Afghanistan; but he might perceive from the speeches of ministers in public, that the maintenance of Afghanistan, as an independent state under British influence, was the policy which at present we desired to pursue. Ultimately his excellency observed that it might be desirable to reduce the substance of our conversation to the form of a note; a course to which I replied that I saw no objection.—I am, &c.

(Signed) "SALISBURY."

As a result of this interview, Count Schouvaloff addressed the following note to Lord Salisbury:—

"My Dear Lord Salisbury—You have expressed surprise on learning that the Russian mission, which you thought had left Cabul, was still there. You reminded me of the declaration made by M. de Giers to the British Chargé d'Affairs concerning the provisional character of this mission, which

was despatched under exceptional circumstances, and at a time when it was to be feared that war might break out between England and Russia. I have received a telegram from Prince Gortschakoff, in which he charges me to ask you whether the arrangements between Russia and England, such as they existed before the despatch of the mission, and such as they are recorded in the correspondence exchanged on this subject between the two Cabinets, are maintained by her Majesty's government, and whether they retain in their eyes their obligatory character. His Majesty the Emperor is disposed, on his part, to observe all the arrangements relative to Central Asia concluded between Russia and England, and to recall immediately the mission which is at Cabul. (Signed) "SCHOUVALOFF."

The Marquis of Salisbury replied as follows:—

"Foreign Office, December 19, 1878.

"My Dear Count Schouvaloff—In reply to your letter of this day's date, I have to state to your excellency that the continued presence of the Russian mission at Cabul is the sole obstacle to a full revival of the understanding between the two Powers expressed in the correspondence which has passed between them upon the subject of Afghanistan and Central Asia; and when the Russian mission is withdrawn, her Majesty's government will consider that all engagements on both sides with respect to those countries retain their obligatory character.—I have, &c.

(Signed) "SALISBURY."

On the same day the Marquis telegraphed to Lord A. Loftus:—"I was informed to-day by the Russian Ambassador that instructions had been sent to the mission to withdraw from Cabul;" and thus the capitulation of Russia to England was complete.







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